Pacific Economic Bulletin Policy dialogue

The dangers of political party strengthening legislation in Solomon Islands1

Jon Fraenkel State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project Australian National University

The government is inevitable feature of ‘proper’ democracy considering introducing laws aimed at (although ancient Greece, the ‘cradle of strengthening political parties, restricting democracy’, never had political parties and members of parliament (MPs) from switching nor for that matter do many local councils sides and halting excessive use of ‘no- in the mass democracies of Western Europe confidence’ motions. The government wants or Australasia).4 Legislation against floor- to: 1) abolish the constitutional position crossing has been introduced in many parts of the ‘Leader of the Independents’;2 2) of the Pacific, including in , New Zealand reform the process of the selection of prime and . The Samoans have ministers; and 3) build a more coherent legal controls on what kinds of new parties party system by adopting legislation similar can be formed (So’o and Fraenkel 2005:355). to that experimented with in Papua New Even in Tahiti (French Polynesia), frustration Guinea.3 The aim is to increase political with frequent government changes led stability and give prime ministers and Gaston Flosse to alter the electoral law in cabinets an opportunity to implement their 2004, hoping to stabilise the political order policies without having to focus continually (although the result was a major defeat for on sustaining fragile coalitions, or on his party). Often, the true objective behind attracting opposition members to cross the party integrity legislation is to strengthen floor to strengthen governments. governments, despite the public rationale being to strengthen political parties. In several cases, laws against MPs Objectives of party integrity crossing the floor have been introduced legislation in the hope of consolidating one political faction, but have ended up strengthening Such laws, sometimes referred to as another. That is what happened in Papua political party integrity legislation, can New Guinea and Fiji. In Papua New serve several objectives. Sometimes, the Guinea, the government of Sir Mekere aim is parliamentary stability, sometimes Morauta introduced laws binding MPs to nation-building and sometimes the goal political parties, but Sir of strengthening parties is driven by the won the 2002 election and his government view that strong political parties are an proved to be the beneficiary of the new

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laws. The opposition in Papua New Guinea that, leaving aside a few as yet untested stayed away from parliament during exceptions, the legislation was ‘problematic much of the second half of 2004, frustrated at best and unworkable at worst’ (Miskin by its inability to challenge the Somare 2003:iii). government. In the wake of the 2007 In Papua New Guinea, the rules against election, leading figures on the opposition floor crossing contained in the OLIPPAC benches—including New Ireland Governor, have not yet been fully tested before the Sir —denounced the Organic courts. Eleven members broke ranks during Law on the Integrity of Political Parties Somare’s 2002–07 government, but none lost and Candidates (OLIPPAC) legislation as their seat. What will happen in Papua New promoting dictatorship (‘Dump law: Chan’, Guinea when a prime minister finds himself The National, 15 August 2008). politically isolated and unpopular? What In Fiji, Sitiveni Rabuka’s government will happen if only the law prevents the fall amended the constitution to prevent floor of such a government? There are plenty crossing in 1997, but Mahendra Chaudhry of cases across the Pacific where prime won the 1999 election. The new law ensured ministers have shown themselves willing that Chaudhry’s Fiji Labour Party’s 37 seats to exploit every available legal instrument in the 71-member parliament formed an to avoid the fall of their governments unbreakable majority. The allied parties in (consider, for example, then Solomon the Labour-led People’s Coalition all split, Islands Prime Minister Francis Billy Hilly’s with the rank and file joining opposition attempt to rescue his government in 1994 protests against the government. Within or Manassah Sogavare’s efforts to stave Labour ranks, Fijian members such as Dr off impending defeat in late 2007). If laws Tupeni Baba and Kenneth Zinck challenged are in place protecting prime ministers the policies being pursued by the Labour against no-confidence votes, will they be leader. These rebels could not, however, complied with when they are used in such legally switch sides. A year later, Fiji a transparently self-serving manner? The witnessed a coup d état. former PNG Chief Justice has suggested In other cases, laws binding MPs to that, in such circumstances, the OLIPPAC political parties have not worked as intended. could not withstand a constitutional In India, more MPs crossed the floor after challenge. The courts may rule the law null 1985 legislation aimed at preventing floor and void because it restrains MPs’ freedom crossing than beforehand (Indian Advisory of association or conscience (Personal Panel on Electoral Reforms, 2001:24). In communication, Sir Arnold Amet, former New Zealand, laws against MPs switching Chief Justice of Papua New Guinea, Honiara, sides simply delayed inevitable political April 2006). In Vanuatu, then Prime Minister realignments and political opinion turned Serge Vohor passed laws in 2004 providing against their continued use (Geddis 2002). a 12-month ‘grace period’ during which Likewise in Papua New Guinea, when there could not be a no-confidence motion; Treasurer Bart Philemon fell out with his this was, however, ruled unconstitutional by Prime Minister, Sir Michael Somare, the the courts and the Vohor government was new laws prevented him from founding subsequently toppled.5 the inevitable new political party (the New Generation Party) until shortly before the 2007 polls. One 2003 survey of the use of rules against party defections concluded

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Essentials of the OLIPPAC of the 1975 constitution, and extended in 1991. After an election, a new government How does the OLIPPAC work in Papua has 18 months during which there cannot be New Guinea? First, under the OLIPPAC, the a no-confidence motion (a provision Somare party with the largest number of seats after in 2004 unsuccessfully attempted to extend an election receives the initial invitation to to 36 months). If there is a no-confidence form a government (see Gelu 2005). The law motion in the last 12 months of the life helped Sir Michael Somare to become Prime of Papua New Guinea’s five-year terms, Minister in 2002 and again for a second parliament is dissolved and there is an early time after the July 2007 elections for he was election. Since MPs always wish to prolong after both elections the leader of the largest their periods in office, there never has been party (The National Alliance). Second, there a successful no-confidence motion in the are some rather weak financial incentives last year of a PNG parliament’s term. That to join parties (and added incentives for shows one interesting way of maintaining female candidates), disincentives to remain the safety valve of no-confidence motions, as independents and rules regarding the while ensuring that they are not used in a registration of political parties. Third, frivolous manner or simply to grab hold of and most importantly, MPs in Papua ministerial portfolios or for ‘fund-raising’.8 New Guinea who vote for a particular If a no-confidence vote entails a general prime minister cannot vote against that dissolution of parliament and an early prime minister in any vote of confidence, election, MPs might take this option only if budgetary vote or vote on constitutional they are riding the crest of a wave of popular amendments for the life of the parliament. dissatisfaction with the government. In There are loopholes. If a party decides normal circumstances, as PNG history collectively to switch sides—in accordance indicates, they will not want to rock the with its internal rules and procedures—it boat if that means going back to face the can do so. For that reason, many PNG electorate earlier than normal. Elections politicians constituted themselves as one- are costly affairs. Between 50 and 75 per man political parties to retain their freedom cent of PNG MPs lose their seat at general to switch. Others nominally conformed to elections. the law, if only to reduce the prospect of The consequences of laws that ensure judicial intervention. Such responses to that a no-confidence vote entails a general the OLIPPAC legislation indicate another dissolution of parliament are illustrated problem with such provisions: they weaken by the Kiribati semi-presidential system. the separation of powers and require judges In Kiribati, the Beretitenti (president) to adjudicate the internal rules of political is directly elected, but he/she forms a parties6 or to uphold the rules of procedures cabinet comprising members of parliament. of parliament. Historically, the courts Parliament can remove the Beretitenti have been reluctant to assume jurisdiction through a confidence vote, but if they do over the internal affairs of parliament and so at any point during the president’s term have viewed the speaker as the proper of office, all members of the Maneaba ni authority for the internal self-regulation of Maungatabu (parliament) lose their seat. A parliament.7 president facing a challenge to legislation The other key part of PNG’s government- that he is pressing through parliament can strengthening package is grace periods, also stamp this as raising a question of which were introduced separately as part confidence, so that if he loses the consequent

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vote the result is, likewise, a dissolution of The MPs concerned were all able to retain parliament and a fresh general election.9 their seats, despite the legal position. In This institutional set-up is a strong deterrent that respect, the law was a paper tiger. If to the use of no-confidence motions, but it Somare’s government had been about to fall, is not watertight. On three occasions—in however, the pressures to enforce the law 1982, 1993 and 2003—there were premature would no doubt have been much greater. dissolutions of parliament and early Third, Somare’s 2002–07 government was elections. Nevertheless, there has been the first since independence to survive a full considerably greater political stability in term in office. In that sense, the law brought Kiribati than in neighbouring Nauru or ‘stability’—an achievement much cherished Tuvalu, where it is possible to dislodge a by PNG reformers. Although the prime government without going back to the polls. minister did not change through 2002–07, Without the dissolution provisions in the many of the key ministers changed and there Kiribati Constitution, there is little doubt that were frequent associated changes at the top the country would have witnessed far more levels of the public sector. No-confidence regular changes in government. challenges were avoided during Somare’s 2002–07 government, not only due to the 18-month grace period and the OLIPPAC The impact of the OLIPPAC but by suspension of parliament at critical junctures when opposition forces were What has been the impact of the OLIPPAC mustering for a challenge, by changes of in Papua New Guinea? First, the number ministers and by the drawing of opposition of political parties has risen, not fallen;10 it parties into the governing coalition (Sepoe has followed a wave-like motion. After the et al. 2007:7–8). OLIPPAC, the number of registered parties There are always dangers associated rose to 43 in 2002, then fell back as a result with laws aimed at restricting no- of five amalgamations and de-registration of confidence challenges or at binding MPs fourteen on-paper parties with no seats at to political parties. They can stabilise all in 2006 and then rose again to 34 ahead popular governments, avoid frivolous no- of the 2007 polls. (Paul Bengo, Registrar of confidence motions and permit parliament Political Parties, cite in ‘Strict terms set for to concentrate on law making; however, new political parties’, The National 4 October they can also remove the ability to dislodge 2006; see also ‘fourteen Political parties a corrupt administration or can entrench an removed from registry,’ The National, 25 unpopular government. In Solomon Islands August 2006. Though different sources cited on 18 April 2006, Snyder Rini was elected different numbers, the wave-like trend both prime minister by parliament, behind closed in registered and parliamentary parties is doors, after an intense period of wheeling clear.) The number of parliamentary parties and dealing between rival factions based after the 2002 elections was 22. The number at three Chinese-owned Honiara hotels. fell to around 15 in 2006, largely due to Consequent protests outside parliament amalgamations, but then rose to 21 after the culminated in the burning down of much of 2007 election (Sepoe et al. 2007). Second, no Honiara’s Chinatown district and involved MP has as yet lost his or her seat due to this attacks on Regional Assistance Mission law, although there have been many breaches to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) vehicles. of the OLIPPAC. Cases were referred to the Eight days later, Rini resigned to head off ombudsman, but no action was taken.11 an impending no-confidence vote, leading

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to jubilation among crowds in Honiara. talking shop or rubber-stamping device for If the PNG grace-period legislation had government. been in place in Solomon Islands on 18 Plans for the top-down construction April, the short-lived Rini-led government of a party-based system are unlikely to would have had 18 months before it could be successful. Parties spontaneously arise have faced a no-confidence challenge, when there are cleavages in the society that and the OLIPPAC might have given that generate political polarisation. In the Pacific government a full four-year term. With the islands, for example, the only three territories people deprived of constitutional means of that have fairly robust political parties are dislodging the government, social unrest all polarised around key issues that divide might have continued to assume a violent the electorate and politicians. In Fiji, the and destructive form.12 Locking in such a schism between the indigenous Fijian and government would have been an unwise Indo-Fijian migrant-descended politicians and dangerous policy choice. has been the critical influence on the party The subsequent government, led by divide. In New Caledonia and French Manasseh Sogavare, was keen on making Polynesia, the cleavage has been between a provision to strengthen governments and those parties that want independence and diminish the opportunity for no-confidence those that do not (or those that prefer some votes. In the period before the fall of the kind of loose autonomy from France). Rini-led government, Sogavare had proved Elsewhere in the region, political parties able to manoeuvre in such a way as to tend chiefly to be loose factional alliances become the opposition’s candidate for the that assume significance only in the wake prime ministerial post (Fraenkel 2006a). In of general elections when the issue becomes the months after Sogavare captured the top who will form the government. job, several frustrated leaders of the smaller Even in Samoa, Vanuatu, Marshall parties in his Grand Coalition for Change Islands and Kiribati, where political parties broke away and joined the opposition.13 are sometimes thought more significant, Ironically, some, such as Bartholomew organisations are more fluid than is Ulufa’alu and Billy Hilly, had, before the commonly recognised (Fraenkel 2006b). April polls, been enthusiasts for laws Samoa’s dominant Human Rights Protection aimed at tying parliamentarians firmly to Party might be unique in the Pacific because political parties. Had they been successful, it has ruled, with only one brief exception, they would have rendered illegal their own for one-quarter of a century. In the wake of subsequent action. Under Sogavare, steps elections, however, Samoan MPs, like those were taken to consolidate the position of elsewhere in the region, seek to gravitate cabinet. Most importantly, the number towards the government benches, and of cabinet ministers was increased from political allegiances can be fluid. Vanuatu 20 to 24—close to half the 50-member once had a robust party system focused parliament. Together with judicious use of on the anglophone/francophone cleavage chairmanships of state-owned corporations, during the days of Walter Lini’s Vanua’aku such tactics were aimed at diminishing Pati and the opposition Union of Moderate the potential for an opposition challenge. Parties, but, after 1991, the major parties In other words, years of effort aimed at increasingly splintered and a more fractured strengthening the role of parliament were political environment emerged (Van Trease potentially under threat. Instead, parliament 2005)—although some micro-parties are still would have reverted to being a mere more organisationally robust in Vanuatu than

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in other Melanesian countries. Where parties to political leadership. In response, several have arisen spontaneously because there are candidates wrote angry letters to the key issues that divide people, this no doubt newspapers denying any connections with adds to the coherence of parliamentary the Liberal Party (‘Liberals vie for 38 seats’, processes; it also raises other difficulties, Solomon Star, 28 February 2006; ‘Former as the troubles of Fiji, New Caledonia and MPs refute Liberal’s claim’, Solomon Star, 28 French Polynesia clearly show. February 2006). In their quest for the prime ministerial position after general elections, the big-men of Solomon Islands politics Party strengthening laws in seek to project an image of significant Solomon Islands support, hoping to generate a roller-coaster or bandwagon-type effect so that others In and of themselves, OLIPPAC-type policies quickly jump aboard, fearing exclusion from will not promote a coherent party system the impending process of distribution of in Solomon Islands. They will, however, ministerial portfolios. strengthen the élite and make more difficult If Solomon Islands introduces Papua the emergence of political newcomers, and New Guinea-style legislation tying new perhaps contribute to frustrations about members more firmly to these political big- unaccountable leadership. At present, the men, the result will be to make competition so-called political parties in Solomon Islands during the period between general elections are primarily vehicles for securing the top and the prime ministerial vote even more job for ambitious political big-men and their intense than at present—and even more supporters. For example, immediately after susceptible to money politics. Asian loggers the 2006 polls, Chinese businessman Tommy and would-be casino operators will be more Chan published a full-page advertisement in likely to seek to influence this process. The the Solomon Star listing alleged members of stakes will be raised because lobbyists will the Association of Independent Members of know that, once the government is elected, Parliament (AIMP) in a bid to win support it could be locked in for a full four-year for his favoured candidate, Snyder Rini term. Competition between the camps (Solomon Star, 10 April 2006). Many of the habitually established at Honiara’s hotels MPs listed in that advertisement had no idea will consequently be even more vigorous that they were being cast as ‘members’ of the than usual, undermining the popular AIMP, or the MP for this or that constituency objective of seeking to avoid corruption was listed without a name (presumably surrounding the so-called ‘second election’. because the writers did not know the Only during this brief period will the electoral outcome in that constituency when bargaining power and opportunism of the they submitted the advertisement). new, first-time MPs be greatly strengthened. The example indicates something Once the government is formed, the about what political parties (or, in this case, well-established politicians who receive clusters of independent members) are in ministerial portfolios will be better able to Solomon Islands. Similarly, former Prime consolidate their control over parliament. Minister Bartholomew Ulufa’alu published Female politicians, of whom a growing advertisements in the newspapers giving number have been contesting elections photos of the alleged candidates for his of late, will be weakened and alternative Liberal Party shortly before the 2006 polls, newer groupings will find themselves at also hoping thereby to strengthen his claim a great disadvantage compared with the

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established so-called parties. Eventually, the the presidency. Another advantage of the likely result will be a major political crisis, parliamentary system in Solomon Islands unless wise counsel prevails among judges is that governments have usually had to be who themselves ditch the new legislation. coalitions with representatives from across the group, balancing, in particular, leaders from Malaita, Guadalcanal and the Western Other approaches to Province. strengthening governments in For the Solomon Islands, the better option Solomon Islands would be to retain the prime ministerial system but introduce legislation that Reforming Westminster systems to makes a successful no-confidence motion remove the possibility of no-confidence entail a general dissolution of parliament. votes is the worst possible way to reform Political scientists who are unfamiliar with Solomon Islands institutions or strengthen Pacific politics might warn that this will government. The primary advantage of entail too many snap elections and short- Westminster systems is that they generate lived governments. Another consequence, greater potential for the mid-term removal however, of the weakness of parties in of unpopular governments than presidential Melanesia is an extreme reluctance on the systems. In presidential systems, it is usually part of politicians to consider a premature difficult to remove the head of state and the dissolution. As we saw previously, Papua government unless opponents go through New Guinea has never had a successful long and elaborate methods of impeachment. no-confidence motion during the last 12 As a result, presidential systems—as in much months of a government, when doing so of Latin America—have often been said to would entail a parliamentary dissolution. be more prone to coups than parliamentary Kiribati has had three dissolutions, but systems (see Linz and Valenzuela 1994; has nevertheless been more politically Shugart and Mainwaring 1997). On the stable than its closest neighbours. Making other hand, the advantage of presidential a no-confidence vote entail a dissolution systems is that they entail nation-wide direct of parliament is a far better option than elections for the head of government, with forbidding no-confidence votes for certain the result that the government has a strong grace periods or locking MPs into backing and direct popular mandate. Retaining this or that political leader. the parliamentary system—without the Neither option would, however, in associated possibility of mid-term removal itself, do anything to diminish political of governments—means adopting the horse-trading between the general election weaker aspects of both systems. It misses and the prime ministerial election. There out on the direct popular vote for the head are four viable responses to address these of state, but adopts only the inflexibility of issues. First, the prime ministerial election the locked-in form of government. might be opened to public scrutiny, rather A standard presidential system would, than taking place by secret ballot.14 In 2006, however, also be a poor choice for the election observers declined to observe the Solomon Islands. Presidential systems tend so-called ‘second election’ on the grounds to be highly majoritarian; there is a single that the constitution forbid them doing so. presidential position to fill and the most Second, the period between the general populous group (if it votes for a single election and the prime ministerial election candidate) will usually be able to capture could be shortened (the 13 days separating

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the two in 2006 compounded difficulties au/papers/melanesia/discussion_ and increased the scope for corruption). papers/05_08_dp_fraenkel.pdf Third, politicians might be subjected to more Geddis, A., 2002. ‘Gang Aft A-Gley: New rigorous scrutiny by formalising the anti- Zealand’s attempt to combat “party corruption ‘pledges’ signed by candidates hopping” by elected representatives’, on the 2006 campaign trail. Nomination Election Law Journal, 1(4):557–71. forms signed by intending candidates before Gelu, A., 2005. ‘The failure of the Organic a general election, might subject would-be Law on the Integrity of Political Parties MPs to greater scrutiny by a strengthened and Candidates (OLIPPAC)’, Pacific Leadership Code Commission. Ultimately, Economic Bulletin, 20(1):83–97. however, tackling corruption during the Indian Advisory Panel on Electoral run-up to a prime ministerial election is Reforms, 2001. Standards in political not something that will be achieved by new life, review of the electoral law, processes legislation. Laws against corruption already and reform options, Consultation exist on the statute books. Curtailing these Paper prepared for the National kinds of activities would be greatly assisted Commission to Review the Working of by only one or two high-profile convictions the Constitution, New Delhi, 8 January of would-be lobbyists offering cash in the 2001. Available from http://lawmin. run up to a prime ministerial election. nic.in/ncrwc/finalreport/v2b1-9.htm Jowitt, A., 2005. ‘Vanuatu: Melanesia References in review’, The Contemporary Pacific, 17(2):456–63. Baker, L., 2005. ‘Political integrity in Linz, J. and Valenzuela, A., 1994. The Papua New Guinea and the search Failure of Presidential Democracy, Johns for stability’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 20(1):100–19. and London. Blackstone, W., 1830. Commentaries on May, R., 2008. The 2007 election in Papua the Laws of England, (1765–1769). Book New Guinea, State, Society and 1:Ch.2. Available from http://www. Governance in Melanesia Briefing lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/bla- Note, 7:1–6. 102.htm Miskin, S., 2003. Politician overboard: Fraenkel, J., 2004. ‘Electoral engineering jumping the party ship, Research in Papua New Guinea: lessons from Paper No.4, Department of the Fiji and elsewhere’, Pacific Economic Parliamentary Library, Commonwealth Bulletin, 19(1):122–33. of :1–48. ——, 2006a. ‘The impact of RAMSI on the Reilly, B., 2006. ‘Political reform in Papua 2006 elections in the Solomon Islands’, New Guinea: testing the evidence’, Political Science, 58(2):63–85. Pacific Economic Bulletin, 21(1):187–94. ——, 2006b. ‘The political consequences Sepoe, O., Gelu, A. and May, R., 2007. of Pacific island electoral laws’, in R. Papua New Guinea’s Organic Law on Rich, L. Hambly and M. Morgan (eds), the Integrity of Political Parties and Political Parties in the Pacific Islands, Candidates, Paper presented at the Pandanus Books, Canberra:43–67. conference Executive Power and the Available from http://rspas.anu.edu. Battle for Parliamentary Confidence,

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PIAS-DG/ANU, Emalus Campus, 3 The Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Port Vila, Vanuatu, 21–23 September Parties and Candidates 2003. Available from 2007:1–27. http://www.paclii.org/pg/legis/consol_ act/olotioppac2003542 Shugart, M.S. and Mainwaring, S. (eds), 4 For a discussion of the different meanings 1997. Presidentialism and Democracy in of the word ‘integrity’ used in Papua New Latin America, Cambridge University Guinea, see Baker (2005). Press, Cambridge, New York and 5 See Vohor vs Attorney General [2004], Civil Melbourne:12–54. Appeal Case 24 of 2004, 8 December 2004. See also ‘Vanuatu agrees to constitutional So’o, A. and Fraenkel, J., 2005. ‘The role reform’, Vanuatu Daily Post, 19 October 2004; of ballot chiefs (Matai Pälota) and ‘Court to decide legality of 12-month grace political parties in Sämoa’s shift to period’, Vanuatu Daily Post, 5 December 2004; universal suffrage’, Commonwealth and Jowitt 2005:462. 9 Comparative Politics, 43(3):333–61. This issue arose also regarding the Fijian legislation, when the courts found it Standish, W., 2004. ‘The dynamics of impossible to establish which of the two Papua New Guinea’s democracy: New Labour Unity Party MPs had ‘crossed an essay’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, the floor’ since there was no internal party 22(1):135–57. resolution making clear the stance of the party (see Fraenkel 2004:128–9). Van Trease, H., 2005. ‘The operation 7 ‘The whole of the law and custom of of the single non-transferable vote parliament has its [origin in] this one maxim, system in Vanuatu’, Commonwealth and that whatever matter arises concerning Comparative Politics, 43(3):296–332. either House of Parliament, ought to be examined, discussed, and adjudged in that House to which it relates, and not Notes elsewhere’ (Blackstone 1830:163). With written constitutions, courts are sometimes more 1 This is an extended version of a talk given prone to regulate parliamentary conduct, at Land, Politics and Development in but usually only where legal jurisdiction is clearly outlined in the constitution. Melanesia, a seminar organised by The 8 Some critical observers of Solomon Islands Australian National University, the Solomon politics describe the objective of (and mutual Islands government and the Solomon Islands interest among parliamentarians in) no- College of Higher Education, 29 July 2008. I confidence challenges as being tied up with am indebted to Anthony Regan and David fund-raising. Those on the government and Hegarty for their comments on an earlier opposition sides can benefit financially from version of the paper. the resulting pressures on political leaders to 2 ‘If at anytime it appears to the Governor- procure political support. General, acting in accordance with the advice of 9 ‘The Maneaba ni Maungatabu [parliament] the Speaker, that the leader of an independent shall stand dissolved if, in respect of any group, by reason of the numerical strength of matter before the Maneaba, the Beretitenti that independent group or by reason of the [President] notifies the Speaker that a vote support which he receives from the members on that matter raises an issue of confidence, of independent groups generally, should and in a subsequent vote on the matter it is be appointed as Leader of the Independent rejected by a majority of all members of the Members, the Governor-General shall appoint Maneaba’ (Kiribati Constitution, s.78[1][b]). him as such [a] leader’ (The Solomon Islands 10 Ben Reilly is in error when he says ‘the trend Independence Order 1978, s.66[2]). To drop this is clear: the number of registered parties has provision seems sensible. fallen sharply since the OLIPPAC reforms

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were introduced, from 42 in 2001 to 15 in 2005’ (Reilly 2006:191). He neglects that the initial reaction was a rise just before the 2002 polls, and confuses the number of registered parties (that is, nominal parties on the books of the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties) with the number of parliamentary parties (that is, parties with seats in parliament). A significant proportion of the alleged decrease in 2002–06 was in fact merely a striking off by the Office of the Registrar of Parties of registered parties without a single member in parliament. For the number of parliamentary parties after the 2007 polls, see May (2008:4). 11 In some cases, this was because internal party procedures were too vague. In other cases, it was because the party declared the issue to be a ‘confidence’ question, permitting a free vote. 12 In Papua New Guinea in early 1977, when Julius Chan’s government was in its last year in office (and therefore when there could not be a no-confidence vote without a dissolution of parliament), Chan recruited Sandline mercenaries with the objective of violently ending the . Mass public demonstrations and a military revolt, rather than a parliamentary reaction, put an end to the policy. 13 Splitting parties in this way has been a familiar tactic in Papua New Guinea—under Bill Skate and Michael Somare. One minister in Somare’s National Alliance in 2004 boasted that ‘we have cut off the heads of the minor parties and will be able to gather up the bodies’ (Standish 2004:147). 14 This would require amendment of the 1978 Constitution, which provides that ‘the election shall be by secret ballot’ and that ‘no person other than the Governor-General, a member, or a public officer whose assistance is enlisted under the preceding sub-paragraph shall be present at an election meeting (Schedule 2 to the 1978 Constitution, s.5[1], s.6[3]).

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