DOCSLIB.ORG

The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth Evidence from Education Policies in India and Brazil

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth Evidence from Education Policies in India and Brazil The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth Evidence from Education Policies in India and Brazil Nicole Rippin and Bettina Boekle-Giuffrida © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth 1 The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth: Evidence from Education Policies in India and Brazil 1. Introduction 1. Introduction 1.1 Pro-Poor Growth 1.1 Pro-Poor Growth 1.2 Education Puzzle 1.2 The “Education Puzzle” 2. Theoretical Framework 2. The Theoretical Framework 2.1 Policy Formulation 2.1 Possible Equilibriums in Policy Formulation 2.2 Policy Implementation 2.2 Possible Equilibriums in Policy Implementation 3. Empirical Application 3.1 Methodology 3. The Empirical Application 3.2 Country Case India 3.1 Methodology 3.2.1 Formulation 3.2.2 Implementation 3.2 Country Case India 3.3 Country Case Brazil 3.2.1 Policy Formulation in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu 3.3.1 Formulation 3.2.2 Policy Implementation in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu 3.3.2 Implementation 3.3 Country Case Brazil 4. Lessons Learned 3.3.1 Policy Formulation in Pernambuco and Ceará 3.3.2 Policy Implementation in Pernambuco and Ceará 4. Lessons Learned © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth 2 When is Growth Pro-Poor? Pro-Poor Growth (relative definition) 1. Introduction 1.1 Pro-Poor Growth 1.2 Education Puzzle Pro-poor recession 2. Theoretical Framework Pro-Poor Growth 2.1 Policy Formulation (both definitions) 2.2 Policy Implementation 3. Empirical Application 3.1 Methodology 3.2 Country Case India 3.2.1 Formulation 3.2.2 Implementation 3.3 Country Case Brazil 3.3.1 Formulation 3.3.2 Implementation Anti-poor recession/ 4. Lessons Learned growth © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth 3 Importance of Elementary Education for Pro-Poor Growth 1. Introduction 1.1 Pro-Poor Growth 1.2 Education Puzzle 2. Theoretical Framework 2.1 Policy Formulation 2.2 Policy Implementation 3. Empirical Application 3.1 Methodology 3.2 Country Case India 3.2.1 Formulation 3.2.2 Implementation Source: Lopez (2004) 3.3 Country Case Brazil 3.3.1 Formulation 3.3.2 Implementation 4. Lessons Learned © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth 4 The “Education Puzzle”: Impact of Educational Investments on Poverty and Growth in India 1. Introduction 1.1 Pro-Poor Growth 1.2 Education Puzzle 2. Theoretical Framework 2.1 Policy Formulation 2.2 Policy Implementation 3. Empirical Application 3.1 Methodology 3.2 Country Case India 3.2.1 Formulation 3.2.2 Implementation Source: Besley, Burgess and Esteve-Volart (2005) 3.3 Country Case Brazil 3.3.1 Formulation 3.3.2 Implementation 4. Lessons Learned © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth 5 The “Education Puzzle”: Impact of Educational Achievements on Poverty and Growth in India 1. Introduction 1.1 Pro-Poor Growth 1.2 Education Puzzle 2. Theoretical Framework 2.1 Policy Formulation 2.2 Policy Implementation 3. Empirical Application 3.1 Methodology 3.2 Country Case India 3.2.1 Formulation Source: Besley, Burgess and Esteve-Volart (2005) 3.2.2 Implementation 3.3 Country Case Brazil 3.3.1 Formulation 3.3.2 Implementation 4. Lessons Learned © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth 6 Theoretical Framework: Possible Equilibriums in Policy Formulation 1. Introduction Reputation Financial Political Constitution Supporting 1.1 Pro-Poor Growth Capability Stability External Parties 1.2 Education Puzzle Government Clientele-Relationship with Clientele-Relationship with the Non-Poor the Poor No Political Competition Political Competition 2. Theoretical Framework Supports Bribes Ignores Supports Bribes Ignores Supports Bribes Ignores 2.1 Policy Formulation Poor Electorate Support X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X 2.2 Policy Implementation Uninformed Oppose X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X Support X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X 3. Empirical Application Informed Oppose X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X 3.1 Methodology 3.2 Country Case India Policies can ceteris paribus be expected to be formulated in a way 3.2.1 Formulation 3.2.2 Implementation that releases their pro-poor potential if: 3.3 Country Case Brazil 3.3.1 Formulation The poor are the clientele of the government 3.3.2 Implementation The government is confronted with a combination of political 4. Lessons Learned competition and a majority of poor voters well aware of the importance of the policy in question © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth 7 Theoretical Framework: Possible Equilibriums in Policy Implementation Accountability Geographic, 1. Introduction Interest Groups Financial enforced by Capability Socio-economic, 1.1 Pro-Poor Growth Government etc. Conditions 1.2 Education Puzzle 2. Theoretical Framework Poor Beneficiaries No Enforcing Power Enforcing Power Unaware Aware 2.1 Policy Formulation Lobby Don’t Lobby Lobby Don’t Lobby Lobby Don’t Lobby 2.2 Policy Implementation Public Official Enforces X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X Altruistic 3. Empirical Application Hampers X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X 3.1 Methodology Not Enforces X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X Altruistic 3.2 Country Case India Hampers X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X X , X 3.2.1 Formulation 3.2.2 Implementation Policies are ceteris paribus expected to be effectively 3.3 Country Case Brazil implemented in a certain area of influence if: 3.3.1 Formulation 3.3.2 Implementation The responsible public official has a strong commitment to 4. Lessons Learned implement The poor have enforcing power and are fully aware of it © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth 8 Methodology: Case Selection 1. Introduction Responsibilities: India Brazil 1.1 Pro-Poor Growth Policy Formulation Centre, States Centre, States 1.2 Education Puzzle Policy Implementation Centre, States Centre, States, Municipalities Indicators: Andhra Pradesh Tamil Nadu Ceará Pernambuco 2. Theoretical Framework Area (sqkm) 275,045 130,058 148,825 98,911 2.1 Policy Formulation # Districts / # Municipalities 23 30 184 185 2.2 Policy Implementation Population 76,210,000 62,405,700 8,547,809 8,810,256 3. Empirical Application % SC Population 16.2% 19.0% - - 3.1 Methodology % ST Population 6.6% 1.0% - - 3.2 Country Case India SGDP (in million at current prices) Rs 3,712,000 Rs 3,392,000 R$ 60,099 R$ 70,441 3.2.1 Formulation Work participation rate 45.8 44.7 58.5 (Fortaleza) 54 (Recife) 3.2.2 Implementation NER (upper primary) 57.5 88.1 98.3 96.8 3.3 Country Case Brazil Literacy Rate 60.5 73.5 80.9 82.1 3.3.1 Formulation EDI (1st – 8th grade) 12 4 - - 3.3.2 Implementation IDEB (1st – 4th grade) - - 4.4 4.1 4. Lessons Learned © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth 9 Country Case India: The Lok Sabha (Lower House) Elections 1. Introduction The political environment can be divided in two main periods: 1.1 Pro-Poor Growth Before 1989/90: Indian National Congress, party of the 1.2 Education Puzzle middle class, is uncontested dominating all elections 2. Theoretical Framework After 1989/90: Fierce competition between various parties 2.1 Policy Formulation 2.2 Policy Implementation (362 in 2009), from Communists with focus on the poor to the Bharatiya Janata Party of the upper castes 3. Empirical Application 3.1 Methodology The majority of the poor electorate seems to be politically unaware 3.2 Country Case India 3.2.1 Formulation and uninformed about the importance of elementary education: 3.2.2 Implementation 32% could not identify most pressing issues, 2% named 3.3 Country Case Brazil 3.3.1 Formulation education (National Election Survey 2009) 3.3.2 Implementation Election campaigns concentrate on food subsidies, votes of 4. Lessons Learned the poor are broadly distributed: Left Front (10.6%), INC (27.3%), BJP (16.8%) (2009) © 2011 d·i·e Rippin and Boekle-Giuffrida (2011): The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Growth 10 Country Case India: National Educational Investments over Time 4.30 1. Introduction Year of Lok Sabha Election National Democratic Alliance Lost vote of confidence (right minority coalition + weak 1.1 Pro-Poor Growth opposition) 4.10 Bharatiya Janata Party (right) 1.2 Education Puzzle Before 1989/90: (minority coalition + strong centre-left opposition) Government ignores the National Front (right-left coalition) 2. Theoretical Framework 3.90 poor, pro poor potential not Samajwadi Janata (INC supported) 2.1 Policy Formulation released 93rd Amendment (2001) National Education Policy 1992 2.2 Policy Implementation 3.70 Indian National Congress Unni Krishnan (1993) United Front (till 94 minority + strong right minority 3. Empirical Application opposition (centre-left support) 3.50 83rd Amendment (1997) 3.1 Methodology National Education Policy 1986 2% education cess (2004/05) 3.2 Country Case India 3.30 INC-led minority coalition (UPA) 3.2.1 Formulation (left support) 3.2.2 Implementation After 1989/90: Government bribes the 3.10 3.3 Country Case Brazil uninformed poor, depending on coalition 3.3.1 Formulation Indian National Congress (centre) sometimes clientele-influence, pro-poor potential 3.3.2 Implementation 2.90 not / partially released 4.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Telangana State Election Commission
    TELANGANA STATE ELECTION COMMISSION Recognized National Political Parties Sl. Symbols in Symbols Name of the Political Party No. English / Telugu Reserved Elephant 1 Bahujan Samaj Party ఏనుగు Lotus 2 Bharatiya Janata Party కమలం Ears of Corn & Sickle 3 Communist Party of India కంకి కొడవ젿 Hammer, Sickle & Star 4 Communist Party of India (Marxist) సుత్తి కొడవ젿 నక్షత్రం Hand 5 Indian National Congress చెయ్యి Clock 6 Nationalist Congress Party గడియారము Recognized State Parties in the State of Telangana Sl. Symbols in Name of the Party Symbols Reserved No. English / Telugu All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul- Kite 1 Muslimeen గా젿 పటం Car 2 Telangana Rastra Samithi కారు Bicycle 3 Telugu Desam Party స ైకిలు Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Ceiling Fan 4 Congress Party పంఖా Recognised State Parties in other States Sl. Symbols in Symbols Name of the Political Party No. English / Telugu Reserved Two Leaves All India Anna Dravida Munnetra 1 Kazhagam ర ండు ఆకులు Lion 2 All India Forward Bloc స ంహము A Lady Farmer 3 Janata Dal (Secular) Carrying Paddy వరి 롋పుతో ఉనన మహిళ Arrow 4 Janata Dal (United) బాణము Hand Pump 5 Rastriya Lok Dal చేత్త పంపు Banyan Tree 6 Samajwadi Party మరిి చెటటు Registered Political Parties with reserved symbol - NIL - TELANGANA STATE ELECTION COMMISSION Registered Political Parties without Reserved Symbol Sl. No. Name of the Political Party 1 All India Stree Shakthi Party 2 Ambedkar National Congress 3 Bahujan Samj Party (Ambedkar – Phule) 4 BC United Front Party 5 Bharateeya Bhahujana Prajarajyam 6 Bharat Labour Party 7 Bharat Janalok Party 8
    [Show full text]
  • Social Media Stars:Kerala
    SOCIAL MEDIA STARS: KERALA Two people whose reach goes beyond Kerala and its politics — Congress MP Shashi Tharoor and BJP’s surprise candidate for the Thiruvananthapuram Assembly constituency former cricketer S Sreesanth — lead the Twitter charts in the state. Chief Minister Oommen Chandy and BJP state president K Rajasekaran are also active, often tweeting in Malayalam. Due to long-standing alliances in the state, the United Democratic Front (UDF) led by the Congress has a handle of its own, in addition to independent handles of the parties. Neither the Left Front nor its leaders seem to have figured out Twitter. In the last of a four-part series on social media stars in the poll-bound states of Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Assam and Kerala, N Sundaresha Subramanian looks at the Twitter scene in God’s Own Country OOMMEN CHANDY Chief Minister, Kerala (Congress) Twitter Handle: @Oommen_Chandy Tweets No. of followers 6,129 51.4K SHASHI THAROOR Congress MP, Thiruvananthapuram Twitter Handle: @ShashiTharoor S SREESANTH Tweets No. of followers BJP candidate, Thiruvananthapuram 30.8K 4.09M Twitter Handle: @sreesanth36 Tweets No. of followers 6,268 1.04M PARTY HANDLES UDF KERALA V MURALEEDHARAN Twitter Handle: @udfkerala BJP veteran Tweets No. of followers Twitter Handle: @MuraliBJP 103 4,602 Tweets No. of followers 625 4,415 CPI(M) KERALAM Twitter Handle: @CPIM_Keralam KUMMANAM RAJASEKHARAN Tweets No. of followers 4,127 State president, BJP 958 Twitter Handle: @Kummanam Tweets No. of followers BJP KERALAM 1,324 10.8K Twitter Handle: @BJP4Keralam Tweets No. of followers RAMESH 3,993 4,906 CHENNITHALA Home Minister , Kerala (Congress) Twitter Handle: @chennithala KERALA CONGRESS Tweets No.
    [Show full text]
  • It Is Well Known That After Independence, West Bengal Has Been Lagging Increasingly Behind Many Other States of India in the Field of Industrial Production
    The Political Economy of Decline of Industry in West Bengal: Experiences of a Marxist State Within a Mixed Economy Subhash C. Ray University of Connecticut Working Paper 2011-10 May 2011 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DECLINE OF INDUSTRY IN WEST BENGAL: EXPERIENCES OF A MARXIST STATE WITHIN A MIXED ECONOMY Subhash C Ray Department of Economics University of Connecticut Storrs CT 06269 USA [email protected] Over more than six decades following Independence, industry in West Bengal has steadily gone downhill. Usually the Left Front government effectively controlled by the Marxist Communist Party (CPM), that has ruled the state for the past 34 years until its recent defeat in the state assembly elections, is held responsible for the plight of industry in the state. The party and its followers, on the other hand, blame denial of the due share of the state in the central resources by a hostile government at the center for industrial retardation. This paper takes a close look at the available statistical evidence to argue that the main reason for the decline is a direct outcome of poor work culture, political interference, and failure of governance that has resulted in industrial anarchy that scares off private investment in the state. While the Left Front has its share of responsibility, the newly anointed Chief Minister of the State, Mamata Banerjee, has herself contributed generously to fostering and cultivating this chaos by calling wildcat general strikes in her erstwhile role as the ‘one person opposition party’. The only thing that can revive industry in West Bengal is liberating civil administration from the grip of political party bosses.
    [Show full text]
  • 296] CHENNAI, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 1, 2010 Purattasi 15, Thiruvalluvar Aandu–2041
    © [Regd. No. TN/CCN/467/2009-11. GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU [R. Dis. No. 197/2009. 2010 [Price: Rs. 20.00 Paise. TAMIL NADU GOVERNMENT GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY No. 296] CHENNAI, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 1, 2010 Purattasi 15, Thiruvalluvar Aandu–2041 Part V—Section 4 Notifications by the Election Commission of India. NOTIFICATIONS BY THE ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA ELECTION SYMBOLS (RESERVATION AND ALLOTMENT) ORDER, 1968 No. SRO G-33/2010. The following Notification of the Election Commission of India, Nirvachan Sadan, Ashoka Road, New Delhi-110 001, dated 17th September, 2010 [26 Bhadrapada, 1932 (Saka)] is republished:— Whereas, the Election Commission of India has decided to update its Notification No. 56/2009/P.S.II, dated 14th September, 2009, specifying the names of recognised National and State Parties, registered-unrecognised parties and the list of free symbols, issued in pursuance of paragraph 17 of the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968, Now, therefore, in pursuance of paragraph 17 of the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968, and in supersession of its aforesaid Notification No. 56/2009/P.S.II, dated 14th September, 2009, as amended from time to time, published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II—Section-3, sub-section (iii), the Election Commission of India hereby specifies :— (a) In Table I, the National Parties and the Symbols respectively reserved for them and postal address of their Headquarters ; (b) In Table II, the State Parties, the State or States in which they are State Parties and the Symbols respectively reserved for them in such State or States and postal address of their Headquarters; (c) In Table III, the registered-unrecognised political parties and postal address of their Headquarters; and (d) In Table IV, the free symbols.
    [Show full text]
  • 01-067 Foff Fed Eng News
    State elections foretell a power shift at India’s centre BY PRASENJIT MAITI More than ever before, one-party India In West Bengal, the Congress formed Building and burning bridges is a thing of the past, and the balance of an alliance with its breakaway faction, These state elections have indicated power is shifting. Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamul Congress. certain emergent trends in the Indian The Congress performed even better than There were elections to five state party system which are likely to inform the Trinamul Congress in terms of assemblies this past May. The Indian the country’s federal politics in the near percentage of seats it won relative to press described them as a mini general future. the total number of seats it contested. election, a prognosis of the relative health The Congress Party, out of power since of India’s federal political parties and ad- However, the Left Front, led by the 1996, is steadily reconsolidating itself in hoc alliances. Communist Party of India (Marxist), the states with the help of regional allies. returned to power in West Bengal for the In particular, observers looked to these It is a kind of Return-of-the-Prodigal-Son sixth time since 1977. The Communists state elections for indications of a change syndrome. This national party is engaged alone, excluding their coalition partners, in support for the ruling Bharatiya Janata in building bridges with once dissident won 143 out of the total 294 assembly Party-led National Democratic Alliance at but powerful factions such as the seats. New Delhi.
    [Show full text]
  • India's 2004 National Elections
    Order Code RL32465 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web India’s 2004 National Elections July 12, 2004 nae redacted Analyst in Asian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress India’s 2004 National Elections Summary U.S. relations with India depend largely on India’s political leadership. India’s 2004 national elections ended governance by the center-right coalition headed by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and brought in a new center-left coalition led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Following the upset victory for the historically-dominant Indian National Congress Party led by Sonia Gandhi, Gandhi declined the post of Prime Minister in the new left-leaning United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition government, instead nominating her party lieutenant, Oxford-educated economist Manmohan Singh, for the job. As Finance Minister from 1991-1996, Singh was the architect of major Indian economic reform and liberalization efforts. On May 22, the widely-esteemed Sikh became India’s first- ever non-Hindu Prime Minister. The defeated Bharatiya Janata Party now sits in opposition at the national level, led in Parliament by former Deputy Prime Minister Lal Advani. A coalition of communist parties supports the UPA, but New Delhi’s economic, foreign, and security policies are not expected to be significantly altered. The new government has vowed to continue close and positive engagement with the United States in all areas. This report, which will not be updated,
    [Show full text]
  • UPDATED LIST of PARTIES & SYMBOLS As Per Main Notification Dated 13.04.2018 As on 09.03.2019
    (UPDATED LIST OF PARTIES & SYMBOLS As per main Notification dated 13.04.2018 As on 09.03.2019) TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE GAZETTE OF INDIA EXTRAORDINARY, PART II, SECTION 3, SUB-SECTION (iii) IMMEDIATELY ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA Nirvachan Sadan, Ashoka Road, New Delhi – 110001 No.56/2018/PPS-III Dated : 13th April, 2018. 23 Chaitra, 1940 (Saka). NOTIFICATION WHEREAS, the Election Commission of India has decided to update its Notification No. 56/2016/PPS-III, dated 13th December, 2016, as amended from time to time, specifying the names of recognised National and State Parties, registered-unrecognised parties and the list of free symbols, issued in pursuance of paragraph 17 of the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968; NOW, THEREFORE, in pursuance of paragraph 17 of the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968, and in supersession of its aforesaid notification No. No. 56/2016/PPS-III, dated 13th December, 2016, as amended from time to time, published in the Gazette of India, Extra-Ordinary, Part-II, Section-3, Sub-Section (iii), the Election Commission of India hereby specifies: - (a) In Table I, the National Parties and the Symbols respectively reserved for them and postal address of their Headquarters; (b) In Table II, the State Parties, the State or States in which they are State Parties and the Symbols respectively reserved for them in such State or States and postal address of their Headquarters; (c) In Table III, the registered-unrecognized political parties and postal address of their Headquarters; and (d) In Table IV, the free symbols. IN SO FAR AS elections to the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir are concerned, this notification shall be deemed to have been issued in terms of Rules 5 and 10 of the Jammu and Kashmir Conduct of Elections Rules, 1965 and under the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 as made applicable for elections to the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir.
    [Show full text]
  • India's Domestic Political Setting
    July 9, 2014 India’s Domestic Political Setting Overview India, the world’s most populous democracy, is, according BJP’s outright majority victory—remains an important to its Constitution, a “sovereign, socialist, secular, variable in Indian politics. Such parties now hold more than democratic republic” where the bulk of executive power 200 seats in parliament. Some 464 parties participated in rests with the prime minister and his Council of Ministers the 2014 national election and 35 of those won (the Indian president is a ceremonial chief of state with representation. The 8 parties listed below account for 67% limited executive powers). Since its 1947 independence, of the total vote and 85% of Lok Sabha seats (see Figure 1). most of India’s 14 prime ministers have come from the country’s Hindi-speaking northern regions and all but three Figure 1. Major Party Representation in the Lok Sabha have been upper-caste Hindus. The 543-seat, Lok Sabha (543 Total Seats + 2 Appointed) (House of the People) is the locus of national power, with directly elected representatives from each of the country’s 29 states and 7 union territories. The president has the power to dissolve this body. A smaller upper house of a maximum 250 seats, the Rajya Sabha (Council of States), may review, but not veto, revenue legislation, and has no power over the prime minister or his/her cabinet. Lok Sabha and state legislators are elected to five-year terms. Rajya Sabha legislators are elected by state legislatures to six-year terms; 12 are appointed by the president.
    [Show full text]
  • Is the Coalition Era Over in Indian Politics? Adnan Farooquia & E
    This article was downloaded by: [Columbia University] On: 06 December 2014, At: 19:49 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctrt20 Is the Coalition Era Over in Indian Politics? Adnan Farooquia & E. Sridharanb a Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India b University of Pennsylvania Institute for the Advanced Study of India, New Delhi, India Published online: 04 Dec 2014. Click for updates To cite this article: Adnan Farooqui & E. Sridharan (2014): Is the Coalition Era Over in Indian Politics?, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2014.988457 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
    [Show full text]
  • Download the Publication
    ASIA PROGRAM Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, D.C. 20004-3027 www.wilsoncenter.org/asia Cover Image: David Talukdar / Shutterstock.com Copyright 2019 All Rights Reserved Preface In 2019, Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) achieved an overwhelming victory in India’s national election. It marked the second such election in a row that resulted in such a resounding triumph for the BJP, a Hindu nationalist party. While the BJP’s win may not have been a surprise—it had been favored by many to win, particularly with the opposition Congress Party having struggled to mount a strong campaign—the large margin of victory was quite striking. In the months leading up to the election, the BJP had looked vulnerable, thanks in great part to several losses in state elections and to soaring unemployment rates. And yet the BJP still managed to pull off a second consecutive dramatic electoral win. How did the BJP get to this point, where it has become the undisputed juggernaut of Indian national politics? This new report, prepared by former Wilson Center public policy fellow Kalyani Shankar, a veteran journalist and political analyst, breaks down the factors that helped account for the BJP’s two electoral triumphs. More broadly, the report demonstrates how the party has evolved over the years, starting from its earliest days, and how it has set itself apart from its rivals. The report also discusses the Indian political right in the context of a current global trend that has seen the rise and triumph of conservative and nationalist political parties and leaders in many different parts of the world.
    [Show full text]
  • Why Regional Parties?: Clientelism, Elites, and the Indian Party System Adam Ziegfeld Index More Information
    Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-11868-3 - Why Regional Parties?: Clientelism, Elites, and the Indian Party System Adam Ziegfeld Index More information Index 2014 election (India) Argentina Bharatiya Janata Party and, electoral success clientelism in, 120 of, 189–90 Peronist Party in, 68 coalition era after, durability of, 188–9 regional parties in, 11, 33 regional parties after, 189–90 Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), 38, 40 SPM government following, 187–90 as opportunistic faction, 230 regional support for, 94 Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), 31, 48–9 Assam (state) programmatic politics and, 89–90 opportunistic factions in, 223–4 African party systems, 19 regional parties in, 98, 180, 214 agrarian national parties. See Janata Dal Australia, regional parties in, 33 Akali Dal. See Shiromani Akali Dal autonomist parties. See regionalist parties All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), 38–9, 182 backward caste. See Other Backward Classes Tamil Maanila Congress (Moopanar) and, Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), 20, 31, 48, 161 107 clientelistic strategies of, 63 All India Communist Party, 161–2 electoral success of, 180 All India Forward Bloc (AIFB), 44–5, 163 programmatic politics and, 88–9 All India Indira Congress (Tiwari), Scheduled Caste voters and, 87 43, 177 Bandhopadhyay, Debabrata, 110 All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen Banerjee, Mamata, 186–7 (AIMIM), 25, 47 Bangla Congress (BAC), 43, 162, 186–7 All India N. R. Congress (AINRC), 49 Berhampore, 110–11 All India Trinamool Congress (AITC), 43, 199, bhadralok castes, 247–8, 250 233 Bhajan
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter- Five
    CHAPTER- FIVE COALITION POLITICS IN INDIA So far as the concept of Coalition is concerned, it strongly believes in the democratization and pluralism of the Indian polity, and is pledged to contributing, in its own exceedingly modest ways, to creating a political and social framework for South Asia that would remove the injustices and liabilities faced by such traditionally disempowered elements as women, tribals, and ethnic and religious minorities. The Coalition shares in the Gandhian view that no one is truly free until everyone is free, Freedom is indivisible.(l) It is to be pointed out that Members of the Coalition agree that for a successful coalition, there must be some level of understanding between and among the members of the coalition. If there is no understanding, a coalition can never be successful or it cannot survive at a11.(2) In fact, the continuance of a coalition is dependent on better understanding. So far as India is concerned, the seed of coalition politics was sown as early as in 1967 with the conclusion of the Fourth General Election. In this election, 88 although not at the Centre but coalition politics emerged as many as in seven states in lndia.(3) The politics of coalition is not a phenomenon peculiar to India. Such a system prevailed in Weimar Germany and operated in contemporary France and Italy and some of the countries of Asia and Africa. In India, the development of some of the political sub system, following the end of the 'one party dominance system' after the General Elections of 1967, is characterised by coalition politics and government.
    [Show full text]