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UC San Diego UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Explaining the causes and consequences of internationally monitored elections Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0pc3q95z Author Hyde, Susan Dayton Publication Date 2006 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Observing Norms: Explaining the Causes and Consequences of Internationally Monitored Elections A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Susan Dayton Hyde Committee in charge: Professor David A. Lake, Chair Professor Gary W. Cox Professor Clark C. Gibson Professor Kristian S. Gleditsch Professor Peter Gourevitch Professor Carlos H. Waisman 2006 Copyright Susan Dayton Hyde, 2006 All rights reserved. The dissertation of Susan Dayton Hyde is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm: Chair University of California, San Diego 2006 iii DEDICATION To my mother, Glenda, to my father, Dayton, and to my husband, Sean iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page……………………………………………………. iii Dedication………………………………………………………... iv Table of Contents………………………………………………… v List of Figures……………………………………………………. vi List of Tables……………………………………………………... viii Acknowledgements………………………………………………. ix Vita……………………………………………………………….. xi Abstract…………………………………………………………... xii Chapter 1 Introduction……………………………………………………..... 1 Chapter 2 The Demand and Supply of International Election Observation……………………………………………………..... 22 Chapter 3 The Democratic Signal: Formal Model………………………… 52 Chapter 4 Material Motivations to International Norm?........................... 74 Chapter 5 Why Do Leaders Invite International Observers?.....…………….. 115 Chapter 6 Introducing Randomization to International Election Observation: The 2004 Presidential Elections in Indonesia……… 146 Chapter 7 Can International Election Observers Reduce Election Day Fraud? Evidence from a Natural Experiment………………......... 167 Chapter 8 International Election Observation and Opposition Party Behavior………………………………………………………….. 213 Chapter 9 Conclusion………………………………………………………... 241 Appendices ……………………………………………………..... 254 Bibliography…………………………………………………........ 261 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1: Percent of Elections Observed…………………………………….... 4 Figure 2.1: Percent Elections Monitored in Latin America and the Caribbean..... 29 Figure 2.2: Percent Elections Monitored in Asia and Oceania………………….. 29 Figure 2.3: Percent Elections Monitored in Europe……………………………... 30 Figure 2.4: Percent Elections Monitored in North Africa and the Middle East…. 30 Figure 2.5: Percent Elections Monitored in Africa……………………………… 31 Figure 3.1: The Democratic Signal Extensive Form Game……………………... 69 Figure 4.1: Total Bilateral ODA for Government and Civil Society …………… 88 Figure 4.2: Total USAID Democracy and Governance Aid…………………….. 88 Figure 4.3: USAID Democracy and Governance Aid as Percent of Total Aid..... 89 Figure 4.4: Current Aid as a Percent of Previous Year’s Aid…………………… 92 Figure 5.1: Elections and Observed Elections, 1960-2004……………………... 128 Figure 5.2: Interaction Effects…………………………………………………... 134 Figure 5.3: Statistical Significance of Interaction Effects………………………. 134 Figure 5.4: Number of Elections with Negative Reports………………………... 136 Figure 5.5: Percentage of Observed Elections with Negative Reports………….. 136 Figure 5.6: Percentage of High and Low-Quality Observation Missions……….. 138 Figure 5.7: Number of Observed Elections with Multiple Observer Groups…… 139 Figure 6.1: Fraud Observation vs. Fraud Deterrence……………………………. 149 Figure 7.1: Continuum of Strategies for Biasing Elections……………………... 173 Figure 7.2: Kernel Density Plot Comparing Round One Incumbent Vote Share.. 200 Figure 7.3: Round Two Vote Share, Always Observed vs. Never Observed…… 201 vi Figure 7.4: Round Two Vote Share, Observed in Round One vs. Round Two…. 203 Figure 8.1: Percent Elections Observed and Percent Boycotted………………… 216 Figure 8.2: Percent of Boycotted Elections that were Observed………………... 217 Figure 8.3: Annual Rate of Monitored Elections………………………………... 234 Figure 8.4: Annual Rate of Election Boycott……………………………………. 235 Figure 8.5: Annual Rate of Election Boycotts for Unmonitored Elections……... 236 vii LIST OF TABLES Table 4.1: Binary Logit: Aid Reduction (Models 1-4)………………………….. 98 Table 4.2: Binary Logit: Aid Reduction (Models 5-6)………………………….. 99 Table 4.3: Elections Held without International Observers……………….......... 102 Table 5.1: Organizations Sending Observer Missions………………………....... 123 Table 5.2: Binary Logit: Observed Elections (Models 1-4)…………………...... 129 Table 5.3: Effects of Country Characteristics…………………………………… 132 Table 5.4: Cold War Alignment and Observed Elections…………………......... 142 Table 5.5: Binary Logit: Observed Elections, (Models 5-6)………………......... 143 Table 6.1: Village Level Summary Statistics…………………………………… 160 Table 6.2: Carter Center Observation Coverage………………………………… 162 Table 6.3: Effects of Observers on Vote Share and Turnout by Candidate…….. 163 Table 7.1: Round One Observer Coverage by Region………………………...... 190 Table 7.2: Number of Polling Stations in Each Experimental Group…………... 193 Table 7.3: Setup of Natural Experimental Design………………………………. 195 Table 7.4: Vote Share by Candidate…………………………….………………. 196 Table 7.5: Difference of Means Tests Between Groups of Polling Stations……. 198 Table 7.6: Difference of Means on Round One Kocharian Vote Share………… 206 Table 8.1: Binary Logit: Election Boycott………………………………………. 233 Table 8.2: Correlation of Errors between Monitors and Boycotts………………. 237 viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This research was made possible by grants and fellowship from the Brookings Institution’s Governance Studies Program, the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California, and the University of California, San Diego’s School of Social Sciences and Department of Political Science. I am also indebted to the office of the University of California’s Washington Center for providing me with a place to work in DC. The Carter Center’s Democracy Program gave me numerous opportunities to serve as an international election observer, invited me to spend a summer in their offices in Atlanta, GA, and gave me the very unique opportunity to work with the organization during the 2004 Indonesian elections. This project has benefited from the comments and support from many individuals, all of whom deserve ample thanks here. I feel especially fortunate to have David Lake as my advisor. He provided the perfect balance of criticism and support, was always available, and was instrumental in teaching me how to become a scholar. I am grateful to Gary Cox, Clark Gibson, Kristian Gleditsch, Peter Gourevitch, and Carlos Waisman for serving on my committee and for providing many excellent comments along the way. This project also benefited from the input and technical assistance of Karen Ferree, Steph Haggard, Miles Kahler, Thad Kousser, Mat McCubbins, Phil Roeder, and Branislav Slantchev. I thank the participants in the department’s graduate seminars in comparative politics and international relations (2003-2004), and the department’s IR workshop retreats. My fellow graduate students in international relations and comparative politics, including Scott Bailey, Emily Beaulieu, Kyle Beardsley, Rob Brown, David Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, Barak Hoffman, Alejandra Rios- Cázares, Idean Salehyan, and Heather Smith all endured numerous iterations of the project, and I am fortunate to have gone through this experience with them. Carew Boulding, as my office partner of three years, deserves special thanks. I also was fortunate to coauthor papers with Emily Beaulieu and Carew Boulding, portions of which are included in this dissertation. I thank Emily Beaulieu for giving me permission to include much of our paper in Chapter 8. The paper was originally presented as “Cheating Incumbents, International Observers, and Opposition Boycotts: Evidence of the Second Image Reversed after the Cold War” at the 100th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL; and at the 63rd Annual National Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. I thank Carew Boulding for giving me permission to include portions of our paper in Chapter 4. Our paper was originally presented as “Political Terror, Election Fraud, and Foreign Aid: When do donors withdraw aid to promote democracy?” during the 63rd Annual National Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. ix Eric Bjornlund was instrumental in making my time in Indonesia possible. Clark Gibson and Mat McCubbins also provided continual feedback while I was in the field. David Carroll, David Pottie, and Avery Davis-Roberts of the Carter Center not only welcomed me in Indonesia, but invited me to continue working with The Carter Center, an experience that has proven to be invaluable. Vladimir Pran of NDI provided me with useful information about the Indonesian elections. In the very early months that I worked on this dissertation, Pat Merloe generously spent time with me on the phone. Gerald Mitchell and Anders Erikson of the OSCE/ODIHR were extraordinarily helpful by providing me with insight into OSCE/ODIHR election observation methodology and ultimately provided me with data on OSCE/ODIHR deployments during the 2003 presidential elections in Armenia. Eric Bjornlund and Anders