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Stephan Heblich Stephen J. Redding Daniel M. Sturm
THE MAKING OF THE MODERN METROPOLIS: EVIDENCE FROM LONDON∗ Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/135/4/2059/5831735 by Princeton University user on 21 August 2020 STEPHAN HEBLICH STEPHEN J. REDDING DANIEL M. STURM Using newly constructed spatially disaggregated data for London from 1801 to 1921, we show that the invention of the steam railway led to the first large-scale separation of workplace and residence. We show that a class of quantitative urban models is remarkably successful in explaining this reorganization of economic ac- tivity. We structurally estimate one of the models in this class and find substantial agglomeration forces in both production and residence. In counterfactuals, we find that removing the whole railway network reduces the population and the value of land and buildings in London by up to 51.5% and 53.3% respectively, and decreases net commuting into the historical center of London by more than 300,000 workers. JEL Codes: O18, R12, R40 I. INTRODUCTION Modern metropolitan areas include vast concentrations of economic activity, with Greater London and New York City today ∗We are grateful to the University of Bristol, the London School of Economics, Princeton University, and the University of Toronto for research support. Heblich also acknowledges support from the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) Grant no. INO15-00025. We thank the editor, four anonymous referees, Victor Cou- ture, Jonathan Dingel, Ed Glaeser, Vernon Henderson, Petra Moser, Leah Platt Boustan, Will Strange, Claudia Steinwender, Matt Turner, Jerry White, Christian Wolmar, and conference and seminar participants at Berkeley, Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), Columbia, Dartmouth, EIEF Rome, European Economic Association, Fed Board, Geneva, German Economic Association, Harvard, IDC Herzliya, LSE, Marseille, MIT, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Nottingham, Princeton, Singapore, St. -
Economic Choices
ECONOMIC CHOICES Daniel McFadden* This Nobel lecture discusses the microeconometric analysis of choice behavior of consumers who face discrete economic alternatives. Before the 1960's, economists used consumer theory mostly as a logical tool, to explore conceptually the properties of alternative market organizations and economic policies. When the theory was applied empirically, it was to market-level or national-accounts-level data. In these applications, the theory was usually developed in terms of a representative agent, with market-level behavior given by the representative agent’s behavior writ large. When observations deviated from those implied by the representative agent theory, these differences were swept into an additive disturbance and attributed to data measurement errors, rather than to unobserved factors within or across individual agents. In statistical language, traditional consumer theory placed structural restrictions on mean behavior, but the distribution of responses about their mean was not tied to the theory. In the 1960's, rapidly increasing availability of survey data on individual behavior, and the advent of digital computers that could analyze these data, focused attention on the variations in demand across individuals. It became important to explain and model these variations as part of consumer theory, rather than as ad hoc disturbances. This was particularly obvious for discrete choices, such as transportation mode or occupation. The solution to this problem has led to the tools we have today for microeconometric analysis of choice behavior. I will first give a brief history of the development of this subject, and place my own contributions in context. After that, I will discuss in some detail more recent developments in the economic theory of choice, and modifications to this theory that are being forced by experimental evidence from cognitive psychology. -
TECHNOLOGY and GROWTH: an OVERVIEW Jeffrey C
Y Proceedings GY Conference Series No. 40 Jeffrey C. Fuhrer Jane Sneddon Little Editors CONTENTS TECHNOLOGY AND GROWTH: AN OVERVIEW Jeffrey C. Fuhrer and Jane Sneddon Little KEYNOTE ADDRESS: THE NETWORKED BANK 33 Robert M. Howe TECHNOLOGY IN GROWTH THEORY Dale W. Jorgenson Discussion 78 Susanto Basu Gene M. Grossman UNCERTAINTY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 91 Nathan Rosenberg Discussion 111 Joel Mokyr Luc L.G. Soete CROSS-COUNTRY VARIATIONS IN NATIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES," THE ROLE OF aTECHNOLOGYtr 127 J. Bradford De Long~ Discussion 151 Jeffrey A. Frankel Adam B. Jaffe ADDRESS: JOB ~NSECURITY AND TECHNOLOGY173 Alan Greenspan MICROECONOMIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 183 Edwin Mansfield Discnssion 201 Samuel S. Kortum Joshua Lerner TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION IN U.S. MANUFACTURING: THE GEOGRAPHIC DIMENSION 215 Jane Sneddon Little and Robert K. Triest Discussion 260 John C. Haltiwanger George N. Hatsopoulos PANEL DISCUSSION 269 Trends in Productivity Growth 269 Martin Neil Baily Inherent Conflict in International Trade 279 Ralph E. Gomory Implications of Growth Theory for Macro-Policy: What Have We Learned? 286 Abel M. Mateus The Role of Macroeconomic Policy 298 Robert M. Solow About the Authors Conference Participants 309 TECHNOLOGY AND GROWTH: AN OVERVIEW Jeffrey C. Fuhrer and Jane Sneddon Little* During the 1990s, the Federal Reserve has pursued its twin goals of price stability and steady employment growth with considerable success. But despite--or perhaps because of--this success, concerns about the pace of economic and productivity growth have attracted renewed attention. Many observers ruefully note that the average pace of GDP growth has remained below rates achieved in the 1960s and that a period of rapid investment in computers and other capital equipment has had disappointingly little impact on the productivity numbers. -
Occasional Paper by Alastair Clark and Andrew
Macroprudential Policy: Addressing the Things We Don’t Know Alastair Clark Andrew Large Occasional Paper 83 30 Group of Thirty, Washington, DC About the Authors Alastair Clark, CBE, formerly Executive Director and Adviser to the Governor of the Bank of England, has since 2009 been Senior Adviser to HM Treasury on Financial Stability and is a member of the UK’s new interim Financial Policy Committee. He has also acted as an independent adviser to overseas public authorities in relation to financial stability and crisis prevention issues. He has been at various times a member of many international groups linked to the G20, the Financial Stability Board, and the Bank for International Settlements. In 2005 he co-chaired, with Walter Kielholz, a G30 Study Group looking at the systemic impact of reinsurance. He holds degrees from Cambridge University and the London School of Economics. Sir Andrew Large retired in 2006 as Deputy Governor of the Bank of England where he had served since 2002. He now acts independently for central banks and governments in relation to financial stability and crisis prevention issues. Andrew Large’s career has covered a wide range of senior positions in the world of global finance, within both the private and public sectors. He is in addition Chairman of the Senior Advisory Board of Oliver Wyman, Senior Adviser to the Hedge Fund Standards Board, Chairman of the Advisory Committee of Marshall Wace, and Chairman of the Board Risk Committee of Axis, Bermuda. ISBN 1-56708-154-1 Copies of this paper are available for $10 from: The Group of Thirty 1726 M Street, N.W., Suite 200 Washington, D.C. -
International Economic and Financial Cooperation: New Issues, New Actors, New Responses
International Economic and Financial Cooperation: New Issues, New Actors, New Responses Geneva Reports on the World Economy 6 International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies (ICMB) International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies 11 A Avenue de la Paix 1202 Geneva Switzerland Tel (41 22) 734 9548 Fax (41 22) 733 3853 Website: www.icmb.ch © 2004 International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Centre for Economic Policy Research 90-98 Goswell Road London EC1V 7RR UK Tel: +44 (0)20 7878 2900 Fax: +44 (0)20 7878 2999 Email: [email protected] Website: www.cepr.org British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 1 898128 84 7 International Economic and Financial Cooperation: New Issues, New Actors, New Responses Geneva Reports on the World Economy 6 Peter B Kenen Council on Foreign Relations and Princeton University Jeffrey R Shafer Citigroup and former US Under Secretary of the Treasury Nigel L Wicks CRESTCo and former Head of HM Treasury Charles Wyplosz Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva and CEPR ICMB INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR MONETARY AND BANKING STUDIES CIMB CENTRE INTERNATIONAL DETUDES MONETAIRES ET BANCAIRES International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies (ICMB) The International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies was created in 1973 as an inde- pendent, non-profit foundation. It is associated with Geneva’s Graduate Institute of International Studies. Its aim is to foster exchange of views between the financial sector, cen- tral banks and academics on issues of common interest. -
14.770: Introduction to Political Economy
14.770: Introduction to Political Economy Daron Acemoglu and Benjamin Olken Fall 2018. This course is intended as an introduction to field of political economy. It is the first part of the two-part sequence in political economy, along with 14.773 which will be offered in the spring. Combined the purpose of the two classes is to give you both a sense of the frontier research topics and a good command of the tools in the area. The reading list is intentionally long, to give those of you interested in the field an opportunity to dig deeper into some of the topics in this area. The lectures will cover the material with *'s in detail and also discuss the material without *'s, but in less detail. Grading: Class requirements: • Problem sets (50% of grade). You may work in groups of maximum 2 students on the problem sets, and even then each of you must hand in your own solutions. There will be approximately 5-6 problem sets in total, covering a mix of theory and empirics. • Final Exam. (40% of grade). • Class participation (10% of grade) Course Information: Professors Daron Acemoglu: [email protected] Benjamin Olken: [email protected] Teaching Assistant Mateo Montenegro: mateo [email protected] Lecture MW 10:30-12:00 (E51-376) Recitation F 12:00 - 1:00 (E51-372) 1 Collective Choices and Voting (DA, 9/6 & 9/11) These two lectures introduce some basic notions from the theory of collective choice and the basic static voting models. 1. Arrow, Kenneth J. (1951, 2nd ed., 1963). -
Zvi Griliches and the Economics of Technology Diffusion: Linking Innovation Adoption, Lagged Investments, and Productivity Growth
This work is distributed as a Discussion Paper by the STANFORD INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 15-005 Zvi Griliches and the Economics of Technology Diffusion: Linking innovation adoption, lagged investments, and productivity growth By Paul A. David Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 (650) 725-1874 The Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research at Stanford University supports research bearing on economic and public policy issues. The SIEPR Discussion Paper Series reports on research and policy analysis conducted by researchers affiliated with the Institute. Working papers in this series reflect the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research or Stanford University Zvi Griliches and the Economics of Technology Diffusion: Linking innovation adoption, lagged investments, and productivity growth By Paul A. David First version: August 2003 Second version: December 2005 Third version: March 31 2009 Fourth version: March 20, 2011 This version: April 4, 2015 Acknowledgements The present version is a revision of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) Discussion Paper No. 10‐029 (March), 2011. The first version of this work was presented to the Conference on R&D, Education and Productivity, held in Memory of Zvi Griliches (1930 –1999) on 25‐27th, August 2003 at CarrJ des Sciences, Ministère de la Recherche, Paris, France. Gabriel Goddard furnished characteristically swift and accurate assistance with the simulations, and the graphics based upon them that appear in Section 4. I am grateful to Wesley Cohen for his perceptive discussion of the conference version, particularly in regard to the supply‐side facet of Griliches’ 1957 article in Econometrica. -
Advanced Econometrics Methods II Outline of the Course
Advanced Econometrics Methods II Outline of the Course Joan Llull Advanced Econometric Methods II Master in Economics and Finance Barcelona GSE Chapter 1: Panel Data I. Introduction II. Static Models A. The Fixed Effects Model. Within Groups Estimation B. The Random Effects Model. Error Components C. Testing for Correlated Individual Effects III. Dynamic Models A. Autoregressive Models with Individual Effects B. Difference GMM Estimation C. System GMM Estimation D. Specification Tests References: Sargan(1958), Balestra and Nerlove(1966), Hausman(1978), Cham- berlain(1984), Amemiya(1985), Anderson and Hsiao(1981, 1982), Hansen(1982), Arellano and Bond(1991), Arellano and Bover(1995), Arellano and Honor´e (2001), Wooldridge(2002), Arellano(2003), Cameron and Trivedi(2005), Wind- meijer(2005) Chapter 2: Discrete Choice I. Binary Outcome Models A. Introduction B. The Linear Probability Model C. The General Binary Outcome Model Maximum Likelihood Estimation Asymptotic properties Marginal effects D. The Logit Model 1 E. The Probit Model F. Latent Variable Representation Index function model (Additive) Random utility model II. Multinomial Models A. Multinomial Outcomes B. The General Multinomial Model Maximum Likelihood estimation Asymptotic properties Marginal effects C. The Logit Model The Multinomial Logit (MNL) The Conditional Logit (CL) D. Latent Variable Representation E. Relaxing the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption The Nested Logit (NL) Random Parameters Logit (RPL) Multinomial Probit (MNP) F. Ordered Outcomes III. Endogenous Variables A. Probit with Continuous Endogenous Regressor B. Probit with Binary Endogenous Regressor C. Moment Estimation IV. Binary Models for Panel Datas References: McFadden(1973, 1974, 1984), Manski and McFadden(1981), Amemiya (1985), Wooldridge(2002), Cameron and Trivedi(2005), Arellano and Bonhomme (2011) Chapter 3: Dynamic Discrete Choice Models I: Full Solution Approaches I. -
Front Matter, R&D, Patents, and Productivity
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: R & D, Patents, and Productivity Volume Author/Editor: Zvi Griliches, ed. Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press Volume ISBN: 0-226-30884-7 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/gril84-1 Publication Date: 1984 Chapter Title: Front matter, R&D, Patents, and Productivity Chapter Author: Zvi Griliches Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10041 Chapter pages in book: (p. -13 - 0) R&D, Patents, and Productivity A National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report R&D, Patents, and Productivity Edited by Zvi Griliches The University of Chicago Press Chicago and London The University ofChicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press, Ltd. , London © 1984 by the National Bureau ofEconomic Research All rights reserved. Published 1984 Paperback edition 1987 Printed in the United States ofAmerica 9695 9493 9291 9089 88 87 6543 2 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING IN PUBLICATION DATA Main entry under title: R&D, patents, and productivity. Papers presented at a conference held in Lenox, Mass., in the fall of 1981, and organized by the National Bureau of Economic Research. Includes indexes. 1. Research, Industrial-United States-Congresses. 2. Patents-United States-Congresses. 3. Industrial productivity-United States-Congresses. I. Griliches, Zvi, 1930- II. National Bureau of Economic Research. III. Title: Rand D, patents, and productivity. HD30.42.U5R2 1984 338' .06 83-18121 ISBN 0-226-30883-9 (cloth); 0-226-30844-7 (paper) National Bureau of Economic Research Officers Walter W. Heller, chairman Franklin A. -
Contracts As Reference Points*
CONTRACTS AS REFERENCE POINTS* Oliver Hart and John Moore July 2006, revised March 2007 We argue that a contract provides a reference point for a trading relationship: more precisely, for parties’ feelings of entitlement. A party’s ex post performance depends on whether he gets what he is entitled to relative to outcomes permitted by the contract. A party who is shortchanged shades on performance. A flexible contract allows parties to adjust their outcome to uncertainty, but causes inefficient shading. Our analysis provides a basis for long-term contracts in the absence of noncontractible investments, and elucidates why “employment” contracts, which fix wage in advance and allow the employer to choose the task, can be optimal. * An early version of this paper was entitled “Partial Contracts.” We are particularly indebted to Andrei Shleifer and Jeremy Stein for useful comments and for urging us to develop Section V. We would also like to thank Philippe Aghion, Jennifer Arlen, Daniel Benjamin, Omri Ben- Shahar, Richard Craswell, Stefano Della Vigna, Tore Ellingsen, Florian Englmaier, Edward Glaeser, Elhanan Helpman, Ben Hermalin, Louis Kaplow, Emir Kamenica, Henrik Lando, Steve Leider, Jon Levin, Bentley MacLeod, Ulrike Malmendier, Sendhil Mullainathan, Al Roth, Jozsef Sakovics, Klaus Schmidt, Jonathan Thomas, Jean Tirole, Joel Watson, Birger Wernerfelt, two editors and three referees for helpful suggestions. In addition we have received useful feedback from audiences at the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in Bonn, -
Theloerder Institute for Economic Research
-TEL- /WI Theloerder Institute for Economic Research, Tel Aviv University 'The Eitan Berglas School of Economics CRV 44 GIANNINI FOUNDATiON OF GRIcULTURAL NOIVIICS Trim inivu raT wily' 173'73 li7n1)i7 IDD TaTi-17J1 110'011'31N mann iv1rY7 no`71-17Dri JOHN NASH: THE MASTER OF ECONOMIC MODELING by Ariel Rubinstein* Working Paper No.29-94 November, 1994 * The Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University and Princeton University Prepared for the Scandinavian Journal of Economics THE FOERDER INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH Faculty of Social Sciences Tel-Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Israel. page 2 1. John Nash During the past two decades non-cooperative game theory has become a central topic in economic theory. Many scholars have contributed to this revolution, none more than John Nash. Following the publication of von Neumann and Morgenstern's book, it was Nash's papers in the early fifties that pointed the way for future research in game theory. The notion of Nash equilibrium is indispensable. Nash's formulation of the bargaining problem and the Nash bargaining solution constitute the cornerstone of modern bargaining theory. His insights into the non-cooperative foundations of cooperative game theory initiated an area of research known as the Nash program. His analysis of the demand game, in which he uses a perturbation of a game to select an equilibrium, inspired the construction of several refinements of the notion of Nash equilibrium. A scholar's influence does not necessarily qualify him for a Nobel prize. One may argue that such awards are a social institution established to serve social goals. -
Studies in Energy and the American Economy Productivity Easure1ent Using Capital Asset Valuation to Adjust for Variations in U
/i / I I STUDIES IN ENERGY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY PRODUCTIVITY EASURE1ENT USING CAPITAL ASSET VALUATION TO ADJUST FOR VARIATIONS IN UTILIZATION* by Ernst R. Berndt IXL-ssacts e I.-Is->, . .J.,-, -Y Melvyn A. Fuss University of Toronto September 1981 Discussion Paper No. 12 MIT-EL 81-067WP Research supported by the Department of Energy, under Contract EX-76-A-01-2295, Task Order 67, is gratefully acknowledged. This paper was also released as Working Paper No. 8125, Institute for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto. *An earlier version was presented at the econometric Society Summer Meetings, San Diego, California, June 24-27, 1981. We wish to thank Bob Russell for his penetrating comments as the official discussant. NOTICE This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the Department of Energy. Neither the United States nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or respon- sibility for any third party's use or the results of such use of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights. Abstract Although a great deal of empirical research on productivity measurement has taken place in the last decade, one issue remaining particularly controversial and decisive is the manner by which one adjusts the productivity residual for variations in capital and capacity utilization. In this paper we use the Marshallian framework of a short run production or cost function with certain inputs quasi-fixed to provide a theoretical basis for accounting for variations in utilization.