DOCSLIB.ORG

Rethinking Mobile Taxation to Improve Connectivity

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Rethinking Mobile Taxation to Improve Connectivity Rethinking mobile taxation to improve connectivity Copyright © 2019 GSM Association The GSMA represents the interests of mobile operators GSMA Intelligence is the definitive source of global mobile worldwide, uniting more than 750 operators with over 350 operator data, analysis and forecasts, and publisher of companies in the broader mobile ecosystem, including authoritative industry reports and research. handset and device makers, software companies, equipment Our data covers every operator group, network and providers and internet companies, as well as organisations MVNO in every country worldwide – from Afghanistan in adjacent industry sectors. The GSMA also produces the to Zimbabwe. It is the most accurate and complete set of industry-leading MWC events held annually in Barcelona, industry metrics available, comprising tens of millions of Los Angeles and Shanghai, as well as the Mobile 360 Series individual data points, updated daily. GSMA Intelligence is of regional conferences. relied on by leading operators, vendors, regulators, financial For more information, please visit the GSMA corporate institutions and third-party industry players, to support website at www.gsma.com strategic decision-making and long-term investment planning. The data is used as an industry reference point and Follow the GSMA on Twitter: @GSMA is frequently cited by the media and by the industry itself. Our team of analysts and experts produce regular thought- leading research reports across a range of industry topics. www.gsmaintelligence.com [email protected] Authors Xavier Pedros, Economist Mayuran Sivakumaran, Senior Economist RETHINKING MOBILE TAXATION TO IMPROVE CONNECTIVITY Contents Summary 5 1 Taxation in mobile markets 10 2 Tax payments made by mobile operators and consumers 14 3 Trends in consumer tax rates 19 3.1 Mobile-specific taxation on usage 23 3.2 Mobile-specific taxation on devices 25 3.3 Mobile-specific taxation on activation 27 4 Trends in operator tax rates 29 4.1 Mobile-specific taxation on activation 30 4.2 Universal service fund contributions 32 5 The impacts of sector-specific taxation 33 5.1 The impact of sector-specific taxation on affordability 33 5.1.1 Lack of affordability of mobile services is a connectivity barrier 33 5.1.2 Reducing sector-specific taxes can drive more connectivity 39 5.2 The impact of sector-specific taxation on investment 43 5.2.1 Investment improves outcomes for mobile customers 43 5.2.2 Other tax factors can reduce investment levels 46 5.3 The impact of sector-specific taxation on the wider economy 47 Appendix 1 Countries included in analysis 54 Appendix 2 Estimation of total mobile tax and fee payments 56 Appendix 3 TCMO analysis 59 Appendix 4 USF rates 63 RETHINKING MOBILE TAXATION TO IMPROVE CONNECTIVITY SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA GENERAL SECTOR-SPECIFIC GENERAL SECTOR-SPECIFIC Average tax payments as a percentage of 15% 10% 14% 10% revenue (2017) TOTAL 26% TOTAL 24% Percentage of countries with sector-specific 63% 56% tax (2017) �� �� Number of sector-specific increases or introductions 41 24 2011 to 2017 37% 1 GB of data as a proportion UN AFFORDABILITY UN AFFORDABILITY of income, all TARGET 2025 5% TARGET 2025 earners (2017) 2% 2% 27% Taxes as a proportion of TCMO UN TCMO UN income, 20% AFFORDABILITY AFFORDABILITY lowest earners TARGET 2025 TARGET 2025 3% (2017) 2% 2% 2 RETHINKING MOBILE TAXATION TO IMPROVE CONNECTIVITY ASIA PACIFIC LATIN AMERICA EUROPE Average tax payments as a percentage of revenue (2017) GENERAL SECTOR-SPECIFIC GENERAL SECTOR-SPECIFIC GENERAL SECTOR-SPECIFIC 14% 10% 14% 4% 17% 4% TOTAL 24% TOTAL 18% TOTAL 21% Percentage of countries with sector-specific tax (2017) 33% 57% 17% Number� of sector-specific increases� or introductions� 2011 to 2017 � ���� 24 15 15 1 GB of data as a proportion of income, all earners (2017) 6% UN AFFORDABILITY UN AFFORDABILITY UN AFFORDABILITY TARGET 2025 5% TARGET 2025 TARGET 2025 2% 2% 1% 2% Taxes as a proportion of income, 20% lowest earners (2017) TCMO UN TCMO UN 4% TCMO UN AFFORDABILITY AFFORDABILITY AFFORDABILITY TARGET 2025 3% TARGET 2025 TARGET 2025 2% 2% 2% 0.7% 3 RETHINKING MOBILE TAXATION TO IMPROVE CONNECTIVITY 4 RETHINKING MOBILE TAXATION TO IMPROVE CONNECTIVITY Summary Mobile is the main gateway to the internet for Mobile consumers and operators are subject to consumers in many parts of the world today, a substantial tax burden, increasingly driven by particularly in developing countries. Despite this, sector-specific taxes governments in many of these countries are increasingly imposing – in addition to general taxes – In 2017, mobile taxes on consumers and industry sector-specific taxes on consumers of mobile services accounted for, on average, 22% of market revenue.1 and devices and on mobile operators. This poses a Almost a third of these payments are taxes specific significant risk to the growth of the services among to the mobile sector, which are levied on mobile citizens, limiting the widely acknowledged social and operators and consumers in addition to other, economic benefits associated with mobile technology. economy-wide, general taxes. Figure 1 Consumers and operators are paying taxes in excess of 30% of market revenue in many countries General and sector-specific taxes and fees as a proportion of market revenue (2017) Latin America 14% 4% 18% Ecuador 16% 14% 30% LATAM Brazil 26% 13% 40% Europe 17% 4% 21% United Kingdom 15% 1% 16% EUROPE Denmark 22% 1% 22% Asia Pacific 14% 10% 24% Sri Lanka 12% 24% 35% APAC India 34% 11% 45% Middle East & North Africa 14% 10% 24% Jordan 14% 20% 33% MENA Tunisia 24% 10% 34% Sub-Saharan Africa 15% 10% 26% DR Congo 33% SSA 15% 17% Guinea 30% 31% 61% General taxes and fees Sector-specific taxes and fees Source: GSMA Intelligence 1 Based on our survey of mobile operators in 86 countries worldwide. 5 RETHINKING MOBILE TAXATION TO IMPROVE CONNECTIVITY This varies significantly across regions: markets in Sector-specific taxes reduce affordability and Sub-Saharan Africa are subject to some of the highest investment overall tax burdens, with markets there paying on average 10% of revenue as sector-specific taxes; this Affordable mobile internet access is important for can, however, be as high as 31% in Guinea. consumers and society, given its power to transform societies and modernise economies. Mobile internet In 2017, almost 1.5 billion consumers in 60 countries improves communication and access to information, were subject to sector-specific taxes when buying boosts productivity and makes markets more efficient. mobile services or devices, with a third of these in Keeping mobile internet affordable allows more people Africa and the Middle East. to start realising these benefits, and allows existing users to consume more data – with more advanced, • The number of countries where consumers pay data-intensive technologies delivering even greater sector-specific levies almost doubled between benefits. 2011 and 2017. There have been around 120 sector- specific tax-rate rises or new levies introduced The UN’s Broadband Commission recently established during this period. the “1 for 2” affordability target. This requires that 1 GB of data should cost less than 2% of monthly income • Half of the 120 sector-specific tax increases were per capita, to ensure that, by 2025, the remaining sector-specific taxes on usage, concentrated in 55% of the global population that is offline becomes Africa and the Middle East. connected. Many countries will struggle to accomplish this target: the purchase of 1 GB of data currently represents 5–37% of income in Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA, Asia-Pacific and Latin America – clearly unaffordable levels that are between 2× and 18× the threshold that the UN aims to achieve by 2025. Figure 2 Mobile internet remains unaffordable for many users across the world Total cost of mobile ownership as a proportion of income, all earners (2017) 37% 20% Proportion of income Proportion 15% 10% 5% 6% 5% 5% UN 2025 AFFORDABILITY THRESHOLD FOR 1 GB OF DATA 2% HIGH – 5 GB MEDIUM – 1 GB, 250 MIN., 100 SMS – 500 MB LOW – 100 MB BASIC 0% 1% 1% Sub-Saharan Africa MENA Asia-Pacific Latin America Europe North America Source: GSMA Intelligence 6 RETHINKING MOBILE TAXATION TO IMPROVE CONNECTIVITY These affordability problems are in part explained over 2% of income) already make services unaffordable by consumers bearing an increasing tax burden. for the 1.2 billion people that represent the bottom 20% Consumer taxes were 19% of the total cost of mobile of the income pyramid – this is before even taking into ownership (TCMO) in 2017, which represents an account the actual price of the service and devices. increase since 2011 – partly driven by the numerous sector-specific tax increases. In several markets (for Reducing the cost of mobile ownership is important for example, Turkey, Congo and Argentina) taxes account governments, as lower consumer costs are associated for more than a third of TCMO for consumers. All of with higher levels of mobile connectivity. In particular, them have sector-specific taxes in place. where the burden of tax is lower for consumers, the cost of mobile ownership is lower. For countries where Affordability can be improved by alleviating the tax taxes account for more than 3.5% of consumers’ burden faced by consumers. In Africa, Latin America, the incomes, reducing taxes could be an important Middle East and Asia-Pacific, consumer taxes alone (at strategy to improve mobile connectivity. Figure 3 How consumer taxes increase the cost of mobile ownership
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Saleh Poll Tax December 2011
    On the Road to Heaven: Poll tax, Religion, and Human Capital in Medieval and Modern Egypt Mohamed Saleh* University of Southern California (Preliminary and Incomplete: December 1, 2011) Abstract In the Middle East, non-Muslims are, on average, better off than the Muslim majority. I trace the origins of the phenomenon in Egypt to the imposition of the poll tax on non- Muslims upon the Islamic Conquest of the then-Coptic Christian Egypt in 640. The tax, which remained until 1855, led to the conversion of poor Copts to Islam to avoid paying the tax, and to the shrinking of Copts to a better off minority. Using new data sources that I digitized, including the 1848 and 1868 census manuscripts, I provide empirical evidence to support the hypothesis. I find that the spatial variation in poll tax enforcement and tax elasticity of conversion, measured by four historical factors, predicts the variation in the Coptic population share in the 19th century, which is, in turn, inversely related to the magnitude of the Coptic-Muslim gap, as predicted by the hypothesis. The four factors are: (i) the 8th and 9th centuries tax revolts, (ii) the Arab immigration waves to Egypt in the 7th to 9th centuries, (iii) the Coptic churches and monasteries in the 12th and 15th centuries, and (iv) the route of the Holy Family in Egypt. I draw on a wide range of qualitative evidence to support these findings. Keywords: Islamic poll tax; Copts, Islamic Conquest; Conversion; Middle East JEL Classification: N35 * The author is a PhD candidate at the Department of Economics, University of Southern California (E- mail: [email protected]).
    [Show full text]
  • Las Nuevas Reformas Fiscales Verdes
    [email protected] www.eforenergy.org ISSN nº Las Nuevas Reformas Fiscales Verdes Alberto Gagoa, Xavier Labandeiraa,b,c, Xiral López-Oteroa a Rede, Universidade de Vigo, Facultade de CC.EE., Campus As Lagoas s/n, 36310 Vigo b FSR Climate, European University Institute, Via Boccaccio 121, 50133 Florencia c Economics for Energy, Gran Vía 3, 3·E, 36204 Vigo Resumen En este trabajo se realiza una puesta al día de los argumentos que avalan y explican la introducción de los impuestos ambientales y las reformas fiscales verdes, estudiando la situación actual de estos instrumentos y describiendo las experiencias con la denominada tercera generación de reformas fiscales verdes. Además, también se analizan los límites y obstáculos existentes para la aplicación de reformas fiscales verdes, así como las oportunidades para estas reformas en España. Los resultados del análisis muestran que, a pesar de los múltiples beneficios asociados a los impuestos ambientales y las reformas fiscales verdes, es necesario superar los obstáculos institucionales existentes para lograr que estos instrumentos desempeñen un papel destacado en los próximos años. 1 1. Introducción En el ámbito de las políticas públicas, la agenda de los países avanzados está ocupada en la actualidad por dos objetivos preferentes: la recuperación económica y la transición a un modelo ambientalmente sostenible. Para alcanzar ambos objetivos, la mayoría de los organismos internacionales apoyan la utilización de impuestos ambientales y paquetes de Reforma Fiscal Verde (RFV). Banco Mundial (Fay et al., 2015), Fondo Monetario Internacional (Mooij et al., 2012; Heine et al., 2012), OCDE (2010 y 2013) y CE (2014a y 2015a) defienden así las políticas basadas en estos instrumentos fiscales para conseguir recursos con los menores impactos, para abordar los objetivos de consolidación fiscal, financiar las políticas de renovables y eficiencia energética, promover la innovación, reducir las emisiones contaminantes y avanzar de esta forma en la transición hacia economías bajas en carbono.
    [Show full text]
  • Doing Business in Argentina Contents
    This publication is a joint project with Doing business in Argentina Contents Executive summary 4 Disclaimer Foreword 6 This document is issued by HSBC Bank (Argentina) Company Limited Introduction – Doing business in Argentina 8 (the ‘Bank’) in Argentina. It is not intended as an offer or solicitation for business to anyone in any Conducting business in Argentina 13 jurisdiction. It is not intended for distribution to anyone located in or Taxation in Argentina 18 resident in jurisdictions which restrict the distribution of this document. Audit and accountancy 29 It shall not be copied, reproduced, transmitted or further distributed Human Resources and Employment Law 34 by any recipient. Trade 37 The information contained in this document is of a general nature Banking in Argentina 40 only. It is not meant to be comprehensive and does not HSBC in Argentina 43 constitute financial, legal, tax or other professional advice. You Country overview 44 should not act upon the information contained in this publication without Contacts and further information 46 obtaining specific professional advice. This document is produced by the Bank together with PricewaterhouseCoopers (‘PwC’). Whilst every care has been taken in preparing this document, neither the Bank nor PwC makes any guarantee, representation or warranty (express or implied) as to its accuracy or completeness, and under no circumstances will the Bank or PwC be liable for any loss caused by reliance on any opinion or statement made in this document. Except as specifically indicated, the expressions of opinion are those of the Bank and/or PwC only and are subject to change without notice.
    [Show full text]
  • Working Paper 65
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by IDS OpenDocs Working Paper 65 The Political Economy of Long-Term Revenue Decline in Sri Lanka Mick Moore February 2017 www.ictd.ac ICTD Working Paper 65 The Political Economy of Long-Term Revenue Decline in Sri Lanka Mick Moore February 2017 1 The International Centre for Tax and Development is a global policy research network that deals with the political economy of taxation policies and practices in relation to the poorer parts of the world. Its operational objectives are to generate and disseminate relevant knowledge to policymakers and to mobilise knowledge in ways that will widen and deepen public debate about taxation issues within poorer countries. Its ultimate objective is to contribute to development in the poorer parts of the world and help make taxation policies more conducive to pro-poor economic growth and good governance. The ICTD’s research strategy and organisational structures are designed to bring about productive interaction between established experts and new stakeholders. The ICTD is funded with UK aid from the UK Government, and by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), a directorate under the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); however, the views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the UK and Norwegian Governments’ official policies. The Political Economy of Long-Term Revenue Decline in Sri Lanka Mick Moore ICTD Working Paper 65 First published by the Institute of Development Studies in February 2017 © Institute of Development Studies 2017 ISBN: 978-1-78118-349-6 This is an Open Access paper distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 4.0 International license, which permits downloading and sharing provided the original authors and source are credited – but the work is not used for commercial purposes.
    [Show full text]
  • The Politics of Taxation in Argentina and Brazil in the Last Twenty Years of the 20Th Century
    THE POLITICS OF TAXATION IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL IN THE LAST TWENTY YEARS OF THE 20TH CENTURY DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Hiram José Irizarry Osorio, B.S. & M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 2005 Dissertation Committee: Approved by: Professor R. William Liddle, Adviser ___________________________ Professor Richard P. Gunther Adviser Professor Marcus Kurtz Graduate Program in Political Science ABSTRACT What explains changes in tax policy and its direction and magnitude? More specifically, what explains changes in taxation centralization, progressivity, and level? This dissertation addresses these questions in a comparative way, by studying Argentina and Brazil’s taxation experiences during the 1980s and 1990s. The main reason for choosing these two cases derives from the occurrence of tax policy reforms in both cases, but different in extent and nature, which is the central explanatory concern of this dissertation. Throughout the literature, explanations of change have had a focus on crisis environments, crisis events, and/or agency. Although all of them present some truth and leverage in order to gain an understanding of change taking place, some middle-range explanation is lacking. By this I mean, crises based explanations remain at a high structural level of explanation, while agency based explanations become extremely micro-focused. Though crises present windows of opportunity for changes to take place, they do not guarantee them. Furthermore, changes still have taken place without crises. Thus, crises-based explanations are not necessary or sufficient type of explanations of ii change.
    [Show full text]
  • How Do Tax Progressivity and Household Heterogeneity Affect
    How Do Tax Progressivity and Household Heterogeneity Affect Laffer Curves?∗ Hans A. Holtery Dirk Kruegerz Serhiy Stepanchukx March 12, 2019 Abstract: How much additional tax revenue can the government generate by increasing the level of labor income taxes? In this paper we argue that the degree of tax progressivity is a quantitatively important determinant of the answer to this question. To make this point we develop a large scale overlapping generations model with single and married households facing idiosyncratic income risk, extensive and intensive margins of labor supply, as well as endogenous accumulation of human capital through labor market experience. We calibrate the model to U.S. macro, micro and tax data and characterize the labor income tax Laffer curve for various degrees of tax progressivity. We find that the peak of the U.S. Laffer curve is attained at an average labor income tax rate of 58%. This peak (the maximal tax revenues the government can raise) increases by 7% if the current progressive tax code is replaced with a flat labor income tax. Replacing the current U.S. tax system with one that has Denmark's progressivity would lower the peak by 8%. We show that modeling the extensive margin of labor supply and endogenous human capital accumulation is crucial for these findings. With joint taxation of married couples (as in the U.S.), higher tax progressivity leads to significantly lower labor force participation of married women and substantially higher labor force participation of single women, an effect that is especially pronounced when future wages of females depend positively on past labor market experience.
    [Show full text]
  • School Finance Tutorial
    Public School Finance Seminar David Anderson Lisa Dawn-Fisher Texas Education Agency Big Picture of School Finance • The system is huge o Annual state aid and local taxes exceed $48.7 billion o 1% error in projecting state cost is worth $370 million in a biennium o It takes large amounts of money to make meaningful change in a system this large Sources of Funds Other local, $1.43 Local I&S taxes, $3.94 State Foundation*, $16.67 Local M&O taxes, $17.23 State Available*, $1.13 State Textbook, $0.17 State GR, $0.79 Federal, $7.19 Technology, $0.13 2009–2010 Estimated, $48.7 billion total (*includes SFSF) Big Picture of School Finance • Wealth is tax base per student, not absolute o A penny of tax rate in Houston ISD generates $10.8 million o A penny of tax rate in Divide ISD generates $5,397 • BUT, o At $1.00 tax rate, Houston ISD produces $5,989 per ADA o At $1.00 tax rate, Divide ISD produces $25,555 per ADA Big Picture of School Finance • Putting local property taxes into perspective o At a $1.00 tax rate, it takes $800,000 in taxable property value to generate $8,000 in local property taxes Three Basic Variables • Number of students o More students increase state cost o Fewer students decrease state cost • Property values o Higher values save the state general revenue (GR) o Lower values cost the state GR Three Basic Variables • Tax rates o In general Higher tax rates increase state cost and local budgets Lower tax rates decrease state cost and local budgets • BUT, o Rate compression costs the state One penny reduction in local tax
    [Show full text]
  • Progressive Taxation, Nominal Wage Rigidity, and Business Cycle Destabilization
    Progressive Taxation, Nominal Wage Rigidity, and Business Cycle Destabilization Miroslav Gabrovski Jang-Ting Guo University of Hawaii at Manoay University of California, Riversidez February 1, 2019 Abstract In the context of a prototypical New Keynesian model, this paper examines the theo- retical interrelations between two tractable formulations of progressive taxation on labor income versus (i) the equilibrium degree of nominal wage rigidity as well as (ii) the re- sulting volatilities of hours worked and output in response to a monetary shock. In sharp contrast to the traditional stabilization view, we analytically show that linearly progressive taxation always operates like an automatic destabilizer which leads to higher cyclical ‡uc- tuations within the macroeconomy. We also obtain the same business cycle destabilization result under continuously progressive taxation if the initial degree of tax progressivity is su¢ cient low. Keywords: Progressive Taxation, Nominal Wage Rigidity, Automatic Stabilizer, Business Cycles. JEL Classi…cation: E12, E32, E62, We thank Nicolas Caramp, Juin-Jen Chang, Yi Mao, Victor Ortego-Marti, Chong-Kee Yip, and seminar participants at Academia Sinica and Chinese University of Hong Kong for helpful comments and suggestions. Part of this research was conducted while Guo was a visiting research fellow at the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, whose hospitality is greatly appreciated. Of course, all remaining errors are own own. yDepartment of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2424 Maile Way, Saunders 516, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA; Phone: 1-808-956-7749, Fax: 1-808-956-4347, E-mail: [email protected] zCorresponding Author. Department of Economics, 3133 Sproul Hall, University of California, Riverside, CA 92521, USA; Phone: 1-951-827-1588, Fax: 1-951-827-5685, E-mail: [email protected].
    [Show full text]
  • Worldwide Estate and Inheritance Tax Guide
    Worldwide Estate and Inheritance Tax Guide 2021 Preface he Worldwide Estate and Inheritance trusts and foundations, settlements, Tax Guide 2021 (WEITG) is succession, statutory and forced heirship, published by the EY Private Client matrimonial regimes, testamentary Services network, which comprises documents and intestacy rules, and estate Tprofessionals from EY member tax treaty partners. The “Inheritance and firms. gift taxes at a glance” table on page 490 The 2021 edition summarizes the gift, highlights inheritance and gift taxes in all estate and inheritance tax systems 44 jurisdictions and territories. and describes wealth transfer planning For the reader’s reference, the names and considerations in 44 jurisdictions and symbols of the foreign currencies that are territories. It is relevant to the owners of mentioned in the guide are listed at the end family businesses and private companies, of the publication. managers of private capital enterprises, This publication should not be regarded executives of multinational companies and as offering a complete explanation of the other entrepreneurial and internationally tax matters referred to and is subject to mobile high-net-worth individuals. changes in the law and other applicable The content is based on information current rules. Local publications of a more detailed as of February 2021, unless otherwise nature are frequently available. Readers indicated in the text of the chapter. are advised to consult their local EY professionals for further information. Tax information The WEITG is published alongside three The chapters in the WEITG provide companion guides on broad-based taxes: information on the taxation of the the Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, the accumulation and transfer of wealth (e.g., Worldwide Personal Tax and Immigration by gift, trust, bequest or inheritance) in Guide and the Worldwide VAT, GST and each jurisdiction, including sections on Sales Tax Guide.
    [Show full text]
  • Carbon Price Policies and International Competitiveness in G20 Countries
    Climate Change, Sustainable Energy & Environment G20 2020 Carbon price policies and international competitiveness in G20 countries Fakhri J. Hasanov, Jeyhun I. Mikayilov, Nicholas Apergis, Brantley Liddle, Ceyhun Mahmudlu, Ryan Alyamani, Abdulelah Darandary November 22, 2020 | Last updated: December 10, 2020 Tags: Climate change and environmental sustainability A major challenge in implementing carbon pricing policies is to account for their economic outcomes. Notably, competitiveness is the key economic performance indicator to be considered. Extant theory mainly emphasizes the negative effect of carbon pricing on competitiveness; however, there is no consensus in the empirical literature. This may be due to the fragmented implementation of carbon pricing, ignoring country-specific characteristics and lack of well-designed mitigation policies. The above challenges are significant for the Group of Twenty (G20). Thus, we propose the implementation of country-specific carbon pricing policies while accounting for any negative effects of such policies on the competitiveness of G20 economies. Challenge The negative effect of carbon pricing on competitiveness stems from the following challenges. First, the mechanism underlined in the Paris Agreement Article 6 (PAA6)[1]to mitigate emissions is an uneven policy measure for the Group of Twenty (G20), although many member countries have implemented some kind of carbon pricing policy. The two main consequences of this fragmented adoption are unfair competition between countries with and without carbon pricing policies, and carbon leakage[2] (Kossoy et al. 2015; Jorge, Dale, and Jefferiss 2020). Second, the G20 is home to developed as well as developing economies. Moreover, there are considerable differences even within these categories in terms of socio-economic, energy-environmental, and institutional characteristics.
    [Show full text]
  • World Bank Document
    DISCUSSION PAPER Public Disclosure Authorized Report No. DRD228 DEVELOPMENT OF A VALUE ADDED TAX IN COLOMBIA By Guillermo Perry and Alba Lucia Orozco de !ciana Mejia? Millan y Perry Ltda Bogota? Colombia Public Disclosure Authorized February 1987 Development Research Department Eco~omics and Research Staff World Bank Public Disclosure Authorized The World Bank does not accept responsibility for the views expressed herein which are those of the author(s) and should not be attributed to the World Bank or to its affiliated organizations. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the results of research supported by the Bank; they do not necessarily represent official policy of the Bank. The designations employed, the presentation of material, and any maps used in this document are solely for the convenience of the reader and do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Bank o·r its affiliates concerning the legal status of any country? territory 9 city 9 area 9 or of its authorities~ Public Disclosure Authorized or concerning the delimitations of its boundaries 9 or national affiliationo DEVELOPMENT OF A VALUE ADDED TAX IN COLOMBIA By Guillermo Perry and Alba Lucia Orozco de Triana Mejia, Millan y Perry Ltda Bogota, Colombia February 1987 Development Research Department Economics and Research Staff World Bank The World Bank does not accept responsibility for the views ~xpressed herein which ate those of the author(s) and should not be attributed to the World Bank or to its affiliated organizations. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the results of research supported by the Bank; they do not necessarily represent official policy of the Bahk.
    [Show full text]
  • 3 Income Inequality
    3 Income inequality Rising inequality need not be an inevitable outcome of growth. Despite continued growth in the 2000s, some countries were able to reverse the direction of change in inequality and started to witness falling income inequality. Income inequality 3.1. Introduction This chapter reviews the trends and drivers of income inequality at a national level, i.e., income inequality between people and households within countries. Many studies have shown that inequality between nations has increased (WCDSG, 2004). But this process has been accompanied by a growing inequality within most countries (Cornia, 2004) and policy-making is mainly national. As noted by the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (WCSDG), “globalization starts at home” and national policies can make a great difference in driving inequality down. Paying attention to inequality at the national level therefore remains important. 1 3.2. Trends in household income inequality 3.2a. Global trends Data on household income inequality shows a rising trend from the early 1990s to the late 2000s 2 in most countries. In a sample of 116 countries, household income inequality as measured by the population- weighted average level of the Gini index increased by 9 percent for the group of high-income countries 3 and by 11 percent for low- and middle-income countries (Figure 3.1). Of course, a global overview masks variations over time and between countries. Various countries and regions have not seen a linear trend, but have witnessed periods of increasing and decreasing inequality during this period. Similarly, in the same regional and income grouping, countries have very different trajectories, resulting in some cases in a net increase in income inequality over the mentioned period and in other cases in a net decrease.
    [Show full text]