HUMANITARIAN ACCESS TEAM (HAT) PRELIMINARY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: Consolidation of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria

SEPTEMBER 2017 Executive Summary

Until late July, the vast majority of opposition-held northwestern Syria (to include all of Idleb governorate and parts of western Aleppo and northern Hama governorates) was under the military and administrative control of two organizations: Ahrar Al-Sham and Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. Over the past two years, the two organizations have been nominally allied under the Jaish Fatah alliance, but simultaneously maintained a significant rivalry over control of opposition-held northwestern Syria. The presence and administrative control of Ahrar Al-Sham was incredibly important to western-supported humanitarian and stabilization actors, as it provided a means to avoid directly engaging with Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham while still working in northwestern Syria. However, beginning in late July 2017, the rivalry between Ahrar Al-Sham and Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham erupted into armed conflict, which has subsequently left Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham as the predominant armed and political actor in opposition-controlled northwestern Syria.

To the casual observer, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s consolidated control poses a substantial and direct challenge to the internationally-supported humanitarian response in Idleb governorate. However, there are three important factors that must be taken into account when understanding the impact of these recent developments for humanitarians: first, while Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham appears to have taken full military control of northwestern Syria, this control is not monolithic and was at least partially achieved through the pragmatic defections of several local armed groups. Second, the degree of current Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham military control across the governorate does not necessarily correlate with governance and service provision control. And third, based on their community acceptance model and current financial state, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham is unlikely to impose significant, policy-level restrictions or impediments upon humanitarian aid delivery in the near term.

Nonetheless, the humanitarian impact of this development should not be underestimated. First and foremost, there have been unconfirmed reports that since their July victory, local elements of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham have attempted to influence beneficiary lists in order to target their own supporters and the families of killed combatants. Of note, this phenomenon is not new, is no way unique to northwestern Syria, and does not appear to reflect Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s formal policy.1 Aside from these reports, the impact of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham

1. Reportedly, larger NGOs and INGOs will likely be more successful in resisting Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s attempts at influence due to the scale of their operations and accompanying clout. control is primarily political, but will nonetheless likely impact the humanitarian response in three ways: first, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham administrative control could jeopardize western humanitarian funding in the short-term. Second, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham control risks to undermine the neutrality of many of the administrative mechanisms used by humanitarians to program and provide essential services in northwestern Syria, such as local councils. Finally, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has publicly announced that it will consolidate administrative, military, judicial, and service provision control, thereby creating a singular civil and military administration in opposition-held northern Syria. The broader impact of this situation is unclear, but could result in western donors imposing similar restrictions in northwestern Syria as those already in existence with respect to Government of Syria-controlled areas.

Based on the HAT’s preliminary assessments, the fundamental take-away for donors should be that Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s control of northwestern Syria is neither absolute nor monolithic, and therefore Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham omnipresence does not necessarily translate into omnipotence. From a humanitarian perspective, the recent Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham military successes should not prevent humanitarian organizations from continuing to implement programs, but will require renewed and extensive research, vetting, and assessment procedures to ensure the neutrality of local councils, partners, beneficiary lists, bakeries, hawalas, and vendors, as well as further messaging to all new stakeholders on humanitarian principles.

Armed Opposition-Controlled Northwest Syria

Dana Sarmada Harim Daret Azza Atareb Turkey Kafr Takharim Batbu

Kelly Hazano

Armanaz

Darkosh Ma'arrat Tamasrin Teftnaz

Idleb Sarmin Um RishAqrabat Bsheiriyeh - Bello Qaysiyeh

Badama Jisr-Ash- Shugur Abul Thohur Ehsem Qastun Ma'arrat An Nu'man Telamnas Kafr Nobol Shorlin Sanjar Lower Amiqa Faqie Hawash Upper Hweijeh Tramla Shahranaz Eastern Huweiz Border Crossing/Access Point Madiq Castle

Armed Opposition Groups (AOG)

Contested Areas

Government of Syria (GoS)

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of HTS Control in Opposition-Controlled NW Syria A 2 Introduction

Idleb governorate is located in northwestern Syria and, since becoming the first governorate to fall under the full control of the armed opposition in mid-2015, acts as the administrative center for opposition-controlled northern Syria. Humanitarian needs have increased dramatically in the past two years, and there are currently 1,667,3372 people in need inside the opposition held areas of northwestern Syria. Throughout all of opposition- controlled northwestern Syria (to include western Aleppo and northern Hama), there are approximately 2,497,948 people, of whom nearly 1,017,600 are IDPs.3 ‘Reconciliation’ agreements negotiated in central Syria and Arsal, Lebanon have further stressed the humanitarian situation in Idleb governorate by adding an approximate 73,000 additional IDPs (included in the total IDP estimate) in the last ten months. Like many areas in Syria, the greatest impediment to humanitarian access is political, in this case a function of the presence of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the U.S. State Department.4

As of August 27, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham now controls the vast majority of northwestern Syria, with the exception of approximately six subdistricts5 that remain in the hands of rival Ahrar Al-Sham. Yet Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s predominance is not only due to military prowess; it is also due to Ahrar Al-Sham defections, which has cost the group between a third and half of its total fighters in Idleb governorate. Local defections were largely driven by pragmatism, whereas senior defections were driven at least partially by internal divisions within between hardline and moderate factions.6 Following their defeat, Ahrar Al-Sham has elected a new leader in early August, and will likely recalibrate its political strategy; whether this is sufficient to retake territory remains to be seen, but is is clear that the organization is by no means finished.

Prior to the conflict in late-July 2017, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham and Ahrar Al-Sham maintained separate and parallel judicial, administrative, and service provision structures, while competing for influence over Shura and local council governance. Since their takeover, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has focused on merging and uniting these judicial, administration, and service provision structures, with an emphasis on sectors with the highest potential for immediate revenue generation. Despite this effort, several communities in Idleb have directly disobeyed, disregarded, or hesitated to implement Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham directives, as will be discussed below. Consequently, the control and influence of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham over service provision, administration, and justice is uneven and differs by community.

There are no indications that Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham plans to formally implement direct taxation or fees on in- kind humanitarian assistance in northwestern Syria; while localized incidents may occur, these appear to be the exception and not the rule. For contrary to eastern Syria, opposition-controlled northwestern Syria is not rich in easily extractable natural resources; therefore, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham is currently financially dependent on internal fees and taxation, and is thus unable to meet western Aleppo and Idleb’s incredibly high humanitarian needs independently. Furthermore, in light of their community acceptance model, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham is unlikely to knowingly take actions that would destabilize the existing in-kind humanitarian response, as this would alienate not only their local constituency but also the potent business community that has emerged to support the remote INGO humanitarian response. Yet if Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham is able to informally or indirectly redirect aid

2. Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2017_Syria_hno_161205.pdf 3. Numbers according to Needs and Population Monitoring, July 2017 round. 4. Although Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham is not formally named as an FTO, ‘Al-Nusra Front’ (Jabhat Al-Nusra) was added by the U.S. Department of State as of May 2015. Subsequently, as Jabhat Al-Nusra re-branded as ‘Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham’ in July 2016 and then ‘Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’ in January 2017, U.S. State Department officials have since affirmed that Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham is a FTO, included as an alias to Al-Nusra Front. 5. These six subdistricts include one in western Aleppo, three in northern Hama, and two Idleb governorates. That being said, in much of opposition-held Syria formal pre-conflict administrative boundaries are not a particularly useful means of analyzing armed actors or the wider population in opposition-controlled areas. However, for the purposes of this paper, traditional administrative boundaries will be used. 6. In November 2016, Ahrar Al-Sham’s Shura Council appointed moderate Ali Al-Omar over hardline Hasham Sheikh, resulting in the resignation of eight of the nineteen Shura Council members, who subsequently defected to join Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham.

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of HTS Control in Opposition-Controlled NW Syria A 3 or influence beneficiary list composition, their local legitimacy may increase; at the same time, if the humanitarian community increases contextual analysis, vetting, verification, and monitoring to ensure beneficiary list selection and partners are neutral,7 and continues to work at scale in northwestern Syria, then Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s legitimacy will remain unchanged, or may even decrease,8 as communities will remain resilient and unreliant on Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham for humanitarian assistance. Armed Actor Dynamics

In late July, large-scale infighting between armed groups in northwestern Syria occurred, concluding with the majority of opposition-held northwestern Syria falling under the military control of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. After brief clashes in strategic areas in northern Idleb and northwestern Aleppo governorates on July 18 and 19, the much-anticipated, Idleb-wide confrontation between Ahrar Al-Sham and Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham began.9 Through July 20 and 21, large-scale infighting, defections, proliferation of checkpoints, and seizures of strategic communities by both Ahrar Al-Sham and Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham occurred. On July 22, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham took control of the strategic hills overlooking Bab Elhawa, the Turkey-Syria border crossing in northern Idleb, which had previously been controlled by Ahrar Al-Sham. On July 23, a governorate-wide ceasefire was implemented. Based on unconfirmed estimates, Ahrar Al-Sham lost up to half of its affiliated fighters in Idleb due to defections, from an estimated total number of 30,000-35,000 to a current estimate of 10,000-15,000 fighters,10 and its core leadership reportedly evacuated to Jarablus. Remaining fighters have reportedly regrouped in western Aleppo and northern Hama, while allied local groups remain largely in control of three subdistricts in Idleb. While the Government of Turkey temporarily closed the Bab Elhawa border crossing due to Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s takeover of Idleb, the border reopened on July 26 to civilians, humanitarian aid, and commercial goods, with restrictions on certain items.11

With their victory, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has begun to dismantle parallel or Ahrar Al-Sham-affiliated organizations and structures and consolidate judicial, governance, and service provision bodies throughout most of Idleb governorate. All available evidence indicates that Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham intends to create unified and centralized military, administrative, judicial, and service provision ministries (For a full diagram of Hay’at Tahrir Al- Sham’s intended administrative structure, see Annex I). However, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham prioritizes its community acceptance strategy; it lacks the financial resources to independently provide sufficient services and humanitarian assistance; and the population of Idleb is heavily reliant on local and international organizations funded by donors perceived to be hostile to Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. Therefore, it is also likely that Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham does not intend to remain the single, predominant political actor indefinitely. To that effect, local reports indicate that on August 24, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham held a conference12 with activists, local notables, and journalists in which it stated not only its intention for a centralized government structure, complete with line ministries, but also that it intends to dissolve all armed groups (including Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham) and fall under the aegis of a single Ministry of Defense.13

7. Of note, the need for renewed contextual analysis is not because compliance threats have fundamentally changed, but rather because armed group alignments have. 8. For more information please see the June 2017 HAT Situation Report: Hawala registration in Idleb, linked here. 9. For more information please see the February 2017 HAT Scenario Plan: Idleb/Western Aleppo/North Hama, linked here. 10. Official Ahrar Al-Sham-affiliated media stated that the armed group included 40,000 fighters before the infighting began with Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. Since late July, Ahrar Al-Sham has not provided any figures regarding the number of fighters remaining after large-scale defections to Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. 11. Reportedly, ‘heavy’ commercial goods, such as construction material and heavy machinery is prohibited from crossing Bab Elhawa from Turkey. 12. According to local reports, the August 24 conference outlined the implementation of a centralized ‘government’ structure complete with ministries, such as a ministry for local administration, ministry of interior, and ministry of defense. Reports also indicated that if the initiative is successful, a medium-term goal would be to dissolve all armed groups, to be merged under the discussed ministry of defense. Although the conference was reported to be open to any willing actor in opposition-held Idleb, the actual armed group representation attending the conference is unclear. 13. This was echoed by Hashim Al-Sheikh Abu Jaber, a Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham commander who reportedly stated, “[The attendees of the August 24 conference]

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of HTS Control in Opposition-Controlled NW Syria A 4 In this way, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham likely seeks to employ a ‘Trojan Horse’ strategy to consolidate and retain influence over all aspects of opposition governance while avoiding accompanying sanctions, which will be described in an upcoming HAT research paper. The success of this plan will largely depend on regional and international actors; while the August 24 conference was praised by Turkish media outlet Yeni Şafak as ‘‘Turkey’s plan to save Idleb” by “[stripping] any legitimacy from the planned international operation against Idlib,” an alliance consisting of armed and political groups hostile to Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has already launched a counter-initiative, which will likely be much more palatable to the Government of Turkey.

While the conflict was devastating politically and militarily for Ahrar Al-Sham, the organization is by no means totally defeated; Ahrar Al-Sham continues to function (though at a much lower level) both politically and militarily, and has recently replaced key leadership in an effort to attract former defected units.14 Defections, rather than military prowess, largely explain Ahrar Al-Sham’s defeat: when fighting began, several prominent defections took place throughout Idleb driven by tactical, pragmatic, and ideological reasons. The latter is in many ways a function of larger geopolitical dynamics: since at least November 2016, Ahrar Al-Sham, like many other Syrian armed groups, has recalibrated its internal political stance on account of increasing international consensus and pressure for a negotiated political settlement to the Syrian crisis. This ‘moderate’ stance has alienated many conservatives and caused a number of key defections; however, Ahrar Al-Sham still may have the ability to reassert itself and win back defected supporters, especially with the selection of hardliner Hassan Sofian as Ahrar Al-Sham’s leader in August 2017. In light of these facts, and recognizing the fluidity of armed actor allegiance in northwestern Syria, Ahrar Al-Sham could ultimately reunite with armed groups that defected to Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. In truth, while this scenario is unlikely, it depends on the geopolitical strategies of regional actors, which are often even more unpredictable than armed group affiliations.

told us first you have to dissolve [Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham]. We said we are ready for this, but only if the factions themselves are dissolved” during a recent Friday sermon. 14. As of August 28, Ahrar Al-Sham continues to control several communities, to include: Armanaz, Armanaz subdistrict; Hazano and Kelly, Maaret Tamsrin subdistrict; Batbu, Atareb subdistrict; Kafr Takharim, Kafr Takharim subdistrict; Bennsh, Bennsh subdistrict; Badama, Badama subdistrict; Madiq Castle and Shahranaz, Madiq Castle subdistrict; As-Suqaylabiyah, As-Suqaylabiyah subdistrict, and Atareb, Atareb subdistrict. Furthermore, the August 1 appointment of Hassan Sofian, one of the three founders of Ahrar Al-Sham, strongly indicates that Ahrar Al-Sham will attempt to recalibrate its military and political strategy. On August 7, Ahrar Al-Sham released a video address by Sofian, acknowledging the cause of Ahrar Al-Sham’s defeat as ‘paralysis’ and ‘lack of message among its membership’, while pledging a comprehensive reform based on ‘an inclusive, revolutionary project’ to include political, military, and civil institutions. Sofian is known to have strong connections with and influence over many of the recently defected armed groups, and is considered to be a ‘unifying’ leader; therefore, it is likely Sofian will attempt to reintegrate armed groups which have defected from Ahrar Al-Sham. Additionally, following his appointment, Sofian reportedly held a strategic meeting in Sokur Al-Sham military base, Ehsim subdistrict, with Tawfiq Shahabuddin, the leader of Noureddine Al-Zenki, Abu Issa Al-Sheikh, the leader of Sokur Al-Sham, and Abu Saleh Tahhan, leader of Jaish Al-Ahrar, an armed group within Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. Of note, Abu Saleh Tahhan formed Jaish Al-Ahrar following his defection from Ahrar Al-Sham to Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. This defection was reportedly prompted by the relatively ‘moderate’ policies of Ali Al-Omar, the former leader of Ahrar Al-Sham.

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of HTS Control in Opposition-Controlled NW Syria A 5 Preliminary Sectoral Impact Assessment Degree of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham Control in Idleb and Western Aleppo by Subdistrict

Haritan Daret Azza Dana

Harim Qourqeena Jebel Saman

Atareb Salqin Kafr Takharim

Maaret Tamsrin Armanaz Teftnaz Darkosh Bennsh Zarbah Hadher

Janudiyeh Idleb Sarmin

Saraqab Jisr-Ash-Shugur Badama Mhambal Ariha

Abul Thohur Tall Ed-daman

Ehsem

Maarrat An Numan

Kafr Nobol Sanjar Heish

Tamanaah Khan Shaykun

No Impact or Control Presence/Low Control In uence/Medium Control Control/High Control

Note: This map reflects HAT research on Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s reported impact, influence, and control over administrative bodies, judicial bodies, local and Shura councils, military and security control, and service provision at the community level, subsequently aggregated and displayed at the subdistrict level (due to security and do-no-harm concerns). Northern Hama has not been included due to challenges associated with applying pre-conflict administrative boundaries to northern Hama as well as the fact that Hama’s armed opposition actors dynamics are unique, and not addressed in detail in this document.

As noted, in the wake of their newfound control of virtually all opposition-held northwestern Syria,15 Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham will seek to influence and ultimately unify governance structures, the judiciary, and service provision directorates, which will also indirectly impact humanitarian interventions and trade routes. In a series of announcements since July 27, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has indicated its intention to coordinate with service providers, local councils, and security services under the Civil Administration for Services (formerly the General Administration for Services), a body affiliated with Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham.16

15. As mentioned previously, armed actors do not necessarily operate in consideration of formal, pre-conflict administrative boundaries. 16. Previously, NGOs worked with parallel governance structures and service providers not affiliated with Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham; broadly speaking, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham is now attempting to integrate these structures.

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of HTS Control in Opposition-Controlled NW Syria A 6 This paper will now assess the impact of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s control over decision-making bodies (Local and Shura Councils), judicial bodies, and administrative and service provision institutions based on several factors, to include the degree of territorial military control. These entities have been selected as they have the potential to facilitate or hinder humanitarian work, and the impact following the July 2017 clashes can be roughly broken down into four categories:

AA No impact: subdistricts where changes in political and military control did not occur, and therefore have not experienced impact due to the fighting in July 2017. Of note, these subdistricts may still be affected by the impact of northwestern Syria’s broader political trajectory, such as changes to cross-border policies, donor and internal legal restrictions, and trade routes, the latter specifically in the event that commodities intersect crossing points controlled (and taxed) by Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. AA Presence: subdistricts where Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has a physical presence for the purposes of intimidation and/or monitoring decisions, agreements, and activities, or has issued decrees regarding decision-making without the power or local buy-in needed for implementation. AA Influence: subdistricts where Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham-affiliated individuals constitute a component in decision-making (for example, having a Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham-affiliated individual on a local council); AA Control: subdistricts where Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has near or complete control over all institutional decision-making. ● Humanitarian Activities

For the purposes of this paper, humanitarian interventions in northern Syria can be divided into two categories: emergency in-kind distributions (delivered through multiple modalities), such as food baskets and NFIs, and service provision, such as health, education, psychosocial support, WASH, livelihood, and other sectors. Outside of a few isolated incidents, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham appears to be inclined to ensure the continuation of in-kind humanitarian activities.17 First and foremost, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham does not have a formal policy of imposing fees from local or international NGOs. To this point, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham issued a statement on July 30 that included several points to include the importance of humanitarian neutrality and the continuity of humanitarian aid delivery; their intention to facilitate humanitarian activities; and the establishment of an adjudication mechanism created to address beneficiary complaints (See Annex II). Subsequently, on August 24, Haya’at Tahrir Al-Sham held a conference in Idleb City intended to solicit buy-in from civil society actors, and announce their intention to develop an inclusive and unified governance and administration platform that will not apparently fall under the aegis of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham specifically, but rather an alternative and more neutral body.

That being said, formally speaking Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has three administrative mechanisms to exert influence on humanitarian actors: the Office of [Humanitarian] Organizations, the Office of Services, and the Shari’a Office. The influence of these three directorates may expand if Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s governance structures grow; however, it is likely against Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s interest to substantially impede humanitarian assistance due to their lack of financial capacity and need for popular support throughout Idleb.

17. On July 22, reports indicated that Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham fighters attacked local humanitarian actors headquarters in Sarmada, Dana subdistrict. The attack reportedly involved indiscriminate shooting, seizure of the building and the arrest of several the NGOs employees. Subsequently, the NGO issued a statement which claimed the incident was due an argument between an individual NGO staff member and two members of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. Reportedly, the issue was resolved after the NGO communicated with the Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham leadership. Additionally, on August 7, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham conducted a raid for unknown reasons into a different local NGO, in Ma’arrat An Nu’man, Ma’arrat An Nu’man subdistrict, where it reportedly expelled the center’s staff and seized control over the building.

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of HTS Control in Opposition-Controlled NW Syria A 7 The Office of [Humanitarian] Organizations formed in late 2015 as a component of the Jabhat Al-Nusra- affiliated General Administration for Services and is nominally responsible for registering and overseeing humanitarian operations in Idleb. However, the Office of [Humanitarian] Organizations is considered to be financially weak, poorly staffed, and largely neglected by Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham leadership.18 The Office of Services, also within the General Administration for Services, is largely focused on electricity and water provision. The Office of Services capacity is also known to be quite low, again due to a lack of funding, human resources, equipment, and neglect from Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham leadership; as such, this office’s capabilities are limited to inquiring and inspecting the technical specifications of water and electricity projects, including those belonging to the humanitarian sector. The third mechanism for Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham to influence humanitarian actors is through the Shari’a Office, which has a mandate to ensure that all NGO and humanitarian activities comply with Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s interpretation of Islamic Law. Previously, NGOs have reported interference when, for example, genders are allowed to mix in workplaces, or when providing educational materials deemed ‘un-Islamic’ (including musical materials). Again, the capacity of this office is limited by financial constraints, and generally only interferes on the basis of request by local councils or community notables.

The indirect impact of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham political control is of far greater importance than the direct Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham interference in humanitarian organizations, which will be outlined in other sections of this paper. Service providing humanitarians will be most impacted by centralization of service provision directorates and increased control and influence over local councils; they will also be impacted by Hay’at Tahrir Al- Sham control over judicial bodies and Shura councils, especially in their role as mediators of local disputes. Furthermore, despite the fact that in-kind humanitarian distributions are not likely to be directly interfered with, any organizations conducting in-kind distributions will need to conduct additional research into the sources of commodities (to include cash) due to shifts in business community and changes in control over smuggling routes. Furthermore, there have been recent reports of newfound ‘relief associations,’ primarily located in northern Idleb and western Aleppo; Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has reportedly encouraged NGOs to coordinate humanitarian activities through these ‘relief associations,’ and it remains unclear the degree to which these new bodies are associated with or under the control of external armed actors. Shura Councils

Acting as an informal oversight body, Shura Councils were initially proposed by Ahrar Al-Sham in 2014 to coordinate and oversee all aspects of governance, to include armed groups, local courts, and selecting and validating the members of a community’s local council. Generally speaking, Shura Councils exist at the community level and contain between 8 to 25 members, including local stakeholders, representatives from the controlling armed group, and other community notables. To form a local council, individuals submit their applications to the Shura Council during a 5 to 15 day ‘election period.’ Once the period concludes, the Shura council will select the members of the local council in a closed session.19 In this way, the neutrality of Shura Councils directly impacts local councils, with which many humanitarian organizations work closely (and will be discussed below).

18. Of note, the Office of Organizations previously demanded that all active humanitarian actors and NGOs register personnel, activities, and projects. However, this demand was largely rejected, primarily due to the Office of Organizations’ low level of financial support and capacity. Currently, the Office of Organization’s primary impact on humanitarian actors is limited to inquiries of projects being implemented by privately-funded charities; this is largely based on requests from either local councils or local notables. 19. Although this is the main mechanism to assemble local councils in Idleb, there have been attempts to create the selection process more open and inclusive. On July 17, the Shura Council in Saraqab took the decision to from the Saraqab Local Council through a public election process. Additionally, the Idleb City Council, ostensibly operating as a local council on a larger scale, is formed by election; however, Idleb City Council is not elected through universal suffrage.

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of HTS Control in Opposition-Controlled NW Syria A 8 Following their offensive in late July 2017, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham had not taken any formal steps with respect to Shura Councils; however, one notable case highlights Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s intention to use Shura Councils as a means of influencing the composition of local councils. The Local Council of Dana, in Dana subdistrict, previously consisted of representatives from Faylaq Al-Sham, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham, and Ahrar Al-Sham, and the council’s term expired on July 20, concurrent to Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s consolidation of control. Subsequently, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham rejected the open application process for the subsequent Local Council of Dana and instead imposed a list of candidates almost entirely comprised of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham-affiliated individuals. Once the Dana Local Council had been formed, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham then dissolved the Shura Council, and reportedly intends to establish a similar body called the A’yan Council, which is likely to be far more influenced by Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. For this reason, humanitarian actors already working in communities where Shura Councils are still actively present should be aware of changes to composition or mandate, and subsequently reshape relationships accordingly. Judicial Entities

Since 2014, judicial decisions in opposition-held northwestern Syria governorate have typically fallen under one of two parallel judicial systems: the Ahrar Al-Sham-affiliated Islamic Administrative Commission, also known as the Shari’a court, and the Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham-affiliated Dar Al-Qadda’. As an outcome of the recent infighting, courts in northwestern Syria will be merged into a single system under the influence of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham.

Although this development will predominantly impact the local population and stabilization actors, humanitarian actors are not immune, and must also examine their longer-term strategy and shorter-term risk and mitigation efforts. While recognizing variations exist amongst donors, and the individual risk tolerance and legal strategy of each humanitarian organization, the primary challenge to humanitarian actors will be developing a new mechanism to adjudicate disputes without approaching Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham-affiliated courts. In the longer-term, one possible option for humanitarians is to adjudicate disputes through other mechanisms, such as local notables of Shura Council (Majlis Al-Shura). However, as outlined below, one must take into account the degree of independence of these organizations as well as possible negative reactions associated with circumventing judicial structures. In the short-term, humanitarians working in communities in which Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has full or partial control of the judiciary should proceed with the utmost degree of caution. Any incidents or disputes that arise from humanitarian activities could result in judicial mediation, thereby increasing the profile of humanitarian interventions, and possibly providing a justification for further intervention in the humanitarian sector.

Jabhat Al-Nusra (the largest component of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham) initially assisted in the establishment of the Islamic Administrative Commission (commonly known as the Shari’a Court) in conjunction with several other armed opposition actors in northwestern Syria, including Ahrar Al-Sham. However, Jabhat Al-Nusra subsequently broke away from Shari’a Courts in 2014 due to internal differences regarding judicial leadership, and formed Dar Al-Qadda’.20 The significance of these parallel systems is twofold: first, it allowed local humanitarian organizations, administration bodies, stabilization actors such as the Free Police amongst others to adjudicate problems without engaging with Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (or formerly, Jabhat Al-Nusra). Second, Ahrar Al-Sham reportedly provided superior services, as Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s affiliated Dar Al-Qadda’ remained unpopular due to the lack of an organized and institutional judicial structure, a lack of transparency in decision-making, and the severity of sentences imposed.

20. Of important note, both judicial systems include an ‘executive force’, consisting of armed fighters with the purpose of enforcing judicial rulings. As such, prior to the late July 2017 infighting, Ahrar Al-Sham-controlled communities were adjudicated by the Islamic Administrative Commission, while Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham- held communities were under Dar Al-Qadda’.

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of HTS Control in Opposition-Controlled NW Syria A 9 After the July 23 defeat of Ahrar Al-Sham, the Islamic Administrative Commission received an official notification from Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham stating that courts will be required to: 1) rebrand as Dar Al-Qadda’, and change all official documents and stamps to reflect this affiliation; 2) payment of salaries from and transfer court fees and penalties to Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham21 ; 3) defer exclusively to Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham for recruitment and staffing decisions; 4) limit Dar Al-Qadda’ judicial decisions to small cases, and refer larger cases directly to Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham leadership; 5) the ‘Executive Force’ of Dar Al-Qadda, used to enforce judicial rulings, to exclusively consist of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham fighters.

In response to the aforementioned directives, local Islamic Administrative Commissions have reacted in one of three different ways, largely depending on Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s level of control and popular support. In some communities, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s instructions were obeyed, either voluntarily or under the threat of violence, such as in Ma’arrat An Nu’man subdistrict. Next, several Islamic Administrative Commissions have been seized by Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham but are inoperational due the local resistance and/or protests, such as in Saraqab, Dana22, and Kafr Nobol subdistricts. Lastly, several Islamic Administrative Commissions have completely ignored the requirements, mainly due the fact that these communities have not yet fallen under control of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham, such as Atareb and Ehsem subdistricts. Local Councils

The independence, autonomy, and neutrality of local councils is vital for humanitarian actors, as coordination with local councils - in terms of needs assessments, beneficiary lists, local coordination, and project specifications - was relied upon to facilitate and coordinate humanitarian interventions in Idleb governorate. In 2012, local councils began to form as an official local authority in opposition-held communities, with varying degrees of autonomy. In Idleb governorate, local council membership is normally renewed on an annual basis, and the councils have several responsibilities to include coordinating between the community judicial, administrative, security authorities, and humanitarian NGOs.

Local councils throughout Idleb governorate have generally struggled to limit armed group influence, and the relationship between local councils and armed groups can be broadly placed into three different categories: first, independent local councils, with no significant armed groups influence, working in areas with strong community leadership, such as the Atareb Local Council; second, local councils with indirect armed group influence due to a high percentage of armed group representation on the Shura Council, such as Kafr Nobol, Sarmada, and Dana; third, local councils with explicit allegiance to a specific armed group, normally shown by the presence of an armed group flag over/at the local council, such as in the case in Telamnas and Sarmin. Of important note, local councils supported externally by remittances, donors, or NGOs have largely been more neutral and independent; external relationships have therefore dissuaded armed groups from attempting to seize direct control of the council for fear of financial and social consequences associated with compromising these funding streams.

Outside of public announcements and the one notable case mentioned above, no formal actions, such as disintegration or imposition of local council membership, have been taken by Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham since late July. That being said, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham released a statement on August 16 requiring approval and authorization by the General Administration for Services for all service contracts, new projects, and any agreements carried out by local councils in Idleb (See Annex III).

21. All income from the Dar Al-Qadda’, through a fee structure and collecting fines, is reportedly transferred into Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s coffers as a component of their revenue stream. 22. Of note, the monthly revenue of a single Land Registry Directorate is estimated to be approximately 3 million SYP, whereas a Civil Registry Directorate is estimated at approximately 1 million SYP.

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of HTS Control in Opposition-Controlled NW Syria A 10 An additional announcement, on August 21, has also declared that the Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham-affiliated Directorate for Local Administration is to hold authoritative power over local councils (See Annex IV). If enforced, regulation of local councils by Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham may cause coordination and neutrality issues between INGOs, local NGOs, and local councils. Given the important role that local councils play in service provision and humanitarian aid, it is unlikely that Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham will directly and formally interfere with local councils which they do not already control due to fears of alienating the local population. That being said, there are three potential mechanisms that Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham may take to increase control over local councils. First, as Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham dissolves the Islamic Administrative Commission, local councils in Idleb may lose their primary mechanism for adjudicating disputes linked to Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham interference. Second, as mentioned previously, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham may attempt to position affiliated individuals within local councils by imposing lists of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham-affiliates through control of the Shura Council as annual local council terms expire; this has already occurred in the Dana Local Council, in Dana subdistrict. Lastly, as Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham attempts to control service provision, local councils may be forced to establish direct communication and coordination with service providing administrations, to ensure continuity of service provision. Therefore, organizations working either directly or indirectly with local councils should pay particular attention to the status of these mechanisms and continually reassess the composition, individual relationships, and allegiance of the local council. Service Provision

Public service provision in Idleb governorate, like the judicial structure, was previously administered through concurrent service provision directorates, the Ahrar Al-Sham-affiliated General Commission for Service Management and the Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham General Administration for Services, as well as autonomous local councils.23 Service provision directorates in Idleb governorate can generally be divided into two categories: revenue-based directorates, which generate monthly income based on fees and taxes, and expenditure- based directorates, which do not generate income. Revenue-generating directorates, to include the Electricity Directorate, the Water Directorate, the Transportation Directorate, and the Grain Directorate24 have been a significant source of tension between Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham and Ahrar Al-Sham in the past due to the potential for revenue generation. Expenditure-based directorates, on the other hand, such as the Office of Services, the Education Directorate, and the Health Directorate, have generally experienced less intrusion by armed groups, due to the lack of potential income, the significant operational costs, and the necessity of cross-governorate coordination with local councils (potentially with different affiliation or allegiance to rival armed groups).

Since Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s majority takeover of Idleb governorate, actual service provision has generally remained unchanged; however, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has begun to consolidate all service provision directorates under the Civil Administration for Services (formerly the General Administration for Services, renamed after the late-July infighting), focused primarily on revenue-based directorates.

23. Beginning in April 2015, service provision in Idleb governorate was primarily the responsibility and function of an semi-independent civil administration, the General Commission for Services Management. However, in late 2015, Jabhat Al-Nusra attempted to seize control over the Electricity Directorate and its income, causing internal issues within the civil administration. Consequently, Jabhat Al-Nusra formed its own administrative body, the General Administration for Services, mirroring the structure and makeup of the General Commission for Services Management with an additional ‘Office of [Humanitarian] Organizations’. 24. The Electricity Directorate is responsible for managing and maintaining electricity stations in Idleb Governorate, supplying electricity to communities through centralized generators, and collecting fees for the service. The same can be said for the Water Directorate, although water is less lucrative as an income source than electricity due to the lack of infrastructure and dependence on WASH projects implemented by humanitarian actors. The Grain Directorate was mainly formed to manage the large wheat stock that was inherited from Government of Syria after the liberation of Idleb city; however, the Grain Directorate eventually began buying wheat from farmers in Idleb for storage to sell at a later date. Lastly, the Transportation Directorate was formed to collect taxes for public transport, charging approximately 1000 SYP monthly, and at 22,000 SYP annually per vehicle.

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of HTS Control in Opposition-Controlled NW Syria A 11 On August 23, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham-affiliated Civil Administration for Services announced the creation of the following nine centralized service provision directorates: communication, water and sanitation, transportation, electricity, land registration, civil registration, agriculture, local administration, and grain and wheat, all located in Idleb city (See Annex V).25 Despite the presence of parallel service provision directorates, many local councils still had significant autonomy of revenue-generating service provision, and the degree of compliance to these centralization decrees will be determined by the strength and independence of the individual communities and their councils.

Imposition of a single service provision directorate could potentially affect the humanitarian sector in two ways: First, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham consolidation of directorates could likely cause a decrease in western support to Idleb governorate, either due to donor compliance concerns or organization-specific risk thresholds, thereby causing a spike in humanitarian needs. Second, service providing directorates affiliated with Hay’at Tahrir Al- Sham will likely continue to consolidate directorates related to physical infrastructure, such as water, sanitation/ sewage, which will complicate non-in-kind humanitarian distribution programs, such as WASH and livelihood projects.26 Movement and Trade Routes

Unlike central Syria, northwestern Syria has generally operational, and financially lucrative, cross-border and cross-line trade routes; markets in Idleb are functional, local procurement for humanitarian interventions remains feasible, and there is a potent and largely independent local business community. Since the July conflict, there have been no significant changes to control over smuggling routes, and while local defections have ostensibly changed smuggling route control, this has yet to have any meaningful impact on the ground. Most importantly, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has not, and likely will not, take any actions with respect to the administration of the Bab Elhawa border crossing due to its humanitarian, commercial, and geopolitical significance.

Commercial and humanitarian access into opposition-held northwestern Syria primarily flows through three primary routes: the Bab Elhawa border-crossing with Turkey; the Daret Azza smuggling point from Afrin into opposition-held western Aleppo; and two smuggling routes in the vicinity of Madiq Castle subdistrict, southern Idleb governorate. Bab Elhawa is the primary and official access point for commercial goods, while the aforementioned smuggling routes are used to transport commodities such as fuel, gas canisters, and cigarettes. The specific routes of individual commodities routes are largely determined by Turkish restrictions at Bab Elhawa; for example, following the July conflict, Turkish authorities prohibited the crossing of construction and building items, and consequently these items have shifted to an alternate informal route.

It is clear that Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham-control of commercial trade networks could pose challenges to humanitarian interventions, both direct and remote. Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has ostensibly increased its control over smuggling routes, largely on account of Ibn Taymiyyah armed group’s defection to Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham in late July. At the same time, internal armed group fragmentation following the July conflict has also increased the number of smuggling routes in Idleb, and consequently half of all smuggling routes are outside the control of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. In the future, smuggling routes will likely become a source of conflict between Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham and affiliated groups on the one hand and independent armed opposition groups on the other hand.

25. The August 23 public notice also stated that any service providing directorate not listed are to have an ‘independent legal status’. 26. While some physical infrastructure, such as electricity, is more easily controlled from a central node, networks for other services such as water distribution or sewage removal do not necessarily function, and are much more localized in terms of scope (such as a water well). That being said, on August 29, the Civil Administration for Services issued a public notice, requiring approval and authorization for all new water wells in Idleb governorate. Therefore, control over these services (such as water, sewage, and grain distribution) would require Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham to directly confront service providers refusing new requirements on a communal basis, some of which are supported by humanitarian actors. MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of HTS Control in Opposition-Controlled NW Syria A 12 Tensions have already risen in Madiq Castle subdistrict and Daret Azza subdistrict, and are likely to escalate in the future.2728

As of August 27, key crossing and trading routes are reportedly open, and humanitarian assistance continued to move through Bab Elhawa unmolested, to include UN interagency cross-border convoys.29 Bab Elhawa border crossing continues to be administered by a civil administration, that includes the following offices: customs, border police, immigration, and lost and found; the composition of bureaucrats in these offices was strongly influenced by Ahrar Al-Sham and has not changed since the July conflict. The border itself has reportedly remained open due to an agreement between Turkish officials and local commercial stakeholders in Sarmada and Dana, as well as the fact that Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has not replaced the management of the Bab Elhawa civil administration.3031

Greater Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham control over trade routes would be significant for humanitarian actors for three reasons. First, should Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham attempt to seize greater control over local markets and commodity trade, it will likely increase prices for civilian consumers and humanitarian actors alike; this will largely be due to increased competition over limited supply routes, the proliferation of checkpoints, and general instability. Second, control over trade routes and commercial actors would become a major source of revenue for Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham; this has the to potential to create compliance issues for humanitarian actors, especially when procuring locally. Third, any attempt to consolidate control over trade routes, especially the Bab Elhawa border crossing, would likely result in increased popular resentment from the local business community, tensions with other armed opposition groups, and potentially drawing a response from key regional and international actors; this could lead to the closure of the border crossing as well as complicate procurement of key commodities, both for direct and remote programming. Registry Directorates and Administrations

The two primary registry and documentation directorates in Idleb governorate are the Civil Registry Directorate and the Land and Property Registry Directorate, which issue formal documentation for Idleb governorate’s 1,979,744 inhabitants. These directorates are often overlooked by humanitarians, but are incredibly important to the overall administration of opposition-held northern Syria, especially with respect to the functioning of an effective and legitimate judicial system.

27. Madiq Castle subdistrict contains two smuggling routes on the eastern and western areas of Madiq Castle town. The eastern smuggling route is reportedly controlled by Haya’t Tahrir Al-Sham; this is a large source of income, considering that the Government of Syria allows gas and fuel to be smuggled through only this route. The western smuggling route, controlled by Ahrar Al-Sham, is known to be secondary in commercial/commodity volume and revenue; fuel and gas are not allowed through this route, and revenue is limited to small fees paid by individuals and families crossing lines of control, in addition to less lucrative commodities. 28. As Turkey has excluded construction materials through Bab Elhawa, these commercial goods have been sourced from the Bab Al-Salameh border crossing, into Afrin, and through the Ibn Taymiyyah-controlled Daret Azza smuggling route into Idleb governorate; of note, Ibn Taymiyyah is a recent defector to Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. As such, Noureddine Al-Zinki, a recent defector from Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham, recently established an alternative smuggling route from Afrin In response, on August 12, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham and Ibn Taymiyya reportedly began arresting Noureddine Al-Zinki-affiliated individuals in Abzemo, Khan Al- Asal, and Kafr Naha in Atareb subdistrict, western Aleppo governorate, reportedly demanding that either profits from the alternative smuggling route be shared or the smuggling route closed. 29. Of note, markets in Idleb and opposition-held western Aleppo have reportedly remained relatively stable since infighting took place in late July; this may be indicative of continued commercial access through Bab Elhawa, although this is unconfirmed. 30. The unconfirmed agreement reportedly included two conditions: customs fees are both returned to the acting Bab Elhawa civil administration for salaries and operations costs and/or given to unspecified local councils, and Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham fighters are removed from the area surrounding Sarmada, Dana, and Bab Elhawa crossing. 31. The Government of Turkey’s ban on construction materials entering Idleb through Bab Elhawa has sharply increased prices for cement, rebar, bricks, and tiles, negatively impacting economic activity and livelihood in Idleb, as well as WASH and shelter programs. As an alternative, vendors in Idleb have began to buy construction materials entering Syria through Bab Al-Salam border crossing in northern Aleppo and transported through Afrin; however, reports have indicated that through this route, construction materials are as much as three times the normal price.

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of HTS Control in Opposition-Controlled NW Syria A 13 Each subdistrict has a local branch for Land and Property Registry as well as Civil Registry, all of which are supervised - in theory - by governorate-level directorates. Parallel registry and documentation directorates existed before the July 2017 conflict, but for a reason different than that of the judiciary. Before the opposition seized Idleb city in March 2015, registry directorate employees, even in opposition areas, drew their salaries from the centralized Government of Syria-managed directorates in Idleb city. Following the armed opposition’s seizure of Idleb city, bureaucrats were required to travel to Government of Syria-controlled Hama city to draw their salaries, an expensive and dangerous journey, which became prohibitively dangerous following the Russian intervention in September 2015. Subsequently, western-supported stabilization actors intervened to create the Opposition Central Civil Registration Directorate near Hantutin, Ma’arrat An Nu’man subdistrict, approximately 7 kilometers from Ma’arrat An Nu’man, from which subdistrict-level Civil Registration Directorate bureaucrats drew their salaries.32 The Central Land and Property Registry Directorate, with a sufficient fee-generated income to support its bureaucrats, remained in Idleb city.

On approximately July 30, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham distributed official notifications to the Civil Registry and Land Registry Directorates stating that the administrative directorates will be allowed to function under specific stipulations, to include: 1) supervision by a delegation consisting of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham officials; 2) implementation of an increased fee structure for services rendered33; and 3) all finances, including revenue generated by directorates as well as operating costs and salaries, to be administered through Hay’at Tahrir Al- Sham officials.34 Presently, registry and documentation directorates in Idleb governorate have been placed under the control of the Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham-supported Civil Administration for Services. While the impact of this degree is minimal for the Land and Property Registry Directorate, it remains unclear whether Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham will centralize the Civil Registry Directorate in Idleb city or maintain the current center near Hantutin.

Similar to judicial institutions in Idleb, reactions of local registration and documentation directorates to these stipulations will vary by community and can be roughly classified into three categories: directorates that have already began implementation of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s new operating procedures, such as Ma’arrat An Nu’man Civil Registry Directorate in Ma’arrat An Nu’man subdistrict; the directorates that requested further discussion with Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham for clarification of operating procedures, and the potentially harmful impact of increased Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham-affiliation vis-a-vis external donors, such as Saraqab Directorate in Saraqab subdistrict, Dana Directorate in Dana subdistrict, and Kafr Nobol Directorate in Kafr Nobol subdistrict; and the directorates that completely ignored Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s instructions, mainly due the fact that these communities have not yet fallen under control of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham, such as Atareb, Atareb subdistrict; Deir Hassan, Dana subdistrict; and Ehsem subdistrict.

Humanitarian actors working on shelter, camp management, WASH, agriculture, and other activities requiring, for example, proof of ownership to implement, should conduct additional research into the local registration body providing such documentation. Additionally, humanitarian actors should also be aware that internal requirements, such as the provision of identification to receive aid, may necessitate that beneficiaries engage with these directorates. These challenges will especially impact IDPs in Idleb, of which there are approximately 1,017,600 according to NPM; IDPs are by far the most vulnerable group and face existing problems associated with documentation, protection, forced eviction, and legal challenges associated with inheritance. Stabilization actors will face additional challenges as these administrative directorates were also significant to to the capacity of other governing institutions such as the judiciary and law enforcement.

32. Reportedly, the Opposition Central Civil Registration Directorate was based near Hantutin, rather than in Idleb City (a more natural location) due to western donor concerns associated with empowering Jaish Al-Fatah-affiliated governance structures. 33. Of note, the new fees price list issued by Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham significantly increased civil registration fees. For example, to register new born infant the fee prior to Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s control was 500 SYP (approximately $1); according to the new list, it will cost 2500 SYP (approximately $5). 34. On August 14, 19 staff members (including judges, judicial clerks, and administrative staff) signed a letter of resignation from the Dana Dar Al-Qadda’, in protest of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s requirements. MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of HTS Control in Opposition-Controlled NW Syria A 14 Recommendations

AA Implement additional research and vetting procedures for partners, service providers, hawalas, and vendors that include contextual and relational assessments, especially in communities in which Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has altered the existing governance or administrative structures (directly or indirectly). AA Recognizing differences in modalities, it is necessary to conduct market chain assessments for both locally procured and cross-border assistance to ensure that taxes and fees aren’t paid to Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. As noted above, this would include analysis of border crossings, trade routes and checkpoints, the relationships of hawala agents, and the sources of commodities for vendors. AA Ensure that all staff and beneficiaries are aware of, and abide by, security and protection protocols to prevent and mitigate any potential risks. Additionally, ensure that NGO and INGO incident reporting mechanisms and security coordination bodies are carefully maintained, both inside and outside Syria. AA In areas in which Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has effectively consolidated the judiciary, it is necessary to apply additional caution when implementing programs in order to avoid disputes that would require adjudication. Furthermore, it is important to ensure that conflict adjudication occurs as locally as possible, and depending on donor restrictions and organizational-specific legal advice, through bodies unaffiliated with Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. For example, rather than having disputes managed by Dar Al-Qadda’, a partner NGO could approach local notables or a Shura Council if appropriate. AA Identify the extent as to which local service providers, directorates, and decision-making bodies have either remained independent or have been absorbed by the Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham-affiliated Civil Administration for Services. This is especially in regards to local councils, water, sanitation/sewage and grain distribution directorates, and certain bakeries (based on local council affiliation. AA Continue, if not increase, humanitarian aid and services to opposition-held Idleb, northern Hama, and western Aleppo, as long as the measures above are taken. As mentioned before, needs in Idleb are extremely high, and are forecasted to increase as both local and international pressure increases against Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. ● ●

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of HTS Control in Opposition-Controlled NW Syria A 15 Annexes: Annex I: Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham Administrative Diagram

Ahrar Al-Sham Affiliated Bodies

Service Management Board Justice

General General General General General General Services Establishment Establishment Establishment Establishment Establishment Establishment Shariʼa Court Office for for for for Supplies for Agriculture for Electricity Transportation Water Services Communication Hayʼat TahrirHayʼat Al-Sham- Government-Affiliated Interim Free Syrian Interim Affiliated Body Affiliated Dar Al-Qaddaʼ Justice Independently FundedIndependently and Managed Body Ahrar Al-Sham- Affiliated Body Affiliated Communication Directorate of Directorate General Directorate of Directorate Water and General Sewage Control and Affiliation Shift of Governance Providing Shift Bodies and Service and Affiliation Control Transportation Directorate of Directorate General Hayʼat Tahrir Al-Sham Affiliated Bodies TahrirHayʼat Al-Sham Affiliated Merger/Full Control 2017 - Pre July Merger/Full Control - Post 2017 July Directorate of Directorate Civil Administration for Services Services Civil Administration for Electricity General in Idelb Governorate, 20, 2017 and Post July Pre Directorate of Directorate Agriculture General Directorate for for Directorate Warehousing Supplies and General Management General Directorate for General for Directorate Provision Local Administration Service Service Office Affiliation - Post 2017 July Affiliation Affiliation - Pre July 2017 - Pre July Affiliation [Humanitarian] [Humanitarian] Organizations Office of Office Directorate for for Directorate Property and Property General Land Directorate for for Directorate Civil Affairs General Coordiation/Cooperation - Post 2017 July Coordination/Cooperation 2017 - Pre July

Organizations Services Electricity Water Health Education Agriculture Offices Offices Offices Offices Offices Offices Offices

Local Administrative Councils

Land Civil Registry Registry Shura Councils

Independent Funding and Management Independent Funding and Management

Note: This administrative diagram shows Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s proposed administrative, judicial, and service provision structure, based upon an analysis of recent Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham statements issued since July 2017. Of very important note, this does not reflect the current ground situation in opposition-controlled northwestern Syria. MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of HTS Control in Opposition-Controlled NW Syria A 16 Annex II: Annex III:

Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s statement regarding Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s public notice requiring neutrality and independence of NGOs and administrative approval and authorization for local humanitarian aid distribution council contracts, agreements, and projects

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of HTS Control in Opposition-Controlled NW Syria A 17 Annex IV: Annex V:

Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s public notice regarding the Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s public notice announcing merger of all service providing directorates within the that all local councils are considered to be under the Civil Administration for Services authority of the Directorate for Local Administration

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of HTS Control in Opposition-Controlled NW Syria A 18 CONTACT PETER LUSKIN Humanitarian Access Team [email protected]

Contributing information sources to this document include public and non­public humanitarian information provided by local partners, UN Specialized Agencies, INGOs, non­state actors, and sources on the ground. The content is compiled by Mercy Corps, is by no means exhaustive, and does not reflect Mercy Corps’ position on the aforementioned subjects. The provided information, assessment, and analysis are designated for humanitarian purposes only. Mercy Corps and its Humanitarian Access Team will continue to closely monitor the evolving situation on the ground and inform accordingly.

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MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of HTS Control in Opposition-Controlled NW Syria A 19