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To understand the logic behind these The Left and the assertions we must begin by distinguish- ing between the mandate and the electoral 15th Elections outcomes: the change in the number of seats won and lost (the electoral outcome) is only a partial, and often imperfect, Deepankar Basu reflection of the change in the actual level of support political parties enjoy among The electoral debacle faced by n the recently concluded 2009 general the people (the mandate); often the parti­ the left parties in the 15th Lok elections to the lower house of the cular logic of electoral arithmetic draws a Sabha elections is due to the fact IParliament (Lok Sabha), what this wedge between the mandate of the people author terms the “Social Democratic Left” and the electoral outcome in terms of that the state governments led by (SDL henceforth) in , composed of seats won or lost. For instance, it is possi- the left followed the very same the -Marxist – ble for a party to increase its share of neoliberal policies that the parties CPI(M), the Communist Party of India votes polled without this leading to any opposed and were able to halt at (CPI) and a bunch of smaller left wing par- addition to the number of seats won; ties, has witnessed the severest electoral conversely, it is possible for a party to the central level. drubbing in a long time. This year, the decrease its share of votes polled without CPI(M) won a total of only 16 parliamen- losing in terms of seats. An example of tary seats; compared to its performance the former is ’s per­ in the last general elections in 2004 this formance at the national level in 2009: it is a whopping decline of 27 seats. The has emerged as the third largest national CPI, on the other hand, won four seats in party, increasing its share of votes polled 2009, suffering a net decline of six par- from 5.33% in 2004 to 6.17% in 2009, but liamentary seats from its position in this has not translated into any appreci­ 2004. Does this mean that the Indian able increase in terms of seats. Hence, to population has rejected even the mildly understand the structure of the “popular progressive and social democratic poli- will”, it is necessary to go beyond an anal- cies that the SDL tried to argue for at the ysis of the relative position of political central level? Is this a mandate for the parties in terms of seats won and lost; one ruling Party and by extension a needs to study the changes in the shares mandate for neoliberalism, its pet project of votes polled. since the early 1990s? I think not. Focusing on the share of votes polled is A careful analysis of the results shows also enough, among other things, to dispel that this is a mandate against the SDL but certain misinterpretations of the mandate not against social democratic policies; of the 2009 general elections that seem to further, just like in 2004 when the have gained wide currency. The first mis- Bharatiya ’s (BJP) “shining interpretation that is gaining ground is India” slogan was decisively rejected by the alleged existence of a “wave” in favour the populace, this is a mandate against of the Congress Party which swept it to neoliberalism and for welfare-oriented power, overcoming the “ubiquitous” current policies. To the extent that the Congress of anti-incumbency observed in Indian was pushed by the SDL to partially imple- politics. Nothing could be farther from the ment such pro-people policies, it can pos- truth as is obvious from a cursory glance sibly be interpreted as an indirect en- at Table 1. Despite having won 206 parlia- dorsement of Congress’ late-in-the day mentary seats, the Congress merely won populism. After making a few comments A slightly shorter version of this article Table 1: Share of Votes Polled in India by Major Parties (%) on the national mandate, in this article, I was published online at http://mrzine. Party 2004 2009 monthlyreview.org/basu220509.html and at focus my attention on West , the BJP 22.16 18.80 http://sanhati.com/excerpted/1540/ bastion of the SDL in India and try to BSP 5.33 6.17 Deepankar Basu ([email protected]) understand why the parties led by the CPI 1.41 1.43 is with the Department of Economics, CPI(M) got such an electoral drubbing CPI(M) 5.66 5.33 Colorado State University, Fort Collins, while paradoxically creating grounds for INC 26.53 28.55 Colorado, US. a Congress victory. NCP 1.80 2.04

10 may 30, 2009 vol xliv no 22 EPW Economic & Political Weekly commentary 28.55% of the votes polled in 2009, increas- the share of votes going to the two main round as many pro-establishment analysts ing it by a little less than 2 percentage national parties has declined and not in- are making it out to be. points from 2004. An overall share of 29% creased; so much for the ascendancy – But the national level figures hide many of the total votes polled at the national what historian Ramachandra Guha called interesting state-level variations; hence Table 2: Share of Votes Polled Going to Congress (%) the “course correction” – of the tendency we must also look at state-level data to get 2004 2009 Decrease for centralisation in the Indian polity.1 a complete picture. There is another rea- 41.56 38.95 2.61 son why we need to supplement national Arunachal Pradesh 9.96 51.11 -41.15 SDL Performance: National Level level with state-level analysis: since the Assam 35.07 34.89 0.18 How did the SDL perform in terms of the SDL is prominent only in the three states 4.49 10.26 -5.77 share of votes polled? At the national of , and , the 29.76 22.6 7.16 level, the CPI(M) lost only marginally in national figures are not very relevant to 43.86 43.38 0.48 terms of the share of votes polled that assessing the electoral prospects of the Haryana 42.13 41.77 0.36 51.89 45.61 6.28 it was able to garner for itself, which SDL. Thus, we must look at state-level data Jammu and Kashmir 27.83 24.67 3.16 declined from 5.66% in 2004 to 5.33% for Kerala, Tripura and West Bengal to 36.82 37.65 -0.83 this year; the CPI, on the other hand, understand the sharp change in the elec- Kerala 32.13 40.13 -8 gained marginally at the national level, toral performance of the SDL in India and 34.07 40.14 -6.07 increasing its share of votes from 1.41 to draw conclusions about its continued rele- 23.77 19.61 4.16 1.43%. Thus, going by these national fig- vance, or otherwise, in the Indian polity. 14.88 42.96 -28.08 ures, there is no evidence of any nation- 45.55 44.84 0.71 wide trend against the “social democrats”; State Level Performance 25.78 29.36 -3.58 there is no evidence of any trend against How did the SDL perform in the different Orissa 40.43 32.75 7.68 their opposition, however feeble, to the states? Three tendencies can be observed in Punjab 34.17 45.23 -11.06 neoliberal policies of the UPA-led central the data summarised in Table 3.2 First, the Rajasthan 41.42 47.19 -5.77 27.43 29.59 -2.16 government. SDL managed to increase its vote share in 14.4 15.03 -0.63 Those who want to interpret the current a few states: Andhra Pradesh, Goa, Gujarat, Tripura 14.28 30.75 -16.47 debacle of the “social democrats” as a Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Rajasthan, 12.04 18.25 -6.21 national mandate for “economic reforms” Uttar Pradesh, , West Bengal 35.32 44.62 -9.3 and against progressive economic and social and Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Apart Chhattisgarh 40.16 37.31 2.85 policies need to rethink their arguments; from Manipur, of course, the total vote 21.44 15.02 6.42 the evidence does not support such an share of the SDL in these states remains Uttarakhand 38.31 43.13 -4.82 argument. In fact, as I will argue below, if insignificant; hence, the increase in the level can hardly be interpreted as a “massive there can at all be discerned any “wave” vote share did not even remotely translate wave”; besides, this overall increase also in favour of the Congress in the mandate into changes in seats. Second, the SDL lost hides substantial decreases in vote share it is largely a “wave” against neoliberal its share of votes polled in a large number of (and seats) in several important states economic policies and not the other way states: Assam, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, like Orissa, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Table 3: Share of Votes Polled in Various States Going to the Andhra Pradesh as shown in Table 2. 2004 2009 Vote Share in 2009 CPI(M) CPI Total (LF) CPI(M) CPI Total (LF) as a Ratio of 2004 The second misinterpretation that is Andhra Pradesh 1.04 1.34 2.38 1.27 1.58 2.85 1.2 doing the rounds pertains to the perception Assam 0.66 1.66 2.32 0.7 0.92 1.62 0.7 that this general election saw the definite Bihar 0.77 1.17 1.94 0.51 1.42 1.93 0.99 demise of regional parties and all federalist Goa 2.17 2.17 2.34 2.34 1.08 tendencies of the Indian populace; the Gujarat 0.11 0.11 0.19 0.09 0.28 2.55 people voted overwhelmingly for national Jammu and Kashmir 0.82 0.82 0.64 0.64 0.78 parties, the argument goes, because they Kerala 31.52 7.89 39.41 30.48 7.44 37.92 0.96 want stability. Whether people desire sta- Madhya Pradesh 0.05 0.24 0.29 0.03 0.38 0.41 1.41 bility or not is a question that cannot be Maharashtra 0.72 0.05 0.77 0.53 0.11 0.64 0.83 entered into at the moment, but the fact Manipur 10.11 10.11 14.93 14.93 1.48 Punjab 1.81 2.55 4.36 0.14 0.33 0.47 0.11 that the populace did not reject regional Rajasthan 0.51 0.37 0.88 1.26 0.26 1.52 1.73 parties in favour of national parties can be Tamil Nadu 2.87 2.97 5.84 2.2 2.85 5.05 0.86 seen by looking, in Table 1, at the share of Tripura 68.8 68.8 61.69 61.69 0.9 votes going to the Congress and the BJP Uttar Pradesh 0.02 0.13 0.15 0.02 0.16 0.18 1.2 taken together: according to provisional West Bengal 38.57 4.01 50.72 33.1 3.6 43.3 0.85 figures released by the Election Commis- Chhattisgarh 0.23 0.43 0.66 0.14 0.92 1.06 1.61 sion of India, the combined vote share of Jharkhand 0.4 3.8 4.2 0.54 1.16 1.7 0.4 the Congress and BJP in fact declined from Uttarakhand 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.23 0.41 2.56 48.69% in 2004 to 47.35% in 2009. Thus, Andaman and Nicobar 2.71 2.71 4.23 4.23 1.56

Economic & Political Weekly EPW may 30, 2009 vol xliv no 22 11 commentary Kerala, Maharashtra, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, however feebly, the continued adoption of 2005, the Central Educational Institutions Tripura, West Bengal and Jharkhand. neoliberal polices at the level of the (Reservation in Admission) Act 2006, the The percentage decline in Punjab and central government, while the same set of Unorganised Workers’ Social Security Jharkhand were very large, though that policies were aggressively pursued in the 2008, the setting up of the Sachar Com- did not affect the reckoning in terms of states where they were in power. The de- mittee to inquire into the continued mar- seats because the SDL did not have seats to bacle of the SDL in the two most electorally ginalisation of Muslims in the country. The start with, i e, in 2004. On the other hand, important states of Kerala and West Bengal Congress encashed the benefits of this the sharp decline in the vote share in can, therefore, be understood as a strong populist swing electorally claiming it to be Tripura did not translate, fortunately for rejection of this doublespeak and hypocrisy its own policies whereas, in truth, the SDL the SDL, into any decline in seats. Third, of the SDL. The rejection of the SDL at the was largely instrumental in pushing for the states where the loss of vote share level of these two states, moreover, dove- these policies at the central level. Other wreaked havoc for the SDL’s reckoning in tails into the overall mandate in favour of such social democratic policies pushed for terms of seats were Kerala and West Bengal: progressive and social democratic policies, by the SDL include: opposition to financial in Kerala, the share of votes going to the and against the neoliberal turn, at the sector reforms (pensions, insurance), op- SDL declined from 39.41% in 2004 to national level. Of course there were other position to outright privatisation of the 37.92% in 2009; in West Bengal, the share local factors, both in West Bengal and in public sector, privatisation of healthcare of votes garnered by the SDL declined from Kerala that overlaid this broad rejection and education. These defensive actions by 50.72% in 2004 to 43.3% in 2009. of the neoliberal turn and turned the the SDL have partially limited the unbridled Let me summarise the evidence pre- mandate decisively against the SDL in power of capital to exploit labour and have sented so far: the SDL’s marginal decrease both these states. Before we look at some provided some relief to the mass of the in vote share at the national level was of these factors, especially for West Bengal working people in India. It is, therefore, made possible by the offsetting of the where the debacle of the SDL was the most no surprise that corporate India is exult- decrease in vote share in several states by stunning, a comment about the so-called ant at the SDL’s drubbing at the hustings in the increase in others. The fact that this national “wave” in favour of the Congress 2009. The stock market in Mumbai went marginal decrease led to such a debacle in is in order. into a tizzy immediately after the results terms of seats is driven largely by the fact were out and trading had to be stopped for that the bulk of the decrease in vote share Left Helps the Congress a while to deal with the unprecedented was concentrated in the electorally impor- The so-called nationwide “wave” in favour euphoria!3 As many media reports show, tant states of Kerala and West Bengal of Congress, if there was one, resulted to the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), whereas the increase in vote share was a large extent from the slew of populist the Federation of Indian Chambers of spread out across states where the SDL is policies that it adopted, paradoxically Commerce and Industry (FICCI), and other electorally marginal. Thus the state-level pushed towards this by the SDL, over the business groups have already started pre- distribution of the increase and decrease last few years in office. These include the paring their “wish list” of “reforms”, by of vote shares for the SDL turn out to have National Rural Employment Guarantee Act which they mean another round of neo­ profound implications in terms of elector- (NREGA), the step-up in public investment liberal policy assault on the common people al outcomes at the national level. in agriculture, the debt relief programme – quite unsurprisingly, land reforms do This, of course, brings us to this impor- for farmers, the Right to Information Act not figure in this wish list of reforms. tant question: why was the bulk of the decrease in vote share for the SDL concen- EPW Needs a Web Editor trated in Kerala and West Bengal? The clue to an answer is provided by the fact The Economic and Political Weekly is looking for a web editor who will be in charge of its on-line edition. that both states, Kerala and West Bengal, currently have “social democratic” govern- e p w is working on a comprehensive overhaul of its website and is planning to host content that is exclusively on-line. The duties of the web editor would be to commission contemporary ments, led by the largest “social democratic” commentaries, invite blogs, moderate discussions and work towards developing a distinct left party in the country, CPI(M). In both identity for the on-line edition. states, the governments have, over the The web editor would work with the editorial team and should also be expected to suggest past few years, increasingly accepted, and operationalise new “on-line publishing”-related ideas on a continuing basis. adopted and pushed neoliberal economic policies, often in the name of development The web editor should have an interest in current affairs and the social sciences, and also in on-line publishing. Knowledge of open source content management systems and their and industrialisation. A little scrutiny architecture would be a bonus but can be acquired on the job. revealed, in every case without fail, that The web editor would initially (for at least six months) be based in Mumbai. Thereafter she can the state government was pushing a parti­ choose to work out of either Mumbai or Hyderabad. Salary would initially be equivalent to that cular type of industrialisation: neoliberal, of an Assistant Editor in e p w . capitalist-led industrialisation. If you have a background in the social sciences and possess the above interests/qualifications This led to the emergence of a seemingly please write to us at [email protected] before June 15. paradoxical situation: the SDL opposed,

12 may 30, 2009 vol xliv no 22 EPW Economic & Political Weekly commentary The SDL’s ability to counter the Congress six person-days, much below the all-India of the electoral defeat of the SDL in West claim that the populist thrust was a result average of 16 person-days. The dismal Bengal, runs something like this: the Left of a progressive shift in the party, in reality performance of the state government led Front made a great tactical mistake in fiercely opposed by entrenched interests the Paschim Banga Khet Majoor Samity severing ties with the Congress-led United within the Congress, was severely limited (PBKMS), a non-party, registered trade union Progressive Alliance (UPA) at the centre on by the SDL’s de facto record in the states of agricultural workers, to file a public the issue of the 123 treaty (nuclear deal) where it was in power: Kerala and West interest litigation in the Calcutta High Court Table 4: Decrease in LF's Vote Share from 2004 to 2009 Bengal. Thus, paradoxically, while the SDL on non-implementation of the 100 days Parliamentary Constituency Vote Share Vote Share Decrease was largely responsible for creating the work guarantee scheme in West Bengal.5 in 2004 in 2009 populist shift in the Congress Party and Coming back to the factors specific to Maldaha South 35.37 37.02 -1.65 Maldaha North 40.90 41.25 -0.35 thereby creating a “wave” in its favour, it West Bengal that led to this stunning elec- Jalpaiguri 46.02 45.54 0.48 could not transform this effort into any toral defeat of the SDL, we must comple- Murshidabad 44.84 43.82 1.02 substantial electoral advantage for itself; ment the story of the state government’s Balurghat 45.55 44.38 1.17 and this was largely because of its dou- surrender to neoliberalism with its mis- Asansol 51.08 48.69 2.39 blespeak and hypocrisy, saying one thing guided arrogance. The utter failure in the Baharampur 39.87 37.28 2.59 at the central level and doing exactly the implementation of the NREGA went hand- Raiganj 41.20 38.58 2.62 opposite at the state level. in-hand with other overt neoliberal policy Bangaon 44.88 42.08 2.80 Probably nothing brings out this double­ moves: privatisation of healthcare and Jangipur 44.34 40.52 3.82 speak and hypocrisy of the SDL better education, the full-scale assault on the Sreerampur 44.08 40.00 4.08 Alipurduars 45.59 41.22 4.37 than the NREGA. The NREGA, which pro- public distribution system, and an aggres- Medinipur 51.86 47.29 4.57 vides a guarantee of a minimum of 100 sive state-sponsored attack on farmers to Jadavpur 50.28 44.65 5.63 days of work to the rural poor, came into “acquire” their agricultural land for a neo- Dum Dum 50.66 44.94 5.72 effect on 2 February 2006 in 200 of liberal industrialisation drive. Singur and Ranaghat 47.06 41.25 5.81 India’s poorest districts. This provision stand as symbols, at the same Jhargram 62.88 56.89 5.99 was originally brought by grassroots-level time, of both this attack by the state on Darjeeling 31.41 25.29 6.12 mass movements in Rajasthan and other behalf of corporate capital and also of the South 41.85 35.39 6.46 states in India, and was later adopted fierce resistance to this brutality by the Coochbehar 51.44 44.66 6.78 and forcefully pushed by the SDL at the poor peasants and landless labourers. Barasat 46.08 38.97 7.11 Tamluk 47.67 40.49 7.18 central level. While the NREGA has been The arrogance of the SDL-led state govern- Krishnanagar 42.51 35.03 7.48 constantly attacked in the mainstream ment was in gruesome display during the Kanthi 50.33 42.48 7.85 press as a waste of resources and a useless “recapture” of Nandigram in March 2007, Mathurapur 49.49 41.55 7.94 policy initiative, in reality it has managed a violent attack on the people opposing Kolkata North 48.15 40.05 8.10 to create substantial benefits for the forcible land acquisition, and also in the Uluberia 49.33 41.12 8.21 rural proletariat and poor peasants; even manner it dealt with the case of Rizwanur 52.58 44.27 8.31 though there is still a lot of room for Rahman. Coming as it does in the back- Basirhat 50.14 40.39 9.75 improvement, the NREGA has managed ground of the dismal conditions of the Hooghly 52.40 42.36 10.04 to improve the lives of the rural poor by Muslims in the state, the total insensitivity Bankura 58.43 47.66 10.77 Ghatal 64.30 53.50 10.80 putting a floor on agricultural wages displayed in the Rizwanur Rahman case Diamond Harbour 49.98 39.17 10.81 and assuring some days of employment, increased the ire of the common Muslim Birbhum 53.14 41.77 11.37 both of which resulted in increased population against the SDL-led state gov- Bardhman Purba 59.14 47.31 11.83 4 rural incomes. ernment; it is interesting that some of the Barrackpur 54.97 42.84 12.13 districts where the SDL performed dismally, Bolpur 62.36 49.91 12.45 West Bengal: A Closer Look like North and South 24 Paraganas, Nadia, Jaynagar 55.36 42.86 12.50 How did the NREGA fare in West Bengal Murshidabad, Malda, Birbhum, have a rel- Purulia 56.78 44.13 12.65 and Kerala compared to other states? In atively high proportion of Muslims. Taken Bardhaman-Durgapur 63.62 50.52 13.10 2006-07, the person-days of NREGA em- together, all these factors created a mas- Bishnupur 65.41 51.33 14.08 Arambagh 76.73 54.18 22.55 ployment generated per rural household sive wave of anger and resentment against was six in West Bengal and three in Kerala, the state government and resulted in the with the US; this severing of ties with the with both states figuring in the list of the unprecedented electoral debacle of the SDL Congress allowed the Trinamool Congress three worst performers. Compared to this, in West Bengal. (TMC) and the Congress to forge an alli- the all-India average was 17 person-days, ance in West Bengal; this alliance man- and Chhattisgarh generated 34, Madhya Refuting a Spurious Argument aged to consolidate the anti-Left votes and Pradesh 56, Assam 70 and Rajasthan 77 At this point, we need to closely scrutinise directly resulted in the electoral drubbing person-days. A similar picture emerges for an alternative argument that is doing the of the SDL in West Bengal.6 the next year too: in 2007-08, West Bengal “social democratic” rounds. This argument, This argument, if true, would provide generated eight person-days and Kerala which purports to provide an explanation some solace to the SDL leadership in India.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW may 30, 2009 vol xliv no 22 13 commentary By shifting the responsibility of the electoral presence of the SDL at the central level. If and working within a framework whose debacle onto the logic of alliance arith­ nothing, the reaction of corporate India to rules have been set by the ruling classes, metic, the SDL would manage to skirt some the electoral debacle of the SDL is proof of the SDL has gradually distanced itself from difficult issues of policy and politics. But alas, the partial efficacy of the SDL’s past inter- its programmatic concerns of a peoples the argument does not hold water when ventions. But there are, I would submit, at democratic revolution. To recover its confronted with evidence. There is a simple least two serious problems of a strategy that potency and relevance, the SDL must re- way to determine the validity or otherwise focuses on primarily on electoral politics, fashion itself by forging links with the of this, to my mind, spurious argument. For as the SDL does. rising tide of revolutionary mass move- if it were true that the SDL debacle was First, most of its interventions, even ments in India against the neoliberal of- fuelled mainly by the consolidation of though salutary, are at best defensive ac- fensive and overcome its obsession with anti-Left votes (because of the Congress- tions and therefore extremely limited electoral politics. It is perhaps time for the TMC alliance), it would mean the following: from any long-term left political perspec- current SDL leadership to return, at the least, the SDL’s share of votes polled would re- tive; the ruling classes set the agenda and to the prescient analysis of P Sundarraya main relatively unchanged between 2004 move forward with a concrete programme who had resigned from the general secre- and 2009. This is a straightforward testable of neoliberal reforms and the SDL reacts to taryship and politburo of the CPI(M) in implication of the above argument. What that agenda, it tries to halt the speed of 1976, alarmed at what he called the “revi- does the evidence say on this? the reforms, tries to win a battle here or sionist habits” within the party and what In Table 4 (p 13), we have summarised there, without in any real sense question- later Marxist-Leninists, borrowing a phrase data about the vote share of the Left Front ing the logic of the whole move. The logic from Lenin, have termed “parliamentary (CPI(M), CPI, (AIFB) of which can only be questioned when cretinism”. Of course if post-poll statements and Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP)) at there is a positive agenda guiding political of the SDL bigwigs, like Biman Bose, are the level of the parliamentary constituencies intervention. In the absence of such a posi- anything to go by, they have decided to do in West Bengal between the general elec- tive political programme, it boiled down exactly the opposite: justify the electoral tions in 2004 and 2009;7 a negative decrease to the following: the ruling class ushers in debacle on external factors, avoid any is, quite obviously, an increase. As can be the policy triumvirate of liberalisation, serious rethinking and continue with elec- seen from Table 4, out of the 42 parliamen- privatisation and globalisation, and the SDL tions as the primary focus of SDL politics. tary constituencies in West Bengal, the SDL’s merely reacts to these. In such a scenario, vote share went down in 40, ranging from the best outcome can only be a return to Notes 0.48% in Jalpaiguri to a whopping 22.6% the status quo, not a move forward towards 1 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/world/ asia/17india.html?_r=2&scp=5&sq=india%20 in Arambagh. The only two constituencies a socialist future. Is it difficult for the SDL elections&st=cse where the SDL managed to increase their to see the inherent and long-term limita- 2 For all states other than West Bengal, the total vote share of the Left Front (LF) is the sum of the vote share are: Malda North and Malda tions of populism? vote shares of the CPI(M) and the CPI; for West Bengal, the vote share of the LF is the sum of the South; in all the other constituencies its This brings me to the second, and related, vote share of the CPI(M), CPI, All India Forward vote share fell between 2004 and 2009. problem of the SDL strategy. The fact that Bloc (AIFB) and Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP). 3 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/19/business/ There were 29 constituencies where the the communist parties, now part of what I global/19rupee.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=india%20 share of votes garnered by the SDL fell by have called the SDL, have lost the political stock%20market&st=cse 4 Economist Jean Dreze has been in the forefront of more than 5 percentage points, there were offensive in the context of the class struggle the struggle to make the NREGA a national issue; 13 constituencies where the vote share fell in India also finds reflection in their over- for details on the implementation of NREGA across states see http://www.frontlineonnet. by more than 10 percentage points and there emphasis on electoral politics, to the virtual com/fl2414/stories/20070727001804100.htm and were nine constituencies where the vote exclusion of all non-electoral struggles. http://www. frontlineonnet.com/fl2604/stories/ 20090227260410100.htm share declined by more than 12 percentage Over the last two decades, there is not one 5 For details see http://sanhati.com/news/1168/ points. Can we, in the face of this over- significant nationwide non-electoral struggle 6 This argument was recently made, among others, by Vijay Prashad in Counterpunch: http://www. whelming evidence of a massive anti-SDL that the SDL initiated or led; all its atten- counterpunch.org/prashad05192009.html wave, still stick to the story of the sup- tion and energy has been fixed towards 7 What complicated this computation was the fact that there was a parliamentary delimitation in posed consolidation of anti-Left votes as how to maintain its electoral position in 2008, precisely between the 2004 and 2009 gen- eral elections; hence, constituencies changed the primary reason behind the SDL debacle? West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura. More their names and the assembly segments contained often than not, the SDL has been willing to in them; hence constituencies could not be com- Beyond Elections pared between 2004 and 2009 without some ad- enter into opportunistic and unprincipled justments. In the Appendix, I have outlined the There is no denying the fact that the SDL alliances to attain short-term electoral method used to make constituencies reasonably comparable between 2004 and 2009; I have used played an important role in halting the goals, little realising that this opportunism that method to compute the entries in Table 4. juggernaut of neoliberalism in India leads to long-term political setbacks. At through its intervention in the formation times it has even gone with the BJP to keep Appendix of the Common Minimum Programme of Congress out of power, quickly reversing All the data in this article come from the fol- lowing three sources: the UPA; and this was largely possible, the logic at the next moment and aligning (1) The data for the 2009 Lok Sabha election given the political situation five years ago, with the Congress to defend secularism. results came from the Election Commission of because of the sizeable parliamentary Caught in these endless electoral antics India’s web site: http://eci.nic.in/results/

14 may 30, 2009 vol xliv no 22 EPW Economic & Political Weekly commentary

(2) The data for the 2004 Lok Sabha election assembly constituency delimitation compli­ (b) the vote share of the LF in precisely these as- results were extracted from the following: cated the comparison because many of the sembly segments in the 2004 general elections (a) Election Commission of India 2004, Statisti- constituencies changed, in terms of the assembly (available from Volume 3 of the 2004 Lok Sabha cal Report on General Elections, 2004 to the 14th segments contained in a parliamentary consti­ election results). Using these two, I computed the Lok Sabha, Volume 1 (National and State Ab- tuency, between 2004 and 2009. Let me take vote share of the LF in the 2004 general elections stracts and Detailed Results), New Delhi. Avail- an example. by aggregating results for the assembly segments able at: http://eci.nic.in/StatisticalReports/ Parliamentary constituency number 7 was that make up the 2009 parliamentary constituen- ElectionStatistics.asp called Malda during the 2004 general elections cies. This gave me comparable vote share figures (b) Election Commission of India 2004, Statis- and was called Maldaha North in 2009. Malda, for the 2004 and 2009 general elections. I have tical Report on General Elections, 2004 to the in 2004, contained the following assembly seg- summarised this information in Table 4. More de- , Volume 3 (Details for Assembly ments: Habibpur, Araidanga, Maldaha, English tailed data, i e, at the assembly segment level, is Segments of Parliamentary Constituencies), Bazar, Manikchak, Suzapur and Kaliachak; available from the author upon request. New Delhi. Available at: http://eci.nic.in/Sta- Maldaha North, in 2009, contained the follow- Two caveats are in order. First, the compari- tisticalReports/ElectionStatistics.asp ing assembly segments: Habibpur, Gazole, son is still not perfect because there were some (3) The data about the 2008 delimitation came Chanchal, Harishchandrapur, Malatipur and assembly segments in 2009 that seemed to be from: Election Commission of India 2004. Maldaha. Thus, the two parliamentary constit- new and there were some assembly segments in “Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly uencies with the same number, seven in this 2004 that were no longer there in the 2009 par- Constituencies Order, 2008”, available at: example, contained pretty different assembly liamentary constituencies. Going further down http://www.delhielections.com/2008/01/10/ segments; hence making comparisons by con- one level in terms of disaggregation would prob- 78654/delhi-elections-delimitation-of-lok-sabha- stituency number would be misleading. ably solve this problem; I leave that as a future and-assembly-constituencies/index.html To solve this problem of comparability, I used research problem. Second, for each parliamen- The main empirical challenge was to find a the following two types of information: (a) the tary constituency, I have left out the postal vote method to make the constituency level data on assembly segments that make up the 2009 parlia- cast; since this is a very small percentage of the vote share reasonably comparable between mentary constituencies (available from the 2008 total votes cast (usually less than 1%), this will 2004 and 2009. The 2008 parliamentary and delimitation order of the Election Commission); not take us very far from the “true” results.

the UDF suffered a rout in terms of the The Left Debacle in Kerala number of seats, it had secured only 38% of the polled votes. The pre-poll surveys which predicted a downslide to 36% for K Haridas the LDF have been proved wrong.

A number of the Left Democratic eventeen members belonging to the ‘Shock Treatment’ Front’s supporters in Kerala Left Front were elected from Kerala Much before the election process started, moved away from it in the 2009 Sin the 2004 parliamentary elections it was clear that this time around the voters and this number contributed significantly who had no affiliation to either of the Lok Sabha elections leading to towards the front’s strength in the 14th fronts were all set to discard the LDF. They its poor showing. This must be Lok Sabha – the highest ever in independent may be in a minority in the highly polarised viewed as a silent revolt by its India. The results in the recently conclud- state but they have a decisive say in the sympathisers who want it to go ed elections are in sharp contrast to the final outcome of the closely contested race previous one and all the squabbles among in each constituency. It will be wrong to back to value-based politics which the front partners which were suspended presume that they are influenced only by distinguishes the left from the during the campaign trail have re-emerged. national issues when it comes to the Lok rest of the political combinations. There are observers who regard these re- Sabha election. The track record of the sults as the prelude to the ultimate deci- LDF regime that assumed office three mation of the left in one of its traditional years ago has been far from attractive. strongholds. However, it is not only the The washing of dirty linen in public not history of the electoral behaviour of Kerala’s only among the various constituents of voters that is a usual phenomenon and the front but also among the leaders of which leads to alternate verdicts in favour the faction-ridden CPI(M), allegations of of the Congress-led United Democratic Front corruption and arrogance at all levels of (UDF) or the CPI(M)-led Left Democratic administration, charges of interference in Front (LDF) in successive elections that administration by the kith and kin of the should caution such observers. It should be state ministers, etc, are aspects that were noted that despite winning only four seats unheard of in the past whenever the LDF the LDF has secured 42% of the polled votes was in power. Stunned by such a scenario as compared to the 48% polled by the UDF. it is no wonder that many concluded that K Haridas ([email protected]) is a The swing away from the left as compared the differences between the two fronts freelance journalist based in Mumbai. to 2004 is only 4%. Moreover, when in 2004 have been erased. Some might even grade

Economic & Political Weekly EPW may 30, 2009 vol xliv no 22 15