Aristotle's Metaphysics
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KINESIS» VS. ENERGEIA: A MUCH-READPASSAGE IN(BUT NOT OF)ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS M. F. BURNYEAT Inmemoriam Michael Frede fie aretodiscuss what is now one of the most famous passages in Aristotle: Metaphysics Θ 6, 1048B18–35, on the distinction be- tween κ#νησις and νργεια.The Passage, as I shall capitalize it, has been endlessly analysedbyphilosophical enthusiasts. It is a par- ticular favourite with those trained in analytic philosophy.1 But ã M. F. Burnyeat 2008 This paperbegan as a contribution to a seminar on Metaphysics Θ held in Cam- bridge during theSpring Termof1995. Acknowledgements for critical comments and many otherkindsofhelpareowed to PeterAdamson, Gwenae•lle Aubry,David Charles, Alan Code, Michel Crubellier,StenEbbesen, Doug Hutchinson, Stephen Makin, Wolfgang Mann, Terumasa Okhusa, Jan Saif, Anna-Maria Schiaparelli, Bob Sharples. Very special acknowledgements are due to Michael Fredeand David Sedley for their continuing supportover the long period of gestation and for theim- portant substantivecontributions their expertise has madetoitseventual outcome. To Francesco AdemolloIowethanksforhelp (both philological and administrative) in connection with the manuscript in Florence, plus comments at various stages in thegrowth of thepaper.Inaddition, I thank audiences in Berlin, Florence, Lille, Munich,Oxford,and Toronto for their sympathetically criticaldiscussions. 1 In part because of theusemadeofitinmodern discussion by Ryle (cited and cri- ticizedbyAckrill) and Kenny.Thus Penner: ‘It was Ryle whofirst showed analytical philosophersthegold mine there was in Aristotle.’ On theother sideoftheChan- nel,the view can be ratherdi·erent: ‘C’est a› lui [the Passage] que je m’attacherai, a› cause desavaleur philosophique conside‹rable, et aussi —l’avouerai-je? — par ce souci sportif de venir en aide au passages quelque peu laisses‹ -pour-compte, et relegu‹ es‹ dans les notes et les subordonnes‹ concessives des ouvrages savants . .’. So wrote Brague (the ‘points de suspension’ are his),twenty-three years afterAck- rill’sseminal paper on the Passage. In the sequel Brague cites Ackrill, but none of thearticles that poured out in the lively controversyheprompted.Iamgrateful for Brague’s unanalytic discussion, despite numerous textualdisagreements sig- nalledbelow.Theanti-analytic discussion of Dufour, by contrast, is a thicket of confusion. (References: J.L.Ackrill, ‘A ristotle’s Distinction between Energeia and Kinesis’ [‘Distinction’], in R. Bambrough(ed.), New Essayson Plato and Aristotle [New Essays] (London andNew York, 1965), 121–41 at 123, 125–6 (repr.inJ.L. 220 M. F. Burnyeat few of these enthusiasts have attempted to explain how it fits into theoverall programme of Θ.2 Ignoring contextisusually a fault. But not here, for the goodreason that the Passage does not fit into theoverall programme of Θ, was not written for Θ,and should not beprinted in theplace we read it today.SoIshall argue. If I am right, theanalysts can legitimately keep analysing the Passage on its own, as an isolated fragment of uncertain origin. I will join in myself. For nothing I sayhere is meant to impugn the philosophical interest and importance of the Passage, or to deny that it is authentic Aristotle. But I will suggest that its focus is ratherdi·erent from what it is usually taken to be. I will also argue, controversially,that the Θ 6distinction is unique in thecorpus and should not beimported into otherAristotelian contexts such as Nicomachean Ethics 10or De anima 2. 5. To speak,asIhavejustdone, of ‘theoverall programme of Θ’ is to takealot for granted.This is not theplace to elaborate a detailed interpretation of Θ. Let me simply acknowledge that my thinking about Θ has been much influencedbyMichael Frede’s 1994 paper on potentiality in Metaphysics Θ.3 So far as I am concerned,that is thestarting-point for all future discussion of Θ’scontribution to the Aristotelian philosophy.4 Ackrill, Essayson Plato and Aristotle (Oxford, 1997), 142–62); R. Brague, Aris- tote et laquestion dumonde: essai sur lecontexte cosmologiqueetanthropologiquede l’ontologie [Monde] (Paris, 1988), 454; M. Dufour, ‘La distinction νργεια–κ#νησις en M‹etaph. Θ, 6: deux manie›res d’et^ re dans letemps’, Revuedephilosophieancienne, 19 (2001),3–43;A.Kenny, Action,Emotion and Will (London, 1963),ch.8; T. Penner, ‘Verbsand theIdentity of Actions: A Philosophical Exercise in theInter- pretation of Aristotle’ [‘Verbs’], in O. P. Wood and G. Pitcher(eds.), Ryle (London and Basingstoke, 1971), 393–460 at 395; G. Ryle, Dilemmas (Cambridge, 1966), 102–3.) 2 An honourable, even heroic, exception is L. A.Kosman,‘Substance, Being, and Energeia’ [‘Substance’], OxfordStudies in AncientPhilosophy,2(1984), 121–49. 3 M. Frede, ‘A ristotle’s Notion of Potentiality in Metaphysics Θ’ [‘Potentiality’], in T. Scaltsas, D. Charles, and M. L. Gill (eds.), Unity,Identity andExplanation in Aristotle’sMetaphysics (Oxford, 1994), 173–93. In M. F. Burnyeat, A Map of Metaphysics Zeta [Map] (Pittsburgh, 2001),esp.ch. 6,Ido havethings to say about the roleofΘ in the larger contextofthe Metaphysics. 4 This sentence was written years beforeFrede’ssudden death at DelphiinAugust 2007. Kinesis» vs. Energeia 221 PART I: TEXT 1. To motivate thetextual enquiry that follows, I begin with a philosophical complaint. The main business of Θ 6 is to contrive an analogical extension. Θ began by studying thecontrast between δ$ναµις and νργεια in thesphereofchange. But Aristotlemade it clear from theoutsetthat forhis current project, which is to explain potential and actual being,change is not themostuseful spheretoconsider(Θ 1, 1045B27–1046A4). We begin thereinorder to arrivesomewhereelse, wherethecontrast is between δ$ναµις as Oλη and νργεια as ο2σ#α.That transition is thetask of Θ 6,as Aristotleexplains both at thestartofthechapter(Θ 6, 1048A25–30) andwhen theextension has been completed(1048B6–9).IuseC to mark cases of change, S for the cases of substantialbeing that Aristotle wants to reach: Since we have discussed the kind of potentialitywhich is spoken of in connection with change, let us determine what, andwhat sortofthing, actuality is. In thecourse of our analysis it will become clear, withregard to thepotential,that besides ascribing potentiality to that whose nature it is to change something else or to bechangedbysomething else, either without qualification or in a certain manner, wealso use theterminanother sense, which is what we have been after in discussing these previous senses. Actuality [νργεια]isthething being present [5π&ρχειν], but not in the waywespeak of when wesay it is potentially present;(S)wesay that potentially,for instance, a Hermes is in the block of wood and the half-line in the whole, because it might beseparated out, and(C) even someone whoisnotexercising knowledge [µ; θεωροντα] wecall knowledgeable [πιστµονα]ifthey are capableofexercising knowledge. Theother case [sc. when they areexercising it] is <knowledge> in actuality. Our meaning can be seen by induction from particular cases. Weshould not seek to captureeverything in a definition, but some things weshould comprehend [συνορ7ν] by analogy.Thus as (C) that which is building is to that which is capableofbuilding, so is the waking to thesleeping, and that which sees <something>5 to a sighted thing with its eyes shut, and(S) that 5 Throughout this paper I am facedwith translation di¶culties arising from the fact that themorphology of ancient Greekverbs does not distinguish,asEnglish morphologydoes, between the continuous and thenon-continuous present. Since Iamtranslating, I write whichever formstrikes me as themostnaturalway,in thegiven context, to put Aristotle’s verbsintoEnglish. Consequently,Ifeel no obligation to follow Ross and other English translators who write ‘is seeing’here to match theprevious ‘is building’.Iwrite ‘sees’, with the accusative ‘something’ 222 M. F. Burnyeat whichhas been shaped out of the matter to the matter,and that whichhas been wroughttotheunwrought. Let actuality [νργεια] be distinguished as one partofthis antithesis, thepotential [τ δυνατν]astheother. Not everything is said to be in actuality [νεργε#Yα]inthe same sense, but only by analogy—as Α is in Β or to Β,soisΓ in ∆ or to ∆; for(C) some are related as change [κ#νησις] to capacity [δ$ναµις], while (S) othersare related as substance to some matter. (Θ 6, 1048A25–B9)6 Notice that in this text building is listed,alongsideexercising know- ledge, being awake, and seeing, as an exampleofνργεια, whileall four areclassed as κ#νησις in relation to δ$ναµις.Inthe Passage, by contrast, building is not νργεια, but κ#νησις (1048B29–31), while seeing is not κ#νησις, but νργεια (1048B23, 33–4). Noproblem yet. The Passage introduces a newdistinction. Some actions (πρ&ξεις)haveanexternal goal,somedonot,because the goal is the action itself. Building aims at theproduction of a house, whichwill last foryears to come. Seeing, by contrast, does not aim at a further product. Its goal is internal to itself, to see what is there to be seen.7 Thenewdistinction divides theprevious listofC-type νργειαι into twogroups: those like seeing which are νργειαι in the new,moretightly defined sense that they aim at nothing beyond themselves, and those like building which aim at a further product. The latterbecome κινσεις in a sense of the word more specific than inserted to stop ‘sees’being equivalent to ‘has sight’.The fact is that ‘is seeing’ is relatively rareinEnglish,forreasons not unconnectedwith thephilosophical content of the Passage. It is in part because Greek morphologylacks