West Bengal Assembly Elections 2021: Does a ‘Party Society’ Really Subsume the Politics of ‘Identity’ and ‘Development’?
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846 West Bengal Assembly Elections 2021: Does a ‘Party Society’ Really Subsume the Politics of ‘Identity’ and ‘Development’? EPW ENGAGE While West Bengal’s “exceptionalism” is often touted to explain the claimed lack of communal and caste-based politics in the state, the rise of populist forces has somehow managed to take advantage of identitarian fault lines without creating space for democratic political mobilisation of marginalised sections. Elections for 294 seats of the West Bengal Legislative Assembly are scheduled to be held between 27 March and 29 April 2021 in eight phases. The key political players in the upcoming elections include: (i) The All India Trinamool Congress (TMC) and its allies, including the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha; (ii) The Sanyukta Morcha, including the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI[M]), other parties comprising the Left Front, the Indian National Congress (Congress) and the Indian Secular Front (ISF); (iii) The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allies; (iv) Unallied other parties including the All India Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen (AIMIM) and the Lok Janshakti Party. Like in the previous assembly elections in the state in 2016, the ruling TMC, led by current Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, faces challenges of anti-incumbency as well as dual ideological opposition from the left and the Congress on one side and the BJP’s Hindutva right on the other. Will Banerjee’s popularity see her through another successful electoral ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846 campaign or will BJP’s majoritarian rhetoric and strategy of inducting former TMC leaders win out? What will the impact of the “alternative” alliance between the CPI(M)-led Left parties, the Congress and Abbas Siddiqui’s ISF be? And will Asaduddin Owaisi’s AIMIM be able to play a key role in determining the political outcome, like it did in the 2020 Bihar assembly elections? While the electoral prospects of the various parties contesting the West Bengal elections will be known only after the counting of votes and announcement of results on 2 May 2021, this reading list attempts to analyse the key themes that are likely to play out in the voting choices in the state. Primacy of Local Political Organisation? Unlike other states in India, where factors of caste, religion and ethnicity have been analysed as determining the “vote banks” of political parties, West Bengal has a unique history of affiliation to political parties and polarisation along party lines. Dwaipayan Bhattacharyya explained this as a “party society.” In 2021, he wrote: In the long rule of the left, a combination of centralised organisation and decentralised governance turned the state’s political field into what I called ‘‘party society.’’ Party kora or ‘‘doing the party’’ is a peculiar Bangla expression; it once referred to Communist Party of India (Marxist)—(CPI[M])—cadres, now it refers to the TMC workers. West Bengal politics generally spins not on caste, religious or ethnic associations, but on their absorption within this or that political party. Subhasish Ray (2017) described the extraordinarily dense party organisation of the CPI(M), which penetrated into each and every aspect of life in rural West Bengal (where a majority of the state lives) as the “core instrument” of the party’s hegemony. Since the time of the long-running Left regime in the state, the party’s organisation was known to mediate interactions between the state and the public, such as in the delivery of public services. Referencing Bhattacharyya, Suman Nath (2018) noted the evolution of the party society: Bhattacharyya (2010: 53) notes that the evolution of such party society germinated from the “violent class-based movements of the poor peasants as they fought against the domination of the landlords ... These movements—facilitated by the left parties—for food, land, security of tenure, and freedom for ‘the intrusion of the excluded.’” Eventually, the domination adopts what Ruud (2003) notes as a form of “symbolic capital” in Bourdieu’s sense of the term. Bhattacharyya (2010: 55) further argues that “this enabled ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846 the communities to use political parties as conduits to pose their demands to the institutions of government, and allowed the party, in return, to transfer policies to the society by dissemination within the communities.” He went on to highlight the extensive role played by the Left’s political organisation when it was in power: Bhattacharyya (2016: 126) also notes several unique characteristics of politics in West Bengal such as the (i) absence of “other channels of public transactions,” (ii) lack of political focus on caste, religion or ethnicity-based social divisions, (iii) partisan forms of conflicts, (iv) accepted position of party as “moral guardians” of social life, and (v) party’s exclusive control over the panchayat system. In the context of TMC’s rise to power and its defeat of the long-running Left government in 2011, Nath (2017) contended that “party-based and organisation-dependent delivery system promoted by the Left Front” had been supplanted by a service delivery model mediated by powerful local leaders and corruption. He explained: The political mediation through different hierarchies—booth committee, branch committee, local committee, and finally, district committee—through which decisions were made used to be well organised, but simultaneously time- consuming. “For getting certain things done, CPM took months … they had their political hierarchy and protocol to follow, TMC did not have much protocol to follow … as a person you need to know whom to ask for what and you must be willing to pay a certain amount” (One of the villagers in Bankura, field notes, January 2015). This notion has been popularised by the TMC as opposed to the CPI(M) in each of the gram panchayats I studied. While Nath interpreted this mediation by “strong leaders with local networks and command over local administration” as an “alternative to ‘party society,’” Bhattacharyya (2021) viewed the new affiliations of the public to local TMC leaders as an extension of “party society” itself, with allegiances continuing to forged along party lines. Though TMC has no organisation that matches what the CPI(M) once had, Mamata has given a relatively free hand to local satraps to run the party in lieu of absolute loyalty to her leadership. Therefore, despite the vote share of the BJP having increased to 40.23% with 18 seats in the ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846 2019 Lok Sabha elections in the state as compared to 17.02% with two seats in 2014, Bhattacharyya held that electoral outcomes at the central level are likely to be a poor indicator of those at the state level: While the local elections in West Bengal are the best barometers indicating changes in party society (panchayat election in 2008 signalled Mamata’s rise), parliamentary elections are the least resonant of the state’s deep social politics. Consequently, the logic of voting for Parliament and for assembly are incongruous in West Bengal, and the former is the least reflective of who controls political power in local society. In this light, will the BJP’s rhetoric of a “double-engine sarkar” (meaning a BJP-led government at both the centre and the state) to bring about development in the state hold sway with voters? Communal Polarisation and Caste-based Assertion While Bhattacharyya has argued for the primacy of “party society” in West Bengal’s political landscape, the electoral significance of other identities—based on religion, caste and ethnicity—cannot be discounted. Rajat Roy (2017) wrote: Muslim population in Bengal is around 28%, and that of Scheduled Castes is around 23%, a majority of them peasants. These peasants successfully resisted the erstwhile Left Front government’s bid for land acquisition in Singur and Nandigram, thus paving the way for the TMC coming to power. After coming to power, the Mamata government took some steps to bring benefits to these socio-religious sections of the society. The BJP’s Hindutva campaign has continually attacked the Banerjee government’s pro- Muslim measures as “blatant appeasement of Muslims.” Roy contended that the sociopolitical space for the Hindutva right was created by the decline of the left. He explained: It is true that ever since partition, the politics of the left and the left-of-centre dominated the political scene in Bengal, and the politics of the Hindu rights never got many takers. However, the decline of the left and Congress in the state has created a void. Instead, caste and community-based identity politics have started raising their heads. Because of a history of partition, West Bengal ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846 had a sizeable number of Hindus who had come from the eastern part of undivided Bengal. While the middle class had resettled themselves in Kolkata and other urban areas, the lower class, mostly peasantry and artisans, were settled in rural areas, many in the districts bordering Bangladesh. The loss of livelihood, coupled with the lack of proper rehabilitation programme taken up by the government made them angry and frustrated. The refugee movement was co-opted by the left and they gave vent to their anger by supporting the left in successive elections. With the passage of time, the refugee movement lost its steam, yet the sense of loss for their lost home and livelihood remained strongly in their mind. The bitter memory of partition had left an indelible mark in their minds that made them hostile to Muslims when fomented by communal politics. The refugees’ disenchantment with the left grew as they got little succour even after the left came to rule the state for more than three decades. In the 1990s, at the advent of the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, the BJP saw its vote share increase (in Lok Sabha constituencies) in border districts, where the refugee voters are a dominant force, wrote Roy.