Similarity and Imagination
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Tales of Similarity and Imagination Tom Schoonen Tales of Similarity and Imagination — A modest epistemology of possibility Tom Schoonen This page is intentionally left blank Tales of Similarity and Imagination — A modest epistemology of possibility ILLC Dissertation Series DS-2020-15 For further information about ILLC-publications, please contact Institute for Logic, Language and Computation Universiteit van Amsterdam Science Park 107 1098 XG Amsterdam phone: +31-20-525 6051 e-mail: [email protected] homepage: http://www.illc.uva.nl/ Copyright © 2020 by Tom Schoonen Cover design by Thom van Gessel & Tom Schoonen Printed and bound by Ipskamp Printing. ISBN: 978-94-6421-096-5 Tales of Similarity and Imagination — A modest epistemology of possibility Academisch Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam op gezag van de Rector Magnificus prof. dr. ir. K.I.J. Maex ten overstaan van een door het College voor Promoties ingestelde commissie, in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Agnietenkapel op vrijdag 4 december 2020, te 16.00 uur door Tom Schoonen geboren te Haarlem Promotiecommissie Promotores: Prof. Dr. F. Berto Universiteit van Amsterdam Prof. Dr. A. Betti Universiteit van Amsterdam Copromotor: Dr. P.M. Hawke Universiteit van Amsterdam Overige leden: Dr. L. Incurvati Universiteit van Amsterdam Prof. Dr. G. Priest City University of New York Dr. K. Schulz Universiteit van Amsterdam Prof. Dr. S.J.L. Smets Universiteit van Amsterdam Prof. Dr. B. Vetter Freie Universität Berlin Faculteit der Geesteswetenschappen This dissertation is part of a project that has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant agreement ERC CoG No. 681404). There is, indeed, a more mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism, when its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common sense and reflection Hume, Enquiry (XII, III, p. 111) This page is intentionally left blank Table of Contents Acknowledgements xi 1 Aims and Assumptions1 1.1 Objective Modality and Modal Realism.................2 1.2 Modal Mooreanism............................4 1.3 Cognitive Plausibility...........................8 1.4 A Cognitively Plausible Epistemology of Possibility.......... 12 1.5 Justification................................ 17 1.6 Chapters: Overview and Origins..................... 20 Part I: Imagination 2 Introduction to Imagination-based Theories 27 2.1 Philosophy of Imagination........................ 28 2.2 The Puzzle of Imaginative Use...................... 33 2.3 Kripke-Putnam A Posteriori Impossibilities.............. 35 2.4 Error-Theories of Imagination...................... 38 3 The Problem of Modally Bad Company 43 3.1 QALC Imagination............................ 44 3.2 QALC Imagination and Epistemology of Possibility.......... 47 3.3 The Problem of Modally Bad Company................. 49 3.4 The Fallibilism Response......................... 53 3.5 The Differentiating Response...................... 54 3.6 Problem of Prior Modal Knowledge................... 56 3.7 Conclusion................................. 58 vii 4 Pretense Imagination 59 4.1 Pretense: A Short Introduction..................... 60 4.2 Pretense Imagination........................... 63 4.3 Logic of Pretense Imagination...................... 66 4.4 Epistemology of Pretense Imagination.................. 74 4.5 Epistemic Usefulness of Internal Development............. 77 4.6 Epistemic Usefulness of Intervened Content............... 80 4.7 Pretense Imagination and the Epistemology of Possibility....... 81 4.8 Conclusion: Potential Objections.................... 84 5 Putting Knowledge from Imagination on Firmer Grounds 89 5.1 Appearance-based Imagination...................... 90 5.2 Imaginative Blocks and Objective Evidence............... 93 5.3 Embodied Imagination.......................... 100 5.4 Embodiment, Introspection, and Objectivity.............. 107 5.5 Limits of Embodied Imagination-based Epistemologies of Possibility. 111 Part II: Similarity 6 Introduction to Similarity-based Theories 117 6.1 Hawke's Safe Explanation Theory.................... 118 6.2 Roca-Royes' Similarity Theory...................... 121 6.3 Relevant Similarity............................ 123 7 Relevant Similarity, Predictive Analogy, and Causal Knowledge 127 7.1 Similarity Theories and Similarities................... 128 7.2 Relevant Similarity............................ 131 7.3 Predictive Analogies and Causal Knowledge.............. 137 7.4 Causal Knowledge and Similarity Theories............... 142 7.5 Conclusion: Similarity Sweet Spot.................... 149 8 Kinds and the Epistemology of Possibility 153 8.1 Kinds and Possibility........................... 154 8.2 Premise (3): Generalisation to Kind-Members............. 155 8.3 Premise (1): Categorisation....................... 167 8.4 The Placeholder Heuristic........................ 178 8.5 Fallibilism: What mistakes can we make?................ 185 8.6 Kinds and Possibility: Theoretical Virtues............... 190 8.7 Mallozzi and the Mismatch Worry.................... 192 viii Part III: Philosophical Possibilities 9 Gettier Reasoning and the Problem of Defeat 199 9.1 Thought Experiments in Philosophy................... 200 9.2 Form, Justification, Detail, and Deviance................ 203 9.3 Williamson's Analysis of Gettier Reasoning............... 205 9.4 Problem of Deviant Defeat........................ 208 9.5 Problems of Disagreement........................ 212 9.6 Intended Enrichment as Input...................... 215 9.7 Pluralism and the Ramseyan Indicative................. 219 10 Are Gettier Cases Disturbing? 223 10.1 Two Takes on Thought Experiments.................. 224 10.2 Common Ground............................. 225 10.3 Macherian Pessimism........................... 230 10.4 Is Gettier Disturbing?........................... 234 10.5 Upshot for Machery's Master Arguments................ 240 Conclusion 11 Conclusion and Further Work: Modal Modesty 249 11.1 Conclusions of this Dissertation..................... 250 11.2 Getting Clear on Modal Modesty.................... 252 11.3 Varieties of Modal Modesty....................... 255 11.4 Motivations for Modal Modesty..................... 257 11.5 Consequences of Modal Modesty..................... 259 Appendices A Representational Imagination 263 B Adding Topicality to Models of Pretense Imagination 271 C Metaphysics of Kinds 283 Bibliography 326 Samenvatting 327 Summary 329 ix This page is intentionally left blank Acknowledgements Hume suggested that truth springs from arguments amongst friends. Regardless of whether there are truths in this dissertation, I feel very grateful for the many inspiring discussions I've had, and the many friends I've made, along the way. First of all, my supervisors Franz Berto, Arianna Betti, and Peter Hawke have helped me a lot in numerous ways. Franz has been my supervisor ever since my Master of Logic thesis and has gotten me into this incredible field of the epistemology of modality, where many of my interests come together. He has been very supportive of my random ideas, interdisciplinary aspirations, and of my academic career in general. I've also worked with Arianna since before the start of this project and she has been a great academic mentor ever since, guiding me in how to connect philosophical and empirical ideas as well as pushing me to write with the greatest conceptual clarity possible. Peter's help has always been invaluable, both in general and pertaining to this dissertation. I feel very lucky to have had a supervisor who is so involved in the topics of this dissertation, who is a great co-author, and most importantly a great friend to have philosophical arguments with (in Rome, Scotland, Amsterdam, and many other places). I hope that our discussions and collaborations will extend beyond the end of this project. Secondly, I would like to thank Luca Incurvati, Graham Priest, Katrin Schulz, Sonja Smets, and Barbara Vetter for kindly agreeing to serve on my doctorate committee and for reading this dissertation. Thanks are also due to the other members of the LoC -gang. Having such a supportive and friendly academic home has made this whole endeavour seem less insurmountable than it otherwise would have. Our bi-weekly seminars, where I was able to test many ideas in their early stages, were incredibly helpful. Ayb¨uke Ozg¨un¨ is the greatest logician co-author that a philosopher could wish for and Karolina Krzy_zanowska is a great sparring partner in all issues concerning conditionals, psy- chology of reasoning, and how to properly deal with empirical work as a philosopher. Over the course of this project, I have enjoyed many great discussions that have been inspirational and helped the ideas developed here to higher grounds. I am very grateful to Barbara Vetter and Sonia Roca-Royes, whose work has inspired much of my thinking about modality and the epistemology thereof, for our discussions that have been invaluable and inspiring at different stages of this project. A special xi thanks to Max Jones for being a great co-author, our discussions about imagination, embodied cognition, and modality have shaped the way I think about the role of imagination in the epistemology of modality. I am much indebted to Chris Badura, Ilaria Canavotto, Martin Lipman, Deb Marber, Becky Millar, Pierre Saint-Germain,