Cognition and Performance: the Relation to Neural Mechanisms of Consequence, Confidence, and Competence
2 COGNITION AND PERFORMANCE: THE RELATION TO NEURAL MECHANISMS OF CONSEQUENCE, CONFIDENCE, AND COMPETENCE Karl H. Pribram Stanford University. California INTRODUCTION In 1968 at a UNESCO meeting on brain and human behavior, Skinner stated that he was interested in the environmental contingencies that produce reinforce ment. I remarked that if this were so, then reinforcement must be conceived as a process whose locus could be nowhere else than the brain. In contributing this chapter, then, I take the opportunity in examining some of the issues that have made the concept of reinforcement, from a structural point of view, so central in behavior theory. Skinner (1976) has clearly opted for a descriptive functionalism in his search for the laws governing behavior. Those of us contributing to this volume are, for the most part, searching for process and mechanism. This ap proach shows kinship with cognitive psychology, and one of the staples of cog- . nitive psychology is the distinction between surface and deep structure, between performance and competence. Thus one of the aims of this chapter will be to bridge the current chasm between functional behavior theory and the structures of cognitive psychology. These "structures" are conceived as patterns describing processes (see, e.g., Saussure, 1922; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Merleau Ponty, 1963). Thus, the keystone to the bridge between behavioral performances (processes of organism-environment interaction) and structural competence (neural processes) may well be furnished by the concept of reinforcement, a concept that was originally invoked to explain learning, i.e., sustained changes in behavior. Biology of Reinforcement Copyright © 1980 Academic Press, Inc.
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