Twenty-First Century Black Mayors, Non-Majority Black Cities, And the Representation of Black Interests

By Ravi Kumar Perry A.B., University of Michigan, 2004 A.M., Brown University, 2006

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science at Brown University

Providence, Rhode Island

May 2009

© Copyright 2009 by Ravi K. Perry

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This dissertation by Ravi Kumar Perry is accepted in its present form by the Department of Political Science as satisfying the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Date______Marion Orr, Ph.D., Advisor

Recommended to the Graduate Council

Date______James Morone, Ph.D., Reader

Date______Wendy Schiller, Ph.D., Reader

Date______Darrell West, Ph.D., Reader

Approved by the Graduate Council

Date______Sheila Bonde, Ph.D., Dean of the Graduate School

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CURRICULUM VITAE Ravi Kumar Perry

144 S. Fitzhugh St. Telephone: (401) 261-7395 Apartment #1 (585) 275-5149

Rochester, NY 14608 Email: [email protected]

Education

2005-current Ph.D. (Expected May 2009), Brown University, Political Science

Dissertation: “21st Century Black Mayors, Non-Majority Black Cities, and the Representation of Black Interests.”

The dissertation is an examination of the conditions under which Black mayors of non-majority Black cities actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents and examines the implications of two phenomena: demographic changes in many American cities that are steadily reversing the population dynamics that brought about the election of this nation’s first African-American mayors and how the election of a Black mayor is viewed by Black residents with high expectations and as a result as an opportunity to see city government work in their interests and to address inequities.

Committee Members: Marion Orr, Chair; James Morone, Wendy Schiller, Darrell West

2006 A.M., Brown University, Political Science

2004 A.B., University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, Political Science, with University Honors

Teaching and Research Interests

Urban Politics, African American and Minority Politics, Public Policy, Political Representation (African American, Ethnic Minorities), American Politics and Institutions, Contemporary Political Theory (modern political thought, liberalism and its critics)

Publications

Perry, Ravi. “Voting Rights Act of 1965.” Encyclopedia of African American Education. Forthcoming, October 2009.

Perry, Ravi. “Black Mayors in Non-Majority Black Cities: A Theoretical and Methodological Approach to their Study in the 21st Century.” Ethnic Studies Review. Forthcoming, Summer 2009.

Research in progress

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Perry, Ravi. “The Sociology and Politics of Applied Black Studies: An Analysis of the Applied Work of Selected 20th Century Political and Sociological Scholars.” Forthcoming, Fall 2009.

Teaching Experience

Visiting Instructor, Wheaton College, Norton, MA Spring 2008 PS 271: African American Politics This class focused on how the struggle for African Americans for full integration and empowerment has influenced the past and current American political environment; the shifting notion of 'community' within the African American experience post the Civil Rights era of the 1960s and development and diversity within the African American community.

Teaching Assistant, Brown University Spring 2008 Mass Media, Dr. Darrell West, Professor

Teaching Assistant, Brown University Fall 2007 African American Politics, Dr. Katrina Gamble, Professor Intro to the American Political Process, Drs. Roger Cobb and Wendy Schiller, Professors

Teaching Assistant/Section Instructor, Brown University City Politics, Dr. James Morone, Professor

Teaching Assistant/Section Instructor, Brown University Fall 2006 Introduction to Public Policy, Dr. Ross Cheit, Professor

Trained Inter-group Dialogue Facilitator, University of Michigan 2002-2004 Courses Taught: Men/Women, International Students/U.S. Students The Program on Inter-group Relations, Dr. Charles Behling & Monita Thompson, Instructors

Guest Lecture, University of Toledo Fall 2007 Introduction to Africana Studies Lecture Title: Constitution through post Civil War Legislation Regarding African Americans

Guest Lecture, Eastern Michigan University Fall 2007 African American Politics Lecture Title: Black Mayors: An Overview and Contemporary Challenges

Guest Lecture, Wheaton College Spring 2007 Urban Politics, Dr. Marcus Allen, Assistant Professor. Lecture Title: Deracialization and Urban Campaigns

Relevant Employment

Mayoral Fellow in the Executive Office of Providence, RI June-August 2006

Developed and implemented strategy related to new city ordinance on graffiti abatement and criminalization; worked with Community Relations and the Office vi

of Neighborhood Services to locate problem areas within the city that needed attention (missing/broken street signs, graffiti, road repair, etc).

Substitute Teacher, Ann Arbor Public School System, Ann Arbor, MI March-July 2005

Coordinated effective and safe educational interaction among students in grades 6-12. Repeatedly assigned to Forsythe Middle School as an instructor of social studies, language arts, and civics, upon teachers’ recommendations, due to positive feedback

Campaign Headquarters Coordinator, Mayor Jack Ford (D, Toledo) Dec. 2004-March 2005 Mayoral Re-Election Campaign, Toledo, Ohio

Daily operation of the office; coordinated volunteers and organized nightly meetings; phone services; key contact for the minority community; driver for the Mayor; photographer for the campaign. As the only paid campaign staff member at the time, my duties were multiple.

Yard Sign Director/Coordinator of Youth Volunteers at Lucas County May - August 2001 Democratic Party for the Jack Ford Mayoral Campaign, Toledo, Ohio

Organized, distributed, and assembled all yard signs for the Jack Ford Mayoral Campaign; coordinated youth volunteer recruitment for office staffing and rallies/marches; featured speaker at Get Out the Vote programs

Fellowships, Honors and Awards

Pre-Doctoral Fellowship 2008-2009 Center for the Study of African American Politics, University of Rochester

Byron Jackson Dissertation In Ethnic and Racial Politics Research Support Award 2008-2009 Urban Politics Section of the American Political Science Association

Finalist, Erksine Peters Dissertation Year Fellowship 2008 University of Notre Dame, Department of Africana Studies

The Phillips G. Davies Graduate Student Paper Award 2008 National Association of Ethnic Studies Conference, Atlanta, GA

Tuition Grant Award, University of Michigan 2007 Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Science Research (ICPSR) Summer Four Week Competitive Program/Workshop: “Methodological Issues in Quantitative Research on Race and Ethnicity”

Passed Comprehensive Exam in American politics with Distinction and was awarded 2007 $1,000 by the department. Also passed the exam in political theory

Fellow, Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences (S4), Brown University 2006-present

Summer Fellowship, Department of Political Science Brown University 2006 and 2007

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Sammy Younge Best Student Paper Award 2005 National Conference of Black Political Scientists

Pi Sigma Alpha, National Political Science Honorary Society 2004 University of Michigan

Bunche Center for African American Studies, University of California – Los Angeles 2003 Summer Humanities Institute, a 10-week Graduate School Preparation Program

Internship, Office of Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur (D-OH), Washington, D.C. 2002

Conference And Seminar Papers

April 2009, The Frederick Douglass Institute for African and African-American Studies, Work in Progress Seminar, The University of Rochester, Rochester, NY “Black Mayors’ Efforts in Black Communities of White Cities: White and Black Reactions”

April 2008, National Association of Ethnic Studies Conference, Atlanta, GA “Black Mayors in Non-Majority Black Cities: A Theoretical and Methodological Approach to their Study in the 21st Century.”

April 2008, Midwest Political Science Association Conference, Chicago, IL “21st Century Black Mayors, Non-Majority Black Cities and the Representation of Black Interests”

April 2008, Urban Affairs Association Conference, Baltimore, MD “21st Century Black Mayors, Non-Majority Black Cities and the Representation of Black Interests”

March 2008, National Conference of Black Political Scientists, Chicago, IL “21st Century Black Mayors, Non-Majority Black Cities and the Representation of Black Interests”

August 2006, Association of Black Sociologists Annual Conference, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. “Black in White: Deracialization and Black Mayoral Governance in ‘White Cities’”

June 2006, Brown University, Spatial Structures for the Social Sciences (S4), Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 1st Annual Summer Institute Mini-Conference “Looking at Wards: Ward and Census intersections of 6 black mayors elected in Ohio since 1999”

April 2006, University of Chicago “Eyes of the Mosaic” 13th Annual Minority Graduate Student Conference, Chicago, IL “Deracialization and Racial Tension in Ohio: A Spatial Analysis of the effects of campaign platforms and the inaugural election of two mayors”

April 2006, National Association of Ethnic Studies, San Francisco, CA “Deracialization and Racial Tension in Ohio: A Survey of Recent African American Mayoral Election Victories and Re-Election Attempts”

March 2006, National Conference of Black Political Scientists, Atlanta GA viii

“Black in White: Critical Inaugural Mayoral Election Victories and the Communities Behind Them”

April 2004, Midwest Political Science Association Conference, Chicago, IL “Black Presidential Politics: How The New York Times Portrayed Sharpton and Jackson’s Presidential Campaigns”

March 2004, National Association of Ethnic Studies Conference, Philadelphia, PA “Black Presidential Politics: How The New York Times Portrayed Sharpton and Jackson’s Presidential Campaigns”

March 2004, National Conference of Black Political Scientists, Chicago, IL “The Effect of NAFTA on African American Farming”

November 2003, People of Color in Predominantly White Institutions Conference, Lincoln, NE “Developing an Ethnic, Multicultural Curriculum in Undergraduate Colleges”

Professional Service

Member, Board of Directors (Graduate Student Representative) for the National 2008-2010 Association of Ethnic Studies

Conference Chair, Chief Organizer, Visionary, and Master of Ceremonies 2008 First Annual Graduate Students of Color Conference, sponsored by the Samuel M. Nabrit Black Graduate Student Association, Brown University

President of Samuel M. Nabrit Black Graduate Student Association, Brown Univ. 2006-2007

Board of Trustees Member, West Side Montessori Center, Toledo Ohio 2004-2005

Community Service

Guest Essayist, Democrat and Chronicle, Rochester, NY 2008 September 26, 2008: “Obama has upper hand on the topic of race relations”

Guest Columnist, The Sojourner’s Truth, 2008-present Weekly African American Newspaper, Toledo, Ohio

Keeper of Records, 2006-2008 Providence Alumni Chapter, Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Inc.

Moderator, City Council Debates for Wards 4 and 10, City of Providence, 2006 sponsored by the RI Black Political Action Committee

Member of Re-activation Committee, Endorsement Committee Member 2006 Moderator of RI Black Political Action Committee Debates for select candidates who pledge to focus on African American issues

Active in the Re-Activation of Rhode Island Black Political Action Committee 2006

Affirmative Action Director, Michigan Youth and College Division of the NAACP 2003-2004 ix

Member, NAACP State of Michigan, Youth/College Division, Executive Committee 2002-2004

Founder, NAACP Chapter at the University of Michigan 2002 Chair of Membership, culminating in the largest membership of a collegiate chapter

Established the Youth Empowerment Award, 2006-2008 City of Toledo Board of Community Relations Bestowed annually

Select Community Speaking Engagements

Guest Sunday morning worship speaker at Bethel AME Church, Providence, RI on the history of the AME Church, the leadership of Richard Allen, and contemporary relevance 2007

Guest Speaker, Black History Month Celebration, Ambulatory Care Center U.S. Naval Base, Newport, RI 2006

Guest Speaker, Rhode Island Coalition for Affirmative Action Meeting with Providence 2006 Schools Superintendent Dr. Donnie Evans

Keynote Speaker, Ministers’ Alliance of Rhode Island Annual 2006 Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Scholarship Prayer Breakfast, Cranston, RI (500-1000 people in attendance, including the Governor, Lt. Governor, U.S. Senators, the President of Brown University and other local RI political officials)

Guest Sunday morning worship speaker at Quinn Chapel AME Church, 2004 Forrest Park, OH on the history of the AME Church, the leadership of Richard Allen, and contemporary relevance

Speaker at City of Toledo Mayor Jack Ford’s Inaugural Celebration, 2002 Toledo Museum of Art

Guest speaker at St. Mark’s Episcopal Church (Toledo, OH) in celebration of 2001 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Birthday

Professional Memberships

American Political Science Association Midwest Political Science Association National Association of Black Sociologists National Association of Ethnic Studies National Conference of Black Political Scientists Pi Sigma Alpha, National Political Science Honorary Society Urban Affairs Association

References

Marion Orr, Ph.D. Director, Taubman Center for Public Policy x

Brown University Box 1977 67 George Street Providence, RI 02912 401 863 9436

James Morone, Ph.D. Chair, Department of Political Science Brown University Box 1844 Providence, RI 02912 401 863 1573

Wendy Schiller, Ph.D. Associate Professor, Department of Political Science Brown University Box 1844 Providence, RI 02912 401 863 1569

Darrell West, Ph.D. Vice President and Director of Governance Studies Brookings Institution 1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW Washington, DC 20036 202 797 6481

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation would have been nearly unfathomable without the gratuitous

support of many individuals and institutions. The altruistically shared expertise of

scholars, community activists, political leaders, and graduate students, was a humbling

experience. Mayors Jack Ford and Rhine McLin were exceptionally open and candid

with me during our lengthy conversations.

For the financial support in the early stages of writing from The Graduate School

and the Department of Political Science at Brown University, I am deeply grateful.

I had the benefit of meticulous reads from the chair of my committee, Marion Orr,

and members James Morone, Wendy Schiller, and Darrell West. I could not have been

any more privileged than to have the shepherding guidance of my advisor Marion Orr. I

know for a fact that he spent countless hours, many of them I am sure that were not particularly enjoyable, all in an effort to help me develop my knowledge and writing skills. His constant presence and warm southern genteel approach, academia could use more of.

Two of Brown’s political science graduate students, Jeremy Johnson and Andrea

Owens-Jones, were especially supportive throughout the project’s development.

Additionally, the Center for the Study of Race and Ethnicity in America at Brown

University provided office space, which proved immensely helpful in the completion of

this project. Thomas Stevie, the social sciences resource librarian at Brown was

especially kind and encouraging. My acquired adroitness with GIS tools is a result of his

careful guidance. It was as thanks to his persuasion, that I applied and was accepted as xii

an inaugural S4 fellow in the Spatial Structure in the Social Sciences fellowship program, where I developed further skills in spatial analysis and GIS tools.

As a pre-doctoral fellow, and in the final stages of writing, I also received

financial support from the Center for the Study of African American Politics (CSAAP),

the faculty/staff of the Department of Political Science and the Frederick Douglass

Institute for African and African American Studies at the University of Rochester.

Scholar and CSAAP director Valeria Sinclair-Chapman was unwavering in her support of

me.

An indelible imprint on my future has resulted from the inspiration and moral

support I received from Professor Hanes Walton, Jr. at the University of Michigan.

Despite having a cadre of students indebted to him, he found time to include me in his

fledgling nests. He was/is willing to give so much of his time, support, direction, and

encouragement. It was Professor Walton who first re-directed me from a law degree

pursuit by infamously telling me he would not write a letter of recommendation to any

law school. The excitement with which he taught Introduction to American Politics

while I was an undergraduate at Michigan, I can only hope to model, as I embark on my

professorial academic career. The inspiration for the focus on Black mayors in Ohio and

the representation of Black interests is in large part, a consequence of his motivation.

Corroborating my support from Walton while at Michigan were the deep friendships I

developed while a student there, the student activism in which I felt obligated to

participate in, and the religious experiences from which I greatly benefitted at Bethel

A.M.E. Church in Ann Arbor. Each of these segments of my life thrives strongly today

and I carried over into my graduate school experience at Brown University. xiii

Finally, community leaders, most probably without their knowledge, have long

nudged me toward research. My experience as a mayoral fellow in the Executive Office

of Mayor David Cicilline in Providence, Rhode Island, taught me, among other things,

how effective city government can be when it has the resources and inspiring leaders

behind it. I had similar experiences at the federal level as an intern for Congresswoman

Marcy Kaptur (D-OH) and my month-long stint as a part-time ‘Call City Hall’ dispatcher

and employee of the Department of Neighborhoods with the city of Toledo, Ohio in

2002. My many years as an active member of the political community in Toledo

introduced me to several government bureaucrats, politicians, community leaders, and

positions where I had the opportunity to experience, in-depth, the inner-workings of local

governing and the functioning of campaigns and elections.

My parents, Drs. Robert L. and D. LaRouth Perry, and siblings, Bayé and Kai,

afforded me tremendous, consistent support and often, good ideas, throughout my many

years of formal education. I firmly believe that my parents’ insistence on enrolling me in

West Side Montessori Center as a child (financed by my deceased maternal grandparents) fostered my acquired independent working skills. Central Catholic High School afforded numerous leadership roles.

It is this diverse coalition of experience, support and training that is echoed in this dissertation.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE – THE REPRESENTATION OF BLACK INTERESTS IN NON- MAJORITY BLACK CITIES Pages 1-31

CHAPTER TWO - EXPECTATIONS CONCERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF BLACK INTERESTS IN MEDIUM-SIZED, NON-MAJORITY BLACK CITIES IN OHIO Pages 32-62

CHAPTER THREE – THE HISTORY OF RACE AND POLITICS IN TOLEDO, OHIO Pages 63-105

CHAPTER FOUR - MAYOR JACK FORD’S EFFORTS WITH MINORITY CONTRACTING Pages 106-136

CHAPTER FIVE – THE HISTORY OF RACE AND POLITICS IN DAYTON, OHIO: THE PUSH AND PULL FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO DAYTON’S COMPLEX RACIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT Pages 137-191

CHAPTER SIX – MAYOR RHINE MCLIN’S EFFORTS WITH HOUSING AND RELATED INITIATIVES Pages 192-242

CHAPTER SEVEN – FINDINGS AND RESULTS Pages 243-288

CHAPTER EIGHT – UNIVERSALIZING THE INTERESTS OF BLACKS Pages 289-336

APPENDICES Pages 337-379

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LIST OF TABLES

City Populations in the United States Page 11

Twenty-First Century Black Mayors in Ohio Page 45

Washington, D.C. Population Change 1970-2006 Page 46

Atlanta, Georgia Population Change Page 47

Medium-Sized Cities with Black Mayors Pages 55-56

The Toledo Blade Racial Content Analysis for Mayor Jack Ford’s 2001 Election Campaign Page 91

Toledo, Ohio Population Change Page 99

Table of Mayor Rhine McLin’s 2001 Election Results by Ward Percentages Page 169

Dayton Daily News Racial Content Analysis for Mayor Rhine McLin’s 2001 Election Campaign Page 171

Dayton, Ohio’s 1994 NCCJ and UD Race Relations Survey Results Page 180

Dayton, Ohio Population Change Page 183

Dayton, Ohio Manufacturer Workers by Standard Industry Classification 1980-2000 Page 197

Efforts by Mayor Ford and Mayor McLin to Improve Black Quality of Life Page 248

Toledo, Ohio Black Personnel Employment for 2002-2005 and 2007-2009 Pages 249-250

Chi-Square Analysis of Role of Race and How the Mayor Addressed Major Black Problems Page 260

Content Analysis of Mayor Jack Ford’s State of the City Speeches and Related Addresses Page 295

Content Analysis of Mayor Rhine McLin’s State of the City Speeches and Related Addresses Page 298

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LIST OF CHARTS AND GRAPHS

Map of the State of Ohio Page 45

Ward Map of Ford’s 2001 Election and Percent Black Population Page 92

Toledo, Ohio Minority Business Enterprise All City Contracts and Agreements Page 129

Ward Map of McLin’s 2001 Election and Percent Black Population Page 170

Dayton Region Population Growth 1970-1998 Page 196

Montgomery County, Ohio Foreclosure Filings 1995-2008 Page 201

Mayor Ford and Mayor McLin and Black Quality of Life Percent of Activities Page 257

Black and White Responses Concerning Mayor’s Efforts to Address Black Problems Page 259

White and Blacks’ Recognition of Policy Ideas Affecting Blacks Page 261

White and Black Perceptions of Leadership to Improve Black Quality of Life Page 262

1

CHAPTER ONE: THE REPRESENTATION OF BLACK INTERESTS IN NON-MAJORITY BLACK CITIES Introduction

The nature of political representation of Black constituents’ interests from their elected Black representatives is changing in the twenty-first century. Increasingly,

African Americans are being elected to political offices where the majority of their

constituents are not African American. Previous research on this question tended to

characterize Black politicians’ efforts to represent their Black constituents’ interests in

two frames: deracialized or racialized. However, the advent of the twenty-first century

has exhausted the utility of that polarization. Black politicians no longer find explicit

racial appeals appropriate for their electoral goals, given the changing demographic environment, and greater acceptance of African American politicians in high-profile positions of power. Black politicians also increasingly find that a lack of attention to racial disparities facing constituents within their political boundaries does not effectively address why certain groups like Blacks are disproportionately and negatively affected than others, across a range of issues. Rather than continue to make efforts to represent

Black interests within those two frames, Black politicians have begun to universalize the interests of Blacks.

Universalizing Black interests as interests that matter for the good of the whole is

increasingly the adopted governing strategy of twenty-first century African American politicians elected to offices where the majority of their constituents are not Black. As a result of the greater acceptance of African American politicians in high-profile political

offices and changing demographics over the course of two decades, this new approach

has been made available to Black politicians who wish to represent Black interests even 2 given their White constituent majority - the emergence of the universalizing of Black interests as interests that matter to all constituents. This is a stark departure from previous approaches to advocate only those issues that transcend race and that de- emphasize race.

Universalizing the interests of Blacks, as many Black politicians have done since the turn of the century, though controversial, is a unique approach these politicians employ to represent the interests of African Americans, without alienating support from the majority of their constituents. To be clear, universalizing the interests of Blacks in a

Black politician’s attempt to represent their interests is different from deracialization. It is different in that these Black politicians, in their representation of Black interests, have often noted, for example, the racial disparities present, given the issue they support. This approach, while resulting in varying electoral levels of success for some Black politicians, has a particular benefit to a Black politician’s successful governing. Had, for example, these politicians employed a deracialization strategy, they, by definition, would not have emphasized race.

McCormick and Jones define deracialization as “conducting a campaign in a stylistic fashion that defuses the polarizing effects of race by avoiding explicit reference to race-specific issues” (1993, 76). While the working definition of deracialization is limited to an electoral strategy, its application to a Black politician’s governing strategy is not too far-fetched. One could replace the ‘conducting a campaign’ phrase with

‘governing an administration,’ for example, and receive a similar result. If this understanding is accepted, it becomes clear that many Black politicians no longer ‘avoid explicit reference to race-specific issues.’ Rather, in their attempt to represent Black 3

interests, Black politicians increasingly note of racial disparities where appropriate and

craft their rhetoric in a stylistic fashion that warrants non-Blacks not to feel threatened.

Yet, McCormick and Jones also note that a deracialized approach “at the same

1 time emphas[izes] those issues that are perceived as racial transcendent.” 0 The difference

in approach is a matter of words and understanding. While the McCormick and Jones definition emphasizes the avoidance of race specific issues and the advocacy of issues that transcend race, the definition does so with the underlying assumption that the topic of race is not discussed. The entire effort, then, is made on the part of the Black

politician to “enhance effectively the likelihood of white electoral support” to maintain or

2 capture public office. 1 The main difference in the approach of Black politicians in the

twenty-first century is often the reason behind the approach. The effort is not solely

being made to win public office and gain the necessary White votes. Rather, the

approach is consciously designed to represent Black interests given the majority White

constituency.

Some of the components of deracialization are undoubtedly present in the

approach to universalize Black interests. For example, in what scholar J.Q. Wilson calls

a nonthreatening image (1980, 214-254); McCormick and Jones emphasize the need for

Black politicians to project a safe portrayal to Whites to obtain a greater likelihood of

winning White support. However, the meaning of a nonthreatening image has changed

since the McCormick and Jones writing given the greater acceptance of African

Americans to high-profile political offices. Thus, while Black politicians, who, in the

twenty-first century, may make efforts to represent Black interests and do not wish to

1 Ibid. 2 Ibid. 4

lose the support of some Whites, they often do have the support of liberal Whites in their

efforts (Cunnigen 2006; Nelson 2006). Hence, projecting a nonthreatening image is not

exactly the precise question any longer. Rather, the question perhaps has become how can Black politicians represent Black interests and convince Whites that those interests

are not represented at the expense of their interests.

Corroborating this trend has been an array of elections of African American

mayors of non-majority Black cities. In the state of Ohio, Columbus, Toledo, Dayton,

Cincinnati, Youngstown, and Cleveland all elected Black mayors in the twenty-first

century. Outside of Ohio, many major cities with a history of Black mayors continued to

elect them, such as, Washington, D.C., Atlanta, Georgia, New Orleans, Louisiana, and

Baltimore, Maryland. Other cities with less of a history of Black mayors, elected some as

well, Buffalo, New York, Tallahassee, Florida, Alexandria, Virginia, and Mobile,

Alabama. This trend suggests Whites have an increasing willingness to vote for Black candidates when they feel as though their interests are not threatened (Hajnal 2007, 160).

In other words, when African American mayors are perceived as pursuing the interests of

the majority and not the interests of particular racial constituencies, Whites are more

likely to support them in the voting booth.

Noticeably, this development excludes mention of the interests of the mayor. For

example, we do not know if these Black mayors who have garnered large amounts of

White support in their election pursuits, have pursued the interests of the majority, once

elected. To the extent that scholars have found Black mayors do, we do not if they did so

preferentially. This matters because it addresses the role shared racial experience plays 5 when Black mayors consider activities to represent the interests of African Americans in non-majority Black cities.

An attempt to address these and related questions, this dissertation analyzes the question of how, if at all, the representation of Black interests is being pursued by Black mayors. Specifically, the dissertation seeks to examine under what conditions do the elected Black mayors of non-majority Black medium-sized cities actively pursue policies

3 and programs designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents? 2 This research question is derived from two propositions. First, as a racial minority that has long been socially, politically and economically marginalized, Blacks historically have experienced disproportionate disparities in housing, education, and income. As a result, the election of a Black mayor is viewed by Black residents as an opportunity to see city government work in their interests and to address these inequities. Consequently, African Americans embrace the election of one of their own with high expectations.

High Expectations

When the first wave of Black mayors won office in the 1960s and 1970s, expectations ran high. In his biography of Carl Stokes, the nation’s first major-city Black mayor, Moore (2002, 191) observed that, “black Clevelanders expected [Stokes] to revitalize their neighborhoods, provide low-to-moderate income housing, end police brutality, create a plethora of social welfare programs, and devise endless economic opportunities.” In an examination of Richard Hatcher, Gary, Indiana’s first Black mayor,

3 It is important to acknowledge that ‘active pursuit’ does not equal influence or necessarily tell us about the outcomes. Nevertheless, evidence of ‘active pursuit’ will provide insight into how active Black mayors are in the governing process inside their administrations and on which issues. Furthermore, an examination of differences in mayors’ actions in terms of levels of active pursuit given unique governmental structures will provide new evidence about Black mayors’ policy and programmatic priorities on issues relevant to their Black residents. In addition, it will help to provide a more thorough understanding of mayoral constraints and how Blacks’ interests are represented in non-majority Black urban contexts.

6

Lane (2001, 61) found that African-American expectations were similarly high, perhaps

unrealistically so. According to Lane,

During Hatcher’s first days in office, his staff was preoccupied with, among other things, constituent requests for jobs, interviews, guided tours of city hall, and answers to homework questions. One woman, for example, wanted to know whether the mayor could marry couples, another whether he could get an errant husband out of the house.

When Kenneth Gibson was elected the first Black mayor of Newark, New Jersey in 1970, the “expectations of supporters during Gibson’s first term extended beyond the question of changing benefits to meet needs of new constituents . . . Many blacks felt the election was a moral and ideological victory. Minorities expected changes in attitudes in the business community and in government.” A key member of Gibson’s 1970 transition

team observed that “after the election of a black mayor some blacks seem to think there

will be jobs for everyone. Others look for immediate improvement of services and

conditions in their neighborhoods” (Curvin 1972, 56).

The Black community’s expectations of Black mayors continued into the 1980s

and early 1990s. Non-majority Black New York City’s David Dinkins, for example, “had

to be concerned about responding to the desires of the various elements of his victorious

coalition – a collection of groups with numerous demands that had accumulated during the many years they had been excluded from power in city hall” (Biles 2001,141).

According to one observer, “like other black mayors,” Dinkins, “had been voted into office burdened by an imposing set of expectations,” especially from fellow African

Americans (Thompson 2006).

Across the country, the election of Black mayors raised the expectations of Black voters. African-American voters viewed Black mayors as modern-day Messiahs who, 7

once in office, would dramatically alter the Black community’s social and economic

predicaments (Reed 1999). As Nelson (2006, 3) observed about the first generation of

Black mayors:

The demands placed on their shoulders were enormous. Their positions as the chief executives of cities created strong expectations that they would be able to use the resources of their offices to deliver an unprecedented array of social and economic benefits to their Black constituents. These politicians were expected to produce jobs for Black workers during a period of economic crisis in America. They were also expected to be skilled political brokers, balancing demands from the media, the fraternal order of police, real estate entrepreneurs, and other establishment groups, with the claims of emergent racial and ethnic groups for greater access to the policy-making process and more substantial benefits from that process. Changes in the urban benefit system produced by Black mayors were expected to be permanent, not temporary.

Similarly, Preston (1990, 131) observed that, Black voters looked upon Black mayors “as the new leaders who would help blacks achieve political power in urban areas. The belief, by most, was that political power would also open the door to more economic power, as well as increase the probability of social justice.” Black mayors were “expected to seek

4 redress for the wrongs that had been perpetuated on blacks for so long.” 3 As Maynard

Jackson, Atlanta, Georgia’s first Black mayor, commented, “The level of expectations of black people when a black mayor is elected is so intensely emotional until it is almost exaggerated. It may be impossible for any human being to satisfy the level of expectations” (Bayor 2001, 181). In short, and as Nelson and Meranto (1977, 339) concluded, “The election of a black man as mayor of a major American city builds up extraordinarily high expectations from his black constituents.”

The dissertation’s second proposition derived from the research question is based

on population trends. Demographic changes in many American cities are steadily

4 Ibid. 8

reversing the population dynamics that brought about the election of this nation’s first

African-American mayors. The 2000 U.S. Census indicates that major cities are losing

Black population, while gaining Latinos and Whites (Frey 2006; Brookings 2001; Frasure

2007). Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, California, San Francisco, California, Seattle,

Washington, New Orleans, Louisiana, Atlanta, Georgia, and Newark, New Jersey are

5 examples of cities with significant declines in Black populations. 4 Some of these cities,

Washington, D.C., for example, have been governed by Black mayors for decades,

beginning with Walter Washington’s appointment to the district’s mayor-commissioner

position in 1967 and his subsequent election as the district first mayor in 1974. However,

should this trend continue, ambitious Black politicians will increasingly find themselves

running for the office of mayor in cities which do not comprise a majority of African

Americans.

The dissertation, then, examines the implications of two primary questions: do

Black mayors in non-majority Black cities actively pursue Black interests and given the

demographic trends, are the historic expectations of Blacks realistic?

Theoretical Expectations and the Significance of the Research Question

Shared Racial Experience

5 “Gentrification Changing Face of New Atlanta,” New York Times, March 11, 2006; “New York City Losing Blacks, Census Shows,” New York Times, April 3, 2006; “Blacks Say Like in Los Angeles Is Losing Allure,” New York Times, January 8, 1995; “The Census Shows Growth in Atlanta’s Population,” New York Times, March 21, 2001; “Atlanta Mayor: Shrinking Black Population Court Hurt Social Policies,” Cox News Service, June 2, 2007; “D.C. May Be Losing Status As a Majority-Black City; Washington Post, May 17, 2007; “San Francisco Hopes to Reverse Black Flight,” USA Today, August 26, 2007; “Central District: Change Is Inevitable, But Forsaking Past is Regrettable,” Seattle Times, November 6, 2002; “Study: New Orleans Could Lose 80 Percent of Black Population,” Associated Press, January 26, 2006; “Major Cities Rapidly Losing Black Population: Could Have Major Negative Impact on Black Political Power,” Taylor Media Services, September 25, 2007; http://www.wnjpin.state.nj.us/OneStopCareerCenter/LaborMarketInformation/lmi25/pl94/cnty/black.PDF 9

The primary expectation guiding this research is that Black mayors will be

involved in actively pursuing Black interest issues. This expectation is founded in

scholarship on Black representation in other political contexts. In the congressional

literature, there are several factors that have been shown to influence members’ personal

policy interests (Hall 1996). For example, despite increased diversity in the Black

community, Black members of Congress share the experience of being a member of a

historically marginalized group (Williams 1998) and Blacks generally (Black mayors

included) have a shared memory of oppression (Williams 1998, 192). That shared

history of racialized experiences should manifest in Black mayors’ policy and

programmatic priorities efforts and incline Black mayors to have more of a personal

interest in actively pursuing policies and programs that are designed to improve the

quality of life of Black residents.

Additionally supportive scholarship suggests that African American mayors might actively pursue Black interest policies in non-majority Black cities because of their feeling of connectedness to other African Americans. Termed “linked fate” by political scientist Michael Dawson in Behind the Mule (1994), the hypothesis is that social and economic factors influence whether or not Black individuals will have a strong tie to their

African American group. Finding that some Blacks use the group’s interests as a proxy

for their individual interests when making political choices, Dawson argues that

individual Blacks, including Black mayors, associate their life chances with that of the

group. Research has found that many Blacks do so because of social, political, and

economic differences between themselves and Whites (Dawson 1994; Tate 1993, 21–29). 10

Finally, the congressional literature also provides another cue as to why we expect

Black mayors to actively pursue Black interests in non-majority Black cities. Gamble

(2007) notes how many Black congressional members nationwide carry a heavy burden as they are often expected to represent not only their districts, but also “black America”

(Clay 1992; Guinier 1994, 47). Additionally, Fenno (2003, 7) found that African

American members of Congress often perceive their Black constituency extending beyond their geographical districts, to include Blacks nationwide, what some label surrogate representation. The same may be true for Black mayors, especially those in the more high-profile role of being the first Black mayor of their city. For example, in an effort to meet good faith minority participation goals in city contracting, Black mayors may, though controversial, seek to employ Black contractors from beyond the city limits should none within the city limits be qualified for the work needing to be preformed.

Hence, the confluence of life experience, feeling of connectedness to the group ‘African

American,’ and commitment to represent Black interests, even within patterns of surrogate representation, makes Black mayors more likely to have strong personal interests in representing Black interests. Thereby, it can reasonably be expected that they would make a more conscious effort to actively pursue policies and programs to improve the quality of life of Black residents.

Critics of Shared Racial Experience

As powerful as the argument of the assumption of shared racial experience is, it must be acknowledged that some congressional scholars have argued (Gamble 2007) that

“theories that focus on shared experience ignore individual differences and the multiple and cross-cutting identities among members of marginalized groups, locking group 11 members into essentialized identities and fixed policy perspectives” (Phillips 1995).

Additionally, some urban scholars argue that contemporary Black mayors face more challenges than Black mayors first elected in major cities (Nelson 2006). Hence, even with shared experience and history, Black mayors, faced with greater challenges and a majority White electorate may not be willing or able to actively pursue Black interests.

Medium-Sized Cities

Significant to this research is the choice to examine cities in the United States that are medium-sized and to use two cities as case studies of the larger phenomena nationwide. With the exception of a few scholars (Bowers/Rich 2000), urbanists have long ignored the public policy impact of Black mayors in medium-sized cities, especially as it relates to their representation of Black interests. Yet, according to data from the

2006 U.S. Census Bureau, most Americans live in medium-sized cities, cities with a population of less than 500,000:

City Populations in the United States Number of Cities Population Bracket Total Number of Persons 258 Over 100,000 225 100,000-500,000 41,676,465 199 100,000-300,000 31,596,692 58 300,000-8 million 49,286,123

Limiting studies of Black mayoral governance to cities of 500,000 or more ignores generalizability to approximately fifty-two percent of the population living in cities of

100,000 or more. The lack of studies of Black mayoral governance on populations living in cities between 100,000 to 300,000 ignores the generalizability to approximately thirty- nine percent of the overall population of U.S. persons living in cities of 100,000 or 12

6 more. 5 Thus, the findings of this dissertation most notably apply to cities like number

thirty-four on the list, Atlanta, Georgia, just shy of 500,000, and continue through number

two-hundred, fifty-nine, Billings, Montana, with just over 100,000.

Medium-sized cities are not often studied in urban politics even though their study may help predict mayoral action given trends in other cities. The scholarship that has focused on mayors of medium-sized cities, even if indirectly, has examined their leadership styles generally (Svara 1987, 1990, 1994) the impact on Black social change

over time (Button 1989), or leadership in respect to a specific issue (Bowers and Rich

2000). While each of the aforementioned authors take great skill in structuring a rigorous

narrative that explains the stylistic approaches, structural conditions, and singular issue

responsiveness over time under which the mayors win elections and govern, missing is a

detailed analysis of responsiveness to the concerns and issues of Blacks’ quality of life.

This is increasingly significant as Black mayors govern cities that are the size of

cities in which most of the world’s urban population resides. According to the

Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat World

Population Prospects 2005 Revision, “almost half of humanity lives in cities” and “small

cities, that is, those with a population of fewer than 500,000 people, were the place of

residence of about fifty-one percent of all urban dwellers in the world in 2005. Thus, the

majority of urban dwellers lived in fairly small urban settlements.” Their 2006 revision

is even more compelling - projecting that by 2030, eighty-seven percent of residents of

the United States will be urban dwellers. Currently, in the United States, nearly fifty

percent live in small and medium-sized cities. Therefore, the actions of mayors who

6 For more information: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_cities_by_population 13

govern within these city contexts arguably have relevance to a larger number of people

than studies limited to larger cities.

The Presence of the Majority

Political scientist Zoltan Hajnal writes in Changing White Attitudes Toward Black

Political Leadership (2007) that, “despite the hopes of the civil rights movement,

researchers have found that the election of African Americans to office has not greatly

improved the well-being of the black community” (xxi). As a solution, Hajnal suggests

that scholars re-direct their research efforts from a focus on the impact – both substantive

and symbolic – that Black mayors have had on Black residents, to focus on the impact

Blacks mayors have had on changing the attitudes and preferences of Whites toward

African Americans.

Hajnal further argues that scholars have ignored the role of the White community

to study gains associated with Black office holding. He finds that attention to White

reactions under Black mayoral leadership yields important conclusions not previously

known about the effects of such leadership on Whites. A key finding of Hajnal’s

research is the process by which, Whites, who reside under the leadership of Black

mayors, change their oft-previously-held beliefs and assumptions of low expectations.

Hajnal posits, “When Blacks have the power (or are perceived as having the power) to

inflict harm on the White community and they choose not to do so, many Whites are

forced to re-evaluate their assumptions” (3). This finding suggests that once Black

mayors secure powerful positions, such as the Mayor’s office in non-majority Black

cities, that Whites “fear that a Black leader will favor the Black community over the

White community [and] they expect a Black leader to redistribute income, encourage 14

integration, and generally channel resources toward the Black community” (3). The

implication, then, when the Black mayor does not advocate those positions, is that Whites

slowly gravitate toward them and begin to support their efforts as mayor. Hajnal does not

examine whether or not the Black mayors he studied wanted to seek the policies and

7 programs in the interests of Blacks that Hajnal claims Whites fear. 6 In contrast, while

Hajnal’s unit of analysis is the White community’s reactions to Black mayoral leadership

in primarily non-majority Black cities, this dissertation’s unit of analysis is the Black

mayor, and his/her policy actions and program development policies over time.

Hajnal suggests Black leadership is relevant in the twenty-first century because

Black mayors have been shown to have a positive impact on the communities of White

Americans. However, this research shows that, Black leadership is additionally relevant because what these mayors actively pursue in terms of policy and program development in the Black community may also comply with the interests of the majority in their municipalities. As polling data indicates, Whites and Blacks largely share similar concerns. The 2008 Joint Center National Opinion Poll of Blacks conducted from

September 16-October 6, 2008 found that sixty-two percent of Blacks cite the economy as the single most important national problem, whereas fifty-five percent of Americans generally named the economy as "extremely important" in a October 23-26, 2008 Gallup

8 Poll. 7 Hence, Whites, the majority of the sample of the Gallup Poll, and Blacks, the only

race sampled in the Joint Center Poll, share similar concerns. To the extent that the

shared concerns between Whites and Blacks can be applied to the urban context, the

7 To be clear, I do not examine the psychological reasons behind the mayors’ active pursuit of policies designed in the interests of Blacks; however, I do examine such a pursuit and theorize the role shared racial experiences plays in the actions. 8 http://www.gallup.com/poll/111586/Economy-Reigns-Supreme-Voters.aspx 15

study of Black mayors in the non-majority Black context may indicate that, even in cases

where policies of direct benefit to Blacks are proposed or implemented, they often pose no threat to Whites, as the mayors are careful to represent Whites with comparable

9 resources and Whites and Blacks generally have similar concerns. 8

The Human Relations Approach

The dissertation encourages mayors and scholars to think beyond the Black-White

dyad and to instead envision the development of policies that can both integrally serve

the constituencies with the most need (including, but not limited to Blacks) and everyone

simultaneously. Adapting what scholar Cornel West suggests in Race Matters is a human

relations approach to solving the pervasive problems that continue to plague Blacks in

many of America’s cities is important in a mayor’s effort to not only actively pursue, but

implement policies and programs designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents. The human relations approach is best defined as governing directed with an explicit appeal to people’s common humanity.

Cornel West asks the question in Race Matters (1993), “How do we capture a

new spirit and vision to meet the challenges of the post-industrial city, post-modern

10 culture, and post-party politics? 9 His stated prescriptions to meet those challenges

include:

Admit[ting] that the most valuable sources for help, hope, and power, consist of ourselves and our common history . . . we must focus our attention on the public square – the common good . . . generate new leadership . . . a visionary leadership . . . grounded in grassroots organizing that highlights our democratic accountability (11-13).

9 The consequence is that ‘black threat’ is not the primary reason why, after the election of the nation’s first Black mayors in cities with similar contexts in the 1960s and 1970s, the representation of Black mayors in non-majority Black cities continues to be significant. Rather, reasons like changing demographics might be more salient. 10 Ibid, 11. 16

In respect to addressing Black issues, he attempts to caste aside the ideological divide

that frames Blacks and their issues. He writes that, for liberals, Blacks “are to be

‘included’ and ‘integrated’ into ‘our’ society and culture, while for conservatives they are

11 to be ‘well behaved’ and worthy of acceptance’ by ‘our’ way of life.” 1 Finding that

observation inadequate, West concludes that neither group understands that “the presence

and predicaments of black people are neither additions to nor defections from American

12 life, bur rather [are] constitutive elements of that life.” 1 Hence, for West, a new

framework is needed that views Blacks and their presence in American life as American.

For him, such a framework should “begin with a frank acknowledgment of the basic

13 humanness and Americanness of each of us.” 1 Other scholars have called for a full

integration of Black Americans’ social and economic problems into the patchwork of

American society:

The failure of America, black and white, to recognize its commonality regarding racial matters lies at the heart of the problem. Whites should not be left off the hook in dealing with societal conditions that will eventually impact their lives. Not surprisingly, many of the problems faced by the black community, such as poor performance of young black males, relocation/outsourcing of jobs overseas, and the feminization of poverty, have become social issues within the white community” (Cunnigen 2006: 28).

While West’s and Cunnigen’s observations, hereby labeled a human relations approach,

are philosophical and conceptual in nature, they can be applied to Black mayoral

representation of Black interests in non-majority Black cities. The hypothesis generated

is that in their efforts to represent Blacks by universalizing their interests in the non- majority Black context, Black mayors may find success in appealing to the shared,

11 Ibid, 6. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid, 8. 17

common, human condition of life experience. This approach may allow the mayors to

actively pursue Black interests without their majority White constituency feeling

threatened or that their interests are taking a back seat.

This human relations approach, if embraced by mayors, would have a direct racial

benefit without the specter of preferential treatment. This approach stands in contrast

with the ‘best way’ suggested by some scholars to help the disadvantaged. For example,

sociologist William Julius Wilson finds “an emphasis on coalition politics that features

progressive, race-neutral policies” is the ‘best way’ to address pervasive problems facing

14 Blacks and other disadvantaged groups. 1 Arguably a method that relies on a trickle

down effect or indirect process of distribution of resources, Wilson’s suggestion does not comprehensively examine how the disadvantaged garner help through the idea.

The human relations approach, on the other hand, has the potential to help scholars understand how a Black mayor can actively pursue policies and programs that work to improve the quality of life of Black Americans in the twenty-first century.

Elected in cities comparable in demographics to the nation’s first Black mayors, many

Black mayors in the modern era govern in the non-majority Black context with favorable race relations vis-à-vis the nation’s first Black mayors. Thus, the ability of a Black mayor to actively pursue policy and program development for Black interests in a non-

Black municipal context is in part explained by time. With a new century of Black mayors came a change in perspective as to how to garner support for policy and program development in the interests of Blacks. This human relations perspective, if it is shown to be adopted by mayors, may suggest what Hajnal hopes for – that Whites support

14 http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=raceneutral_policies_and_the_democratic_coalition 18

policies that work to improve the quality of life of Blacks without harboring the fear that

their well-being might suffer as a result.

Definition of Terms

• ‘Black Community’

‘Black Community’ refers to native born African American voters of all social

classes. Additionally, ‘Black community’ is treated as a single, aggregate entity of all

Black voters in a given city. While differences within the Black community undoubtedly

exist, the Black community still largely votes as a monolithic voting bloc (Tate 2003).

• ‘Black Expectations’

The Black community’s expectations, both historically and currently, are defined

as those beliefs held by Black residents that a mayor is in a position to substantially

change their personal quality of life. Consequently, a mayor’s promotion of better neighborhoods, enactment and enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, promotion of affirmative action in employment and education, or an increase in social services are each an example of mechanisms Black residents believe are within the mayor’s control.

“Black expectations” is treated as a background condition, and not a variable.

Parenthetically, it is meant that, given the historical reality of high expectations, I hold such expectations constant, and do not expect variation on the condition of high expectations among Black residents.

• Policy Actions and Program Developments

Introduced or implemented policies are identified throughout as policy actions.

Introduced or developed city programs are identified throughout as program

development. Policy actions and program developments were determined using all 19

available sources of data, including, printed campaign leaflets, city budgets, mayoral

proposed budgets, administration press releases, state of the city speeches,

council/commission meeting minutes and agendas and newspaper articles

15 • ‘Black Interests’ and Quality of Life 1

‘Black interests’ are defined as those issues of relevance to the Black community.

Some issues that Blacks deem relevant are also of interest to other communities.

Arguably for Blacks, these issues are of special relevance given the intensity of Black

preferences. For example, narrowing the achievement gap disparity between Whites and

Blacks in education is seen as a “Black interest” and is given greater significance.

Although the gap in educational attainment between Blacks and Whites is shrinking,

there still exist significant differences. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2003,

approximately seventeen percent of Blacks 25 years old and over had a bachelor’s degree

or higher, compared to thirty percent of non-Hispanic Whites (U.S. Census Bureau 2004).

In addition, the gap in K-12 Black and White students’ performance on standardized

tests, and the historical significance that Blacks have given education as an avenue for

racial advancement, makes education of greater importance. Improving K-12 education,

then, becomes an example of Black interest.

National opinion polls and surveys show what programs, policies and issues are

supported by and are of concern to African Americans. These data serve as indicators of

15 Given that Blacks are found to have multiple life experiences, it is difficult to define Black interests or Black quality of life (Cohen 1999; Reed 2000; Young 2000). In concert with Gamble (2007), while I recognize the growing diversity among Blacks, this research makes some important assumptions when defining which policies and programs may be important to African Americans in the cities studied and to improving their quality of life. Although we cannot regard Blacks as ideologically homogeneous, there are certain policies and programs mayors may pursue that we can assume are in the interest to Blacks and are likely to be designed to improve Black quality of life. Therefore, I have taken into account objective measures of social and economic disparities between Blacks and Whites to define Black interests.

20

the interests of Blacks. According to the 2008 Joint Center for Political and Economic

Studies National Opinion Poll, sixty-two percent of African Americans name the

economy as the single most important problem facing the country, followed by

Healthcare (seven percent) and the war in Iraq (seven percent). The 2004 National

Opinion Poll shows that among African Americans, the single most important problem

facing the country was: the economy (thirty-one percent), followed by the war in Iraq

(twenty-two percent), and healthcare issues (twenty percent). The 2000 National Opinion

Poll shows that among African Americans, the single most important problem facing the

country was: education (26%); followed by Healthcare (18%); and crime, violence and

16 drugs, sixteen percent. 1 The 1984-1988 National Black Election Panel Study found that

eighty-eight percent of Blacks agreed that the government should work to improve the

position of Blacks, and eighty-two percent favored increased government spending for

job creation. More specifically, seventy-nine percent of Blacks were in favor of

increased spending for Medicare and fifty percent for increased funding for food stamps

(Dawson 1994: 190-191; Gurin, et al: 88).

These national public opinion data help to define ‘Black interests’ constructively.

Providing insight on how Blacks view themselves and their socioeconomic condition, the

data allow me to posit that improving their socioeconomic condition, and thus their

quality of life, is in the interests of Blacks. It is important to note that there is a general

17 congruence between Black policy preferences of all relevant social classes. 1 As Dawson

(1994, 205) notes, “perceptions of group interests are not associated with economic

16 http://www.jointcenter.org/index.php/publications_recent_publications/national_opinion_polls 17 Tate (2003) finds, however, that “Blacks are very divided in opinion on most social and economic policy matters . . . black opinion has become somewhat more conservative over time. This makes the distinctively liberal policy representation of blacks less representative of their real policy issues (93).

21

status. Within the confines of mainstream American politics, individuals’ economic

status plays a small role in shaping African Americans political choice.” His finding is

consistent with research from Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson (1989), and Ippolito,

Donaldson, and Bowman (1968). As Gurin, et al. note, “blacks from all walks of life had

similar political goals and policy preferences and also felt a sense of racial solidarity”

(117). Other scholars have also noted how survey research suggests that Blacks

traditionally support liberal economic and social policies (Kinder and Sanders 1996;

Kinder and Winter 2001; Lublin 1997, 73–78; Tate 1993, chap. 2).

Hence, Blacks are more likely to believe that racial and economic inequalities still

exist and to favor local government programs and policies that support individuals who are politically and economically marginalized. In addition to policy actions and programmatic developments that deal explicitly with race or Blacks, the dissertation considers mayoral actions regarding education, poverty, housing, welfare, unemployment, and criminal justice to be actively pursued actions involving Black

18 interests. 1 Some of which may include, efforts that increase police presence in Black

neighborhoods, that prohibit discrimination in any area of city government, (including

voting, housing, education, employment), and that supports cleaner streets, job programs,

and assistance with unemployment, or education advancement. I would not argue that

these are the only areas of interest to Black constituents or Black mayors, but, for the

purposes of this research, these types of policies and programs will be considered active

pursuit of Black interests.

Methods for Examining the Research Question

18 I borrow from Haynie’s (2001) definition of ‘Black interests’ where it encompasses “support [for] legislation and policies favoring social welfare, economic redistribution, and civil rights issues” (24).

22

The research design functions as follows. The unit of analysis is the mayor’s

policy actions and program development over time. I examine each city separately, in

order to control for variation. For example, I conduct a year-by-year analysis of a

mayor’s policy actions and program development to the extent that these efforts meet

Black interests, and in the end, offer a summary analysis of the total years in office. This

year-to-year examination allows one city and one mayor to remain constant, in respect to

the variation found within the propositions, or independent variables. After the

assessment for one city is completed, the steps are then replicated for the other city to

make comparisons.

Data

Eighty-one semi-structured interviews of mayors and other city officials, business

leaders, the heads of civic organizations, including non-profits, race-advancement

associations, community organizations, religious denominations and other relevant groups, in addition to a dozen other informational interviews, were conducted. The research also included analysis of a total of four hundred ninety-four city council minutes and agenda summaries, mayoral press releases, other official city and campaign documents, major and Black newspaper content analysis, and an examination of 2001 ward-level election results.

Overview of the Dissertation

The following chapters expand on the literature and test several propositions derived from the literature with a detailed look at two medium-sized cities with Black mayors where Blacks do not constitute a majority. Thereafter, the project studies the 23

advancement of Black political leadership in arenas that are not numerically ‘set up’ to

elect Black mayors.

Chapter Two expands upon the literature review and examines the propositions

(the hypothesized relevant independent variables) derived from previous scholarship. In so doing, the chapter explains the significance of the study of medium-sized cities, provides support for why the leadership of twenty-first century Black mayors is unique vis-à-vis the nation’s first Black mayors, and expands upon the demographic trends in various cities nationwide that serve as support for the dissertation. I also provide a listing of select, current Black mayors of medium and large cities to whom this research may be applied given greater resources in the future.

Chapter Three details the recent racial and political history of Toledo, Ohio, one of the two case-study cities chosen for the study. Thereby, the chapter hypothesizes why and examines how a Black mayor in this strong mayor context actively pursues policies and programs designed to improve the quality of life of Blacks in the city.

Chapter Four takes an in-depth look at a major area of policy action and program development actively pursued by the mayor of Toledo, Ohio, with the intent to improve

Black quality of life. The mayor’s merger of the Office of Purchasing with the Office of

Affirmative Action and Contract Compliance, and the related efforts to build the capacity of minority contractors to competitively bid for and receive large-scale contracts is the example cited.

Chapter Five details the recent racial and political history of Dayton, Ohio, one of the two case-study cities chosen for the study. Thereby, the chapter hypothesizes why and examines how a Black mayor in this council-manager (weak mayor) context actively 24 pursues policies and programs designed to improve the quality of life of Blacks in the city.

Chapter Six takes an in-depth look at a major area of policy action and program development actively pursued by the mayor of Dayton, Ohio, with the intent to improve

Black quality of life. The mayor’s support of affordable housing, economic development, and the related efforts to support the construction of mixed-use communities is the example cited.

Chapter Seven provides a brief overview of select respondents’ responses to three questions on the research’s interview schedule. Thereby, the chapter demonstrates how

Whites and Blacks view their mayor’s efforts to improve Black quality of life differently.

Also, the chapter details how one mayor is perceived by Whites and Blacks more favorably in terms of their efforts than the other. The chapter concludes providing suggestions for further research on this question and theorizes why Whites and Black may view the mayor’s efforts differently.

Chapter Eight summarizes what this research informs. First, the chapter explains how the mayors successfully actively pursued Black interests by examining the content of

State of the City speeches and related addresses. Second, the chapter returns to the human relations approach and casts the approach as a new method to represent Black interests in non-majority Black political contexts, without being deracialized and without being explicitly racial.

Conclusion

At the cornerstone of this dissertation lies the idea of political representation.

Given the unique challenges of the twenty-first century, mayors of urban cities must 25

develop innovative policies and programs that address the needs of particular constituencies. However, that task is often difficult to achieve. Mayors have varying degrees of control in cities. Therefore, their role in the effective development of policies germane to citizens’ interests varies tremendously across city, county, and state lines.

The study of Black mayors is no different. In fact, African American mayors of medium-

19 sized cities are most often mayors with little formal authority. 1 While some Black

mayors govern with full executive ‘strong mayor’ powers, most Black mayors have city

managers with whom they govern collaboratively with along side a city council. In such

structured environments, the mayor is often but one voice of several others. He or she

often has few additional powers in terms of appointments, policy or program

development, than the other members.

Yet, given that the congressional literature finds that Black legislators have been

found to be more likely than White legislators to introduce Black interest bills (Canon

1999; Haynie 2001); and Black legislators are more likely than White representatives to use their time to affect the legislative agenda by introducing bills that benefit African

American constituents, then it is reasonable to expect that Black mayors’ representational

activity would not differ. Because we know that Black legislators have a strong sense of

linked fate, like many other Blacks, then, Black mayors should have an interest in policies that disproportionately affect the Black community—leading to this research’s expectation that a strong preference toward Black interest policies and programs will be found.

A Note on Data Limitations

19 According to data from the National Conference of Black Mayors, of top 50 mayors of cities with populations over 50,000, most of the 50 mayors govern cities with charters that given them little formal authority. 26

The lack of previous research in the context of medium-sized cities that the data

sources typically found in comparable yet distinct previous works may or may not be

useful or accessible. Given that the context is the often less-funded (vis-à-vis large cities)

medium-sized cities, record keeping is a problem of paramount concern to researchers.

Additionally, because this research makes the working assumption that Black mayors will make efforts to address Black interests in the non-majority black medium-sized city context, but will likely do so utilizing a unique human relations approach, the accessibility of previous models of research design have been extremely limited. Hence, the argument of this research is that these actions of mayoral behavior are unique to the

modern era, and as such, the tools with which researchers may use to make reasonable

conclusions are also unique from previous studies. Furthermore, the compounded nature of seeking to capture the mayor’s active pursuit of the totality of Black interests for the purpose of improving the whole group’s quality of life also makes identifying comparable models of research design uniquely challenging. Most comparable representational work either derives from the less than congruent congressional arena or

lies within the urban context and is often limited to a mayor’s responsiveness given a

particular issue or subject matter over time.

Additionally, the focus on medium-sized cities yields data accessibility problems

due in large part to the entrenched nature of the political environment. It appears that

when mayoral transitions occur, whether between politicians of different political parties

or not, data that should be available is not readily accessible and service delivery 27

20 suffers. 1 The hypothesis for this occurrence is two-fold: 1) the cities have limited resources and as a result effective record keeping can become short-changed without a designated archivist, for example; 2) in the context of smaller cities, where electoral politics functions in niche, close-knit contexts, the desirability of a new administration to allocate resources to maintain records of a political opponent is limited. These challenges to the study and testing of a Black mayor’s active pursuit of Black interests designed to improve the group’s quality of life has left the field with areas upon which to focus future

resources and research.

20 For more information, see Clingermayer, James C. and Richard C. Feiock “Leadership Turnover, Transaction Costs, and External City Service Delivery,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 57, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1997), pp. 231-239 28

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Cunnigen, Donald. 2006. “Black leadership in the twenty-first century.” Society 43:5 (July): 25-29

Curvin, Robert. 1972. “Black Power in City Hall,” Society 9 (September/October): 56-57

Dawson, Michael C. 1994. Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African American Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Fenno, Richard F., Jr. 2003. Going Home: Black Representatives and Their Constituents. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 29

Frasure, Lorrie A. 2007. “Beyond the Myth of the White Middle Class: Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Settlement in Suburban America.” The National Political Science Review. 11: 65-86.

Frey, William. March 2006. Diversity Spreads Out: Metropolitan Shifts in Hispanic, Asian, and Black Populations Since 2000. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Report.

Gamble, Katrina L. 2007. “Black Political Representation: An Examination of Legislative Activity Within U.S. House Committees.” Legislative Studies Quarterly, 32: 421-447.

Guinier, Lani. 1994. Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Direct Democracy. New York: Free Press.

Gurin, Patricia, Shirley Hatchett and James S. Jackson. 1989. Hope and Independence: Blacks’ Response to Electoral and Party Politics. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Hajnal, Zoltan. 2007 Changing White Attitudes Toward Black Political Leadership. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hall, Richard L. 1996. Participation in Congress. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Haynie, Kerry L. 2001. African Americans Legislators in the American States, New York: Columbia University Press.

Ippolito, Dennis S., William S. Donaldson and Lewis Bowman. 1968. “Political Orientations Among Negroes and Whites.” In Blacks in the United States, eds. Norval D. Glenn and Charles M. Bojean. San Francisco: Chandler, 105-113.

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Kinder, Donald R., and Nicholas Winter. 2001. “Exploring the Racial Divide: Blacks, Whites, and Opinion on National Policy.” American Journal of Political Science 45: 439–56.

Kleppner, Paul. 1985. Chicago Divided: The Mayor of a Black Mayor. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.

Lane, James B. 2001. “Black Political Power and Its Limits: Gary Mayor Richard G. Hatcher’s Administration, 1968-87.” In African American Mayors, eds. David R. Colburn and Jeffrey S. Adler. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

30

Lublin, David Ian. 1997. Paradox of Representation: Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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Preston, Michael B. 1990. “Big City Black Mayors: An Overview.” National Political Science Review. 2: 131–95.

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31

Swain, Carol M. 1996. Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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32

CHAPTER TWO: EXPECTATIONS CONCERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF BLACK INTERESTS IN MEDIUM-SIZED, NON-MAJORITY BLACK CITIES IN OHIO

Black Mayors and Public Policy

As a new phenomenon coming on the political scene in the late 1960s, by the

1970s and 1980s, political scientists were turning their attention to examining the impact

of Black mayors. Did Black mayors live up to the Black community’s expectations?

Were Black mayors successful in delivering on their campaign promises? H. Paul

Friesema (1969) was one of the early commentators to caution about the high level of

Black expectations, warning that Black mayors were inheriting what he labeled a "hollow

prize." Friesema argued that African Americans were gaining control of cities where

businesses and White middle-class residents were leaving, depleting the cities' tax bases

and leaving inadequate resources to address the social and economic needs of the Black

community. One of the earliest empirical studies to test this thesis was conducted by

Edmond Keller (1978). In a study of six cities, Keller examined whether there was a

discernable difference in the “policy preferences” and positions on municipal

expenditures between White and Black mayors. Keller found that African-American

mayors are more likely to support social welfare policies than White mayors. According

to Keller, “black mayors, because of the constituencies they serve, would like to make

welfare-type policies their central concern; but they are often constrained from doing this

21 by structural and human factors.” 2

Karnig and Welch (1980, 152) find modest shifts in spending policy preferences

as a result of having a Black mayor. For example, they found that “cities with Black mayors made greater gains in educational spending and in the social welfare areas.” In

21 Ibid, 49-50. 33

his study of forty-three cities, Eisinger (1982, 391) observed that, “the presence of a

black mayor has a modest incremental effect on levels of black employment and on

affirmative action effort, enabling us ultimately to conclude that a small but discernable

portion of black employment is a product of black political authority” (but see Mladenka

1989). In a subsequent study, Eisinger (1984) notes that the capture of city hall by

Blacks can have important and positive economic consequences for the Black community. In an important study of ten California cities, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb

(1984, 168) found that Black political incorporation, especially Black control of the mayor’s office, was

Associated with important changes in urban policy – the creation of police review boards, the appointments of more minorities to commissions, the increasing use of minority contractors, and a general increase in the number of programs oriented to minorities. Cities with strong minority incorporation were much more likely to be responsive to minority interests.

In their political incorporation model, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb gave extra weight

to those cities where an African American occupied the mayor’s office. From their

perspective, Black mayors played a stronger and more important leadership role than

African-American city council members.

Saltzstein (1989, 539) finds that Black mayors have a clear effect on the type of

policies implemented in reference to police matters. More recently, Robert A. Brown

(2007: 26) found that the presence of a Black mayor in many financially strapped cities

“had a substantive impact upon increased spending for housing and community

development.” He also found a positive impact upon increasing health spending. In the

final analysis, he notes, “black mayors had a significant influence upon increasing city 34

22 government spending for social programs.” 2 In general, the research seems to conclude

that the election of a Black mayor has a positive impact on the design and/or promotion

of city policies that work to change the quality of life of African American residents.

Symbolic Effects of Black Mayors

In addition to research on Black mayors’ impact on policy, elections, and campaigns, scholars have recognized the symbolic, psychological, impact of Black mayors. For example, Bobo and Gilliam (1989, 387) find that having a Black mayor does increase the political incorporation and participation of constituents, leading to, in the end, increased participation, greater political knowledge, and political empowerment

of Black voters. Their conclusions suggest that Black residents in cities who are

descriptively represented at the mayor’s office are more active participants in local

politics (387). More recently, Marschall and Ruhil (2007) find that Blacks report higher

levels of satisfaction with their neighborhood conditions, police services and public

schools when represented by Blacks in city government, including the mayor’s office.

This recent research confirms work of earlier scholars who found that having Blacks in

high leadership positions at the municipal level led to higher levels of political trust and,

23 at times, participation, and feelings of empowerment. 2

Constraints with Black Mayors’ Policy Implementation

However, considerable literature points to the limitations Black mayors have in

shaping urban public policy. Much of this literature is in line with the “hollow prize”

thesis. We have already seen that Keller (1978) found that Black mayors spend more on welfare related items than White mayors, but institutional structures limit their action on

22 Ibid, 38. 23 See, for example, Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Howell and Fagan 1988; and Abney and Hutcheson 1981. 35

policy of relevance to Blacks and their efforts to make such policies permanent. Adolph

Reed, Jr., (1999, 97) for example, has pointed to the “structural and ideological

constraints” that put considerable hindrances on the extent to which Black mayors can

respond to the needs and concerns of their Black constituents, especially the Black poor.

Carl Stokes, the nation’s first major-city African-American mayor, discovered these limitations. After two terms in office, Stokes concluded that being a Black mayor held only the “promises of power” (Stokes 1973). Stokes found, for example, that as mayor he had little control over the city’s bureaucracy. As Woody (1982, 101-102) concluded in her study, African-American mayors “quickly discover” they have “little or no power over the bureaucracy and can meet few demands of [their] supporters . . . [due to] problems developing good intergovernmental relations with the state and federal bureaucracy [and to] limits [that] are structural and institutional and . . . embedded in local charters.”

Preston (1976) finds that Black mayors in large and medium-sized cities are without the power necessary to bring about significant changes to the quality of life of their residents, especially Black residents. Describing the wave of Black mayors elected in the 1970s, Preston laments that, “the new black mayors have limited powers.” Black mayors, according to Preston (1976, 125) became “facilitators or housekeepers.” Nelson

(1978, 61) similarly finds a lack of institutional power for Black mayors. Citing a study by the Joint Center for Political Studies, Nelson finds that most of the twenty-three cities with Black mayors under review did not give the mayor statutory power. “Many black mayors are denied substantial control over the policy-making process of city government 36

by city charters.” He discovered that, “Crucial powers of budget control and appointment

were assigned either to city councils or to city managers” (Nelson 1978, 61).

Yet, even in cities where a Black mayor might have such authority, such as

Chicago, Illinois, Harold Washington was frequently met with resistance to his proposals

from city council. As Judd and Swanstrom (1994, 385) recorded, “Washington was

hampered throughout most of his first term by the so-called council wars. Led by

Edward Vrodlyak, a longtime machine Democrat, white machine politicians, who held a

majority on the City Council, did everything possible to thwart Washington’s agenda.”

For Black mayors, then, constraints on power are not only because of limiting

institutional structures. As with other mayors, there are usually structural limits to

effectiveness. However, when studying Black mayors, the literature indicates an

examination of structure alone is not sufficient. Rather, for Black mayors, (as in the case of Washington’s battle with city council), an interaction of structural limitations and race,

work together to prevent enactment of legislation. Thereby, intragovernmental resistance is another constraint and limitation placed on Black mayors. Thompson (2006, 193-194) argues that similar resistance from city council to a Black mayor’s agenda was found in

New York, Cleveland, and Philadelphia. In response, the African-American mayors of these cities sought to restructure city council by influencing future council elections, but

with little avail. Hence, these constraints are greater given an institutional structure

where a Black person is serving as mayor, yet the city council is majority White.

Moreover, the constraints are greater if such White councilmembers are not ideologically

in synch with the mayor. 37

Most scholars seem to agree with Reed (1999, 89) who finds that, “these

constraints stem from three main sources: 1) the city’s changing economic base and

functions, 2) fiscal and revenue limitations, and 3) competition and conflict – both latent

and overt – among the [Black mayor’s] constituencies.” Some scholars have gone as far

as arguing that “minority mayors do not just inherit distressed cities, they cause them,

simply by being elected, not through any policies they pursue” (Kraus and Swanstrom

2001, 203). In general, the research seems to conclude that Black mayors must confront

multiple limitations in their effort to positively affect the quality of life of their Black

residents through policy. Structural and institutional constraints, then, are significant

hindrances to Black mayors’ responsiveness to Black interests and expectations.

Black Mayors and the Representation of Black Interests

Scholarship on the governing of Black mayors and their Black communities is

varied in number, content, and approach (Nelson 1982; Woody 1982; Piliawsky 1985;

Stone 1989; Sonenshein 1993; Orr 1999; Reed 1999; Rich 1999; Moore 2002; Bowers

and Baker 2000; Perry 2000; Grenell and Gabris 2000; Thompson 2006). Much of the

scholarship, however, focuses on single-issues, like education, or housing development,

24 for example. 2

While scholars recognize the structural limitations Black mayors face (Reed 1999;

Keller 1978; Nelson 1992; Nelson and Meranto 1977; Preston 1976; Nelson 2006), they

also tend to note that even given such constraints, they can impact policy. Urban scholars

have attempted to ferret out those conditions that are more likely to lead to Black and

24 The attention of scholars to Black mayors of non-majority Black cities and their active pursuit (or not) of policies and programs designed to improve Blacks’ general quality of life has received short substantive attention.

38

White mayors having an impact on local policy. Pressman (1972) introduced a model that focused on the financial, political, and personal resources available to a mayor.

Pressman called them “preconditions of mayoral leadership:” 1) sufficient city government financial and staff resources; 2) city jurisdiction to enact social welfare programming, 3) mayoral jurisdiction within such programming, 4) a full time salary, 5) sufficient staff support, 6) favorable avenues of publicity, and 7) supportive political groups. Pressman found, however, that there are significant informal attributes or resources at a mayor’s disposal that, when used effectively, can make up for the limited

‘formal’ authority some mayors have.

For example, several Black mayors have been able to make some substantive changes for African-American residents within the formal constraints of the mayor’s office. A number of these mayors did not enjoy many of the preconditions laid out by

Pressman (1972). Harold Washington’s tenure in Chicago is a vivid example.

Washington is generally recognized as having put in place policies that -- had he not faced an untimely death -- could have potentially helped Blacks in Chicago. Though

Washington enjoyed Pressman’s preconditions such as mayoral jurisdiction to create social welfare programming, and a full time salary as mayor, in many efforts he lacked support from a key governing body, the Chicago city council. Washington also inherited a city without a financial surplus.

Nevertheless, as Judd and Swanstrom (1994, 384) note of his first term,

Washington was able to “create a more open and participatory atmosphere in city government” by including numerous agencies and community organizations in his office’s consultations about social policy, housing and economic development policy. 39

Many of these groups were predominantly African American in composition. Hence, while the city council and other political groups lobbied against his efforts, Washington effectively garnered the support of other organizations to assist his policy development and implementation. This political maneuvering was effective for the socioeconomic progress of the Black community, particularly. As Mier and Moe (1991, 77) note, a critical feature of Washington’s plan for economic development involved minority participation. As a result, the number of minority firms receiving city contracts increased from nine to sixty, in a three-year period under Washington. Washington’s brief tenure illustrates that one effective avenue for mayors to get beyond the financial and political constraints of their city or office, is to establish relationships with active groups who might assist their implementation of some goals.

Jones (1978, 116) observed a similar network of support for Maynard Jackson in

Atlanta after his administration’s creation of an office of contract compliance. For the first time in the city’s history, a city department was established responsible for reviewing all contracts entered into by the city and all purchases made by the city to ensure minority participation. The result of this policy change was that minority participation in city contract work rose from two percent soon after Jackson took office to thirteen percent near the end of his first term.

Noticeably, Jackson faced opposition, especially from Atlanta’s White business elite. However, Jones notes that Jackson rebuffed some criticism and attempts at stalling the project, and others like it, in large part because of active groups who assisted his efforts. Jackson’s success in reordering some of Atlanta’s municipal priorities toward the benefit of the Black community was a large result of ideologically congruent, active 40 group participation. As Jones notes, “the key to effective community empowerment is the presence of a well-organized and highly disciplined organization which not only works to help elect candidates sympathetic to its interests, but also develops a plan for action . . . to convert agenda items into policy.” According to Jones, mayoral constraints and limitations make it difficult for Black mayors to reorder “existing priorities.”

Nevertheless, “a more equitable share for the black community within existing priorities is possible.”

Nelson (1982, 191) writes about Carl Stokes’ ability to garner funds for the construction of 5,496 low to moderate income housing units by the end of his second term, despite the resistance from city council. Even in the face of “threats,” Stokes

“assisted black businesses by initiating a policy that encouraged competitive bidding by black firms for city contracts.” Nelson credits Stokes’ “activist-entrepreneur style of leadership.” Karnig and Welch (1980, 152) similarly note that, “in this matrix of crisscrossing obstacles, it is perhaps surprising that our analysis indicates that black mayoral representation does result in some changes in the level of municipal expenditures.” In short, many scholars have concluded that there is room for a Black mayor, even in a non-majority Black city, facing considerable financial and political opposition, to actively pursue policies that are designed to improve the lives of Black residents. Even in the midst of structural, political, and financial constraints, Black mayors were able to effectively bring about substantive changes for the Black community.

In general, the literature speaks to the limitations of Black mayors to affect change in policy, but also to the possibilities, within such constraints, that are available to 41 mayors. In addition, whether they adopt a leadership style of Stokes’ “activist- entrepreneur” approach or enjoy much of Pressman’s preconditions, Black mayors are capable of producing such change for Blacks. As Reed (1999, 98) eloquently summarizes, “it is not necessarily the case that those [black mayoral] regimes are so tightly hemmed in by absolute paucity of fiscal resources that they have no span for intervention.” To create more favorable conditions to implement such policy, we have seen that Black mayors benefit largely from soliciting the support of active groups who share their administration’s goals. These supportive groups may be the key determinant of a Black mayor’s success at such efforts.

The Independent Variables

Based on the literature, we can generate the following propositions about conditions under which Black mayors of non-majority Black cities are more or less likely to actively pursue policies and programs designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents:

More Likely

Proposition 1: Elected in liberal cities (Browning, Marshall and Tabb, 1984)

Proposition 3: Institutional and formal powers of a strong-mayor system (Svara 1994;

Pressman 1972)

Proposition 4: African-American predecessor(s) (Nelson 2007)

Proposition 6: Large White middle class population (Stone 1989)

Proposition 7: Active, mobilized and organized Black community (Nelson 2007, Burns

2006)

Proposition 8: Black City Council Members (Jones 1976; Karnig and Welch 1980) 42

Proposition 9: Major Newspaper Endorsements (Tate 2003; Burns 2006)

Proposition 10: Large proportion of Latinos

Less Likely

Proposition 2: Elected in racially divided election campaign (Metz and Tate 1995, Perry

1996)

Propositions 5: Large working class White population (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989)

In addition to propositions derived from the literature that are predicated to impact the likelihood of a Black mayor of a non-majority Black city to actively pursue Black interests, other factors may affect the degree to which Black mayors understand and respond to their Black constituents as well. Given the unique nature of city cultures

(Elazar 1972), every city unveils challenges to a mayor’s active pursuit of policies and programs. Some cities’ histories may require that mayors consult union leaders prior to any major policy development for certain local neighborhood communities. In other cities, the mayor may find him or herself more likely to pursue such policies if they have

party endorsement. When, for example, V. O. Key in Southern Politics wrote of the two party competitive politics environment, he argues that such a system is better suited to produce a guarantee of responsiveness, than is one-party dominance. In other words, when the electorate is conceivably given ‘political options,’ elected officials of a political party within a two-party system are more likely to be responsive to their supporters’ concerns. Additionally, district elections may influence the quality of representation residents receive on city councils and commissions because they are said to provide a closer connection between the office holder and the constituents than at-large elections

(Engstrom and McDonald 1986; Karnig 1976; Karnig and Welch 1982; Latimer 1979). 43

Moreover, a Black mayor’s active pursuit of policies for Blacks might take an

unconventional approach to avoid potential backlash. For example, these mayors might

seek out Black community-based organizations and neighborhood associations or groups

to illuminate Black interests and assist in the governance of the city (Orr 1999). Ferman

(1985) argues neighborhood and community groups play key roles as channeling agents

to achieve responsiveness for/from government leaders. By lobbying their interests,

responsiveness to their concerns is found is be more salient. Additionally, the public

official, in this case, a Black mayor is informed of the issues. While some argue the

limitations of their effectiveness (Peterson 1981, Jones and Bachelor 1993), the presence

of a strong and mobilized Black community and the shared racial experience between the

Black mayor and his or her Black constituents, tends to produce greater levels of

responsiveness to Black interests. Still, other scholars have found that traditionally

excluded groups use neighborhood organizations to gain attention, service and access to

government and that organizational resources empowered racial and ethnic minorities

25 (Orr 2007). 2

In contrast, scholars have noted that the urban politics literature has long focused

26 on ‘conventional’ channels (Burns 2006). 2 Browning, Marshall and Tabb (1984) found

that government effectively represents minorities when Blacks form active electoral

coalitions, win elected office, and comprise a significant part of a dominant, but liberal

governing coalition. The authors found that when Blacks are members of the dominant

25 The unconventional school is not without its critics. In some cases, governments have chosen to appease these groups through financial resource allocation. Also, some scholars suggest those who comprise neighborhood groups tend to be of a higher socioeconomic status or that these groups existed to maintain forms of residential segregation (Putnam 2000: 57). 26 The predominance of attention is devoted to electoral politics, leadership styles, and a public official’s responsiveness to a particular issue, often lacking a thorough analysis of mayoral governance. 44

coalition, cities were more likely to create civilian review boards of the police, increase

Black presence on boards and commissions and municipal employment and expand the

number of city contracts awarded to Blacks. Building on this research, other scholars

have found that the presence of Black elected representatives resulted in an increase of

Black personnel in the public sector, and had an impact on the effectiveness of fire and

police services and road and park conditions in Black communities (Button 1989).

Hence, the likelihood of responsiveness to Black interests appears to be most

salient with Blacks in key leadership roles such as the mayor’s office or city council.

Often, without the power of those positions the degree to which Blacks may expect

government to effectively respond to their interests is slim.

The dissertation applies the propositions and additional factors that may impact

Black mayors’ efforts to address Black interests to the selected case studies of medium- sized, non-majority Black cities of Dayton and Toledo, Ohio. In Toledo, the focus is on the tenure of the city’s first Black mayor, Jack Ford (2002-2006). In Dayton, the analysis centers on the tenure of Rhine McLin (2002-present), the city’s third African American mayor and its first female executive.

Dayton and Toledo, Ohio

The selection of Dayton and Toledo Ohio as case studies for the dissertation is significant. As the following map indicates, Dayton, in southwest Ohio, with a population of 155,461, and Toledo, in northwest Ohio, with a population of 295,029 are two cities comparable in population to many cities in which many Americans live: 45

Second, the cases of Dayton and Toledo are representative of a wave of Black mayors elected in other cities in Ohio in the twenty-first century. As the following table indicates, every major city identified in the map above has elected a Black mayor at the turn of the twenty-first century, beginning with the election of Michael Coleman, as mayor of Columbus in 1999:

21st Century Black Mayors in Ohio Term(s) Mayor City Notes 1999-present Michael Coleman Columbus City’s first Black mayor of Ohio’s largest city. 2002-2006 Jack Ford Toledo City’s first Black mayor; 2002-present Rhine McLin Dayton City’s first female mayor; 2006-present Mark Mallory Cincinnati City’s first popularly elected Black mayor 2006-present Frank Jackson Cleveland City’s third Black mayor

2006-present Jay Williams Youngstown City’s first Black mayor

Another reason why this research argues scholars and practitioners should care about two medium-sized cities in Ohio that have elected Black mayors with non-majority

Black populations is because the study of their efforts to actively pursue the interests of

Blacks in their cities will provide cues to Black mayors of cities with whom, scholars and 46

the general public are more familiar. While, as of 2008, a significant number of those mayors of larger cities govern majority Black cities, demographic trends suggest those

cities will be non-majority Black soon.

Changing Local Demographics and their Implications for Black Mayoral Politics

Changes in the U.S. population in the last two decades have eroded or are

potentially eroding a key variable in the election of Black mayors – a Black population

majority. With cities losing Black population while gaining Whites and Latinos, the

conditions under which Black candidates run for mayor in many U.S. cities is quite

different from the experience of the first elected Black mayors. For example, as the

following table indicates, Washington, D.C. has lost sixteen percent of its Black

population since 1990:

Washington, D.C. Population Change 1970-2006

Total Population Whites Blacks Latinos* N % N % % N % % N % % Change of Change of Change of Change Pop. Pop. Pop. 1970 756,510 205,272 27.1 517,382 68.4 15,108 0.2 1980 638,333 -15.7 171,768 27 -16.3 448,906 70.3 -13.2 17,679 2.8 17 1990 606,900 -4.9 179,667 29.7 4.6 399,604 65.9 -11 32,725 5.4 85.1 2000 572,059 -5.7 176,101 30.8 -2 343,312 60 -14 41,091 7.2 25.6 2006 581,530 1.7 200,395 34.5 13.8 322,105 55.4 -6.2 47,775 8.2 16.3

Since 2000, the Black population has decreased by six percent. Yet, during the same

time period, the District has experienced increases in White population, with a fourteen

percent increase since 2000. At the time of this writing, the District has a Black

population of fifty-five percent as compared to a Black population over seventy percent

27 in 1980. 2

27Washington Post, “D.C. May Be Losing Status As a Majority-Black City” May 17, 2007. 47

Atlanta, Georgia also has experienced a loss of Black population. Since 1990, the

White population has increased six percent, totaling thirty-seven percent of the

population. As the following table indicates, Black population during the same period

decreased nearly twelve percent, to fifty-five percent in 2006:

Atlanta, Georgia Population Change 1970-2006

Total Population Whites Blacks Latinos* N % N % % N % % N % % Change of Change of Change of Change Pop. Pop. Pop. 1970 496,973 234,402 47.2 245,361 49.4 7417 1.5 1980 425,022 -14.5 137,879 32.4 -41.2 282,911 66.6 15.3 5842 1.4 -21.2 1990 394,079 -7.3 122,377 31.1 -11.2 264,274 67.1 -6.6 7601 1.9 30 2000 416,474 5.7 138,352 33.2 13 255,689 61.4 -3.2 18720 4.5 146.3 2006 442,887 6.3 164,912 37.2 19.2 246,513 55.7 -3.6 26091 5.9 39.4

Between 1990 and 2006, the Latino population also increased to 2008 levels approaching

six percent. According to Atlanta mayor, Shirley Franklin, the Black population has shifted from nearly a two-thirds majority of seventy percent in 1980 to less than sixty

28 percent post 2000. 2 These data are suggestive of trends where, if they continue,

ambitious Black candidates for mayor will find their electoral coalitions comprised of

increased numbers of Whites and Latinos in areas where Blacks have dominated for

decades.

A decline in Black population across many cities is not the entire story, however.

In some cities, the total share of Black population has increased as many Whites moved

out, while the White population in other cities has declined (Brookings Institution 2000).

The White/Black dyad concerning population suggests varying shifts – some cities lose

Black population while gaining Whites; others cities lose White and Black population. In

28“Atlanta Mayor: Shrinking Black Population Could Hurt Social Policies,” Cox News Service, June 2, 2007 48

either event, the compelling story is the fluctuation of White and Black populations in

many U.S. cities, coupled with an increase in Latino population – although only marginal

in some cities. One of the most important observations, then, is a loss in the share of the

percentage of the total population for African Americans for many cities – whether or not

Black population declines -- but especially so, when it does.

Some scholars cite Blacks’ exit to the suburbs for the reason for numeric decline

(Frasure 2007). For example, Blacks in Washington, D.C. are said to be moving into

Prince George’s County, Maryland, whereas Atlanta, Georgia’s Blacks are said to be

moving into suburbs like Stone Mountain and Decatur. According to the U.S. Census

Bureau and survey reports, Newark, New Jersey had a Black population of near sixty

percent in 1990, yet in 2008 the Black population is fifty-three percent. Rising crime and

Black middle class exodus out of the city limits is cited as a possible reason for the

decline. New Orleans, Louisiana is another example, where, in part due to the 2005

Hurricane Katrina, Black population has declined. A survey commissioned by several

state agencies and reported in the New York Times indicates that the city pre-Katrina had

a Black population of sixty-seven percent, and post-Katrina, the population in 2008 is

approximately forty-six percent. Thus, while the reasons for decline in Black populations

across many cities vary, the fact of the decline in Blacks’ share of the population remains.

As a result, given the changing demographics in many cities, it is expected those

Black mayors will soon govern cities with non-majority Black populations, if they do not

already. Thus, one reason why it is important to study two medium-sized non-majority

Black cities and their Black mayors’ efforts to address Black interests is to contribute to

scholars’ understanding of the implications of the national trends. Given the entrenched 49

history of Black politics in many cities nationwide, even with the pending shift to non-

majority Black status, those mayors will likely be expected to continue to actively pursue

Black interests.

At issue, is how, if at all, the representation of Black interests is changing. The

demographic trends indicate that researchers may no longer be able to count on

descriptive characteristics as a proxy for a Black politician’s promotion of Black interests. With many cities changing from Black majority populations to Black minority populations, Black mayors will increasingly find themselves having difficulty justifying promotion of Black interests, at the exclusion of White and Latino interests, for example.

Given the increasing diversity of America’s population, the skill of advancing one group’s interests becomes more complex, especially when it comes to White v. Black or

Black v. Latino relative to the allocation of resources.

The Past and the Present

The nation’s first Black major-city mayors were elected, at the time, in non- majority Black cities. For example, at the time of Carl Stokes’ election as mayor of

Cleveland, Ohio in 1967, the city was majority Caucasian. At the time of Tom Bradley’s

election as mayor of Los Angeles, California in 1973, the city was majority Caucasian.

Given the literature of the first wave Black mayors and their efforts to address constituent

interests, a fair question to ask is, how this research differs. The answer is three-fold.

The first, already discussed, is that the cities chosen for this research, Dayton and Toledo,

Ohio are medium-sized cities, under-studied by scholars in the discipline in terms of

Black mayors’ active pursuit of Black interests. This is significant as city size and 50 culture affects the role of government and leadership development. As Bowers and Rich

(2000) find,

Although their small scale affects the resources available to middle-sized cities to promote their sustainability, their size also presents opportunity for quality mayoral leadership absent in big cities. Given medium-sized cities’ smaller and more geographically compact populations, their mayors possess the opportunity for a sustained relationship between their communities and themselves that is more intimate than that ever experienced by a president, governors of all but the smallest and more sparsely populated states, or big-city mayors. This close proximity to the inhabitants of their cities creates for these mayors, opportunities to aggressively engage in leadership (2-3).

The geographic and constituent composition of medium-sized cities is unique from larger cities. Thus, the potential for substantive changes in urban policies and programs that work to benefit Black residents is plausible and likely probable in the context of medium- sized cities with Black mayors.

Second, according to scholars, the advent of the twenty-first century has produced unique challenges of Black mayors not experienced by the first wave of Black mayors

(Nelson 2006). The unique challenges faced by Black mayors in the twenty-first century are centered on the economy:

The success of Black mayoral regimes in the twenty-first century will depend, in great measure, on the ability of Black mayors to recognize, and effectively respond to, changes in the economic environments of state and federal governments. The fiscal problems that confront Black mayors today are far different from those faced by the first wave of Black mayors in the 1960s and 1970s (Nelson 2006, 125-126).

Thus, macro problems, like the economy and globalization, according to Nelson, make the challenges faced by modern era Black mayors unique from those of the first wave.

While some challenges are unique to the century, others like, high expectations, to work on behalf of the less-privileged, remains: 51

The twenty-first century presents to Black mayors both challenges and opportunities. Black mayors are expected to be agents of change who posses the power and authority to radically alter both the structure and distributional impact of urban decision-making . . . Standing at the center of the local governing process, Black mayors must be frontline fighters in the efforts to litigate the negative impact of devolution in the federal system on the social and economic status of the poor and minorities in 29 cities. 2

The presence of high expectations has remained constant over time. The high expectations that accompanied the election of Black mayors in mayor U.S. cities in the

1960s and 1970s, is because as one scholar put it, “represents, in many respects the

extension of the Black Civil Rights Movement in the South into the dynamic terrain of

30 city politics.” 2

Hence, a third reason why this research differs from scholarship on the first wave

of Black mayors elected in non-majority Black cities is that the context in which the first wave mayors campaigned for mayor was racially divisive. The expectations of Blacks of their Black mayors were partly the result of the electoral style embraced by Black mayoral candidates who articulated campaign positions purposely designed to mobilize

Black voters. As Nelson and Meranto (1977, 340) note, “the waging of emotionally stimulating campaigns is a key ingredient in the mobilization effort in the black community that must be made to elect a black man to the mayorship.” For example, when Detroit’s Coleman Young was first elected in 1973, he campaigned largely on the issue of police-community relations, promising that if elected he would “put more Blacks in blue” and rein in a White-dominated police department many Black Detroiters viewed as an occupational army (Rich 1989). Young’s campaign rhetoric was a mobilizing force for Black Detroiters.

29 Ibid, 138. 30 Ibid, 122. 52

Metz and Tate (1995, 264) observed of mayoral candidates in racially divisive

urban campaigns that, “black candidates . . . emphasize race in order to augment their

chances of winning. Since blacks, given their demographic profile as a group, often vote at lower rates than whites, race is generally used by black candidates as a means of galvanizing and mobilizing the black voters in the city.” Kleppner articulates this dynamic with the 1983 mayoral election of Chicago’s first Black mayor, Harold

Washington. Kleppner, who also examined the racial appeal of Washington’s White opponent, writes that Washington’s original strategy to campaign as a candidate for everyone, like his two White opponents did in the primary, was reversed when his attempts at gaining much White and Latino support seemed not to be fruitful, in large part due to his racially polarizing campaign slogan.

As a result, Washington “began to present himself as a symbol of black pride and progress” (Metz and Tate 1995, 264). Kleppner (1985, 210) writes that Washington told a largely Black audience on the campaign trail that, “We have given the white candidates our vote for years and years and years. Now, it’s our turn . . . it’s our turn . . . it’s our turn.” In fact, the phrase “it’s our turn” became Washington’s campaign slogan. As

Washington, himself noted of the slogan, “every group, when it reaches a certain population percentage, automatically takes over . . . they don’t apologize . . . they just

31 move in and take over.” 3 Atlanta’s first Black mayor, Maynard Jackson campaigned on

a similar message in his first bid for election in 1973. As Thompson (2006, 58) notes of

Jackson’s campaign strategy: “his early image [was] as an advocate of Atlanta’s

predominantly poor black community.” Jackson made direct efforts to appeal to the

Black community.

31 Ibid, 155. 53

Colburn (2001, 33) observed that, generally speaking, “economic issues dominated campaign platforms of . . . black mayors. In nearly every campaign they called for programs to enhance economic development, recruit new businesses, and develop enterprise zones.” These strategies were undoubtedly geared toward mobilizing

Black voters who often lived in deteriorated economic conditions:

The stagflation of the 1970s followed by mounting unemployment in the 1970s and 1980s, stagnating personal incomes, the out-migration of the white and black middle class in the 1970s and 1980s and the transformation of the national economy from industry to service and high technology, nearly devastated the old industrial inner cities . . . Black residents felt these pressures more than most.

Thus, “the rhetoric of campaigns in black neighborhoods was rooted initially in

32 the civil rights movement and in an emerging black consciousness.” 3 Coleman Young and Harold Washington are just two examples of Black mayors who in their campaigns for mayor were successful in mobilizing Black votes by heightening expectations of them. As Nelson explains, “the first wave of Black mayors came into office in an environment of widespread and deep-seated racial polarization and conflict. Political mobilization in the Black community was fueled by bruising conflicts over open housing and public education policies in cities” (Nelson 2006, 123). The first wave of Black mayors was elected under racially volatile conditions and they were expected to serve

Black constituencies.

However, it is because of the racial climate in which many were elected that any efforts they may have made on behalf of their Black residents must be analyzed with caution (Thompson 2006). Caution is required because as the first Black mayors elected in these cities, their elections were viewed as watershed events and therefore, as an

32 Ibid, 37. 54

immediate opportunity to make a substantive impact on the Black community. The

mayors felt the burden of the expectations associated with their Black residents. Winning

office in part due to the high percentages of Black support, many mayors felt enormous

pressure to make substantive socioeconomic changes in the Black community and

pursued policies and programming to realize that goal. Yet, many were unsuccessful, especially in efforts with the Black poor: “What did (Jackson) do for [poor blacks]? Not a lot. They were poor in 1973, they were poor eight years later at the end of his term, and

they’re still poor” (Lucas 1988 quoted in Thompson 2006). Consequently, what makes

the turn to this non-majority Black context significant in this twenty-first century era is

that the responsibility and expectations attributed to a Black mayor’s election is

heightened or at least remains constant vis-à-vis the 1960s and 1970s, even though

modern era mayors face challenges unique to the twenty-first century, and govern with in

a more favorable racial climate.

The twenty-first century has produced Black mayors who did not run or

experience as racially divisive campaigns as the first wave of Black mayors. In fact, the

shift in racial understanding in the American political landscape in the twenty-first

century is as one scholar suggests, a “social transformation” (Cunnigen 2006). Though,

the prolonged history of racial discrimination and prejudice remains in the minds of some

Americans, resulting in Cunnigen to conclude that

The role of black leadership [in the twenty-first century] should begin with the acknowledgement of its limitations. The limitations include the leadership’s inability to solve every conceivable problem facing the [black] community. It should recognize that the black community’s 33 problems are American problems that require an American solution. 3

33 Ibid. 55

For Cunnigen, the problems in the Black community in the modern era are problems that

impact the lives of others. It follows, then, that others should be involved in solving the problems.

In the modern era of the twenty-first century, given the unique challenges facing

Black mayors, they, like all public officials, have a responsibility to work on behalf of all

of their constituents. This is not to suggest however, that specific goals and policies can

not be directed toward a particular constituency. For example, many mayors direct

policies toward specific groups in the form of libraries, pools, schools, and park

development in certain neighborhoods. Moreover, many mayors address the needs of

Blacks by tending to problems in their neighborhoods. They rally and rely on other city

leaders and citizens to exercise genuine custodial concern for a neighborhood whether or

not one’s own. A major contribution of this research is to examine in two cities how

actively pursued are these Black mayoral types of efforts and activities on behalf of

Blacks

Black Mayors and the Representation of Black Interests in Medium-Sized Cities

Scholars Bowers and Rich (2000) argue that governing medium-sized cities

presents unique challenges and opportunities for all mayors. The study of Black mayors

of medium-sized cities is no different. Of the dozens of Black mayors in office at the

time of this writing, a dozen meet the criteria for medium-sized cities (populations

between 100,000 and 500,000):

Medium-Sized Cities with Black Mayors

Mayor City Total Population % Black Mark L. Mallory Cincinnati 331,285 42.9 Byron W. Brown Buffalo 292,648 37.2 Corey A Booker Newark 273,546 53.5 56

Bernard Kincaid Birmingham 242,820 73.5 Melvin “Kip” Holden Baton Rouge 227,818 50 Samuel Jones Mobile 198,915 46.3 Cedirck B. Glover Shreveport 198,874 51 L. Douglas Wilder Richmond 197,790 57.2 William V. Bell Durham 187,035 43.8 Frank Melton Jackson 184,256 70.6 Rhine McLin Dayton 166,179 43.1 John Marks Tallahassee 150,624 34.2

Of the twelve mayors, half are mayors of non-majority Black cities. However, how Black mayors have actively pursued policies designed to improve the quality of life of Blacks in medium-sized cities is limited. The existing scholarship often confines critical analyses of Black mayors’ efforts in behalf of Black to particular issues. For example, Bowers and Baker (2000) examine the efforts by Rochester, New York’s first

Black mayor (1994-2006), William A. Johnson, Jr., in respect to education reform. Perry

(2000) examines the efforts by Mayor Richard Arrington, Jr., Birmingham, Alabama’s first Black mayor (1979-1999) in respect to crime and public safety. Grenell and Gabris

(2000) examine the efforts by Mayor Charles Box (1989-2001), the first Black mayor of

Rockford, Illinois as it related to economic development.

The issue-specific examples of Arrington, Johnson, and Box as Black mayors of

medium-sized cities, this research argues, is insufficient in its scope to make reasonable

conclusions about the mayors’ effort to create programs and policies designed to improve

the quality of life of Black residents. The issue-specific scholarship of medium-sized city

mayors’ governance does make a significant contribution to our understanding of

medium-sized cities in that it demonstrates “when mayors of middle-sized cities exercise

strong and vigorous leadership, they and their cities are better able to weather and

mitigate the negative forces threatening their sustainability than are mayors who lead less 57

energetically” (Bowers and Rich 2000: 3). However, the impact Black mayors have (or

not) on their Black residents’ general quality of life has yet to be examined in detail.

The following detailed chapters on Toledo and Dayton, Ohio, examines the Black mayors of these medium-sized non-majority Black cities and their efforts to actively

pursue policies and programs designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents.

Case studies of these two cities provide evidence of the conditions under which Black

mayors on non-majority Black medium-sized cities may represent Black interests. Future

research has the opportunity to expand on the case studies of Dayton, and Toledo Ohio,

to include other Black mayors and their efforts to represent Black interests within the context of medium-sized cities.

58

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63

CHAPTER THREE: THE HISTORY OF RACE AND POLITICS IN TOLEDO, OHIO History of Toledo

Described by native Toledoan and author P.J. O’Rourke as a city “in the middle

34 of nowhere,” 3 Toledo, Ohio is not often the study of significant research and

scholarship. However, Toledo has a rich history. Nestled in Lucas County, in the

northwest corner of Ohio, a few miles south of what is now the Michigan border, Toledo

developed as a city, as a result of a “war.”

Labeled the Toledo War, or the Ohio-Michigan war, early settlers fought without

bloodshed from 1835-1836 over which state had rights to the area. The genesis of the

war was in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 which set the southern boundary of

Michigan territory at the line drawn from the southern tip of Lake Michigan, east to

where it meets Lake Erie. Yet, later surveys determined the southern tip of Lake

Michigan was further north than where previously located (Porter 1987, 27). Between

1787 and 1834, three different surveys were conducted each resulting in unique lines.

The various surveys had, in effect, created an area of approximately 450 square miles

between the territory of Michigan and the state of Ohio, what became known as the

35 Toledo Strip. 3

In 1812, Congress authorized a survey of the boundary and hoped to end the

dispute, as both the governor of Michigan’s territory and the state of Ohio claimed

ownership. The War of 1812, however, prevented the survey from taking place. Two

additional surveys were conducted in subsequent decades by Ohio and Michigan. In

1833, however, the United States Senate sided with Ohio, while the House of

34 All Things Considered, National Public Radio, March 18, 2007. Commentary on his book, Good Roots: Writers Reflect on Growing Up in Ohio. 35 http://www.toledowar.com/ 64

36 Representatives refused to endorse the Senate's view. 3 The Governor of the Michigan

Territory, Stevens Mason, proposed the formation of a commission to negotiate a solution. Yet, Governor Robert Lucas of Ohio refused and in 1835, the Ohio legislature

37 formed Lucas County out of the disputed territory. 3

In response, Governor Mason dispatched his territory’s militia to the disputed

land. Governor Lucas responded in kind, sending Ohio's militia. Mason asked President

Andrew Jackson to intervene who sent two representatives to negotiate a peaceful

resolution to the conflict. The federal government's representatives suggested Ohio and

Michigan jointly govern the territory until the United States Congress could decide the

issue. However, Mason refused, intensifying the potential for bloodshed. As a result,

38 President Jackson removed Mason as governor of the Michigan Territory. 3 John Horner

replaced Mason. Horner worked with Lucas to reach a conclusion. On June 15, 1836,

President Jackson ratified an agreement between the two governors. Under the

agreement, Ohio would receive the disputed area and the Michigan Territory would

become a state and would receive nine thousand square miles of the Upper Peninsula to

Michigan. However, Michigan’s first ‘convention of assent’ in Ann Arbor on September

26th, refused to comply with the Act of June 15th. Michigan finally conceded on

December 14, 1836 at its second ‘convention of assent’ in Ann Arbor, and was formally

39 admitted into the Union as the twenty-sixth state on January 26, 1837. 3 The

compromise gave the Toledo Strip to Ohio, allowing Toledo to be incorporated as a city

36 http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/entry.php?rec=562 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid, 28. 39“The war between Michigan and Ohio,” by Tom Jones, The Detroit News, May 21, 2000 65

within the state of Ohio on January 7, 1837, and the western two-third of the present-day

Upper Peninsula was given to Michigan (Porter 1987).

Toledo’s Political Culture

Toledo is of special note since it is part of a state with a unique and varied

political culture. Elazar (1972) generally describes the political culture of the state of

40 Ohio as individualistic. 3 This designation suggests government involvement, in the

view of its residents’ private activities is limited, especially in economic affairs. Rather,

government solely exists to serve the demands of the people.

However, Elazar also provides the distribution of political cultures throughout

regions within Ohio, and upon close examination, it is found that the Toledo area, as it is

close to Michigan (a state Elazar labels as moralistic) exudes strong traces of a moralistic

41 culture. 4 While the individualistic nature generalized throughout the state is present,

morality takes precedence in northwest Ohio. The moralistic political culture emphasizes

the good of society. Hereby, good government is measured by the degree to which it

promotes the public good. The culture of Toledo is significant to understanding the

progression of racial relations and the ebbs and flow of racial tension in Toledo

throughout the mid-to-late twentieth century. In other words, if the culture of the city’s

majority residents is that government actions should benefit the good of society for

everyone, then it is thereby assumed that government attention to race-specific or

perceived activity will be met with suspicion.

40 Hero (1998, 9) tackles Elazar’s political culture typology on the basis that it is limiting because it is based on his research of people mostly of European background. Hero prefers instead, a social diversity perspective, which contends that much of state politics and policy is related to racial and ethnic diversity. Instead of an individualistic, moralistic and traditionalist typology, Hero advocates a homogeneity, heterogeneity, and bifurcation typology that he says is more appropriate to the nature of state politics. 41 Correspondingly, each of Mayor Ford’s State of the City Addresses began and ended with some reference to clergy, God, or prayer 66

42 Early Black History in Toledo 4

At the time of the Toledo war, African Americans were few in number. Like with

many urban northern cities, an influx of Black population did not occur until the

historical period known as the great migration. Toledo was not unique. However, the

rapid growth of Toledo, because of its vast influx of Blacks, was unique. Between 1910

and 1930, the Black population in Toledo increased nearly 336 percent, to approximately

13,360 residents. During the same period, the city’s total population only grew 64

percent (Williams 1980, 5).

The majority of the Black newcomers were no longer residents of the Midwest, as

had been most common previously. Rather, they came in greater numbers from the

southwest and deep south. According to Williams, three forces contributed to the growth

of the Black community:

There were . . . at least three distinctive forces that found a place in the growth of such a community as black Toledo during the two decades after 1910. One set ‘pulled’ blacks ever northward. A second set, the brutalities in the south (both mental and physical), ‘pushed’ many Afro- Americans out of their native states. Still a third set, the loss of both a 43 ‘sense of community’ and the prospects of the unknown was at work . . . 4

The growth of the Black community in Toledo in the first three decades of the twentieth century was met with a decline in the number of foreign born Whites settling in Toledo.

According to Williams,

42 For additional information on early Black Toledo not covered here, see John Hinehart’s Master’s Thesis, “The Negro In a Congested Toledo Area,” Bowling Green State University, 1940; Johnson, Everett, “A Study of Negro Families in the Pinewood Avenue District of Toledo, Ohio,” Opportunity: Journal of Negro Life, VII (New York, National Urban League, August, 1929), 243-45; The Toledo Chapter of the NAACP: “Containment of Minority Groups Through Housing,” (Unpublished pamphlet, Local History Room, Toledo-Lucas County Public Library); Williams, B.F., “Interracial Activities in Toledo,” The Southern Workman V. 54 (April, 1925: 162-65); Wheaton, Emmett L., “The Social Status of the Negro in Toledo, Ohio,” Unpublished Master’s Thesis, University of Toledo, 1927 43 Ibid, 9. 67

By 1914 . . . the number of foreign born whites to the city is suggestive of the coming availability of increased economic prospects, even as common laborers, for black newcomers. Around the turn of the twentieth century, more than 12,300 foreign born whites entered Toledo . . . but dropped to 44 around 2,200 from 1925-1930. 4

However, well before Toledo’s Black population reached such significant numbers,

Toledoans expressed discontent about the perceived inevitable migration. In the Toledo

Riot of 1862, a White mob of striking dock workers attempted to drive Blacks from the

45 city. 4 Increased tensions resulted in the local NAACP being established in 1915. And

in 1917, the city’s leading newspaper, The Toledo Blade, lamented to its readers to accept

“Negro immigration as a permanent dilution of the white population.” These and related

46 incidents, were known as ‘Negrophobia.’ 4

By 1930, after the significant migration of Blacks to Toledo nearly concluded,

Blacks were employed in semi-skilled professions at increasingly higher rates. Eighty-

two percent of porters were Black, and thirty-one percent of janitors were Black. Sixty-

one percent servants were Black females, and sixty-two percent were elevator operators

(Williams 1980, 22). While these positions cannot be classified as white collar

occupations, for many Blacks from the agrarian south, the positions were a welcomed

economic boost.

Only 4.6 percent of the total Toledo population in 1930, the Black community

was growing as a result of the slowly-improved economic condition. African Americans

began to mobilize and organize their community. As a sign of growth in the community,

44 Ibid, 10. 45 Levstik, Frank R. “The Toledo Riot of 1962: A Study of Midwest Negrophobia,” Northwest Ohio Quarterly, XLIV, (Fall 1972) 46 Not all Toledoans were anti-Blacks, however. According to a speech commemorating the 99th anniversary of the NAACP, U.S. Senator Sherrod Brown noted that. “The call for this conference in 1909 was designed to take stock of the progress since the end of the Civil War. Among the 60 organizers was the mayor of Toledo, Ohio.” That mayor was Brand Whitlock. 68 the first Black church in Toledo, Warren A.M.E. Church, established in 1847 with a few members, purchased a new building in 1943, and moved into it in 1950 with over one-

47 hundred members and fanfare of twenty-five automobiles. 4

African Americans became increasingly more visible in high profile roles. James

Slater Gibson was the first Black attorney in the city law department installed in 1934.

James B. Simmons, Jr., a Toledo resident since 1935, a member of Warren A.M.E.

Church and recent graduate of the University of Toledo Law School, was elected the first

Black Toledo City councilman in 1945 under Toledo’s former proportional representation system for city council elections with a ninth place finish, having raised $2,100 for the effort. Come re-election in 1947, he finished fourth, and in 1949, he finished third. In

1959, he was elected by Council as the first Black vice-mayor, a position held until he decided not to seek re-election in 1961 (Kaptur 1990). Simmons is the earliest example of a leader in the Black community.

A founder of the Mass Movement League, an organization devoted to pursuing the civil rights of African Americans, Simmons was active in the early days of civil rights protests in Toledo. At one such event in November 1942, prior to his election on council, the organization protested against unfair practices throughout the city against Blacks.

The picket line protest resulted in fifty police officers standing watch and the injury of a

Black pregnant woman. The protest was a catalyst for a movement in Toledo and later

Simmons’s call for justice drew a crowd of over 1,500 at a local Black community service agency, the Frederick Douglass Community Association (Kaptur 1990).

Simmons is credited with forcing local hospitals, cab companies, telephone companies,

47 http://www.warren-ame.org/history.html 69

and manufacturing companies to hire more African Americans and in prominent

positions.

Other early Black trailblazers include, Emory Leverette who was chosen as a

48 principal within the Toledo Public Schools in 1955. 4 Hence, within a few decades,

Blacks made significant strides in highly visible roles throughout the city. However, as the 1970s approached, even with increasing Black population and some Blacks serving in key roles, Toledo was not immune from the tumultuous post-civil rights decade that has characterized the larger Black American experience - socioeconomic problems persisted.

Race and Politics in Toledo in the Latter Twentieth Century

In 1987, the New York Times chronicled the work of Rev. H.V. Savage, a White

Toledoan who opened a Kitchen for the Poor in 1969 as a “free food center in the heart of

Toledo’s black district as a temporary measure until economic gains took root from civil

49 rights laws and Government antipoverty programs.” 4 As stated in the New York Times,

two decades later, while some Blacks moved up the economic ladder, the concentration

of Black poverty in Toledo had spread significantly.

However, Savage’s efforts in 1969 were well conceived given that twenty percent

of Toledo Black population lived below poverty at the time. In 1970, 10,531 Toledo

Blacks lived in poverty neighborhoods when the Black population was 52, 925. By 1980,

the Black poor grew to 16,019, and the number has since increased. The conditions

under which Savage created the Kitchen for the Poor in Toledo were volatile racial times.

In that same year, on September 18, 1970, 33-year old, three-year White police officer

48 “Trailblazers topple local racial barriers: Black leaders reflect on their journeys,” The Toledo Blade, February 1, 2009 49 “Black Poverty Spreads In 50 Biggest U.S. Cities,” New York Times, John Herbers, January 26, 1987 70

William Miscannon was killed by a gun shot at point-blank range from a silver handgun while on duty in front of the Toledo Black Panthers headquarters in the 1300 block of

50 Dorr Street in Toledo’s Black community. 4 Shooting continued for over an hour. Troy

Montgomery, sixteen years old, and a member of the Black Panthers, was injured. John

McClellan, twenty-five years old, and a member of the Black Panthers, was arrested and charged with the shooting. According to Panther biographer Ward Churchill, the events

51 can be described as a raid: 5

The fusillade fired by fifty police officers during the second raid wounded two Panthers, ostensibly in response to Panther gunfire. None of the Panthers was arrested for their supposed assault, however, and even Police Chief Anthony Bosch later expressed doubts as to whether his men’s cover story was accurate. The pretext for the raid was to arrest a Panther named John McClellan for killing a police officer, William Miscannon (66).

Yet, McClellan was tried in two trials, both ending in hung juries. While Miscannon’s partner testified he saw McClellan shoot Miscannon, a waitress from a nearby restaurant said the partner was dining at the time. One Black officer, a former partner of Miscannon and also on the scene at the time of incident, “had pulled across the street after talking

52 with Officer Miscannon moments before the shooting occurred.” 5 He later testified for

John McClellan. After the two hung juries, a federal judge eliminated the possibility of a third trial, citing double jeopardy. McClellan has always maintained his innocence.

The 1970s and 1980s drew increased Black political activity, largely not seen since Simmons began to focus on his legal career in 1962. In 1971, an African

American, Bill Copeland was elected business manager of Laborers’ International Union

50 “Toledo police officer killed in 1970 shooting,” The Toledo Blade, February 21, 2007 51 http://propagandhi.com/wp-content/empires/Ward_Churchill.pdf 52 “Retiring TPD officer never forgot first lessons on force,” The Toledo Blade, Laren Weber, January 2, 2009 71 of North America, Inc. Local 500, a construction-based union with approximately one thousand local members. In 1974, Copeland ran for Toledo City Council and won. That same year, George Davis, Jr., an African American, was elected president of the

53 American Motor Inter-corporation Council. 5 In 1983, Copeland was elected by council as Vice-Mayor, the second Black person to hold that title. Two years later, in 1985,

Copeland became the first African American elected to a county office, with his election

54 as Lucas County Recorder. 5

In 1986, Jack Ford, forty years of age, and the executive director of Substance

Abuse Services, Inc., and president of the Mental Health Agency Insurance Trust, was

55 nominated by the Lucas County Democratic Party to fill a vacancy on city council. 5 An

African American had not been on council since Copeland left the body and was elected

County Recorder. However, after a tie vote on council considering the vacancy in

January 1987, Ford withdrew his name from consideration, and decided to run for

56 election to council in the November election. 5 At the time of his election, he is cited as supporting the development of “more and different” recreation programs for youth, and an increased police focus on drugs. He said, “I’m a social worker and I’m interested in

53 Interview, July 1, 2008; Davis later was elected on the executive committee of the Jeep Unit of United Auto Workers Local 12, where he served as Vice Chair and Chair. For more than fifty years he served as a Chief Steward at Jeep. He also served as first vice-president of the local NAACP from 1977-1982 and 1990-1992; he has been a precinct committeeman of the Lucas County Democratic Party for decades, an organization for which he served as vice-chair from 1990-2004 54Five years later, in 1990, Copeland was appointed to the Board of Lucas County Commissioners, again making history as the first African-American County Commissioner. For many years, he was the only African-American serving on a board of county commissioners among Ohio’s eighty-eight counties. He served until his retirement in 2002. Phil Copeland, Bill Copeland’s nephew, succeeded him as the leader of Local 500, winning the election of secretary-treasurer in 1985, a position he still holds. After Bill Copeland’s retirement from the Lucas County Commissioners in 2002, an at-large Toledo city councilwoman was endorsed by the Lucas County Democratic party to replace Copeland, who soon thereafter passed. In 2005, Phil Copeland was appointed to fill another at-large vacancy left on city council, by a departing member who was elected to the Lucas County Commissioners. 55 “Democrats Back Ford for Furney Seat on Council,” The Toledo Blade, December 19, 1986 56 “Ford Withdraws Name For Vacant Council Seat,” The Toledo Blade, January 12, 1987 72

getting a little bit more of a social worker’s philosophy on Council in delivering

57 services.” 5

But the rise of the city’s third Black member of city council did not yield

immediate improvement of Blacks’ lives and their treatment. Corroborating the political advancement of Toledo’s Blacks in the 1970s and 1980s was an increasingly racially polarizing environment. With the advent of a new self-appointed Black community

leader in Rev. Floyd Rose, the founder and pastor of Family Baptist Church since 1979,

Blacks in Toledo began to mobilize. One year after Ford assumed his new role on

Council, a group of ten Black local ministers, two non-clergymen, and the NAACP were

arrested at a city council meeting for occupying the seats reserved for city officials and

th 58 refusing to leave for ninety minutes on June 28 , 1988. 5

The group was protesting the suspension of four Black city workers in the

community development department for alleged mismanagement of funds. The Renewal

Commissioner within the department who was Black, Bernard ‘Pete’ Culp and the

brother of a local prominent Black pastor was fired as commissioner and the director was demoted. The group staged a protest claiming that the accusation of mismanagement was really about the city’s priorities for the distribution of the federal government’s

Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) funds versus the federal government’s stated priorities. According to Culp’s supporters: “The men who got fired had actually been in charge of award-winning urban renewal developments, like

59 Washington Village, which was what the funds were supposed to be used for.” 5 A

57 “Step Up Drug Fight, Council Hopeful Urges,” The Toledo Blade, October 1, 1987 58 “5 Toledo Ministers Go On Trial Over Bias Protest,” The New York Times, December 20, 1988 59 “How a 1988 Protest Against City Council Shaped a Civil Rights Journey,” Matt Cummings, The City Paper, November 19, 2008 73

White councilman expressed to the local paper, The Toledo Blade, at the time that, “It’s an old story that they can’t do any wrong because they’re black. We have to hire blacks because of affirmative action, but the problem is, once you do and they screw up you

60 can’t get rid of them.” 5 The five Black Toledo ministers that were arrested and charged

61 with obstructing official business went on trial over the bias protest. 6

For many in the Black community, the suspension of workers in the community development department was just the ‘climax’ to a host of other issues. For example, the

Associated Press reported in the New York Times in August 1988 that a federal lawsuit was filed on behalf of nineteen year old Walter Wade Jr. of Toledo with the purpose of

“seeking an end to a new Police Department policy of randomly stopping and questioning

62 black teenagers.” 6 The policy’s inception began with a letter from then-Police Chief

Martin Felker to members of a historic neighborhood association, the Old West End,

which instructed a deputy chief to “pay close attention to groups of black juveniles” and

“officers are to stop and identify these youths so that in the event an occurrence does take

63 place, investigators will have the names of the juveniles.” 6 The policy was supported by

Republican Mayor Donna Owens and City Manager Philip Hawkey. Meanwhile, acting

staff director of the Federal Commission on Human Rights Melvin Jenkins said of the

policy: “When you look at Toledo, you’ve got to look at the police’s chief’s policy. It

64 was Neanderthal.” 6

60 “How a 1988 Protest Against City Council Shaped a Civil Rights Journey,” Matt Cummings, The City Paper, November 19, 2008 61 “5 Toledo Ministers,” Times, 1988. 62 “Toledo is Sued Over Random Stopping of Blacks,” The New York Times, August 14, 1988 63 Ibid. 64 “5 Toledo Ministers,” Times, 1988. 74

Then-city council member Jack Ford tried to strike a moderate approach in an

effort to defuse the situation. Ford, according to a Toledo Blade editorial attempted to

encourage the ministers to stop their ‘counterproductive’ strategy, while at the same time,

encourage then-Mayor Owens, Manager Hawkey and fellow city council members to

65 reach out to the Black ministers, the Black community and their concerns. 6 In a separate

incident in 1989, a group of approximately seventy-five protestors attended a city council

meeting on July 18th to highlight the “alleged discriminatory hiring and promotion by the

66 city and alleged racist statements by Fire Chief William Winkle.” 6 Ford took action in

that effort too, saying at the time, that “there clearly is underutilization of women and

67 minorities.” 6

The result of these incidents in the late 1980s was two-fold. On the one hand, the

incidents resulted in the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to investigate, writing a report

68 on race relations and municipal Black employment in Toledo. 6 The efforts resulted in a

city affirmative action plan showing that, of the 3,045 employees in 1988-1989, Blacks

and other minorities accounted for twenty-two percent of all city employees, women at

69 twenty-one percent. 6 Dividing the city workforce into eight categories, the report

established a template for future measurements of city personnel. Not surprisingly, the

report found that women were underrepresented in the administrative, protective services,

skilled craft, and service maintenance categories, while being over-represented in the

office/clerical category. Similarly, minorities, who were mostly Black at the time, were

65 “Mr. Ford Has a Point,” The Toledo Blade, August 8, 1988 66 “Affirmative-action plan drafted, held,” Norris P. West, Toledo Blade, July 19, 1989 67 Ibid. 68 “Race Relations in Toledo: A Summary Report of a Community Forum” Ohio State Advisory Committee Report, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 34 pages, 1989 69 “Affirmative-action plan drafted, held,” Norris P. West, Toledo Blade, July 19, 1989 75 underrepresented in the administrative and professionals category, while the largest percentage worked in maintenance. The second largest percentage of Blacks worked in the police and fire departments, where eighteen percent of the total workforce in the departments was African Americans.

Finally, the commission’s plan directed that the city administration “would direct all city departments, divisions, and agencies to develop one-year and five-year affirmative action goals and objectives along with their budgets. The human resources

70 director would correct problems [and] ensure compliance.” 6 While the plan was viewed as a success by Toledo’s Black leaders, they continued to bring attention to issues in the

Black community. Hence, an additional result of the council incidents was a ministers’ boycott of local businesses, beginning with a major hotel chain in a key shopping district, which had no Blacks in upper management, resulting the exodus of Black bowlers of the

National Bowling Association convention staying at the hotel in November 1988.

Jack Ford on City Council

At the time of the 1980s and 1990s racial incidents in Toledo, Jack Ford was either on city council or a member of the Ohio House of Representatives, and in both cases, an active advocate on behalf of the interests of African Americans. His service on council, however, is most significant as many of the programs and policies supported were in place once he was elected mayor. Jack Ford’s initiatives on city council largely included his support of inclusion, diversity, fairness, and social justice, especially as it related to employment with the city, youth programming and the health welfare of

Toledo. Many of those efforts happened to coincide with the racial turmoil in the Black community. However, Ford’s positions on these issues were not only a result of strained

70 Ibid. 76

race relations in Toledo. Rather, Ford’s background as a social worker drew him to these

issues independent of the status of race relations.

Immediately after taking office in 1987 as the sole minority representative on city

council, Jack Ford started advocating for key issues on behalf of Blacks. His first major

proposal, proposed renaming the downtown Cherry Street Bridge, connecting Toledo’s

east and west side via the Maumee River for Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. According

to The Toledo Blade, in so doing, Ford, “succeeded in a few minutes in accomplishing

what others had failed to achieve for a year or more – winning agreement on naming an

71 appropriate civic memorial for Dr. King.” 7 Additionally, Ford cited the city manager

system as a structure that limits the opportunities for women and minorities, and supported a strong-mayor grassroots movement to change Toledo’s form of

representation. Ford is quoted saying of the city manager role that:

What a lot of citizens want is a rock’em-sock’em mayor. Toledo is not a city manager town. Not in the 1980s . . .Under a city manager form of government . . . the black community is tolerated, but is treated to reservation-type politics where they’re lumped together and told this is your thing to do, just don’t jump the fence . . . The city manager can say ‘I 72 don’t give a damn what the public thinks.’ 7

Ford did not immediately get his wish in 1988. Ford even encountered detachment from members of the Black middle class community who felt earlier attempts for a strong

mayor form of government were ignored by city officials: “’I would be very careful about

giving too much power to the folk downtown without them giving something back to us in the form of a district plan,’ said Kenneth Spruce, founder of the Study Group, which

73 describes itself as a community-oriented black think tank.” 7 Recognizing the initial

71 “King Bridge: A Symbolic Span, The Toledo Blade, January 15,1988 72 “Councilman Renews Call for Strong-Mayor in City,” Dave Murray, The Toledo Blade, March 17, 1988 73 “Strong-mayor plan draws skepticism,” Mark Zaborney, The Toledo Blade, October 27, 1988 77

sense of skepticism from fellow Blacks, Ford replied in a community gathering where he

attempted to draw support that,

Strong mayor brings our political and administrative government closer to the people. But there is a responsibility that has to be matched by the electorate. The black community will not only have to register strongly, it will have to vote more. The day that black folks stop being foolish about not voting and begin to meet their civic duty, you’ll see an automatic turnaround in responsiveness from city hall and county government 74 because candidates look at that closely. 7

The issue went before voters on November 8, 1988 and was not passed. Similarly, strong

mayor plans were rejected in 1937, 1946, 1957, 1959 and 1986, though with the margin

75 of defeat shrinking from 33,809 votes in 1957 to 8,137 votes in 1986. 7

Meanwhile, Ford actively discussed race relations in the city during his first year

on council. In a speech to the Jewish Federation of Greater Toledo, two weeks before the

strong mayor vote, Ford commented that race relations had never been “at as low an ebb

76 as it is right now.” 7 Rekindling support for a failed effort that attempted to establish an

Urban League in 1984, Ford said in 1989 that, “I think we could use an Urban League in

this town,” and “unless opportunities are open for black men and women to exercise

77 control . . . the community will never be strong.” 7

Key legislative agenda items of Ford’s first year on council, included proposing

an ordinance to make it illegal to sell drug paraphernalia used to consume illegal drugs,

promoting a “guerilla-type war” effort against drugs and an increase police effort to

tackle communities plagued by drugs. Also, he proposed an ordinance, the first for any

74 Ibid. 75 “Strong-mayor issue is ‘dead duck’ if voters don’t pass it, Ford says,” Jeff Harrington, The Toledo Blade, October 5, 1988; Data to determine how Black districts (wards 8, 13, and 14) voted in respect to the strong mayor ballot initiatives were unavailable from the Lucas County Board of Elections. According to officials, records are not kept “that far back.” 76 “Leadership called key in black community,” Jim Saunders, The Toledo Blade, October 14, 1988 77 Ibid. 78

Ohio city that outlawed discrimination against victims of HIV/AIDS and against those

78 who care for them when an estimated thirty people were affected by it in Lucas County. 7

Other initiatives include encouraging the Board of Community Relations to urge the-then city manager to hire more minorities and women in administrative and managerial

79 positions. 7

While preparing to run for re-election on city council in 1989, Ford was

nominated by local Democrats to run for mayor. However, he declined, citing the need to

80 raise nearly $300,000 to unseat a “formidable” challenger in eight months.” 7 He also

cited the lack of mayoral power given the failed strong mayor initiative and his concern

about the lack of minorities on council, should he win. Though, the cousin of the then-

Springfield, Ohio mayor, he indicated he had an interest in being mayor in 1989: “It is the

mayor’s office where the real action is at in dealing with local problems. I think anyone

who is in politics at the local level would at some point entertain the idea of occupying

81 the mayor’s seat.” 8 He felt, at the time, that a Black person could be mayor “if that

candidate has everything that is required, and that means the ability to raise $250,000, the

political organization, and the deep name recognition that comes from ballot

82 longevity.” 8 Though, Ford concluded that 1989 “wasn’t my time,” he did suggest he

would run for mayor in the 1990s, if the position were strengthened and included a four

year term.

Key legislative initiatives pursued on council in 1989 included advocating that the

city make a more sustained investment in affordable housing, especially the 3,000

78 “Ford wants to end bias against AIDS victims,” Jim Saunders, The Toledo Blade, October 17, 1988 79 “Hawkey Blamed for Failure to Hire Minorities,” The Toledo Blade, March 18, 1988 80 “Toledo Almost Had Black Candidate,” The Toledo Blade, March 5, 1989 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 79

“abandoned homes and make them available at low cost to the working poor and welfare

83 recipients.” 8 Additionally, Ford supported an initiative with minority contractors to

“withhold support of the 0.75 percent income tax renewal,” indicating that minority contractors receive less than $10,000 of about $30 million of business from the city

84 annually.” 8

In pursuit of the initiatives that mattered to his legislative agenda, Ford developed a reputation for not being camera-shy. The Toledo Blade once wrote of Ford that “his news conferences are so frequent that some of Jack Ford’s colleagues on Toledo city council have asked for copies of his press releases so they can respond to reporters’ questions about them” and that “Mr. Ford is not the sort of old-boy politician who plays the game quietly behind the scenes. When he’s got something to say, he likes to say it in

85 front of a camera.” 8 In his early political career, Ford used the media to his advantage, though he also respected the profession.

For example, in Ford’s campaign for re-election to city council in 1989, he candidly answered questions posed by The Toledo Blade in reference to the city’s “racial problems.” Ford’s responses indicate five steps he thought needed to be taken:

1) Resolve the Pete Culp firing via settlement fair to both sides 2) Shake up the Fire Department and the Police Department, which is more racist than the fire division 3) Continue to hire quality minority candidates in visible jobs 4) Strengthen the Board of Community Relations by making good appointments and heeding its’ recommendations 5) Develop a bottom up community sense of obligation by Black residents around the issues of housing maintenance, curtailed drug trafficking, and getting our children to stay in school and engage in 86 more positive recreational and other civic activities. 8

83 “Inexpensive Housing is Goal of Ford Effort,” The Toledo Blade, April 5, 1989 84 “Mayor Chastises Ford, says he should back tax,” Norris P. West, The Toledo Blade, May 31, 1989. 85 “Activist Ford not camera-shy,” Mark Rollenhagen, The Toledo Blade, August 29, 1989 86 Ford’s responses were accessed from the Toledo Blade Library in July 2008 80

The issues and priorities Ford listed in reference to tackling racial problems at the beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century in Toledo are indicative of the attention to social issues of which his political career was focused. He was highly endorsed for the seat by The Toledo Blade on October 29, 1989.

After winning re-election, Ford tackled additional issues on behalf of the Black

87 community. 8 In 1990, he opposed the development of two construction projects off

separate ends of Dorr Street, a historic street connecting downtown with outlying

suburbs, yet connecting through a large Black middle class neighborhood. The projects,

a proposed 180-unit apartment complex in March of 1990 and a proposed shopping

center at Dorr Street and Collingwood Blvd., Ford argued, would negatively impact the

88 character of several middle-class Black neighborhoods. 8 In 1990, he also successfully

sought to increase the power of the Board of Community Relations, an independent

organization chartered by the city that promotes social justice and intervenes in conflicts

and disputes by giving the board power to subpoena witnesses when investigating

allegations of discrimination. Finally, he proposed a ban on cigarette vending machines

in most public places, especially where youth under the age of eighteen could access them.

The year 1991 saw Ford’s introduction of legislation to require signs in bars warning of alcohol dangers for pregnant women, a revised strong mayor form of government plan, which included district council seats, and the proposal for the

87 Active in the community since his days as a law school and MPA student at the University of Toledo, Jack Ford was awarded two significant awards in 1990 as well. In January, he was awarded the Martin Luther King Jr. Holiday Commission’s Ohio Humanitarian Award in part for his effort to bar discrimination against victims of HIV/AIDS, and in September 1990, Ford was awarded the 1990 Distinguished Leadership Award from the National Association for Community Leadership. For more information, read “Jack Ford honored for leadership,” John Nichols, The Toledo Blade, September 19, 1990 88 “Ford says city should go slow on developments,” Clyde Hughes, The Toledo Blade, March 15, 1990 81

establishment of a commission on youth to provide job and leadership training and

recreation for area young people. Up for re-election in 1991, again, he won the

endorsement of The Toledo Blade.

His third term on council included his entre into media. He became the host of

Minority Monitor, a local weekly cable television show, where he focused on such issues

as the increase in the number of Black males hired in ranking administrative roles for the

89 city. 8 He also led a successful effort to create and pass a ballot issue establishing a youth curfew, and he formed a committee to focus on lead-based paint, and pushed for more funding, in an effort to eliminate lead poisoning that harms a higher percentage of

90 poor children living in older, deteriorated homes in the inner city. 8 Additionally, Ford,

along with other council members, proposed a change to the city’s then-58-year old city

manager-council proportional representation system with a mayor who would be elected

chief executive and an expanded council that would include representatives from

districts. Voters finally passed the amendment in 1993, electing former council member

and vice-mayor Carleton Finkbeiner as the city’s first strong mayor and Jack Ford was

91 elected council president by his peers. 9 With six at-large council seats, Jack Ford was

again the only Black candidate and was the top vote-getter for one of the at-large seats.

Of the six new district seats, two African Americans were elected.

Soon after his election as city council president, Mayor Finkbeiner, with whom

Ford was known to have a “hot and cold” relationship, announced that he wanted City

Council President Jack Ford to run for the vacated state representative seat in district

89 “Ford, as TV host, takes viewers behind scenes,” James Drew, The Toledo Blade, April 20, 1992 90 “$350,000 campaign is proposed to rid homes of lead-paint hazard,” James Drew, The Toledo Blade, January 13, 1993 91 “8 Democrats on council support Ford for top post,” James Drew, The Toledo Blade, December 1, 1993; “Ford elected council chief; mayor’s revamp under study,” James Drew, The Toledo Blade, January 4, 1994 82

92 forty-eight, a largely Black district in central city Toledo. 9 Casey Jones, the only Black

person from Toledo to reach the state legislature was retiring after twenty-six years.

Ford, who had acknowledged for years he coveted that position, had promised voters that

if elected council president, he would not seek the state representative seat. However,

after eleven months as president of council, in November 1994, Ford won the seat to the

93 Ohio House of Representatives with eighty percent of the vote. 9

King Street?

While Jack Ford was in Columbus, a more recent polarizing occurrence in

Toledo’s racial and political history was Mayor Carleton Finkebiner’s suggestion to name

a major street after Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in 2001. At the time, Toledo was (and

remains) the only major city in Ohio that has not dedicated a street to Dr. King. The effort was welcomed by Toledo’s Blacks yet not by many others. Civil rights leader Rev.

Floyd Rose had previously pushed to name Dorr Street in 1986 for Dr. King. Named for

the city’s tenth mayor, Charles Dorr, and home to one of the city’s Fortune 500

companies and major country club’s, and given its significant length, the proposal failed.

In preparation for the city’s 2001 King Holiday Celebration, Mayor Finkbeiner

announced that naming a street in his honor was being pursued: “We’d like to have total

94 community support of it and to do it in the right way,” the mayor said at the time. 9 The mayor charged an appointed all-Black seven-member ad-hoc advisory committee, chaired by the president of the local NAACP branch, to consider the options, make recommendations within ninety days and to have public meetings to gather input. The

92 “Mayor eyes draft-Ford campaign,” James Drew, The Toledo Blade, February 4, 1994; “Carty’s motives pretty clear cut,” William Brower, The Toledo Blade, February 8, 1994 93 “Ford captures seat in Ohio House,” Tom Troy, The Toledo Blade, November 9, 1994 94 “Toledo to get King street next year,” The Toledo Journal, Bob Stiegel, March 29, 2000 83

mayor also had an all-White appointed committee of his own within city hall to review

95 the panel’s recommendations and voted on the mayor’s suggestions. 9 In effect, an all-

Black committee was charged with making recommendation to an all-White committee

and then the mayor was to make the final suggestion.

Mayoral Influence

However, soon thereafter, Mayor Finkbeiner suggested Cherry Street, a 2.5 mile

96 street platted in 1827, ten years prior to the city’s founding. 9 His recommendation was

to re-name the street King-Kennedy parkway in honor of Dr. King and President

Kennedy. The recommendation had broad support, but not from some of the major

businesses on the street. Yet, it was initially considered a better choice than Dorr Street,

as Cherry was not named on behalf of an individual, but a tree that once grew along its

length. Key civil rights leader Rev. Floyd Rose did not support the recommendation,

saying,

I’ve traveled the length and breadth of this country; I have seen boulevards straight through the center of town in communities in the South. I’ve seen portions of expressways named for Dr. King, major thoroughfares for Dr. King. And I have never, ever seen nor heard of Dr. King having his 97 named shared with anybody else – never. 9

Without the support of key figures in the Black community and select businesses along

Cherry Street, the bid failed. Rose, instead re-argued his position that Dorr Street should

be the choice, rejecting the claim that removing the name of a street for a former mayor

was significant: “The irrelevant past must always yield to the relevant present . . . in any

95 “Cherry St. may become King-Kennedy Pkwy: Committee given street name change recommendations to consider,” The Toledo Journal, Bob Stiegel, January 3, 2001 96 Ibid. 97 “Make it King – and King alone: Rev. Floyd Rose says designated street should bear only civil rights leader’s name,” The Toledo Journal, Bob Stiegel, January 24, 2001 84

98 progressive society.” 9 For Rose, Dorr Street was an important consideration given its

surrounding concentrated Black population.

Three Recommendations

In the end, the all-Black advisory committee made three formal recommendations

to the mayor and ranked them accordingly. The first choice was to rename Toledo

Express Airport the Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. International Airport. However, that

recommendation required both the mayor’s approval and approval by the board of the

Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority, which operates the airport under lease with the city.

Also, the Federal Aviation Administration would weigh in. It would have been the first

airport named for Dr. King; however the idea had little support. While opposition was

not fierce, support from key individuals like the mayor and the president of the port

authority board was not made public. The mayor noted the airport was in Swanton

99 Township and “is located far from the heart of Toledo’s minority community.” 9 The

recommendation died.

The next suggestion was Collingwood Boulevard, a street that runs through a

large section of the Black community, crosses Dorr Street and through the city’s historic

Old West End neighborhood. The street is also the home of one of the largest majority-

Black public high schools in the city. However, that recommendation was sidetracked by members of the Old West End Association, a majority-White neighborhood group, citing the street’s history as the site where the famous phrase “Holy Toledo” was uttered and that once was known as the avenue of millionaires as it is runs through the neighborhood

98 Ibid. 99 “Put King’s name on train station, mayor says,” The Toledo Journal, Bob Stiegel, July 4, 2001 85

with the largest collection of Victorian and Edwardian homes east of the Mississippi

100 River. 9

The Collingwood Street recommendation resulted in racially polarizing

arguments. The all-Black committee’s recommendation was confronted by an all-White

resident protest at a community gathering to discuss the issue. Residents claimed having

to write four words for their street would be a burden: “I don’t know any streets that have

101 four words that I have to write out. For me, it’s a huge burden,” claimed one resident. 1

Other residents insisted at length that their opposition was not about race and took issue with what they believed to be the suggestion of some Black members on the committee that Dr. King was not important to Whites: “It’s like [you think] he’s not a hero to all of

102 us?, one resident claimed. 1 No resolution was determined at that meeting. At a

subsequent public meeting in an overcrowded public library largely frequented by

Toledo’s Black community and located on Dorr Street, Blacks asked why Collingwood

was not an appropriate choice. One resident, Dr. LaRouth Perry, a visiting assistant

professor of Africana Studies at the University of Toledo, at the time, expressed that,

I’m suspicious that there is camouflage about the reason [White residents of the Old West End Association are against the recommendation]. And I would like to have those things be aired. What is the real problem? I’m feeling, I’m sensing that whatever happens tonight, most of us will go out the same way we came in, and that will not be any progress. But I really want to hear why Collingwood is not OK. I hear that it’s not. I just want 103 to know why. 1

100 “Objections raised to King Boulevard proposal: Old West End area residents vow to stop renaming committee’s efforts,” Bob Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, March 14, 2001 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid. 103 “A question unanswered: Why not Collingwood?: Motivation of opponents to street renaming remains suspicious,” Bob Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, April 4, 2001 86

The response the resident received from some opponents at the gathering was that

Collingwood has history too. In fact, many such residents organized and placed yard

signs in members’ yards reading “Keep it Collingwood.” In addition, The Toledo Blade,

the city’s main newspaper wrote an editorial rejecting Collingwood. There was seemingly

no resolution. However, the committee submitted Collingwood Boulevard as its second

choice anyway and recommended that if it were accepted, the two street names should be

104 present on signs for the first four years to give residents time to adjust to the change. 1

The final recommendation of the committee was to consider Cherry Street, but only named for Dr. King. However, a major business, St. Vincent Mercy Medical

Center, a large hospital, did not accept the removal of Kennedy and either did Central

Catholic High School, located across the street. Both catholic-based institutions were attracted to the King-Kennedy Parkway idea because Kennedy was Catholic. Yet, with the removal of Kennedy’s name, the support from major business was no longer present.

Hence, none of the committee’s recommendation were accepted – and the five streets suggested by the mayor and some of his administrators were unacceptable to Toledo’s

Black community.

Compromise

Mayor Carleton Finkbeiner later recommended naming Central Union Plaza, the city’s Amtrak station for Dr. King. While that decision also had to be accepted by the

Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority Board, it received welcomed unanimous support from the board of twelve White men and one African American woman. The proposal, however, garnered mixed reaction from Toledo’s Black community. While Rev. Dr.

104 “Airport top candidate for renaming for Dr. King,” Bob Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, May 2, 2001

87

Robert Culp, a member of the all-Black committee spoke before the board when they considered the recommendation and ultimately supported the mayor’s recommendation, he added, “the recommendation before you today was neither recommended by nor rejected by the committee. It was just never presented to the committee.” He added his

105 personal support was “lukewarmish, at best.” 1 The compromise of the compromise was to incorporate other elements into the train station name, mainly the development of a circular street in front of the train station named in honor of Dr. King and space and facilities promised for an African American history museum. The amendments were accepted and the recommendation was approved.

In Multicultural Manners, former journalist, Norine Dresser profiles the incident as a major event and an example of race manners. She notes that the majority White Old

West End Association rejected the committee’s recommendation of Collingwood

Boulevard which effectively ended the bid to name a street after Dr. King in Toledo.

However, Dresser highlights how the compromise resulted in positive discussion about race relations:

Public hearings and community debate ensue[d]. Rather than change the [Collingwood] street name, the committee creates the Martin Luther King Train Station, which also has space set aside for a future civil rights museum. From this resolution, a work shop is born called ‘Building Relationships Toward Racial Harmony,’ an organization of cross-racial conversation. Since May 2001, the fifty-member BRRH has met monthly, working on race issues in Toledo (169).

Dresser details how the group used Race Manners, Bruce Jacob’s book about confronting race related issues in the United States as its guide. The group later invited the author to

Toledo, and group members were so inspired that they created a Race Manners reading

105 “Black leaders show conciliation in King tribute saga: ‘Lukewarmish’ acceptance of train station given,” Bob Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, August 1, 2001

88

project with over a dozen local agencies promoting the text and training facilitators, leading to over three-hundred readers. According to Dresser, on a return speaking trip to

Toledo, Jacobs was awarded a proclamation by Mayor Jack Ford and noted “there was a

106 real change in the air.” 1 Dresser uses the Toledo King Street controversy as an example

of a “method [that] could serve as a model for other communities dealing with racial

107 dissension.” 1 Nonetheless, the city has yet to name a street in Dr. King’s honor. And

the train station has yet to build a museum.

Mayor Jack Ford

2001 Election Campaign

In the midst of the King controversy, term-limited state representative Jack Ford decided to run for mayor. In 1992, Ohio voters adopted an amendment to the Ohio

Constitution that limited state lawmakers to eight years in office. There were thirty-six

members of the Ohio House who were prevented from seeking re-election to the House

that fall. After two successful terms, Ohio House Minority Leader Ford, who had been

elected as leader of the Democratic Caucus in 1998, was an example. He announced his

campaign for mayor of Toledo in May 2001, only seven months before the election. Ford entered the race at the urging of then-Lucas County Democratic Party Chairwoman Paula

Ross who did not want to support the more-funded conservative Democratic candidate,

Lucas County Treasurer Ray Kest.

Ford’s 2001 campaign theme, “serious leadership for serious times” was meant to address the pending impact of the shrinking national economy and the funds available to the city as a result at the beginning of the twenty-first century. At his announcement,

106 Ibid. 107 Ibid. 89

Ford indicated in remarks that his administration would be so inclusive and focused on

diversity that an affirmative action office would not be needed. He said:

I believe in diversity, I teach it, I work it. I live it. A Mayor should appoint directors and commissioners who believe in diversity and hold them accountable. I plan to work toward abolishing the office of affirmative action. If directors and commissioners do not hire, train, and 108 promote fairly, they won’t stay on my team. 1

The comments were misinterpreted by some as a statement to suggest he wanted to

abolish the office. Hence, he fielded calls from the president of the local NAACP and the

109 city’s affirmative action commissioner where he explained himself. 1 However, it is

significant to note that, given his long history as an advocate for social services that his

campaign began with that misinterpretation.

Largely, though, the campaign did not suffer from racial overtones, although the

nature of his historic candidacy was imminent. Ford successfully courted votes from

Toledo’s White liberal community, African Americans and other minority groups. In the all-Democratic primary, Kest was originally said to beat Ford, but a later recount indicated otherwise, and Ford was the top vote getter. Ford was no stranger to Kest. In

1994, he defeated Kest in the race for the Democratic Party’s state central committee.

This time, however, Ray Kest had the support of some African Americans as well,

110 including an endorsement from a major Black newspaper The Toledo Journal. 1 Much

of his support was derived from more conservative Whites and select members of the business community. Ford, though, was endorsed by another Black newspaper The

108 The text of the campaign announcement address was accessed at the Toledo Blade library in July 2008 109 “Ford Backs Affirmative Action Office,” The Toledo Blade, June 28, 2001 110 Interviews suggested that The Toledo Journal supported Ray Kest because as county treasurer he regularly paid for large advertisements with the paper over the course of several years 90

111 Sojourner’s Truth, which recently started circulation. 1 The city’s main newspaper, The

Toledo Blade, endorsed Ray Kest for mayor. In fact, in their November 4th, 2001

endorsement of Ford’s opponent, The Toledo Blade editorial board wrote:

A strong mayor is by definition his or her community’s most outspoken advocate and cheerleader. But Mr. Ford simply does not appear comfortable in front of the cameras, and though he is not the sullen, wollen individual in person some believe him to be, neither is he at ease with the public relations obligations of the job, That could mean that he is better to be a legislator than a chief executive.

The paper that once described Ford as ‘not camera-shy,’ now chose to describe Ford

differently, labeling the mayoral campaign of 2001 both ‘lackluster and ‘benign:’

Image is almost everything these days, but neither Ray Kest nor Jack Ford gives the impression of running on all cylinders. There’s been no discernible or creative varooming of their mayor-wannabe engines. They lumber about, lowering the bar on what 50-somethings are supposed to look like, neither evincing the pizzazz or the healthy glow we’re grown 112 accustomed to seeing our current mayor exude. 1

Undoubtedly, The Toledo Blade’s description of the campaign was meant to portray their

view of Ford’s professorial communication style.

However, in an acknowledgment of Ford’s overwhelming victory, The Toledo

Blade wrote that,

Race . . . clearly was not an issue in this campaign. When a candidate wins a head-to-head match-up with 60 percent of the vote in a city that is roughly 28 percent minority, he obviously appeals across the board and 113 across the city. 1

111 The necessity of two Black newspapers in a city where Blacks comprise only 25% of the population is a sign of the factions within the Black community, perhaps. 112 Kest, Ford: Turtles Chasing a Whippet,” Eileen Foley, The Toledo Blade, October 25, 2001 113“A Ford In Our Future,” The Toledo Blade, November 8, 2001 - Race may not have been an issue such that Whites were not willing to vote for Jack Ford. However, race was present on the campaign trail. Ford, who is married to a Caucasian woman, did endure verbal insults from certain segments of the Black community who questioned his commitment to their concerns. Additionally, as the lack of support from a major Black newspaper may indicate, not all African Americans were supportive of his campaign. 91

The Toledo Blade is largely accurate in its assessment of the campaign’s racial dynamics. Ford’s victory was a landslide as he won nearly every ward. His opponent,

Lucas County Treasurer Ray Kest, carried only one of the city’s twenty-four wards. Ford won sixty-one percent of the votes to Kest’s thirty-nine percent. In the predominantly

Black wards (8, 13, 14), Ford won 88.8%, 87.9% and 89.5%, respectively. Yet, even in the heavily White wards (3, 7, and 23), Ford won more than fifty percent of the vote:

50.7%, 50.7%, and 52%.

Thereby, content analysis of The Toledo Blade’s newspaper’s coverage of Ford’s election campaign demonstrated that he did not suffer from an overly racially divided portrayal or perception. The Toledo Blade articles were derived from a search at the

Toledo-Lucas County Public Library in Toledo, Ohio by typing in keywords “Jack Ford,” in the database of Newsbank, Inc. and searching for articles discussing his potential candidacy, his candidacy, and swear-in ceremony. The content was analyzed for the presence of race. Articles were coded on a Likert scale of 1-5, 1 being a negative mention of race, 5 being a positive mention of race:

Number of Articles Time Period Mean Rating (1-5) The Toledo Blade 192 2/23/01 – 1/31/02 3.51

The average rating suggests his candidacy was viewed by the media, and by extension, the public, not in overtly negative racial terms. This suggests his candidacy did not encounter media detractions from his agenda-setting plans and goals, largely devoted to diversity.

While The Toledo Blade is accurate in its assessment of Ford’s broad appeal, most the higher proportions of his support in each ward came from the Black community. 92

As the following hand-digitized Toledo ward map, constructed using ArcMap GIS demonstrates, where African Americans resided in higher concentrations in Toledo, Ford received higher percentages of the vote:

The map above indicates how Jack Ford defeated Ray Kest and was elected the first

Black mayor of Toledo. As the election data suggests, Ford’s broad appeal and

significant Black support was significant in 2001, what Ford labeled in his first State of

114 the City address as “a high point.” 1

The Beginning of an Administration

While elected with a sense of improvement in race relations, the city’s at times

polarizing racial and political history informs the conditions under which Mayor Ford

entered office as the city’s first Black mayor. In addition to the strife that plagued the

city in the 1980s, 1990s and prior, Ford entered office while Blacks and Whites were

114 Speech given February 21, 2002 - Accessed on the internet while Ford was mayor in November 2005 93

feuding over whether or not to name a street after Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. He also

entered office at a time when a nearby community and parish in Sylvania, a Toledo

suburb, were considering moving a house that has historic ties to the Underground

115 Railroad. 1 That racial and political history, however, did not determine Ford’s agenda as mayor; it only highlighted the importance of it.

Ford was careful to establish needed relationships to support his agenda quickly after winning election. As for council, the twelve-member council, elected a Latino as president, a Ford supporter, once the president serving while Ford was elected resigned to run for a seat in the House of Representatives. Other minorities on council included two

Black members elected from districts. One of the first actions the mayor-elect took was

to organize support in the business community. His step to court their support is

significant. Claiming “we’re going to have a more business approach at city hall,” the

116 effort informs how Ford understood he needed their support to govern effectively. 1

Ford understood he could not rely only on those who supported him overwhelmingly if his administration was to be successful. And at the same time, Ford’s touting of the business community’s support may have been a sign of his acknowledgment of the expectations from many Black supporters. As one supporter indicated to a Blade columnist, she “found a lot of comfort in Mr. Ford’s plans. He is setting out to deal with people, not things. The way his agenda sounds, ‘things’ might be taken care of because

117 ‘people’ are addressed.” 1 Hence, Ford acknowledged, if major changes were to occur,

115 “Sylvania council told to drop fight for Lathrop House: Others speak up for preservation of Underground Railroad station,” Bob Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, May 14, 2003 116 “Ford Heralds Commitment to City Business Community,” The Toledo Blade, November 27, 2001 117 “For Some, Ford Has a Better Idea,” Roberta De Boer, The Toledo Blade, January 12, 2002 94 principal among them, filling budget shortfalls, without cutting services, the business community would need to be involved.

118 Ford pledged to make Toledo “an elegant city.” 1 Additionally, he campaigned on a promise to spend thirty percent of his time of youth issues. Perhaps best described as an extension of his legislative career on city council, the Ohio House of

Representatives, and his social work background, once elected, Mayor Ford’s administrative priorities reflected his interest to improve the socioeconomic condition of

African Americans. One of the first uses of his bully pulpit included a verbal criticism of the Black school superintendent’s performance in the majority-minority student school system. Citing a report that indicated Toledo Public Schools had not moved up one performance indicator, achieving only five of the twenty-seven indicators used by the

Ohio Department of Education to rank districts, Ford took issue with the claim that the district was still identifying weakness: He [the superintendent] should know that now,

119 and I expect him to fix the weaknesses, pronto.” 1 As an educator, Ford took early interests in using his strong mayor platform to work to improve conditions of the public school system.

Other early initiatives included appointing a Black woman minister to serve as executive assistant as an important feature in his efforts to involve churches in community service and government affairs. Significantly, for the first time in the city’s history, he appointed a Black chief of staff. Though he promised in his campaign speech announcing his candidacy that person would be a woman, he appointed a male to the role.

118 “First Family Puts Elegance on Display,” Vanessa Winans, The Toledo Blade, January 3, 2002 119 “Mayor Castigates Toledo Schools for Poor Showing,” Tom Troy, The Toledo Blade, January 8, 2002 95

Chapter seven will cover in detail his entire term of administrative actions as it relates to

his active pursuit of Black interests.

2005 Campaign

The racial climate under which Ford entered office as the city’s first Black mayor

was less than ideal. As he pursued an aggressive social improvement agenda over the

course of this term, those relations arguably never improved. When Ford prepared to run

for re-election, the county Democratic Party had a change in leadership as Ford supporter and Chairwoman Paula Ross was defeated by a more conservative faction, led by former

120 mayor Carleton Finkbeiner, according to many inside sources. 1 The loss of Ross as the

head of the party meant that Ford was not likely to receive the party’s endorsement as the

incumbent. Perhaps sensing the shift in tone in the party’s direction, Ford never sought

the endorsement either. The party endorsed former mayor Carleton Finkbeiner who

organized a campaign, complete with yard signs, on the theme, ‘Carty Gets Results.’

Meanwhile, Ford, along with other liberal Democrats formed their own PAC to

raise funds and organize independent of the Lucas County Democratic Party. The party

rift was labeled the A Team versus the B Team by media sources. The A Team being

those who supported a more liberal agenda and who were in control of the party for

several decades. The B Team being the more conservative Democrats who slowly filled

vacant precinct committee seats in an effort to gain enough support to take over the

121 position of Chair. 1 Their effort succeeded in 2005 in time for the mayor’s race.

Regardless of the party tensions, Mayor Ford continued to run for re-election.

Meanwhile, his A Team loss its footing as one member of the team rejected his support

120 Interview, Paula Ross, June 23, 2008; Interview, Jack Ford, June 24, 2008 121 Many however, saw the A Team/B Team rift as one in part, due to race and some conservative Democrats’ discontentment with having a Black mayor. 96

of Ford and ran against him and former mayor Finkbeiner in the September primary.

Ford placed a distant second to former mayor Finkbeiner in the primary, a chilling

endorsement of his tenure. Even though his campaign conducted internal polling

suggestive of a significant loss ahead for Ford, he felt an obligation to run for re-election as he felt he wanted the time to finish many projects already begun. However, his serious commitment to the race was questioned by members of the media and residents alike,

122 many concluding Ford exuded what they thought was a lack of enthusiasm for the job. 1

October Surprise

Two weeks before the November election and on October 15th, 2005, the National

Socialist Movement, or ‘America’s Nazi Party,’ a Neo-Nazi organization planned a

123 march to protest alleged Black gang activity in North Toledo. 1 Ford spoke to a

gathering of about two thousand people at a local Black church the night prior to the

planned march urging people to ignore the neo-Nazis. Ford’s pleading fell on deaf ears.

The next day, the planned march from a mixed-race neighborhood nearby park through a

triad of neighborhood streets and back to the park never started because the members of

the organization were met with hundreds of protestors, most of whom were Black youth,

124 described as gang members in news reports. 1 The Toledo Police and Fire Departments,

attempted to pre-empt the volatile situation with riot-gear presence. Mayor Jack Ford,

and the Fire Chief, both African American, tried to explain to the crowd that the group

had the legal right to march, and that the best response to their legal right is non-

responsiveness. However, just as it appeared Mayor Ford was able to calm the audience,

122 These statements are drawn from multiple interviews conducted in the summer of 2008. Chapter seven and eight will explore in detail the content of those opinions. 123 “Neighbors defend protest over neo-Nazi march,” Associated Press, October 16, 2005 124 Ibid. 97

isolated protestors began to set fire to nearby businesses and looting, throwing bricks at

125 police cruisers and yelling at Ford and Fire Chief Bell. 1 Dozens were arrested.

The aftermath in the Black community of the rioting, which was broadcast on

national television, was largely that Mayor Ford should not have allowed them to enter

the city or to plan to march in neighborhood streets. In the end, the riot was a precursor to the inevitable defeat of Mayor Ford by his predecessor in November. The election results of 2005 were almost identical to 2001. Finkbeiner won with 61.89 percent of the vote to Ford’s 38.11 percent of the vote. In the predominantly White wards (3, 7, and

23), Finkbeiner won 76.48%, 73.80%, and 75.80%. In the predominantly Black Wards

(8, 13, and 14), Ford only won 80.80%, 80.55% and 83.37%, an average loss of seven percent of support in the Black community that he received in 2001.

Post Ford Race Relations in Toledo

After Mayor Ford loss re-election, other key African American leaders left Toledo or their prominent positions. Superintendent of Toledo Public Schools Eugene Sanders left to become the CEO of the Cleveland School District. Toledo School Board President and Vice President Larry Sykes and Deborah Barnett chose not to seek re-election.

Johnnie Mickler, Jr., the founding director of the Urban League returned to South

Carolina to run the Urban League of the Upstate and to attend to family matters. Fire

Chief Michael Bell was selected as the State of Ohio Fire Marshall and moved to

126 suburban Columbus. 1 At-large councilwoman and attorney Karyn McConnell-Hancock loss her re-election to her seat. And in 2008, the first Black president of nearby Bowling

Green State University, Dr. Sidney Ribeau left the area to become president of Howard

125 “Riot Worse Than Police Expected,” Stephen Smith, CBS News/Associated Press, October 16, 2005 126 Bell also maintained a home in Toledo 98

University. The result has been an exodus of key African Americans from significant

leadership roles, which have mostly been replaced by White males. With the exception

of the Urban League’s new director, all have been replaced by Whites.

Meanwhile, the current mayor Carleton Finkbeiner has been sued by three Black

employees he fired and who filed complaints with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission.

After an investigation, the commission found “probable cause” to believe that

discrimination for engaging in “prior protected activity” occurred in the firings of those

127 three individuals, one of whom was the director of affirmative action for the city. 1

The racial conflicts between Blacks and city hall, historic local civil rights leader and Baptist minister Rev. Floyd Rose returned to Toledo. Rose led a movement to establish a Toledo chapter of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference with the director of affirmative action that Finkbeiner fired, serving as head of the new organization. Also, Rose returned to advocate, though unsuccessfully, for Toledo’s

Blacks not to support the city’s .75% tax renewal on the ballot on March 4, 2008. He argued, that the city was not worthy of the support of Blacks in their effort to deliver services as Blacks are not recipients of fair treatment: “this isn’t about black and white.

128 It’s about what’s wrong and right.” 1

The city’s back and forth relationship with calm race relations and effective and

mobilized Black leadership is perhaps greatly impacted by the macro factors affecting

Toledo and similar Midwest, rust-belt cities. Toledo, according to one report, has the

127 “State panel faults Toledo in discipline of 3 black employees,” Tom Troy, The Toledo Blade, February 2008 128 “Toledo’s blacks told to vote down .75% tax renewal,” JC Reindl, The Toledo Blade, January 30, 2008 99

129 third highest Black unemployment in the nation. 1 Unemployment for the city as a

130 whole is the highest of all the major cities in the state of Ohio. 1 Meanwhile, Blacks’

share of the total population has increased from 24.5% in 2001 when Mayor Ford took

office to over twenty-six percent in 2006:

Toledo Population Changes

Total Black White Latino 1990 332,943 2000 313,619 73,854 (23.5%) 220,261 (70.2%) 17,141 (5.5%) 2005-2007 289,103 73,278 (25.3%) 194,829 (67.4%) 17,952 (6.2%) Source: U.S. Census Bureau and the 2005-2007 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates

Those poor economic conditions in the city of Toledo, the home of Jeep, Libbey Glass,

Owens Corning, The Toledo Ticket Company, jazz greats Art Tatum and Jon Hendricks,

and other national known entities, produced a poor economic outlook for the city in the future. If history is any precedent, the likelihood of race relations improving depends largely on the economy.

The less than liberal or welcoming environment in Toledo for African Americans, described herein made the conditions under which Ford could actively pursue policies and programs designed to improve Black quality of life very difficult. The following chapter details, how within the Toledo racial climate, Mayor Ford actively pursued the interests of Blacks. The chapter surveys one specific area of pursuit, the mayor’s merger of the Department of Affirmative Action/Contract Compliance with the Division of

Purchasing, and the related efforts to build the capacity of minority contractors to bid for contracts, receive them, and thereby generate wealth in the Black community.

129 “Omaha in Black and White: Barriers to jobs are many,” Henry Cordes, Erin Grace, Cindy Gonzalez, Omaha World Herald, November 4, 2007 130 “Toledo leads state again in unemployment,” The Toledo Blade, January 27, 2009

100

REFERENCES

Books and Journal Articles

Barber, Kathleen L. 2000. A Right to Representation. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

Barber, Kathleen L. 1995. Proportional Representation and Election Reform in Ohio. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

Dresser, Norine. 2005. Multicultural Manners, Revised Edition. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons.

Elazar, Daniel. 1972. American Federalism: A View from the States, Second Ed. Boston: Thomas Y. Crowell Company.

Hero, Rodney. 1998. Faces of Inequality. New York: Oxford University Press.

Jacobs, Bruce. 2006. Race Manners, Second Edition. New York: Arcade Publishing.

O’Rourke, P.J. 2007. “Why It’s Good to Come from Nowhere.” In )., Good Roots: Writers Reflect on Growing up in Ohio, ed. Lisa Watts. Athens: Ohio University Press.

Patterson, Ernest. 1974. Black City Politics. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company.

Porter, Tana M. 1987. Toledo Profile: A Sesquicentennial History. Toledo: Toledo Sesquicentennial Commission.

Stinchcombe, Jean L. 1968. Reform and Reaction: City Politics in Toledo. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing.

Williams, Lee. 1982. “Concentrated Residences: the Case of Black Toledo, 1890-1930.” Phylon 43: 167-176.

Williams, Lee. 1980. “Newcomers to the City: a Study of Black Population Growth in Toledo, Ohio, 1910-1930,” Ohio History 80: 5-24.

Internet

Churchill, Ward, n.d. “To Disrupt, Discredit, and Destroy: The FBI’s Secret War Against the Black Panther Party.” http://propagandhi.com/wp- content/empires/Ward_Churchill.pdf (February 2009)

Ohio History Central. http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/entry.php?rec=562. (February 2009).

101

The Toledo War. http://www.toledowar.com/ (February 2009).

Warren A.M.E. Church, Toledo, OH http://www.warren-ame.org/history.html (February 2009).

Interviews

Davis, George Jr. Interview. July 1, 2008.

Ford, Jack. Interview. June 24, 2008.

Ross, Paula. Interview. June 23, 2008.

Miscellaneous

National Public Radio. All Things Considered. Commentary on Good Roots: Writers Reflect on Growing Up in Ohio. March 18, 2007.

Opportunity: Journal of Negro Life. 1929. 7(August): 243-45. New York: National Urban League.

“Race Relations in Toledo: A Summary Report of a Community Forum.” 1989. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Ohio State Advisory Committee Report.

The Toledo Chapter of the NAACP. Unpublished Pamphlet. “Containment of Minority Groups Through Housing.” (Local History Room, Toledo-Lucas County Public Library).

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Kaptur, Marcy Rep. Floor Statement. February 27, 1990.

Theses

Folk, Richard A. 1972. “Black Man’s Burden in Ohio, 1849-1863.” Master’s thesis. University of Toledo.

Harr, Eunice F. 1969. “Race, religion and class in a Friendly Town Project.” Master’s thesis. University of Toledo.

Hinehart, John. 1940. “The Negro in a Congested Toledo Area.” Master’s thesis. Bowling Green State University.

Johnson, Everett. 1929. “A Study of Negro Families in the Pinewood Avenue District of Toledo, Ohio.” Master’s thesis. University of Toledo.

Smith, Harold Ellsworth. 1975. “Spatial analysis of housing and neighborhood stress in the inner-city of Toledo, Ohio.” Master’s thesis. University of Toledo. 102

Vandenbosch, William V. 1972. “Voter registration analysis of 56 precincts in Toledo's inner city 1964-70.” Master’s thesis. University of Toledo.

Wheaton, Emmett L. 1927. “The Social Status of the Negro in Toledo, Ohio.” Master’s thesis. University of Toledo.

Journal Articles

Levstik, Frank R. 1972. “The Toledo Riot of 1962: A Study of Midwest Negrophobia.” Northwest Ohio Quarterly XLIV (Fall).

Williams, B.F. 1925. “Interracial Activities in Toledo,” The Southern Workman 54(April):162-65.

Newspaper Articles

Tom Jones, “The war between Michigan and Ohio,” The Detroit News, May 21, 2000.

“Trailblazers topple local racial barriers: Black leaders reflect on their journeys,” The Toledo Blade, February 1, 2009.

John Herbers, “Black Poverty Spreads In 50 Biggest U.S. Cities,” New York Times, January 26, 1987. “Toledo police officer killed in 1970 shooting,” The Toledo Blade, February 21, 2007.

Laren Weber, “Retiring TPD officer never forgot first lessons on force,” The Toledo Blade, January 2, 2009.

“Democrats Back Ford for Furney Seat on Council,” The Toledo Blade, December 19, 1986.

“Ford Withdraws Name For Vacant Council Seat,” The Toledo Blade, January 12, 1987.

“Step Up Drug Fight, Council Hopeful Urges,” The Toledo Blade, October 1, 1987.

“5 Toledo Minister Go On Trial Over Bias Protest,” The New York Times, December 20, 1988.

Matt Cummings, “How a 1988 Protest Against City Council Shaped a Civil Rights Journey,” The City Paper, November 19, 2008.

“Toledo is Sued Over Random Stopping of Blacks,” The New York Times, August 14, 1988.

“Mr. Ford Has a Point,” The Toledo Blade, August 8, 1988. 103

Norris P. West, “Affirmative-action plan drafted, held,” Toledo Blade, July 19, 1989.

“King Bridge: A Symbolic Span, The Toledo Blade, January 15, 1988.

Dave Murray, “Councilman Renews Call for Strong-Mayor in City,” The Toledo Blade, March 17, 1988.

Mark Zaborney, “Strong-mayor plan draws skepticism,”, The Toledo Blade, October 27, 1988.

Jeff Harrington, “Strong-mayor issue is ‘dead duck’ if voters don’t pass it, Ford says,” The Toledo Blade, October 5, 1988.

Jim Saunders, “Leadership called key in black community,” The Toledo Blade, October 14, 1988.

Jim Saunders, “Ford wants to end bias against AIDS victims,” The Toledo Blade, October 17, 1988.

“Hawkey Blamed for Failure to Hire Minorities,” The Toledo Blade, March 18, 1988.

“Toledo Almost Had Black Candidate,” The Toledo Blade, March 5, 1989.

“Inexpensive Housing is Goal of Ford Effort,” The Toledo Blade, April 5, 1989.

Norris P. West, “Mayor Chastises Ford, says he should back tax,” The Toledo Blade, May 31, 1989.

Mark Rollenhagen, “Activist Ford not camera-shy,” The Toledo Blade, August 29, 1989.

John Nichols, “Jack Ford honored for leadership,” The Toledo Blade, September 19, 1990.

Clyde Hughes, “Ford says city should go slow on developments,” The Toledo Blade, March 15, 1990.

James Drew, “Ford, as TV host, takes viewers behind scenes,” The Toledo Blade, April 20, 1992.

James Drew, “$350,000 campaign is proposed to rid homes of lead-paint hazard,” The Toledo Blade, January 13, 1993.

James Drew, “8 Democrats on council support Ford for top post,” The Toledo Blade, December 1, 1993.

104

James Drew, “Ford elected council chief; mayor’s revamp under study,” The Toledo Blade, January 4, 1994.

James Drew, “Mayor eyes draft-Ford campaign,” The Toledo Blade, February 4, 1994.

William Brower, “Carty’s motives pretty clear cut,” The Toledo Blade, February 8, 1994.

Tom Troy, “Ford captures seat in Ohio House,” The Toledo Blade, November 9, 1994.

Bob Stiegel, “Toledo to get King street next year,” The Toledo Journal, March 29, 2000.

Bob Stiegel, “Cherry St. may become King-Kennedy Pkwy: Committee given street name change recommendations to consider,” The Toledo Journal, January 3, 2001.

Bob Stiegel, “Make it King – and King alone: Rev. Floyd Rose says designated street should bear only civil rights leader’s name,” The Toledo Journal, January 24, 2001.

Bob Stiegel, “Put King’s name on train station, mayor says,” The Toledo Journal, July 4, 2001.

Bob Stiegel, “Objections raised to King Boulevard proposal: Old West End area residents vow to stop renaming committee’s efforts,” The Toledo Journal, March 14, 2001.

Bob Stiegel, “A question unanswered: Why not Collingwood?: Motivation of opponents to street renaming remains suspicious,” The Toledo Journal, April 4, 2001.

Bob Stiegel, “Airport top candidate for renaming for Dr. King,” The Toledo Journal, May 2, 2001.

Bob Stiegel, “Black leaders show conciliation in King tribute saga: ‘Lukewarmish’ acceptance of train station given,” The Toledo Journal, August 1, 2001.

“Ford Backs Affirmative Action Office,” The Toledo Blade, June 28, 2001.

Eileen Foley, “Kest, Ford: Turtles Chasing a Whippet,” The Toledo Blade, October 25, 2001.

“A Ford In Our Future,” The Toledo Blade, November 8, 2001.

Bob Stiegel, “Sylvania council told to drop fight for Lathrop House: Others speak up for preservation of Underground Railroad station,” The Toledo Journal, May 14, 2003.

“Ford Heralds Commitment to City Business Community,” The Toledo Blade, November 27, 2001.

105

Roberta De Boer, “For Some, Ford Has a Better Idea,” The Toledo Blade, January 12, 2002.

Vanessa Winans, “First Family Puts Elegance on Display,” The Toledo Blade, January 3, 2002.

Tom Troy, “Mayor Castigates Toledo Schools for Poor Showing,” The Toledo Blade, January 8, 2002.

“Neighbors defend protest over neo-Nazi march,” Associated Press, October 16, 2005.

Stephen Smith, “Riot Worse Than Police Expected,” CBS News/Associated Press, October 16, 2005.

Tom Troy, “State panel faults Toledo in discipline of 3 black employees,” The Toledo Blade, February 2008.

J.C. Reindl, “Toledo’s blacks told to vote down .75% tax renewal,” The Toledo Blade, January 30, 2008.

Henry Cordes, Erin Grace, Cindy Gonzalez, “Omaha in Black and White: Barriers to jobs are many,” Omaha World Herald, November 4, 2007.

“Toledo leads state again in unemployment,” The Toledo Blade, January 27, 2009.

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CHAPTER FOUR: MAYOR JACK FORD EFFORTS WITH MINORITY CONTRACTING

“What we’re trying to do is almost revolutionary. What we’re trying to do is develop the capacity of individuals who live in the core city, in the neighborhoods that ring the downtown area ... (to be) able to get their fair share of these billions of dollars that we know are getting ready to come 131 into this economy,” Jack Ford 1 Introduction

As newly elected Mayor Ford closed his inaugural address as the city of Toledo’s

first Black mayor in January 2002, he quoted Isaiah 58: “house the homeless, clothe the

132 naked, lift the yokes of oppression from the disinherited.” 1 He continued, “We are

promised God’s marvelous support and backup if we do these things. Some believe

helping the disinherited is not the Mayor’s business – I disagree!” Mayor Ford was

trained as a lawyer, but did not practice law and worked primarily as a social worker.

This biblical reference reflects the governing mode and priorities of the Ford administration.

Elected in November 2001 as mayor with forty-five percent of Toledo’s Black

133 voters, the largest percentage in Toledo’s history, 1 Ford became mayor of a city where

he was responsible for nearly 2,800 employees, a $400 million budget and the health and

welfare of approximately 300,000 citizens. Mayor Ford took office during an economic

downturn where manufacturing-based, heavy industrial rust-belt cities, such as Toledo

were the first to feel the cuts. He also inherited a $15 million budget deficit from the

previous administration. Hence, Frisema’s (1969) “Hollow Prize” thesis accurately

portrays the conditions under which Mayor Ford took office in Toledo.

131 “City, university and industry team up to assist minority contractors: Officials promise results at announcement for Center for Capacity Building,” Bob Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, September 4, 2002 132 Ford Inaugural Speech, accessed while Ford was mayor at the City of Toledo official web address on- line. 133 “Toledo mayor brings message of civility, youth empowerment,” Kylene Kiang, The Michigan Daily, March 14, 2002 107

The previous chapter indicated how the racial and political climate, his life and career experience served as indicators of his mayoral policy actions and program development priorities. Significantly, as this chapter demonstrates, his career as a social worker is reflected in his primary policy objectives during his mayoral tenure.

A History of Legal Challenges

An example of a primary program development that Ford actively pursued and designed to improve the quality of life of Blacks is the 2003 creation of the Center for

Capacity Building program in conjunction with partners, the University of Toledo, the

Associated General Contractors of Northwest Ohio (AGC), the Northwestern Ohio

Building and Construction Trades Council and the Economic Opportunity Planning

Association (EOPA). However, the genesis for the Toledo center has a long legal history that precedes it. In December 1980, the Ohio House of Representatives passed

House Bill 584, The Minority Business Enterprise Act, known as the Set Aside Law:

Ohio’s MBEA was passed after many years, during the 1970s, of executive and administrative agency task force consideration of complaints regarding and statistics concerning minority group 134 participation in state construction contracts. 1

House Bill 584 was later struck down by U.S. District Judge Joseph Kinneary in 1982, but the Sixth Circuit reversed his decision in Ohio Contractors Association v. Keip in

1983. The bill established the Minority Contractors and Business Assistance Program

(MCBAP) and originally designated that specific geographic areas be awarded grants from the Ohio Department of Development to establish programs that fostered the

134 Text from Judge Graham ruling in Associated General Contractors of Ohio, Inc.; Associated General Contractors of Northwest Ohio, Inc. v. Sandra A. Drabik, Director, Department of Administrative Services; Reginald Wilkinson, Director of Rehabilitation and Correction. Accessed via http://vlex.com/vid/36185309

108

development of minority business opportunities. The determination of the amount of

funding provided each program was conducted at the state level by the Minority Business

Development Office annually. The office utilized U.S. Census Bureau data and zip codes in their effort to locate the highest concentrations of minority businesses.

The businesses are generally referred to as Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs) and include individuals, corporations or joint ventures of any kind. If the business has

more than one owner and operator, those that are 51% owned and controlled for at least

one year previous by minorities (Black, Hispanic, Asian, and American-Indian) are

135 considered a minority business enterprise. 1 Largely the focus of MCBAP is limited to

the construction industry and increasingly to goods and services as well. The Ohio

136 Department of Administrative Services listed 1,180 MBEs in October 1998. 1

The bill established requirements that minority business enterprises are given the

opportunity to effectively bid for and receive state procurement contracts with the private

sector, specifying fifteen percent of purchases for goods and services, five percent for

prime construction contracts, and seven percent for sub-contract construction contracts

137 and materials. 1 Since passage in 1980, the bill’s genesis and implementation has been

altered with various offices merging, the establishment of additional offices and the

removal of others. Significantly, an executive order by Governor George Voinovich in

1997 established the Historically Underutilized Business program, which allowed women

to be included. Hence, the state now had incentive to do business with minorities,

135 Ibid. 136 Data retention regarding the awarding of MBE contracts in the Toledo area is severely limited. The current director of the MBCAP office for the Toledo Regional Chamber of Commerce and the current commissioner for Affirmative Action at the city of Toledo both cite the lack of this information. While it is possible to cite the number of enrollees and graduates from the Capacity Building Program, the number of minorities who subsequently bid for and were awarded contracts is unavailable. 137 Ibid. 109

including women.

However, in 1998, the Association of General Contractors (AGC) an organization

that represents contractors, filed suit from its Toledo chapter that House Bill 584 was

unconstitutional. Federal Judge James Graham in the case of Association of General

Contractors v. Sandra Drabik, et al found House Bill 584 unconstitutional. The Ohio

House of Representatives later amended the bill to remove the set-aside clause for

construction and related projects. In addition, the state of Ohio filed an appeal to the

Sixth Circuit making the argument that the law passes strict constitutional scrutiny

138 because it serves a compelling state interest. 1 `As the Toledo Journal reports, the bill’s

history is mixed: “Complicating matters is that the goods and services component was

declared constitutional in January 1999 by the Ohio Supreme Court, which ruled called

Ritchey named for the plaintiff in a separate lawsuit. But the construction component had

139 been ruled unconstitutional in 1998 by a federal district judge.” 1

However, what is most significant is that the Toledo chapter of AGC brought the

suit. This suggests that the large contractors they represent in Toledo are discontented

with the increasing resources and bidding tools made available to minority contractors.

According to a Toledo Journal article, Bill Brennan, president of the chapter justifies the

suit: “Quite honestly, we’re not in favor of set asides as administered by the state of Ohio.

I guess I would have to see the evidence . . . that minority companies can not

140 compete.” 1 Thus, Ford’s creation of the Capacity Building Program, where AGC was

138 Ibid. 139 “Court ruling aside, Taft committed to contracting fairness, adviser says: Stephen Cheek says governor pledges level playing field for minority businesses,” Bob Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, June 14, 2000 140 “State appeals federal court’s overturning of set-aside law: Contracts for prison work prompted Toledo contractor group to challenge affirmative action program,” Bob Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, June 21, 2000 110

not only a co-sponsor, but also mentored minority business enterprises on various aspects of the contracting process, is a significant achievement.

“The House that Jack Built”

According to officials quoted in newspaper reports, the center’s creation coincided with the planning of large-scaled institutional, commercial and industrial construction projects such as the city sewer construction, the Toledo Waterways Initiative

Project, the I-280 Bridge Construction Project, the Toledo Public Schools Facilities

Improvement Project, Toledo Hospital and the development of the Marina Entertainment

District - projected to cost two billion over a period of fifteen years.

The development of the Center for Capacity Building, which some observers labeled “The House that Jack Built,” was started at the suggestion of a project manager at

EOPA, Weldon Douthitt and the head of economic and community development at the

141 University of Toledo, Ken Dobson. 1 The result was a cocktail party meet-and-greet initiative organized by Mayor Ford between minority contractors and large contractors at the elite private club, The Toledo Club. The early goal was that minority contractors would develop long-lasting relationships with some of the larger and more profitable construction companies that would result in wealth generation. As mayor-elect, Ford was informed that one of the city’s major project agreements for sewer reconstruction with

Black and Veatch Co. was set to begin without goals or targets for minority participation.

Thereby, immediately upon taking office in January 2002, Ford placed a hold on the agreement and sought out help in setting goals and building the capacity of minority

companies to be qualified to meet goals. The cocktail gatherings were, in part, designed

141 “School’s in session for innovative Center for Capacity Building,” Bob Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, January 22, 2003 111

for that purpose.

In his 2003 State of the City address Ford introduced the program as an initiative

142 to “build capacity within Toledo’s disadvantaged business community.” 1 The first of

its kind in the United States, the fourteen month education program was “created at the

insistence of the Ford Administration and funded annually [with a pledge of five years of

143 support] with $250,000 from the city,” according to The Toledo Journal. 1 Additional

start-up support was provided by Republican Governor Bob Taft with a $1.34 million

grant toward operating costs and the AGC’s valued in-kind contributions totaled

$340,000. Pledging the support of the university with the use of space and its head of

economic and community development as the center’s director, the president of the

University of Toledo indicated at the announcement ceremony that “This is what it means

to be a metropolitan university, to be engaged with the city, to be engaged with the state,

144 to be engaged with the private sector industry and community leaders.” 1 Thus, Ford

was able to attract the support and partnerships of private and public sector partners for

the center.

High Hopes

At its development stage, the center enjoyed the best wishes of all involved.

Mayor Ford recognized the program as a significant moment in history where public and

private partnerships were successfully arranged for the purpose of leveling the playing field for minority contractors. Taking personal pride in the center’s development, Ford at the inaugural of program noted how,

142 Text from Ford 2003 State of the City address accessed at the official city government website in November 2005 while Ford was mayor 143 “First class of ‘capacity’ graduates better prepared to go after ‘serious money,’” Bob Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, March 3, 2004 144 “School’s in session,” Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, 2003. 112

This is an historic moment in Toledo’s history. There’s some groundbreaking on economic development that is occurring here that can be a pattern not only for the rest of the state but for the rest of the country . . . This is very serious business. I think this may be the strongest initiative that I’ll have on my watch to empower entrepreneurs to live and work 145 inside the city. 1

Lee Moore, the president of the Toledo Minority Contractors Association suggested of

the program that “For anybody with any kind of future in their minds, who intends to

146 move up and advance . . . it’s one of the best opportunities they’re ever going to get.” 1

Tom Manahan, Jr., president and general manger of Lathrop, Inc, a large contracting company in the Toledo area said “We have a unique opportunity in this community to

147 make a difference over a long period, not just a single project.” 1 Ken Dobson, the director of the center said of the program and his new responsibility that, “We have such a great opportunity here to create wealth. For the businesses that develop the capacity,

148 there is a world of opportunity waiting for them.” 1

Republican city councilman George Sarantou called the investment in the center

“money well spent” and added that,

You know, when you talk to people and you say how’d you get your start invariably people say ‘I got a break somebody gave me a chance’ and it’s no different with this. We’ve just got to get more people involved that 149 normally don’t have those opportunities. 1

Bill Brennan, the president of the Associated General Contractors of Northwest Ohio lauded the program saying “it represents a great movement inside this community.

150 There’s nothing like this anywhere in America. We are way ahead of the curve.” 1

145 “City, university and industry team up to assist minority contractors: Officials promise results at announcement for Center for Capacity Building,” Bob Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, September 4, 2002 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid. 148 Ibid. 149 Ibid. 150 “First class of ‘capacity,’” Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, 2004. 113

Finally, the president of the University of Toledo, Dan Johnson, proudly supported the

project calling it a significant aspect of the university’s mission in community affairs:

“Not just a University of Toledo, but a university in Toledo and a university for

151 Toledo.” 1 From all sectors and corners – private, public, and political, the center’s

development was lauded as a great success for which many had significant hopes and

investments in its success.

Curriculum

Called the Core Competencies in Construction Curriculum, the program’s

courses, which cost enrollees nothing, if accepted, focused on construction process,

project management and scheduling, understanding financial statements, and insurance

and bonding. The forty-five week program was comprehensive in its design and stated goals, according to its director:

They will be mentored . . . they will be taken to the offices, to the job sites. They will be introduced to the equipment. They will be taught the business end of construction contracting - and not just building buildings, but making money, retaining profits and reinvesting those profits back into their businesses . . . This is not a two hour workshop. This is a long path, 152 but the right path. This is a difficult path, but the right path. 1

The sense that varying community members had a responsibility to assist in the effort

was broadly understood and was evident in the design of the curriculum.

The center’s mixed curriculum included experiential learning and traditional

understanding of basic skills. Students were offered mentoring and individualized

tutoring, in addition to the twelve-month classroom instruction, complete with fifteen

computers with relevant software at their disposal. University professors and major

contractors were the instructors, assisted by graduate students, with the intent that the

151 Ibid. 152 “School’s in session,” Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, 2003. 114

larger contractors would groom the smaller and subcontractors with the goal of helping

those developing skills to be prime contractors in the future. Major contracting companies welcomed the opportunity to assist in the skill development and wealth generation of smaller companies. According to Bill Rudolph, president of

Rudolph/Libbey, Inc., “We think that’s good for us, we think that’s good for the community, we think it’s good for the other companies and most of all it’s good for our

153 customers.” 1 In addition, students had monthly meetings with officers from major

contractors, bonding companies, insurance firms and banks that assessed the capacity of

each student’s individual business and spent six months in on-site mentoring with large

contractors.

The program’s primary goals were to enable minority contractor participants to

qualify for larger construction projects. Organizers wanted minorities to procure more

contracts at progressively higher levels with the hope that with the curriculum completed,

the experiential learning embarked upon, and the relationships established, an increase in

earnings and profitability would result. The process was designed to encourage the

continued attraction and engagement of more-qualified minority construction workers

into the construction industry.

Oversight

The center, while operated by a director, was overseen by a forty-seven member

board of advisors, and executive committee, and three advisory committees, comprised of

a coalition of local government, academia and private industry officials. The advisory committees were focused on three areas, Construction Contracting, Engineering Planning and Design, and Workforce Attraction and Development. This organization structure

153 “City, university and industry team up,” Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, 2002. 115

was designed to ensure transparent oversight but also to keep in mind the center’s

mission, which is as The Toledo Journal suggests a program “intended to give small

minority-owned companies the training needed to grow and get bigger construction

154 contracts.” 1 It provided the tools, the information, and the skills that enabled minority

construction contractors, subcontractors, and tradesmen to develop and prepare to bid for

federal, state, and city contracts.

The First Class

Fifty-three minority entrepreneurs graduated from the program’s first class. A majority of those graduates were African Americans, as Mayor Ford intended. The

Toledo Journal reports that “Mayor Jack Ford said he wants as much of [$2 billion in

pending area projects] money as possible going in to the bank accounts of African

155 American and other minority contractors.” 1 The graduation of the first class, then, was

a significant first step in Ford’s goal to generate wealth in the Black community.

Although more than eighty individuals initially enrolled, not everyone graduated.

As the director Ken Dobson said of the program, “it’s a lot of work – no question about

it. There is an investment on their part. It’s like going to college but working full- time.”156 Though all did not graduate, a significant number did. According to the Toledo

Journal,

Sixty-three minority business owners actually completed course requirements. But graduation certificates went only to those who had course attendance – twice a week for sessions of two to four hours – of at least ninety percent. Fourteen of the graduates had one-hundred percent attendance, and the overall graduation rate was eighty-four percent.157

154 “First class of ‘capacity,’” Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, 2004. 155 “School’s in session,” Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, 2003. 156 “City, university and industry team up,” Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, 2002. 157 “First class of ‘capacity,’” Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, 2004. 116

The graduation rate of the first class was lauded by one councilman at the graduation

ceremony as very significant. Councilman Michael Ashford, one of three Black

councilors at the time, said “That’s better than high school, better than college, better than anything.”158 In his address to the graduates, Mayor Ford touted the program’s

significance to the city and highlighted the role it was designed to play in assisting Black

contractors to conduct annual business worth more than what many top out at $75,000 to

$80,000:

This administration is committed – and I mean that, committed to diversity and to creating wealth throughout the city. As long as I am mayor, we’re going to stay the course . . . My role is see you get up to a $200,000 or a quarter million . . . then a half-million and beyond. I’m talking about, in simple terms, big money. Serious money. That’s where I want you to be.159

While wealth generation was his long-term message to the graduates, in the short term,

graduates received a certificate, plaque and memberships to both the Toledo Area

Chamber of Commerce and the Association of General Contractors.

Graduates and Early High Praises and High Expectations

Mayor Ford’s program development of the Center for Capacity Building raised

the expectations of the largely Black enrollees. At the program’s genesis, many enrollees

spoke very highly of the program. Graduate Milton McIntyre, president and CEO of Peak

Electric, Co. said, “Most helpful has been the networking. That’s been the best part of

the program for me. Just to know where to go and who to call for what you need . . . being able to talk to some of the major players.”160 Graduate Ruben Daniels, owner of

Rules Piping and Fire Protection was amazed at how the improved efficiency of the

158 Ibid. 159 Ibid. 160 “Center for Capacity Building participants point to networking opportunities,” Bob Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, June 25, 2003 117

technology he was introduced to would reduce his time to estimate the cost of installing

fire suppression equipment: “They’ve got a beautiful system. Two hours – that’s for the

whole building. It’s all computerized. That’s something I didn’t know. Something I

wouldn’t have known if I wasn’t in this program.”161

Graduate and African American contractor Thomas Bebley informs that the

program “allowed us to meet contractors that we may have heard of or met in passing . . .

But in a classroom setting, you had the opportunity to pick their brains.”162 Stan

McCormick, a Black contractor who owns an industrial supply business praises that “this offered us the opportunity to get fully engaged in the business of construction.”163 The

previous quotes suggest that participants really had high praises for the skills developed and information learned as a result of the program.

However, many of the same persons who had those high hopes arguably had them in expectation that they would receive a job as a result of completing the program.164

McIntyre indicated that “It’s tough to make money in the bid industry. I’m looking to being able to actually make deals.”165 According to The Toledo Journal, “Mr. Daniels hopes he gets hired to install fire suppression systems in the buildings planned by Toledo

Public Schools.”166 However, those integrally involved in the program like the current

director of the Toledo Regional Chamber of Commerce’s MCBAP program, who credits

Mayor Ford for helping him develop his landscaping business, suggest that most Blacks

expected jobs to result from their participation in the program and when they did not

161 Ibid. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid. 164 Interview, George Robinson, Toledo Regional Chamber of Commerce MCBAP Director, February 11, 2009 165 “Center for Capacity Building participants,” Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, 2003. 166 Ibid. 118

immediately develop, they were more than disheartened:

Participants thought they were going to get jobs through their participation in the program. It was sold and perceived that that was the number one goal. However, participants failed to know that no one can guarantee goals. They may help you get opportunities, but they can’t promise it.167

The high expectations that many would get jobs as a result of completing the program led to a community-wide misconception of the program’s original goals and intent. While city council increased the city’s funding to $257,000 for the second year of the program, private investments slowly decreased and the center’s mission was altered.168 As a result,

the program that began as a history making endeavor began to erode.

Competing Interests

The genesis to create a center designed to assist minority contractors in their

business development was perceived by nearly everyone involved as a grand idea.

Mayor Ford praised the collaborative effort, while speaking directly to the enrollees and

to a larger mixed-raced audience at the inaugural ceremony: “We’re going to move into a

whole new world, in time, and what happens today starts you on the path of creating real

significant wealth. Not just enough money to get by, but wealth creation. And we

[African Americans] need as much of that as we can get.”169 The program was

significant in its stated purpose to create wealth and because it filled gaps in service

delivery that many in the minority community thought could not be offered by the Toledo

Regional Chamber of Commerce, the Economic Opportunity Planning Association, The

Toledo Minority Contractors Association, or the Northwest Ohio Black Chamber of

Commerce on their own. As one anonymous participant says, “It was like crack, folks

167 Interview. Robinson, February 11, 2009. 168 “Center for Capacity Building participants,” Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, 2003. 169 “School’s in session,” Stiegel, The Toledo Journal, 2003. 119

were hooked on this.” However, the program’s sustainability was always threatened

under the surface given the challenges similar programs faced at the state level.

At the time of this writing, the program is noted for its grand intentions and

limited success at implementation. The former president of the University of Toledo

indicated in an interview to me: “The program was well conceived, yet it was poorly implemented.”170 As noted, many of the program’s majority-Black participants seemed

to expect to be awarded contracts as a result of completing the program. As one active

Black participant, who chose to remain anonymous suggests:

The minority community was not focused on the inherent business skills they need. Their focus was not on business management and how to better advertise and market their services. Rather, their focus was on the pie in the sky, their focus was on getting a job.

However, the program was not designed to give jobs, but to serve as a conduit for bidding and ultimately securing contracts. The misconception by the majority of the participants, according to the anonymous observer, led many to perceive the mayor misled them.

Ford, in part, created the program given the perception in the Black community that the local MCBAP state-funded program - that is charged with providing assistance to minority contractors in an identical capacity - was not doing so effectively. During

Ford’s tenure, the Economic Opportunity Planning Association (EOPA), a community agency that oversaw the MCBAP process lost its decades-long control over the grant.

This is significant as the association’s mission is to “develop and operate programs to advocate for low-income and moderate-income individuals and families to assist them in achieving self-sufficiency.”171 A largely Black-run community action agency since its

founding in 1964, the loss of the grant that assists minority contractors in securing and

170 Interview, Dan Johnson, former president of the University of Toledo, August 4, 2008 171 http://www.eopa.org/ 120

bidding for contracts was a blow to their organization.172

Perhaps more significant is the fact that the Toledo Regional Chamber of

Commerce took control of MCBAP for the region. While the argument was that The

Toledo Regional Chamber of Commerce has a variety of greater resources to ensure the

sustained execution of the state-funded MCBAP, the perception in the Black community was cold. The Chamber had a reputation as a largely White and elite-business favoring organization.173 The result, then, for Ford’s mayoral tenure was that the services of

MCBAP in Toledo were largely attempted by the Capacity Building program and his

administration’s merger of the Office of Affirmative Action/Contract Compliance with

Purchasing.

The argument for the importance of the center was framed in a way where Mayor

Ford clearly expressed his desire to create wealth in the Black community. However,

even Mayor Ford labels the program “a failure.”174 First, although many African

Americans may have gained skills from the program, most still blamed the mayor when

they did not receive a contract. Second, though the city took $250,000 from the water and

sewer budget to fund the project initially,175 with the support of the University of Toledo

and the state of Ohio, major contractors like Rudolph Libbey who once donated

significantly to the effort, began to decrease their donations.176 Hence, the program

essentially dissipated after Ford’s mayoral tenure completed.

The gap in minority contracting assistance once provided by EOPA and later the

Capacity Building Program, which included more than how to bid for contracts, but

172 Phone Interview, Weldon Douthitt, project manager at EOPA, January 2008 173 Interview. Robinson, February 11, 2009. 174 Interview, Jack Ford, June 24, 2008 175 Interview, Jack Ford, June 24, 2008 176 Interview, Jack Ford, June 24, 2008 121 effective business management, is currently left to the Toledo Regional Chamber of

Commerce who has established an MCBAP division to equip minority contractors with the needed information and skills to compete effectively. Meanwhile, the Center for

Capacity Building at the University of Toledo has re-framed its original mission to focus on energy efficient and alternative energy construction and technological development projects.177

Regardless of its implementation ineffectiveness, which is widely noted, the genesis for the program development was very significant. Ford saw that the city of

Toledo and the office of the mayor, specifically, had a vital role in ensuring minorities were actively and fairly engaged in the procurement of contracts from private entities and all levels of government. With no model for the program anywhere in the country, his effort to train minority contractors to be better skilled was a clear example of actively pursing the development of a program that was designed to improve the quality of life of

Blacks in Toledo.

Merger of the Office of Affirmative Action/Contract Compliance with Purchasing

In addition to his development of the Capacity Building program, Mayor Ford worked to change the Toledo Municipal Code in a specifically designed effort to protect the interests of African Americans. Although the previous chapter noted how, in his

2001 campaign announcement to run for mayor, Ford implied for some that he would abolish the affirmative action office, once elected, Ford took an aggressive stance to strengthen the office. Making good on his 2001 campaign announcement speech promise

177 According to my phone interview with George Robinson, Toledo Regional Chamber of Commerce MCBAP Director on February 11, 2009, the program’s shift in focus had led to an increase in Black contractors without capacity skills. With an environmental focus, even those who completed the courses under the original mission were not trained in that area. And, given the limited focus on the environment, many Black contractors see little utility in the program to serve their immediate needs 122

that “I will work to increase the participation of minority firms as city vendors,” in 2003,

Mayor Ford merged the office of Affirmative Action and Contract Compliance with the

Division of Purchasing and funded one director. This merger gave the city the power to

ensure their minority participation goal in city business of 12.3% was met.

In addition, the merger gave the director the power to issue contracts (or not) to

those companies that could prove they met the city’s 12.3% minority participation goals.

Under the previous mayor’s administration, the Purchasing Division could essentially

overrule the Affirmative Action/Contract Compliance office. Hence, the merger of the

two offices under Mayor Ford’s administration is significant as it ensured city contracts

were only awarded to those companies that met the criteria set for minority participation.

The result of this merger was the enforcement of minority good faith goals that were

established as result of the ministers’ protests and boycotts in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Timeline

As mayor-elect, Ford introduced The Ford Plan, a comprehensive document

detailing the priorities of his pending administration.178 The Plan, completed by April

2002 was based on the recommendations and observations of the Ford Citizen Transition

Team and the goals and visions Ford established for his administration. The transition

team was organized into several committees and the members of the committees conducted surveys and interviews of stakeholders from within city government and the

community at large. Subsequently, the committee prepared a report containing the

information gathered in their surveys and interviews and made recommendations and

goals for the Ford Administration. Their reports were presented to the Mayor on March 1,

2002.

178 Accessed at http://uac.utoledo.edu/Publications/appendix-2-Ford-Plan.pdf 123

In part three of the plan, Management Strategies and Objectives, the transition

team made two key recommendations regarding Affirmative Action: “1. Enforce and encourage Affirmative Action in all hiring and promotion decisions [and] 2. Move purchasing and contract compliance functions to the Affirmative Action Office.”179 The team also made several recommended goals for Affirmative Action, including, but not limited to: maintaining a current Affirmative Action Plan and developing an effective monitoring process within one hundred days; developing interim effective working relationships with the Departments of Human Resources and Purchasing within six months; and establishing a plan and process for on-going coordination between the

Department of Affirmative Action and Contract Compliance and the Departments of

Human Resources and Purchasing for diversity related matters within a year.180

Additionally, the Plan suggested that the Board of Community Relations might be merged with the Department of Affirmative Action and Contract Compliance, with the new board comprised of “community leaders/activists and individuals with expertise and a skill set in specific economic/professional area.”181 The Plan also recommended the

development of a report to the community, entitled the

‘State of Diversity in The City of Toledo,’ an annual publication to address all areas of responsibility under the aegis of the Affirmative Action/Contract Compliance Department. The report should include projected goals and accomplishments toward the goals, indicating hiring contracts let to MBEs, community outreach and mediation efforts.182

Hence, the plan to re-organize the Department of Affirmative Action and Contract

Compliance was the genesis of the Ford Transition Team recommendations.

179 http://uac.utoledo.edu/Publications/appendix-2-Ford-Plan.pdf 180 Ibid. 181 Ibid. 182 Ibid. 124

On August 26, 2002, eight months into Ford’s term, Toledo city council

considered a first read of Ordinance number 654-02. The ordinance, drafted by the city’s

law department at Ford’s urging, called for a new chapter 125 of the Toledo Municipal

Code, moving “responsibility for Purchases and Supplies from the Department of Finance

to the Office of Affirmative Action and Contract Compliance.”183 At-large Republican

councilwoman Betty Schultz referred the ordinance to the Committee of the Whole, a

standing committee, where the president of council is chair and all members of council

are on the committee. The ordinance sat in committee for a year and on August 27, 2003,

the proposed ordinance was brought to council for a second read.184 The following determination was made: “pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Council, [it is] requested

[that the ordinance] remain active [in committee] for up to one additional year.”185 On

November 25, 2003, however, the ordinance was voted on with eleven council members

voting in favor, and one excusing herself, Betty Shultz. The ordinance was passed as an

emergency measure, meaning that the measure took effect and was enforced immediately

after passage. According to the passage document, the emergency “lies in the fact that

this Ordinance is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health,

safety and property.”186

Impact

183 Text of the Toledo Municipal Code was provided by Acting Director of the Department of Law at the City of Toledo Adam Loukx upon making a public records request 184 An explanation for why the ordinance sat in committee could not be determined. Interviews suggested that Ford’s administration operated as if the ordinance would be approved prior to its final approval. Thereby, it is plausible that members of council did not find it imperative to formally approve the ordinance. Mayor Ford and the members of council at the time who were interviewed could not specifically recall why the ordinance was not formally approved for an entire year. 185 Text of the ordinance’s legal progression was provided by officials working on behalf of City Council in addition to the public records requests made to the Acting Director of the Department of Law at the City of Toledo Adam Loukx 186 Municipal Code. Courtesy of Director Loukx. 125

The creation of the Department of Affirmative Action, Contract Compliance and

Purchasing was significant. The merger meant that the responsibilities of the Division of

Purchasing in the Department of Finance were relegated to the new office. The director of the new office was appointed by the mayor and

shall be responsible for the City’s Affirmative Action program, contract compliance activities and purchasing functions . . . [and] shall have authority to perform the same functions and duties as those specified for the Commissioner of Purchases and Supplies and Administrator of Purchases and Supplies throughout the Toledo Municipal Code.187

The new director of Affirmative Action and Contract Compliance now had control over

what got spent and how.

Significantly, the merger also allowed the director of Affirmative Action,

Contract Compliance and Purchasing to pursue legislation that would make it easier for

Black and minority contractors to bid on and ultimately receive city contracts. In

December 2003, the director, at the mayor’s request, asked the law department to draft legislation to amend the Toledo Municipal Code in respect to contracting purchasing and

supplies. Ordinance 832-03 was designed to make the following key changes. First, to

increase the local preference criteria from four percent to five percent, meaning that local

vendors and contractors would be eligible for a five percent discount in their bids for

goods and services. Additionally, the threshold for formal bidding and for performance

bonds on City contracts would increase from $10,000 to $40,000. Significantly, the

ordinance amended the criteria that indicated the lowest bid should always be accepted to

include a “lowest and best” criterion for construction contracts.188

187 Municipal Code. Courtesy of Director Loukx. 188 Committee of the Whole Meeting Audio Transcript, December 9, 2003 126

The ordinance was designed to make the process easier for small and minority

businesses to bid for and therefore receive city contracts. Prior to the ordinance,

according to small business owners, any contract over $10,000 required a lengthy bid

process of over a dozen forms, and a timeframe of at least six weeks until notice.189 The formal bid process required that any contract over $10,000 must be advertised, which government officials suggested usually took two to three weeks.190 Then, bids must be

evaluated by the appropriate division or department, and a recommendation made to the

purchasing division. At that point, then, the purchasing division may process contracts in

bid form.

The ordinance sought to change the threshold to $40,000. That idea the

government officials argued in a Committee of the Whole Meeting on December 9, 2003.

Officials made the argument that the ordinance would allow small businesses, many

without the time and resources to devote to completing multiple forms and to appeal in

person to the Department of Purchasing and City Council for a contract, to only have to

do so if the contract was over $40,000. Hence, increasing the threshold, allowed for

more of a diverse group of vendors to bid, since for any contracts under $40,000, a bidder

would not need to produce a bond.191 Small local businesses, many of whom are Black-

owned, would then be in a position to apply for a city contract between $10-40,000, and

not only the contracts of $10,000 or less. According to administration officials arguing in

favor of the ordinance, the purpose of the $40,000 was to expedite service to citizens, and

189 Testimony of local business owner, Committee of the Whole Meeting Audio Transcript, December 9, 2003 190 Testimony of then-Director of the Department of Affirmative Action, Contract Compliance and Purchasing, Anita Lopez, Committee of the Whole Meeting Audio Transcript, December 9, 2003 191 The lack of needing a bond statement is based on my phone interview with former Director of the Department of Affirmative Action, Contract Compliance and Purchasing, Yulanda McCarty-Harris, July 2008. 127

the review of all purchasing requisitions and contracts.192 Administration officials also

suggested in the meeting of the Committee of the Whole that the $40,000 number, though

at the time a higher threshold than in any major city in the state, was appropriately based

on the needs of divisions and departments, and not inflation, as one councilor suggested

the threshold should be based.193

In addition, the ordinance created a maintenance system where for one calendar

year a potential vendor could volunteer to be listed as pre-qualified with the department

to eliminate the need to re-apply for bids that opened throughout the year. Furthermore,

the ordinance also allowed the Department of Affirmative Action, Contract Compliance

and Purchasing to “hone in on” experience specific to the work needing to be completed, and not only related experience.194 Within the city bureaucracy, the culture of the

awarding of contracts was that large companies who may offer a variety of services often

beat out smaller companies who specialized in the work the contract specified either

because they did not have the resources to apply within a designated time frame or

because the large company could afford to make a lower bid given the capital revenue

they gross annually.

The “lowest and best” criteria the ordinance sought to establish and apply to construction contracts, allowed the city take into consideration a number of factors in awarding contracts, including related project experience, project familiarity, and construction experience generally.195 The salience of price as the sole significant criteria

to be considered was to be reduced to only one of the factors considered, giving access to

192 Testimony. Anita Lopez. December 9, 2003. 193 Committee of the Whole Meeting Audio Transcript, December 9, 2003 194 Testimony of Steve Seaton, Ford Administration Official, Committee of the Whole Meeting Audio Transcript, December 9, 2003 195 Testimony. Steve Seaton. December 9, 2003 128

more local vendors, thereby increasing tax revenue, and potentially allowing for a better

project, so argued the officials.

Finally, with one voluntary application projected to be needed for a vendor to pre-

qualify annually, paperwork stalemate would be significantly reduced, small businesses

would be better positioned to bid for contracts, and tax revenue would increase to the city

as a result of the local preference incentive since a greater number of smaller, but Toledo-

based companies could bid for contracts.196

The merger of the Division of Purchasing with the Department of Affirmative

Action and Contract Compliance ensured that one director was responsible for the

awarding of contracts and that person was also responsible for ensuring that Blacks and

other minorities were given equal opportunity to the bidding process.

Projected Impact

One of the merger’s key successes, as with the Capacity Building program, was largely improving the perception that the city had an active role to play in ensuring minorities, and African Americans in particular, have equal access and opportunity to exponentially and economically grow their business. Additionally, the merger with one director established one individual as the contact for private sector industries like the

University of Toledo who sought to better prepare, educate and train minorities to be competitive.197

The merger also affected the way in which MBEs were actually counted. The

ideology of the mayor and his appointees to the position of director was that MBEs

largely meant Black contractors. Had the departments been separate, confusion as to

196 Testimony. Anita Lopez. December 9, 2003. 197 This statement is based on a phone interview with Jack Ford in January 2009 129

what constitutes a minority business enterprise was more likely. For example, previous

administration included neighborhood organizations as MBEs.198 However, while their

missions may include economic development, the procurement of contracts and the development of the necessary skills to successfully bid for them was often never the focus.

The result of the merger was increased efficiency on the bidding of contracts, improved tracking of the awarding of contracts, and the development of the perception that Black and minority contractors are not inferior, unqualified, and inexperienced, if given the tools and resources to bid confidently. According to the chart below, it appears that at the time of the merger, the city of Toledo MBE participation significantly increased in 2003:

198 This statement is based on a phone interview with Jack Ford in January 2009 130

As the chart indicates, the 2003 merger allowed for greater MBE participation.199

Prior Culture within the Division of Purchasing

According to interviews with members of the Black business community in

Toledo it appears the culture of the Division of Purchasing prior to Mayor Ford’s merger was that the commissioner of purchasing would largely grant contracts to the usual members of a ‘good ole’ boy’ system.200 The first director of the newly merged office indicated that,

When I was running the office, the majority of the people I worked with were African Americans and the merger allowed me to force all city departments to seek out MBEs, not because they were minorities, but because they were qualified. That never happened under the previous arrangement. As a result, bids were more competitive and departments had to prove that the minority bid was not qualified.201

Thereby, the merger was a significant shift in the culture of the office as it related to purchasing. As the director suggested, former purchasing commissioners likely would not have insisted on MBE participation in contracts since their job was not to ensure that goal was met. The director further highlighted the shift in culture by implying previous persons in control of the funds were of backgrounds that limited their understanding of the significance of fairness: “if you don’t live in a diverse community, you can’t break patterns of oppression. You have to make institutional change. There was this culture of graft and I made a lot of enemies because of hiring.”202 For the director, the power of the office was significant as she was in a position to change the city administrative culture.

199 The significant decrease in MBE participation from 1999 to 2000 can not be explained. Specific data of MBE participation from Finkbeiner’s administration (1993-2001) that would be housed at the Office of Affirmative Action was unavailable 200 Interviews with Anita Lopez, June 19-20, 2008; Interview, Jack Ford, June 24, 2008; Phone interview with Yulanda McCarty-Harris, July 2008; Phone interview, George Robinson, February 11, 2009; Phone Interview, Weldon Douthitt, January 2008 201 Interviews with Anita Lopez, June 19-20, 2008 202 Ibid. 131

The office’s second and last director (as the office functioned during Mayor

Ford’s tenure) also spoke of the broad focus of the position, indicating how enforcement

was tracked more efficiently: “[the merger] allowed me to have direct control over

everything that was bid out. If you didn’t do minority inclusion, you couldn’t bid.”203

Calling the mayor “the smartest man I know,” and noting that “Blacks felt they had a voice and access within Jack’s administration,” the director commented how in her role as director, “it was my job” to assist with efforts related to the Black community.204

Indicating that she had the support to aggressively pursue and ensure that minority participation goals were met, the director laments that “Jack was very committed to

African American issues, yet he was misunderstood.”205 For her, the merger of the

offices was a significant step by the mayor to attempt to change the culture of city

bureaucrats who viewed Black contractors as inferior, as it was an effort to change the

perception by Whites that Blacks were incapable of performing contract services.

However, she continues that the risk to change the culture and perception as

evidenced by the merger of the two offices was at his expense: “He did not get re-elected

and I think a part of the reason why he did not is because construction is a good ole’

boys’ network.”206 As one White businessman and leading contractor put it, “it changed

the look of employment in the city of Toledo . . . the public sector doesn’t create jobs.”207

Hence, Ford’s efforts to hire more Blacks in key administrative roles at city hall, who then assisted in the hiring of more Black contractors was not well-received by everyone.

The Office Today

203 Phone interview with Yulanda McCarty-Harris, July 2008 204 Ibid. 205 Ibid. 206 Ibid. 207 Interview with Bill Brennan, August 4, 2008 132

When Mayor Finkbeiner took office, he removed the powers of the Division of

Purchasing from the director of the office of affirmative action, contract compliance, and

demoted the office from department level status. In fact, he later fired the director of the

office he hired, and who directed the office in his previous administration in the 1990s.208

An avid supporter, the fired director, with two other fired Black city employees sued and filed a complaint with the Ohio Commission on Civil Rights, who later found probable cause that discrimination was a function of their firings.209

Meanwhile, the present commissioner of the affirmative action office and the

current mayor suggest in the MBE participation chart submitted to me that their

participation rates are higher than Mayor Ford efforts, which Ford disputes. In an article

in The Sojourner’s Truth, an African American newspaper, the former mayor and director

take issue with those numbers. According the article,

Finkbeiner’s figures have lumped together HUD monies, grants, and agency funds – those for community development corporations . . . the Ford administration uses a measure of the amount of city contracts going to minority contractors . . . only money going to minorities . . . Finkbeiner’s figures included monies to contractors who then funneled parts of those contracts to majority contractors.210

There are varying ways to count minority participation. For example, are the businesses

counted Toledo-based companies? Does MBE participation include women and other

minorities? How is the 51% ownership criteria set forth in House Bill 584 measured?

Are the same individual companies receiving contracts or are a diversity of diverse

companies being awarded the contracts? Does a significantly high MBE participation

208 “State panel faults Toledo in discipline of 3 black employees,” Tom Troy, The Toledo Blade, February 1, 2008 209 Ibid. 210 “Mayor Jack Ford: Focusing on Fiscal Responsibility and Helping People,” by Fletcher Word, The Sojourner’s Truth, September 7, 2005 133

goal match with the actual number of contracts awarded to MBEs? These questions are

significant as they pinpoint the leeway an individual strong mayor has in his or her

interpretation of a MBE goal.

Conclusion

Mayor Ford said bluntly in an interview to me that, “why run for mayor if Black

folk aren’t going to benefit? I ran for mayor and had a clear position for Blacks to be

empowered . . . I wanted to create wealth for Blacks in Toledo.”211 His major program development, the creation of the Center for Capacity Building at the University of Toledo was a clear example of this said desire to empower African Americans. For Ford, it was not enough to simply educate Black contractors on how to bid for contracts. When he came into office at least two organizations already did that. For Ford, he specifically sought to create a more educated class of Black entrepreneurs who would be better skilled to effectively manage their businesses – all in an effort to position them for long term sustained economic growth.

The Capacity Building Program, at its genesis had that focus. Ford was initially successful in securing the support of significant private partners. Many of these private partner organizations were led by influential Whites who Ford convinced benefitted from supporting the program. Thus, Ford’s successful effort to obtain the support of major

White corporate and non-profit leaders is an example of his ability to universalize the interests of Blacks as interests that matter to everyone. With Ford’s tactics at persuasion, these leaders were initially convinced that their interests and the interests of the majority-

Black enrolled program were mutually beneficial. As chapter eight explains in more detail, largely as a result of his rhetoric in State of the City addresses and conversations

211 Phone Interview, Jack Ford, January 2009 134 behind the scenes, Ford framed his advocacy of Black interests in such a way that did not alienate the potential for support from key White leaders or deemphasize the significance of race. In fact, White corporate and non-profit leaders were initially drawn to efforts like the Capacity Building Program because of the universalizing Black interests approach Ford utilized. However, as private sector funding and support, particularly from large contractors waned in subsequent years, enrollment decreased in number as word spread that previous enrollees were dismayed in not securing a contracts, and the leadership structure at the center shifted their focus to primarily bidding assistance and green initiatives - the implementation of an idea that enjoyed a highly lauded genesis was weakened.

The policy action of merging the Division of Purchasing and the Department of

Affirmative Action and Contract Compliance and the subsequent procurement ordinance were clear examples of actively pursuing the interests of African Americans as the merger and ordinance provided the tools for Black contractors to competitively bid for and thereby, increase their chances of being awarded a contract. While the number of

Black contractors who benefitted is undetermined, the impact of the effort to change perception by a mayor who believed the public sector had a role in private companies’ development, especially Blacks, has few models.

135

REFERENCES

Internet

Ohio Minority Contractors’ Business Assistance Program (MCBAP) History - http://www.pidcovmba.org/history.html (February 2009).

Associated General Contractors of Ohio, Inc.; Associated General Contractors of Northwest Ohio, Inc. v. Sandra A. Drabik, Director, Department of Administrative Services; Reginald Wilkinson, Director of Rehabilitation and Correction. http://vlex.com/vid/36185309 (February 2009).

Jack Ford Transition Team Report. “The Ford Plan.” http://uac.utoledo.edu/Publications/appendix-2-Ford-Plan.pdf (February 2009).

Economic Opportunity Planning Association, Toledo, Ohio - http://www.eopa.org/ (February 2009).

Books

House-Soremekun, Bessie. 2002. Confronting the Odds: African American Entrepreneurship in Cleveland. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.

Newspaper Articles

Bob Stiegel, “City, university and industry team up to assist minority contractors: Officials promise results at announcement for Center for Capacity Building,” The Toledo Journal, September 4, 2002.

Kylene Kiang, “Toledo mayor brings message of civility, youth empowerment,” The Michigan Daily, March 14, 2002.

Bob Stiegel, “Court ruling aside, Taft committed to contracting fairness, adviser says: Stephen Cheek says governor pledges level playing field for minority businesses,” The Toledo Journal, June 14, 2000.

Bob Stiegel, “State appeals federal court’s overturning of set-aside law: Contracts for prison work prompted Toledo contractor group to challenge affirmative action program,” The Toledo Journal, June 21, 2000.

Bob Stiegel, “School’s in session for innovative Center for Capacity Building,” The Toledo Journal, January 22, 2003.

Bob Stiegel, “First class of ‘capacity’ graduates better prepared to go after ‘serious money,’” The Toledo Journal, March 3, 2004.

136

Bob Stiegel, “City, university and industry team up to assist minority contractors: Officials promise results at announcement for Center for Capacity Building,” The Toledo Journal, September 4, 2002.

Bob Stiegel, “Center for Capacity Building participants point to networking opportunities,” The Toledo Journal, June 25, 2003.

Tom Troy, “State panel faults Toledo in discipline of 3 black employees,” The Toledo Blade, February 1, 2008.

Fletcher Word, “Mayor Jack Ford: Focusing on Fiscal Responsibility and Helping People,” The Sojourner’s Truth, September 7, 2005.

Interviews

Brennan, Bill. Interview. August 4, 2008.

Douthitt, Weldon. Telephone Conversation. January 2008.

Ford, Jack. Interview. June 24, 2008.

Ford, Jack. Telephone Conversation. January 2009.

Johnson, Dan. Interview. August 4, 2008

Lopez, Anita. Interview. June 19-20, 2008.

McCarty-Harris, Yulanda. Phone Conversation. July 2008.

Robinson, George. Telephone Conversation. February 11, 2009.

Miscellaneous

Text of the Toledo Municipal Code was provided by Acting Director of the Department of Law at the City of Toledo Adam Loukx upon making a public records request

Toledo, Ohio City Council. Committee of the Whole Meeting. Audio Transcript. December 9, 2003.

137

CHAPTER FIVE: THE HISTORY OF RACE AND POLITICS IN DAYTON, OHIO: THE PUSH AND PULL FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO DAYTON’S COMPLEX RACIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Dayton’s Push and Pull Racial and Political Environment

The history of race and politics in Dayton, Ohio demonstrates a push and pull phenomenon. Unlike many communities that gradually approach social and political racial harmony with strategic advances in significant racial and political contexts, Dayton is an example of a city that experienced the pushing of racial progress while often simultaneously confronting the pulling of racial prejudice. For example, during the mid

1970s and 1980s when other Midwestern medium-sized and large cities with minority

Black populations elected Black mayors, the voters in Dayton, Ohio elected a Black mayor as well. James McGee – who would become Dayton’s longest serving mayor – was appointed in 1970 and elected in 1973. Before being appointed, McGee, an attorney, served as a city commissioner where he replaced the city council’s first Black member,

Don Crawford, who was elected in 1961.212

In addition to the Black political advances within the city of Dayton politics in the early 1960s and 1970s, C.J. McLin, Jr. was elected to the Ohio House of Representatives in 1966. A powerful Black politician in the state of Ohio, McLin later would become a special advisor to Ohio Governor John Gilligan and an active voice on behalf of the

Black community in Dayton and throughout the region. His father, a two-time, unsuccessful candidate for Dayton city commission, was also an active member of

Dayton Black political establishment in the 1930s and 1940s. McLin Sr. formed the

212 Crawford, who established the city’s Human Relations Council, that monitors compliance with fair housing and affirmative action regulations, later became the clerk of commission. 138

Democratic Voters League in west Dayton, the once political epicenter of Dayton’s Black

residents.

However, Dayton’s early history with pushing Black political empowerment came

during a time when racial incidents skyrocketed nationally and locally and thereby pulled

the city’s advances away from earlier or simultaneous racial progress. For example, in

1963, when the Black family of James Fuller moved into the Townview section of

Madison Township, a nearby Dayton suburb, a small riot by White protestors ensued,

including the presence of one-hundred riot-trained members of the police department.

In September 1966, a Black Dayton resident named Lester Mitchell was killed while sweeping his sidewalk at 3 a.m. He was shot in both of his eyes, as witnesses

claimed, by Whites in a drive-by shooting. Race riots ensued with more than one

hundred Black protestors and over one hundred arrests (Loyacano 31). After an

investigation that found witnesses’ reports of a drive-by was not scientifically possible,

the riots inflamed, and were only calmed once Mayor Dave Hall called in one thousand

members of the Ohio National Guard to maintain the peace.

This chapter examines how Dayton’s racial and political history developed over

the previous several decades. Utilizing the theme of pushing racial progress while

pulling with racial prejudice, the chapter explores how the presence of Black political

empowerment and the struggle to build effective governing coalitions amid social unrest

served as constant intervening variables in the examination of Dayton’s racial and political context prior to the election of the city’s third Black, and first female mayor,

Rhine McLin.

Dayton’s Political and Social Culture 139

Dayton is of special note since it is part of a state with a unique and varied

political culture. Elazar (1972) generally describes the political culture of the state of

Ohio as individualistic.213 This designation suggests that government involvement, in the view of its residents’ private activities, is limited, especially in economic affairs. Rather, government solely exists to serve the demands of the people. For Elazar, Dayton is an individualistic city. In Dayton, then, the city’s political culture is tempered by a general commitment to all things communal – governmental or non-governmental.

Consequently, issues carry an important political value and private activities are viewed only as a function of the public good. Hence, Dayton’s individualistic character is different from Toledo’s moralistic culture. Thereby, the conditions under which a Black mayor may successfully advocate for and implement policies of interests to Black residents, may be different from the city of Toledo, more than two hours north.

Other scholars have studied Dayton’s political culture as well. Myers (1959) described Dayton as a city with a southern culture and a northern geography:

It has been said that Dayton is a northern city with a southern exposure . . . We are close to the Mason-Dixon Line and have absorbed some of the South’s prejudices. But we are far enough north so that these hot prejudices are tempered by the cooling breezes of racial tolerance and understanding.214

For Myers, a White founding member of Dayton’s chapter of the National Urban League,

the city’s geographic location and emotional context fostered a unique environment that

could potentially served as a role model for better race relations for other cities. Noting

213 Hero (1998, 9) tackles Elazar’s political culture typology on the basis that it is limiting because it is based on his research of people mostly of European background. Hero prefers instead, a social diversity perspective, which contends that much of state politics and policy is related to racial and ethnic diversity. Instead of an individualistic, moralistic and traditionalist typology, Hero advocates a homogeneity, heterogeneity, and bifurcation typology that he says is more appropriate to the nature of state politics. 214 Ibid, 22. 140 how the Dayton race relations context in the 1940s and 1950s was tense, Myers observed how such a context developed. In so doing, he perhaps best explains how Dayton’s social and political culture is unique from Toledo:

What has made the race situation in Dayton more tense than in cities farther north is the fact that with the Negro migrants who came seeking not only employment but freedom from persecution as well, came also the Southern whites seeking employment in our factories and who found competition from Negro workers here. And the mountain whites of Kentucky and Tennessee are perhaps the most race conscious of all southerners.215

For Myers, it was the confluence of southern Blacks and Appalachian Whites migrating to Dayton in the 1940s and 1950s from unique experiences and with the same employment expectations that best explains the racial unrest.

Other scholars agree that the presence of Appalachian Whites contributed to racial tension. For example, Levine (2005, 174) noted that, “thirty-five thousand newer white immigrants from Appalachia reinforced a solid core of people opposed to [school] desegregation [in the 1970s].” While segregation proponents were many in Dayton,

Myers (1959) described Dayton’s segregated culture as not systemically organized:

Even in the difficult matter of segregation Dayton has been making definite progress. In line with most cities so close to the south, we practice segregation in housing, schools, churches, recreation, and hospitals. Transportation has never been restricted in Dayton. We have never had Jim Crow cars even though hotels and restaurants are definitely segregated. We are southern in our eating but northern in our riding. Our prejudices are all mixed up with our emotions, a difficult psychological background. Reason plays no part.

215 Ibid, 25. Myers’ rhetorical observation is confirmed by statistical evidence. Dayton, has been, and remains, one of the largest cities with a large Appalachian White population (Pulera 2004, 100). Between 1940 and 1970, Dayton, along with other Midwest ‘port cities’ experienced a huge increase in its urban Appalachian population (Sisson, et al. 2007, 855). In addition, the urban Appalachian population has organized into a group in Dayton called “Our Common Heritage” (Clayton 2002, 299). Annually, since the 1980s, the group has organized the Mountain Days Festival in August, for members of their community to gather and fellowship. 141

Myers described how the segregation of Dayton in the 1940s and 1950s was largely random, noting how busses were not segregated, yet no Black drivers were hired in a city with thirty thousand Blacks until after 1960.216 As for hospitals, one, as of 1959, had racial restrictions. Accordingly, with its conflicting racial environment, Dayton’s political and social culture is appropriately described as a historic push and pull relationship between understanding and prejudice.

Early Black History in Dayton

The presence of African Americans in Dayton dates back to 1798, where the first reference to a Black person appeared in a Dayton township tax document entitled

“William Maxwell and his negro” (Drury 1909, 166). While Blacks in Dayton were few in number, elsewhere in Ohio, Blacks were migrating to cities in large numbers.

Therefore, in 1804, the state passed an act entitled “Act to Regulate Black and Mulatto

Persons,” requiring Blacks entering Ohio to provide documentation proving their freedom. Additionally, no White resident could employ an African American without a certificate of freedom, as slavery was forbidden under the provisions of the Northwest

Ordinance of 1787 (Davis 1976).

Limited ‘Free’ Life

Many scholars have noted the significance the ‘free’ state of Ohio had long played in the freedom quest of enslaved African Americans who mostly fled the south and crossed into Ohio via the Ohio River. According to Drury, the location of Dayton made the city an avid stop on the Underground Railroad:

The location of Dayton on the route to Canada so often chosen by fleeing Negroes tended to keep at high tensions the excitement over the slave issue. Race riots occurred in 1836 and 1841, in which Negroes were

216 Ibid, 38. 142

driven away, their houses destroyed, and the sympathizing abolitionists mobbed” (Drury 1909, 254).

As Drury found, Dayton’s geographic location in southwest Ohio led to its active role in

the Underground Railroad. However, the influx of Blacks in Dayton as a result of the activity of the Underground Railroad forced some Blacks to leave as the riots proved that

Blacks faced a lot of tension. As the riots and the tension continued, those quality of life

and living conditions factors contributed to force some Blacks to leave the Dayton region

altogether:

In 1825, there were thirty-four colored people in Dayton. In 1833 and 1834, the Dayton colony received considerable accessions from Virginia and North Carolina . . . in many respects, conditions were unfavorable to them. Twenty-four of the seventy-three colored people of Montgomery County left Dayton for Hayti in 1824. On the night of January 26, 1841, the ‘Paul Pry,’ a disreputable colored resort in the southwestern part of the city, was mobbed by white people, one of the attacking party being stabbed and killed. The city council did all that it could to protect the colored people, but on the night of February 3rd a number of houses occupied by Negroes were burned.217

Thereby, the conditions under which even recently free Blacks in Dayton lived in the mid

1800s suggests that early Black Daytonians’ lives were severely restricted. Riots and threats of death however were not the only examples of limited Black life and

participation in official affairs. According to the “Act to Amend the Act Entitled ‘An Act to Regulate Black and Mulatto Persons,’” Blacks, though in a free state, lived with the following restrictions: “1. No black persons could enter Ohio unless, within twenty days, two white freeholders would post a $500 bond guaranteeing his good behavior; 2, No black persons could give evidence in a trial involving a white person, 3, no black person could serve on a jury, 4, Black children were denied admission to the state common

school system, [and] 5, blacks were barred from serving in the militia” (Davis 1987).

217 Ibid, 166. 143

These ‘Ohio Black Laws,’ as they came to be known are an example of severe

restrictions on Black social and political life in the Dayton in the mid 1800s.

The Black Community Expands

These Restrictions, however, did not deter some Blacks escaping slavery from

stopping in Dayton and many making the city home. By 1820, the U.S. Census reported

one hundred forty one free Blacks in a city with 1,139 residents (Peters 1995). And, by

1875, the Dayton Black population grew to 548 persons while the city’s population was

30, 473 (Peters 1995, 15). As population grew, so did the number of Black organizations.

During the period between 1820 and 1875, Blacks in Dayton developed many

organizations, including the American Sons of Protection, the Wayman Chapel AME

Church, a Prince Hall Masonic Ancient Square Lodge No. 40, the United Daughters of

Zion and the Lincoln Guards. This early establishment of organizations suggests the need for Dayton Blacks to form community, even before the Civil War or during the period known as Reconstruction nationally.

The latter part of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth century began with continued increases in Black population in Dayton. By 1920, 9,052

Blacks were recorded in the U.S. Census, a significant increase from 901 reported in

1890.218 And again, with an increase in population came the establishment of more community organizations. Churches such as Allen AME Church, St. Margaret’s

Episcopal Church and Bethel Baptist Church were established. The West Area YWCA was established from the basement of Eaker Street AME Church. In addition, Dayton’s first Black police officer, William Jenkins, was hired in 1897. By 1910, the city had three Black police officers.

218 Ibid, 25. 144

The city’s first Black newspaper, The Dayton Forum was published in 1913, the

same year as the city’s great flood. The flood severely damaged the property of Black

businessmen and the homes of many Blacks. With three days of rain totaling over 9,000

gallons of water, the flood, which killed seventy-nine people, covered much of Dayton

with twenty feet of water. According to Myers (1959), the flood had a great impact on

race relations:

It made little difference then whether or not the man who was rowing a boat to take you out of the second story window was white or black. You got in to the boat and prayed that it wouldn’t be swamped before it got to the nearest river bank, which looked miles away across the swollen yellow torrent. And, you thank God that a Good Samaritan whether yellow or red white or black had braved the flood to rescue you. That experience made us a prayerful people and we have remained so (25-26).

By 1940, the Black population had reached 20,273 persons and Blacks’

participation in more community organizations increased (Peters 1987) and by 1944

Dayton’s Black population had increased nearly fifty percent ((Loyacano 26). The

Dayton’s League of Colored Women Voters was established in 1921, the Delphinium

Garden Club in 1931, and the Omega Chapter of Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority, Inc. in

1934. By 1960 Dayton’s total population increased to 262,332 with 57,288 Blacks,

ninety-five percent of whom lived in west Dayton (Peters 1987, 85). During the period of 1940-1960, the all-Black Regal Theater was opened, the Southern Christian

Leadership Conference and Dayton Urban League were formed, and Blacks were admitted to the apprenticeship program at National Cash Register.

Generally, the lives of early twentieth century African Americans in Dayton were calm and respectful prior to the genesis of the civil rights movement nationwide. While racialized incidents were known to occur, largely, the history of the racial and political 145 experience of Blacks in Dayton was without major incidents. Blacks slowly built their community west of the river in Dayton, apart from Whites. For example, the DeSoto

Bass Courts, a segregated apartment complex was developed in the 1940s.219 More organizations formed, such as the South Side Civic Association, the Dayton Alumni

Chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, and the West Dayton Area Council.

The early twentieth century pushing of Black social and political activity as evidenced through the rapid development of a Black cultural community was tempered by the pulling back of racial prejudice. In 1945, a riot was brewing, but was successfully averted. A young Black woman was hired as a drill-press operator at a local war plant producing materials for World War II. White citizens went on strike to protest the hire at a time when the materials produced were in high demand. Myers references the event as a racial ‘setback:’

A setback came in 1945. It was reminiscent of the riot of 1841 since both involved young Negro women. Here is a headline which appeared in the Dayton Daily News, March 28, 1945: ‘All efforts fail to end strike at Kurz-Kasch Company. While officials of the company and representatives of the U.S. Government sought some way to end the work stoppage at the plant which started last Thursday following the employment of a Negro woman as a drill-press operator, production of vital war materials continued at a standstill.’ That white citizens would go on strike during a war at a plant which was making vitally needed distributors for B-29 bombing planes, shows the tense feeling which existed (Myers 1959, 26).

Racial incidents continued in 1945. In one case, a “Negro elevator operator” was killed by a White guard. According to Myers, while both incidents could have resulted in riots, they did not as the bi-racial ministerial alliance was credited with calming Dayton’s west side Black community. In response to the incidents, mayors appointed race relations

219 Ibid, 91. 146

committees at various junctures to address the problem, yet, according to Myers, such

efforts were ‘short-lived.’220

In the midst of the pulling of racial prejudice by some Whites, with the civil rights

era dawning, Blacks in Dayton began push racial tolerance and more actively and

successfully engaged in politics. In 1947, C.J. McLin, Sr. became the first Black to run for Dayton City Commission. In 1950, Fred Bowers was elected to the Ohio House of

Representatives. In 1952, Rev. J. Welby Broaddus became the first Black elected to the

Dayton Board of Education.

The early political successes were again pulled back in 1954 as a faction of

Blacks protested in front of city hall over the lack of fair treatment and equal employment opportunities for Blacks in Dayton. While the group was credited with increased loan activity and jobs for Blacks, the group organizer lost his dry cleaning business as White suppliers “refused to sell to him” (Peters 1987, 94). Though some Black businessmen lost their businesses because of organized political activity, most Black businesses, which were located on Fifth Street in west Dayton, remained strong. Given segregated housing and development patterns, Fifth Street became known as the “center of black life,” with more than seventy Black owned and operated businesses by 1940.221

1950s

By 1950, Dayton’s description as a city that experienced the pushing of racial

progress while confronting the pulling of racial prejudice became even more evident. By

1950, Dayton’s Black population had reached fourteen percent of the total population

with 34,151 persons out of a total of 243, 872 Dayton residents (Loyacano 26).

220 Ibid, 27. 221 Ibid, 145. 147

However, the 1950s was an era of the “omnipresent reality of race” in Dayton, according to native Daytonian and scholar Manning Marable (Marable 1995: 1). A “predominantly blue-collar, working-class town, situated on the banks of the Great Miami River,”

Marable described the city of Dayton as a city divided by class and race. For example, neighborhoods were divided by class: “Oakwood was the well-to-do WASP-ish community . . . Dayton View on the northwest side was becoming increasingly

Jewish.”222 For Marable, the presence of Blacks in Dayton and their growth and

population coincided with an increased separation based on economic worth.

While class divisions were present for Marable’s description of the 1950s, the

presence of race was the constant fixture of Black life in Dayton:

Beneath the divisions of income, religion, and political affiliation seemed to be the broad polarization of race. There appeared to be two parallel racial universes which cohabited the same city, each with its own set of religious institutions, cultural activities, social centers, clubs, political organizations and schools. African Americans generally resided west of the Great Miami River. The central core of the ghetto was located along the corridors of West Third and West Fifth Street.223

For Marable, the west side of the Miami River, and thereby the west side of Dayton was

nearly exclusively Black. Whether Blacks lived at separate ends of the west side, “color

was the greatest denominator.224 For Marable, growing up on Dayton’s west side in the

1950s and 1960s, race was a prominent aspect of life.

For the Black community in which Marable expressed that, “The black

community existed largely in its own world, within the logic of institutions it had created

to sustain itself.”225 Hence, the clubs and organizations, churches and businesses in

222 Ibid, 2. 223 Ibid. 224 Ibid, 3. 225 Ibid, 2. 148

Black Dayton, were integral to Black quality of life in Dayton. Meanwhile, on the other side of the river, the presence of race and racism was imminent:

White taxicab drivers often avoided picking up black passengers at the train station. Very few blacks were on the local police force. Black children weren’t permitted to use the public swimming pool on Germantown Pike. In most aspects of public and private life, whites acted toward African Americans as ‘superiors,’ and usually expected to be treated differently . . . there was always an unbridgeable distance between us . . . whites were omnipresent in our lives, frequently as authority figures . . . Race existed as a kind of prism through which we understood and saw the world, distorting and coloring everything before us.226

Thus, for Marable, Dayton in the 1950s, fostered a sense of pride for Dayton’s Blacks,

yet also remained largely segregated and Blacks were viewed unequally.227

Race and Politics in Dayton in the Latter Twentieth Century

As the 1950s gave way to the dawn of the 1960s, Dayton bilateral racial context

ensued as the pulling of racial prejudice continued to occur while the pushing of racial

progress developed. For example, by 1960, Dayton’s Black population reached 74, 284,

or twenty-eight percent of the total population. Meanwhile, the city’s total population

decreased because of ‘white flight’ (Peters 1987, 165). Again, McLin and Crawford were

elected to key political positions. However, racialized incidents and riots continued.

In November 1964, Dr. King, along with Andrew Young, visited the University of

Dayton for Dayton’s Freedom Forum sponsored by Rev. George Lucas of Bethany

Baptist Church. King delivered an hour-length oration to more than 6,500 audience members. The city commission’s sole Black member presented King with a key to the city saying that “there were many streets and neighborhoods in the city that the key

226 Ibid, 3. 227 The racial divide in Dayton in the 1950s was further enforced when U.S. expressway 25, later known at Interstate 75 was built along the east bank of the Great Miami River, near the center of city, serving as a structural indicator of the east and west racial divide (Loyacano 26). 149 wouldn’t open” (Loyacano 27). The comment, in part fueled by the fact that Dayton City

Commission voted down a fair housing ordinance proposed by the NAACP earlier that month, outraged fellow commissioners, who thought Crawford embarrassed the city with the comments.

In 1967, several major incidents occurred. In June, after a speech by H. Rap

Brown, the new chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, riots broke out in west Dayton. According to newspaper reports, Brown’s words, such as “The honky is your enemy . . . You better shoot that man to death . . . that what he’s been doing to you,” triggered two nights of rioting with police estimating damages of

$150,000.228 Another observer, Ray Alexander, who was a high school student at the time, recalled in a newspaper article that “It was fiery. Folks were fired up. As soon as the speech broke up, somebody threw a brick. Next thing you knew, it just got out of hand . . . They were opportunistic. They’d riot, burn, loot. Some people, that’s all they know to do . . . . I remember police chasing us.”229 Hence, Brown’s speech sparked riots in Dayton that damaged a lot of property, though no injuries were reported.

In September, “a vice squad detective shot and killed Robert Barbee in downtown

Dayton” (Loyacano 31). Barbee was a Black Social Security representative carrying a pipe the White officer mistook for a weapon. A year later the officer was acquitted of manslaughter, which resulted in over five hundred protestors - mainly Black - at city hall and nearby police headquarters. In addition, a North End Black neighborhood was burned and looted in 1967 (Levine 2005: 174). Dayton’s pushing of racial progress in the

1960s was evident by the continued election of key Blacks to significant political

228 “Rap Brown Returns,” Dayton Daily News, September 1, 1990, David Keppel 229 “Ray Alexander: Belief in social justice still alive,” Dayton Daily News, July 22, 2007, Tom Beyerlein 150

positions; however the pushing was confronted by the pulling of racial prejudice as

evidence through Black protests of perceived discrimination and unequal treatment.

Dayton School Desegregation

With the dawn of the 1970s, Dayton pushing and pulling racial context became

even more pronounced. While 1970 saw the appointment of the city’s first Black mayor,

by 1972 Dayton had experienced a direct example of a racial incident where pushing and

pulling occurred - the Dayton Public Schools bus desegregation case. Dayton’s history

with busing desegregation is extensive. However, a brief examination of the key events

is constructive as it provides context concerning the racial and political environment in the city of Dayton. Moreover, in Dayton, the school board is elected and the mayor along with city commission often yields informal influence in their selection of a superintendent. Hence, a profile of the major issues and events of the school desegregation case is significant as it helps to contextualize how history of race and politics functioned within the city of Dayton.

The key issues involved in the 1970s legal chronology stemmed from the fact that

Dayton’s Public Schools suffered from de facto segregation that was in violation of Ohio law. Moreover, when a liberal school board attempted to institute a plan to desegregate the school system, Dayton’s majority White voters did not re-election them. After the conservative school board began to dilute the previous liberal board’s desegregation plan, the local NAACP sued.

On December 8, 1971, the Dayton School Board adopted a series of resolutions committing itself to an integrated system in the fall of 1972. The resolutions, many 151

thought, were a necessary step to confront the school system’s segregated culture. For

example, as Myers (1959) found,

We haven’t made up our minds about our schools. Roosevelt High School is bi-racial, while Dunbar High School is 100% segregated. Both are West Side schools . . . At Roosevelt High . . . in the swimming pools and locker rooms definite segregation is practiced. There are even two swimming pools, one for the whites and one for the colored, although when constructed the two pools were built, one for the girls and one for the boys.230

For Myers, Dayton’s experience with school desegregation was not systemic in its scope.

Rather, segregation in the school system function under informally implemented yet broadly understood terms.

Myers also found that the school segregation practice in Dayton was financially irregular. He noted how “Dayton spends over $15,000 a year to transport white school

children out of colored districts . . . we waste more than $15,000 each year transporting

children from one school district to another.”231 For Myers, school desegregation had

more than a presumed psychological effect, but a financial effect as well that did not

benefit the district.

The various examples of the scope and practice of Dayton’s school desegregation

provides significant and important cues concerning how racism functioned in Dayton

after the modern day civil rights movement. The detailed scope and practice of

discrimination within Dayton’s school board system also reinforced the significance of

the school board’s 1972 resolutions to integrate the school system toward full integration.

One such resolution claimed, “That ‘every reasonable and constructive measure’ would

be taken to ‘eliminate racial imbalance’” (Levine 174). The resolution was followed by

230 Ibid, 39-40. 231 Ibid, 40. 152

an aggressive desegregation plan for the district with a 42.7% Black student enrollment in

1971-1972.232

However, little action was taken on the desegregation plan as voters in Dayton

elected a more conservative school board. That board, soon thereafter, fired the superintendent who co-drafted the integration plan and the same new conservative board

later rescinded the plan’s scheduled implementation. The local NAACP sued, claiming

the board created “a deliberate pattern of segregation” (Watras 1997: 181/Peters 1987,

166). The chronology of the case events is a specific example of how one race-based

event or incident demonstrates the pushing of racial progress and the pulling of racial

prejudice in Dayton.

The genesis of the desegregation case began in 1972 when the parents, joined by

the local NAACP sued the Board of Education and related parties in District Court on the

basis that the school system operated separate and unequal schools, nearly twenty years

after the passage of Brown:

A number of students in the Dayton, Ohio, school system, through their parents, brought this action in District Court in 1972, alleging that the Dayton Board of Education, the State Board of Education, and various local and state officials were operating a racially segregated school system in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After protracted litigation at both the trial and appellate levels, the District Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that, although the Dayton Schools concededly were highly segregated, the Dayton Board's failure to alleviate this condition was not actionable absent sufficient evidence that the racial separation had been caused by the Board's own purposeful discriminatory conduct. In the District Court's view, plaintiffs had failed to show either discriminatory purpose or segregative effect, or both, with respect to the Board's challenged practices and policies . . .233

232 http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/39/0f/37.pdf 233 Transcript from the Supreme Court case involving Dayton Public Schools 153

Hence, the District Court affirmed the case of the parents and the NAACP, and determined that certain actions by the Dayton Board amounted to a “cumulative” violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court also approved a desegregation plan that had limited desegregation objectives. The initial legal proceeding seemed to demonstrate the pushing of racial progress. However, that February 1973 decision by U.S. District Court Judge Carl Rubin the NAACP found objectionable and

“too lenient” because it did not affirm the NAACP’s proposal for metropolitan desegregation (Levine 174).

Even though the District Court's judgment that the Dayton School Board had violated the Fourteenth Amendment was affirmed, the NAACP appealed to The Sixth

Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals. Chief Judge Philips, writing for a three-judge panel, wrote that the District Court decision was within the law but rejected the District court’s desegregation plan as not aggressive enough (Watras 1997, 187). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that since Brown v. Board of Education, the Dayton Board had operated a racially segregated, dual school system. Moreover, the Court held that the Dayton

School Board was constitutionally required to disestablish that system and its effects after

Brown I, however that the School Board failed to do so.

Finally, the Court found that the School Board’s failure to uphold Brown led to further consequences as a result of sustaining their dual system. Chief Judge Philips’ decision wrote that the School Board’s dual system had widespread “segregative effects” across the district and mandated a system-wide remedy. Thereafter, the Sixth Circuit

Court of Appeals twice reversed the U.S. District Court decision. In two separate 154 instances, Sixth Circuit Chief Judge Philips remanded the case back to the District Court on the grounds that its proposed desegregation plans were inadequate to eliminate all system-wide vestiges of the segregation.

In the end, the District Court ordered the Dayton Board of Education to take the necessary steps to assure that each school in the system would roughly reflect the system- wide ratio of Black and White students. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit approved the system-wide plan for desegregating the public schools of Dayton,

Ohio in Brinkman v. Gilligan, (1978). Therein, the Court of Appeals found that the

Dayton Board of Education had operated a racially segregated, dual school system at the time of and after the passage of Brown v. Board of Education. Thereby, “[t]he evidence of record demonstrates convincingly that defendants have failed to eliminate the continuing system-wide effects of their prior discrimination” and “actually have exacerbated the racial separation existing at the time of Brown I.” On appeal from the

Dayton School Board, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of

Appeals, finding that,

The public schools of Dayton are highly segregated by race. In the year the complaint was filed, 43% of the students in the Dayton system were black, but 51 of the 69 schools in the system were virtually all white or all black . . . Every school which was 90 percent or more black in 1951-52 or 1963-64 or 1971-72 and which is still in use today remains 90 percent or more black. Of the 25 white schools in 1972-73, all opened 90 percent or more white and, if open, were 90 percent or more white in 1971-72, 1963- 64 and 1951-52.234

The fact that the case reached the Supreme Court and was not settled with the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals or the District Court is an example of the pulling racial

234 http://supreme.justia.com/us/433/406/case.html 155

prejudice that subsumed Dayton even in the midst of pushing racial political advances.

For example, at the time the city had a Black mayor. However, the conservative school

board, elected by the voters, continued to file appeals to various forms of integration

rulings as the NAACP continued to push for a more aggressive desegregation plan.

Hence, the ‘pulling back’ of the school board’s appellate process and the ‘pushing

forward’ of the local NAACP served as an indicator of the racial and political climate in

Dayton.

Moreover, in another example of the pushing of racial progress vis-à-vis the

pulling of racial prejudice, the District Court Judge Rubin seemed willing to

acknowledge discrimination had taken place yet unwilling to enforce aggressive remedies

to correct the wrongs. Rather, it took action from the Sixth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme

Court to force Rubin to require that the School Board enacted fair practices. Finally, on

September 2, 1976, schools in Dayton opened under the new court-ordered busing plan.

The plan mandated that “each school must be balanced racially within a 15 percent

margin of the overall racial makeup of the school district” and called for the “clustering

and pairing [of] 37 elementary schools and four high schools. An estimated 13, 230

students are to be bused to achieve desegregation.”235

According to the Dayton Daily News, within ten years, the plan negatively impacted public school enrollment, as “the number of school-age children who did not

attend public schools rose from 8 percent to 18 percent [and] fewer students overall were

attending the city schools.” In 1987, the state of Ohio agreed to pay $25 million to the

district and reimburse them 50% for all future costs associated with busing. Though, by

235 “Desegregation Busing Ends,” Scott Elliott, Dayton Daily News, April 16, 2002 156

1997, Dayton Public Schools sued in federal court to reopen the desegregation case, arguing that the state of Ohio should pay a larger share of the reform plan.

In 1999, Black Dayton city commissioners with the support of then-State Senator

Rhine McLin, State Reps. Tom Roberts and Dixie Allen (all Black) called for an end to

the court ordered busing. In February 2001, with the support of then mayoral candidate

McLin, the Dayton school board voted to ask a federal judge to lift the desegregation

order that the city schools had been under since 1976. At a time when the district

enrollment was seventy-three percent minorities, the majority Black school board and its

supporters claimed that busing Black children around town served little purpose and that

the order’s original remedy had exhausted itself. Detractors, such as the Black

superintendent and the local NAACP at the time claimed that ending school busing

would cost the district millions in state subsidies. However, after Black parents and the

NAACP expressed their support for an end to court-ordered busing in May 2001, busing

officially ended in Dayton in April 2002. Thereby, during the course of “forty-four

months of opposition through litigation,” in the 1970s and the subsequent decades of

various disputes, the Dayton community, as evidenced by the School Board’s repeated

legal actions and the newspaper’s criticism of the order’s effective, seemed unwilling to

deal with the pending social changes (Levine 174). Meanwhile, Black leaders and

organizations also seemed unwilling to initially recognize the significance of the

changing demographics and its effects on the 1970s desegregation order.

The Development and Implementation of Dayton’s Priority Boards

While Dayton dealt with the issue of pulling of racial prejudice by some

detractors of the school desegregation case in the 1970s, the city also experienced the 157

pushing of racial progress as it embarked on a comprehensive citizen participation

program. The city of Dayton began a tradition of involvement in city government

decision-making for its citizens with its selection as a Model City in 1967. Model Cities

was a program of President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society and War on Poverty

initiatives. Authorized on November 3, 1966 by the Demonstration Cities and

Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, the Johnson-era program originated to address

urban violence and the reform of federal programs by emphasizing comprehensive

planning, rebuilding and rehabilitation, social service delivery, and citizen participation.

With its selection as a Model City, Dayton developed the formation of elected

neighborhood councils as part of the Planned Variation Program, a ‘first’ for a city of its

kind and in the format it functioned. In June 1975, the Dayton City Commission

officially adopted the neighborhood councils as ‘priority boards’ and since they emerged as the official mechanism for citizen participation in city government.

The priority board system evolved over its more than thirty year history. For the first ten years, the priority boards provided a vehicle of communication between citizens and city government by primarily identifying the needs and priorities of neighborhoods for city officials. The elected representatives also assessed the city’s service effectiveness. Dayton city government used the priority boards to funnel information to neighborhoods about its actions.

In the 1980s and 1990s the priority boards expanded their scope. They fostered grassroots leadership development through leadership programming and established the

Citizens Financial Task Force in 1994 to have an active role in the city’s budgeting, strategic planning and capital allocations. The turn of the twenty-first century brought 158

additional changes to the priority board system. Boards included citizens from every

Dayton neighborhood and representation from neighborhood groups, including business

associations and neighborhood associations and clubs. Each board had and remains

consisted of at least one official relationship with a Community and Neighborhood

Development Corporation (CNDC). The CNDCs established a task force and sub-

committees that priority board members to which priority board member are elected.

The role of the priority boards was and remains to provide neighborhood

representation in city administration decision-making activities. Given that each

Commission member is elected at-large, the priority board systems helps to ensure the

city’s neighborhoods are represented effectively. Through their chairpersons, the boards

act as the official voice of the neighborhoods, and identify and prioritize the annual goals

and objectives of citizens within the neighborhood. The goals are annually submitted to

city administration and Dayton’s state legislative delegation. The boards also are expected through various committees to provide official input from the neighborhoods on which public service activities function well and which need to be cut. Through partnerships with neighborhood development corporations, the boards are designed to play a role in most issues that affect the neighborhood, including maintaining housing options by preserving the existing housing stock.

To be elected to a priority board, a candidate must obtain 25 signatures from verified voters living within the designated area. Representatives are elected by ballots which are mailed to all registered voters in the area using mailing labels supplied by the

Montgomery County Board of Elections. Voters may mark their choice(s), sign the enclosed envelope and return the ballot by the designated deadline date. The city’s 159

Division of Citizen Participation bears responsible for verifying the validity of and the

counting of the ballots. Thereby, elections are conducted by the City of Dayton and the

Division of Citizen Participation:

Each year, about four months to the start of the election season, each Priority Board is asked to prepare an election plan consisting of 1) a representation plan which divides the entire Priority Board area into smaller election districts and establishes which seats are to be filled in the coming election; 2) a determination of the length of the term which new members will serve. This plan along with an election timetable, budget, and accompanying budget are submitted to the Priority Board Chairpersons for approval.236

Each election plan is varied, representing the diversity of the Priority Board areas in

terms of preferred governance structures.

Additionally, though the boards contribute to all Daytonians’ effective city

participation, they play a significant role in the representation of Black interests. Many

such boards hold offices in the community, while others hold them at city hall. The

placement of offices in the community arguably gives Black residents, perhaps with

transportation difficulty, with immediate access to their priority board representatives. In

theory, then, the boards can serve as great facilitators of Black residents’ interests and

concerns. Three of the seven total boards are representative of the African American

community: Innerwest, Southwest, and Northwest. These boards play a significant role

in McLin’s efforts to address Black interests. For example, the Black priority board

leaders identify the areas of concern for their neighborhoods to McLin. While interviews with Innerwest Priority Board leaders suggested they do not feel as though McLin effectively represents their community, interviews with the city’s Priority Board staff suggested that the dissemination of information about the community’s concerns to

236 City of Dayton, Ohio Community Involvement Strategy, City of Dayton, April 15, 1995 160

McLin is an important role the board plays in informing her of the issues. Without the

appropriate detailed knowledge of block-level neighborhood issues, McLin would be less

able to address Black interests.

Officially created while the city had it first Black mayor in 1975 the boards were

recognized by the city commission as “and declared to be the official citizen participation

structure for the Community Development Program and such other activities where

citizen participation is desirable to improve the quality of life of the residents of the City

of Dayton.”237 Hence, the introduction of the priority board system is a key development

in Dayton’s racial and political history, as it provides the tools through which Black

citizens may actively engage local government (and the mayor) on issues that matter to

them.

The Evolution of Dayton’s Racial and Political History in the 1980s & 1990s

Even with an increasing or steady number of Blacks in key political positions, and a system of government in place that directly encouraged citizen participation, the advent of the 1980s brought continued racial and political incidents. Similar to earlier decades of Dayton’s racial and political history where polarizing racial incidents occurred simultaneously with Black political advances, the 1980s saw that trend continue. For example, the Dayton City Commission chose its first Black police chief, Tyree

Broomfield, in 1983 and elected its second Black mayor in 1984. Attempts to gather detailed information about Broomfield’s tenure as police chief were not reliable, however. Newspaper reports suggested Blacks in Dayton recalled Broomfield’s tenure as

237 Cmty. Involvement Strategy, Dayton. 161

having to combat police union racism that took its tool in 1987 when Chief Broomfield

fired two Black majors and then re-hired them.

The initial firings resulted in three hundred protestors at city hall. Making an

appearance at the protest, the chief announced the two majors would keep their jobs.

According to one Dayton historian, “That announcement caused Broomfield to lose city

commission support and led to reports that he would be forced out of office” (Peters

1987, 173). According to the New York Times, Broomfield received six months’

severance pay and $100,000 in private donations to leave the post. Other newspaper

reports indicated that some residents recalled that Broomfield was not effective as police

chief. For example, Dayton’s majority White police union was actively critical of his

performance. However, Broomfield did have the support of Black leaders who claimed

he was a “victim of racism.”238

Broomfield resigned in December 1987 and later became the chief of police at

Central State University, his alma mater. In a newspaper article covering Broomfield’s

death in 2008, Black leaders, including Mayor McLin credited him, as having tried to

diversify the ranks of the police department. However, when asked of significant

racialized events in Dayton’s history during interviews, Broomfield’s brief tenure was not

mentioned. Moreover, in 1989, four Black police officers and a group of ministers sued

the city and the local Fraternal Order of Police “claiming a ten percent black police force

238 “Black Police Chief in Dayton Quits With $100,000 Payment,” Associated Press, New York Times, December 7, 1987 162

in a forty percent black city was unjust.”239 The Black Police Officers Association had previously sued the city in 1976 unsuccessfully with similar charges (Loyacano 33).

The late 1980s and 1990s saw some improvement in Dayton’s race relations. In

1989, the Greater Dayton Christian Connection held its first annual Peace Bridge event

where participants meet in the middle of Third Street and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

Way and walk across the bridge connect west Dayton with the downtown area.240 The annual event is a symbolic “coming together of the two races” (Loyacano 35). In 1992, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference conducted a successful drive to name

Third Street, in the heart of Dayton’s Black community and connecting through downtown, for Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. King’s wife, Coretta Scott King attended the event.

The theme of intervening racial and political contexts continued in the 1990s. In

1990, Dayton’s second Black mayor, Richard Clay Dixon, was the only Black member of city commission and only twenty-four percent of the city’s 2,689 employees were minorities. Meanwhile, the city’s Black population was thirty-eight percent. Also,

Dayton residents elected its first Black woman to the city commission and Montgomery

County residents elected its first Black commissioner in 1991. Additionally, Rhine

McLin was elected as the first Black woman to the Ohio State Senate in 1994.

However, also in the 1990s, the city of Dayton experienced additional race related political and cultural incidents. In 1990, a group called Citizens For a Fair Share, co-lead

239 Ibid, 166. 240 The Greater Dayton Christian Connection later joined with the Interracial Ministers for Reconciliation to organize the annual event 163 by current city commissioner Dean Lovelace, organized Dayton’s Black community to oppose the city’s 0.5 percent tax renewal, a $19 million source of income for the city at the time. According to a Dayton Daily News article Lovelace indicated at the time that

“before we should be asked to pay for more taxes, we want to make sure we’re getting what we’re paying for.”241 For Lovelace, the city’s Black community deserved more attention from the city of Dayton. “The group wants the city to improve its record of hiring and promoting blacks in all city departments and parity for blacks in the police and fire ranks,” wrote Dayton Daily News staff writer Edwina Blackwell.242 Accordingly, the

1990s demonstrate the pushing of racial progress in addition to the pulling of racial prejudice.

Mayor Rhine McLin

Two years before the scheduled November 2001 general election, State Senator and Democratic Caucus Leader Rhine McLin, announced she would run for mayor of

Dayton. Her early musings about the potential run, however, did not have the support of the Dayton Daily News:

A couple of years ago, Sen. McLin was saying she did not want to be mayor. She said she watched the sometimes raucous city commission meetings on television, and the job did not look like fun. Something has changed her mind. But this is not all good. After all, when Ms. McLin . . . first went to the legislature, [she was] not ready . . . She was the neophyte daughter of a political legend who had died in office; she was uncomfortable under the public spotlight and not able to discuss public policy issues with any sophistication.243

That Dayton Daily News editorial was less of a critique of McLin and more of a critique of the state legislature’s term limits that, according to the editorial, creates “state

241 “Some to fight city tax to push rights agenda,” Edwina Blackwell, Dayton Daily News, March 1, 1990 242 Ibid. 243 “McLin, Roberts move on for better, worse,” Dayton Daily News, September 11, 1999 164

legislators who don’t know local government.”244 Admittedly, McLin’s announcement focused on the term limits: “Because of term limits and these types of things, you have

got to let your plans be known early.”245 At the outset, she indicated her interests in

having the city manager foster better relationships with the Dayton Public Schools.

With her decision, McLin was prepared to take a pay cut of $20,000 in base salary

earnings, as the mayor position in Dayton is officially part-time with a salary of $36,000.

Her opponent was the incumbent, two-term Republican mayor Mike Turner. Turner is

credited with bringing downtown economic vitality to Dayton that even McLin

acknowledged as the Democratic Party endorsed her candidacy: “The major focus has been downtown and we’re not knocking that but it’s the neighborhoods and residents that

make a city great.”246 For McLin, “what has happened downtown (is good) but it has

happened on the backs of neighborhoods.”247 Hence, within her campaign theme, “Real

Leadership for a Better Dayton,” and on her campaign literature she stressed how she

would “work to improve ALL neighborhoods, not just a privileged few.” For McLin,

running for mayor was about jobs, neighborhoods, community-based policing and better

quality schools.

2001 Election Campaign

The daughter and granddaughter of political veterans C.J. McLin, Sr., and C.J.

McLin Jr., Rhine McLin’s choice to run for mayor at first glance appeared unorthodox.

Though she was barred from immediately seeking a third term to the State Senate

because of terms limits and would need to find a new occupation, she was the Democratic

244 Ibid. 245 “McLin to run for mayor,” Jim Bebbington, Dayton Daily News, December 30, 1999 246 “McLin, Zimmer, Williams win nods,” Jim Bebbington, Dayton Daily News, January 26, 2001 247 “McLin, Turner make it official,” Jim Bebbington, Dayton Daily News, March 9, 2001 165

Leader there, the first Black woman ever in that role. And, as previously noted, Dayton’s

form of government did not provide McLin with strong executive authority. However, as

the Dayton Daily News suggests, it can still be a powerful: “the office of mayor can be

influential depending on the occupant’s ability to rally votes from other commissioners or

to use the job’s public stature as a soapbox to push for programs.”248 Perhaps it was the

appeal of the soapbox that attracted McLin to a position in which she previously had little

interest. In either event, once she announced, she campaigned aggressively.

By late July, she sent out her first mailing which touted her familial background and her position to “call for an end to court-ordered busing of our school children,” an

appeal that was initially directed at White voters but that also received Black parental

support and the support of the NAACP in its final stages249 In August, McLin conducted

business lunches with key groups in that community. In September, she forcefully

criticized the incumbent on his effort to retain Dayton jobs:

Job retention and creation in Dayton needs a mayor’s attention . . . Turner has not led on jobs for Daytonians . . . The current mayor is front and center when a ribbon is cut or the business community announces good news downtown. But his silence is deafening when it comes to jobs moving out or neighborhood businesses closing.250

McLin’s rhetorical ability, however, to acknowledge the weaknesses of her opponent

would not be enough to secure victory. As one political observer indicated, “Rhine has to

show that she has an in-depth command – not just a rhetorical command - of the

248 “Ibid. 249 “McLin, Turner courting voters,” Jim Bebbington, Dayton Daily News, August 12, 2001 250 “McLin criticizes mayor on loss of jobs,” Jim Bebbington, Dayton Daily News, September 6, 2001 166

problems facing Dayton.”251 In an effort to, perhaps, invoke such a presence, McLin

benefitted from her personality. As the Dayton Daily News suggests:

Anyone who knows, or has ever met, Rhine McLin would agree she has personality aplenty – including a whimsical, often self-effacing sense of humor. What else can you say about a political leader who sports a Winnie the Pooh watch, prefers to rollerskate rather than ride in parades and keeps a stash of toys and coloring books in her office.252

For McLin, who calls herself “vertically challenged,” “a kid,” and thinks she drives “a

high-chair with wheels,” her personality was an asset her opponent lacked.253

McLin used her personality to her advantage, building relationships with those

who may have initially mistrusted her and re-establishing relationships with those who

may have thought her service as a state legislator removed her from the inner-workings of

Dayton politics. As one Republican politician put it, “Rhine McLin is seriously very

street smart and politically savvy. She has a great ability to establish rapport with and

work with diverse constituencies. And she’s also very good at constituent relations.”254

McLin’s personality, though, was not enough to win victory against a two-term

Republican who many thought was doing a fair job. But, it did help in that she was able to carry over her reputation in the state senate as a collaborator to skeptic voters. As one former Republican colleague in the state senate suggested of McLin: “Rhine was a bridge-builder . . . She always took a consensus approach.”255 Another Republican

colleague said that “I have great respect for her. She was always concerned, first and foremost with her constituents.”256 McLin’s ability to reach across the ideological and

251 “Rhine McLin faces tough race to continue family tradition,” Jim DeBrosse, Dayton Daily News, September 23, 2001 252 Ibid. 253 Ibid. 254 Ibid. 255 “Rhine McLin faces tough race,” DeBrosse, Dayton Daily News, 2001. 256 Ibid. 167

racial aisle to see commonality, she credits as a result of her college education at Parsons

College, a small liberal arts, majority White institution in western Iowa.

In addition, McLin found that her training as a mortician helped guide her

approach toward addressing Dayton’s historic racial problems: “when you open people up – and I don’t care who it is, everybody – we’re all the same.”257 Her skill at bridging

a racial divide in a city with a long racially divisive history proved a formidable

challenger for the incumbent mayor. For example, she successfully courted the support

of many of the city’s largely white male unions. As one union official commented, “this

is a new era in politics. They (white males) are going to vote for her. They’re going to

vote for a black female.”258 Hence, people recognized McLin as a serious doer on behalf

of Dayton issues – a label her legislative colleagues from both political parties recognized

and a reputation that she effectively carried over into the mayor’s race.

Her ability to connect with voters individually was an important asset for McLin

as she was handicapped by her disadvantage in fundraising and a key endorsement. For

example, Turner’s re-election bid included $270,000 in television ads. McLin,

meanwhile, spent $131,000 on television ads.259 Moreover, her second place effort in fundraising was not the only disadvantage cited by the Dayton Daily News in their endorsement of her opponent: “[McLin’s] message lacks a compelling theme and is delivered unconvincingly.”260 While they had some criticisms of Turner, the paper

concluded that “[Turner] has represented Dayton well and has done much to improve the

257 Ibid. 258 Ibid. 259 “McLin Tops Turner in Mayor’s Race,” Jim Bebbington, Dayton Daily News, November 7, 2001 260 “Mayor Turner Still the Right Choice,” Dayton Daily News, October 28, 2001 168

city. He has earned re-election.”261 The newspaper’s endorsement of Turner was significant as it is the only major newspaper in the city. However significant the endorsement may have been, it may not have compared with the national attention

McLin’s campaign received. She held fundraisers in Philadelphia and Cleveland and her campaign received donations, loaned staff and visits by then-Chair of the Democratic

National Committee Terry McAuliffe.

The newspaper endorsement for Turner was not enough for him to secure victory.

In an editorial after his defeat, the Dayton Daily News exclaimed, “this is an upset.”262

McLin was able to defeat a two term popular Republican mayor by championing education as her number one priority and citing a rise in car thefts, the deterioration of neighborhoods and a preference for downtown business. The newspaper cited her reputation as “the largest factor in her victory,” noting how “she has become somebody whom Daytonians – black and white – see as caring about people like them.”

McLin was able to defeat Turner, a popular Republican incumbent in large part due to her name recognition, her scandal-free campaign (unlike the previous Black mayor who ran against Turner) and as a result of Dayton’s history as a Democratic city. As strong as her opponent, may have been, he was not strong enough to defeat a comparably popular opponent in McLin with a family political lineage tied to the Black community in a largely Democratic city. For example, in the 2001 election, McLin had stronger victories in Dayton’s Black wards than her previous Democratic mayoral counterparts and Turner in previous elections.

261 Ibid. 262 “McLin Found Turner’s Weaknesses,” Dayton Daily News November 7, 2001

169

In that election, McLin and Turner both won eleven wards each. Voter turnout was at forty-four percent. The newspaper claimed McLin had ten strong wards from previous elections, and Turner had eight strong wards based on previous elections, and the advantage of more registered voters. Of those ten favored for McLin, she received over eighty-five percent of the vote, whereas Turner compiled less than eighty percent in his favored eight wards.263 Much of McLin’s support was from the west and northwest

communities of Dayton where the majority of African Americans reside:

Dayton Ward McLin % 1 39.3 2 23 3 22.7 4 47.8 5 74.5 6 86.4 7 85 8 21.1 9 17.1 10 15.7 11 21.4 12 20.5 13 87.7 14 84.5 15 84 16 79.4 17 55.8 18 44.6 19 88.8 20 17 21 82.6 22 76.2 Total 50.07

263 “McLin Digs into Turner Strongholds,” Ken McCall, Dayton Daily News, November 7, 2001 170

As the highlighted wards demonstrate in the map and table, McLin’s base of support in

the 2001 election victory was largely from Dayton’s Black community.264 As the former

political director for the Republican National Committee indicated, “I don’t think you can

count on turnout to ever diminish the strength of the African American community. They turn out, they vote, and they vote enthusiastically.”265 The Dayton Daily News’ evidence

confirmed the previous statement. The newspaper conducted an analysis of the race

which concluded that race matters in Dayton politics and victory for McLin:

A Dayton Daily News analysis found a significant correlation between her ward-by-ward vote totals and the ward’s proportion of voting-age black residents. For every 10 percent increase of voting-age African Americans, McLin gained a 100-vote margin over Turner, the analysis found. ‘The correlation is undeniable,’ [political scientist Robert] Adams said. ‘It certainly displays very clearly that race remains a very, very strong motivating force in Dayton politics’ . . . But voting-age blacks are still a minority in Dayton, according to the 2000 Census, making up 38 percent of the 18 and older population, while whites make up 59 percent. There was more to the election than race.266

While McLin’s base of Black support helped her defeat Turner in a significantly low

margin of victory, both candidates are credited with not making identity politics key

264 Attempts to gather turnout percentages from the Montgomery County Board of Election to compare with previous elections were unsuccessful 265 “Base of support critical in McLin’s victory,” Ken McCall, Dayton Daily News, November 18, 2001 266 Ibid. 171

aspects of the campaign. According to the Dayton Daily News, “to their credit, neither

McLin nor Mayor Mike Turner made gender or race an issue in this campaign.”267

The Dayton Daily News is largely accurate in its assessment of the campaign’s

racial dynamics. Content analysis of The Dayton Daily News’ coverage of McLin’s

election campaign demonstrates that she did not suffer from an overly racially divided

portrayal or perception. The Dayton Daily News articles were derived from a search

using Lexis-Nexis by typing in keywords “Rhine McLin,” in the database and searching

for “Full Text” articles discussing her potential candidacy, her candidacy, and swear-in ceremony. The content was analyzed for the presence of race. Articles were coded on a

Likert scale of 1-5, 1 being a negative mention of race, 5 being a positive mention of race:

Number of Articles Time Period Mean Rating (1-5) Dayton Daily News 61 3/30/00-1/8/02 3.66

The average rating suggests her candidacy was viewed by the media, and by extension, the public, not in overtly negative racial terms. This suggests her candidacy did not encounter media detractions from her agenda-setting plans and goals. Additionally, we know that race was not a significant factor in the election as McLin received considerable support from east Dayton and more conservative wards, winning at least sixteen percent in wards with nearly ninety percent White population. In the end, McLin won by one thousand, ninety-six votes.268

267 “McLin making ‘Her’-Story,” Mary McCarty, Dayton Daily News, November 9, 2001 268 Her election was part of a wave of Democratic mayors, mostly Black, elected in the six major Ohio cities. The November 2001 elections signaled the first time in Ohio history to have that many Black mayors serve simultaneously and the first time in Ohio history to have that many Democrats serving as mayor simultaneously as well. 172

It appears that the central factors that allowed McLin’s election victory included her strong support in majority Black wards along with her ability to decrease Turner’s edge in east Dayton when compared to previous mayoral elections. In other words, while

Turner may have won many of east Dayton’s White wards, he won them with a lower percentage of the vote than in previous elections. Newspaper reports did not specifically indicate why McLin was able to cut into some of Turner’s White support. However, it is reasonable to presume that as an experienced politician who represented some of

Dayton’s White community in her State Senate seat, which included majority White neighborhoods in and outside of Dayton, and that she was a Democrat running in an historically Democratic city, helped her defeat Turner.

The Beginning of an Administration

Similar to the conditions in which Mayor Ford was elected mayor of Toledo in

2001, McLin’s election as Dayton’s mayor on the same day also came with a sense of improvement in race relations and as a milestone for women. Though, unique from

Toledo, McLin did not enter office with contentious racial events at the forefront of the community’s conscience. While there was disagreement between Black ministers and other Black community members, including McLin on a recently failed city commission bid to enact a gay rights ordinance for city employees, the issue itself was not racialized.

Rather, McLin’s victory over Turner coincided with an ambivalent Black city manager’s tenure as she first accepted another position out of the country and later a position in a nearby Cincinnati. The manager, with close ties to Turner, also did not have the support of some newly elected commissioners. However, that issue was largely a personnel concern, and not a racial issue, as the city manager is appointed by the commission to 173

oversee a government with 3,128 employees. Simply put, there were no major racial

incidents that coincided with McLin’s election.

As mayor-elect, McLin, conscious of the historic victory as the first female mayor

of Dayton, chose the Dayton Woman’s Club as her location to hold post-election

interviews. Though the context in which she was elected was somewhat different, vis-à-

vis Ford in Toledo, the immediate steps were similar. Within a month, McLin organized

a transition team, of Black community leaders, members of local media, heads of non-

profits, and key business leaders. The transition team of many fiscally minded members

was no accident as McLin was elected while the outgoing city commission was finalizing

its budget for her first year in office.

Immediately upon winning office, McLin and fellow commissioners-elect assisted

outgoing commissioners with the new budget in anticipation of adopting a balanced

budget by April 1, 2002. Facing “bad news about the budget,” McLin and

commissioners debated how to continue basic services such as trash pick-up and

recycling.269 Frustrated by the budget dilemma and the culture of city government in her

first weeks in office, McLin lamented that “coming from the state level, we dealt in line

items, here we speak in generalities.”270 Eventually, however, a budget was passed.

After passage of a $180 million annual general fund budget, McLin took steps to separate her from the contents of budget with which media reports suggested most commissioners had issues. McLin indicated that “this is not my budget. I’m playing the cards I was dealt.”271

269 “Ex-Officer Interim Dayton Manager,” Jim Bebbington, Dayton Daily News, February 14, 2002 270 Ibid. 271 “Commission Balks At, But Approves, Budget,” Jim Bebbington, Dayton Daily News, March 21, 2002 174

In addition to facing fiscal problems in McLin’s first weeks in office, a stalemate

with the city’s commission-appointed civil service board concerning a commission plan

to diversify the police and fire departments was at issue. Two Black commissioners, who

were Turner supporters, threatened to fire two members of the board for stalling the implementation of the plan. The commission’s plan called for bonus points to be awarded on the civil service test for apprentices. However, the civil service board found

this objectionable. The commission argued that the plan was necessary to diversify the

ranks of the police and fire departments that are ten percent minority in a city with over

forty percent African Americans.272 The commission ordered the board to submit a separate diversity plan within thirty days. After they did, the commission did not accept their plan. The impasse resulted in firefighters picketing downtown.

Moreover, the city’s ambivalent, yet competent city manager was found to be a candidate for a similar position in Cincinnati, Ohio. After the city manager, the first

African American in that position, resigned, McLin expressed her support that a new search be limited to “Ohio people” to increase the probability of retaining an individual with strong ties to the community. The assistant city manager was later selected to serve as acting city manager until a replacement was later found in July 2002. Thereby, personnel issues such as the civil service board, and the city manager resignation faced

McLin and the new commission in their first several weeks in office.

Moreover, a Dayton Daily News article highlighted how a center to honor Rev.

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was supported by a vote of the commission in 1992, and a forty-member committee’s recommendation in 1996, yet no center or memorial had been

272 “Diversity Plan to be Changed,” Ken McCall, Dayton Daily News, March 29, 2002 175

built in large part due to funding.273 In addition, organizers were concerned that the

center’s potential location on Dayton’s west side might be viewed as a resource only for

Dayton’s Black community. Hence, the tensions of the city’s east and west sides of

Dayton, though minimal, remained an issue for McLin upon taking office.

In addition to race issues on the fringes, Mayor McLin voted with the city manager’s recommendation and other commissioners to close a 414-bed jail which offered rehabilitation programs for nonviolent offenders.274 The decision was a blow to

the union supporting the jail workers, a union that heavily supported McLin’s election

bid. However, the four commissioners who voted for the closing in May 2002 indicated

they had little choice as the county sheriff had pulled county inmates from the center,

ending the center’s largest paying customer. The lack of revenue from the center, the

city’s $1 million cut in state funds, and the city’s fiscal budget were cited as reasons for

the commission’s reluctant vote to close the center. Their decision was followed by more

bad business news for the city as Elder-Beerman, a national department store, announced

that it would be closing its downtown store in the summer. Hence, McLin’s effort to

implement an agenda was thwarted by the economic realities she faced in her first year.

She gave herself a “C” in her first six months.

In addition to budget shortfalls, the city’s civil rights leaders protested the

promotion of a White Dayton police officer in June 2002.275 The officer had pepper-

sprayed a Black teenage girl during an arrest in 1998. The officer was initially fired.

However, he was later reinstated and acquitted of one criminal charge. He also was

ordered to attend diversity training and received a one-year unpaid suspension. However,

273 “King Center Remains Dream,” Marcus Franklin, Dayton Daily News, January 20, 2002 274 “City Moves to Shutter Workhouse,” Ken McCall, Dayton Daily News, May 16, 2002 275 “Officer’s Promotion Protested,” Jim Bebbington, Dayton Daily News, June 6, 2002 176

his later promotion to sergeant angered civil rights leaders who labeled the incident “a

terrorist act.”276 On behalf of the city, the city manager claimed the city had exhausted its ability to prevent the officer’s reinstatement. McLin reacted to the event by expressing that: “When you see it from the outside in, it looks terrible, but everyone is entitled to their due process.”277 Her support of the process of law in a contentious issue

for the Black community mirrors Mayor Ford’s recognition of the right for Neo-Nazis to

march in neighborhood streets. Though her support for the process of law may have been

legal and highlights her campaign theme to be the mayor of everyone, it may have played

a role in some Blacks in Dayton not supporting her re-election.

2005 Campaign

McLin’s official re-election effort began in late 2005, as she spent much of the year conducting city business. While she filed for re-election, occasionally reacted to

opponents’ charges and participated in the May nonpartisan primary in which she won,

she largely did not campaign actively. In February 2005 she indicated that “I inherited a

fragile budget when I became mayor and the economy changed and it hasn’t gotten any

better. The focus I’ve had has been to maintain the city’s fiscal integrity while

maintaining basic services. I welcome the opportunity to prove myself.”278 Her message was largely identical to Ford’s, though without the looming problem of personality and a popular incumbent that he faced. McLin’s two major opponents were a former police

major and the executive director of the Home Builders Association of Dayton. The

276 Ibid. 277 Ibid. 278 “Dayton mayor race shapes up,” Jim Bebbington, Dayton Daily News, February 23, 2005 177

challengers claimed cuts in public safety budgets made the city less safe.279 The

challengers also claimed the city suffered from poor leadership.

In the May primary, McLin was the top vote-getter with 49.5 percent of the vote

in a four-way race; while David Bohardt, the executive director of Home Builders came

in second, winning the slot to be her general election opponent. The Democrat, running

as an Independent had the support of the former mayor and other key business leaders

and cited a lack of leadership as his reason for running: “I think it is difficult to

overestimate how important the leadership issue is.”280 For Bohardt, Mayor McLin lost

her connection to the problems of the average citizen of Dayton. For Barbara Temple, a

fired police major who competed against Bohardt and McLin in the primary, McLin

neglected neighborhoods: “Mostly, the neighborhoods are feeling somewhat

disconnected (from the city as a whole) which is not good. There’s a high-level

frustration with service delivery.”281 McLin’s reaction to her opponents focused on the

budget: “we have a commitment to go out and do what we can as a city, but the

community needs to go out and do what it can, too.”282 For McLin, the city’s fortune

includes active participation of all residents, not only government officials.

McLin and Bohardt participated in a debate focused on public safety and the budget. Bohardt claimed McLin “confuse[s] the absence of bankruptcy with the presence

of leadership” and called for more police officers.283 Whereas, McLin responded that

“it’s not how many police people you have, it’s how the police people operate.”284 For

279 In fact, a Black Dayton Daily News reporter and evening disc jockey was killed by gunfire in 2004, as disgruntled and denied patrons to a nightclub fired shots at the building’s entrance. 280 “Mayoral Contest focuses on budget, resources,” Jim Bebbington, Dayton Daily News, April 3, 2005 281 Ibid. 282 “Candidates for mayor report on finances,” Jim Bebbington, Dayton Daily News, April 22, 2005 283 “Mayor, challenger disagree on city safety,” Jim Bebbington, Dayton Daily News, September 16, 2005 284 Ibid. 178

McLin, she should not be blamed because her election coincided with a downturn in the economy.

According to the Dayton Daily News, within the dismal fiscal climate McLin was able to count the following turn of events:

Crime rates have dropped in most major categories . . . the unemployment rate is almost unchanged [at] 8 percent . . . the city has reduced what it spends for police and fire services and increased by 6 percent what it spends on public works . . . it was fewer police and firefighters than four years ago . . . Airport revenue grew 65 percent.285

McLin’s list of major adjustments and accomplishments, as reported by the Dayton Daily

News, was enough for the paper to endorse McLin for re-election. In their editorial, the paper said “there have been good things that have been going on during Mayor McLin’s tenure – the University of Dayton’s purchase of NCR property, Good Samaritan and

Grandview hospitals’ redevelopment efforts, to name a few.”286 In the end, McLin was re-elected with “the same coalition of Democrats, blacks and labor on her side that she had four years ago.”287 McLin carried 55 percent of the vote, receiving ninety percent of the vote on the city’s west side.

Perceptions of Race in Dayton: Surveys of Racial Attitudes

Three surveys of racial attitudes conducted throughout the mid to late 1990s by the University of Dayton and the Dayton chapter of the National Conference for

Community and Justice found that “increased contact between the races reduces prejudice” (Loyacano 34). Cognizant of the push and pull racial climate, the Dayton

Daily News and others have conducted surveys on Dayton’s race relations. One survey

285 “Future mayor faces big changes,” Jim Bebbington, Dayton Daily News, September 18, 2005 286 “McLin has been making the tough calls,” Dayton Daily News, November 1, 2005 287 “McLin didn’t coast to her re-election,” Dayton Daily News, November 9, 2005 179

was of residents in 1979 on the quality of race relations in Dayton and the six-county

Miami Valley region. Fifty-three percent of Whites indicated that race relations were

“good” or “excellent” whereas only thirty-nine percent of minorities indicated the same.

In response to the importance of race relations in 1979, eighty percent of Whites found

that race relations were “very important” or “important,” versus ninety-six percent of

minorities.288

The survey was repeated in 1989 and “revealed a diminishment in the perception

of racial quality among both groups.”289 Sixteen percent of Whites found that race

relations were “poor” or “very poor,” a six percent increase from a decade earlier.

Thirty-six percent of minorities thought race relations were “excellent” or “good,” a

decline of three percent. In response to the importance of race relations in 1989, ninety-

six percent of Whites found that race relations were “very important” or “important,” a

sixteen percent increase suggesting Whites had similar opinions of minorities. Sixty-four

percent of minorities considered race relations to be “very important,” an eighteen

percent increase from 1979.

In 1994, the Dayton chapter of the National Conference for Community Justice

(NCCJ) in conjunction with the University of Dayton conducted a telephone survey and

held focus groups on racial and religious attitudes for the county of Montgomery.290

Survey results revealed that Blacks and Whites in the Dayton region continued to view race under different lenses. Of the African Americans surveyed, 59 percent said they had

288 Employment Opportunities for Minorities in Montgomery County Ohio, Chapter Two: Racial Attitudes in Montgomery County, Ohio, page one; The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Ohio Advisory Committee 289 Ibid. 290 NCCJ was formerly known as The National Conference and the National Conference of Christians and Jews 180

experienced discrimination in the past year and 76 percent said there was less opportunity

for managerial promotions versus 36 percent of those in the White community.

In a variety of survey categories, including the hospitality and service industry

and the career sector, Whites reported perceptions of equal opportunity where Blacks

noted discrimination. In some cases, a near forty percent differential was reported.291

Other areas of reported discrimination also indicated perceived differences between

Whites and Blacks:

Police Discrimination Teacher Discrimination Store Clerk/Sales Discrimination

Blacks 13.2% 4.4% 32.5%

Whites 1.5% 0.9% 3.3%

Appalachians 1.1% 1.1% 4.5%

Other Minorities 6.8% 6.8% 6.8%

Source: “Racial Attitudes Reported,” Mark Fisher, Dayton Daily News, October 11, 1994

The results show that Blacks and Whites have vastly difference perceptions of racial

discrimination across a variety of areas. The University of Dayton commissioned a

comparable survey in 1997 that addressed race relations with similar results. The survey

of 1,100 Montgomery County residents found that 89.4 percent of respondents believed

“that discrimination against blacks is still a problem in the United States.”292 The

findings indicated that Blacks experienced discrimination six times more that Whites

using comparable indicators from the earlier survey.

291 Source: The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Midwestern Regional Office, from National Conference for Community and Justice data accessed in Employment Opportunities for Minorities in Montgomery County Ohio, Chapter Two: Racial Attitudes in Montgomery County, Ohio, page 3-4; The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Ohio Advisory Committee 292“Apology? A Few Opinions,” Charlise Lyles, Dayton Daily News, June 20, 1997 181

Present-Day Race Relations in Dayton

The city’s long history with push and pull race relations, and the results of several

racial attitude surveys led to the creation of several groups to address the issues in the

twenty-first century. Scholars noted how this development is important for Dayton.

Briand (1999) found that “many communities today are so deeply divided along racial

lines that it is uncertain whether people will ever be able to live and work together.

Dayton, Ohio is one of those communities. Dayton is divided literally as well as

figuratively.293 Briand, however credits the “vision, commitment and goodwill” of some

Dayton residents from trying to improve the relations.294 He noted how an interracial

group of pastors, The Black-White Christian Clergy Dialogue, and members of several

congregations created the Vineyard Project to build relationships between people of

similar faiths and “shared spiritual and moral values that obligated them to show concern

and respect for their fellow human beings.”295 According to the Dayton Daily News, the

group formed in the late 1980s and early 1990s and,

Pairs off small groups of members from black and white churches for a ministry that emphasizes focused study of issues of common concern to people everywhere, such as the drug crisis, AIDS and day care . . . the basic plan calls for each set of congregational partners in the Vineyard to meet once a month over a six to nine month period each year to talk about issues.296

For Briand, this initiative was and remains a civic partnership that can be replicated

across the country, not for its spiritual connection but its “value commitments.”297 He finds the project extraordinary only because of the “ordinariness of the people who

293 Ibid, 164. 294 Ibid. 295 Ibid. 296 “Vineyard Project Hopes to Bridge Gaps,” Dayton Daily News, October 27, 1990 297 Ibid, 165. 182

conceived it.”298 Hence, the effort to improve race relations in the Dayton community

begins with community members, and not necessarily government. Though, Briand

recognizes that “healthy civic relationships are not sustained on goodwill alone. People

keep them alive by doing the difficult political work of recognizing the hard choices they face by struggling together, to find a way forward that everyone can live with.”299 Briand

refers to the effort as political practicality.

Other groups have developed in an effort to improve Dayton’s race relations

recently. In October 2000, The Dayton Dialogue on Race Relations (DDRR) was formed

directly as a result of the 1997 Racial Attitudes Survey of Montgomery County. The

program is a coalition of community leaders that seeks to use intergroup dialogue to

foster improved race relations. The city of Dayton and Montgomery County contribute

approximately $60,000 annually to the program with the Dayton Human Relations

Council, the Dayton Daily News, and the Kellogg Foundation and other groups funding

the initiative as well. The project had the support of many areas groups, such as 27 Good

Black Men. According to the Dayton Daily News, “The DDRR has groups of eight to 12

racially diverse Miami Valley residents meet in homes for six, two-hour sessions to talk.

Discussions range from personal experiences to observations about how people relate to

each other.”300 The first home session took place in December 2000.

During McLin’s terms in office, it appeared that the city and county’s efforts to

improve race relations suggest the Dayton region is committed to moving forward in

respect to its volatile racial history. However, not everyone believes McLin’s terms have

produced positive changes in their community. For example, while McLin is actively

298 Ibid. 299 Ibid. 300 “Dayton Race Dialogue to mark first year,” Amelia Robinson, Dayton Daily News, October 22, 2001 183 running for re-election to a third term, an influential group of Black ministers announced they would not support her effort. The leaders cited a rising crime rate for their lack of support, much of which has occurred in the city’s west side.301 Four other candidates have submitted petitions to run against McLin.302

Meanwhile, Blacks’ share of the total population has remained steady from when

Mayor McLin took office in 2001. As of 2006, the total Black population in Dayton is forty-two percent:

Dayton Population Change Total Black White Latino 1990 182,044 2000 166,179 71,688 (43.1%) 88,676 (53.4%) 2,626 (1.6%) 2006 156,771 64,056 (42.4%) 82,701 (54.7%) 2,107 (1.4%) Source: U.S. Census Bureau

The increase in crime in the city’s Black community, reported by the group of Black ministers, combined with the poor economic conditions in the city create a dismal environment for Dayton’s fiscal health and McLin’s support in the Black community, her base of electoral support.

Moreover, the less than liberal or welcoming east side environment in Dayton for

African Americans, described herein and the limited power structure of the office of mayor, made the conditions under which McLin could actively pursue policies and programs designed to improve Black quality of life very difficult. The following chapter details how, within the Dayton racial climate, Mayor McLin actively pursued the interests of Blacks. The chapter surveys the mayor’s support of affordable housing, economic

301 “Black Leaders Not Backing McLin,” WDTN News, March 5, 2009 302 “4 submit petitions to run against McLin for Dayton mayor,” Joanne Huist Smith, Dayton Daily News, March 7, 2009. 184 development, the rehabilitation and construction of housing developments and related initiatives.

185

REFERENCES Books

Bell, Trudy E. 2008. The Great Dayton Flood of 1913. Charleston, SC: Arcadia Publishing.

Berstein, Mark. 1996. Grand Eccentrics. Wilmington, OH: Orange Frazer Press.

Briand, Michael K. 1999. Practical Politics. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Conover, Charlotte Reeve. 1917. The Story of Dayton. Dayton, OH: The Otterbein Press/The Greater Dayton Association.

Curwen, Maskell E. 1860. A Sketch of the History of the City of Dayton, 2nd Edition. Dayton, OH: James Od’ell, Publisher.

Dalton, Curt. 2006 Dayton. Charleston, SC: Arcadia Publishing.

Drury, A.W. 1909. History of the City of Dayton and Montgomery County, OH, Vol. 1. Dayton, OH: S.J. Clarke Publishing Company.

Dunham, Tom. 2005. Dayton in the 20th Century. Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse.

Edgar, John F. 1896. Pioneer Life in Dayton and Vicinity: 1796-1840. Dayton, OH: U.B. Publishing House.

Griffin, William W. 2005. African Americans and the Color Line in Ohio, 1915-1930. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.

Gruen, Nina Jaffe and Claude. 1972. Low and Moderate Income Housing in the Suburbs: An Analysis for the Dayton, Ohio Region. New York, NY: Praeger Publishers.

Levine, Bertram. 2005. Resolving Racial Conflict. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press.

Loyacano, Marjorie E. 2002. A History of Race Relations in the Miami Valley. Dayton, OH: Carillon Historical Park.

Marable, Manning. 1995. Beyond Black and White. New York, NY: Verso.

McLin, C.J. Jr., Johnson, Minnie Fells, Lillie P. Howard, Sarah Byrn Rickman, eds, 1998. Dad, I Served. Dayton, OH: Wright State University Office of Public Relations.

Myers, Phineas Barton. 1959. Ninety-five years After Lincoln. New York, NY: Exposition Press. 186

Peters, Margaret E. 1995. Dayton’s African American Heritage: A Pictorial History. Virginia Beach, Virginia: The Donning Company.

Rightor, Chester E., et al. 1919. City Manager in Dayton. New York, NY: The MacMillan Company.

Steele, Robert W. and Mary Davies. 1896. Early Dayton. Dayton, OH: U.B. Publishing House.

Tharp, Charles and Deanna Beineke. 2007. Dayton. Charleston, SC: Arcadia Publishing.

Watras, Joseph. 1997. Politics, Race and Schools: Racial Integration, 1954-1994. New York: Garland Publishing.

Newspaper Articles

“McLin is ready for 2nd Term,” Dayton Daily News, October 23, 2005.

Jim Bebbington, “Winds of Change in City Hall,” Dayton Daily News, November 11, 2001.

Jim Bebbington, “McLin Says Challenges Have Slowed Her Plan for Dayton,” Dayton Daily News, June 30, 2002.

“McLin Must Add Substance to City Hall Style,” Dayton Daily News, July 3, 2002.

“Black Leaders Not Backing McLin,” WDTN News, March 5, 2009.

Jim Bebbington, “Dayton mayor race shapes up,” Dayton Daily News, February 23, 2005.

Jim Bebbington, “McLin urges public service by residents,” Dayton Daily News, February 15, 2005.

Jim Bebbington, “Commissioners eager to take oath,” Dayton Daily News, January 6, 2002.

“Mayor McLin Has New, Different Ring,” Dayton Daily News, January 8, 2002.

Jim Bebbington and Mark Fisher, “Dayton to seek manager from Ohio,” Dayton Daily News, January 17, 2002.

“Lemmie Can’t Square Talk, Action,” Dayton Daily News, January 13, 2002.

187

Jim Bebbington, “Candidates for City Manager Limited,” Dayton Daily News, January 18, 2002.

Marcus Franklin, “King Center Remains Dream,” Dayton Daily News, January 20, 2002.

Jim Bebbington, “City Approves Workhouse Study,” Dayton Daily News, January 31, 2002.

Jim Bebbington, “Commissioners Don’t Agree on Interim City Manager,” Dayton Daily News, February 7, 2002.

Jim Bebbington, “Civil Service Diversity Proposal Draws Fire,” Dayton Daily News, February 2, 2002.

Jim Bebbington, “Ex-Officer Interim Dayton Manager,” Dayton Daily News, February 14, 2002.

Ellen Belcher, “McLin Hasn’t Found Groove Yet,” Dayton Daily News, March 3, 2002.

Jim Bebbington, “Commission Balks At, But Approves, Budget,” Dayton Daily News, March 21, 2002.

Ken McCall, “Diversity Plan to be Changed,” Dayton Daily News, March 29, 2002.

Scott Elliott, “Desegregation Busing Ends,” Dayton Daily News, April 16, 2002.

“Where’s the Leadership at City Hall?” Dayton Daily News, May 1, 2002.

Ellen Belcher, “City Problems Not Around Bend,” Dayton Daily News, May 5, 2002.

Ken McCall, “Dayton Looking for Ways to Ease Pinch,” Dayton Daily News, May 8, 2002.

Ken McCall, “Sentencing Today for Jail,” Dayton Daily News, May 15, 2002.

Ken McCall, “City Moves to Shutter Workhouse,” Dayton Daily News, May 16, 2002.

Jim Bebbington, “McLin: Small Businesses Key to City,” Dayton Daily News, June 4, 2002.

Jim Bebbington, “Dayton Names Dinneen City Manager,” Dayton Daily News, July 11, 2002.

Jim Bebbington, “Dinneen The Surprise Choice for All,” Dayton Daily News, July 12, 2002.

188

Jim Bebbington, “Mayor Organizes Charity to Raise Funds for Groups,” Dayton Daily News, August 22, 2002.

Angelle Haney, “Mayor’s Charity Ball Successful,” Dayton Daily News, September 9, 2002.

Jim Bebbington, “Officer’s Promotion Protested,” Dayton Daily News, June 6, 2002.

Dan Patterson, “Problem Has Been Ignored,” Dayton Daily News, February 27, 2005.

Jim Bebbington, “Mayoral Contest focuses on budget, resources,” Dayton Daily News, April 3, 2005.

Jim Bebbington, “Candidates for mayor report on finances,” Dayton Daily News, April 22, 2005.

Jim Bebbington, “McLin, Bohardt to face off in November,” Dayton Daily News, May 4, 2005.

Jim Bebbington, “McLin led fund-raising field, too, report shows,” Dayton Daily News, June 11, 2005.

Jim Bebbington, “Mayoral race signs appear,” Dayton Daily News, September 11, 2005.

Jim Bebbington, “Mayor, challenger disagree on city safety,” Dayton Daily News, September 16, 2005.

Jim Bebbington, “Future mayor faces big changes,” Dayton Daily News, September 18, 2005.

Jim Bebbington, “Mayoral race sees less spending,” Dayton Daily News, October 28, 2005.

Lynn Hulsey, “Mayor’s race clearly defined,” Dayton Daily News, October 30, 2005.

Jim Bebbington, “Dayton’s mayoral race respectful, competitive,” Dayton Daily News, October 30, 2005.

Jim Bebbington, “McLin wins re-election,” Dayton Daily News, November 9, 2005.

Jim Bebbington, “Mayoral candidates stick to themes,” Dayton Daily News, November 1, 2005.

“McLin has been making the tough calls,” Dayton Daily News, November 1, 2005.

“McLin didn’t coast to her re-election,” Dayton Daily News, November 9, 2005. 189

Jim Bebbington, “McLin ruled West to retain mayoral post,” Dayton Daily News, November 12, 2005.

Jim Bebbington, “City Calls for End to Busing,” Dayton Daily News, June 3, 1999.

Jim Bebbington, “McLin may seek mayor’s position,” Dayton Daily News, August 28, 1999.

“McLin, Roberts move on for better, worse,” Dayton Daily News, September 11, 1999.

Jim Bebbington, “McLin to run for mayor,” Dayton Daily News, December 30, 1999.

Jim Bebbington, “McLin, Zimmer, Williams win nods,” Dayton Daily News, January 26, 2001.

Jim Bebbington, “McLin, Turner make it official,” Dayton Daily News, March 9, 2001.

Jim Bebbington, “McLin, Turner courting voters,” Dayton Daily News, August 12, 2001.

Jim Bebbington, “McLin criticizes mayor on loss of jobs,” Dayton Daily News, September 6, 2001.

Jim DeBrosse, “Rhine McLin face tough race to continue family tradition,” Dayton Daily News, September 23, 2001.

“Time is here to focus on mayor’s race,” Dayton Daily News, October 5, 2001.

Jim Bebbington, “Election forum to focus on race,” Dayton Daily News, October 9, 2001.

Martin Gottlieb, “McLin gets religion on gay rights,” Dayton Daily News, October 21, 2001.

Jim Bebbington, “Dayton mayoral contest about to get more visible,” Dayton Daily News, October 14, 2001.

“Mayor Turner Still the Right Choice,” Dayton Daily News, October 28, 2001.

Ken McCall and Jim Bebbington, “Dayton Mayor Candidates Turner, McLin Have to Beat Odds,” Dayton Daily News, October 28, 2001.

Martin Gottlieb, “Turner, McLin Not at Most Risk in Race,” Dayton Daily News, November 3, 2001.

“Ad Misleads on Crime, But All Not Well,” Dayton Daily News, November 3, 2001.

190

Jim Bebbington, “Battle for Dayton Mayor Intensifies with 2 Days to Go,” Dayton Daily News, November 4, 2001.

Martin Gottlieb, “McLin Victory Would Get Big Notice,” Dayton Daily News, November 4, 2001.

“125,000 Expected at Polls to Pick Mayors, Issues,” Dayton Daily News, November 6, 2001.

“McLin Found Turner’s Weaknesses,” Dayton Daily News November 7, 2001.

Ken McCall, “McLin Digs into Turner Strongholds,” Dayton Daily News, November 7, 2001.

Jim Bebbington, “McLin Tops Turner in Mayor’s Race,” Dayton Daily News, November 7, 2001.

Jim Bebbington, “Newly elected Dayton mayor getting bearings,” Dayton Daily News, November 9, 2001.

Mary McCarty, “McLin making ‘Her’-Story,” Dayton Daily News, November 9, 2001.

Leigh Allan, “Turner Defeat Explained,” Dayton Daily News, November 10, 2001.

“New team’s Loyalty Must be to City,” Dayton Daily News, November 11, 2001.

Martin Gottlieb, “McLin’s victory fits national trend,” Dayton Daily News, November 11, 2001.

Ken McCall, “Base of support critical in McLin’s victory,” Dayton Daily News, November 18, 2001.

Jim Bebbington, “Mayor-elect forms transition team,” Dayton Daily News, December 11, 2001.

Jim Bebbington, “Pair Set Record in Mayor’s Race with $770,000,” Dayton Daily News, December 15, 2001.

Jim DeBrosse, “Neighborhood Activist announces run for Dayton mayor,” Dayton Daily News, December 26, 2008.

Associated Press, “Black Police Chief in Dayton Quits With $100,000 Payment,” New York Times, December 7, 1987.

Edwina Blackwell, “Some to fight city tax to push rights agenda,” Dayton Daily News, March 1, 1990. 191

Charlise Lyles, “Apology? A Few Opinions,” Dayton Daily News, June 20, 1997.

Mark Fisher, “Racial Attitudes Reported,” Dayton Daily News, October 11, 1994.

“Vineyard Project Hopes to Bridge Gaps,” Dayton Daily News, October 27, 1990.

Amelia Robinson, “Dayton Race Dialogue to mark first year,” Dayton Daily News, October 22, 2001.

Miscellaneous

City of Dayton, Ohio Community Involvement Strategy. April 15, 1995. City of Dayton.

Dayton: A Case Study of Economic Development and Resource Recovery. 1981. Washington, DC: United States Conference of Mayors Institute for the Development of the Urban Arts and Sciences.

Dayton: A History in Photographs. 1976. The Junior League of Dayton, Ohio, Inc.

Employment Opportunities for Minorities in Montgomery County Ohio. Columbus, OH: Ohio Advisory Committee. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.

The Impact of the “City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Decision Upon Minority and Female Business Programs in Selected Cities of Ohio. 1997 (March). Columbus, OH: Ohio Advisory Committee. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.

Montgomery County Survey. 1940. Chicago, IL: The Montgomery County Survey Board, Public Administration Service.

Testimony of Jenni Roer. 1998 (June 11). Dayton, OH: Ohio Advisory Committee. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Fact-finding meeting. Transcript: 109-119.

Your Neighborhood . . . A Place of Innovation, Creativity & Leadership: 2008-2009 City of Dayton Neighborhood Directory. 2008. Dayton, OH: Dept. of Planning and Community Development.

192

CHAPTER SIX: MAYOR MCLIN’S EFFORTS WITH HOUSING AND RELATED INITIATIVES

“When you talk about all these issues, even though I’m the mayor of color, it’s across the board. There is only in the city, to your constituency, an east and a west, but to me as the mayor, they’re all my constituents,” Rhine McLin303

Introduction

Mayor Rhine McLin was elected mayor of the city of Dayton in November 2001 with fifty-one percent of the vote. Having campaigned on improved schools, better neighborhoods and reduced crime, her defeat of a two-term popular incumbent was historic. As the first female and third Black mayor in Dayton’s history, McLin was elected mayor of a city with a long and sometimes difficult racial past. McLin, herself,

was knowledgeable of the significance of race relations, as she once taught collegiate

courses on the subject. In addition, her self-identification as an African American and

her familial political lineage also made her especially sensitive to racial issues. For

example, shortly after taking office, McLin organized “friendship” lunches as part of her

effort to address the region’s historic racial problem. At the first lunch, nearly three

hundred people attended and paid $15 in a donation to her established charitable fund.

According to McLin, “I wanted to do something a little different and let people have a

relaxed atmosphere and have people understand friendship.”304 For McLin, then, while

she strongly identified with the Black community, her role as mayor was to be the mayor

of everyone.

It is the ‘mayor for everyone’ mantra that best defined the approach McLin used

in her efforts to impact the quality of life of Black Daytonians. This chapter details how

and to what extent McLin actively pursued the interests of Blacks in Dayton.

303 Interview, June 26, 2008 304 “Artists paint picture of friendship,” Jim Bebbington, Dayton Daily News, August 29, 2003 193

Specifically, this chapter examines how McLin, along with support from the city

commission and private partners, worked to provide affordable housing, increase the enforcement of housing violation penalties, fought against predatory lending, decreased

the number of vacant and blighted properties, worked to spur or retain economic

investment, and co-sponsored the development of mixed-use living communities in

Dayton. Finally, the chapter underscores that her efforts were not targeted to the Black

community. However, the kinds of issues McLin chose to focus on behalf of all of

Dayton’s citizens and the varied implementation efforts to address those issues had a

residual effect on Dayton’s Black community.

Limited Powers

Dayton’s commission-manager form of government means that the mayor is a

weak mayor. According to the city charter:

[T]he Mayor . . . shall be separately nominated and elected as Mayor . . . The Commission shall constitute the governing body with powers as hereinafter provided, to pass ordinances, to adopt regulations, and to appoint a Chief Administrative Officer to be known as the “City Manager,” and exercise all powers hereinafter provided.305

With the exception of some board appointments, according to the city charter, Rhine

McLin had no more authority to implement policy and develop programs than did her

fellow commissioners.306 McLin, rather, had additional ceremonial duties and was

charged with leading the city commission regular meetings:

The Mayor . . . shall be the presiding officer of the Commission, except that in his absence, a president pro tempore may be chosen. The Mayor

305 City of Dayton City Charter, Website: http://www.cityofdayton.org/cco/Documents/City_Charter.pdf 306 Mayor McLin makes limited appointments to the following boards: Enterprise Zone Tax Incentive Review Council, Dayton Foundation Governing Board, Parade Permit Board, Compensation Board, Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority, Mayor's Forum For Real Estate Development, and the Dayton- Montgomery County Port Authority. While most appointments she can make without commission approval, the port authority requires the advice and consent of the commission. 194

shall be recognized as the official head of the city by the courts for the purpose of serving civil process; by the Governor for purposes of the military law; and for all ceremonial purposes.307

In Dayton, the administrative duties were left to the city manager, who was responsible, among other things, for submitting an annual budget, and the hiring/appointment of heads of departments: “The Commission shall appoint a City Manager who shall be the administrative head of the municipal government and shall be responsible for the efficient administration of all departments.”308 The city manager oversaw sixteen departments, a general fund budget of approximately $170 million and 2,400 employees.

Although McLin did not have the executive authority Ford had in Toledo, she yielded much informal influence. While as a member of commission she had some formal authority, if she unilaterally desired to actively pursue the interests of Blacks, it was because the other members had the same authority that it meant it would likely be a result of her informal powers that she could initiate the efforts. For example, it can not be doubted that the McLin name in Dayton politics would serve as an asset should she

work to actively pursue the interests of Blacks. She is the daughter of a famous Ohio

State Representative with a powerful reputation as an advocate for Blacks. However, on

the other hand, given that McLin saw that her role as mayor was to advocate for the

interests of everyone, the extent to which she actively pursued Black interests may be

limited. Unlike her father, she was not the state representative of a majority Black

district; rather, McLin was the mayor of a majority White city.

Economic Challenges

307 City of Dayton City Charter, Website: http://www.cityofdayton.org/cco/Documents/City_Charter.pdf 308 Ibid. 195

As she entered office, McLin faced a $16 million shortfall in the budget and a projected regional economic outlook that appeared bleak for the foreseeable future.

Dayton and the surrounding region’s predicted economic future, though, was symptomatic of the state’s economic condition. Between 2000 and 2007, the state of

Ohio lost nearly 250,000 manufacturing jobs. Meanwhile, the poverty rate increased as

Ohio’s poverty rate soared from 1998 to 2004, putting an estimated 580,021 more

Ohioans at or below poverty by 2004 (an increase of five percent). To add insult to injury, Ohio was one of only seven states in which the poverty rate increased between

2003 and 2004. The state’s poverty rate had increased by 2.5 percent, or more than

293,000 people, between 2000 and 2008.

Moreover, the number of elementary school students eligible for free lunches in the state of Ohio, a commonly used approximation of the poverty rate, rose by nine percentage points between 1993 and 2000. The high school graduation rate in Ohio was

88.3 percent for Whites and 61.9 percent for Blacks in 2002. Sixty percent of White

Ohio students scored at the ‘proficient’ level or higher on third grade achievement tests, compared to 27.8 percent of Black students in 2003. According to a report by Education

Week, Ohio’s Black-White achievement gap was among the worst in the country in 2006, with 80.5 percent of Whites graduating and 50.7 percent of Blacks.

At the county level, the economic picture also showed signs of distress. As a result of the steady poor economic conditions, the population significantly declined in

Montgomery County, where Dayton is situated; meanwhile, the population increased in neighboring counties: 196

309 The above diagram from the 1999 CitiPlan Dayton, The 20/20 Vision report finds that in less than thirty years the Montgomery County population decreased eight percent, losing nearly 50,000 residents. Meanwhile, neighboring counties enjoyed an average increase in population of twenty-six percent, or roughly 9,000 residents.

The city of Dayton itself was negatively affected by the county and state’s poor economic outlook. McLin was elected mayor at a time when the city had a substantial unemployment rate of 9.2% in 2000.310 Dayton’s manufacturing base was severely declining from its historic past as the city with the largest number of manufacturer workers, second only to Detroit. As the following table indicates, Dayton’s manufacturing base declined precipitously since 1980:

Manufacturing Workers by SIC Industry

309 This graph and more information about the demographic changes in Dayton may be found at http://www.cityofdayton.org/departments/pcd/Documents/CitiPlan2020PDF.pdf 310 State of the Cities Data Systems Census, http://socds.huduser.org/census/totalemploy.odb 197

Year Dayton

1980 46,433

1990 32,951

2000 23,146

Source: http://socds.huduser.org/census/jobind.odb311

Dayton lost more than half of its manufacturing jobs during a twenty year period. The

city ranked 15th poorest among medium-sized cities in 2006 and had a median household

income of $28,630, according to the U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey.

In 2006, 28.8 percent of the city’s residents lived below the poverty line. In addition,

experts found that since 2000, an additional 30,000 jobs were lost in the region.312

Major Dayton manufacturing companies such as General Motors, Delphi, National Cash

Register, the GH&R Foundry, and Mead Corporation had all significantly downsized, closed, or left the region entirely. In 2008, for example, General Motors announced its plant in nearby Moraine would close in 2010. According to the mayor, many of the

Moraine workers are Black citizens of Dayton. Furthermore, according to the Ohio

Department of Education, 65 percent of Dayton public school students qualified as poor and the district ranked the 20th poorest in the state in 2007.

Moreover, McLin was elected mayor of a city where many of her constituents, especially Appalachian Whites and low-income Blacks, lived in poverty. According to the 1999 CitiPlan Dayton, The 20/20 Vision report, Dayton’s residents are:

311 Workers by Industry in Place of Work data for 2000 displayed here according to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system are estimated from the data released under the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS). 312 This statement is based in a comment by Richard Stock, Director of the University of Dayton Business Research Group as reported in “Dayton, Ohio: Job Losses Boost Foreclosures,” by Christine Dugas, USA Today, February 2, 2009 198

Four times as likely to be living in poverty as residents living in the rest of Montgomery County. In Dayton, 25 percent of the people live in poverty while only 6 percent of the people in the rest of the county live in poverty. The most troubling are the statistics on children in poverty. In the nation, 18 percent of children live in poverty, and, in Dayton, 40 percent of children live in poverty.313

Hence, for decades, the Dayton region faced a barrage of poor and further declining

economic news and demographic changes, including increased poverty rates and disparate education rates for many of its residents, especially children and African

Americans.

A 2007 National League of Cities report on Dayton’s poverty and equity agenda did not reveal any positive changes in the poverty pattern from the 1999 CitiPlan report, though it found that elected officials, including Mayor McLin, had a “moral imperative,” to address the issue.314 The report suggested that some cities were examples of

“innovation, creativity and leadership” in their efforts to tackle the “problems of poverty, inequalities, and racism endemic to urban America” (1). The efforts conducted by the cities that the report profiled, including Dayton, Ohio, the authors labeled an equity agenda. For the authors, the leaders in the ten cities studied, contextualized their efforts in such a way so as to “mak[e] their cities more livable for residents and more attractive to people who want to move or invest there” (1). The report detailed how the poverty

313 CitiPlan Dayton: The 20/20 Vision report is a comprehensive strategy and development plan for the city of Dayton originally adopted in 1999 by the City Plan Board and the City Commission. The report includes analysis of business and economic conditions, proposals and recommendations to addresses significant challenges. The planning process implementation is the responsibility of the City Commission according to the report. Six working committees were established which focused on the following areas: Downtown, Community Development and Neighborhoods, Youth, Education, and Human Services, Economic Development, Open Space and Quality of Life, and City Services. Recommendations and outcome goals by 2003 were reported, including a future land use plan and development patterns in the region. The report may be accessed here: http://www.cityofdayton.org/departments/pcd/Documents/CitiPlan2020PDF.pdf 314 National League of Cities, Tapping the Power of City Hall to Build Equitable Communities: 10 City Profiles “Chapter 6 - Dayton, Ohio: A Poverty Focus Sustained by a Tradition of Collaboration,” page 143 199

rate in Dayton increased from twenty-three percent in 2000 to twenty-nine percent in

2005.315 The report’s co-authors found that as a result of fiscal necessity and conviction,

Dayton city leaders developed an equity agenda through partnerships and collaboration

with county agencies and non-profit organizations. Yet, while Dayton city officials had

an equity agenda to address the condition of poverty, they were limited in their

implementation as “cities are increasingly expected to do more with less. For every one-

point increase in the poverty rate, cities spend $27.75 per capita more on non-poverty

related services.”316 Hence, with these economic challenges, McLin’s ability to

implement an agenda that served the interests of Blacks faced an uphill battle from the

beginning of her term.

McLin’s response to the economic conditions under which she took office was

varied in scope and approach. However, given the tight budget, she, other commission

members, and the city manager were forced to streamline city services and lay off city

workers for the first time in thirty years. Even with the layoffs, McLin’s efforts to

improve Dayton’s economy were supported by the Dayton Daily News: “With steadfast

support from Mayor Rhine McLin and the other commissioners, Mr. Dinneen [the city’s

then-city manager] has made sure Dayton didn’t collapse financially . . . Efforts by

Mayor McLin . . . during the past three and a half years have mattered immensely.”317

As an indicator of the economic climate in Dayton, for the newspaper, McLin’s effort to keep the city from bankruptcy was by itself worthy of recognition. Significantly, then,

315 National League of Cities, Tapping the Power of City Hall to Build Equitable Communities: 10 City Profiles “Introduction,” page 6 316 Ibid, 4. 317 “Dayton city manager job just got harder,” Dayton Daily News, February 19, 2006 200

even within a poor economic climate, McLin found ways to improve Black quality of

life, though her efforts were not necessarily targeted at the Black community.

Barriers to Safe and Affordable Dayton Neighborhoods

The severity of the city’s budget shortfall and the economic challenges McLin

faced upon entering office in 2002 can not be understated. Nevertheless, Mayor McLin’s

support for the development and/or continued funding of programs and policies that would improve the quality of life of Dayton’s Black residents was crucial to their passage on city commission. It is important to note that her immediate efforts in this area of housing and neighborhood development were in part an extension of her campaign rhetoric.

Housing and neighborhood redevelopment was not a major issue of the 2001

election campaign, though it received some attention. According to some observers,

McLin’s opponent did highlight his record on housing and neighborhood development,

which included efforts related to the rehabilitation of designated areas city-wide,

including the initial investments in many of the projects that this chapter found were

continued by McLin. However, on the campaign trail, the McLin campaign responded to

her opponent’s claims about investment in neighborhoods by distributing campaign

material that took issue with the purported claims. Sponsored by the Ohio Democratic

Party, the leaflet suggested that her opponent’s expenditures of $140,000 to $260,000 per

house to fix seventeen homes in two neighborhoods are not an effective use of

rehabilitation resources. The literature particularly attacked then-Mayor Turner for

introducing “an Emergency Resolution which gave a ten year tax break on property

valued at $460,000 on Red Oak, the Estate Home of wealthy supporters of Mike Turner.” 201

The literature concluded that “Turner takes care of his wealthy supporters and calls it an

investment in our neighborhoods.” For McLin, then, the issue of housing and neighborhood development had its genesis with her 2001 election campaign.

Her efforts to improve housing and neighborhood redevelopment, once she took

office, were significant as safe and affordable housing was then and remains a major

issue for the Dayton region. As lagging housing and crime statistics demonstrate, Dayton

area residents faced a steady and growing concern in respect to how their quality of life

was negatively affected by the lack of safe and affordable housing. For example,

according to a report on foreclosure growth in Ohio from Policy Matters Ohio, a non-

profit economic policy research organization, surrounding Montgomery County, in which

Dayton is situated, experienced an unprecedented growth in the number of foreclosures

since the mid nineties. Since McLin took office 2002, an additional 1, 313 foreclosures

were reported in the county by 2008:

Source: Policy Matters Ohio “Foreclosure Growth in Ohio 2009” Report, March 2009 202

Within the city of Dayton, the foreclosure rate was comparably high. In 2007, the city of

Dayton had the 15th highest foreclosure rate in the country, with 8,493 foreclosures or

2.07% of households entering some stage of foreclosure in the same year.

In November 2008, the city of Dayton’s Neighborhood Stabilization Plan

Substantial Action Plan Amendment report identified the areas within the city that were most affected by foreclosures.318 The city used the foreclosure and abandonment risk score system suggested by HUD in targeting the areas of greatest need within the city.

The City of Dayton, Department of Planning and Community Development, under the supervision of the City Manager analyzed and mapped five HUD and local data indicators to determine areas of greatest need. Using five indicators, the report found that while much of the city of Dayton was affected by foreclosures, many in west Dayton also had tax delinquent properties, where non-payment on taxes for two or more years was reported. This information suggested that many of Dayton’s Black citizens were disproportionately harmed by foreclosures and lived in areas that the report suggested will likely face increased foreclosures. Additionally, the report claimed, non-payment of

318 In November 2008, the city of Dayton compiled a Neighborhood Stabilization Plan (NSP) to compete for the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) awarded grants from the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA). The Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008 was passed by the U.S. Congress and signed by the President on July 30, 2008 containing $3.92 billion in Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) funding. On September 29, 2008, the City of Dayton was awarded a special allocation of $5,582,902 in Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds to be used for foreclosed and abandoned properties in the City as part of the NSP. NSP funds are to be used primarily for the acquisition and rehabilitation of abandoned and foreclosed properties, including the establishment of temporary land banks of abandoned or foreclosed properties to facilitate redevelopment; the demolition of blighted structures; the purchase of foreclosed or abandoned parcels; the redevelopment of vacant, abandoned or foreclosed properties; and the resources to offer purchase and redevelopment assistance to income-eligible buyers of foreclosed or abandoned properties. In addition to applying for the federal grant, the City of Dayton applied to the State of Ohio for $2.2 million of additional funding through the Ohio Neighborhood Stabilization Program.

203 property taxes is a good predictor of future abandonment. For Mayor McLin, this foreclosure crisis in Dayton created other problems:

The foreclosure and the market crisis also breeds the abandoned properties, the nuisance properties that we have to try to tear down, which also increases the crime, then you have the renters, the renters that are paying rent and then the people that own the building are the owners of the building and are in foreclosure so now immediately you have displaced people . . . then on the other hand you also have the people who are making the mortgage payments but they can’t afford to fix up their houses so then the cities are charging them with housing inspection violation so I mean there are a lot of consequences that are happening . . . the property values are going down - who would have thought that the American dream of a home would devalue.319

Given the reverberating problems spawned from a foreclosure and market crisis, McLin recognized that securing safe and affordable housing was significant. Hence, in Dayton, the poor housing market statistics, most notably the high rate of foreclosures, compounded the already poor economic conditions reported.

The confluence of a city budget shortfall, a declining tax base as a result of an outmigration of residents to neighboring counties, disparities in education access and achievement and home ownership and affordability maintenance contributed to the city’s crime rate. Crime has remained an issue for Dayton, where violent incidents reported an average 3.5 percent increase between 2007 and 2008. For African Americans, presumably, the conditions were exasperated. In police districts three and five, (west

Dayton) crime increased in each of the violent crime categories since 2007. In 2007,

Dayton ranked the 19th most dangerous city by CQ Press’s annual ranking of the country’s most dangerous cities. While the American Society of Criminology lamented

319 MayorTV, a project of The Nation and The Drum Major Institute interviewed select mayors nationwide who encouraged the presidential candidates to focus on cities, Website: http://mayortv.com/rhine_l_mclin/ 204

that the data used to make the determination was “an irresponsible misuse” of crime data,

the ranking is, in fact, striking.

Moreover, the FBI Uniform Crime Reports from 2003-2007 suggested that

Dayton had an average number of reported violent crimes of 1,627, or 4.5 violent

incidents per day. Low educational attainment in Dayton had arguably created an

environment where employment options were limited, home ownership was unattainable

or unsustainable and income generation for many was derived illegally. The result was

evidenced in the crime statistics. If there is a correlation between lack of education,

housing, or employment, then the city-predicted foreclosure risk-areas, largely in west

Dayton, do not bode well for the effort to decrease crime in the future.

Barriers to Home Ownership

While crime remained steady during McLin’s terms in office and the city faced a

budget shortfall and foreclosure crisis, another barrier to the development and

sustainability of safe and affordable neighborhoods became more evident – the lack of

available employment. The city’s unemployment rate in November 2008 was 6.7%,

lower than the state of Ohio's unemployment rate of 7.3 percent in November 2008, yet

higher than the national average, which was 6.5 percent in November 2008.320

Meanwhile, Dayton’s unemployment rate rose to 12.6% in January 2009, four percentage points higher than the national average. Moreover, the Census Bureau 2005-2007

American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates reported that more than forty percent of the city’s Black population lived below the federally defined poverty level, versus only

320 The unemployment rates in Dayton, Ohio and the country have all since increased as of March 2009. National unemployment data accessed via http://www.nidataplus.com/lfeus1.htm; Ohio unemployment data accessed via http://jfs.ohio.gov/releases/; Dayton unemployment and crime data, as reported by Harry Moroz at the Drum Major Institute Blog and accessed via http://mayortv.com/rhine_l_mclin/ 205

twenty percent of Whites. These statistics indicate that safe and affordable housing

should be a major concern for Dayton Mayor Rhine McLin.

With such significant levels of Black poor residents, however, their accessibility

to enter the housing market was and remains limited. This fact confirms earlier research

which found that Blacks are significantly less likely than non-Blacks to be homeowners

(Horton 1992). Homeownership is significant, however. Owning a home is the primary avenue to build wealth (Belsky and Retsinas 2005). In addition, in a region where 30,000 jobs have been lost since 2000, homeownership is especially important as it potentially creates a safety-net for owners not available to renters, such as federal and state supported foreclosure assistance, home equity borrowing power and rental income.

In a city where homes have become increasingly affordable, one might presume

that accessibility to home ownerships for African Americans in Dayton improved.

Though, while in Dayton, the median purchase price of a home declined nearly twenty

percent since early 2008, the declined median value still was likely not attainable for the

majority of Dayton’s Black residents. According to the Dayton Area Board of Realtors,

the median home price in Dayton was $79,900 in February 2009, an eighteen percent

decrease from February 2008. That median price was significantly lower than the state

median of $118,992 or the national median at $174,700. However, even though the

median home price in Dayton had decreased, given that forty percent of its Black

residents lived below the poverty level, even an $80,000 purchase price was and remains

likely not to be attainable. Hence, most Blacks in Dayton continue to be unable to

qualify for a mortgage. While job losses boosted foreclosures in Dayton, foreclosures

provided opportunities for first-time home buyers. However, given the Black poverty 206

rate and other barriers to homeownership many of those opportunities were and remain to

be missed by Dayton’s Blacks. The missed opportunity demonstrates that the issue of

safe and affordable housing should be a major concern for Dayton Mayor Rhine McLin.

Given that the mayor found that the foreclosure crisis breeds additional problems such as

increased crime, homelessness and poverty, it is in the interest of McLin to choose

housing and neighborhood redevelopment as an issue in which to focus city resources.

McLin did pursue the issue of housing and neighborhood development as a major priority and as the remaining pages demonstrate, in her symbolic and substantive efforts to address the housing and neighborhood redevelopment issue for all of Dayton, Blacks’ quality of life was improved.

Support for Affordable Housing and Neighborhood Redevelopment

Introduction

Recognizing the city’s housing and neighborhood development downturn, McLin supported many different housing and neighborhood redevelopment projects. By partnering with non-profit community development housing organizations such as

Improved Solutions for Urban Systems (ISUS) and CityWide Development, McLin actively supported the construction of affordable and/or mixed-use housing communities.

Though these projects did not exclusively benefit African Americans, they arguably

improved the aesthetic image, business development, and market value of homes in many

neighborhoods in which African Americans lived. As this chapter has yet to

demonstrate, Mayor McLin supported the redevelopment of Wright-Dunbar Village and

the Genesis Project and continued to encourage the development of more affordable

housing in the Arcade and other projects. 207

Additionally, McLin’s legislative efforts to secure funding to demolish vacant and

blighted properties, her rhetorical support for predatory lending initiatives of her

commission colleagues, and her enforcement of housing violation penalties were significant initiatives within her focused priority area of housing and neighborhood redevelopment. Moreover, with the Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority, (DMHA),

McLin supported the grants they received through the Department of Housing and Urban

Development’s (HUD) HOPE VI program. While the grants were secured under the previous administration, its execution occurred while McLin was mayor. As a result of the program, at the time of this writing, hundreds of dilapidated block-designed housing units were replaced or are in the process of being replaced with more community- centered units. Also, McLin’s support of the city’s ORION Solution, Organizing

Resources to Improve Our Neighborhoods, was critical as it focused on the targeted development of single-family home neighborhoods with strategic investments in social and economic capital-based resources. Finally, McLin’s behind the scenes efforts to retain retail in west Dayton’s primarily Black community was a significant effort to prevent further economic deterioration.

The Arcade

In line with her desire to be “the mayor of everyone,” McLin’s housing and redevelopment efforts were not necessarily targeted at the Black community. However,

the focus on the housing issue, in particular, appears to have been supported in part to

have an impact on the Black community. In her first state of the city address, McLin

commented that the Arcade, an abandoned historic landmark in downtown Dayton,

should be redeveloped with affordable housing. Located in Dayton’s central business 208

district, the Arcade consists of five interconnected buildings. Originally, when built in

1902, the main space was used as a farmer’s market with housing on the upper floors.

Through the 1940s the Arcade’s supermarket is said to have been “one of downtown’s

prime attractions.”321 By the 1970s, investors began to restore the Arcade as a retail

shopping center and it was re-opened in 1980. However since 1990, the Arcade has been

closed and vacant. In the 2003 address, McLin stated that “I believe the site has the

potential to include the kind of affordable housing we have pursued in our more

traditional neighborhoods . . . a proposal is being considered now to use the Arcade for

affordable housing.” Her support for affordable housing in downtown Dayton landmarks

is part of an effort to create a ‘walkable’ urban community.

For McLin, affordable housing did not necessarily mean low-income housing as it

is often characterized. For example, in an interview with MayorTV, she commented that

affordable housing meant housing that is affordable, not necessarily low-income:

And let’s just face it there’s always been little buzz words out there and you know when you start talking about affordable housing, people think you’re talking about low income housing . . . [but] affordable housing . . . [is] something that whatever you’re making that you can afford to buy.322

According to McLin, affordable housing is not simply government subsidized housing, though that is how it was interpreted.323 For instance, her speech was labeled “strange,”

according to the Dayton Business Journal, who claimed some downtown landmarks already included affordable housing: “As far as we know, ‘affordable housing’ is a

321 Preservation Dayton Inc., “The Historic Arcade,” http://preservationdayton.com/historic-arcade.cfm 322 MayorTV, a project of The Nation and The Drum Major Institute interviewed select mayors nationwide who encouraged the presidential candidates to focus on cities, Website: http://mayortv.com/rhine_l_mclin/ 323 It appears McLin’s definition of affordable housing is not entirely congruent with the city’s utilization of the federally defined term. For the city’s Neighborhood Stabilization Plan Substantial Action Plan Amendent November 2008 report, the city said that “The City adheres to HUD’s generally accepted definition of affordability. A household is to pay no more than 30 percent of its annual income on housing. Families who pay more than 30 percent of their income for housing are considered cost burdened and may have difficulty affording necessities such as food, clothing, transportation and medical care” (16). 209

euphemism for ‘government-subsidized housing,’ which is what the Biltmore already

offers.”324 For the Journal, McLin’s plea for affordable housing stood in conflict to the

continuing development of one of the Arcade’s neglected buildings, at the time when

strategic investments of any kind were sorely needed. The Journal cited how the

developer had invested millions of upgrades in the Arcade and that the U.S. Department

of Housing and Urban Development “said it would be impractical to have a mixture [of

affording units and others].”325

Despite the criticism, McLin’s pursuit of more affordable housing in downtown

apartment buildings was a significant example of actively pursuing interests of Blacks as

they, too, lived downtown. According to the U.S. Census Bureau 2000 Population and

Housing Profile for the Downtown Priority Board district, fifty-two percent of the 2, 156

persons living in the district, were African American.326 The district had 931 households

and 927 occupied housing units, compared to 77,321 housing units city-wide. More than

ninety percent of Blacks and Whites living downtown were renters, though two percent

fewer Whites rented than Blacks. Of the fifty-eight owners of housing units downtown,

sixty percent were White-owned.

Of the twenty years of age and older population who had attained some education,

885 of them were African American, of whom three Black women received a graduate or

professional degree, compared to fourteen White Women and thirty-five White men. The

mean household income for Blacks in the district was $17,884 compared to $26,048 for

Whites. Additionally, ten percent of Black households earned $50,000 or more compared

324 “McLin struck strange note in city speech,” Dayton Business Journal, February 21, 2003 325 Ibid. 326 2000 Census of Population and Housing Summary File 3 - Downtown Priority Board accessed at http://www.cityofdayton.org/departments/pcd/Documents/2000%20CensusPDFs/Downtown/SF3DTPB.PD F 210 to twelve percent of Whites. Meanwhile, seventy-eight percent of downtown Black households earned less than $15,000 annually compared to fifty-six percent of Whites.

Moreover, fifty-three percent of those who lived below the poverty level in the district were African American. Finally, McLin’s focus on downtown was significant as more

Blacks had barriers to transportation access. Fifty-two percent of Black workers sixteen years of age and older reported using public transportation as their means to work compared to ten percent of Whites. Thereby, McLin’s push to construct more downtown apartment affordable units where public bus routes are more accessible may incline more

Blacks to move to or stay downtown in an effort to diminish travel times to places of employment.327

According to Preservation Dayton, a grassroots alliance of neighborhoods and individuals who actively promote the work of historic preservation and revitalization the city, in 2005 the Dayton City Commission took possession of the Gibbons Annex, one of the buildings that are a part of the downtown Arcade block. The primary function of the building “is housing an enclosed walkway that allows people to walk from a parking

327 For more information on the spatial mismatch hypothesis, Blacks’ barriers to public transportation access and its effects on employment, see, Holzer, H. J. (1991). The spatial mismatch hypothesis: What has the evidence shown? Urban Studies, 28, 105-122; Kain, J. F. (1968). Housing segregation, Negro employment and metropolitan decentralization. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82, 175-197; Gordon, P.,Kumar, A.,& Richardson, H.W. (1989). The spatial mismatch hypothesis: Some new evidence. Urban Studies, 26, 315-326; Johnston-Anumonwo, I. (1997). Race, gender, and constrained work trips in Buffalo, NY,1990. Professional Geographer, 49, 306-317.Johnston-Anumonwo, I. (2000). Commuting constraints of African American women: Evidence from Detroit, Michigan. The Great Lakes Geographer, 7, 66-75; McLafferty, S., & Preston, V. (1996). Spatial mismatch and employment in a decade of restructuring. Professional Geographer, 48, 420-431. McLafferty, S., & Preston, V. (1997). Gender, race and determinants of commuting: New York in 1990. Urban Geography, 18, 192-212; Johnston-Anumonwo, I (2001). Persistent Racial Differences In The Commutes of Kansas City Workers Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 31 No. 5, May 2001 651-670; “Racial Differences in Transportation Access to Employment in Chicago and Los Angeles, 1980 and 1990 by Chanjin Chung, et al in American Economic Review Vol 91: 2; “Urban Change and Minority Opportunity,” by John Kasarda, in The New Urban Reality, Paul Peterson, Editor; and “Public transportation and black unemployment” by John M. Goering and Edward M. Kalachek in Society Vol. 10: 5, July 1973, 39-42 211 garage at Third and Ludlow Streets to One Dayton Center.”328 Hence, given her proposal to make more strategic use of the Arcade by constructing more housing that is affordable,

McLin’s efforts to redevelop the Arcade had the potential to impact the quality of life of

Blacks in Dayton. Additionally, its central downtown location may have been attractive to downtown’s Black residents who desired to live in close proximity to the accessible transportation bus routes to their places of employment.

Given the reported racial disparities in access to transportation, educational attainment and household income in the majority Black Downtown neighborhood district,

McLin’s efforts to convert some vacant downtown buildings such as the Arcade to affordable housing units that residents “can afford to buy” is noteworthy. The efforts suggest that the majority of Black downtown residents would have greater opportunities to improve their quality of life with close transportation access and downtown resources within walking distance. Most downtowns are not being redeveloped to attract low- income residents and the Dayton Arcade example would be an opportunity available to non-Blacks as well since McLin’s housing and redevelopment efforts are not directly targeted to the Black community. However, given that the majority of residents in downtown Dayton were Black, they were better positioned to benefit from increased development opportunities, including the city’s acquisition of a portion of the Arcade in expectation to develop proposed new affordable housing units.

In addition to the Arcade, affordable housing is annually supported by the city.

For example, the city’s 2008 and 2009 action plans detailed goals to support affordable housing efforts. The annual action plans were significant as Dayton continued to construct new housing units when seventy-one percent of Dayton’s housing stock is more

328 Preservation Dayton Inc., “The Historic Arcade,” http://preservationdayton.com/historic-arcade.cfm 212 than forty years old.329 The action plan explained the city’s strategic efforts to continue to support public and private partnerships that construct new homes and invest in the maintenance and renovation of other properties “to suit the needs of low to moderate income households.”330 Hence, the plan, and McLin’s support of the Arcade as an example was significant in its scope and approach toward her priority focus on housing neighborhood development.331

Support for the New Development and Renovation of Mixed-Use Communities

In her inaugural State of the City address, McLin actively supported Project SUN,

Strong Urban Neighborhoods. SUN was a new city initiative she helped to establish that involved training the city’s community development staff to develop diverse housing and retail opportunities for Dayton residents through new construction and renovation. In her inaugural address, McLin expressed that the combination of quality schools, diverse housing and support for business development was key to improving the city’s neighborhoods. McLin used the new organization as a vehicle to spur the in-progress development begun under the previous administration and to generate new initiatives.

Project Genesis

An example of a city neighborhood redevelopment project McLin highlighted as part of the Project SUN initiative is Project Genesis. Genesis was located near Miami

Valley Hospital and in Dayton’s Fairgrounds neighborhood. Situated in the South Park division of the Southeast Priority Board, the Fairgrounds neighborhood is a racially mixed community in Dayton’s southeast side. The 2000 Census reported that the

329 “City of Dayton 2008 Action Plan,” page 16 - http://www.cityofdayton.org/departments/pcd/Planning%20Docs/08%20Action%20Plan%20Final.pdf 330 Ibid 331 McLin’s role in the development of the action plan is unclear. Under the city charter, the successful implementation of such plans is the responsibility of the city manager. 213

neighborhood was seven percent bi-racial, ten percent African American and eighty

percent White. Blacks living in the South Park division had a mean household income of

$13,451 in 2000 whereas the mean income for Whites was $31,555.

Genesis was a comprehensive redevelopment project managed by CityWide

Development Corporation, a non-profit resource partner with the City of Dayton that

offers a variety of services including financial, consultative, educational, and investment

services with a focus on business, neighborhoods, entertainment and downtown housing.

Additionally, CityWide offers financial assistance loans to businesses and homeowners alike to purchase and maintain their properties. Their mission is to “provide leadership in

the creation and implementation of strategies addressing the city's need for economic

growth and viable, attractive neighborhoods.” Genesis, one of the projects CityWide

funded, purchased vacant houses and either tore them down and rebuilt new homes in their place or refurbished homes that were structurally sound.

The developers for the project demolished at least forty homes, and built or remodeled more than twenty homes and townhomes since the project’s inception. The project received the Audrey Nelson Community Development Achievement Award from the National Community Development Association (NCDA) in 2004. The award, named for NCDA’s first deputy executive secretary, was established in 1987 to recognize exemplary uses of Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds which address the needs of families, homes and neighborhoods. According to the association website, the award’s purpose is

To recognize exemplary uses of CDBG, HOME and other community development funds, and particularly those programs that address the needs of neighborhoods and families. The judging panel will look more favorably on those projects or programs that use multiple funding sources 214

and view the development or redevelopment of neighborhoods from a comprehensive, sustainable approach.

Genesis was an award winning development project that McLin supported in large part

due to the city’s pre-established commitment to the project under the previous

administration.

Although McLin was not mayor when the initial stages of the development

project began in 1996, her support of Genesis demonstrates her commitment to improve

all of Dayton’s neighborhoods. Moreover, McLin’s continued support of the majority

White district on the city’s east side also demonstrates her effort to impact the quality of

life of Blacks in Dayton, regardless of where they reside. For example, the project’s low

interest loan program potentially provided attractive buying options for moderately

income African Americans. Thus, McLin’s verbal support of Genesis, a community with

a ten percent Black population was exemplary of her desire to be the ‘mayor of

everyone.’ While the community had few African American residents and she arguably

had no choice to support the project given its inception prior to her being elected mayor,

McLin was under no obligation to publicly acknowledge Project Genesis in her inaugural

State of the City address. Finally, the percent of Blacks who did live in the neighborhood would not have necessarily benefited had McLin’s efforts in the Black community been limited to the primarily Black west side of Dayton.

Wright Dunbar Village

Another city neighborhood redevelopment project McLin supported with the

Project SUN initiative, was the Wright Dunbar Village. The redevelopment of the historic Third Street, west Dayton corridor, home to the Wright brothers’ famous bicycle shop and poet Paul Laurence Dunbar, began in 1995 under McLin’s predecessor, with the 215

Wright-Dunbar Urban Renewal Plan. With a $24 million initial investment in a public

and private partnership that would eventually cost more than $75 million, the ten-block area project redevelopment began. At the time, the city sold $7.9 million in bonds and the county, state and federal governments provided the other contributions.332

Unlike Genesis, Wright-Dunbar, located on the city’s west side in Five Points, is primarily Black. The 2000 Census reported that the Wright-Dunbar area is ninety-five percent Black with a mean household income of $26, 237. Of the 244 25 years of age and older Blacks who reported in the 2000 Census to live Five Points and have attained education, twelve percent received a graduate/professional degree or higher, though the vast majority did not begin or complete college. The dozen or so Whites who lived in

Five Oaks in 2000 had a mean household income of $35,157 and none achieved more than an associate’s degree. Though Blacks were and remain the majority, according to a

Black community member within the district who chose to remain anonymous, the neighborhood is increasingly diverse: “Wright-Dunbar is an eighty percent working class community; however it has the foundation in the making to become a middle class community. Yes, it is majority African American. However, there is more and more diversity . . .” For this community member, the city’s 2003 home showcase in the village helped to attract a diversity of new buyers to the area.

However, the community member would not label the increased diversity in the neighborhood or the business sector, as gentrification: “the increased diversity is not gentrification – it is not – [private and public partnerships] have made a very big effort to

332 ProjDel Corporation was competitively hired to provide project and construction management, public relations and marketing services for Wright-Dunbar. They compiled a report of their services, entitled “Wright-Dunbar Redevelopment, Dayton, Ohio: A Case Study,” Website: http://www.projdel.com/Wright- Dunbar.pdf 216

make resources available to individuals who own their properties to stay in their homes.”

The anonymous community member credited the previous administration for initiating

the Wright Dunbar redevelopment efforts. The community member noted how the city,

at the time, identified local, state and federal funding for the area’s first housing

redevelopment in over forty years and awarded grants to individuals to be able to

rehabilitate their homes.

For example, in preparation for the Dayton 2003 Celebration of Flight, a tribute to

the historic accomplishments of the Wright brothers and poet Paul Laurence Dunbar, the

city, under the previous administration, planned a Citirama ‘showcase of homes’ event,

and purchased three demonstration houses as examples of the type of construction desired

in the area. Competitively selected developers were chosen to construct the homes and

significantly, seventy-four percent of the thirty contractors working on the three

demonstration homes were minority firms.333 The competitively selected developers for

the project used $12 million to build new roads and utility lines and redeveloped five

historic buildings, twenty owner-occupied homes, constructed eight new homes matching

the late 19th century style of existing structures, and rehabilitated eight vacant lots.334

They also coordinated with the city to cut off street entrances and added streetlights to improve the perception of the safety of the neighborhood.335

As of 2004, forty-five new homes were built and seventy-three were renovated.

According to one of the contracting companies, the success of the redevelopment project

333 “Wright-Dunbar Redevelopment, Dayton, Ohio: A Case Study,” Website: http://www.projdel.com/Wright-Dunbar.pdf 334 Ibid. 335 In addition, with the help of Congress, in 1992, the project also included the development of the Dayton Aviation Heritage National Historical Park. The park was slated to be developed by 2003. As of 2008, the park included the Wright Cycle Company Complex, the Wright Dunbar Interpretive Center, the Aviation Trail Visitors’ Center and Museum, the Paul Laurence Dunbar House, Dayton History at Carillon Park, and the Huffman Prairie Flying Field 217 was evident by the value of homes being sold in the village for $150,000 in 2003 when they once sold in 1995 for less than $10,000.336 Homes were built by a variety of contractors and organizations, including ISUS, a charter school partially funded by

YouthBuild USA, the Innerwest Community Development Corporation, and the

Ecumenical Neighborhood Development Corporation.

The developers’ work was award-winning. The village was recognized with significant publicity and awards. The Wright-Dunbar Village neighborhood became a locally designated historic district in March 2002. One of the village developers, the

Miller Valentine Group received the Associated Builders and Contractors’ Award for

Excellence in Renovation for its work on the Victor Cassano Senior Health Center project located within the district in 2003. First Lady Laura Bush visited the village in

2003 and the project’s leaders received the Department of Housing and Urban

Development (HUD) Opportunity and Empowerment Award in 2004.

The anonymous community source noted that McLin had to some extent continued what was started under the previous administration, though not with the same level of leadership and resources. Another active neighborhood community leader within the village, in particular, concurred, finding that “really hardly anything has been done since she’s been in office, nothing in particular has been done in Wright Dunbar . . . With the ISUS program – they swooped up some land and are putting up some replica houses, but according to the National Trust [for Historic Preservation] it shouldn’t have

336 “Wright-Dunbar Redevelopment Case Study. 218

happened.”337 Thereby, for some leaders, McLin’s “support” for Wright Dunbar Village

is unfounded or unknown.

Despite the criticism, the city made efforts in Wright Dunbar under McLin’s

leadership. McLin purchased a home and moved into the primarily working-class

neighborhood in 2004 commenting that “by purchasing a home in the Wright-Dunbar

neighborhood, it gives me an opportunity to show my commitment to the restoration of

this historic neighborhood. It is a win-win situation.”338 McLin’s support of the project

is essential as the neighborhood was once the cultural center of African American life in

Dayton: “not only has the Wright-Dunbar Village been revitalized after years of

disinvestment, but the surrounding neighborhoods are also starting to benefit as well. We

are creating vibrant neighborhoods and new housing choices for residents that were not

available before.”339 For McLin, the construction of the new homes in the village had a

positive effect in surrounding neighborhood as well.

In addition to moving into the neighborhood, McLin had the opportunity to fund some of the project’s final stages. Her vote on the commission to fund the last two phases of the project and its showcase of urban homes in 2003 was significant as it provided more than $300,000 in marketing and loan interest support for area corporations.340 She also voted in 2005 to give Wright Dunbar, Inc. a $994,100 grant

provided by HUD to rehabilitate the interiors of six historic buildings within the village

ready for commercial tenants.

337 ISUS, Students from Improved Solutions for Urban Systems, is a community school that trains students in the construction industry 338 “Dayton mayor moving,” Dale Huffman, Dayton Daily News, February 2, 2004 339 “Wright-Dunbar a model for success,” Jason Roberson, Dayton Daily News, February 22, 2004 340 “2003 celebration inspires housing project,” Kristen Wicker, Dayton Business Journal, November 8, 2002

219

McLin’s support of the development effort in this historic African American

community is symbolic, as evidenced by her move to the neighborhood, and substantive as shown by her votes to fund the project’s final stages, helping the project continue to succeed. Subsequently, other successes have come to the village, including rising home values, more home construction with the final two stages calling for nineteen new homes and thirteen renovated homes. Many of the homes were built by Students from Improved

Solutions for Urban Systems, or ISUS, employing many Dayton area minority youth while training them in the construction industry. Moreover, PriMed, a local physicians group renovated space in the village at the cost of $801,000 for a new office. WDAO radio, the country’s first full-time rhythm and blues station, moved into the district as well with support from the city of Dayton.

Other McLin-Supported Housing and Redevelopment Efforts

Comparable projects McLin supported include the development of the Phoenix project, a housing development investment near Good Samaritan Hospital in west

Dayton, adjacent to downtown, where there are no income restrictions for home buyers.

The initiative, modeled after Project Genesis, is an effort to remove dilapidated homes and build new ones in Dayton’s Fairview and Mount Auburn neighborhoods near the hospital. After voting in 2003 to give $5 million to the project, McLin indicated that:

“I’m pleased we could come together as the catalyst for the improvement to the Good

Samaritan Hospital neighborhood.”341 The $5 million investment was directed to be used

for affordable housing subsidies. Additionally, in January 2008, McLin and fellow

commissioners voted to approve funding for the new construction of forty homes in west

341 “Phoenix project gets $10M,” Shannon Joyce Neal and Jim Bebbington, Dayton Daily News, November 13, 2003 220

Dayton, primarily where the city’s Black population resides. The three to four bedroom homes was an $8.1 million investment billed as lease to own properties with monthly rents averaging $485.342

In a city that offers the most affordable housing in the state at a time when the city faces an economic shortfall, McLin’s support for improved housing and neighborhood conditions was aggressive.343 McLin lobbied on behalf of better housing and neighborhood redevelopment efforts to her fellow commissioners. She was a voice of opposition to a state senate bill to change municipal residency requirements in an effort to keep a middle class tax base. Moreover, she moved into one of the newly developed communities, Wright Dunbar. These actions solidify her role as the ceremonial head of the city. Her supportive actions, particularly in the area of home construction, have reaped some substantive rewards as well. 2002 and 2003 were years that experienced an increase in home construction in Dayton and throughout the region. Significantly, in

2002, housing construction was at its busiest in Dayton since 1986.344

The housing redevelopment projects examined herein are not specifically targeted at African Americans as the homes constructed within the Phoenix, Wright-Dunbar, and

Genesis projects, once built, sell for market value, at approximately $150,000. Thereby, the homes’ price ranges are likely to cost more than the average Dayton African

American may be able to afford. However, the new and renovated construction in

342 “City Approves housing funds,” Dayton Business Journal, January 17, 2008 343 For example, McLin’s effort to improve Dayton’s neighborhoods and living conditions included her opposition to Ohio State Senate Bill 82 that required cities to remove residency requirements for municipal employees. The bill passed the Ohio Legislature in January 2006. The bill was signed days later by Governor Taft. McLin claimed the bill directly rejected the opinion of Dayton voters, who voted in favor of a residency requirement in 1987. For McLin, the bill infringed upon the state’s “Home Rule Amendment,” set forth in Article XVIIII, Section Three of the Ohio Constitution, and hindered the middle class tax base in the city. For more information, see “House bill would let a city’s workers reside elsewhere,” Jim Siegel, The Columbus Dispatch, January 19, 2006 344 “Affordability key to housing market,” Jason Roberson, Dayton Daily News, January 22, 2003 221

formerly dilapidated areas does change the image of neighborhoods. As a result, the

quality of life for a majority of Dayton residents, including African Americans, is

arguably positively affected.

Support for Vacant Demolitions, Predatory Lending and Low-Income Families

In addition to McLin’s support of various housing and neighborhood

redevelopment construction projects, which improved the safety, character, and home

values of mixed neighborhoods, McLin lobbied local and federal officials for assistance

in tearing down nuisance properties. For example, between 1999 and 2003, the city

received $2.5 million in federal funds to demolish 171 single family homes and 58

commercial buildings. Moreover, McLin voted with the city commission in 2004 to

spend $1.1 million to demolish approximately fourteen commercial and apartment

buildings, and indicated that: “we agree it’s tough to stimulate new housing or economic

investment in areas where vacant eyesores exist, so we are taking a much more

aggressive approach to removing them from our community.”345 For McLin, vacant properties were an extension of the broader housing and neighborhood redevelopment agenda she advocated. In 2008, McLin lobbied the federal government, with the assistance of Commissioner Whaley and Senator Sherrod Brown, for $5.5 million in foreclosure assistance to knock down blighted properties, including twenty-five to thirty apartment buildings.346 With the additional federal funds, McLin aggressively supported

city efforts to tear down nuisance properties.

345 “Plan set to raze run-down buildings,” Joanne Huist Smith, Dayton Daily News, December 16, 2004 346“Dayton to use federal money for demolition of blighted properties,” Jacob Dirr, Dayton Business Journal, October 24, 2008 222

While not targeted at Dayton’s Black community, the support by McLin for these demolition efforts is significant for Dayton’s Black community. The city’s demolition efforts were city-wide; however, many of the properties were located within west

Dayton.347 The appendix includes a numerical listing of the demolished structures

completed during McLin’s terms. Additionally, the effort to demolish vacant mattered

for Blacks’ quality of life because when left standing, vacant and abandoned structures

often become sites for illegal activity, arson and other concerns that eventually may cost

the city more in services.348

Furthermore, to add more support to the demolition of the vacant properties effort,

McLin announced the development of a “weed and seed” program to encourage

downtown businesses and area homeowners across city neighborhoods to keep better

maintenance of their properties. In addition to encouraging litter campaigns as a part of

the program’s goals, the city’s Housing and Neighborhood Strategies Task Force, with

the support of the mayor, sent inspectors to areas to warn owners about property up-

keep.349 For Mayor McLin, then, improvements in Dayton’s housing and neighborhood

development, not only included constructing new homes, and tearing down dilapidated

structures, but also a focus on yard violations: “This is an area where citizens have requested help from City Hall, and we are giving it to them.”350 McLin understood that

citizens demanded that the broader housing and neighborhood redevelopment effort

347 The addresses and number of demolitions could not be made available from the city’s Community Planning and Neighborhood Development department. This statement is based on interviews with city leaders. 348 For more information, see W. Skogan, Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods (Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1990). 349 “City targets junky yards,” Joanne Huist Smith, Dayton Daily News, April 7, 2005 350 Ibid. 223

include the demolition of vacant structures and the enforcement of the city’s housing

regulations.351

In another area of support for housing and neighborhood redevelopment, McLin

helped to lead the fight against predatory lending practices. This is particularly

significant to Blacks as recent research indicates that there is a geographical

concentration of subprime mortgages in neighborhoods with high concentrations of low-

income and minority households.352 Understanding how Blacks are often targets of

subprime lending practices, McLin actively supported taking legal action in Dayton. For

example, in 2001, when Dayton City Commission colleague Lovelace introduced the first

anti-predatory lending law for a municipality in Ohio, McLin supported the ordinance

during her first campaign.

In 2005, as a candidate for re-election she directed the following comments to her opponent, suggesting that “on any level there doesn’t seem to be any sympathy on predatory lending.”353 For McLin, her opponent, who was a key figure in Dayton’s home

construction industry, did not support the evidence that demonstrated the targeted effects

of such lending practices. In a related effort, in 2008, at a joint event with other Ohio

mayors, McLin exclaimed that “unfortunately today’s economic times are causing more

351 On a related measure, in 2006, McLin voted in favor of a city commission disclosure ordinance to ensure code violations are resolved before a residential property changes hands. This ordinance is significant as it potentially helps to force property owners to maintain their property at appropriate code, but also may prevent court proceedings as to who is responsible for violations as the property in on the market for purchase. Finally, the ordinance may serve to aesthetically benefit the look of neighborhoods. For more information on the ordinance, see City of Dayton, Ordinance 30565-06, Introduced by Commissioner J. Williams, June 7, 2006, Website: http://www.cityofdayton.org/departments/bs/Documents/disclosureordinance_only.pdf 352 See Calem, et al. (2004) “The neighborhood distribution of subprime mortgage lending,” Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 29:4, 393-410 353 “Candidates disagree on lending issues,” Jim Bebbington, Dayton Daily News, November 2, 2005 224

and more people to fall prey to the lure of the so-called payday loan operations.”354

Thereby, McLin expressed her continued support for safer lending opportunities for low to moderate income families.

On the national level, McLin supported creating housing opportunities for low- income families. As of 2008, McLin was one of only two public officials in Ohio who supported the National Housing Trust Fund Campaign, an effort by the federal government to establish sources of revenue to build, rehabilitate, and preserve 1.5 million units of housing for the lowest income families over the next ten years.355 President Bush signed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act in July 2008, establishing the National

Housing Trust Fund and a February 2009 New York Times editorial supported the project and encouraged even more federal funding.356 The fund (and McLin’s support of it) is

significant to Black Dayton residents because one of the fund’s primary goals is that at

least seventy-five percent of the trust fund dollars should be used for housing that is

affordable for extremely low income households.357 Given that forty percent of African

Americans in Dayton live below the poverty line, it is reasonable to assume that many of the low-income residents in Dayton are African American.358

As the examples cited demonstrate, McLin’s focus on housing and neighborhood

redevelopment was varied in scope. From the support of construction projects such as

Wright Dunbar and Genesis to her support for the increased enforcement of housing

354 “Local headlines,” Joanne Huist Smith, Dayton Daily News, March 27, 2008 355 National Housing Trust Fund, “305 National Housing Trust Fund Endorsers in Ohio,” Website: http://www.nhtf.org/doc/states/Ohio.pdf 356“A Stimulus for the Poor,” New York Times, February 6, 2009 357 National Housing Trust Fund, “President Signs Housing Trust Fund Into Law on July 30, 2008,” Website: http://www.nlihc.org/doc/NHTF-word-doc.pdf 358 U.S. Census Bureau, “Poverty Status in the Last Twelve Months,” 2005-2007 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates, American Community Survey 225 penalties, various forms of housing-based commission and state legislation and the demolition of properties, her efforts to improve housing and neighborhood redevelopment were multiple and significant.

Moreover, the focus on housing was important because Dayton’s population suffers from heavy housing segregation. The previous chapter indicated how, given the residents’ segregated housing patterns, such housing segregation impacted the city’s attempts to integrate its public school system. The fact that Dayton was and remains racially and residentially divided makes McLin’s support of diverse urban living developments and renovation projects like Genesis and Wright-Dunbar even more significant. For some, the attention to improved housing conditions and the development of more housing opportunities may improve the city’s race relations. According to the former president of the Dayton Urban League, race relations are negatively impacted by the housing segregation, “look at how people live. They don’t go to church together.

They’re not at a lot of social events together. If you had more instances where people were being together more than apart, there would be more community and better understanding of the [racial] issues.”359 Hence, for instance, McLin’s support of the

Wright-Dunbar Village is an example of an effort that may impact the city’s marked housing segregation culture since the once primarily Black low-income and nearly abandoned neighborhood is increasingly more diverse.

HOPE VI and the Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority

The mayor’s support for housing and neighborhood development, however, did not have a good beginning. According to custom, the mayor of Dayton has the power to

359 “Dayton needs ‘equivalent of a 365-day-a-year peace bridge,” Scott Elliott, James Cummings and Ken McCall, Dayton Daily News, May 20, 2007 226

make two appointments to the Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority (DMHA), the

agency with county-wide jurisdiction that is charged with the research, development, and

recommendation of policy and programs to assist citizens in obtaining affordable

housing. DMHA also is responsible for the operation of the public housing projects in the Dayton region. In her first year in office, McLin asked two city appointees, appointed by her predecessor, to resign. McLin initially claimed they had not contacted her, or

reported of their progress or duties since the eight months she was in office at the time.

While McLin later dismissed the incident as a communication problem, the Dayton Daily

News did not support her initial move, commenting in an editorial that: “for someone

who says her forte is building bridges, Mayor McLin’s missives were clumsy and

insulting.”360 The paper did not support her unilateral attempt to remove Turner’s

appointees, though they supported her efforts to get updates of the agency’s progress.

McLin’s specific complaint at the time was centered on where the agency planned to

replace the residents slated to be affected by their plan to raze more than four hundred units of public housing projects.361

The agency, formed by the state of Ohio, received federal support for the alleged

razed buildings with a grant it received from the HUD HOPE VI program, which stands

for Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere. HOPE VI was a $5 billion federal

public housing program enacted by Congress in 1992 as a result of the recommendations

of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing.362 That commission, established by Congress in 1989, was charged with identifying severely

360 “Mayor picks wrong fight with DMHA,” Dayton Daily News, August 8, 2002 361 “2002 very good for Downtown Dayton,” Dayton Daily News, January 2, 2003 362 Popkin, et al., “A Decade of HOPE VI: Research Findings and Policy Challenges,” The Urban Institute’s A Roof Over Their Heads: Changes and Challenges for Public Housing Residents Research Initiative, May 2004 227

distressed public housing developments and assessing strategies to improve their

condition. The commission’s national action plan to address the problem included the

creation of HOPE VI. According to HUD,

The HOPE VI Program was developed as a result of recommendations by National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing, which was charged with proposing a National Action Plan to eradicate severely distressed public housing. The Commission recommended revitalization in three general areas: physical improvements, management improvements, and social and community services to address resident needs.363

The DMHA’s HOPE XI funding was a long process. With 3,500 units of public housing

in Montgomery County, DMHA often has several to rehabilitate and/or demolish.364 The agency had success at receiving smaller grants, such as a HUD $800,000 demolition grant in 1998 to tear down Summit Court, a public housing complex. However, in the

1990s they had less success in securing larger funds. Finally, in 1999, after several unsuccessful applications, DMHA was awarded a $18.3 million HOPE VI revitalization grant to finance the demolition of three public housing units, Edgewood Courts, Metro

Gardens, and Metro Annex. The grant also provided funds to rehabilitate or construct new construction for one hundred Old Dayton View homes. Old Dayton View is a neighborhood within the Northwest Priority Board area on Dayton’s west side that was eighty six percent Black as of 2000.365

363 Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), “Home and Communities: Public and Indian Housing – HOPE VI, Website: http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/ 364 “What is DMHA’s Public Housing,” Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority, Website: http://www.dmha.org/public.htm Attempts to determine the number of public housing units within the city of Dayton were unsuccessful. Though a representative from DMHA indicated that there are some units within the city that are not managed by DMHA. 365 “Old Dayton View Neighborhood Planning District,” Northern Ohio Data and Information Service 2000 Census of Population and Housing, Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Summary File 3 228

The various HOPE VI projects’ developers were sued in 2002 by the Dayton

chapter of the National Association of Minority Contractors, alleging that the developing

partners failed to follow federal guidelines to create an open and competitive bidding

process.366 David Abney, the president of the local chapter claimed “in my capacity as the president of Wise Construction, I have been denied the opportunity to bid as the general contractor or joint venturer in the HOPE VI housing initiative.”367 However, Jeff

Payne, the HOPE VI project manager claimed that Wise Construction did not respond to

a DMHA request for qualifications issued in August 2000. The suit was important as it had the potential to stall the project with a deadline for completion for December 2003, as a result of low-income tax credits being used to finance the initiative.368

McLin actively supported the Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority’s

procurement of HOPE VI and other grants for the purpose of building public housing

developments in the Dayton area. For example, in 2003, DMHA began demolishing

1200 public housing units in the city of Dayton, which continued as of 2007. The agency

developed approximately 1,000 affordable housing units throughout the city during the

same time period.369 In July 2008, McLin voted with fellow commissioners to purchase

and dispose of a property on Negley Place, on Dayton’s west side, a HOPE VI project.370

Through her active support, she lent her political capital as it related to the physical plan

Cleveland State University accessed at http://www.cityofdayton.org/departments/pcd/Documents/2000%20CensusPDFs/Northwest/SF3old%20da yton%20view.PDF 366 “Minority contractors file lawsuit,” Marcus Franklin, Dayton Daily News, September 13, 2002 367 “Contractor sues over bidding process,” Kristen Wicker, Dayton Business Journal 368 Attempts to garner the outcome of the suit were unsuccessful. However, it appears the suit was dismissed. 369 Testimony of Greg Johnson, Executive Director of DMHA to the City Commission on September 5, 2007 370 Ordinance No. 30760-08 introduced By Matt Joseph 229

for the new developments. Many new developments were built with a sense of

community in mind, replacing a popular, yet outdated superblock design.371

The ORION Solution

In addition to advocating for the redevelopment of neighborhoods though public- private partnerships and supporting the construction of new public housing projects with

DMHA, in 2005, McLin helped initiate the ORION Solution, short for Organizing

Resources to Improve Our Neighborhoods. The initiative was “created to address the undesirable circumstances that immediately affect the City's residents.”372 Through the

collaborative efforts of city departments, neighborhood organizations and other private

entities, The ORION solution seeks to increase civic participation in neighborhood projects by gathering information about the issues negatively affecting the quality of life in neighborhoods.

According to the Dayton Daily News, The ORION solution seeks to improve quality of life: “This latest effort to reduce crime and generally improve quality of life pulls together neighborhood organizations and citizens to help focus services such as police, fire, building inspection, recreations and public works to provide some extra help.”373 The combination of city and neighborhood resources with targeted focus is

371 The demolition of outdated public housing structures in favor of the construction of community-centered units with more green space was part of larger trend nationwide to make public housing units aesthetically more appealing. In addition, many of the Dayton housing and redevelopment construction and renovation projects used students to build and renovate the low-income homes in a trade-school program called Improved Solutions for Urban Systems, (ISUS). The community school helps students to earn a high- school diploma, credit toward an associate’s degree and gain industry-recognized construction certifications. Many of those students are African American. 372 The City of Dayton, Department of Planning and Community Development: Citizen Participation, “The ORION Solution,” Website: http://www.cityofdayton.org/departments/pcd/cp/Pages/TheORIONSolution.aspx 373 “Plan: Better life in the ‘hoods,” Joanne Huist Smith, Dayton Daily News, November 17, 2005 230

designed to positively impact residents’ quality of life in the particular neighborhood

impacted.

After the appropriate data is gathered, the city departments are to use the data in a

strategic manner in terms of the allocation of resources over a concentrated four-month period. Throughout the four month period, work teams, comprising members of city government, neighborhood groups and other community based organizations serve as a guide to the neighborhood’s development. The idea is that at the conclusion of the city- sponsored, four-month concentration, the neighborhood will be better positioned to continue to address what quality of life issues negatively affect their community most.

The city, then, evaluates proposals from neighborhoods that compete to be a part of the next round of intensified efforts.

The targeted areas chosen for the first round of concentrated resource support were four neighborhoods, two within Dayton’s primarily Black Innerwest and Northwest priority board areas – Wolf Creek and Old Dayton View. The other two neighborhoods were located in the adjacent and racially mixed Fair River Oaks priority board area, northwest of downtown. Subsequent rounds of targeted impact also continued to focus on neighborhoods throughout the city.

Economic Development: West Dayton Retail and the Role of the City Manager

Mayor McLin noted in previously quoted interviews that the city of Dayton’s economic vitality was not only a function of improved housing opportunities, but improved neighborhood aesthetics. She noted how investments in the neighborhoods were unlikely to occur if neighborhoods suffer from a decaying image. Hence, McLin actively supported the investment of retailers in the west Dayton community. 231

Understanding that the relationship between housing and neighborhood redevelopment and economic development in the neighborhoods were symbiotic, particularly in

Dayton’s Black community, McLin actively attempted to preserve the presence of west

Dayton retail giants Rite-Aid and Kroger.

As her support for retail in Dayton’s Black community attests, much of McLin’s efforts on behalf of Blacks in Dayton were not executed publicly. An interview with

Dayton’s city manager, Rashad Young, suggested that McLin yielded much informal power behind the scenes. Addressing how well McLin responded to major problems facing the Black community, Young indicated, “in very subtle ways. She’s not at the podium and might not even make [the issue] very pronounced with me . . . She’s on the phone . . .”374 For Young, McLin may not have always publicly addressed the needs of

Black Dayton residents, however she was actively engaging the issues behind the scenes

– privately.

For example, Rite-Aid, a national drug store chain announced in 2007 that they were closing Dayton area retail stores, many in west Dayton. Even though McLin and

Young had a difference of opinion concerning the role of the city in respect to the commitment of resources for their retention, Young said McLin took a behind-the-scenes aggressive approach. According to Young, McLin called Rite-Aid executives to determine how many stores were slated to close, where and when.375 Young said that

McLin pressed the company executives to provide convincing marketing evidence to support their decision to close, asking what the revenue numbers were, what the shrinkage variables were, and why they chose not to invest in store facades. In specific

374 Interview, Rashad Young, July 16, 2008 375 Interview, Rashad Young, July 16, 2008 232

reference to the retail stores such as Rite-Aid announcing closings in Dayton’s Black

community, Young said McLin returned to the phones and asked the senior vice

presidents, “What’s your commitment to African Americans in Dayton.” She followed up her pursuit of retention of retail stores in Dayton’s Black community by asking the presidents of the companies to visit Dayton to discuss the retail drain in the community.

For Young, while much of McLin’s efforts to support the Black community were not exercised publicly, she actively pursued the interests of Blacks (and not at the expense of the primarily White community in east Dayton):

[McLin is] one of the hardest working mayors I’ve ever seen. She walks around regularly at 10 p.m. just talking to people. She gives rides to strangers – Blacks normally . . . but she is in a difficult spot, caught in the middle a lot. To some Black leaders, she’s not doing enough on the west side; from the east side, the perception is that all she does is cater to the west side. Kroger is a classic example.376

In 2007, Kroger, a national grocery chain announced it was closing a west Dayton store

by January 2008 and opening an east Dayton store at the cost of $16 million. A coalition

of west Dayton civil rights leaders, residents and Black ministers protested. They

garnered nearly three hundred signatures in a petition drive submitted to the city

commission asking them to cease future dealings with the company. In response to the

east Dayton-west Dayton Kroger store incident, Dayton Black minister Rev. Jerome

McCorry said, “We try not to make it a racial issue, but West Dayton is not treated like

the rest of the city.”377 He asked other clergy to use their pulpits express support for a

boycott, to utilize church transportation and to help residents to other west Dayton area

grocery stores.

376 Interview, Rashad Young, July 16, 2008 377 “Group to commission: Shut out Kroger,” Joanne Huist Smith, Dayton Daily News, November 23, 2007 233

Earlier, McCorry’s group held a community meeting with more than one hundred residents calling for a boycott of all Kroger stores. At the meeting, McCorry also asked residents to make copies of their grocery receipts and pass them on to their church secretaries to be collected and tabulated in an effort to estimate the Black community’s buying power. Kroger officials who attended the meeting cited how closing the store was not about the community it served: “We have operated a store at that location for 20 years. It has not been profitable for us. It is very hard for me to stand in front of you. We felt it was our responsibility to come and speak with you. Our intention, be that as it may, is to close in January.”378 Hence, the Black ministers’ boycott of Dayton Kroger stores was highly visible. Rather than publicly support the boycott, McLin, according to

Young, opted to work the phones, questioning Kroger officials’ commitment to the Black community, and demanding that they documented their lack of profit.379 The Kroger store, however, still closed. The planned east Dayton Kroger store was delayed as a result of the economy.

Young’s references of McLin’s efforts on behalf of Blacks were significant as it demonstrated the working relationship between the city manager and the mayor.380

Young directly credited McLin for his hire as an assistant city manager, interim city manager and her support to be selected outright as the city manager. In response to a question asking did McLin make key personnel changes within her appointment powers

378 “West Dayton group seeks Kroger boycott,” Joanne Huist Smith, Dayton Daily News, November 20, 2007 379 Interview, Rashad Young, July 16, 2008 380 Sworn-in in December 2006, Young is the city’s second Black city manager and the first Black male in that role. Thirty years old when he was appointed, Young is also one of the nation’s youngest. Prior to serving as city manager, the Dayton native was previously employed with the city in a variety of roles, including Assistant to the City Manager, Deputy Director for the Department of Information & Technology Services and Acting Assistant City Manager. In 2002, he left Dayton to become the Assistant City Manager for the City of Cincinnati. He returned in Dayton in 2005 as an Assistant City Manager. 234 that benefitted Blacks, Young responded, “Hiring me.”381 Although Young noted that she has very limited appointment powers according to the city charter, his reply suggests the informal mechanisms at play. An interview with McLin corroborated the informal concept that she hired Young as she indicated that she wanted to be mayor long enough to ensure his tenure was successful.

Conclusion: Black Perceptions of McLin’s Behind the Scenes Approach

The Rite-Aid and Kroger incidents, where McLin chose a behind the scenes approach, demonstrate her perceived ineffective communication to Dayton’s Black community. Perceptions of McLin’s efforts in the Black community were mixed. Black supporters such as Alvin Freeman, a grassroots organizer and B. Cato Mayberry, a higher education official, were quick to point out the constraints of the economic climate and the unrealistic high expectations of some Blacks that served as barriers to effective implementation or the perception thereof.382 However, others such as the anonymous

Wright Dunbar community member expressed that McLin’s efforts to improve Black quality of life are not supportive.

The editor of the only Black newspaper in the city, Don Black, commented that all he sees “is the mayor cutting ribbons in other parts of the community. I don’t see any drive to keep economic vitality.”383 For some Blacks, then, McLin’s front and center approach on initiatives such as housing and neighborhood redevelopment new construction projects like Genesis is contrasted with her seemingly quiet approach toward retaining Black neighborhood retail. For instance, leaders in one of the city’s primary

381 Interview, Rashad Young, July 16, 2008 382 Interview, Alvin Freeman, August 7, 2008; Interview, B. Cato Mayberry, August 8, 2008 383 Interview, Don Black, editor of The Dayton Weekly News, July 23, 2008 235

Black priority board areas find few results in terms of McLin’s efforts in the Black community. For them, McLin addressed major Black problems poorly.

Annie Bonaparte, the first vice chairperson of the Innerwest Priority Board claimed that “the Black community doesn’t have any businesses. Nobody is trying to create anything, especially in the Black community.”384 The president of the same board,

Claud Bell, Sr., could not name any important policy ideas directly affecting Blacks that

McLin introduced or implemented. For Bell, McLin needed to communicate better with the Black community, “I should not have to be president of the NAACP to get attention,” he claimed in an interview.385 He noted how “she’s likable, [but] she doesn’t touch her father, who always had time [for the Black community].” McLin, then, as Young suggested, faced the high expectations from Blacks that she can substantively improve their quality of life and devote as much time to their community as mayor of a majority

White city as her father did as state representative of a majority Black district. Thereby, some Blacks perceived her in contrast with her familiar political heritage. Meanwhile,

Whites who largely reside in Dayton’s east side, according to city manager Young, perceived that her attention only went to the west side.

Regardless of the community perceptions, within this racially divided context,

Mayor McLin’s terms in office did demonstrate some attention to issues that potentially had a positive effect on Blacks’ quality of life. Unlike Mayor Ford, whose efforts were largely streamlined to a few major priorities, this chapter demonstrated that McLin’s efforts were varied and multiple in scope and approach. Her confrontation of the housing issue in Dayton included the development of programs such as the ORION solution, and

384 Interview, Annie Bonaparte, August 5, 2008 385 Interview, Claud Bell, Sr., August 5, 2008 236 a variety of supportive efforts from the public housing initiatives of DMHA to the rhetorical support for predatory lending and state senate municipal residency bill. It appears, then, that her efforts for Blacks were indirectly sought and addressed through her chosen priorities. Presumably, then, with multiple approaches to one large encompassing issue such as housing, her efforts in the Black community may be less direct and perhaps less effective. For example, it appears her behind the scenes approach to represent Black interests was not effective in retaining businesses in west Dayton.

However, some efforts are evident. For example, the purchase of her new home in

Wright Dunbar Village, her support for affordable housing and mixed-use development projects, and her advocacy for Dayton’s Blacks in retail closings are indicators of her effort to pursue the interest of Blacks in Dayton, even if behind the scenes. On the other hand, her role in hiring a Black city manager who is most responsible for the city’s administrative function and economic turnaround was more visible.

In particular, with many of the varied housing initiatives, McLin was successful in securing the support of significant private partners and public officials. Many of these private partner organizations were led by influential Whites and many of the public officials she successfully courted to support the legislative initiatives were Whites who

McLin convinced benefitted from supporting the efforts. Thus, McLin’s effort to obtain the support of White public officials and corporate or non-profit leaders is an example of her ability to universalize the interests of Blacks as interests that matter to everyone.

With McLin’s tactics at persuasion, many of these leaders were initially convinced that their interests and the interests of some of the majority-Black focused housing initiatives were mutually beneficial. As chapter eight explains in more detail, largely as a result of 237

her rhetoric in State of the City addresses and conversations behind the scenes, McLin

framed her often indirect advocacy of Black interests in such a way that did not alienate the potential for support from key White leaders or that explicit deemphasized the significance of race. In fact, it appears that White public officials were, in part, initially drawn to continue to support pre-established city efforts on housing and related initiatives that McLin continued because of the universalizing Black interests approach McLin

utilized.

As her championed issues suggests, McLin used an approach to represent Black

interests within Dayton’s non-majority Black context that did not deny the presence of a racial dilemma (as the phone calls to retail executives demonstrate); nor did the approach explicate racialized policy appeals. While McLin, perhaps, was moderately successful with the approach, McLin’s efforts and actions on behalf of Blacks were vastly unique from Ford in Toledo. Whereas he was often able to propose and implement policies and programs almost entirely unilaterally, much of McLin’s efforts were limited to supporting others’ initiated actions, while introducing additional symbolic actions.

238

REFERENCES Newspaper Articles

“Dayton city manager job just got harder,” Dayton Daily News, February 19, 2006.

“McLin struck strange note in city speech,” Dayton Business Journal, February 21, 2003.

Dale Huffman, “Dayton mayor moving,” Dayton Daily News, February 2, 2004.

Jason Roberson, “Wright-Dunbar a model for success,” Dayton Daily News, February 22, 2004.

Shannon Joyce Neal and Jim Bebbington, “Phoenix project gets $10M,” Dayton Daily News, November 13, 2003.

“City Approves housing funds,” Dayton Business Journal, January 17, 2008.

Jason Roberson, “Affordability key to housing market,” Dayton Daily News, January 22, 2003.

Joanne Huist Smith, “Plan set to raze run-down buildings,” Dayton Daily News, December 16, 2004.

Joanne Huist Smith, “City targets junky yards,” Dayton Daily News, April 7, 2005.

Jim Bebbington, “Candidates disagree on lending issues,” Dayton Daily News, November 2, 2005.

Joanne Huist Smith, “Local headlines,” Dayton Daily News, March 27, 2008.

Scott Elliott, James Cummings and Ken McCall, “Dayton needs ‘equivalent of a 365- day-a-year peace bridge,” Dayton Daily News, May 20, 2007.

“Mayor picks wrong fight with DMHA,” Dayton Daily News, August 8, 2002.

“2002 very good for Downtown Dayton,” Dayton Daily News, January 2, 2003.

Marcus Franklin, “Minority contractors file lawsuit,” Dayton Daily News, September 13, 2002.

Kristen Wicker, “Contractor sues over bidding process,” Dayton Business Journal.

Joanne Huist Smith, “Plan: Better life in the ‘hoods,” Dayton Daily News, November 17, 2005.

239

Joanne Huist Smith, “Group to commission: Shut out Kroger,” Dayton Daily News, November 23, 2007.

Joanne Huist Smith, “West Dayton group seeks Kroger boycott,” Dayton Daily News, November 20, 2007.

Kristen Wicker, “2003 celebration inspires housing project,” Dayton Business Journal, November 8, 2002.

“A Stimulus for the Poor,” New York Times, February 6, 2009.

Jim Bebbington, “Artists paint picture of friendship,” Dayton Daily News, August 29, 2003.

Jim Siegel, “House bill would let a city’s workers reside elsewhere,” The Columbus Dispatch, January 19, 2006.

Jacob Dirr, “Dayton to use federal money for demolition of blighted properties,” Dayton Business Journal, October 24, 2008.

Journal Articles, Book Chapters, Books

Calem, et al. 2004. “The neighborhood distribution of subprime mortgage lending.” Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics. 29: 393-410.

Chanjin Chung, et al. “Racial Differences in Transportation Access to Employment in Chicago and Los Angeles, 1980 and 1990. American Economic Review. 91:2

Goering, John M. and Edward M. Kalachek. 1973. “Public transportation and black unemployment.” Society 10(July): 39-42.

Gordon, P., Kumar, A., & Richardson, H.W. 1989. “The spatial mismatch hypothesis: Some new evidence.” Urban Studies. 26: 315-326.

Holzer, H. J. 1991. “The spatial mismatch hypothesis: What has the evidence shown?” Urban Studies. 28: 105-122.

Johnston-Anumonwo, I. 1997. “Race, gender, and constrained work trips in Buffalo, NY, 1990.” Professional Geographer. 49: 306-317.

Johnston-Anumonwo, I. 2000. “Commuting constraints of African American women: Evidence from Detroit, Michigan.” The Great Lakes Geographer. 7: 66-75.

Johnston-Anumonwo, I. 2001. “Persistent Racial Differences In the Commutes of Kansas City Workers.” Journal of Black Studies. Vol. 31(May): 651-670.

240

Kain, J. F. 1968. “Housing segregation, Negro employment and metropolitan decentralization.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 82: 175-197.

Kasarda, John. “Urban Change and Minority Opportunity.” In The New Urban Reality, Paul Peterson, ed.

McLafferty, S., & Preston, V. 1996. “Spatial mismatch and employment in a decade of restructuring.” Professional Geographer. 48: 420-431.

McLafferty, S., & Preston, V. 1997. “Gender, race and determinants of commuting: New York in 1990.” Urban Geography. 18: 192-212.

Schuck, James P. and Jon Brollier. “General Assembly Seeks to Limit Municipality Employee Residency Requirements.” Finley’s Ohio Municipal Service. Vol. 18:1.

Skogan, W. 1990. Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods. Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press.

Miscellaneous

“Wright-Dunbar Redevelopment. Dayton, Ohio: A Case Study.” Website: http://www.projdel.com/Wright-Dunbar.pdf

MayorTV, Website: http://mayortv.com/rhine_1_mclin

National League of Cities. Tapping the Power of City Hall to Build Equitable Communities: 10 City Profiles.

City of Dayton. Ordinance 30565-06. Introduced by Commissioner J. Williams. June 7, 2006. Website: http://www.cityofdayton.org/departments/bs/Documents/disclosureordinance_only.pdf

CitiPlan Dayton: The 20/20 Vision.

State of the Cities Data Systems Census. Website: http://socds.huduser.org/census/totalemploy.odb

National Housing Trust Fund. “305 National Housing Trust Fund Endorsers in Ohio,” Website: http://www.nhtf.org/doc/states/Ohio.pdf

National Housing Trust Fund. “President Signs Housing Trust Fund Into Law on July 30, 2008,” Website: http://www.nlihc.org/doc/NHTF-word-doc.pdf

Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), “Home and Communities: Public and Indian Housing – HOPE VI, Website: http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/ 241

Northern Ohio Data and Information Service 2000 Census of Population and Housing, Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Summary File 3, Cleveland State University, “Old Dayton View Neighborhood Planning District,” Website: http://www.cityofdayton.org/departments/pcd/Documents/2000%20CensusPDFs/Northw est/SF3old%20dayton%20view.PDF

Testimony of Greg Johnson, Executive Director of Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority, to the Dayton City Commission on September 5, 2007

City of Dayton, Ordinance No. 30760-08, Introduced by Commissioner Matt Joseph

“City of Dayton 2008 Action Plan,” Website: http://www.cityofdayton.org/departments/pcd/Planning%20Docs/08%20Action%20Plan %20Final.pdf

The City of Dayton, Department of Planning and Community Development: Citizen Participation, “The ORION Solution,” Website: http://www.cityofdayton.org/departments/pcd/cp/Pages/TheORIONSolution.aspx

City of Dayton City Charter, Website: http://www.cityofdayton.org/cco/Documents/City_Charter.pdf

Toledo v. State 2008-Ohio-1957, the city of Toledo suit to the Ohio Sixth District Court of Appeals, Website: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/6/2008/2008-ohio- 1957.pdf

Popkin, et al. 2004, “A Decade of HOPE VI: Research Findings and Policy Challenges,” The Urban Institute’s A Roof Over Their Heads: Changes and Challenges for Public Housing Residents Research Initiative.

“What is DMHA’s Public Housing,” Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority, Website: http://www.dmha.org/public.htm

Interviews

Bell, Sr., Claud. Interview. August 5, 2008.

Black, Don. Interview. July 23, 2008.

Bonaparte, Annie. Interview. August 5, 2008.

Freeman, Alvin. Interview. August 7, 2008.

Mayberry, B. Cato. Interview. August 8, 2008.

242

McLin, Rhine. Interview. June 26, 2008.

Young, Rashad. Interview. July 16, 2008.

243

CHAPTER SEVEN: FINDINGS AND RESULTS

Introduction

Mayor Ford of Toledo, Ohio, and Mayor McLin of Dayton, Ohio, were both first

elected, under similar conditions, in 2001, with terms beginning in 2002. In both cities,

severe budget shortfalls, struggling public schools and downtowns, and a lack of

corporate leadership posed serious challenges. And both cities elected Black mayors who

were “firsts,” surmounting significant historical barriers to public office: McLin was the

first female mayor of Dayton, and Ford was the first Black mayor of Toledo. Even given

these and other constraints, however, the mayors were able to introduce policies and

programs that had an impact on the quality of life of Black residents to some extent, as

the previous case studies demonstrated.

Informed by the findings of the case studies, in this chapter I analyze the extent of

the mayors’ efforts to improve Black quality of life throughout their terms of office. That

is, after defining what is meant by “Black quality of life,” I detail the extent to which the

mayors’ actions, described in the earlier chapters, can be viewed as examples of the pursuit of Black interests. Additionally, I examine select respondents’ responses to three interview questions as a way of revealing White and Black citizens’ differing perceptions

of their mayors’ efforts. I then return to the propositions of chapter one to examine this

study’s hypotheses regarding these two mayors’ behavior in office, drawing conclusions regarding which of the study’s hypotheses have been confirmed by the data. The chapter

concludes by explaining the four additional significant findings that emerge from the

research observations and interviews.

Black Representation and Local Context 244

In the first chapter, I explained how the assumption of shared racial experience affects a Black mayor’s responsiveness toward his or her Black constituents. The case study chapters showed how the presence of a Black mayor led to a fairly active pursuit of

Black interests on select issues. In the overview that follows, I consider scholars’

explanations for why this type of representation, the representation of Black interests,

matters. Scholars’ views conflict regarding the role the presence of a Black politician

alone has on the introduction and implementation of Black-interest programs and

policies. The most recent scholarship clearly finds, however, that Black congressional

representatives more actively represent Black interests than do White members of

Congress.

There is a strong theoretical and empirical body of literature that describes how

the representation of Black interests differs from other kinds of representation because of

“descriptive” characteristics, such as shared racial experience. A number of scholars

have explored ideas about representation and investigated to what degree politicians are

responsive to their constituents. By detailing how shared racial experience defines a

strong connection between a Black politician and his or her constituents, congressional

scholarship literature helps to explain why we might expect the interests of Blacks to be

represented by a Black mayor in a non-majority Black city.

The Debate over the Representation of Black Interests

Scholars disagree concerning what factors contribute to the representation of Black

interests. For example, Swain (1996) has posited, like Pitkin (1967), that there is a

distinction between “substantive” and “descriptive” representation and that Black and

White Democratic members of Congress at the very least equally represent African 245

Americans. Hence, for Swain, who examined Black representatives in a variety of different districts, including majority-White districts, descriptive representation has no place: “Black interests on Capitol Hill, at least measured by the policy congruence between the representative and his or her Black populations, are better looked after by the

Democratic congressional party . . . It suggests that Black interests will certainly be represented in Congress, even if the number of Black faces remain low” (19). What surfaces in Swain’s argument is the significance of party membership, platform, and ideas – not of the race of individual representatives. In this view, substantive representation stands in for descriptive representation, and Black constituents rarely gain any more from electing a Black representative than from electing a White one, provided that representative belongs to the Democratic Party. What the “certain” representation of black interests requires is an increased number of representatives from the Democratic

Party. Whether these members are Black, White, or of any other ethnic group is irrelevant. Consequently, Swain thinks Blacks and Whites should form biracial coalitions to maximize the representation of one another’s interests. Swain’s findings and recommendations are limited, however, to a comparable measurement of White

Democratic members of the 100th Congress.

Katherine Tate (2003) criticizes Swain for equating partisanship to Black interests, noting that “descriptive representation turns out to be very important to Blacks, as Blacks were generally approving of their legislator when that representative was

Black.”386 Yet Swain argues that aggressive pushes for descriptive representation for

Blacks in Congress can be damaging: “The assumption that only Blacks can represent

Black interests puts African Americans who want to maximize the descriptive and

386 Ibid, 122. 246

substantive representation of Blacks in Congress in an untenable position . . . It operates

to hurt Black politicians who need White support – those Black politicians who seek to

emphasize racial commonalities, those who seek to represent Whites as well as Blacks”

(189). Swain does not suggest that White representatives can unequivocally represent

Blacks. She argues: “Although a White representative can ‘think, act, and talk Black,’ he

or she can never be Black. White representation of Blacks will never replace Black

representation” (217). Nevertheless, Swain’s overall conclusion is that White

Democratic representation in Congress is equal to or better for Blacks than descriptive

Black representation.

Tate, among others, finds this prioritization of party over racial group

membership in the representation of Black interests to be troubling. She argues that

Black representation is not only best achieved through Black members of Congress,

because Black representatives share a particular interpretation of history with their Black

constituents, but that all groups, including Whites, place a strong value on descriptive

representation. This is a recognition that Pitkin (1967) and Swain (1996) ignore. For

them, it appears, descriptive representation is not only pejorative but is limited to

minority group experience.387 Tate, on the other hand, is adamant that “all Americans

place a strong value on [descriptive representation,] as it is a component of political

representation continuously stressed by members of those elected to the U.S. Congress”

(6). Both Tate (2003) and Runciman (2007) concur that descriptive representation is

387 This statement reflects Pitkin’s definition of descriptive representation as “standing for” and not “acting for” representation. Since descriptive representation is primarily inferred as benefiting minority groups, it seems implied that the “acting for” representation is like unto the theme of white male representation common during the era Pitkin was originally writing. Yet the “standing for” descriptive representation, which she deems not representation at all, is counter-productive. For Swain (1996), her discussion is limited to people of color. 247

endemic in the institution of political representation. Challenging Swain’s conclusion

that party trumps racial identification, Tate asserts that “black Democrats are strikingly

more liberal or less conservative than White Democrats” (85). This finding potentially

refutes Swain’s finding that White Democratic Party members of Congress represent

Black interests as well as Black members do.388

The Active Pursuit of Black Representation in Toledo and Dayton

Scholarship on political representation thus suggests that Black politicians more often actively pursue the interests of Blacks than do White politicians. The debate frames the argument for why I can expect that a Black mayor of a city with majority White constituents would pursue Black interests when Blacks are the minority.

Beyond the Case Studies: Additional Policy Actions and Program Development

Chapters four and six detailed case studies of policy actions and program development that Mayor McLin and Mayor Ford advocated in their pursuit to represent the interests of Blacks. However, the case studies alone leave the impression that the efforts detailed within them were the only activities pursued by these two mayors on

behalf of Black interests, which was not in fact the case. Both mayors took other policy

actions and developed other programs affecting their Black constituents.389 In addition,

the case studies do not adequately explain how the data was gathered, particularly

concerning the effort to gauge the informal mechanisms exercised by Mayor McLin.

388 However, Swain was studying a different Congress and notes her findings should be limited to that 100th session. In the final analysis, for Tate, race matters, in that it fosters better deliberation and leads to the promotion of more Black interest policies. Both Swain (1996) and Tate (2003) identified partisanship as a key variable in studies of representation and implementation of Black interests. For example, the partisan bias of the city, the state, the mayor, or council members is likely to have an effect on a Black mayor’s promotion of Black interests. 389 For a roster and detailed explanation of additional select activities not included within the case study chapters, see the appendix. 248

A numerical analysis of McLin’s and Ford’s efforts to improve Black quality of life is detailed in the table below.390 The data shows how, during the course of their years in office, Ford and McLin actively pursued the interests of Blacks:391

Efforts by McLin and Ford to Improve Black Quality of Life

Mayor Ford Mayor McLin

Terms 2002-2005 2002-2008392

Number of Policy Actions 28 48

Number of Program Developments 20 48

Annual Average of Policies and Programs 12 12393

Total Number of Policies and Programs 48 96

Mayor Ford and Mayor McLin annually introduced and/or implemented an average of twelve policy actions and program developments—or roughly one initiative per month— that impacted the quality of life of Blacks in Toledo and Dayton. These results are compelling, given that these are non-majority Black cities.

The Example of Municipal Employment: Toledo

Municipal employment, an example of political incorporation, is often cited as a key way in which mayors can exercise a substantive impact on the lives of Black constituents. Thereby, the number of Blacks Mayor Ford employed during his term in office offers one example of a mayor’s active pursuit of the interests of Blacks. After

390 For a yearly examination of Ford and McLin’s policy actions and program development to improve Black quality of life, see the appendix. 391 Admittedly, the quantitative coding is not ideal. While the number of policies and programs may be significant, the substantive impact of the policies and programs is of more value. These data are useful as they show the number of policy and programmatic efforts pursued by the mayors and it provide cues concerning the time the mayors spent actively pursuing Black interests. 392 This data analysis for McLin concludes on August 1, 2008. However, McLin is still serving as mayor of Dayton and is seeking a third term. 393 The average for McLin is divided by eight, as she is currently in her eighth year of office. 249

Ford took office, Blacks’ share of the percentage of Toledo’s municipal workforce increased in significant categories.394 Data in the following table confirm Browning,

Marshall, and Tabb’s findings that the presence of a Black mayor has an impact on municipal employment (Browning, Marshall, Tabb 1984; Orr 1997):

Black Personnel Employment: Toledo City Government, 2002-2005 and 2007-2009395

Ford Years: 2002-2005 Number of Whites Number of Blacks % Black

Executive Administrative 60 24 27

Professional 140 29 17

Technicians 181 31 14

Office and Clerical 276 93 23

Craft Workers 109 21 16

Operatives 296 84 21

Laborers 106 136 54

Service Workers (Protective-Fire- 252 80 22 Fighter) Service-Workers (Protective-Fire 99 24 18 Command Officers) Service Workers (Protective- 392 101 19 Police Officers) Protective Services (Police 110 19 14 Command Officers) Service Workers (Non-Protective 77 35 29 Service) Finkbeiner Years: 2007-2009396

Officials and Administrative 79 23 21

Professionals 294 54 15

394 Workforce analysis data was not available for 1993-2001, the two terms of Ford’s predecessor. However, the appendix includes a roster of middle-level and upper-level management positions that were filled by Blacks after Mayor Ford took office. According to my interviews with administration members, Blacks had not occupied these positions previously. 395 This data is for full-time employees only. The lack of corresponding labels between the 2002-2005 and 2007-2009 data is yet another example of data problems in medium-sized cities. From 2002-2005, while Ford was mayor, the city kept more detailed records, as evidenced by service and protective worker subcategories. Comparable data for Dayton was not made available upon request. Given that McLin does not have the power to make such appointments, the absence of the data is not significant. 396 This is data for Ford’s predecessor who also succeeded him as mayor. The data is as of June 30, 2008 250

Technicians 257 37 12

Protective Service 646 165 18

Paraprofessionals 0 0 0

Administrative Support 203 80 27

Skilled Craft 191 73 26

Service-Maintenance 223 185 44

Source: City of Toledo, Office of Affirmative Action/Contract Compliance, Underutilization and Workforce Analysis Data, 2002-2005 and 2007-2009

The table shows that from 2002 through 2005, Blacks were well represented in the

categories that tend to require more skills and training (i.e., executive and administrative,

professionals, technicians, and protective/service workers). While the largest percentage

of Blacks is found in the laborers category, Blacks are also found in jobs requiring

significant skills, making up a significant portion of protective service workers, for

example. If we average the percentage sub-categories of protective service workers from

2002 through 2005, the result is 18 percent, comparable to the result for the 2007-2009

years under Ford’s successor, Mayor Finkbeiner. Though the percentages are equal, the

salaries are not: while 28 percent of protective service workers in 2002-2005 with salaries of $43,000 to $54,999 are Black, only 12 percent of protective workers with salaries between $55,000 and $69,999 are Black. Although the 2007-2009 data are not reported in the same detail, the salary discrepancies perhaps indicate that if the subcategories had been divided as in 2002-2005, the percentage of Black protective workers in higher salary ranges would be significantly lower than in 2002-2005. If this is indeed the case, it would suggest that Mayor Ford appointed Black men and women to better-paying jobs in police and community relations than did his successor. These data also confirm earlier 251

research that showed Black mayors have had a special interest in police and community relations (Salzstein 1989).

While Ford was mayor, Blacks were also very well represented in the executive/administrative and professional categories, the two highest-skilled and highest-

wage classifications. The percentage of Black employees in both categories decreased

for the 2007-2009 data, after Ford left office, with the largest decrease occurring in the

category of executives and administrators. In Mayor Ford’s years in office, 27 percent of

the administrators were Black; near the end of Mayor Finkbeiner’s current term in office,

only 21 percent are Black.397

These data are encouraging. Given that both Mayor Ford and Mayor Finkbeiner

governed during poor economic times when layoffs were threatened, increases in taxes

were debated, and the delivery of city services was downsized, the decrease in the

number of Blacks in higher-level job classifications under Finkbeiner can not be blamed

solely on economic conditions. Both mayors faced a dim economic prospect, but only

Ford aggressively diversified the city’s workforce while balancing the budget annually.

Assessing Black Quality of Life

In an effort to better code and define particular mayoral efforts as substantively

meaningful attempts to improve “Black quality of life,” I have created a political

typology that can be used to classify a given mayor’s activities. The placement of

activities within a particular category structures the range of representative efforts from

the largely descriptive to the seminally substantive. This range serves as the frame for

397 While I can not compare with previous administration given the problem of gathering data in medium- sized cities identified in chapter one, the appendix does report a roster of Blacks in Toledo who were either promoted or hired in middle-level and upper-level positions that had not seen Blacks previously. See appendix for the roster of Black city of Toledo employees promoted or hired during Mayor Ford’s tenure (2002-2005). 252

describing what constitutes quality-of-life improvements. I have conceptualized five

essential categories that follow below. For any given mayoral effort, a value of one is

low, indicating that the mayor has made only a relatively insignificant attempt to improve

Black quality of life, while a value of five is high, since activities placed in category five

are presumably the more difficult to pursue. Each category provides a context describing

how a mayor might achieve his or her goals and indicating how he or she has prioritized

policy decisions through administrative management.

1. The Politics of Shared Racial Experience. Evidence of mayoral

responsiveness and recognition of Black constituent concerns is manifested in symbolic gestures situated within the context of shared racial experience. One example in which a mayor expresses his or her shared racial experience with his or her constituents is Harold

Washington’s 1983 campaign slogan, “It’s our turn” (Kleppner 1985, 155). Another

might be the mayor’s officiating in the marriage ceremony of his Black constituents

(Lane 2001, 61). Noticeably, in these examples, the mayor and his constituents are

drawn together by Black Americans’ common experience of slavery and institutionalized

racism, not by their class or other life attributes. It is difficult to measure how strongly

such shared Black experiences are reflected in a mayor’s active pursuit of certain policy

priorities, however. Within this context, Blacks are also diverse, and there are obviously

individual differences in how much intensity Black mayors will exercise in addressing

Black constituent interests.

2. Access and Opportunity: The Policy Incorporation of Black Interests. Evidence

of Black mayors’ attempts at incorporating and mobilizing Blacks most notably includes

their appointment and hiring of qualified African Americans in visible, significant 253 positions across the spectrum of city government. In the example of hiring practices, the

Black mayor is presumably making a political and economic contribution to the lived experiences of qualified African Americans. Opening up employment opportunities for some Blacks is an expression of shared racial experience, since Blacks were not given the same level of access and opportunity in prior or subsequent administrations. A mayor’s active pursuit of hiring and appointing qualified Black men and women, then, makes a difference for politics and power.

3. The Politics of Constituent Service. In the area of constituent service, evidence of a Black mayor’s active pursuit of policies that are designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents is more concrete. Constituent services range from neighborhood street cleaning, paving, and development to trash removal and snow plowing to tree stump removals and improved street lights and signs.

4. Programs for Black Middle-Class and/or Low-Income Residents. Evidence in this policy or programmatic arena of Black mayors’ active pursuit of policies and programs that are designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents is multilayered, as the beneficiaries might extend beyond the Black community. In the allocation of city contracts, for example, are contracts awarded according to the city percentage requirement by the city’s good faith goals? Does the mayor monitor the allocation of the contracts in a way that is fair and equitable to ensure minority contractors have access and opportunity to apply?398 In a community where African

398 For example, according to Mier and Moe (1991), Harold Washington increased the contracts awarded to minority firms in the city of Chicago from 9 to 60 in a three-year period. However, we have no idea to what extent this meets a city ordinance or good faith goal that requires a certain percentage of minority participation in the contracting process. Without that clear understanding, the stated increase during those three Washington years could be substantively meaningful or simply symbolic. It could be significant, for example, if minority contractors received the average of the total dollar amount relative to their proportion within the city’s population. 254

Americans are disproportionately poor, moreover, what programs has the mayor

introduced that may have broad appeal and at the same time strongly meet the particular

interests of Blacks? Policies that are designed to provide neighborhood redevelopment

and renovation, for example, such as HUD’s HOPE VI programs, may have broad appeal

to low-income residents and at same time significantly meet the interests of Blacks. This

area of policy concern might largely be considered community development. Brown

(2007, 26) is an example of scholarship that focuses on such social welfare–defined

policies and programs.

5. Substantive Management Priorities. Finally, mayors may actively pursue

policies and programs that work to improve the quality of life of African Americans.

These may be social welfare policies and programs that improve access to health care, such as the introduction of a health care network for the uninsured or a citywide smoking ban, or they may include increased employment opportunities for minority youth, or the substantive support of the financial and academic status of the city’s public school

system.

Each category in the typology reflects a different level of responsiveness to Black citizens’ interests. The typology provides a structured mechanism from which to

evaluate the extent and breadth of Mayors Ford and McLin’s active pursuit of policies

and programs that work to improve the quality of life of Black residents. In combination with respondents’ answers to certain interview questions, as well as with content analysis

of city council minutes and agendas, I use the typology to label each of the mayors’

annual activities previously identified as designed to improve the quality of life of

Blacks. 255

Interview Methodology

In the previous chapters, case studies provided examples of the policies and programs Ford and McLin actively pursued as they related to Black interests. Using transcribed and recorded interviews as evidence, in this chapter I examine the perception and recognition of McLin’s and Ford’s responsiveness to Black interests. These interviews assisted in the identification of policy actions and program developments introduced and/or implemented by the mayors and the formal and informal mechanisms used and with the examination of the conditions under which Mayor Ford and Mayor

McLin actively pursued policies and programs that are designed to improve the quality of life of Blacks. Thirty semi-structured interviews were performed in Dayton, Ohio, and fifty-three in Toledo.399 Four separate interview schedules were conducted, wherein respondents generally answered thirty of the same questions. The four categories of persons interviewed included General Influentials, Public Officials, Mayors, and

Community Activists.

The category “General Influentials” included members of campaign and administration staff, journalists, academic and business leaders, friends and opponents of the mayor, and other relevant actors with knowledge of the mayor’s efforts. “Public

Officials” encompassed elected officeholders in varying roles at the time of the interviews. Dayton’s unelected City Manager was also included. Former elected officials were categorized as “General Influentials.” The “Mayors” category included the two mayors who are the subject of the study and their immediate predecessors, though

McLin’s predecessor chose not to be interviewed. Finally, “Community Activists”

399 The difference in the number of interviews is justified. Given the structure of government, it is expected that Toledo would generate more interviews, as Mayor Ford had a larger direct impact on more individuals due to Toledo’s strong mayor format of representation. 256

included members of the Black community, pastors, leaders of race-advancement

associations, and neighborhood activists. The interviews were conducted from June 10,

2008, through August 7, 2008. The appendix includes a list of the questions asked in

each interview.

Qualitative data gathered from the interviews and content analysis performed on

city council/commission minutes and agendas were coded to identify the extent of each

mayor’s active pursuit of Black interests.400 The city commission in Dayton meets

weekly, whereas the city council in Toledo meets bi-weekly. Therefore, content analysis

was performed on a total of 108 minutes/agendas for the entirety of Mayor Ford’s term in

Toledo from 2002-2005. In Dayton, a total of 386 city commission minutes and agendas

were analyzed, from the beginning of Mayor McLin’s term in 2002 through August 1,

2008. McLin is still serving and is seeking a third term as mayor.

The combined data show that Ford actively pursued more substantive Black

interests than Mayor McLin. This finding is especially significant, as it suggests that a

larger Black population has little effect on the Black mayor’s policy and programmatic

efforts in the Black community, as previous research has determined in the legislative

arena.401

400 For dates of the city council and city commission minutes and agendas, see the appendix. Included is a sample content analysis rubric to better understand how the content analysis was performed and then applied to the data. 401 Bullock, Charles S. III and Susan A. MacManus “Policy Responsiveness To the Black Electorate: Programmatic Versus Symbolic Representation,” American Politics Research, Vol. 9, No. 3, 357-368 (1981) 257

Mayor Ford and Black Quality of Life

5 8

e

4 35

3 53

2 4

Typology of Black Quality of Lif of Quality Black of Typology 1

0 102030405060708090100 Percent of Activities

Mayor McLin and Black Quality of Life

5 0

4 8

3 87

2 3

Typology of Black Quality of Life 1 2

0 102030405060708090100 Percent of Activities

Both McLin and Ford spent a significant majority of their efforts to aid Black constituents on category 3 activities, or constituent service activity for Black residents.

This type of effort is significant, as city culture often dictates that neighborhoods that are 258

better served in terms of service delivery are often those associated with the mayor.402

Hence, the presence of a Black mayor has an impact on the delivery of city services to residents of poor neighborhoods.

The data also show that Ford spent 43 percent of his time conducting more substantive types of efforts to improve the quality of life of his Black constituents

(categories four and five). Meanwhile, McLin made no efforts in category five, suggesting she is limited in her powers to substantively impact the quality of life of

Blacks in Dayton. Additionally, McLin spent a larger percentage of her time on the more symbolic activities and efforts of categories one and two. In addition to gauging the two mayors’ level of interest in actively pursuing efforts to aid Black constituents, these findings suggest the influence of government structure on the introduction and implementation of policies and programs that are designed to improve Black quality of life.

The Perception and Recognition of Mayors’ Active Pursuit of Black Interests

While the data thus far shows that Ford more actively pursued Black interests than McLin, we have yet to examine how McLin and Ford’s efforts were perceived by city residents. Three interview questions specifically aimed to address this research question: “From your perspective, what do you see as the major problems facing African

Americans in City X, and how were/have these issues been addressed by Mayor X?”

“Are/were there important new policy ideas directly affecting the African American community implemented by Mayor X’s administration?” and “How would you characterize Mayor X’s efforts at pursuing programs designed to improve the quality of

402 Cingranelli, David L. “Race, Politics and Elites: Testing Alternative Models of Municipal Service Distribution,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Nov., 1981), pp. 664-692 259 life of black residents?”403 The demographics of the interviewees were theoretically representative of the cities’ populations, as 56 percent of the respondents were White, 40 percent were Black, and 4 percent were Latino.

The following table displays how well Dayton and Toledo respondents, taken as a single group, think the mayor addressed major Black problems the respondents identified:

While 58 percent of White respondents indicated that their Mayor responded very well to major Black problems in the city, only 39 percent of Black respondents felt the same—a difference of nearly 20 percent. This finding suggests that Whites are more likely than

Blacks to see their Black mayors as responsive to Black problems. Noticeably, 12

403 The other interview questions were largely helpful in gaining the more recent racial and political context identified in chapters three and five, as well as in helping to determine the role of ideology and partisanship locally (e.g., in respect to the variables at play when public officials consider the mayor’s policy and programmatic proposals within city council/commission). Moreover, remaining questions asked the interviewee their perspective on the role of the business community in the administration, the business climate in the city, and the relationship between the mayor and civic leaders. Respondents were asked a series of closed and open-ended questions. For closed questions, the interviewer marked the appropriate reply. For the sole open-ended question being analyzed, the interviewer created dummy variables of Yes, No, and N/A. 260 percent of Blacks found the mayor addressed Black problems poorly or not very well, versus only 4 percent of Whites. Hence, the Black respondents were less convinced of the success of their Black mayor’s efforts to address problems in their community.

A chi square test was performed on the responses to this question in order to establish the significance of the relationship identified above. The chi square is more likely to establish significance to the extent that a relationship is strong, the sample size is large, and/or the number of values of the two associated variables is large. A result of

0.293 in this test justifies rejecting the null hypothesis that the row variable is only randomly related to the column variable. As the table below shows, the result of the chi square test indicates that a near seventy percent confidence exists to determine the strength of the significance of the relationship between the question and the race of the mayor:

Value df Asymp. Sig (2-sided) Pearson Chi-Square 7.315 6 0.293 Likelihood Ratio 7.635 6 0.266 Linear-by-Linear Assoc 5.527 1 0.019 N of Valid Cases 81

The data reported here is for the question that asked, “From your perspective, what do you see as the major problems facing African Americans in City X [and] How were/have these issues been addressed by Mayor X?” While the probability is less than .05, the question still carries some significance. While I would have liked to determine significance with the chi-square test for each of the three questions discussed in this chapter, the significance of the relationship between the variables in the other questions could not be shown. This result, however, has no effect on the significance of the rich qualitative content of the interview questions. 261

In response to a question asking respondents to identify a policy or program of the mayor’s that directly affects the Black community, more than 90 percent of Whites and

Blacks were able to respond with the details of a particular policy or program:

Blacks and Whites overwhelmingly indicated that the Black mayor implemented important new policy ideas directly affecting African Americans (97 percent to 91 percent, respectively). Blacks did so almost unanimously, suggesting Blacks have a greater knowledge of issues in the Black community than do Whites. The high response rate of both Black and White constituents, however, suggests that the mayors have done an effective job of communicating to their constituents. The fact that such a high percentage of Whites could identify their mayor’s efforts that directly impacted Blacks, however, has the potential to be detrimental to the mayor’s efforts, as well.

Hypothetically, if a majority of those Whites were prejudiced, their recognition of the mayor’s efforts might cause them to throw their support to a different mayoral candidate. 262

The following table identifies Dayton and Toledo respondents’ responses to a

second question that asked how they would characterize their mayor’s efforts at pursuing

programs designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents:

The pattern is the same, with Whites responding more positively: 42 percent of Whites

indicated the McLin and Ford did a lot in terms of pursuing programs to improve Black quality of life, versus only 33 percent of Blacks. Meanwhile, 30 percent of Blacks indicated that the mayor either did not do enough or did not do nearly enough, whereas only 9 percent of Whites responded in this way.404

The respondent data for Dayton and Toledo taken as a single group, then,

suggests that while Whites and Blacks are equally able to identify their mayor’s pursuit

of policies in the interests of Blacks, Whites consistently view these efforts as more

successful than do Blacks. When we examine the cities separately, we find similar

results, with the distinction that Mayor Ford’s Black and White constituents perceived

him to be notably more successful than Mayor McLin in addressing Black concerns.

Sixty-two percent of Toledo respondents indicated that Mayor Ford addressed major

404 The N/A category had a large number of respondents that are ignored because they are public officials in officials at the time. I did not want to create a conflict of interests given the nature of the question, so I did not ask this question of public officials. 263

problems facing the African American community “very well,” as compared to only 34 percent for Mayor McLin in Dayton. Furthermore, 46 percent of Toledo respondents

characterized Mayor Ford’s efforts at pursuing programs designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents as “doing a lot,” whereas only 21 percent of Dayton respondents indicated so for McLin. Sixty-five percent of White leaders interviewed in Toledo indicated that Mayor Ford addressed major problems facing African Americans “very well,” as compared to 44 percent of Whites in Dayton speaking of Mayor McLin. On the same question, 50 percent of Blacks in Toledo indicated “very well,” compared to 23 percent who said so of Mayor McLin. Again, it appears Blacks perceived their both

Black mayors’ efforts more negatively than did Whites.

A clear majority of Whites and Blacks in Dayton and Toledo indicated that the

Black mayor implemented important new policy ideas directly affecting African

Americans, yet they differed in their characterization of these policies. Twenty-five percent of White Daytonians characterized Mayor McLin’s effort at pursuing programs designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents as “doing a lot,” versus 15 percent of Blacks. Fifty-one percent of White Toledoans responded that Mayor Ford was

“doing a lot” for his Black constituents, as compared to 45 percent of Black Toledoans.

In general, Mayor Ford’s constituents were more likely to recognize and approve of his efforts on behalf of Blacks than were Mayor McLin’s. Mayor McLin compared less favorably in every category, according to respondents.

Evaluating the Propositions

Chapters one and two generated a number of hypotheses regarding the conditions under which Black mayors would actively pursue the interests of Blacks in non-majority 264

Black cities.405 The findings from the interviews and research observations confirmed some of these propositions, while others remained unconfirmed. Moreover, findings were unearthed that were not originally expected. The section that follows reviews these findings.

Unconfirmed Propositions

The first proposition, that Black mayors elected in liberal cities are more likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents, remains unconfirmed. Toledo and Dayton, Ohio, are not liberal cities as defined by

Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984). Rather, Toledo and Dayton, while historically

Democratic cities, have populations that are largely blue collar and working class. As a result, the ideological culture is more conservative. Dayton, for example, elected a conservative Republican mayor for two terms in the mid-nineties (Mayor McLin’s predecessor). In Toledo, during Mayor Ford’s term, the conservative faction of the Lucas

County Democratic Party, in opposition to his agenda, took control, and the new leadership worked successfully to defeat the more liberal Ford. Thus, the cases analyzed in this study do not allow for investigation of the first proposition.

Proposition two, that Black mayors elected in racially divided election campaigns are less likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents, is also untested and therefore unconfirmed. While the mayors of Toledo and

Dayton indicate that they experienced some racialized events as candidates for mayor, neither identified their campaigns as racially divisive in interviews.406 Both mayors

concluded that race was a central underlying element in their campaigns and sometimes

405 For a list of the propositions, see the appendix. 406 Interview with Rhine McLin June 2008; Interview with Jack Ford, June 2008. 265

an overt one; however, they also indicated that they would not characterize their

campaigns as “racially divisive.”

Also unconfirmed—because tested and found incorrect for the two cases in

question—is proposition four, that Black mayors who had one or more African-American

predecessors are more likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents. Though Mayor McLin had Black predecessors in her position, she pursued such policies and programs less actively than did Mayor Ford in Toledo, and he had no Black predecessors. As the analysis of the city council minutes and interviews found, Mayor McLin’s efforts were hindered not so much by design as by structural limitations. While McLin was able to exercise some informal power, her impact on

Black quality of life was only marginally significant when compared to the kinds of actions actively pursued by Mayor Ford.

Likewise, proposition five, that Black mayors who govern cities with a large working-class White population are less likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents, is unconfirmed. Both mayors governed in

cities with a large White working-class population that is, in part, supported by a declining automobile manufacturing base. Toledo is a base of Chrysler and a large producer of Jeep vehicles. The Dayton region is a base of General Motors. Yet the presence of a large White working class did not prevent either mayor, or particularly

Mayor Ford, from actively pursuing policies and programs to benefit Black quality of life. Thereby, it cannot be said definitively that a large White working class will decrease the opportunities available to mayors to actively pursue Black interests. 266

Proposition seven is also unconfirmed. This proposition holds that Black mayors who are elected in cities where the Black community is mobilized and organized are more likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents. Neither the mayors nor community activists interviewed in either city said there was an active Black community. Interestingly, when asked to identify the leaders of the Black community, White interviewees often initially cited the traditional civil rights organizations and major Black churches. Meanwhile, most Blacks initially scoffed at the question. Only when aggressively probed would they reluctantly identify organizations and individuals. Rather, the consensus among the Black interviewees in both Toledo and Dayton was that there is no mobilized and organized Black community.

While there was evidence of pressure from certain Blacks in self-appointed or neighborhood leadership positions on Mayor McLin to address the perceived interests of

Blacks in Dayton, such pressure was not organizational in nature. No such organizational or individual pressure was evident from Toledo’s Black community in respect to Mayor

Ford.

Proposition nine, that Black mayors who gain the endorsement of the major newspapers and whose policies are embraced and positively covered by the newspapers are more likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of

Black residents, is unconfirmed. Neither McLin nor Ford received the major newspaper endorsement in 2001. The newspaper content analysis performed indicated that the press neutrally covered the historic candidacies of Ford and McLin in 2001. Meanwhile, both mayors were found to pursue Black interests even though they lacked the benefit of the papers’ endorsements in 2001. 267

Finally, proposition ten is unconfirmed. This proposition holds that Black mayors who are elected in non-majority Black cities that have a sizable proportion of Latinos are more likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents. Like many medium-sized Midwestern cities, Toledo and Dayton do not have significant Latino populations. The population of Latinos in Toledo is 5 percent, and in

Dayton it is 2 percent.

Confirmed Propositions

The evidence from Dayton and Toledo does support the three remaining propositions. Proposition three, that Black mayors who have the institutional and formal powers of a strong-mayor system are more likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents, has been demonstrated. While both Ford and McLin pursued Black interests, Ford did so more substantively, and it seems this difference was due to the presence of the institutional and formal powers of a strong- mayor system in Toledo but not in Dayton.

Proposition six, that Black mayors who govern in cities with a large White middle-class population are more likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents, is also confirmed. Toledo has a higher household median income and higher White median family income (in 1999 dollars) than Dayton,

Ohio. While the findings do not tell us whether it was this variable that determined

Ford’s greater pursuit of Black interests, the fact of the larger White middle-class population in the city where the mayor is found to have more actively pursued Black interests is notable. 268

Finally, proposition eight, that Black mayors who serve on city councils in which

African-Americans are a majority or a substantial minority are more likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents, is confirmed.

When Ford was mayor of Toledo, the city council had three Black members, two elected from districts and one elected at-large. The presence of Black members of council had a significant impact on the passage of the few mayoral agenda items that needed council approval, though Ford did also need the support of White liberal members of council.

For McLin, the city commission had two additional Black council members, though one was not an avid supporter of her 2001 election. Additionally, on some issues, such as the mayor’s support of a gay rights ordinance, the Black commission members did not support McLin’s agenda, whereas two liberal White members did. Hence, it would seem that the presence of Black council members is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for mayors of non-majority Black cities to actively pursue Black interests.

In addition to the confirmation of three of the hypothesized ten propositions, four additional findings were determined to be significant.

Four Significant Findings

Two additional major findings were generated from the interviews and two from research observations regarding government conditions.

The Interview Data

The transcription of key interviews demonstrated that a mayor’s personality style and approach toward governing, and the presence (or not) of effective relationships with members of the business community, are two key variables significant to a mayor’s efforts to improve Black quality of life. Interviewees often reported the effects of the 269

mayor’s personality on efforts to improve Black quality of life. McLin’s personality was found to be an asset (at times), while Ford’s was considered to be a detriment.

Additionally, in both cities, members of the business community have good personal relationships with the mayors. These positive personal relationships have little effect on policy actions and program developments introduced or implemented by the mayors, however. The result in each case, arguably, is the business community’s limited

support of the mayor and the mayor’s efforts. Such limited support from business

interests had a greater effect on Ford, who failed to be re-elected, than on McLin, who

has an extensive base of support in Dayton’s Black community.

The Necessity of Effective Business Relationships: Toledo.

The interviews revealed that Mayor Ford generally suffered from weak

relationships with the business community. The combination of what The Blade

described as Mayor Ford’s lackluster personality, his perceived lack of attentiveness to

some business community members’ concerns, and his perceived active promotion of

Black business at the expense of downtown economic development projects in the

business community played a role in his failed re-election.

Many of the interviewed members of Toledo’s business community familiar with

Mayor Ford’s administration lauded his efforts in the Black community. Mayor Ford’s

creation of CareNet, interviewees agree, is “his legacy and his purported desire to “create wealth” through the establishment of the minority contracting Capacity Building Program was also cited as significant.407 Those two projects were the most often cited examples

of his efforts to improve Black quality of life. Nonetheless, respondents in Toledo’s business community also found that Ford’s style of governing suffered from ‘[a] lack of

407 Specific interview quotes from interview with Bill Brennan 270

communication.’408 Hence, Ford’s professional relationship with the largely White business community was poor overall, though many business owners and union representatives personally liked him. Ford is credited with being knowledgeable on business-related issues to an extent, but his approach was viewed negatively. One member of the business community indicated that while Mayor Ford had “good personal relationships” with business leaders, he “did not come across as somebody who was

leading the city.” That same individual claimed that “as much as [Ford] wanted to be, he’s not a good communicator.”409

When pressed about Ford’s one-on-one relationships with business leaders,

another respondent replied that his relationship with Ford was “personally, very good.”410

When probed about Ford’s professional relationship on behalf of the city, another key respondent said, “It’s not his style to champion [issues].”411 For these leaders, Ford’s approach, while not uninformed, “[came] off as really laid back,” this resulted in their perception that he was not as serious about meeting business needs as he was about some other goals. In addition, one business leader felt particularly snubbed, suggesting, “I infrequently felt I had access.”412 Thus, Ford’s professional relationship with members

of the business community was not ideal. His approach to meeting business needs was

challenged, his staff members’ willingness to return phone calls was questioned, and

many felt that what they perceived to be a lack of one-on-one meetings to discuss economic concerns only further highlighted his disinterest.

408 Interview, Bill Brennan, July 2008 409 Interview, Robert C. Savage, July 2, 2008 410 Interview, James M. Murray, July 2, 2008 411 Interview, Thomas S. Crothers, June 18, 2008 412 Interview, Bill Brennan, July 2008 271

Mayor Ford responded to the criticism by acknowledging he could have done

more to court the business community. He counters, however, that “Because I was a

Black man, I think when they saw me they saw a Black guy, quiet, overweight, who

didn’t care much about kissing their ass.”413 Yet, even given their criticisms of Ford, the

business leaders who were interviewed recognized his efforts to improve Blacks’ quality

of life in Toledo. When asked to share their perceptions of the mayor’s leadership in this

area, most responded favorably. Many indicated Ford did “a lot” or “everything he could

do” and described his work as “superb,” saying, “He always supported the children.”

Moreover, one business leader even suggested that Ford ‘did not do enough.’414 The suggestion that Ford’s active pursuits of Black interests was extensive, yet still not enough for the Black community, is compelling and implies that even when business leaders did not find Ford to have positive working relationships with the business community, they still recognized his efforts on Black issues and thought that he could have done even more.

Ford’s approach toward business was apparently different from what leaders were accustomed to, which caused Ford to have a weak professional relationship with the business community. This turned out to be significant, as many of these leaders, who may have voted for Ford in 2001, actively campaigned against his re-election bid in

2005.415 The subsequent loss by Ford obviously curbed his ability to make a sustained

impact on Black quality of life in a second term. This suggests that a Black mayor needs

to sustain positive relationships with the business community to be most successful in

pursuing policies and programs designed to improve Black quality of life.

413 Interview, Jack Ford, June 2008 414 Interview, Thomas S. Crothers, June 18, 2008 415 For example, the Interview with Bill Brennan 272

The Necessity of Effective Business Relationships: Dayton.

Interviews with business leaders in Dayton revealed that many members of the

business community compared Mayor McLin’s approach to business with that of her

predecessor. According to one respondent, Mayor Turner “had been a strong mayor in

sense of opinions, able to articulate a vision.” He characterized Mayor McLin’s approach

as different, stating, “Mayor McLin does not come out of the same mold as her

predecessor, an approach many in the business community are familiar with, [and] they don’t think she gets business issues as well as she should.”416 Conversely, a union leader with AFSCME-Dayton Region, when asked of McLin’s relationship with civic leaders, responded that “I think the mayor is 100 percent dedicated with what she feels is right, but is it the right path? Could that energy be used elsewhere? . . . She’s a likable person, has energy, loves her job, but with a legacy like her father’s, she could have done much more, but [has been] wined and dined by big business.”417 These interview excerpts

suggest that some members of the business community who cast McLin in the shadow of

her predecessor argue that she is not knowledgeable about business issues, while others

who compare her to her father, a member of the Ohio House of Representatives, perceive

her as catering to business interests. While business leaders generally characterize their

personal relationships with McLin as good, the interviews overall suggest that McLin is

viewed as weak on business issues. Acknowledging this view, Mayor McLin replied in

her interview that “the city’s a conduit for businesses. We don’t make businesses. But

they don’t understand that.”418

416 Interview with business leader on August 7, 2008 who chose to remain anonymous 417 Interview, Ken Sulfridge, August 2008 418 Interview, Rhine McLin, June 2008 273

Phillip L. Parker, the President and CEO of the Dayton Area Chamber of

Commerce, reported that McLin supported a pre-existing effort to build the capacity of

minority contractors to have the “wherewithal, information and understanding of projects

in a couple areas in Dayton.” Yet, Parker observed that “most businesses do not perceive

doing business with the city as business friendly – they are concerned with the cost of

doing business in a city with taxes when there is less regulation in townships.” While

McLin and members of her administration have supported the chamber’s contracting capacity program, Parker stated, many in the business community “do not think she gets business issues as well as she should.”419 Hence, Parker suggests that McLin is perceived

as making an effort to support business but lacking critical business knowledge.

Another active business community leader who chose to remain anonymous

found McLin’s efforts in the business arena acceptable: “On the housing front, [McLin] is taking down a lot of vacant housing, [and she conducts] good community development work with businesses to develop neighborhoods [and where] youth and gang violence is very visible.” Furthermore, “McLin is in – in the inner city – with neighborhood watch programs and police – crime is not big in Dayton, but the perception is it is bad, [and]

McLin asked to look at police and fire hiring within ranks at parity with the city’s demographics . . . to look at how to get qualified Blacks to apply.” Additionally, this business leader pointed out that McLin “used informal influence to help with fund requests for projects in the Black community,” though he noted that “she doesn’t distinguish between White and Black, when we talk about issues, it’s not Black or White, it’s everybody.” While this respondent noted McLin’s efforts in the business community

419 Telephone Interview with Phil Parker, President and CEO of Dayton Area Chamber of Commerce 274 for Blacks and the general public, he also stated that “she is not using the power of her political position yet.”

Thus, it appears while some in the business community can point to efforts by

McLin to spur economic development in the Black community and more generally, the perception remains that she is weak politically and not competent when it comes to business issues. McLin’s relationship with business leaders appears to be one of paradox and shadows. She lives in the shadow of her politician father and her Republican predecessor. She is viewed as likable and personable, but also as “wacky” and

“capricious.” Such diverging perceptions foster tenuous business relationships, at best.

Mayoral Personality and Style: Toledo.

Mayor Ford also lived in the shadow of his predecessor, Carleton Finkbeiner— who became his successor. Finkbeiner was viewed by community members as more direct and confrontational than Mayor Ford. As the city’s first strong mayor, Finkbeiner crafted a host of expectations concerning how the position should be conducted. The

Toledo Blade wrote in an editorial endorsing Mayor Ford’s 2001 opponent, for example that stated, “A strong mayor is by definition his or her community’s most outspoken advocate and cheerleader.”420 Yet Mayor Ford’s his approach to governing was different.

He countered the criticisms of his mayoral personality, style, and governing approach in his 2005 State of the City address: “I have been criticized for what one pundit recently called my lumbering style. That I seem to be in perpetual hibernation and that nothing gets done or will be done. Fellow citizens, my style has been to work hard, work quietly, and have the work I’ve done speak for me. . . . I ran for mayor on the stated platform of serious leadership for serious times. You will never see me substitute frantic ravings in

420 The Toledo Blade, “Kest for Mayor,” November 2001 275

place of thoughtful planned out action.”421 The problem with Mayor Ford’s approach is

that it did not help him get re-elected. Citizens and the mainstream media expected a

different style of governing – one that Mayor Ford was unwilling to deliver.

The effect of the community’s perception of Mayor Ford’s personality was that

many felt much was not accomplished during his term. Ward map election return

comparisons demonstrate that many who supported Mayor Ford in 2001 chose not to

support him in 2005.422 As a result, he lost his re-election bid, which essentially

destroyed his ability to implement the “quiet” agenda to improve Black quality of life or

to “create wealth” in the Black community, as one respondent characterized Ford’s

approach. His personality and style, when compared to that of Finkbeiner, created the

perception in the community that he achieved little while in office.

This perception also led to a loss of power for the county Democratic Party, as

Ford did not aggressively work with the then-Chairwoman to ensure that vacant committee seats were filled by like-minded supporters of his agenda and administration.

Ford indicated in his interview, “I was never really a leader in the [Democratic Party]; I was just the one willing to run – almost like I was a sacrificial lamb.”423 Meanwhile, a

more conservative faction led by Finkbeiner is reported to have quietly filled vacant seats, enough to oust the party leader in support of Mayor Ford shortly before his re- election bid.424 The result of Mayor Ford’s reportedly “lumbering” approach to

governing, then, was that it was perceived as ineffective. Mayor Ford admits that his

personality has some political deficiencies, commenting in the interview, “I did my job

421 Jack Ford, State of the City Address, February 2005 422 The Toledo Blade, November 2005 423 Interview with Jack Ford, June 2008 424 Interviews with a former politician and lawyer who chose to remain anonymous; Interview with Francis Szollosi on June 25, 2008; Paula Ross on June 23, 2008, and James Ruvolo on June 19, 2008 276

and thought people would be able to see that I did it. I mistakenly and naively thought

that if I fix the $15-million deficit that most folks would re-elect me just on that. I really

wasn’t a smiling type of guy. Toledo has a history of Black politicians that tend to be

more easy-going.”425 Mayor Ford’s choice not to promote successes other than the

balanced budget apparently backfired; his political personality deficiency made it

difficult for him to relate to voters and ultimately cost him re-election.

Mayoral Personality and Style: Dayton.

Dayton’s Mayor McLin was described in the interviews as “very likable,” “very

accessible,” and “passionate” and one respondent stated that “everybody loves her.” Yet

it seems that not everybody does—another interviewee called her “wacky” and “not

serious.” Nonetheless, Mayor McLin’s personality seems to serve her well. The former

teacher is said to “often ha[ve] three or four kids with her at different city events,”

suggesting that her accessibility and approachability have made her a favorite of some

young citizens.426 Mayor McLin recognizes the significance of her attention to youth:

“When these kids see me, they see the mayor and especially for Black children and little

girls, they feel as though they can become the mayor one day.”427 For Dayton youth, she

organizes annual events like a Valentine’s Day Jam and a Showcase of Talent.

While the respondents complimented her interactions with Dayton’s young people, they also pointed to some of her personality deficiencies as mayor—deficiencies

that McLin herself acknowledges. “I hate giving the State of the City,” she told me. “I

am a workhorse, not a show horse.”428 For McLin, achieving behind-the-scenes progress

425 Interview, Jack Ford, June 2008 426 Interview, Rashad Young, June 2008 427 Interview, Rhine McLIn, June 2008 428 Ibid. 277

is a better use of time than giving state of the city speeches. It appears she understands

her approach is foreign to many, and she sees much of the criticism of her personality

style and approach as based in sexism. In respect to the Black community, for example,

she indicates, “People don’t realize how sexist the Black male establishment can be.”429

In respect to her father selecting her to take his seat upon his death, she muses, “I didn’t even think my Daddy thought that much of me.” McLin believes that as the city’s first female mayor, she is viewed through the lens of sexism, especially by the Black community, her base of support.

Mayor McLin’s personality, style, and approach, while they have supported her symbolic work with youth and made many feel that she is approachable and likable, have apparently also affected perceptions of her understanding of business and her relationship with the business community, causing some not to take her seriously. Such perceptions, particularly among Black leaders and business leaders, hinder her ability to work on behalf of Black quality of life, limiting the number of substantive activities she was able to carry out.430

Research Observations

Two additional findings regarding governmental relations were generated from

field research observations. Participant observation and analysis of mayoral professional

behavior revealed that the structure of the political system in which the mayor governs and the extent to which he or she has ideologically similar council supporters significantly impacts efforts to improve Black quality of life.

429 Ibid. 430 Much of McLin’s analysis confirms earlier research on Black weak mayors’ limited substantive impact in Black communities. See, Piliawsky, Monte. “The impact of black mayors on the black community: The case of New Orleans’ ernest morial,” The Review of Black Political Economy Volume 13, Number 4 / March, 1985 5-23 278

Structure Matters

A Black mayor’s active pursuit of policies and programs designed to improve the

quality of life of Blacks in non-majority Black cities is in part determined by the

governmental structure in which the mayor operates. This finding confirms previous

research that found mayoral structure to be significant (Svara 1994; Pressman 1972).

In Toledo, a strong-mayor form of government, which equipped the office of the

mayor with significant authority concerning the city’s economic development and

business industries, permitted Mayor Ford to enact and introduce the policies and

programs that he did.431 Mayor Ford’s personal visits to businesses, many unscheduled,

to ask how the city could help and to evaluate their minority participation, as listed on

their contract applications, serves as an example of Ford’s use of strong mayor

authority.432 His ability to directly hire dozens of city personnel and his responsibility to submit a proposed budget to city council annually are additional examples of how he was able to use his strong-mayor powers to benefit African Americans.

In Dayton, Mayor McLin suffered from her inability to make direct efforts to improve Black quality of life. Though reported to have influence over some Black appointments, such as the City Manager, Director of Water, and Director of Public

Works, the significance of such influence is not immediately obvious.433 Generally,

McLin’s power is limited. While she has the power to convene summits with private and

public partners to devise strategies for making substantive changes, she has only one vote

431 His executive order (date of Blade article) near the end of his administration to enforce the city’s minority good faith goals in contracting is an example of his use of the strong mayor form of government to advocate for Black interests. 432 Interview, Alan Bannister, June 28, 2008 433 The Director of Water and Director of Public Works positions are filled by the city manager. However, an interview with Carole Grimes suggested McLin has significant influence over those appointments. 279

of five on a city commission that enacts such changes. The limitations of a weak-mayor

system cause McLin to be seen as unable to directly address significant problems. In

fact, interview respondents frequently answered questions with the qualifying phrase “to

the extent that she can . . .” suggesting that many are cognizant of her limited powers as

mayor.

McLin benefits from her political family lineage, and she can heavily influence

the all-Democratic commission to vote with her on major issues. Her influence only

extends so far, however. On a controversial decision to extend rights and benefits to gay

city employees, for example, she was forced to cast the tie-breaking vote to enact the

policy.434 She supported the ordinance despite negative community backlash, largely

from the Black religious community. McLin was unable to influence the other Black

Democratic commission members to vote with her on the ordinance, demonstrating that her influence is not all-encompassing.

Given the tenuousness of McLin’s influence, however, she is not entirely prohibited from making major contributions on behalf of Blacks. As previously noted, she moved into a newly redeveloped predominantly Black neighborhood. She introduced symbolic activities for the city youth, many of whom are Black. Moreover, her personality arguably helps the average Dayton Black citizen feel more connected to the mayor’s office, as she continues to wear glasses with a square lens and round lens, and she occasionally skates to work—all in an effort to connect to Daytonians on a “street- level” they understand.435 The limited powers of Dayton’s mayor, then, leave the

interests of African Americans to be determined in part by the occupant of the office.

434 Gay Rights Ordinance, Dayton City Commission 435 The ‘street-level’ reference is borrowed from the interview with McLin. 280

Yet, even for those who may fairly actively pursue Black interests, like McLin, limited powers hinder their ability to implement substantive changes.

The Role of Ideology and Partisanship within Legislative Bodies

A second observation that emerged from the field research is that the presence of like- minded members on the major legislative body – council or commission – plays a significant role in the mayor’s effort to improve Black quality of life. This finding confirms previous research that noted how the presence of Black council members has an impact on Black political representation (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Jones

1976).

Mayor McLin has some influence over members of the city commission, who are elected on a non-partisan ballot in at-large elections every four years. While she has been mayor, all members of the commission have been Democrats, and presently three of them

(including the mayor) are Black and two are White. While it is possible for Mayor

McLin to achieve the necessary three-person majority with the support of her two fellow

Black Democrats, the aforementioned vote in favor of the extension of benefits to gay employees serves as an example of how ideology may matter more than shared racial experience. Though not a “Black” issue, the vote demonstrates that where Blacks in the commission may disagree, Mayor McLin can benefit from having like-minded White members on the commission to support her positions.

Mayor Ford, on the other hand, led a city council of twelve members, ten

Democrats and two Republicans, with the support of the council’s three Black members.

This support was not sufficient to get the mayor’s agenda implemented. Therefore, it was equally significant that Ford had the support of the sole Latino member of the council, 281

who served as President and the support of at least two White members of the council as

well. Without their support, many of Mayor Ford’s initiatives would have failed.

That the cases of Toledo and Dayton demonstrate that having Black members on

the city council to support mayoral initiatives is not sufficient in itself partially confirms

Swain (1996). Swain argued that party trumps race in the representation of Black interests, as White Democratic congressional members were found to advocate for Black interests. In the cases of Mayors Ford and McLin, however, it is not that Black representation on the council and commission did not matter, but that it was insufficient.

Hence, the finding also confirms Tate (2003) that Black legislators significantly play a role in promoting the passage of the interests of minority issues.

The Significance of the Four Findings

The four major conditions under which a Black mayor of a non-majority Black city actively pursues policies and programs that work to improve the quality of life of

African Americans are: the presence of a strong mayor form of government, the presence of ideologically like-minded council members, the existence of effective business relationships, and a mayoral personality and style that is beneficial to community members’ perception of the mayor.

The finding of the importance of a strong-mayor form of government confirms previous research. The finding is significant in this case; it confirms the importance of mayoral structure in medium-sized cities, as well as the limitations of a weak-mayor system, the system of government under which most Black mayors govern.436 The

436 For more information, see “The Future of Local Government Administration: The Hansell Symposium,” Washington, D.C.: International City and County Management Association, 2002; and Svara, J. “Effective mayoral leadership in council-manager cities: Reassessing the facilitative model,” National Civic Review, July 2003 Volume 92 Issue 2, Pages 157 - 172; Statement regarding the number of Black 282

finding also helps to explain the consequences of high expectations: the interview data

demonstrated that Blacks in both Toledo and Dayton regarded the mayor’s efforts in

respect to Black interests less favorably than did Whites. If a majority of Black mayors

govern within a system wherein the mayor is structurally unable to make significant

strides to meet Black expectations, Blacks may continue to grade Black mayors less

favorably than their fellow White citizens.

The finding that ideology trumps race to some extent in respect to council

members’ support of mayoral agenda items is significant because it demonstrates the

usefulness of the political representation debate in political science literature. As this

chapter’s literature review on Black representation examined, one school argues that race

trumps party, while the other argues that party trumps race. The finding in Toledo and

Dayton, however, is that the presence of minority councilors matters, but not as an end of

itself. Rather, mayors need the support of ideologically congruent councilors of other

racial groups to ensure enough votes to pass agenda items. Thereby, the finding, in part,

confirms both of the opposing arguments within the political representation debate.

The finding that the presence of effective business relationships plays a significant role in whether or not a Black mayor advocates for Black interests in non-

majority Black cities confirms earlier scholarship which found that the business

community was integral to a Black mayor’s success (Stone 1989). Additionally

significant is the finding that Black mayors who are not perceived to have an

understanding of business will be limited in their ability to finance desired city programs

or a re-election campaign. The fact that the business community, including union

mayors in weak mayor systems is based on November 2008 data from the National Conference of Black Mayors website indicated the number of Black mayors of cities with population over 50,000. 283

leadership, is a large contributor to mayoral campaigns in medium-sized cities with union

cultures like Toledo and Dayton is important, as it pinpoints the electoral and governing

coalitions necessary for substantive change: both coalitions must have business members

playing active roles.

Finally, the finding that the mayor’s personality style and approach toward

governing plays a significant role in efforts to impact Black quality of life is significant because it confirms previous scholarship on the roles and different types of mayors, given varying governmental power structures (Svara 1994). Additionally, the finding suggests that the extent to which a Black mayor is able to advocate for Black interests is largely within the mayor’s own control. While structural impediments are often insurmountable within a term or two, a mayor does have the ability to affect the way he or she is perceived by others. As in the case of Ford, however, if Black mayors choose not to recognize the role of image or choose not to embrace the reality of its effects on implementing an agenda, they may be unable to actively pursue policies that impact

Black quality of life.

Conclusion

One of the interview questions asked respondents, “In a city like X, where Whites represent X% of the population, how likely is it that Mayor X can actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents?” When probed further,

respondents were asked to replace “Mayor X” with the name of the former White mayor.

Whites and Blacks reported that the Black mayor could and would more actively pursue

Black-interest policies, with the former White mayor being considered on average 20

percent less likely to do so. This result indicates that Black mayors of Toledo and 284

Dayton are perceived to be more likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve

the quality of life of Blacks than were their White predecessors. This finding is

confirmed by previous research on Black political representation (Tate 2003).

Generally, the findings from the interviews and research observations confirm respondents’ answers to this question, as Ford and McLin were both found to pursue

Black interests, though McLin did so less actively. This result also supports research that has found that Black legislators are more likely than White legislators to make Black- interest bills a high policy priority, given that Black legislators are more likely to have a personal interest in Black-interest policies than White members.437

Furthermore, the responses of Black and White respondents in Toledo and Dayton

that McLin and Ford more actively pursued Black interests than their White predecessors

confirm why it was reasonable to expect Black mayors in non-majority Black cities to

actively pursue Black interests. Thereby, the findings are significant, as they help to explain why Black mayors are said to represent Black issues better than White mayors, as

well as why mayoral governing structure is a key determinant of Black mayors’ active

pursuit of Black interests.

In the final analysis, Ford more actively pursued Black interests than McLin and the strong mayor structure of government helped him in his effort. In order for Black mayors to copy Ford’s success while avoiding his mistakes, and thereby to actively pursue Black interests in non-majority Black cities, they must have the active support of the business community, maintain super-majority support within the Black community, cultivate positive relationships with ideologically congruent council members, and foster a personality and governing approach that is viewed favorably by media, critics, and non-

437 See Gamble 2007. 285

affluent Whites. Moreover, they may secure re-election by cultivating comparable

constituencies in their electoral and governing coalitions. Winning re-election is necessary for the continued pursuit of policies and programs designed to improve Black

quality of life. Without successful governing and electoral coalitions, as determined in

part by community perceptions, the effort to substantively impact Black quality of life is

likely to be sidelined. 286

REFERENCES

Books

Browning, R.P., Marshall, D.R., & Tabb, D.H. 1984. Protest is not Enough: The struggle of blacks and Hispanics for equality in urban politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kleppner, Paul. 1985. Chicago Divided: The Mayor of a Black Mayor. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.

Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. 1967. The Concept of Representation. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Stone, Clarence. 1989. Regime Politics. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.

Svara, James H. 1994. Facilitative Leadership in Local Government: Lessons from Successful Mayors and Chairpersons. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Swain, Carol M. 1996. Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Tate, Katherine. 2001. Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and Their Representatives in the U.S. Congress. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Brown, Robert A. 2007. “Race and Politics Matter: Black Urban Representation and Social Spending during the Urban Crisis,” The National Political Science Review, Vol.11: 17-41.

Bullock, Charles S. III and Susan A. MacManus. 1981. “Policy Responsiveness To the Black Electorate: Programmatic Versus Symbolic Representation.” American Politics Research, Vol. 9: 357-368 .

Cingranelli, David L. 1981. “Race, Politics and Elites: Testing Alternative Models of Municipal Service Distribution.” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25(Nov): 664-692.

Gamble, Katrina L. 2007. “Black Political Representation: An Examination of Legislative Activity Within US House Committees.” Legislative Studies Quarterly XXXII: 421.

287

Lane, James B. 2001. “Black Political Power and Its Limits: Gary Mayor Richard G. Hatcher’s Administration, 1968-87.” In African American Mayors, eds. David R. Colburn and Jeffrey S. Adler. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Mier, Robert and Kari J. Moe. 1991. “Decentralized Development: From Theory to Practice,” In Harold Washington and the Neighborhoods: Progressive City Government in Chicago 1983—1987, eds. Pierre Clavel and Wim Wiewel, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Orr, Marion. 1997. “The Struggle for Black Empowerment in Baltimore: Electoral Control and Governing Coalitions.” In Racial Politics in American Cities Revisited 2nd edition, eds. Rufus Browning, Dale Marshall, and David. Tabb. New York: Longman Press, 201-219.

Piliawsky, Monte. 1985. “The impact of black mayors on the black community: The case of New Orleans’ ernest morial,” The Review of Black Political Economy. Volume 13 (March): 5-23.

Runciman, David. 2007. “The Paradox of Political Representation,” The Journal of Political Philosophy. Vol. 15: 93-114.

Saltzstein, Grace Hall. 1989. “Black Mayors and Police Policies,” The Journal of Politics. Vol. 51: 525-544.

Svara, J. 2003. “Effective mayoral leadership in council-manager cities: Reassessing

the facilitative model.” National1 Civic Review. Vol. 92(March): 157 -172.

Miscellaneous

“The Future of Local Government Administration: The Hansell Symposium.” 2002. Washington, D.C.: International City and County Management Association.

Jack Ford, State of the City Address, February 2005

The Toledo Blade, “Kest for Mayor,” November 2001.

Interviews

Brennan, Bill. Interview. August 4, 2008.

Crothers, Thomas S. Interview. June 18, 2008.

Ford, Jack. Interview. June 24, 2008.

McLin, Rhine. Interview. June 26, 2008.

288

Murray, James M. Interview. July 2, 2008.

Parker, Phil. Telephone Interview.

Ross, Paula. Interview. June 23, 2008.

Ruvolo, James. Interview. June 19, 2008.

Savage, Robert C. Interview. July 2, 2008.

Sulfridge, Ken. Interview. August 5, 2008.

Szollosi, Francis. Interview. June 25, 2008.

Young, Rashad. Interview. July 16, 2008.

Interview with Dayton business leader on August 7, 2008 who chose to remain anonymous.

Interview with a former Toledo politician and lawyer who chose to remain anonymous.

289

CHAPTER EIGHT: UNIVERSALIZING THE INTERESTS OF BLACKS

The Framing of a Human Relations Approach toward Governing

What remains to be described is how it is that Toledo Mayor Jack Ford and

Dayton Mayor Rhine McLin actively pursued Black interests (though to varying degrees)

in their non-majority Black cities. An examination of the mayors’ rhetoric in State of the

City speeches and related addresses returns the focus to the human relations approach, as

defined in the first chapter. To the extent that Ford and McLin were able to introduce

policies and programs designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents, they found the most success when they framed their initiatives as affecting the lived condition of, and common humanity shared among, all city residents. It is important to note that

this approach was not deracialized: far from deemphasizing the significance of race,

some of their speeches indirectly and sometimes even directly noted the race variable.

Both mayors, however, framed their Black-interest policy actions and/or program

developments as initiatives that benefited all citizens.438

Ford: Content Analysis of State of the City Speeches and Related Addresses, 2002-2005

As Mayor Ford’s first State of the City address reveals, his efforts on behalf of

Black Toledoans included aggressive policy actions and program development proposals

that were designed to have an impact on Black quality of life. One of Mayor Ford’s

initial agenda items was to focus city revenues on neighborhood improvements. Much of

the increased attention went toward Toledo’s inner-city neighborhoods, and Ford himself

often drove inner-city streets and alleys on Sunday afternoons to examine the progress of

his initiative.439 In his 2002 State of the City Address, which focused on Safety,

438 McLin’s rhetoric was less explicitly racial and perhaps somewhat deracialized in tone. 439 Interviews with Alan Bannister, Bob Bell, and Bob Savage. 290

Infrastructure, Technology and Education (SITE), Ford highlighted neighborhood improvements, noting: “Toledo is returning to basics. We will trim trees, remove the snow, fill the cracks, and maintain Toledo’s infrastructure. No longer will citizens have to wait for a tree to fall or a car to be damaged by debris in our alleys.”440 Cornel West characterizes “the neglect of our public infrastructure” as a reflection of “not only our myopic education policies . . . but also the low priority we place on our common life”

(1993, 12). Thus, Ford’s focus on improving infrastructure offered evidence of his interest in improving Toledo’s common life, satisfying West’s call for public leaders who emphasize common humanity and strive for better human relations. Ford’s human relations focus also extended to include his stated desire to support community development agencies, including those with a targeted focus in Toledo’s Black community. Ford said, “We will give them the tools they need to fix existing housing and make it attractive and affordable for working families.”

In respect to education and youth, Ford aggressively emphasized the need to support the city’s majority-minority school district: “We have over seventy thousand youngsters in Toledo. Each deserves nothing less than our best effort.” As a consequence, he supported not only school reform but also several youth programs, including Seeds of Success, which provided small loans to youth to encourage them to start businesses; Mayor’s Time, which offered safe places and productive activities to youth between 3:30 and 6:30 p.m. and focused on reading, recreation, and remedial tutoring; and Fit for Kids, which used creative methods to encourage youth to lose weight, eat healthy, exercise regularly, and avoid alcohol and other drugs, as well as

440 Cornel West, in Race Matters, notes how a focus on infrastructure can be an example of a politician’s commitment to common humanity (1993, 12). 291

helping families with limited incomes to obtain affordable health care for their children

through a state-subsidized program. Also in 2002, Ford proposed the creation of what would become CareNet: “Over 44,000 city residents are without health insurance . . . and

neither the state nor federal government is doing enough to help. Many of those forty-

four thousand are adults who are sick. Others are hurt. None of them will seek care

because they don’t have insurance or can’t afford to pay. This is unacceptable. We can do something about this, and we will.”441 A public/private partnership that mobilizes a network of medical volunteers, hospitals, clinics, and referring community service organizations, CareNet provides low-income, uninsured residents of Lucas County with improved access to primary and specialty medical and dental care, affordable prescriptions, and reliable transportation. The initiative has enrolled over 14,000 people since its inception in 2003 and has approximately 5,000 active members.442

Finally, Ford spoke directly of race relations in 2002: “I believe we are at a high

point. The recent election sent a strong message, not just here in Toledo, but to Ohio and

the nation, that Toledoans voted for who they felt could best do the job – regardless of

race and ethnicity.” In addition, Ford announced at his campaign kick-off on June 10,

2001: “I believe in diversity. I teach it. I work it. I live it. A mayor should appoint

directors and commissioners who believe in diversity and hold them accountable.”

Additionally, as noted in chapter four, Ford commented in his inaugural speech: “Some

people believe that helping the disinherited is not the mayor’s business – I disagree! I

believe it is the mayor’s business to help all – from corporate leaders to the homeless!

We are going to do just that.” As his 2002 State of the City address attests, many of

441 Ford, State of the City Address, February 21, 2002. 442 CareNet: Toledo/Lucas County Annual Report 2007: “Making a Real Difference in the Lives of the Uninsured,” Gauthier Marketing, Toledo, OH 292

Ford’s subsequent programs and policies were designed to put that understanding into action.

As in 2002, Ford’s 2003 State of the City address focused in part on education and youth. In education, he noted how “we raised funds to enhance the libraries at

Nathan Hale and MLK schools,” two elementary schools with Black student enrollment surpassing 90 percent. On youth-related issues, Ford also spoke of his success with the city’s “anti drug, anti-delinquent” youth entrepreneur program, in which “14 or 15 year olds” earned “between six and seventeen hundred dollars.”

Ford’s second State of the City address also included mention of broader diversity-related efforts, including the introduction of a summit on cleaning city neighborhoods, many of which were targeted at inner-city communities. He lauded the commencement of CareNet with 500 enrollees, moreover, and announced his support for a ban on smoking in public areas. Both programs had a significant impact on Black quality of life: CareNet helped many low-income Blacks attain access to health care, and the smoking ban, while contributing to the city’s overall health, significantly impacted

Blacks as well, as they are the second-largest group of smokers in the country and are more likely than other groups to work in occupations in which smoking is permitted.

In the same address, Ford announced other programmatic developments that focused on human relations and the improved quality of life of Blacks. He noted, for example, “Some have expressed disappointment in our fire recruitment process and the recent lack of African American hiring. We will strive to do better in recruitment but we will not drop standards for recruits.” Moreover, Ford highlighted the opening of the

Center for Capacity Building in conjunction with the University of Toledo by saying, 293

“This center will create a new class of entrepreneurs and wealth in our community.”

Finally, near the conclusion of the speech, and similar to how he ended his 2002 address,

Ford spoke directly of race-related issues: “Much has been made about my

administration’s commitment to diversity. Some say diversity is not important – that it doesn’t mean anything in 2003. I disagree. To a society that is based in large part on the principles of fairness and equality – diversity with merit is big picture equality. It is of high value to my administration. It is our future and a key to the success of Toledo and

Northwest Ohio.” For his first two years in office, then, Ford spoke directly and openly about race and diversity in his State of the City addresses in front of majority-White audiences.

In subsequent years (2004–2005), as Ford approached his reelection bid, he spoke less directly of race, of policies and programs that affected the Black community, and of largely Black issues in his State of the City addresses. He did highlight some programs that had an indirect impact on Black quality of life, however. In 2004, for example, Ford spoke of increased funding for the Art Tatum Jazz Festival, named for the famous native

Toledoan Black pianist. He also announced mergers and collaborations within the city’s

Community Development Corporations (CDCs), where some inner-city-based CDCs that had been found to be inefficient were asked to merge with others to decrease costs.

Finally, he chronicled an increased number of Block Watch groups in city neighborhoods.

In his 2005 State of the City address, Ford asked the Department of Housing and

Urban Development (HUD) to advise him regarding Toledo’s entitlement status as a designated urban county. Such a designation is only applicable to counties that receive 294

HUD Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funding through CDCs.443 It was

significant, as “counties that do not have powers under state law to carry out community

development and housing assistance activities may enter into cooperation agreements

with local governments that do have such powers under state law essential to carry out

the Urban County's CDBG program.”444 To qualify, counties have to demonstrate that they met certain population requirements and that they had powers in community

development and housing assistance for unincorporated areas within the county not

associated with local governments, and they also had to produce a consolidated plan. The

announcement demonstrated Ford’s commitment to regionalism and his pursuit of

additional funds to support the city’s community development agencies. In 2005, he also

announced the redevelopment of the inner-city Hawley Street underpass with bright

lights.

Hence, it appears that Ford’s rhetorical style incorporated mention of policy

actions and program developments that benefitted Blacks’ quality of life. Ford noted the

significance of race more often earlier in his term, however, than he did as he approached re-election.445 A sentence content analysis of his major addresses finds that the number

of sentences that focused on race or on issues that could be counted as an example of

universalizing the interests of Blacks or mattering to Blacks declined as he approached

reelection:446

443 http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/lawsregs/notices/2000/00-7.pdf 444 Ibid. 445 His efforts, however, did not decline. As a March 25, 2004, Toledo Blade article suggests, late in his term, Ford wrote a five-page executive order reaffirming “that city contractors must make good faith efforts to include minority and women-owner businesses as subcontractors.” 446 ‘Race’-coded sentences were determined to be those that explicitly referenced race-specific programming or a particular racial group. ‘Universalize Black Interests’-coded sentences were determined to be those that mentioned policies and programs that might have affected the Black community or that were largely Black issues introduced in a way to achieve broad appeal. Programs on community police, 295

Sentence Content Analysis of Mayor Ford’s Major Speeches

No. of Sentences Race (%) Universalize Black Interests (%) Other

Campaign Kickoff 84 9 (10.7) 4 (4.7) 71

Inaugural Address 71 1 (1.5) 8 (11.2) 62

State of the City 2002 258 9 (3.5) 31 (12) 218

State of the City 2003 203 10 (4.9) 37 (18.2) 156

State of the City 2004 349 0 (0) 36 (10.3) 313

State of the City 2005 219 0 (0) 16 (7.3) 201

In his final years in office (2004–2005), Ford spoke less directly of race and issues that

could be coded as universalizing the interests of Blacks than in previous years. On average, of 1,184 sentences, 2.5 percent focused directly on race and 11 percent on issues that could be coded as universalizing the interests of Blacks.

Numerical coding of Ford’s racial reference in speeches, while significant, does not capture the substantive quality of the sentences’ content. Arguably, while his mentions of race and the universalizing of Black interests were limited in extent when

compared to the length of his entire speeches, the content of the sentences in which he did mention race and universalize Black interests was exceedingly substantive.

McLin: Content Analysis of State of the City and Related Addresses, 2002–2008

Dayton Mayor Rhine McLin did not give a State of the City address in her first year in office, though she presented a 100 Day Speech in April 2002. She began her annual State of the City addresses in 2003. Given the city’s more polarizing (spatially

and historically) racial context, I did not expect to find much explicit reference to racial

housing, and neighborhood and economic development in Black neighborhoods were among those included. ‘Other’ comprised the remaining sentences in the text. 296

concerns in Mayor McLin’s speeches. When McLin spoke of a new initiative, Strong

Urban Neighborhoods, or Project SUN, for instance, ‘urban’ was not a coded term for

Black. Rather, the examples McLin cited were in all segments of the city. Moreover, in her first State of the City address in 2003, there was no direct reference to the Black community in Dayton.

It appears, however, that McLin did often indirectly speak of race. In her 2004

State of the City address, McLin spoke directly of a development project in her predominantly Black neighborhood, Wright-Dunbar. She highlighted the success of the

Citirama Wright-Dunbar event as “an ambitious marriage of both historic preservation and new construction.” The event showcased the redevelopment underway in the city’s historically Black neighborhood and business district. In 2004, McLin also directly recognized the prevalence of the racial issue in the community, and she noted her involvement: “I also want to recognize Mayor Smith and her colleagues in Kettering for another joint effort between our two cities. Together we held a series of meetings dealing with issues of race and reconciliation. The three-part dialogues were an extension of the work initiated by the Dayton Dialogue on Race Relations . . .The discussions were instrumental in our on-going efforts to break down stereotypes and create greater tolerance among all peoples.” In directly mentioning race in her 2004 address, McLin displayed her race sensitivity while framing her words in such a way as to remain racially inclusive. She did not, for example, specifically reference the topics discussed or the primary racial groups involved in the discussions.

In her 2005 State of the City address, McLin made no specific references to race.

While she did discuss some policies and projects that may have been of interest to 297

Blacks, she did so significantly less than she had in the year prior. In her 2006 State of

the City address, the most significant reference McLin made to race was limited to a

discussion of the 2005 mayoral race in which she noted how her opponent wrote in the

local newspaper “about the underlying nature of race in the mayor’s campaign.” She said:

“It was there not because either one of us put it in the campaign. But because it is an

underlying sore in our community.” This is an example of McLin’s fairly consistent,

though indirect, conscious notation of the problem of race that existed in Dayton.

In her 2007 State of the City address, McLin again made no direct reference to

race. She did announce the hiring of the new city manager, Rashad Young, the first

Black male in that position, though she did not comment on his race in the speech, saying

only, “I would like to recognize City Manager Rashad Young and his fine team for the

excellent work they do in managing our city and providing first-rate services to the

citizens of Dayton.”447 As an example of a reference to issues that mattered to Blacks and could be coded as universalizing the interests of Blacks, McLin also noted the

inception of the ORION solution and the city’s support of laws opposing predatory lending. Again in her 2008 State of the City address, she made no direct reference to race, and she focused less than in the prior year on issues that could be coded as universalizing the interests of Blacks.

Given that McLin governed in a more polarizing racial climate than Ford in

Toledo, it is no surprise that McLin’s references to race and her universalizing of Black interests ebbed and flowed in her major addresses. As she mentioned in our interview,

447 While McLin did not publicly recognize the significance of Young serving as the city’s first Black male city manager, she did in her interview comment on his youth and racial identity. Moreover, she noted she had an interest in running for re-election, in part, to ensure Young had a stable base to remain in the position. 298

she prefers to de-emphasize the prevalence of racial divisions. She expressly noted that

she is mayor “of everyone” and that, for her, all of Dayton’s citizens, from the east and

west, are her constituents.

A sentence content analysis of his major addresses finds that the number of

sentences that focused on race or on issues that could be counted as an example of

universalizing the interests of Blacks or mattering to Blacks declined as McLin

approached reelection:

Sentence Content Analysis of Mayor McLin’s Major Speeches

No. of Sentences Race (%) Universalize Black Interests (%) Other

First 100 Days Speech 63 9 (14.2) 5 (7.9) 50

State of the City 2003 123 5 (4) 13 (10.5) 105

State of the City 2004 189 5 (2.6) 46 (24.3) 138

State of the City 2005 190 0 (0) 25 (13.1) 165

State of the City 2006 178 17 (9.5) 34 (19.1) 127

State of the City 2007 184 0 (0) 25 (13.5) 159

State of the City 2008 174 0 (0) 20 (11.5) 154

According to this numerical analysis, McLin spoke more often of race and issues that

could be coded as universalizing the interests of Blacks than did Ford. Similar to Ford, in

her later years in office (2007-2008), she also spoke less directly of race and issues that

could be coded as universalizing the interests of Blacks than she had in previous years.

On average, of 1,101 sentences, 3.2 percent focused directly on race and 15 percent on

issues that could be coded as universalizing the interests of Blacks.

Ford and McLin Speech Content Comparison 299

In this analysis, it appears McLin spoke more often of race and related issues than

did Ford. This finding may appear to contradict the earlier findings that Ford more

actively pursed Black interests than did McLin. That is not the case, however: what this

analysis demonstrates is that McLin used the informal powers of her position as a weak

mayor in a commission-manager form of government to introduce the variable of race

and related content when she had the forum to do so. In examining this analysis, consideration must be given to the historic racial climate in Dayton and to the mayor’s

own oratorical style. Finally, numerical calculation does not highlight substantive content or implemented results.

It can be noted from this analysis that McLin seemed to view her role as mayor in

less historically racial terms than Ford. (She was the city’s third Black mayor, whereas

Ford was Toledo’s first Black mayor.) Given her limited mayoral powers, she was

unable to take individual credit for city initiatives, such as improvements in

neighborhoods that were predominantly Black. In her speeches as a mayor, she spoke for

the entire commission and the city manager while highlighting each of their collective

administrative and management successes. As a result, more explicit references to race

were expected to be limited, as she could not knowingly speak for everyone’s racial

views. She had the additional responsibility of noting city efforts that involved other

officials with power largely equal to her own.

In other words, the nature and purpose of the State of the City address in Dayton

was different from that of Toledo as a result of the cities’ differing government

structures. While Ford made fewer explicit references to race, those that he did make

were largely generated from the individual leadership afforded the strong mayor in 300

Toledo. Meanwhile, McLin’s seemingly more frequent references to race, even given

their ebbs and flows, could not be framed as individual mayoral efforts. Hence, though

McLin spoke more often of race, her level of involvement in the issues discussed was

more limited than that of Ford. Hence, when the two mayors’ speeches and addresses are

included, it can still be said that Ford more actively pursued Black interests than did

McLin.

The Focus on Common Humanity: Universalizing the Interests of Blacks

Toledo Mayor Jack Ford and Dayton Mayor Rhine McLin’s support of Black

interests extended beyond their State of the City speeches and related addresses. For

example, in an interview, Ford once asked, “Why run for mayor, if you’re not going to

help Black people? That was the point.”448 In his inaugural address, Ford framed his policies and programs that were designed to have an impact on the quality of life of

Blacks by appealing to others with the message found in Isaiah 58 – that helping the least is helping everyone. Ford’s efforts with minority contracting, described in chapter four, are another indication of his approach to universalizing the interests of Blacks. In those efforts, Ford managed to effectively secure major political, construction industry, and university support from White leaders to improve the quality of life of Blacks in Toledo.

He was able to persuade each of these leaders that the interests of Blacks in minority contracting was significant to all of them.

McLin’s efforts with housing and related initiatives critically involved maintaining supportive working relationships with White county and city leaders, including members of city and county commission, the business community, and

organizations like DMHA. While her role was largely supportive in each context, she

448 Jack Ford Phone Interview, January 2009 301

effectively facilitated White leadership support for policies and programs that were in the

interests of Blacks. I label this approach toward securing policy gains for a particular

racial constituency as a third tier in the study of race politics, one that adds a new

understanding to understandings of universalism in existing scholarship on racialized and

deracialized mayoral political behavioral actions.

Jack Ford and Rhine McLin are examples of mayors who did not explicitly

advocate for race policies, failing the tests established by scholarship of the 1960s and

1970s that looked for Black representatives to take race-specific approaches.449

However, neither did they seek the fulfillment of race-specific policies by deemphasizing race (or replacing a racial label with the ‘urban’ label) — through deracialization.450

Rather, Ford and McLin are examples of twenty-first-century Black mayors of non- majority Black cities who were successful in their active pursuit of policies and programs designed to improve the quality of life of Blacks because they noted the racial significance of supported policies and programs where appropriate.

In some instances, for example, the mayors’ advocacy of the interests of Blacks was framed as simply the right thing to do. As Ford indicated in his 2004 State of the

City address regarding the city’s smoking ban, “It is the right thing to do, period!”

McLin, though indirectly, invoked a similar argument as she spoke of her city’s long- standing Third and Main Street dilemma in her 2005 State of the City address. The corner where many African Americans transfer who utilize public transportation, including students, was the subject of contention, as White downtown dwellers and

449 For an example of how the Black Power or Black Threat approach was used by scholars to explain the political behavior of Black elected officials see Cole (1976: 98-105). 450 For an example of how the Deracialization approach was and is used by scholars to explain the political behavior of Black elected officials see McCormick II and Jones (1993: 66-84) and for a more recent examination see Persons (2007, 92-94). 302

property owners allegedly often accosted transitioning Blacks they viewed as a deterrent

to their pursuit of customers. In response, McLin commented: “We [the Commission]

have also directed our focus at the human element as well – our own civility . . . we [the

Commission] believe it was important to remind people about the value of personal

interaction as we go about our daily lives. The Civility Resolution encourages all of us to

remember the basics of courtesy and respect.” Hence, both Ford and McLin in their own

way addressed the quality of life of Blacks in their cities by responding to concerns about

quality of life with programmatic infusion and policy introductions that were framed in

speeches as the “right” thing to do and as important for lived and shared human

experience in the city, not solely as issues that affected Black city residents.

While many other leaders, Black and White, have long framed matters concerning

the quality of Black life by pointing out what is “right” and by invoking the notion of

common humanity, more often than not those efforts have been largely unsuccessful.

Some leaders of the civil rights movement or the NAACP, for example, attempted to

push the civil rights organization’s mission to focus more broadly on human rights,

though with little success. In his 1963 Letter from a Birmingham Jail, Rev. Dr. Martin

Luther King, Jr. noted how his organization, the Southern Christian Leadership

Conference had assistance from other groups: “We have some eighty five affiliated

organizations across the South, and one of them is the Alabama Christian Movement for

Human Rights. Frequently we share staff, educational and financial resources with our

affiliates.”451 Thus, King and others, in part, viewed the civil rights efforts in

Birmingham, Alabama in the context of human rights:

451 As quoted at: http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html 303

To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law. Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that degrades human personality is unjust. All segregation statutes are unjust because segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality. It gives the segregator a false sense of superiority and the segregated a false sense of inferiority.

However, the attempt of some civil rights movement activists to frame Black civil rights

issues as human rights issues is usually considered to have failed as scholars have long

considered the civil rights movement as distinct from other rights-based movements.452

Perhaps recognizing how the language of ‘rights’ can detract from one’s attempt

to build a coalition of support, Ford and McLin, on the other hand, are examples of

elected officials who did not invoke the notion of common humanity in their appeal to

garner support for Black-friendly public policies by framing their public statements in the

language of rights. Rather, they framed their appeals in the language of citizenship.453

For them, it was ‘right’ to support such policies and programs because their Black beneficiaries were citizens of the city as well. Thus, they might have argued, “If we help them, we help all of the city’s citizens and strengthen the broader foundation of the city’s structure.”

The Universalism and Targeted Policy Debate

452 Take, for example the issue of gay rights. Scholars and media pundits have suggested why gay rights, in their view, should be viewed as a civil rights issue (Icard 1986; Cohen 1999; Lee-St. John 2005). However, others share a different view (Wadsworth 1997; Solomon 1999). A more recent example is the tension noted within the membership of the NAACP, as few leaders such as Julian Bond and Coretta Scott King have noted that gay rights is in line with the organization’s mission. Detractors, such as civil rights leader Rev. Fred Shuttlesworth, find that gays are rightly discriminated against “because of their behavior.” Thus, proponents of gay rights have long framed the issue as a human, rights-based issue with ties to the civil rights movement. However, others view their concerns as distinctly different from the context of rights, human or civil. For more information, see Lewis (2003) and “Is Gay Rights a Civil Rights Issue?” Ebony, July 2004: 142. 453 For more information concerning how minority interests may effectively be protected by appealing to citizenship, see Kymlicka (1995). 304

The question of how best to implement social welfare and urban public policy initiatives has most recently been debated in terms of initiatives’ universal or targeted impact and has received much scholarly attention.454 Sociologist William Julius Wilson and political scientist/sociologist Theda Skocpol are often cited as supporting a universalistic approach to public policy implementation (Midgley, et al 2000; Greenstein

1991). For example, Wilson (1987) describes how targeted problems such as Aid to

Families with Dependent Children, introduced by President Franklin D. Roosevelt under the New Deal, were only successful in gaining political support because they were perceived to have temporary benefits for all. Wilson points out that these programs provided “a modicum of security for all.”455 President Lyndon Johnson’s targeted War

on Poverty programs, on the other hand, gained little political support because “this system amounted to taxation to pay for programs that were perceived to benefit mostly minorities, programs that excluded taxpayers perceived to be mostly white.456 Thus, in rejecting race-specific policies and programs with a targeted focus, Wilson argued for a universal, economic-reform-based program “to improve the life chances of groups such as the ghetto underclass by emphasizing programs in which the more advantaged groups of all races can positively relate.457 Economically based, universally applied social programs, Wilson argues, will address racially disparate problems in inner-city communities and the “substantive inequality” that would remain if the policy focus was

454 See, for example, Grogan and Patashnik 2003; Anttonen 2002; Manza 2000; Mkandawire 2005; Barnett, et al 2004; Baker and Feldman 2004; Dynarski 2002; Roberts 1996; Skocpol 1990, 1991, 1995; Wilson 1987, 1991, 1996; Greenstein 1991; Wilkins 1989; Massey and Denton 1988, 1989, 1994; Massey and Eggers 1990; Boger 2000; Hasenfeld 1997; Midgley, et al 2000; Rosanvallon and Harshav 2000. 455 Ibid, 119. 456 Ibid. 457 Ibid, 120. 305

limited to race-specific policies and means-tested goals and objectives.458 Consequently,

universalistic policies and programs can have targeted benefits for African Americans in

the urban context.459

Focusing largely on Social Security and Medicare, Skocpol (1991, 1995) has agreed with Wilson that social welfare and urban public policy programs require universalistic benefits:

U.S. history speaks loud and clear to those who would do more now to help the poor through public social policies. Rather than devising new programs narrowly focused on low-income people or the urban poor, and rather than seeking to reform or expand Aid to Families with Dependent Children and other means-tested public assistance programs, policymakers should work toward displacing welfare with new policies that could address the needs of less privileged Americans along with those of the middle class and the stable working class. New policies must speak with a consistent moral voice to all Americans who would be recipients and taxpayers. The policies should reinforce fundamental values such as rewards for work, opportunities for individual betterment, and family and community responsibility for the care of children and other vulnerable people (1995, 267).

Scholars who champion the universalism approach toward social welfare and urban public policy programs that may benefit particular constituencies like Blacks allege that policymakers’ efforts should be guided by fundamental values and moral obligations that are alleged to be monolithically understood or accepted.

Not all scholars agree with Skocpol and Wilson.460 For example, Greenstein

(1995) argues that Skocpol makes incongruent comparisons between universal programs

458 Ibid, 146. 459 In the urban context, Stone’s (1989) regime theory perhaps is comparable. Regime theory assumes a political economy perspective and maintains that class is the leading variable to consider in urban politics. It follows, then, that proponents of regime theory may favor a class-based approach to solve urban social problems, including those which disproportionately plague Black urban constituencies. However, Stone’s view is not uniformly followed. For example, the views of scholars such as Nelson (2000) and Kraus (2004), who find that the approach does not adequately address the racial variable prevalent in the urban context, are perhaps most comparable with scholars like Greenstein (1995) who finds universal policies to address national social problems through public policy are limited. 306

that provide entitlements to targeted programs that do not. For Greenstein, “[Skocpol]

overstates the relative political strength of universal programs because she compares

universal programs providing entitlements to targeted programs that are not entitlements

and must have their funding levels determined in the appropriations cycle each year.”461

Greenstein also argues that Skocpol overstates the success of universal programs by

“using programs for the elderly as her primary example.462 Greenstein describes how

Skocpol compares programs that provide entitlements for the elderly with programs that

are not focused on the elderly and “are not considered earned benefits.” Hence,

Greenstein argues, “it would be better to compare a universal program for the elderly

such as social security with a means-tested program for the elderly such as supplemental

security income.463

As a solution, Greenstein argues for a combination of universal and targeted

approaches. He cites an unpublished paper by Sawhill (1989) that found “if there is one

lesson that we have learned from all the evaluations and research that has been conducted

since the War on Poverty began, it is that [service] programs that provided limited

benefits to many people, although politically popular, are not effective in responding to

the problems of the most seriously disadvantaged” (3). Massey and Eggers (1990) have

also found that social conditions vary significantly between ethnic groups and across

regions. Hence, social programs should perhaps be targeted to certain ethnic groups or

within certain regions to achieve the best possible outcome.

Proponents of Universalism as Communitarian Political Theorists:

460 For example, see Wilkins (1989), Massey and Denton (1988, 1989, 1994), and Massey and Eggers (1990). 461 Ibid, 443. 462 Ibid, 444. 463 Ibid. 307

Social Differentiation without Exclusion

It should be clear from the preceding chapters that I share many of the universal criticisms of scholars such as Greenstein, Wilkins, Massey, and others. This dissertation’s findings support the targeted thesis based on the premise of the assumption of shared racial experience and the understanding that Blacks and Whites in the cities examined reported that Black interests were more actively pursued with a Black mayor than under their White predecessors. By extension, then, it struck me how similar proponents of universalism appeared to be to communitarian theorists. Communitarians often view the public realm as unified and homogenous, where collective interests and

“equal” citizenship are normative values. It follows, then, that by embracing the commonality of citizens, all persons’ interests and problems are addressed in civic life.

Similarly, proponents of universalistic-based public policy approaches to solve racially disparate and urban problems suggest that by appealing to the universal, the needs of the particular are served.464

As theorist Iris Marion Young has indicated, however, “the universal citizen is also white and bourgeois” (110). Thus, for Young, who argues against Rousseau and other early political philosophers whose views embodied “the universal point of view of the collective interests and equal citizenship” yet denied citizenship to women, the universal or impartial ideal is insufficient. In rejecting what Young calls the universality of the ideal of impartiality, she distinguishes between two kinds of universality:

Universality in the sense of the participation and inclusion of everyone in moral and social life does not imply universality in the sense of the adoption of a general point of view that leaves behind particular

464 Historically, scholars have disagreed with the universal approach. For more information concerning why protecting minority rights (particular) within the context of the majority (universal) is significant, see Kymlicka (1995) and/or Madison’s Federalist #10. 308

affiliations, feelings, commitments, and desires . . . universality as generality has often operated precisely to inhibit universal inclusion and participation.465

As a result, for Young, approaches to civic life that construct the universal as general, and

subsume the differences embodied in the particular experiences of those who are not

“white and bourgeois,” inherently fail to adequately address the interests of those who are different.

Young finds that the communitarian approach excludes the value of citizenship for those who are socially different from the norm. She finds that “this ideal expresses a desire for the fusion of subjects with one another, which in practice operates to exclude those with whom the group does not identify. The ideal of community denies and represses social difference.”466 Correspondingly, proponents of universal programs to

address the interests of particular constituencies presume that the urban problems of

Blacks can be addressed by crafting economic policies to meet the needs of low-income

citizens, including Blacks. However, as Young suggests, if we presume the universal

approach to be successful in addressing low-income Black problems in the urban context

because it addresses low-income economic limitations for all citizens, then it would

follow that other Black “problems” experienced by those who are not low-income would

not be addressed. Hence, by suggesting that urban Black problems can be fixed by

appealing to macroeconomic restructuring, one, in effect, denies the potential problem of

racially disparate issues that affect Blacks who are not low-income.467

465 Ibid, 105. 466 Ibid, 227. 467 Moreover, Myrdal (1944, 75-76) found that poor Blacks and poor Whites are not similarly situated as Blacks suffer from cumulative causation or mutual restraint (Powell 2009). Wilkins (1989) also noted how the experiences of the Black poor are unique from Whites. 309

Young notes that “appeals to community are usually antiurban” (236). Her

solution to the many problems of urban conditions is regionally based governmental units

and public policy and service delivery initiatives (255). Both Ford and McLin

championed a regionally based network of shared responsibility and investment. While

Young’s alternative to the communitarian, universal approach is important, most

significant is the theoretical comparison her research affords, which can be applied to the

targeted versus universal social policy debate.

Opponents of Universalism: Universalism within Targeting or Targeted Universalism

Similar to Greenstein’s proposal to combine the targeted and universal approaches in an effort to substantively address social welfare policies, John A. Powell, Executive

Director of the Kirwan Institute for Race and Ethnicity at Ohio State University, has argued as a legal scholar that universal laws and policies do not effectively address the needs of Black and urban communities. Powell argues for targeted universalism in race politics, in which arguments are made in way that is racially inclusive rather than polarizing. It is this rhetorical strategy that I found Ford and McLin utilized in their State of the City speeches and related addresses. Powell’s reference to “targeted universalism” is similar to Skocpol’s notion of “targeting within universalism,” wherein extra benefits are directed to low-income groups within the context of a universal policy design

(Skocpol 1991: 414; Midgley et al. 2000; Grogan and Patashnik 2003).468 As an example

of targeting within universalism, Skocpol cites the hypothetical development of a family

468 The inverse of ‘targeting within universalism’ is ‘universalism within targeting,’ “a pattern that can arise whenever a targeted program’s threshold of means-tested income is set high enough that a significant number of people from mainstream backgrounds qualify” (Grogan and Patashnik 2003; Gilbert 2001). An example of such a program, cited by Grogan and Patashnik, is the reliance of senior citizens in nursing homes on Medicaid. 310

security program as an extension of pre-existing social security programs for the elderly

(429).

Powell’s targeted universalism has a different focus. A civil rights and civil liberties Professor of Law at Ohio State University’s Moritz College of Law, Powell describes why universal, race-neutral policies are ineffective in race politics:

Policies that are designed to be universal too often fail to acknowledge that different people are situated differently. For racially marginalized populations, particularly those who live in concentrated-poverty neighborhoods, there are multiple reinforcing constraints. For any given issue — whether it is employment rates, housing, incarceration, or health care — the challenge is to appreciate how these issues interact and accumulate over time, with place as the linchpin holding these arrangements together. Universal policies that are nominally race-neutral and that focus on specific issues such as school reform will rarely be effective because of the cumulative cascade of issues that encompass these neighborhoods.469

Thus, Powell, whose scholarly expertise focuses on the intersections of structural racism,

racial justice, concentrated poverty, voting rights, and affirmative action in the United

States, argues for the necessity of a policy and programmatic approach that acknowledges

that any social problems affect more than just Blacks, yet still require targeted

implementation.

In addition, proposed remedies, such as affirmative action, should examine a

broader array of factors than race alone.470 Powell’s “targeted universalism” is a strategy

that achieves what racialized politics attempted in the 1960s and 1970s with, for example,

programs focused on urban renewal. In a new era in which scholars at least question how

a preference for “diversity” in the job sector may negatively impact Blacks (Jaynes and

469 John A. Powell, “Race, Place and Opportunity” The American Prospect, September 22, 2008 470 “Revisiting ‘The Rage of a Privileged Class,” Ellis Cose, Newsweek, February 2, 2009 311

McKinney 2003), however, Powell recognizes that racialized efforts are ineffective and that universal interests deny the specter of race:

What is required is a strategy of ‘targeted universalism.’ This approach recognizes that the needs of marginalized groups must be addressed in a coordinated and effective manner. To improve opportunities and living conditions for all residents in a region, we need policies to proactively connect people to jobs, stable housing, and good schools. Targeted universalism recognizes that life is lived in a web of opportunity. Only if we address all of the mutually reinforcing constraints on opportunity can we expect real progress in any one factor. My research suggests targeted efforts — ones that target both racial and spatial arrangements — to break this cycle of the racial dimension of the geography of opportunity . . . [can be effective]. While these practices may be less dependent on deliberate racialized policies today than earlier in America's history, only deliberate policy interventions that are sensitive to the structural dynamics of opportunity are likely to be effective in ending this cycle of opportunity segregation.471

Powell’s concept of targeted universalism is a political strategy and governing approach that recognizes the need for a universal platform that is simultaneously responsive to the needs of the particular. By extension, then, targeted universalism is a rhetorical strategy and also potentially a public policy program development strategy wherein policy output is determined in part by how a program effectively can be described as benefitting all citizens, yet with a targeted focus toward the problems of specific groups.

Powell cites current Los Angeles mayor Antonio Villaraigosa and former Chicago mayor Harold Washington as examples of public officials who have actively utilized the approach successfully: both of these men “built broad-based multi-racial, multi-class coalitions and succeeded by keeping both race and class issues in focus.” Powell continues: “There has never been–at least in 20th Century America–a progressive political movement built solely on class. To inoculate such efforts from divisive race- baiting, there must be discourse to inspire whites to link their fates to nonwhites” (Powell

471 Powell, “Race, Place” American Prospect, 2008. 312

and Menendian 2006).472 The concept of targeted universalism is thus meant to establish

a discourse and to develop related actions and programs that inspire “Whites to link their

fates to non-Whites.” What Powell considers targeted universalism I characterize as

Toledo Mayor Jack Ford’s and Dayton Mayor Rhine McLin’s efforts to universalize the interests of Blacks. In these attempts, the mayors garnered White support for seemingly

racialized initiatives. While their reelection may be threatened, as McCormick and Jones

(78) note, at the very least they have initiated a discourse on racial equal opportunity that

potentially can affect the city culture for years to come.

As proponents of targeted universalism have argued, though, while an opportunity

for positive discourse may develop out of a targeted universalistic approach, the approach

has significant problems. As Young has indicated, notions of what is universal are

understood insofar as they stand in contrast to background assumptions that are particular, or non-universal. When it comes to universal public policies and how best to implement them, however, often such policies, even if targeted under the framework of universalism, tend to be perceived as racially polarizing. President Johnson’s aforementioned War on Poverty programs are one example: though these programs were promoted in universal language, many White citizens felt that their tax dollars were being spent to benefit Black people. Some scholars have noted, moreover, that Aid to Families

472 In part, because of limitations on detailed sub-municipal level data in other medium-sized cities or larger cities with limited access to historical data from mayors’ past administrations, I can not definitely describe the examples of the mayors’ efforts Powell lists nor can I describe other examples where targeted universalism translated into an active pursuit of Black interests. However, Washington’s neighborhood improvement program in Chicago and William A. Johnson, Jr.’s similar program in Rochester appears to be examples of universal programs that benefitted all city neighborhoods, but also provided resources to Black neighborhoods as well. For more information of Washington’s neighborhood efforts, see Clavel and Wiewel (1991). For more information on Johnson’s neighborhood efforts, see Clavel (2007). In both texts, the authors cite how the universal neighborhood programming, like Johnson’s creation of Neighbors Building Neighborhoods, improved the quality of life in the city's minority neighborhoods. McLin’s ORION solution, then, may also be an example. 313

with Dependent Children, a universal program, came to be perceived as predominantly

for the Black urban poor (Gilen 1999). Even though Blacks were disproportionately

excluded from the program when it was first established, demographic changes and

changes in the development of media led many Americans to believe poor Blacks were the dominant group affected by poverty. Thus, according to some scholars, most universal programs are de facto targeted or particular, either because of how they are perceived or in terms of how their benefits are implemented (see Lieberman 2001, 227-

28). In the final analysis, then, it appears that particularly at the implementation stage, targeted universalism can become racialized.

A second problem with the targeted universalism approach concerns how to measure what it is that proponents of the approach are, in fact, attempting to accomplish.

There is no way to answer the question directly, as some may utilize the approach, as

Ford and McLin arguably have, to achieve racial justice or fairness (Roediger 2008), while others may focus less on the “targeted” dimension of the concept and more on the

“universal” dimension and seek to accomplish racial or color blindness. This possibility, as Powell has noted, leads to another problem because while theoretically these two versions of the concept could “work in tandem, in practice they are often in conflict”

(Powell 2009, 7). Moreover, Hamilton and Hamilton (1997) examined a variety of targeted universal programs, particularly those in the civil rights movement era, and found that none promoted racial justice, in part because of salient racial resentment.

Finally, Powell (2009) argued that the framing of the particular within the confines of the universal creates a legal and policy limitation, as those who are either aggressively pro- racialization or pro-deracialization occupy better positions in terms of argument strength, 314

given that they do not suffer from the weakness of trying to occupy both ends of the

spectrum simultaneously. Consequently, according to some scholars, the implementation

of targeted universal policies and programs rather than universal programs and race-

specific programs is not a perfect solution.

As emphasized in chapter one, though, the practice of universalizing the interests

of Blacks is not the same thing as deracialization, and as a result, by some scholars, is conceivably a better option, even if its targeted focus is not perfect. The universalizing approach is different, as the process includes Black elected officials that take the interests of Black constituents, develop particularized policy actions and program developments, and popularize them by rhetorically advocating for these interests in a way that does not deemphasize race or alienate all Whites. The context in which this process functioned in the case studies was one in which the mayors emphasized citizens’ common humanity.

Hence, in addition to noting the significance of race while supporting certain policies and programs, the mayors carefully tapped into the common humanity of city residents through strategic rhetorical framing. As a result, the mayors received support for their causes in neighborhoods and groups not their own, as when Ford received initial assistance from the Associated General Contractors of Northwest Ohio to support his

Capacity Building Program or McLin received the support of the business community, as recognized by an anonymous business leader and by the President and CEO of the

Dayton Area Chamber of Commerce. Their approach is a good example of how to maintain some White electoral and governing support in a non-majority Black city while at the same time, advocating for Black interests.

Alternative Approaches 315

The alternative approaches to universalizing the interests of Blacks are racialization and deracialization. As the content analysis of the mayors’ speeches and addresses showed, however, and as their policy and program development actions demonstrated, the universalizing approach is likely the most effective of these three options. The racialization approach, I argue, is largely ineffective not because it fails to produce substantive results but rather, due to a cultural and demographic shift that has occurred since the 1970s, explicit appeals to one racial group’s problems as such are likely to be ineffective as increasing numbers of minority groups compete for representation.473 While Cruse (1990) suggests that, given the nature of the African

American experience, race-specific policies are needed to mitigate the impact of racism on both the Black middle class and the disadvantaged, in a climate where race is decreasingly bifurcated and increasingly multicultural, the successful implementation of such policies becomes more complex. Thus, while scholars like Cruse suggest that racialization is the most direct way to implement race-specific policies that will have a significant impact on the quality of life of poor and middle-class Blacks, the political and social climate of the twenty-first century has limited the utility of that option.

The deracialization, or race-neutral, universal perspective, suggests that race- specific issues are polarizing in campaign rhetoric and governance and that race-specific rhetoric must be defused and avoided by political actors. I argue that this approach is increasingly exhausted as well. It is, however, likely the most popular alternative approach taken by Black mayors and other elected officials in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century. The fact that this approach attempts to transcend race-

473 “Race and Representation,” The American Prospect, Carol M. Swain, May 17, 2004

316

specific policy in favor of mobilizing a diverse coalition of electoral and governing

support suggests that it places any direct attention to racial disparities and municipal

problems that may disproportionately affect one race more than another out of bounds.

Yet deracialized policies often manage to help the Black community only to a limited

extent. For example, the approach, to which is famously attributed the rise of the Black

middle class and Black political governance in Atlanta, has noticeably had little effect on

the city’s poorer Black community (Sjoquist 1988; Stone 1989; Jones 1990).

McCormick and Jones address the dilemma of Black elected officials of

predominately White jurisdictions and ask if they should pursue an openly racial public

policy agenda after winning office. The authors find “no ready answers to this difficult

question” (78). They do suggest, however, that such politicians should find a balance, as

White voters and elected officials will be needed to support “any race-specific policy

option . . . considered by an African-American elected official.”474 They go so far as to

say that “white support is necessary to make such options become reality.” The authors

suggest that the racial balance of political power may determine the extent to which

Black politicians in predominately White areas can pursue an aggressive race agenda.

While they argue that it is risky for a Black elected official with a majority-Black power

structure to introduce race-specific policies in a White jurisdiction, they also find that

such an official’s failure to introduce such policies carries its own risks:

While we consider it politically improbable for these politicians in predominately white jurisdictions to be constantly at the vanguard on race- specific policy issues, their failure to address such issues periodically and send appropriate signals to the black community could undoubtedly cost them crucial support within that community that could prove to be damaging when reelection is sought.475

474 Ibid. 475 Ibid. 317

Hence, Black politicians with a majority of White constituents must pay some attention to

Black issues to prevent Black voters from choosing other candidates during a reelection cycle.

McCormick and Jones note that White support is necessary to implement a Black elected official’s race-specific policies; however, they ignore the variable of political ideology. As this research found, the racial balance of power on city councils and commissions affected legislative support of mayoral agenda items, but it was not the only factor determining such support. Indeed, it often was liberal White support that helped

Ford and McLin achieve their Black-friendly policy goals. In other words, the deracialization premise that Black elected officials should defuse race in their pursuit of public office and in their policy implementation after they win is in part problematic because it is based on the idea that Whites in general will be against a race-specific agenda. However, shared ideology between a Black politician and a White politician may in fact trump Whites’ supposed race-based opposition to Black-friendly policies.

Ford and McLin’s ability to court White support for their efforts on minority contracting and housing, respectively, again stand out as examples of White support for programs and policies that had the effect of improving Black quality of life.

Though the racialization approach may be more effective at substantively addressing Black interests, then, the social and political climate of the twenty-first century largely makes the effective utilization of that approach impossible. Moreover, while the deracialization approach is likely the most popular among Black elected officials, it has been shown, at least in the case of Atlanta, to have limited effects on disadvantaged Blacks. Additionally, the approach inherently assumes that Whites in 318

general are against race-specific policies, which ignores the ideological congruence of

some Whites and Blacks. In other words, liberal White policy makers and voters have in

fact supported the implementation of Black programs directly through public policy or indirectly by supporting a Black candidate whom they perceived might implement such policies. Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984), for example, noted how liberal and

White dominant coalitions in some of the cities they studied developed policies and programs that directly benefitted Blacks:

In Richmond, San Francisco, and Berkeley federal social programs did not become the focus for minority electoral mobilization efforts. But the programs did contribute directly to some increases in policy responsiveness because they permitted the dominant coalition to expand services to minorities and produced some institutionalization of minority interests. The clearest example is Richmond . . . a liberal administrative coalition was led by the city manager, a white, and his top-staff, with acquiescence from a liberal-to-moderate majority on the council . . . they used Model Cities to promote modestly redistributive programs, which were responsive to blacks but which also served to avoid disruptive conflict (220).

Browning, Marshall, and Tabb note that White liberal administrative leaders and council members have developed and implemented race-specific policies and programs of direct benefit to Blacks. Hence, while Kinder and Sanders (1996), Feldman and Huddy (2005), and others have noted Whites’ “racial resentment” of race-specific policies, some Whites who can be defined as ideologically liberal have in fact supported race-specific policies and programming.

Other scholars have noted how Whites may find themselves supporting Black programs. Steele (1990) and Harvey and Oswald (2000), for example, found that Whites’ guilt can lead to their support of programs, policies, and laws that support Blacks.

Feldman and Huddy (2005), though, have more recently noted the connection between 319

racial resentment and ideology, finding that “conservatives are more likely than liberals

to hold highly individualistic beliefs” and that “there are fundamental differences in the

character of racial resentment for liberals and conservatives” (178). In the final analysis,

however, they maintain that “it is difficult to conclude that resentment constitutes a clear

measure of ideology among conservatives.”476 That finding is based on the fact that the

authors found no evidence that “resentment was more closely tied to values like

individualism and limited government for conservatives than for liberals.”477 Yet the

authors did find that conservative ideology “apparently [had] ideological effects on

opposition [to a college scholarship program that is targeted at specific racial groups].”478

Consequently, while the correlation between racial resentment and prejudice remains undetermined, it remains the case that conservatives oppose race-specific policies and programs more than do liberals.479

The Genesis of the Humanity-Based Approach

As chapter one underscored, Cornel West arguably began the common-humanity,

human-relations theoretical reasoning for public policy in Race Matters (1993). In the introduction, West argued that a new framework was needed in order to effectively engage in a serious discussion of race in America. He noted that “we must begin not with the problems of black people, but with the flaws of American society” (6). To that end,

West suggested that the new framework must include reference to our common

476 Ibid, 180. 477 Ibid, 181. 478 Given that memberships to conservative political organizations like the Republican Party are largely White, the usage of ‘conservative’ can reasonably be understood to mean Whites. 479 Inversely, the racialization approach allows for the denial of race-specific disparities that may exist in municipal and other jurisdictions’ constituent service delivery, while an approach that universalizes the interests of Blacks as important to everyone can improve the political and social climate. Because the approach emphasizes a common-humanity, human-relations theme, it likely has a larger impact on disadvantaged Blacks than deracialization and perhaps even racialization.

320 humanity: “To establish a new framework, we need to begin with a frank acknowledgment of the basic humanness and Americanness of each of us. And we must acknowledge that as a people — E Pluribus Unum — we are on a slippery slope toward economic strife, social turmoil, and cultural chaos. If we go down, we go down together.”480 Hence, West commented on the necessity that any serious discussion of race in America not be limited to the Black experience.

West implicitly suggested that to ignore race would be perilous, but he also seemed to understand that explicit racial appeals had exhausted themselves in favor of a process that invokes the shared human experience. Thus, he argued that a new framework must recognize the role of race while not exploiting it. In his estimation, what is to be done is to “admit that the most valuable sources for help, hope, and power consist of ourselves, and our common history.” He continued: “We must focus our attention on the public square — the common good that undergirds our national and global identities.

The vitality of any public square ultimately depends on how much we care about the quality of our lives together. The neglect of our public infrastructure, for example . . . reflects not only our myopic economic policies, which impede productivity, but also the low priority we place on our common life.”481 Perhaps without knowing it, West wrote the handbook for twenty-first-century Black mayors in non-majority Black cities in respect to how they might use the power of their positions to impact the substantive quality of life of Blacks.

Mayoral Leadership Models and the Active Pursuit of Black Interests

480 Ibid, 8. 481 Ibid, 11-12. 321

Significantly, the common-humanity, human-relations approach that Toledo

Mayor Jack Ford and Dayton Mayor Rhine McLin employed to actively pursue Black

interests can be framed in terms of pre-existing scholarship that focuses on different

mayoral leadership and governing styles. In fact, some scholars argue that it is necessary

for mayors to cast their leadership approach as a governing process in order to be

effective. Bowers and Rich (2000) write that “constructing a leadership infrastructure

and coaligning processes, structures, and forces that might otherwise constrain [mayoral]

leadership efforts is necessary for mayors if they hope to remain relevant to and

participate in defining the long-term sustainability of their cities” (223). They maintain

that good mayoral leadership is a necessity for small and medium-sized cities. Their

emphasis on leadership confirms earlier scholarship that found leadership to be important

in mayoral governance and Black communities (Stone 1995; Chatterjee 1975; Smith

1996; Marable 1998, West 1993) and speaks in concert with later research (Walters and

Smith 2007; Davis 2007; Persons 2007). All of these studies note that strong leadership

is required to force change and action in cities and in Black communities.

As the case studies presented in the preceding chapters highlighted, how a mayor

defines leadership and executes his or her leadership agenda is critical to the active pursuit of Black interests in non-majority Black cities. The case studies underscored that

leadership — how it is defined and executed by the occupant in the mayor’s seat —

determines the number and level of substantive policy actions and program developments

actively pursued by the mayors. While mayoral leadership may be affected by structural

constraints, such as a weak-mayor system of government, shared racial experience and ideological views can also circumvent these constraints. 322

To varying degrees, though, the case studies of Toledo and Dayton, Ohio, also demonstrate that Black mayoral leadership in non-majority Black cities can bring about substantive change for Black residents. Toledo Mayor Jack Ford engaged in a type of substantive leadership by merging the city’s Affirmative Action/Contract Compliance office with the Division of Purchasing. Ford also aggressively advocated for the capacity of Black and minority contractors to bid for and ultimately receive public contracts.

Dayton Mayor Rhine McLin actively supported the redevelopment of mixed-community and Black neighborhoods, such as Wright-Dunbar Village. McLin also moved into

Wright-Dunbar — a substantive and symbolically significant step. These actions by Ford and McLin are evidence of what Stone (1995) labels change-producing leadership.

As the variance in substantive policy action and program developments underscored in the previous chapter suggests, however, not all of the mayors’ pursuits were so active in nature that they produced the substantive change Stone’s criteria describes. Both Ford and McLin engaged in the active pursuit of Black interests that were purely symbolic in nature, with a limited ability to produce substantive change. The prevalence of such symbolic policy actions and program developments were a function of their cities’ political governing environments. As Bowers and Rich (2000) note,

Ammons and Newell (1989) and Banfield (1965) establish “that a city’s political- governing environment affects the likelihood that successful change-producing mayoral leadership will occur.” They continue:

This environment includes the structure of city government, particularly the formal powers of the mayor. It also includes such important contextual variables as the city’s history, ethnicity, economy, and political traditions. Collectively, these political-governing variables define the extent to which mayors are at the center of their city’s leadership environment. More often than not, mayors, particularly elected ones, 323

come to recognize that although they may be at the political centers of their cities, they are not necessarily at the centers of those cities’ political and economic power (Rich 1989, 25). Thus the successful managing of the political governing environment in which they act becomes crucial to their ability to lead and bring about desired change (Bowers and Rich 2000, 218).

This nexus of political and governing variables and how mayors respond through their political and governing coalitions was evident in the case studies of Toledo and Dayton.

For example, both McLin and Ford found that their political power was in part a function of relationships with the city’s business community, arguably the source of the city’s power structure (Hunter 1950).

In addition, the case studies presented in the preceding chapters reinforce research that recognizes the importance to effective leadership of individual variables specific to the mayors themselves. For instance, Toledo Mayor Jack Ford was labeled ‘lackluster’ by the city’s media and was generally perceived by residents to be dull and boring. His approach was viewed in contrast to the city’s first strong mayor, Ford’s predecessor and successor, Carleton Finkbeiner. The perception of Ford’s lack of enthusiasm and dull personality led to the prevalent notion that Ford did not do enough in his term as mayor to merit reelection. Dayton Mayor Rhine McLin’s personality was viewed as an asset on the campaign trail against a Republican opponent in 2001, though some residents, particularly business leaders, found her ‘wacky and capricious’ once she assumed office.

Thus, Ford’s and McLin’s roles as mayor and their ability to actively pursue Black interests were in part a function of their personalities and their development over time

(Gottfried 1962; Bullock 1962; George 1964; Maddi 1968; Hall and Lindzey 1970;

Kotter and Lawrence 1972). 324

Closely related to the recognition of the importance of personality is the centrality of mayoral leadership style or governing approach to the active pursuit of Black interests.

Ford’s efforts in Toledo, for example, reinforce Rich’s (1989) assertion that a risk-taking leadership style is relevant to achieving change-producing actions: “Risk-taking is an unusual use of power, which is rooted in the belief that power cannot be depleted – that there is an endless supply. The joy of exercising power is thus triggered by its value as a risk and as an endless resource in a game of change.”482 Political actors who are risk- takers “love to experiment . . . and endorse grandiose plans. The more resistance they receive, the more convinced they are that their course is right. They are prone to action that upsets other politicians and attracts audiences” (Rich 1989, 36). While Ford likely fits this description, his efforts as mayor were also coupled with the public perception that he was dull — a variable Rich did not consider.

The strong-handed, powerful approach to the active pursuit of Black interests, moreover, likely contributed to Ford’s failure to be reelected. Ford himself noted in an interview that he “probably should have introduced the smoking ban in a second term,” but he chose instead to take the risk in his first term. Hence, Ford’s risk-taking, reform- oriented approach was beneficial to Blacks in Toledo while it lasted, but given how it contributed to Ford’s failure to be reelected, the approach may also have limited any long-term effects of Ford’s mayoralty on Black quality of life.

482 Ford may be an example of Cunningham’s (1970) public entrepreneur model, with the exception that reform appears not to be an explicit recognizable component of the model. For Cunningham, “nearly any bold thrust of a mayor – initiating an urban renewal project, promoting jobs for blacks, intervening with the Board of Education for curriculum reform, setting up an elite tactical police unit – risks the loss of the votes of certain groups whose interests may be harmed, while it chances the gain of the votes of many whose interests may be advanced” (15). While Cunningham’s model is comprehensive in its risk-taking approach, it does not explicitly emphasize reform. 325

Dayton Mayor McLin’s behavior in office was different. Her largely symbolic

efforts to impact Black quality of life in Dayton are best described as the result of her adoption of a “public entrepreneurial” style of leadership.483 Kotter and Lawrence (1974,

21) describe this type of mayoral leadership as an approach that “entails originality,

initiative, energy, openness, organizational ability, and promotional ingenuity” (Rich

1989, 220).484 The public entrepreneur approach toward governing, leadership, and

mayoral behavior requires that a mayor be a bold problem solver, very active, and

possess a mild willingness to take risks. McLin fits this description: as mayor, she was

interested in taking risks, but she did not feature an aggressive, active, or reform-minded

approach. McLin’s perceived openness to residents, as well as her energetic and quirky

demeanor, was evident in her promotion of a charitable fund and of various symbolic

programming for Dayton youth. Additionally, her enthusiastic move into Wright-Dunbar

demonstrated her willingness to be associated with the project, yet the action can not be

described as a substantive pursuit of Black interests.

One of the most important observations that can be made about the case studies of

Toledo and Dayton utilizes Stone’s emphasis on the importance of mayors’ controlling

the existing governing and political infrastructure or building new structures they control

(1995, 107). Toledo Mayor Jack Ford had the benefit of neither. Dayton Mayor Rhine

McLin had the luxury of both. As chapter seven found, Ford admitted that he had little

political power: “I was never really a leader in the [Democratic Party]; I was just the one

483 McLin may be an example of Ruchleman’s (1969) multihat model, with the exception that she herself admits poor performance and little interest in ceremonial functions of the position. However, her active role in the Montgomery County Democratic Party, her legislative experience in the Ohio Statehouse makes her a strong candidate for this model. For more information on the multihat model, visit Kotter and Lawrence (1972, 29). 484 For more information of the public entrepreneur model, visit Schumpeter (1947), Schumpeter (1965) and Cunningham (1970). 326 willing to run — almost like I was a sacrificial lamb.485 Though Ford had little control over the existing political and governing infrastructure, he actively pursued more substantive policy actions and program developments than did McLin. As a result of his lack of political and governing control and his seeming disinterest in building his own coalition while mayor, however, he failed to be reelected, effectively nullifying many of the gains.486

The structure in which McLin governed, meanwhile, limited the number of substantive actions and developments she could pursue, yet her success at sustaining control over the Montgomery County Democratic political and governing infrastructure may imply that her more symbolic efforts had the opportunity to have a greater impact on

Black quality of life over a longer period of time than did Ford’s more substantive ones.

When mayors do not have effective relationships with the business community, support on the city council, positively perceived personalities and governing approaches, and the formal powers of a strong-mayor system of government, they are handicapped in their ability to actively pursue Black interests in non-majority Black cities. As the case studies of Ford and McLin attest, mayors who lack any of the necessary four components may be limited in their ability to actively pursue Black interests either substantively

(McLin) or over time (Ford).

That McLin’s ability to substantively improve Black quality of life from her position in a weak-mayor system perhaps reinforces Hunter’s (1950) business and power structure model, which argues that we should pay attention not to a mayor’s ability so much as to the power structure within which that mayor operates. The occasional

485 Jack Ford Interview, June 24, 2008 486 Ford’s healthcare network, CareNet is still in operation. For more information on CareNet, see the appendix. 327

inability of mayors, like Ford, who govern in a strong-mayor system to have a sustained

impact on Black quality of life, on the other hand, perhaps reinforces Stone’s (1995)

emphasis on the importance of mayors controlling more than just the mayoral office.

Without the support of an electoral coalition that allows a mayor to sustain power throughout a second term, his or her ability to substantively affect Black quality of life is either transferred or forfeited to other political or economic elites. As a result, the Black

mayoralty, and the Black residents who benefit from it in non-majority Black cities, may

be denied the benefits of municipal leadership based on shared racial experience.

Limitations of the Dissertation and Guide to Future Research

The primary focus of this dissertation has been on extending the discussion in

political science literature concerning Black representation to the context of medium-

sized cities and the realm of governance. As such, I hope to speak in concert with

scholarship in other academic arenas that has also noted how a focus on voting, elections,

and campaigns, particularly as an end of themselves, on the achievement of the goals of

Black political representation has long been exhausted (Guinier 1991).

At this preliminary stage of research, however, this dissertation has its significant

shortcomings. Perhaps most noted by scholars who are concerned with similar areas of

research is the limited inclusion of municipal data from the two case-study cities and the

lack of a budgetary analysis of the mayors’ total expenditures on Black issues. This is a

limitation that could not be addressed effectively within the confines of this study, given

the data resources made available to the cities and the lack of a collectively defined

understanding of what constitutes a Black issue and how can it be quantitatively

measured. My attempt to conduct content analyses of city council minutes sufficed in 328 this dissertation to meet the demands of those specific data. It is to be hoped, however, that future research will be able to code mayoral efforts on Black issues in a non-majority

Black context more constructively.

This dissertation was also limited by the number of case studies. In choosing two medium-sized cities in one state, I attempted to make a contribution to the literature on medium-sized cities and Black representational efforts within that context. Two case- study cities are arguably not enough, however, from which to draw national implications.

While I believe generalizability can be applied to Black elected officials who govern in political jurisdictions that are comprised of populations with non-majority Black residents

(i.e. state legislatures, U.S. Congress, governors, and more recently the office of

President of the United States), generalizability to other medium-sized cities and other mayors’ efforts is limited in depth and scope as the context varies. It is my hope that future research will be able to compile a nationwide medium-sized-city database with significant data points to test the findings of this dissertation in other comparable contexts.

Finally, the application of the targeted versus universal social policy debate to the context of Black mayors’ public policy implementation efforts as a function of their shared racial experience in the context of non-majority Black cities deserves more substantive attention in future research. While I believe that the comparison of communitarian political theorists to scholars who support a universalism-based approach is significant, the theoretical framing of such a relationship should benefit from a more in-depth analysis of the goals and interests of both parties in future research. Moreover, future research based on this dissertation’s findings may implement a more detailed 329 discussion that frames how an approach that universalizes the interests of Blacks can be utilized rhetorically by Black elected officials in non-majority Black political jurisdictional contexts and can be successfully implemented and sustained in terms of public policy outputs. 330

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APPENDIX A

Methodological Process for the Construction of the Mapping

I used 2000 Census data to determine the general, social, economic, and housing characteristics of city residents in Dayton, and Toledo. This helped me to generalize what categorized people voted for the candidates. These data were then juxtaposed with ward percentages from the Mayors’ elections to determine the nature of candidates' and elected officials' attention to their own racial group members in regard to policy.

I used ArcMap, Arc GIS 9.1, Geographic Information Systems to transpose the ward maps from the County Boards of Election for each of the cities. I re-drew the ward maps on a street map layer for each city. This allowed me to add the 2000 United States

Census data from the United States Census Bureau into the file. To generate the range and mean of the Census data for each variable within the wards, I included all the census tracts that intersected each ward. The range was the minimum to maximum value for all census tracts that intersected the ward. The mean was the average for all census tracts that intersected the ward.

338

APPENDIX B

Methodological Process for Newspaper Coverage Analysis

The question considered while conducting content analysis of newspaper articles

to gage coverage of the Black mayors as candidates was: “Does the major local

newspaper coverage focus on McLin and Ford’s actual election potential, or are they

viewed as underdogs?” In addition to having that question in mind, three methods of

comparative analysis were used to analyze the print media coverage. One measured the

frequency of articles about McLin and Ford as candidates for Mayor and as first-term

Mayors. The selected articles are not random. A second method focused on the

placement of those articles which primarily discussed McLin and Ford, yet were not

centrally located in local newspapers, and therefore, had a less likelihood of being read.

Such positioning of articles was also a significant aspect of the methodological analysis,

and was termed “article placement.”487 This aspect of the newspaper’s practice was

categorized in this manner because the position of articles determined to what extent articles are read. A third method consisted of analytical commentary on the articles’ content as defined by the criteria established below. The methods of analysis were useful in seeking, for example, the number of times “race” was simply mentioned in the articles and the number of times the issue of race in the campaign or administration was mentioned and how.

It was the third analysis method that needed further explication. Searching for a way to demonstrate how the various local newspaper articles on McLin and Ford accomplished a particular intent, wanting to objectify the analysis of content, and needing

487 Benjamin Page, Who Deliberates, p. 112, University of Chicago Press, 1996 339

to identify, categorize, measure and tabulate differentials, a five-label rubric was devised.

This instrument served as a means to offer a systematic analysis about the local newspaper coverage. Specifically, they were labeled: Policy/Race (Positive);

Policy/Race (Positive-Neutral); Neutral; Policy/Race (Negative-Neutral), or Policy/Race

(Negative). The following includes an explanation of the terms:

The term Policy/Race (Positive) referred to articles that fairly represented McLin and Ford and did not include potentially stereotypical or politically or racially damaging

language. Positive indicated that the article’s placement in the local newspaper was

good; and the article content was primarily factual, and predominantly based on political issues and campaign policies. Positive does not suggest formal support for a particular candidate, however, it may.

The term Policy/Race (Positive-Neutral) referred to articles that appeared to be positive, and seemingly shared its characteristics aforementioned, yet often because of article placement, subject, and/or language, no longer could be labeled as such. Often, the article lacked the necessary information to label as positive, yet included enough information from which the reader could grasp significant information about the candidate.

The term Neutral referred to articles that were not negative or positive.

Frequently, the articles were simply unbiased, good reporting, but lacked detail.

Occasionally, such articles may have had subject-related inconsistencies and outliers or may not have included enough information about the candidates to affix a label. Articles included in this coding were considered generally negative because of a lack of 340 information to the reader about the candidate or elected official, perhaps inferring a possibility of voter apathy and uninformed voters.

The term Policy/Race (Negative-Neutral) referred to articles that appeared to be negative, and seemingly shared its characteristics, yet included factual information or equal bias in terms of the candidates and/or elected officials presented in the article, and lacked seemingly deliberate racialized or potentially damaging language.

The term, Policy/Race (Negative) referred to articles that unfairly represented

McLin and Ford and included potentially racially stereotypical, unnecessary and/or politically damaging language. Negative also indicated that the article’s placement in the local newspapers and the article content was likely in a position not to be read. Also, the negative article content may not have been related to campaign issues or factual information, in reference to the article’s subject title. For example, if the article posed personal or campaign issues as opposed to policies and initiatives, it was labeled negatively.

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APPENDIX C

List of Interview Questions Questions for Mayors

1. While mayor, what do/did you see as the major problems facing City X?

2. How were/have these issues been addressed by your office? A. Very Well; B. Somewhat Well; C. Not Very Well; D. Poorly

3. From your perspective, what do you see as the major problems facing African Americans in City X?

4. How were/have these issues been addressed by your office? A. Very Well; B. Somewhat Well; C. Not Very Well; D. Poorly

5. Are/were there important new policy ideas from your office that have been generated?

6. Are/were there important new policy ideas directly affecting the African American community implemented by your office?

7. What policies failed? Why did they fail?

8. As Mayor, what policy initiatives or programs were/are you especially concerned with?

9. How do things get done in City X?

10. Describe the nature of the political process in city X. Is it partisan? Does true party competition exist?

11. How have changes in business in city X over the last 8-10 years led to changes in the community?

12. What has been the impact of a changing business climate on the African American community?

13. How did African American leadership communicate and interact with the city’s leadership during your term(s)?

14. Are/were these issues a priority to your administration and the city’s (then)political leaders?

342

15. What are the names of the important and active organizations within the African American community?

16. To what extent do these organizations work together to pursue their own set of issues? A. Well; B. Somewhat Well; C. Just about Right; D. Poorly

17. Who are the leaders in each of these organizations?

18. Are there individuals in the African American community who are not necessarily leaders but are well informed about the community?

19. Are there individuals in X who are not necessarily elected officials but have significant political influence?

20. Did the major newspaper/networks endorse you in either of your campaigns for office? From your perspective, why do you think they did or did not? If not, why do you think they did not?

21. How would you characterize your relationship with White and Black leaders throughout City X?

22. What, if anything do you recall doing on behalf of African American issues? Statements – public or private, press conferences, personal requests.

23. Do you recall approaching specific businesses or organizations directly or indirectly to assist with efforts related to the African American community?

24. How would you characterize your commitment to African American issues? Did you initiate any ‘firsts’ when it came to producing substantive benefits for African Americans?

25. If so, do you think you suffered any negative backlash as a result?

26. Did you make any key personnel changes within your appointment powers that benefited African Americans?

27. Do you know of any African Americans whose lives have positively changed in some substantive way as a result of a direct action by you while in office?

28. In a city like X, where Whites represent X % of the population, how likely is it that you can actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents? A. Very Likely; B. Somewhat Likely; C. Not Very Likely; Not Likely At All

343

29. How important is it to have fellow African Americans on city council/commission – whether or not they support your every initiative?

30. (Mayor Ford) What do you contribute to your failed re-election bid?

31. (Mayor Ford) What role do you think the Nazi march/race riot two weeks prior affect your standing as a Black mayor and your chances at re-election?

32. (Mayor McLin) What do you contribute to your successful re-election

Questions for General Influentials (including newspaper editorial board members and publishers, mayors’ campaign and administration officials and appointees, business, leaders, union leaders, and former political officials)

1. From your perspective, what do you see as the major problems facing City X?

2. How were/have these issues been addressed by Mayor X? A. Very Well; B. Somewhat Well; C. Not Very Well; D. Poorly

3. From your perspective, what do you see as the major problems facing African Americans in City X?

4. How were/have these issues been addressed by Mayor X? B. Very Well; B. Somewhat Well; C. Not Very Well; D. Poorly

5. Are/were there important new policy ideas from Mayor X’s administration that have been generated?

6. Are/were there important new policy ideas directly affecting the African American community implemented by Mayor X’s administration?

7. As a community leader, what policy initiatives or program are you especially concerned with currently? During Mayor X’s administration?

8. How do things get done in City X?

9. Describe the nature of the political process in city X. Is it partisan? Does true party competition exist?

10. How have changes in business in city X over the last 8-10 years led to changes in the community?

11. What has been the impact of a changing business climate on the African American community?

344

12. How did African American leadership communicate and interact with the city’s leadership during Mayor X’s term(s)?

13. Are/were these issues a priority to Mayor X’s administration and the city’s (then)political leaders?

14. What are the names of the important and active organizations within the African American community?

15. To what extent do these organizations work together to pursue their own set of issues? B. Well; B. Somewhat Well; C. Just about Right; D. Poorly

16. Who are the leaders in each of these communities?

17. Are there individuals in the African American community who are not necessarily leaders but are well informed about the community?

18. Are there individuals in X who are not necessarily elected officials but have significant political influence?

19. Did the major newspaper/networks endorse Mayor X in either of his/her campaigns for office? From your perspective, why do you think they did or did not? If not, why do you think they did not?

20. How would you characterize Mayor X’s relationship with White and Black leaders throughout City X?

21. How would you characterize Mayor X's efforts at pursuing programs designed to improve the quality of life of black residents? A) doing a lot; b) notenough; c) just about right; d)not nearly enough?

22. [If applicable] Do you recall Mayor X or his/her staff approaching your business/organization directly or indirectly to assist with efforts related to the African American community?

23. How would you characterize Mayor X’s commitment to African American issues? Did Mayor X initiate any ‘firsts’ when it came to producing substantive benefits for African Americans?

24. If so, do you think Mayor X suffered any negative backlash as a result?

25. Did Mayor X make any key personnel changes within his/her appointment powers that benefited African Americans?

345

26. Do you know of any African Americans whose lives have positively changed in some substantive way as a result of a direct action by Mayor X while in office?

27. In a city like X, where Whites represent X % of the population, how likely is it that Mayor X can actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents? B. Very Likely; B. Somewhat Likely; C. Not Very Likely; Not Likely At All

28. How much interaction have you had with Mayor X?

A. Daily/Frequent; B. Somewhat Frequent/Weekly; C. Not That Frequent; D. Rarely Ever

29. Demographic Information collected on each respondent: Gender: _____Male _____Female

Ethnicity/Race: _____Hispanic _____African American _____White _____Asian American _____Native American _____Other (Specify:______)

30. How long have you lived in city X? _____# of Years

Questions for Public Officials (including any elected members of the political community currently holding office)

1. From your perspective, what do you see as the major problems facing City X?

2. How were/have these issues been addressed by Mayor X? A. Very Well; B. Somewhat Well; C. Not Very Well; D. Poorly

3. From your perspective, what do you see as the major problems facing African Americans in City X?

4. How were/have these issues been addressed by Mayor X? C. Very Well; B. Somewhat Well; C. Not Very Well; D. Poorly

5. Are/were there important new policy ideas from Mayor X’s administration that have been generated?

6. Are/were there important new policy ideas directly affecting the African American community implemented by Mayor X’s administration?

7. As a community leader, what policy initiatives or program are you especially concerned with currently? During Mayor X’s administration?

346

8. How do things get done in City X?

9. Describe the nature of the political process in city X. Is it partisan? Does true party competition exist?

10. How have changes in business in city X over the last 8-10 years led to changes in the community?

11. What has been the impact of a changing business climate on the African American community?

12. How did African American leadership communicate and interact with the city’s leadership during Mayor X’s term(s)?

13. Are/were these issues a priority to Mayor X’s administration and the city’s (then)political leaders?

20. What are the names of the important and active organizations within the African American community?

21. To what extent do these organizations work together to pursue their own set of issues? C. Well; B. Somewhat Well; C. Just about Right; D. Poorly

22. Who are the leaders in each of these communities?

23. Are there individuals in the African American community who are not necessarily leaders but are well informed about the community?

24. Are there individuals in X who are not necessarily elected officials but have significant political influence?

25. Did the major newspaper/networks endorse Mayor X in either of his/her campaigns for office? From your perspective, why do you think they did or did not? If not, why do you think they did not?

26. How influential is it for a Mayor in city X to have a county party endorsement in their campaign(s)? What effect do (did) the local, county political parties have on Mayor X’s efforts to pursue programs designed to improve the quality of life of black residents?

21. How would you characterize Mayor X’s relationship with White and Black leaders throughout City X?

347

22. What, if anything do you recall Mayor X doing on behalf of African American issues? Statements – public or private, press conferences, personal requests [if applicable, to your office?]

23. [If applicable] Do you recall Mayor X or his/her staff approaching your business/organization directly or indirectly to assist with efforts related to the African American community?

24. How would you characterize Mayor X’s commitment to African American issues? Did Mayor X initiate any ‘firsts’ when it came to producing substantive benefits for African Americans?

25. If so, do you think Mayor X suffered any negative backlash as a result?

26. Did Mayor X make any key personnel changes within his/her appointment powers that benefited African Americans?

27. Do you know of any African Americans whose lives have positively changed in some substantive way as a result of a direct action by Mayor X while in office?

28. In a city like X, where Whites represent X % of the population, how likely is it that Mayor X can actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents? C. Very Likely; B. Somewhat Likely; C. Not Very Likely; Not Likely At All

[Where applicable, for city council/commission members]

29. (For those in districts), Is your main purpose to voice the concerns of those in your districts or the citizens of city X, in general? 30. Who or what groups constitute your core constituency?

31. While they were Mayor, how much interaction have you had/did you have with Mayor X?

A. Daily/Frequent; B. Somewhat Frequent/Weekly; C. Not That Frequent; D. Rarely Ever

32. Demographic Information collected on each respondent: Gender: _____Male _____Female

Ethnicity/Race: _____Hispanic _____African American _____White _____Asian American _____Native American _____Other (Specify:______)

348

32. How long have you lived in city X? _____# of Years

Questions for Community Activists/Advocacy Groups (including Black community religious leaders, the Black press, neighborhood activists, and other ‘leaders’)

1. From your perspective, what do you see as the major problems facing City X?

2. How were/have these issues been addressed by Mayor X? A. Very Well; B. Somewhat Well; C. Not Very Well; D. Poorly

3. From your perspective, what do you see as the major problems facing African Americans in City X?

4. How were/have these issues been addressed by Mayor X? D. Very Well; B. Somewhat Well; C. Not Very Well; D. Poorly

5. Are/were there important new policy ideas directly affecting the African American community implemented by Mayor X’s administration?

6. As a community leader, what policy initiatives or program are you especially concerned with currently? During Mayor X’s administration?

7. How do things get done in City X?

8. What has been the impact of a changing business climate on the African American community?

9. How did African American leadership communicate and interact with the city’s leadership during Mayor X’s term(s)?

10. Are/were these issues a priority to Mayor X’s administration and the city’s (then)political leaders?

11. What are the names of the important and active organizations within the African American community?

12. To what extent do these organizations work together to pursue their own set of issues? D. Well; B. Somewhat Well; C. Just about Right; D. Poorly

13. Who are the leaders in the African American community?

14. Are there individuals in the African American community who are not necessarily leaders but are well informed about the community?

349

15. Did the African American newspaper(s)/networks endorse Mayor X in either of his/her campaigns for office? From your perspective, why do you think they did or did not? If not, why do you think they did not?

16. Can White political leaders represent African American constituencies or do African Americans need African Americans in office in order to be represented? Why or why not?

17. Can a mayor survive in city X if he or she ignores African Americans?

18. If no, when was the last time that African Americans could be ignored?

19. Why can African Americans no longer be ignored?

20. How would you characterize Mayor X’s relationship with White and Black leaders throughout City X?

21. What, if anything do you recall Mayor X doing on behalf of African American issues? Statements – public or private, press conferences, personal requests [if applicable, to your office?]

22. [If applicable] Do you recall Mayor X or his/her staff approaching your business/organization directly or indirectly to assist with efforts related to the African American community?

23. How would you characterize Mayor X's efforts at pursuing programs designed to improve the quality of life of black residents? A) doing a lot; b) not enough; c) just about right; d)not nearly enough? --- Mayor Finkbeiner’s/Turner’s

24. Did Mayor X initiate any ‘firsts’ when it came to producing substantive benefits for African Americans?

25. Did Mayor X make any key personnel changes within his/her appointment powers that benefited African Americans?

26. Do you know of any African Americans whose lives have positively changed in some substantive way as a result of a direct action by Mayor X while in office?

27. In a city like X, where Whites represent X % of the population, how likely is it that Mayor X can actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents? D. Very Likely; B. Somewhat Likely; C. Not Very Likely; Not Likely At All

28. How much interaction have you had with Mayor X while in office or while campaigning for office?

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A. Daily/Frequent; B. Somewhat Frequent/Weekly; C. Not That Frequent; D. Rarely Ever

29. Demographic Information collected on each respondent:

Gender: _____Male _____Female

Ethnicity/Race: _____Hispanic _____African American _____White _____Asian American _____Native American _____Other (Specify:______)

30. How long have you lived in city X? _____# of Years

351

APPENDIX D

Consent Form

By signing this form, you agree to voluntarily participate in a Brown University research project. You hereby are informed of the purpose of the project and the manner in which your voluntary participation will be exercised. Your signature indicates that you have been made aware of the potential risks and benefits of your participation by the investigator for this project. Your signature indicates you understand that the process of your participation is voluntary, without-compensation, and will involve you responding to questions by the investigator in relation to the subject to the best of your knowledge for approximately one to two hours or less.

You understand that the project’s chief aim is to examine under what conditions do Black mayors of non-majority Black cities actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents - and that your voluntary participation as a member of the Toledo or Dayton, Ohio metropolitan community in some capacity (resident, through your employer, etc) provides a valuable resource for the said project.

You may contact the Brown University Research Protections Office if you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this research. The person to contact is Susan Toppin, Sr. IRB Manager at 1-866-309-2095. Your signature states that you understand all interviews will be conducted by the investigator, taking notes, and tape- recorded. Your signature below indicates you understand your name may be used in future print documents in relation to this project, as written by the investigator. However, your name will only be used in direct reference to your comments, as recorded or observed by the investigator during the interview(s). You will be given a copy of the consent form, as signed.

You may withdraw as a participant in the research at any time, with no consequence to you. Significant new findings developed during the course of the research that may relate to your willingness to continue participation will be provided, if 352

applicable. You understand that your responses to queries from the investigator are strictly confidential, and that only the investigator will have access to the information you provided as a voluntary participant in this Brown University research study.

Signed,

______Print Name Signature

Date ______

353

APPENDIX E

List of Issue-Area Categories

A respondent’s perspective on the mayor’s active pursuit of policies and programs, designed to improve the quality of life of Blacks is somewhat determined by their perception of the problems he or she, in their view, need to address. Therefore, of the dozens of questions asked respondents, one question was of particular significance. I asked each respondent the following question: “what do you see as the major problems facing African Americans in City X?” Respondents provided a variety of answers to this open-ended question. I then grouped these answers into larger categories. For example, various respondents said that lack of jobs, the poor economy, the loss of the automotive industry, or job creation was a major problem facing their respective city.

I grouped these responses into one jobs and economy category and concluded that

White and African American interviewees gave the same response if one said economic development and the other said loss of the manufacturing base - both responses were categorized as jobs and economy. I presented each interviewee’s response under the general category. If a respondents’ answer was not direct, even after significant probing, from those categories, I inferred a response and affixed a label of the respondent’s reply.

The following is a sample roster of issue categories and select respondent’s responses to give the reader an idea of how open-ended responses were coded to provided a ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ response concerning the major problems facing African Americans in the city and the major’s efforts to address them:

Jobs and Economy Jobs 354

Limited employment opportunity Economics Businesses can’t get viable customer base Too few jobs Minority contracting Lack of jobs Unemployment Lack of wealth Getting share of resources Lending institutions Small black business High paying factory jobs without education

Public Safety Criminal Justice High incarceration rate Higher drug arrests Concentrated black population Safe streets

Education Schools Schools Need Better Resources Schools not financed, structured or staffed as it should Public school system deficient Inner city schools not supported High drop out rate Lack of educational attainment No solid education

Housing Severely segregated housing patterns

Opportunity and Access Personal Belief in Ability Access Community Resources Belief that the system will Serve Belief in the public trust Getting beyond the red tape to survive Lack of leadership 2nd tier leadership Lack of influence even in diversity related matters

Intra-Community Concerns Togetherness Separate Class of People Media portrayal of blacks 355

Perception that Toledo hasn’t moved far in race relations No One Stand Out Leader Racism Lack of Cohesiveness, Trust, lack of willingness to sacrifice Skepticism Knowing the right people 50s and 60s mentality Confluence of race and poverty Behind the starting line opportunities Tendency to be stuck in the past Reluctance of leaders to step back in their roles No long term strategic opportunities for leadership Inclusion African Americans (we are the problem) Self appointed leaders Lack of Pro-activity Lack of real role model Blacks themselves A lot of naysayers

Healthcare Lack of available healthcare Lack of health insurance Mental health

Youth Young children in programming Divorced families – single family homes

356

APPENDIX F

Interview Statistics

53 – Toledo

30 – Dayton

Total: 83

Dayton Toledo

General Influentials 12 32

Public Officials 10 11 (Elected, Current Office Holders) Dayton’s City Manager Included

Mayors 1 2

Community Activists 7 8

TOTAL 30* 53

*One of the interviews in Dayton was a joint meeting with three city officials in the Department of Planning and Community Development. I counted that meeting as one individual

357

APPENDIX G

List of Interviews

Toledo 1). Michael Ashford Former City Council President; Current District Councilman July 1, 2008

2). Alan Bannister Former Mayoral Assistant June 28, 2008

3). Michael Beazley Former Clerk of Council and Chair of Democratic Party June 19, 2008

4). Bob Bell President and CEO, The Toledo Symphony; Friend of Mayor Ford July 2008

5). Michael Bell Former Fire Chief for City of Toledo; Current State of Ohio Fire Marshal July 21, 2008

6). Jay Black, Jr. Former Chief of Staff June 10, 2008

7). John Block Publisher of The Toledo Blade July 15, 2008

8). Bill Brennan President of the Associated of General Contractors of NW Ohio August 4, 2008

9). Wilma Brown District Councilwoman June 17, 2008

10). Phillip Copeland At-Large Member of City Council July 15, 2008

358

11). Thomas Crothers Former Chief of Staff June 18, 2008

12). George Davis, Jr. Community Activist; Former 1st Vice-President of NAACP July 1, 2008

13). Kelli Daniels Ford Campaign Staffer September 19, 2008

14). Louis Escobar Former President of Toledo City Council August 12, 2008

15). Teresa Fedor Former State Representative; Current State Senator; Former Teacher July 14, 2008

16). Carleton Finkbeiner Mayor (Mayor Ford’s predecessor and successor) July 16, 2008

17). Jack Ford Former Mayor of Toledo; Current Member of Toledo School Board June 24, 2008

18). Pete Gerken Current Member of Lucas County Board of Commissioners August 21, 2008

19). Ellen Gracheck Former District Councilwoman July 2008

20). Juanita Greene Executive Director of the City of Toledo Board of Community Relations June 19, 2008

21). Barbara Herring Former Law Director July 4, 2008

22). George Hilliard Community Activist; Democratic Party Ward Chair and Precinct Committeeman 359

July 10, 2008

23). Dr. Dan Johnson Former President of the University of Toledo August 4, 2008

24). Joslyn Jones Engineer for City of Toledo August 19, 2008

25). Wade Kapszukiewicz Former City Councilman; Current Lucas County Treasurer June 10, 2008

26). Ben Konop Member, Lucas County Board of Commissioners July 18, 2008

27). Anita Lopez Former Head of Office of Affirmative Action and Contract Compliance Current Lucas County Auditor June 19-20, 2008

28). Lloyd Mahaffey Director of Region 2B of the United Auto Workers

29). Ted Mastroianni Consultant to Ford Campaign; Executive Director of Transition Committee July 1, 2008

30). Yulanda McCarty-Harris Former Director of Office of Affirmative Action and Contract Compliance July 2008

31). Doni Miller Executive Director, Neighborhood Health Association Former President of Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority August 4, 2008

32). James Murray President of Ohio Operations of FirstEnergy Corp (based in Toledo) July 2, 008

33). Michael Navarre Chief of Police July 8, 2008 360

34). Willie Perryman, Jr. Mayoral Assistant and Pastor of Jerusalem Baptist Church July 3, 2008

35). Susan Reams Former Arts Consultant for Ford Administration July 10, 2008

36). Paula Ross Former Chair of Lucas County Democratic Party June 23, 2008

37). Jan Ruma Executive Director of CareNet August 21, 2008

38). James Ruvolo Consultant June 19, 2008

39). George Sarantou At-Large City Councilman June 20, 2008

40). Robert Savage Transition Team Co-Chair; Friend of Ford

41). Peter Silverman Former President of Toledo School Board June 15, 2008

42). Tina Skeldon-Wozniak President, Lucas County Board of Commissioners July 2, 2008

43). Robert Smith Founder of African American Legacy Project of NW Ohio July 19, 2008

44). Larry Sykes Former President of Toledo School Board July 5, 2008

45). Francis Szollosi At-Large City Councilman 361

June 25, 2008

46). James Telb, Ph.D. Sheriff, Lucas County July 9, 2008

47). Duane Tisdale Pastor of Friendship Baptist Church July 23, 2008

48). Megan Vahey Former Campaign Manager, Public Information Officer, and Executive Assistant June 28, 2008

49). Robert Vasquez Friend of Ford and Current Member of Toledo School Board July 2008

50). Joe Walter Former Safety Director June 17, 2008

51). Charles Welch Owner of WJUC-The Juice-107.3 FM August 4, 2008

52). Linnie Willis Executive Director of Lucas County Metropolitan Housing Authority July 17, 2008

53). Fletcher Word Editor and Publisher of Weekly Black Newspaper, The Sojourner’s Truth June 18, 2008

362

APPENDIX H

List of Interviews

Dayton

1). Claud Bell, Sr. President, Innerwest Priority Board August 5, 2008

2). Richard S. Biehl Chief of Police, City of Dayton July 22, 2008

3). Don G. Black Editor and Publisher of The Dayton Weekly News July 23, 2008

4). Willis E. Blackshear Montgomery County Recorder July 22, 2008

5). Annie C. Bonaparte 1st Vice President, Innerwest Priority Board August 5, 2008

6). Idotha Bootsie-Neal President, Wright-Dunbar, Inc. and former city commissioner Telephone Interview

7). Ronald F. Budzik Member, Dayton Business Committee August 7, 2008

8). City Officials with Dayton Priority Boards Department of Planning and Community Development July 3, 2008

9). James Cummings Dayton Daily News Reporter Telephone Interview

10). Harry Delaney WHIO-TV Vice President and General Manager 363

August 7, 2008

11). Judy Dodge Montgomery County Commissioner August 5, 2008

12). Alvin Freeman Founding Member, Concerned Christian Men August 7, 2008

13). Daniel K. Foley Montgomery County Commissioner August 5, 2008

14). Daniel G. Gehres Judge, Dayton Municipal Court August 7, 2008

15). Martin Gottlieb Editorial Columnist, Dayton Daily News July 22, 2008

16). Marsha Greer Director of Educational Programs, Parity, Inc. August 7, 2008

17). Carole L. Grimes Member, Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority Board August 5, 2008

18). Rev. Dr. P.E. Henderson, Jr. Pastor, Corinthian Baptist Church August 5, 2008

19). Matt Joseph Dayton City Commissioner July 3, 2008

20). Karl L. Keith Montgomery County Auditor August 7, 2008

21). Debbie Lieberman Montgomery County Commissioner August 14, 2008

364

22). B. Cato Mayberry Director, Office of Alumni Relations, Central State University August 6, 2008

23). Rhine McLin Mayor, City of Dayton June 26, 2008

24). Mark E. Owens Chair, Montgomery County Democratic Party July 22, 2008

25). Philip L. Parker CEO, Dayton Chamber of Commerce Telephone Interview

26). Ginny Strausburg Executive Director, Dayton Power and Light Company Foundation August 5, 2008

27). Ken Sulfridge President of AFSCME Local 101 August 5, 2008

28). Kurt Stanic Superintendent, Dayton Public Schools August 5, 2008

29). Nan Whaley Dayton City Commissioner June 26, 2008

30). Rashad Young City Manager, City of Dayton July 16, 2008

365

APPENDIX I

List of Propositions

Proposition 1: Black mayors elected in liberal cities are more likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents (Browning,

Marshall and Tabb, 1984).

Proposition 2: Black mayors elected in racially divided election campaign are less likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents (Metz and Tate 1995, Perry 1996).

Proposition 3: Black mayors who have the institutional and formal powers of a strong-mayor system are more likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents (Svara 1994; Pressman 1972).

Proposition 4: Black mayors who have had an African-American predecessor(s) are more likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of

Black residents (Nelson 2007).

Propositions 5: Black mayors who govern in cities with a large working class White population are less likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989).

Proposition 6: Black mayors who govern in cities with a large White middle class population are more likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents (Stone 1989). 366

Proposition 7: Black mayors who are elected in cities where the Black community is mobilized and organized are more likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents (Nelson 2007, Burns 2006).

Proposition 8: Black mayors who serve on city councils in which African-Americans are a majority or a substantial minority are more likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents (Jones 1976; Karnig and

Welch 1980).

Proposition 9: Black mayors who gain the endorsement of the major newspapers and whose policies are embraced and positively covered by the newspapers are more likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents (Tate 2003; Burns 2006).

Proposition 10: Black mayors who are elected in non-majority Black cities that have a sizable proportion of Latinos in their population are more likely to actively pursue policies designed to improve the quality of life of Black residents.

367

APPENDIX J

Roster of Significant Activities of Mayors Ford and McLin

Mayor McLin 1. Housing and Neighborhood Redevelopment (Project SUN, HOPE VI, The 2003 Citirama in Wright Dunbar Village and Paul Laurence Dunbar Event, The ORION Solution) 2. ‘Hiring’ of Police Chief and City Manager 3. Support of the School System 4. The Role of Symbolic Gestures (e.g., Mayor’s Valentines Day Jam, Showcase of Talent)

Mayor Ford 1. The Capacity Building Program 2. Merger of the Office of Affirmative Action/Contract Compliance with Purchasing 3. CareNet 4. 2003 Smoking Ban Passage 5. Hiring of Blacks/Promotion in Key Positions in City Government

368

APPENDIX K

Research Methods Process

Council/Commission Minutes Content Analysis Methodology488

Step 1: Examined minutes and an agenda for one meeting

Step 2: Identified content that impacted African Americans

Dayton, Ohio Example:

McLin support of Informal Resolution No. 650-05 - Authorizing Support of the Proposed Triangle Project Sponsored by Improved Solutions for Urban Systems (ISUS). Voting in the affirmative were Mayor McLin, Commissioners Lovelace, Williams, Zimmer and Joseph. A roll call vote was taken resulting in a 5-0 vote. The Informal Resolution was adopted.

Date: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 Meeting of the Dayton City Commission

Step 3: Coded Examples as Policy Action or Program Development

Step 4: Coded by year

Step 5: Consulted interview data, coded into 1-5 typology

488 108 minutes/agendas for the entirety of Mayor Ford’s term in Toledo from 2002-2005 and 386 minutes/agendas from the beginning of Mayor McLin’s term in 2002 through August 1, 2008.

369

APPENDIX L

Names of Significant Mayor Ford African American Appointees489

In Mayor’s Office Jay Black, Jr. Cynthia Savage - Secretary Cynthia Wilkes - Secretary Cecelia Burton - Secretary Alan Bannister – Mayoral Assistant Tracy Hopkins – Mayoral Assistant - Administrative Specialist -Youth Commission Art Jones – Constituent Affairs

Directors of Departments Joyce Chappele – Human Resources Yulanda McCarty-Harris - Affirmative Action-Contract Compliance/Purchasing Michael Bell - Fire Department Juanita Greene - Board of Community Relations Kattie Bond - Parks and Recreation Jimmy Gaines - Public Service

Black Commissioners within Departments Julian Highsmith – Fleet & Facilities Robert Gilchrist – Economic Development Jerry Jones – Utilities Administration and Environmental Services John Walthal – Commissioner of Environmental Services and the Water Treatment Plant Todd Mitchell – Commissioner of Special Projects - in Parks and Recreation Willie Perryman – Commissioner of Development under Dept of Neighborhoods

Black Managers within Departments Jeannette Ball – Manager of Environ Services Michelle Hughes-Tucker – Manager of the Landfill in Solid Waste, Public Service Angela Lynn Stewart – Manager of Special Projects/Benefits in HR Art Jones – Manager of Special Projects in Public Utilities John Walthal –Manager of Water Treatment Plant Rose Ellis – Manager of Benefits in HR

Other Professional Positions George Robinson – Environmental Services Patekka Bannister- Environmental Services

489 The listing of names may be incomplete and is based on information from a phone interview with Alan Bannister, a former campaign official and administration appointee of Ford. 370

Adea Boston – Attorney in Affirmative Action/Contract Compliance (worked under consent decree project) Marcy Cannon – Attorney in Affirmative Action/Contract Compliance (worked under consent decree project; later moved to Law Department as Attorney) Josyln Sumers-Jones - Engineer Veronica Cottingham – Engineer

371

APPENDIX M

Tables of Mayoral Activities

Ford’s Black Quality of Life Activities in 2002

Policy Actions Program Development

9 Balanced $15 million budget shortfall (did 9 Introduced a ‘no broken windows’ not lay off any police or fire fighters) approach toward crime (focused on neighborhood blight, rehabilitation and/or 9 Reviewed the role of Community demolition of abandoned buildings and Development Corporations as they broken streetlights) impacted all citizens 9 Pursued a police substation in a working 9 Formed an economic development staff class neighborhood that visited 500 businesses (to determine how government could meet business 9 Appointed Black Female Police Sergeant needs) to revitalize Toledo’s Block Watch Program 9 Raised funds for two predominantly Black elementary schools’ libraries 9 ‘Make the Grade,’ (a program of adult tutors to children in need of help with core 9 Settled an eleven year old U.S. EPA subjects) lawsuit (the longest running lawsuit of its kind in the country aimed at developing 9 Seed of Success (an entrepreneurial cleaner water) program to provide small loans to youth to start their own businesses)

9 ‘Mayor’s Time’ (a program that focuses on organized productive activities at locations available to youth between the hours of 3:30 and 6:30 p.m.)

9 Fit for Kids program, (an initiative focused on youth weight, healthy eating, exercise and alcohol/drugs)

9 CareNet, (a network of coordinated healthcare for adults without health insurance)

372

Ford’s Black Quality of Life Activities in 2003

Policy Actions Program Development

9 Merger of Office of Affirmative 9 Created Capacity Building Program Action/Contract Compliance and (designed to build capacity within the Purchasing Department disadvantaged business community by providing minority business owners 9 Collaboration with Fire Department to training and information as it related to provide more homes with smoke detectors applying for city contracts)

9 Collaboration with Police Department to 9 Built a skateboard complex reinstate a gun buy-back program through the use of drug forfeiture funds 9 Established a disability accessible park

9 Created the city’s first written ethics policy 9 Created an alley-clean strike team (for the purpose of monitoring illegal dumping, 9 Balanced budget (without safety layoffs) nuisance abatement, litter and blight)

9 Reduced sick-time abuse and city vehicle 9 Created a Department of Information take-home and cell-phone use Services

9 Reformed the Community Development 9 Hired a Director to fix city hall’s Block Grant funding process technology infrastructure

9 Tore down vacant or abandoned units 9 Increased the number of Block Watch groups 9 Appointed full time Safety Director; 9 Initiated the Mayor’s Coalition on Prostate 9 Resurfacing of roads program Cancer Awareness and Education

9 Advocated aggressively for city-wide smoking ban

373

Ford’s Black Quality of Life Activities in 2004

Policy Actions Program Development

9 Began renovation of crime lab 9 Secured funding for the Art Tatum Jazz Festival 9 Authorized the installation of video cameras at high risk carry outs 9 Increased the number of Block Watch groups 9 Supported the Local Initiatives Support Corporation, (a program to fund projects to 9 Completed the process to reform the change the image of neighborhoods) CDGB grant process (eliminated poor performing agencies and rewarded well- 9 Reported the building of new housing performing ones) units, rehabilitations, and demolition of blighted or abandoned units 9 Youth entrepreneur program, reported 73 youth started their own businesses 9 Issued 8,000 tickets for property nuisance violations

9 Held four city-wide cleanups (debris in largely inner-city neighborhoods)

9 Filled nearly 59,000 potholes and paved 22 miles of streets, including brick crosswalks downtown

9 Repaired two bridges with significance to Blacks – one downtown named after Martin Luther King and another in inner- city Black neighborhood

9 Repaired an underpass and installed bright lights in a predominantly low income Black neighborhood

9 Upgraded tennis courts in predominantly Black neighborhood

9 Approved the request for a new basketball court in a predominantly Black neighborhood

9 Requested that HUD advise the city regarding it as an Urban County designation

374

McLin’s Black Quality of Life Activities in 2002

Policy Actions Program Development

9 The city’s first-ever racial profiling 9 Initiated Mayor’s Nights (a program policy to talk one-on-one with Dayton citizens) 9 Evaluated the effectiveness of the Human Rehabilitation Center, a 9 Initiated an annual program to read center for incarcerated criminals to children (summers, in all city libraries) 9 Supported the plan to end school busing 9 Initiated Mayor’s walks (in a dozen selected communities annually to 9 Diversify the ranks of the police and identify problems within fire departments neighborhoods)

9 Initiated mayoral meetings with 9 Visited and encouraged economic school board and administration development staff to make 370 contacts with local businesses 9 Organized economic meetings with selected business leaders 9 Supported creation of Dayton Technology Task Force (to attract 9 Initiated home rule provision suit technologically based companies) against State of Ohio ` 9 Influenced the department of 9 Mayoral Office support of school economic development to devote levy business assistance resources for suppliers to expand markets 9 Supported the development of the former Frigidaire plant into Tech Town

375

McLin’s Black Quality of Life Activities in 2003

Policy Actions Program Development

9 Initiated Project SUN (Strong Urban 9 Genesis Project (a community rebuilding Neighborhoods) partnership)

9 Initiated TeamGov (a regional effort to 9 Provided support for the Arcade and the develop collaboration across government Biltmore – downtown for redevelopment jurisdictions) into affordable housing

9 Joint Application with the City of 9 Provided support for the Inventing Flight Kettering, for a $100,000 U.S. Conference Festival of Mayors/DuPoint Corp. grant (to remove lead-based paint from neighborhood 9 Collaborated with the city of Kettering, on housing units) a dialogue on race and reconciliation

9 Phoenix Project (comprehensive 9 Issued permits for 276 new homes neighborhood redevelopment project in NW Dayton) 9 Supported the Citirama event in Wright Dunbar Village 9 Provided support of the re-write of the city’s zoning code 9 Provided support for City’s Forest and Ecumenical Homes housing project 9 Provided support for Building Services’ enforcement of illegal dumping 9 Provided support for the HOPE VI project (a collaboration of HUD and DMHA) 9 Provided support for Greater Dayton Regional Transit Authority (RTA) (a new 9 Provided support for the $627 million Park-N-Ride facility in the Wright Dunbar School Facilities Master Planning Process Village) in building new schools

9 Worked to balance the budget (without layoffs)

9 Support Commission Retreat to provide direction for monthly financial and budgetary issues

9 Supported the creation of the Strategic Financial Plan Study Commission (a collaboration of public and private sectors to study the impact of the economy on the Dayton region)

376

McLin’s Black Quality of Life Activities in 2004

Policy Actions Program Development

9 City government achieved a bond rating by 9 Created Teen council to address youth Moody’s Investors Service from A1 to A2 concerns

9 Pursued more resources from the state’s 9 Initiated a road re-pavement program Local Government Fund 9 Provided support for Building Services’ 9 Provided a coalition of partners’ support to demolition of nuisance structures encourage residents to take advantage of the federal Earned Income Tax Credit and 9 Supported community policing efforts, the Child Tax Credit which she attributed to a 17% decrease in major crime since 2001. 9 Provided support for a free financial education training program (sponsored by 9 Provided support for the Police the Division of Citizen Participation and Department Park and Patrol program the Southwest Priority Board) (designed to get officers out of their cars and onto neighborhood streets) 9 Provided support fir collaborative regional partnership to reduce chronic homelessness 9 Provided support of the Department of Parks, Recreation and Culture’s program 9 Supported passage of the Civility Safe Haven hours program (to provide Resolution to encourage citizens’ basic and designated safe locations for youth mutual respect between the hours of 2-8 p.m. M-F)

9 Provided support of the housing development team’s processing of 208 single family home permits

9 Provided support for mortgage credit counseling program

9 Provide support for new downtown housing development

377

McLin’s Black Quality of Life Activities in 2005

Policy Actions Program Development

9 Proposed Mayor’s Heritage Program (an 9 As mayor and a member of city initiative to encourage citizens to put forth commission, voted for the purchase of 20 hours of community service) new police vehicles

9 Collaborated with Miami Township to 9 As mayor and a member of city complete first joint economic development commission, voted for the purchase of a district agreement new ladder truck for the fire department

9 Provided an endorsement for the city’s 9 As mayor and a member of city $100,000 contribution to the Community commission, voted for the purchase of a Blood Center ‘s expansion and renovation new waste collection truck project 9 Advocated for the development of 9 Provided support for a tax sharing brownfields (Nibco property, McCalls agreement with Montgomery county printing plant site and the old HG and R (Kettering, Vandalia, and Moraine) foundry)

9 Reported overall crime decreased by 25% 9 Provided support of the new class of police over last 5 years officer recruits

9 Provided support for community based 9 Provided support for the development of a policing (resulting in a purported reduction regional crime fighting effort (designed to in major crime) equip police officers with a central database access to track suspects) 9 Provided support for the Shaming Sign program (designed to pressure owners of 9 Provided support for the housing and neglected property) neighborhood taskforce initiative to demolish nuisance structures 9 Helped develop et al. the ORION solution (a program that provides city and quality of 9 Provided support for the development of life resources for neighborhoods) market rate houses

9 Provided support for predatory lending 9 Provided support for a Youth Anti- legislation Violence Seminar

9 Provided support for the creation of the Dayton Commission on Youth

9 Mayor’s program to showcase talented young people’s positive activities

9 As mayor and a member of city commission, supported the DPS by allotting a $552,000 check (funds collected as a result of the economic development tax sharing program)

378

McLin’s Black Quality of Life Activities in 2006

Policy Actions Program Development

9 As mayor and a member of city 9 Re-initiated the Mayor’s Reading commission, ‘Hired’ first Black Male City Challenge Manager 9 Encouraged the implementation of the 9 Provided support for passage of the city’s recommendations from the Strategic ½ % renewable portion of the 2.25% Financial Plan Study Committee earnings tax 9 Provided support for the Youth and Young 9 Completed the update of the zoning code Adult Trade and Skills Fair (designed to offer advice to youth on career planning 9 As mayor and a member of city and education) commission, authorized the hiring of firefighters and police officers 9 Provided support for the city’s collaboration with DPS Construction 9 Provided support for Operation Safe Technologies program (designed to Summer (a regional initiative to focus on provide students with the technical skills to troubled locations) rehab a property in Wright Dunbar village)

9 Provided support for the adoption of 9 Supported development of Ball Park regulations to reduce persons’ illegal Village (a comprehensive downtown stripping of metal and other materials from riverfront development project) buildings and construction sites

9 As mayor and a member of city commission, enacted disclosure ordinance for residential properties to help get existing code violations resolved before property changes hands

9 Provided support along with Commission on Youth for the hiring of Youth Development Coordinator

9 Provided support for a regional Comprehensive 2-yr Plan to reduce chronic homelessness

379

McLin’s Black Quality of Life Activities in 2007

Policy Actions Program Development

9 Mayor reports all major crime categories, 9 As mayor and a member of city including homicide and vehicle theft, commission, scheduled demolition of decreased down 25% or more deteriorating housing complex

9 As mayor and a member of city 9 Provided support for investment of a commission, appointed Chief of Police Salvation Army Community Center (who had experience in community policing) 9 Provided support and attended the dedication of new bridge, connecting West 9 As mayor and a member of city Dayton with downtown commission, doubled the financial resources directed toward the demolition of 9 Created and implemented the City Life nuisance, abandoned properties Sculpture exhibit downtown

9 Mayor reported an increase in volunteers 9 Provided support for Urban Nights a free and projects registered for the Mayor’s event that showcases downtown’s dining, Heritage Community Service program nightlife, art, music, retail, and urban living options (twice a year on a Friday night - an 9 Provided support of City Manager’s all-inclusive street party) implementation of key recommendations from an independent study of Dayton’s 9 Provided support for city internship economic development programs program to acquaint youth with City Hall

9 Provided support for the Homeless Solutions Taskforce’s creation and development