The Dangers of Political Party Strengthening Legislation in Solomon Islands1
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PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN Policy dialogue The dangers of political party strengthening legislation in Solomon Islands1 Jon Fraenkel State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project Australian National University The Solomon Islands government is inevitable feature of ‘proper’ democracy considering introducing laws aimed at (although ancient Greece, the ‘cradle of strengthening political parties, restricting democracy’, never had political parties and members of parliament (MPs) from switching nor for that matter do many local councils sides and halting excessive use of ‘no- in the mass democracies of Western Europe confidence’ motions. The government wants or Australasia).4 Legislation against floor- to: 1) abolish the constitutional position crossing has been introduced in many parts of the ‘Leader of the Independents’;2 2) of the Pacific, including in Fiji, New Zealand reform the process of the selection of prime and Papua New Guinea. The Samoans have ministers; and 3) build a more coherent legal controls on what kinds of new parties party system by adopting legislation similar can be formed (So’o and Fraenkel 2005:355). to that experimented with in Papua New Even in Tahiti (French Polynesia), frustration Guinea.3 The aim is to increase political with frequent government changes led stability and give prime ministers and Gaston Flosse to alter the electoral law in cabinets an opportunity to implement their 2004, hoping to stabilise the political order policies without having to focus continually (although the result was a major defeat for on sustaining fragile coalitions, or on his party). Often, the true objective behind attracting opposition members to cross the party integrity legislation is to strengthen floor to strengthen governments. governments, despite the public rationale being to strengthen political parties. In several cases, laws against MPs Objectives of party integrity crossing the floor have been introduced legislation in the hope of consolidating one political faction, but have ended up strengthening Such laws, sometimes referred to as another. That is what happened in Papua political party integrity legislation, can New Guinea and Fiji. In Papua New serve several objectives. Sometimes, the Guinea, the government of Sir Mekere aim is parliamentary stability, sometimes Morauta introduced laws binding MPs to nation-building and sometimes the goal political parties, but Sir Michael Somare of strengthening parties is driven by the won the 2002 election and his government view that strong political parties are an proved to be the beneficiary of the new 155 Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 23 Number 3 2008 © The Australian National University PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN Policy dialogue laws. The opposition in Papua New Guinea that, leaving aside a few as yet untested stayed away from parliament during exceptions, the legislation was ‘problematic much of the second half of 2004, frustrated at best and unworkable at worst’ (Miskin by its inability to challenge the Somare 2003:iii). government. In the wake of the 2007 In Papua New Guinea, the rules against election, leading figures on the opposition floor crossing contained in the OLIPPAC benches—including New Ireland Governor, have not yet been fully tested before the Sir Julius Chan—denounced the Organic courts. Eleven members broke ranks during Law on the Integrity of Political Parties Somare’s 2002–07 government, but none lost and Candidates (OLIPPAC) legislation as their seat. What will happen in Papua New promoting dictatorship (‘Dump law: Chan’, Guinea when a prime minister finds himself The National, 15 August 2008). politically isolated and unpopular? What In Fiji, Sitiveni Rabuka’s government will happen if only the law prevents the fall amended the constitution to prevent floor of such a government? There are plenty crossing in 1997, but Mahendra Chaudhry of cases across the Pacific where prime won the 1999 election. The new law ensured ministers have shown themselves willing that Chaudhry’s Fiji Labour Party’s 37 seats to exploit every available legal instrument in the 71-member parliament formed an to avoid the fall of their governments unbreakable majority. The allied parties in (consider, for example, then Solomon the Labour-led People’s Coalition all split, Islands Prime Minister Francis Billy Hilly’s with the rank and file joining opposition attempt to rescue his government in 1994 protests against the government. Within or Manassah Sogavare’s efforts to stave Labour ranks, Fijian members such as Dr off impending defeat in late 2007). If laws Tupeni Baba and Kenneth Zinck challenged are in place protecting prime ministers the policies being pursued by the Labour against no-confidence votes, will they be leader. These rebels could not, however, complied with when they are used in such legally switch sides. A year later, Fiji a transparently self-serving manner? The witnessed a coup d état. former PNG Chief Justice has suggested In other cases, laws binding MPs to that, in such circumstances, the OLIPPAC political parties have not worked as intended. could not withstand a constitutional In India, more MPs crossed the floor after challenge. The courts may rule the law null 1985 legislation aimed at preventing floor and void because it restrains MPs’ freedom crossing than beforehand (Indian Advisory of association or conscience (Personal Panel on Electoral Reforms, 2001:24). In communication, Sir Arnold Amet, former New Zealand, laws against MPs switching Chief Justice of Papua New Guinea, Honiara, sides simply delayed inevitable political April 2006). In Vanuatu, then Prime Minister realignments and political opinion turned Serge Vohor passed laws in 2004 providing against their continued use (Geddis 2002). a 12-month ‘grace period’ during which Likewise in Papua New Guinea, when there could not be a no-confidence motion; Treasurer Bart Philemon fell out with his this was, however, ruled unconstitutional by Prime Minister, Sir Michael Somare, the the courts and the Vohor government was new laws prevented him from founding subsequently toppled.5 the inevitable new political party (the New Generation Party) until shortly before the 2007 polls. One 2003 survey of the use of rules against party defections concluded 156 Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 23 Number 3 2008 © The Australian National University PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN Policy dialogue Essentials of the OLIPPAC of the 1975 constitution, and extended in 1991. After an election, a new government How does the OLIPPAC work in Papua has 18 months during which there cannot be New Guinea? First, under the OLIPPAC, the a no-confidence motion (a provision Somare party with the largest number of seats after in 2004 unsuccessfully attempted to extend an election receives the initial invitation to to 36 months). If there is a no-confidence form a government (see Gelu 2005). The law motion in the last 12 months of the life helped Sir Michael Somare to become Prime of Papua New Guinea’s five-year terms, Minister in 2002 and again for a second parliament is dissolved and there is an early time after the July 2007 elections for he was election. Since MPs always wish to prolong after both elections the leader of the largest their periods in office, there never has been party (The National Alliance). Second, there a successful no-confidence motion in the are some rather weak financial incentives last year of a PNG parliament’s term. That to join parties (and added incentives for shows one interesting way of maintaining female candidates), disincentives to remain the safety valve of no-confidence motions, as independents and rules regarding the while ensuring that they are not used in a registration of political parties. Third, frivolous manner or simply to grab hold of and most importantly, MPs in Papua ministerial portfolios or for ‘fund-raising’.8 New Guinea who vote for a particular If a no-confidence vote entails a general prime minister cannot vote against that dissolution of parliament and an early prime minister in any vote of confidence, election, MPs might take this option only if budgetary vote or vote on constitutional they are riding the crest of a wave of popular amendments for the life of the parliament. dissatisfaction with the government. In There are loopholes. If a party decides normal circumstances, as PNG history collectively to switch sides—in accordance indicates, they will not want to rock the with its internal rules and procedures—it boat if that means going back to face the can do so. For that reason, many PNG electorate earlier than normal. Elections politicians constituted themselves as one- are costly affairs. Between 50 and 75 per man political parties to retain their freedom cent of PNG MPs lose their seat at general to switch. Others nominally conformed to elections. the law, if only to reduce the prospect of The consequences of laws that ensure judicial intervention. Such responses to that a no-confidence vote entails a general the OLIPPAC legislation indicate another dissolution of parliament are illustrated problem with such provisions: they weaken by the Kiribati semi-presidential system. the separation of powers and require judges In Kiribati, the Beretitenti (president) to adjudicate the internal rules of political is directly elected, but he/she forms a parties6 or to uphold the rules of procedures cabinet comprising members of parliament. of parliament. Historically, the courts Parliament can remove the Beretitenti have been reluctant to assume jurisdiction through a