PRELIMINARY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: Consolidation of Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham's Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS TEAM (HAT) PRELIMINARY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: Consolidation of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria SEPTEMBER 2017 Executive Summary Until late July, the vast majority of opposition-held northwestern Syria (to include all of Idleb governorate and parts of western Aleppo and northern Hama governorates) was under the military and administrative control of two organizations: Ahrar Al-Sham and Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham. Over the past two years, the two organizations have been nominally allied under the Jaish Fatah alliance, but simultaneously maintained a significant rivalry over control of opposition-held northwestern Syria. The presence and administrative control of Ahrar Al-Sham was incredibly important to western-supported humanitarian and stabilization actors, as it provided a means to avoid directly engaging with Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham while still working in northwestern Syria. However, beginning in late July 2017, the rivalry between Ahrar Al-Sham and Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham erupted into armed conflict, which has subsequently left Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham as the predominant armed and political actor in opposition-controlled northwestern Syria. To the casual observer, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s consolidated control poses a substantial and direct challenge to the internationally-supported humanitarian response in Idleb governorate. However, there are three important factors that must be taken into account when understanding the impact of these recent developments for humanitarians: first, while Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham appears to have taken full military control of northwestern Syria, this control is not monolithic and was at least partially achieved through the pragmatic defections of several local armed groups. Second, the degree of current Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham military control across the governorate does not necessarily correlate with governance and service provision control. And third, based on their community acceptance model and current financial state, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham is unlikely to impose significant, policy-level restrictions or impediments upon humanitarian aid delivery in the near term. Nonetheless, the humanitarian impact of this development should not be underestimated. First and foremost, there have been unconfirmed reports that since their July victory, local elements of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham have attempted to influence beneficiary lists in order to target their own supporters and the families of killed combatants. Of note, this phenomenon is not new, is no way unique to northwestern Syria, and does not appear to reflect Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s formal policy.1 Aside from these reports, the impact of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham 1. Reportedly, larger NGOs and INGOs will likely be more successful in resisting Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s attempts at influence due to the scale of their operations and accompanying clout. control is primarily political, but will nonetheless likely impact the humanitarian response in three ways: first, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham administrative control could jeopardize western humanitarian funding in the short-term. Second, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham control risks to undermine the neutrality of many of the administrative mechanisms used by humanitarians to program and provide essential services in northwestern Syria, such as local councils. Finally, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has publicly announced that it will consolidate administrative, military, judicial, and service provision control, thereby creating a singular civil and military administration in opposition-held northern Syria. The broader impact of this situation is unclear, but could result in western donors imposing similar restrictions in northwestern Syria as those already in existence with respect to Government of Syria-controlled areas. Based on the HAT’s preliminary assessments, the fundamental take-away for donors should be that Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s control of northwestern Syria is neither absolute nor monolithic, and therefore Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham omnipresence does not necessarily translate into omnipotence. From a humanitarian perspective, the recent Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham military successes should not prevent humanitarian organizations from continuing to implement programs, but will require renewed and extensive research, vetting, and assessment procedures to ensure the neutrality of local councils, partners, beneficiary lists, bakeries, hawalas, and vendors, as well as further messaging to all new stakeholders on humanitarian principles. Armed Opposition-Controlled Northwest Syria Dana Sarmada Harim Daret Azza Atareb Turkey Kafr Takharim Batbu Kelly Hazano Armanaz Darkosh Ma'arrat Tamasrin Teftnaz Idleb Sarmin Um RishAqrabat Bsheiriyeh - Bello Qaysiyeh Badama Jisr-Ash- Shugur Abul Thohur Ehsem Qastun Ma'arrat An Nu'man Telamnas Kafr Nobol Shorlin Sanjar Lower Amiqa Faqie Hawash Upper Hweijeh Tramla Shahranaz Eastern Huweiz Border Crossing/Access Point Madiq Castle Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) Contested Areas Government of Syria (GoS) MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of HTS Control in Opposition-Controlled NW Syria A 2 Introduction Idleb governorate is located in northwestern Syria and, since becoming the first governorate to fall under the full control of the armed opposition in mid-2015, acts as the administrative center for opposition-controlled northern Syria. Humanitarian needs have increased dramatically in the past two years, and there are currently 1,667,3372 people in need inside the opposition held areas of northwestern Syria. Throughout all of opposition- controlled northwestern Syria (to include western Aleppo and northern Hama), there are approximately 2,497,948 people, of whom nearly 1,017,600 are IDPs.3 ‘Reconciliation’ agreements negotiated in central Syria and Arsal, Lebanon have further stressed the humanitarian situation in Idleb governorate by adding an approximate 73,000 additional IDPs (included in the total IDP estimate) in the last ten months. Like many areas in Syria, the greatest impediment to humanitarian access is political, in this case a function of the presence of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the U.S. State Department.4 As of August 27, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham now controls the vast majority of northwestern Syria, with the exception of approximately six subdistricts5 that remain in the hands of rival Ahrar Al-Sham. Yet Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s predominance is not only due to military prowess; it is also due to Ahrar Al-Sham defections, which has cost the group between a third and half of its total fighters in Idleb governorate. Local defections were largely driven by pragmatism, whereas senior defections were driven at least partially by internal divisions within between hardline and moderate factions.6 Following their defeat, Ahrar Al-Sham has elected a new leader in early August, and will likely recalibrate its political strategy; whether this is sufficient to retake territory remains to be seen, but is is clear that the organization is by no means finished. Prior to the conflict in late-July 2017, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham and Ahrar Al-Sham maintained separate and parallel judicial, administrative, and service provision structures, while competing for influence over Shura and local council governance. Since their takeover, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham has focused on merging and uniting these judicial, administration, and service provision structures, with an emphasis on sectors with the highest potential for immediate revenue generation. Despite this effort, several communities in Idleb have directly disobeyed, disregarded, or hesitated to implement Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham directives, as will be discussed below. Consequently, the control and influence of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham over service provision, administration, and justice is uneven and differs by community. There are no indications that Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham plans to formally implement direct taxation or fees on in- kind humanitarian assistance in northwestern Syria; while localized incidents may occur, these appear to be the exception and not the rule. For contrary to eastern Syria, opposition-controlled northwestern Syria is not rich in easily extractable natural resources; therefore, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham is currently financially dependent on internal fees and taxation, and is thus unable to meet western Aleppo and Idleb’s incredibly high humanitarian needs independently. Furthermore, in light of their community acceptance model, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham is unlikely to knowingly take actions that would destabilize the existing in-kind humanitarian response, as this would alienate not only their local constituency but also the potent business community that has emerged to support the remote INGO humanitarian response. Yet if Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham is able to informally or indirectly redirect aid 2. Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2017_Syria_hno_161205.pdf 3. Numbers according to Needs and Population Monitoring, July 2017 round. 4. Although Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham is not formally named as an FTO, ‘Al-Nusra Front’ (Jabhat Al-Nusra) was added by the U.S. Department of State as of May 2015. Subsequently, as Jabhat Al-Nusra re-branded as ‘Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham’ in July 2016 and then ‘Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’ in January 2017, U.S. State Department officials have since affirmed that Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham is a FTO, included as an alias to Al-Nusra Front. 5. These six subdistricts include one in western

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