5025 Ethical Pers. 01/4/02

Ethics and The Discernment of Spirits1 Garrett Barden William Desmond is a deeply rooted thinker The second reason is that sometimes one dis- whose work exhibits not only the universal covers that the fulfilment of what one has taken to rhetoric of analysis but also, and quite openly, the be one’s present desire leaves one dissatisfied; local and personal rhetoric of living. I have tried leaves one with the sense of unexpected incom- here to honour that complex rhetorical intertwin- pleteness; with a dimly felt hunger. But here, too, ing by a reflection on St. Ignatius of Loyola whose in the sense of inadequacy, desire remains as a cri- influence on me has been and remains, I think, terion; one has not yet found one’s heart’s desire. greater and more obscure than I know. What There is a temptation entirely to repudiate Ignatius calls the discernment of spirits I call here desire as a criterion of the good in favour of some the discrimination of desires. naturally known explicit set of propositions that My theme is that the great philosophers of the would define the good and from which other spec- moral life have, in very different ways, spoken of ifications of the good could be deduced. This is the same experience, the experience that led Kant the temptation of Pascal’s esprit de géométrie that to write in one breath of “the starry heavens above would discover ethical axioms whence ethical the- and the moral law within”2 and which for Ignatius orems could be deduced. The roots of this tempta- is the first practical fruit of his Spiritual Exercises. tion are deep in the Western mentality in which the The subtitle of this essay could well be: What is geometric method has been for centuries, even if Ethics and the Between about? no longer, the ideal of enquiry and the model of I begin by recalling what everyone knows, that rationality.3 from the outset it was feared that the good might There is a temptation entirely to repudiate be no more than a misleading name for the object desire as a criterion of the good in favour of some of present desire. But why fear this? Why not sim- analysis of human action that would show the con- ply accept that the good is no more than the name nection between the goodness of an action and the for whatever seems to each one to be what he now fundamental nature of that action. So, for exam- desires? There are two reasons not to accept it. ple, that it is good to tell the truth and not to lie is The first is that when one claims that some- shown in analysis to be connected with the nature thing is good — for instance, that this particular of human conversation. And this is so. Human course of action is good or that, more generally, conversation can survive much deceit but it cannot this kind of action, say, truth-telling, is good — survive total deceit; truth-telling is intrinsic to it one discovers oneself to be going beyond the bare and lying undermines it. A question looks to the assertion that this now seems to fulfil my present true, not merely the convenient, answer. But why desire; one is not negating that assertion but one is should I, or anyone, tell the truth when, in the cir- going beyond it. There is an experiential reluc- cumstances, it would be more convenient for me tance to identify ‘the good’ with at least one of the to lie? The virtue of justice is intrinsic to contrac- ways in which the phrase ‘the object of my present tual exchange not an arbitrary moral addition to it desire’ is used. And yet ‘present desire’ is but why should I be just when it is more to my pre- involved. sent obvious advantage to defraud? These are not Ethical Perspectives 8 (2001)4, p. 254 questions about the character of the action but the phrase ‘true proposition’ is pleonastic such about the character of the actor and notice how, in that ‘true proposition’ means no more than ‘propo- the way that they are asked, they pit present desire sition’, it is also presupposed that propositions — understood as more or less immediate gratifi- may be other than true, that is, not true. One cation or convenience to me — against the inter- answer9 to the question as to what it means for a nal orientation or structure of conversation or con- proposition to be true is: A proposition states what tract.4 is the case and is true if and only if what it states And yet, again and again, the question of desire to be the case is in fact the case.10 (Accordingly, a recurs. Augustine’s “our hearts are restless until proposition is not true if and only if what it states they rest in Thee” is part of a theory of human to be the case is in fact not the case.11) This answer desire. Perhaps Augustine is mistaken; perhaps discovers a characteristic or feature of proposi- correct. Correct or mistaken, his hypothesis tions. It neither helps us nor pretends to help us to remains in the tradition and cannot honestly be distinguish between true and untrue propositions avoided although it can be, and often is, ignored. and it gives no indication as to how to go about Reflection on it can be postponed; perhaps indefi- discovering whether a given proposition is true or nitely. Augustine discovers the restlessness of the untrue. human heart — this is an experiential discovery5 Assume that the question as to what it means to — and asks in what it will rest. His hypothesis is be true is about friends. Again it is presupposed that it comes to rest in God, in the good.6 Here I that friends may be true or not true. But what kind want to attend to his discovery and to his question. of answer is anticipated? Perhaps something like We experience the finality7 of desire, the heart’s this: a true friend is one who acts towards his restlessness before we know where and how the friend in a certain way in certain situations. Notice heart will come to rest. William Desmond’s Ethics that if one is asked whether or not Peter is a true and the Between is, I think, an account of human friend one’s evidence for an affirmative answer is action that attempts to take account of the central- that he has acted in the past as a true friend. But the ity of desire. His question is: what does it mean to true friend is expected to act in the future as a true be good?8 I want to attend to what I take to be an friend. And we say that Peter is a true friend important element in his answer: to be good is to because he has acted as one in the past and because fulfil one’s heart’s desire. we expect him so to act in the future. Did we What does it mean to be good? To be good is to expect him not to act as a true friend in the future fulfil one’s heart’s desire. There are underlying we should rather say that he used to be a true friend presuppositions in both question and answer. but no longer is. Were we unsure about his future Compare: ‘what does it mean to be good?’ with responses we should incline to say that we were ‘what does it mean to be true?’ Consider the sec- now unsure whether or not he is still a true friend. ond of these. What is this question about? Sometimes the suspicion that he is no longer a true Propositions? Friends? To answer the question one friend casts doubt on the idea that he once was. must make some presupposition explicit. ‘True’ in Sometimes the evidence for his being a true friend ‘What does it mean to be a true proposition?’ is is in the present as when we experience him acting not used in the same way as it is in ‘What does it as a true friend, for example, we might hear him mean to be a true friend?’ The uses may well be defending his absent friend’s good name. This kind related but they are not identical. of answer, unlike the answer to the meaning of Assume that the question as to what it means to ‘true proposition’, tells what acts, or kinds of act, be true is about propositions. Now it is presup- count as the acts of a good friend. We tend to give posed that propositions may be true and, unless an incomplete list of these acts from which the Ethical Perspectives 8 (2001)4, p. 255 questioner gets the general idea of what it is to be In this light consider the definition of the virtue a good friend. In my example, the true friend acts of justice in Justinian’s Institutes, a definition that in a certain way (he defends his friend’s good has remained since then in Western jurisprudence: name) in certain circumstances (when doubt is cast justice is the constant and enduring willingness to upon his friend’s good name). The example is, as give to each what is due.12 “Justice” is a “constant all examples will be, cultural for it is in commu- and enduring willingness”. What is defined here is nites that these answers are developed and tested.

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