...... ------

306 NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, SECURITY, AND NONPROLIFERATION DDD Summary DDD .. 1 have built up a nuclear weapons program and then com- DDD South Afnca IS the o.n y ~ountry to. mation about South Africa's acquisition of weap­ 17 pletely and voluntanly dlsmantle~ It. Infor bl . studying the possibility of a nonnuclear 1 d know-how IS very va l ua e m ons, tec h no ogy, an . 1"£ Although the technology of basic nuclear weapons Argentina and Brazil weapons state b~commg ~ p~o 1 erat~. h 1 1 we learn that it is still within the reach of a and uranium ennchment IS 0 a. very Ig eve'd· therefore not an unachievable barrier. reasonably advanced industrialized country ~n IS, ·1' k the latest technology Th· . more realistic when the country IS not necessan Y see mg IS IS even bT . James E. Doyle but simply to acquire nuc~ear we.apo~s c~a e1 ::l:~·to attempt for all parties involved. South The disarmament 0 a natlOn IS a ug A n~tion with hundreds of nuclear Africa had less than sev~n com~.1~~d ;eii~:St~~r~fss~o true way to verify whether or not weapons would be muc more 1 lCU. . d't completion This reverts to problems of the h d ·1 f th d·smantlement were carne 0 • . h d t e eta 1 s 0 e 1 .11 1 k if the participating countnes are onest an NPT and.the IAEA; t~e proces.ses ~he~~ Ts :~~ance that South Africa may still have nuclear Introduction do not wIthhold any mformatlO~.. . f oliferatin again. There is no concrete proof of capabilities or at leas~ the pos~btl~ty ~ ~~itionall ,gthe shredding of documents cannot .be From the late 1960s through the 1980s Argentina and Brazil made efforts to create nuclear the complete ~estru~tlon of tec no ogy, Jb th f ~t that a majority of the process remams power infrastructures that could provide the materials for nuclear weapons. There is little evi­ verif~e~. Th~s Issue IS furt~er exagge:~i~e th~t k~o~ledge cannot be erased from one's mind, dence, however, that either of these two countries ever made the decision to go forward with the ~lasslhed. Fmally, there eXIsts the ~e It~s also difficult to accurately monitor workers o~c.e construction of a nuclear weapon. This is clearly true in the case of Argentina. In Brazil it seems mdependent of deleg~ted ne~ tas. s. h ram There must be laws that clearly prohIbIt that efforts were made to investigate nuclear weaponization but that these efforts were termi­ they have been ~~b.nefed an eXIt t ~ b:o~ean~ to enforce these laws. Following the key nated before a decision to complete a nuclear explosive device was taken.1 In addition, neither proliferation act~vltles, and there mus i an obli ation of the state. Nevertheless, the case Argentina nor Brazil appears to have assessed seriously the role of nuclear arms in their respec­ people involved m the weapons ?rogra~ s gh rocess of nuclear disarmament, and tive national security strategies. of Sout~ Africa is very helpful m learnml~ ;:ro~:h~r ec~untries to follow, it is hoped that this Argentina and Brazil generated suspicions regarding their nuclear intentions by con­ because It has al:eady served as an ex1amp d 1for countries such as North Korea and Iran. structing facilities that could produce bomb-grade nuclear materials and refusing to accept history will contmue to serve as a ro e mo e international safeguards on all their nuclear activities. Until the early to mid-1990s, both states also refused to bring fully into force the terms of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which establishes a nuclear weapons-free zone in Latin America, or to join the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In addition, throughout the 1970s and 1980s there was little public accountability of the nuclear programs in Argentina and Brazil. This is especially true in the case of the secret nuclear activities of the Brazilian military. Finally, political and military lead­ ers in both countries often declared their right to explore a nuclear weapons option and to be free to develop the capability for so-called peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs).2

IThere is no evidence of weaponization in Argentina. In 1967 Brazil's National Council for Nuclear Energy (CNEN) commissioned a study of the feasibility of building an atomic bomb. See H. Jon Rosenbaum, "Brazil's Nuclear Aspirations," in Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries, Onkar Marwah and Ann Schulz, eds. (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1975). In 1978 Brazil launched a secret nuclear development program that proceeded in parallel to its acknowledged civil nuclear program. For some members of the Brazilian military who participated in this program, objective was to develop the capability to construct a nuclear explosive device. See Michael "The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil," CISAC, Stanford University, 1987; http://iis- 0340/barletta.pdf (Jan. 2007). In addition, former Brazilian Minister of and Technology Jose Goldemberg has stated that he believes a nuclear explosive would been designed by the Brazilian Air Force at the Aerospace Technology Center near Sao Paulo. David Albright, "Brazil Comes in From the Cold," Arms Control Today, Dec. 1990, p. 13. Brazil such statements started with General Artur da Costa e Silva, head of the military ~'UU".JUl in 1966. See Michael J. Siler, Explaining Variation in Nuclear Outcomes Among States: Bargaining Analysis of u.s. Nonproliferation Policies Toward Brazil, Egypt, and South Korea (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, May 1992), p. 163.

307 4

308 NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, SECURITY, AND NONPROLIFERATION 17 Argentina and Brazil 309 The efforts by Argentina and Brazil to maintain a nuclear option were motivated only nuclea~ energy ~as seen as way to reduce reliance on foreign energy supplies.3 These two in part by security concerns. Motivation stemmed primarily from. th~ perceived d~mestic countnes also wItnessed the power of nuclear weapons in World War II. Both countries political benefits of maintaining independent nuc~ear po~tures, ~ behef m ~he econo~l1c ben­ began nuclear e?ergy programs in the 1950s and by the end of the 1960s had efits of advanced nuclear technology, and the desIre for mternatlOnal prestIge. The VIew that resea~ch to acqUlre n.uclear that could produce weapons-usable fissile mate­ nuclear energy development was an important determinant of overall economic and tech­ ~lan~ed mfr~str~ctu~es nals. One o.f the pnI?ary motIVatlOns m both countries for the development of a nuclear nological advancement and the corresponding belief that international controls on nuclear weapons optlOn was SImply to hedge against the possibility that many states would acquire activities would constrain such advancement were particularly strong in both states. The ~hem and the. consequen~e that states that did not would be relegated to second-class status political leadership in both nations rejected the N~T as .dis~riminatory and ~pposed eff~rts m. 5 Argentma Brazil had aspirations to join the ranks of the highly indus­ by the advanced nations to impose nuclear suppher gUldehnes that constramed Argentma ~orld aff~lrs. a~d tnahzed na~lOns, and they beheved that an unconstrained nuclear energy sector and nuclear and Brazil's ability to acquire modern nuclear technology. weapons mIght be needed to achieve this goal. 6 Moreover, Argentina and Brazil derived political benefits from supporting one anoth­ In the tw,o were suspicious of one another. Traditionally, Argentina er's decisions to remain outside the global nonproliferation regime. These benefits included a ~ddition, cou~tries and B.raztl have been reglOnal r.Ivals for political and economic leadership in Latin tacit mutual approval of their self-proclaimed right to develop nuclear explosive technology co~peting Amenca. the penod dunng which initial decisions on nuclear matters were and the creation of an informal agreement to defy the nonproliferation regime. This agree­ Thro.u~~out made,. POSSIbIhty.of armed c.onflict between the two states remained the focus of military ment to maintain common policies toward the NPT guaranteed that neither state could be th~ plannmg m both. ThIS mutual dIstrust and competition were present in the early nuclear pro­ singled out by the international community for refusing to join ~e treaty. Ironically, t?is grams of both stat~s. For example,. there wa~ speculation in Brazil and elsewhere in the early strategy for mutual opposition to the NPT evolved into a me~hamsm. for more su~stan~lve that was conductmg expenments aimed at producing a nuclear explosion. bilateral nuclear cooperation and eventual integration into the mternatlOnal nonprohferation 19~Os Argentm~ 7 !hIS may have to Brazil's decision in 1953 to send Admiral Alvaro Alberto, pres­ regime. cont~lbute~ Ident of the countrr: s Natl~nal Research Council, to West Germany to obtain gas centrifuge Over time Argentina and Brazil came to see the disadvantages of a policy designed technology for uramum ennchment.8 to preserve a nuclear weapons option and the benefits of forswearing th~t option and joi~­ Although early to achieve advances in nuclear technology unsuc­ ing the international nonproliferation regime. Argentina signed the NPT I? 1995 and Braz.11 th~se at~empts were~ cessful, they est~bhshed a }astmg pattern whereby Brazil sought to match or better Argentine joined in 1997. Both countries have brought the Treaty of Tlatelolco ~lly lI~to force on theIr accomp!lshments. Moreover, the two states have always been attuned to the military territories renounced their right to conduct PNEs, and are strengthemng theIr nuclear export nuclea~ potentIal of theIr nuclear developments ..For example, Argentina's 1968 decision to purchase controls. Moreover, they have created a joint system of inspections of all their nuclear facil­ a West water reactor usmg natural uranium fuel for its first nuclear power ities that includes accepting full-scope IAEA safeguards. Finally, both states have canceled ~erman ~~avy plant raIsed BrazIhan conce~ns that this reactor type was chosen for its ability to produce plans to build reprocessing plants and have scaled back uranium enrichment capabilities. In more weapons-u~able plutomum outside of international safeguards than could a light water short, they have accepted political barriers to acquiring nuclear weapons. . . reactor usmg ennched uranium. 10 The role played by external actors in this case of nuclear rollback was hmited. Although the chance of military conflict between Argentina and Brazil has tradition­ Nonetheless, several important elements of u.s. and multilateral nonproliferation policy a!ly been !ow, there have als? been territ~rial disp~~es and periods of increased regional ten­ helped shift the balance of proliferation inc~ntives an~ disincentiv~s .and thu.s ~ade a con" SlOn. Durmg the 1:70s economIC and mtlitary assistance to Bolivia, Paraguay, and tribution to nuclear rollback in South Amenca. These mclude provIdmg contmumg support . Bra~tlian Uruguay resulted m Argentme perceptions of an increased capability by Brasilia to project and leadership for the international nonproliferation regime, efforts to harmonize the exp01;t control policies of nuclear suppliers, promotion of liberal economic reforms, and the· nance of a nonproliferation dialogue with Argentina and Brazil. In addition, the United played a more active role after the two countries reached ~ 1985 .a?re~ment on .. 3This was particularly the case for Argentina and Brazil after the 1973 oil embargo. See nuclear cooperation. Specifically, the United States took a leadmg posltion !n the prOVlSlon Wol~ Gra~endorff, "Brazil," and Antonio Sanchez-Gijon, "Argentina," in A European Non­ technical and financial support for nuclear safeguards development. In thIS respect, the Pr~~erattOn P~licy, Haral~ Muller, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 323-400. of Argentina and Brazil contains some lessons for ongoing or future efforts to facilitate o~ Argentma, see Damel Poneman, "Nuclear Proliferation Prospects for Argentina," Orbis rollback of nuclear proliferation in other countries. 27 (Wmter 1?84!.: pp. ~53-880. For Brazil, see David J. Myers, "Brazil: Reluctant Pursuit of the Nuclear OptlOn, Orbzs 27 (Winter 1984): pp. 881-911. 5Ibid. Motivations for Acquiring the Capability to 6John R. Re~ick, Julio C. Carasales, and Paulo S. Wrobel, "Nuclear Rapprochement: Brazil, and the Nonproliferation Regime," The Washington Quarterly 8 (Winter Build Nuclear Weapon 5): p. 110. Beginning in the 1950s, Argentina and Brazil, like many other states, viewed nuclear 7These ~ears proved unfounded because Ronald Richter, the scientist leading the experiments as having great potential for economic and scientific development. The Argentma, was revealed as a fraud. None of Richter's experiments ever resulted in a nuclear See Daniel Poneman, Nuclear Power in the Developing World (London: Allen and 1982), pp. 68-70, and John R. Redick, "Nuclear Illusions· Argentina and Brazil" For additional statements, see "Navy Minister Says Country Could Build a Nuclear Bomb,'" ·.-~'VU"l Paper 25, The Henry L. Stimson Center (Dec. 1995): ~. 2. ' LAT, June 29,1981, p. D2; and "Army Minister said to Favor Building Atomic Bomb," "Brazil's Reluctant Pursuit," p. 883. Sept. 4, 1985, p. D2. For similar statements by Argentine leaders, see Joseph Pilat and Donnelly, An Analysis of Argentina's Nuclear Power Program and Its Closeness to N1"r.II!arn' "~razil's Reluctant Pursuit," p. 889, and Norman Gall, "Atoms for Brazil, Dangers Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service [Dec. 2, 1982]), pp. 19-36. Forezgn Policy, no. 23 (Summer 1976): pp. 183-184. ------~------...... 310 NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, SECURITY, AND NONPROLIFERATION

17 Argentina and Brazil 311 11 d buffer states. In turn, military plan~in~ in power and influence th:oughout these. so~~ :ntine desires to regain the "Iost.ter~itones of g to promote close cooperation in the nuclear field, and to coordinate activities to surmount Brasilia has focused at tl~es ~n thwartm f th~ Rio de la Plata.ll These territones m~lude the the former Spanish colomal vIceroyalty 0 d. I de parts of Bolivia and BrazIl. These increasing obstacles to obtaining nuclear equipment and materials. 16 The continued applica­ tion of nuclear energy for military purposes by either state was clearly inconsistent with the present-day states of Paraguay and .ur~g~;~2a:tt~:p~ to reoccupy the Malvinas/F.alkland.s intent of these agreements. concerns were in~reased by Argent:~~ sfor 150 years. This action created doubts m BrazIl In addition, both nations' nuclear programs faced varying degrees of domestic opposi­ Islands, territory It had not. contro . nal stability.12 .. I regarding Argentina's commltme~t ~ regI? and Brazil to develop the capabIlIty to manu- tion. ? The cost, impact on the environment, and political implications of the respective nuclear A final motivation for bot rgentma I pon option was economic. Nuclear programs were criticized in certain public and official circles. For example, the foreign minis­ . I d h serve a nuc ear wea . d facture fissile matena an t us pre . experience with engineermg an construc! tries in both states were sensitive to the diplomatic costs of their nations' independent nuclear energy development was seen as a w.ay to gaI~ctors of the economy. Acquisition of the ful policies and were concerned that Argentine-Brazilian nuclear ambitions might inadvertently tion technology that would be usefulI.n ot~~n~e on foreign suppliers, add value to natu.ral spark proliferation in other neighboring states. Financial officials and private corporate inter­ ests also recognized the independent nuclear policies as an impediment to foreign investment nuclear fuel cycle was needed to av01~ rJ. I ous nuclear industry capable of exports. LIke 18 and processed uranium, and crea~e an m Igen some of their uranium enrichment and sper: - and trade. Members of the scientific elites as well believed that the two countries' rejection of t the international nonproliferation regime was foreclosing access to advanced Western technol­ South Africa, Argent~n~ .and Br~~Il:r~r~!~h:~ international inspection to protect industnal fuel reprocessing actIvItIes wou e ogy and undercutting the objectives of economic development and modernization. 19 Finally, secrets.13 environmentalists and local officials were often opposed to nuclear activities, especially those that had military potential. The election of civilian governments in both countries in the 1980s made it easier for these groups to voice their opposition concerning the nuclear programs. Reservations and Constraints ... , onstraints and disincentIves to acqumng Argentina and Brazil also faced ,reser~atI~nsfo~ either co~ntry to develop nuclear weapor:s Pursuit of a Nuclear Weapons Option nuclear weapons. First, the strategIC ~a~on~1 e ere wary of one another, but like most LatI~ was never compelling. Argentin~ an raZI w rimarily internal. Throughout the 20t In 1990 and 1991, when Argentina and Brazil made firm political and legal commitments American countries, their secunty concer~,~ 7er~ Pfact the benefits of good bilateral rela­ providing reassurance to the international community that they would not deVelop nuclear weapons, they both possessed advanced nuclear infrastructures with military potential. This century, war between ~he twohw:sen~:~~ ;ft::·be~n acknowl~dged by ~overnments in both section provides some history on the nuclear programs of both nations. tions, trade, and techmcal exc a g , hreat from outsIde the regIOn. , capitals Nor did either country face a senlous t b th that neither country would allow Itself Argentina Second,. gIven, t h"elr nva Iry, it was c ear to 0 ons if one began 'Bm earnest. raZI T s, supe- to be left behind in a race to ~evel?p nu~~e~~:~:f greater resources than could Argentma t? In Argentina, the National Commission for Atomic Energy (CNEA) was organized in 1950 rior wealth meant that, over tIme, It co~ il could foresee the dangers in an arms con;Fet~­ to conduct the nation's nuclear program. The country's first research reactor, RA-I, was built az tiona nuclear that couldweapon result program. in its weaHowkeve~, er nva tacqUI'ring a weapon that has been called the UltI­ in 1953 under the Atoms for Peace Program and used heavy water imported from the United States. By the 1960s, Argentina could build its Own research reactors and had mastered nuclear mate equa IIzer., ,,14 h d t red the technology to pro d uce weapons-usable, fuel element processing. In the 1970s Argentina constructed two reactors northwest of Buenos Even before either country a ~~~ e t for peaceful nuclear cooperatIOn. In h d h d an mltla l agree men 'd e Aires: a West German-built natural-uranium heavy water power reactor at Atucha (Atucha I) nuclear material, they a reac e _ , 'do visited Buenos Aires and signe an agre .~ and a Canadian heavy water power reactor at Embalse. The existence of plentiful supplies May 1980 Brazil's military leader, Joao Flguelr~ " that included joint research and h 'I nuclear commISSIOns ( of natural uranium in Argentina made heavy water reactors a logical choice because this ment between t e two natIOna h of nuclear materials, uranium pro spec mg, design would lessen Argentina's reliance on foreign suppliers for enriched uranium. Plutonium opment on nuclear power reactor~5 ~~cN~~~~ber 1985, the two states signed the .•... could be also separated from the spent fuel used in these reactors. The Argentine program the manufacture of fuel elements. I P I' (the Declaration of Iguazu) that reempna~ , D I tion on Nuc ear 0 ICY 'I f I sizedBrazilian their Jomt mutual ec commItment ara , to deve Iop n uclear energy for exclusIve y peace u

16See Julio Cesar Carasales, "A Unique Component of the New Argentine-Brazilian Relationship: Nuclear Cooperation," in Averting a Latin American Nuclear Arms Race, Paul L. , I' s in the Twentieth Century," in Brazil in Leventhal and Sharon Tanzer, eds. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), and John R. Redick, llFrank D. McCann, "Brazilian Wayne A. Selcher, ed. (Boulder, CO: H',>onm", International System: The RIse of AFore~~~e~eo:~~n MI , "Argentina and Brazil: An Evolving Nuclear Relationship," Occasional Paper Seven Press, 1981), p. 6. '" 81 (Southampton, U.K.: Program for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 1990). 12M "Brazil's Reluctant PurSUIt, p. 8 . 17Por information on domestic opposition in Brazil, see Michael]. Siler, "Explaining Variation yers, ., 195-269. , , , in Nuclear Outcomes Among Southern States: Bargaining Analysis of U.S. Nonproliferation 13Spector Nuclear Proltferatlon Today, pp. 'C . Their Nuclear Capabtlltles, 14Mitchell' Reiss, Brtdle, db"Am Itlon. . Why CountrIes onstram52'. Toward Brazil, Egypt, India, and South Korea" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern May 1992), p. 140. d W'lson Center Press, 1995, p. . '{ . Washington, D.C.: Woo row ~ S ice (FBIS) Nuclear Development and Proll,eratton 18Paulo Wrobel, "Brazil-Argentina Nuclear Relations: An Interpretation," unpublished draft 15Foreign Broadcast InformatIOn erv , , h J eline R Smith Nuclear IlJ,w •• ___ for the Rockefeller Foundation, Oct, 1993, pp. 26-27. 4-16 Also see Leonard S. Spector WIt acqu .. , 388-389, i--,·~".u 25,The 1980),Spread pp.. of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-1990 (Boulder, CO: WestVIew, 1990), pp. 19See "Physicist Warns Against Objectives of FRG Nuclear Deal," PBIS Latin America (May 1979), p. D1, and Redick, "Nuclear Illusions," pp. 42-45. 17 Argentina and Brazil 313 NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, SECURITY, AND NONPROLIFERATION 312 Brazil also included uranium production and nuclear fuel manufacturing facilities. In March 1976, In 1955, after unsuccessful early efforts to obt . . . CNEA announced plans for a third nuclear power plant, Atucha II, and a commercial heavy West Germany, Brazil signed an a am uramum ennchment technology from water plant that would eliminate the need for overseas suppliers for the Atucha I and Embalse under the Atoms for Peace Progra!.e~:~~~~o~r:~ft::a~ c~operation ~ith the United States plants. The Atucha II reactor contract was awarded to West Germany and the heavy water (CNEN) was created. Brazil also si ned a n I a~IOnal AtomIC Energy Commission plant contract to the Swiss firm Sulzer Brothers.20 and established a relationship witt th W,uc e~ cooperatIOn agreement with France in 1967 By the early 1990s several facilities in Argentina had the potential to be used to pro- Unlike Argentina, Brazil maintained t:o :~:llefrmaf Nuclear Research .Center in 1969.27 duce material for nuclear weapons. Argentina had constructed a gaseous diffusion enrich­ acknowledged nuclear energy prog p nduc ear programs. The hrst was a publicly ment facility in the Andean resort village of Bariloche-called the Pilcaniyeu facility-and C. ram manage by the stat d B 'I' orporatIOn (Nuclebras) and subject to IAEA f d e-owne raZllan Nuclear a demonstration plutonium reprocessing unit at Ezeiza, near Buenos Aires. In addition, guarded program run by the Brazilia T sa eguar .s. The second was a secret, unsafe- Argentina had an experimental pilot-scale heavy water facility situated near the Atucha I usable fissile materials and enrich ur n. ml ~tary to ~cqUlre the means to produce weapons­ and II nuclear power stations in Buenos Aires province. Finally, there were unsubstantiated however, that although Argentin ~~um o~ nava propulsion reactors. It should be noted claims regarding a possible Argentine nuclear test site in Patagonia.21 gram in the 1960s and 1970s wa: al~o ~:~ b av~ tW<:>r separate programs, its nuclear pro~ The Ezeiza reprocessing facility, begun in 1978, was planned to be in operation by safeguards. y t e ml ltary and not subject to international the early 1980s, providing Argentina direct access to weapons-usable plutonium. But eco­ One of th~ original components of Brazil's civili nomic and technical problems combined to delay the project and construction has been sus­ key power statIOn (Angra I), purchased from h Ua; nf~clear en~rgy progr,am was a turn- pended since 1990. The Ezeiza plant was subject to international safeguards only when it turned to West Germany ho f ,t e .. lrm Westmghouse m 1971. Brazil ' d ' wever, or a maSSIve purchase f I h I reprocessed safeguarded spent fuel (which was the only type of spent fuel Argentina had at U mte States and Canada insisted 0 B "l' 0 nuc ear tee no ogy after the the time because all of its nuclear reactors were safeguarded). If it had been completed as tion for further nuclear supply.28 Br:zil~a;~:e a~~;~t~,nce of full-scope safeguards as a condi­ planned, the reprocessing facility was expected to extract enough plutonium for one or two Germany was a multibillion-dollar agreeme t f h fuclear deal of the century" with West nuclear weapons per year.22 nolo~w to a developing country. It encom a~edo:llt e argest transfer to date of nuclear tech­ Construction of the Pilcaniyeu enrichment plant was also begun in 1978. The proj- uranmm exploration, fuel fabrication t p 1 250 aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including ect was kept secret for five years by Argentina's military government and was revealed only scale uranium enrichment plant '1' wo, . megawatt power reactors, an industrial­ weeks before civilian president Raul Alfonsin's inauguration in 1983. On November 10, deal, which was to be impleme~t~Jl ot reprt;essmg pl~nt, and nuclear waste storage. The 1983, Castro Madero, head of CNEA, announced; "Argentina has successfully demonstrated additional power reactors. over a -year penod, also included an option for six the technology for the enrichment of uranium.,,23 Theoretically, the plant had the potential to enrich enough weapons-grade uranium for four to six nuclear bombs per year.24 However, The German deal raised suspicions concern' B"l' ,. that West Germany was chosen as I ml? raZl s nuclear mtentIOns. It appears Argentine scientists claimed that Pilcaniyeu was designed to enrich uranium to only 20% a nuc ear supp ler beca 'd'd ' accept IA EA safeguards at all its nuclea f T' I dd use It 1 not reqUlre Brazil to U235 , which is not considered to be weapons-usable. The plant reportedly began enriching transfer to Brazil of enrichment a d r ac~ ltles. n a ition, the agreement included the f d '1' n reprocessmg technology Th' t h I I uranium to 20% U235 in 1988.25 erre to ml ltary-run facilities to prod bl ,'. IS ec no ogy cou d be trans- Although Argentina in the early 1990s had come close to completing a nuclear infra- , Brazil's unsafeguarded, military_~f:e~:~P~:;I~~sra e fISSIle materi~l. structure that could begin producing weapons-usable fissile material, it never achieved an receIved the support of CNEN Th' ,program began m the mid-1970s and actual capability to do so. The Pilcaniyeu uranium enrichment ran into technical and finan­ well as personnel and developed technology as 26 technol~gy l:r;~~famd r~hed o~ infdig~nouslY cial difficulties and never produced weapons-usable HEU. It now operates under interna- By 1988 it included a laboratory sea) erre ~ofm t e orelgn-supported civilian program r R h - e gas centn uge uranium enr' hi' tional safeguards. un. esearc Institute on Nuclear Engineerin (IPEN) _ Ie ment p ant at the navy- In August 2006, Buenos Aires announced a major nuclear initiative worth $3.5 billion an mdustrial-scale enrichment plant I g d near Sao Paulo. The first modules of to finish its third nuclear reactor plant (Atucha II), restart a heavy water production plant Facility in Ipero, A laboratory-scale ::er:o a so, un er, ~onstruction at the Aramar Research in Neuquen Province, and conduct feasibility studies for construction of a fourth reactor well and plans were under wa f p ~essmg fa~llity had been constructed at IPEN as at Embalse. It also plans to resume nuclear enrichment activities at the Pilcaniyeu complex facility near Rio de Janeiro F~rthor a grap~lteI9plutomum-production reactor at an army-run d h f . ermore m 84-1985 the B T 'I' using a gaseous diffusion-based enrichment technology. eep s a ts for a possible nuclear te t" , razl Ian ml ltary had prepared s mg program m northern Brazil.

2oLeonard Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, p. 210. 27Edward Wonder, "Nuclear Comm d 21John R. Redick, "Argentina, Brazil, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime," address 975," Orbis (Summer 1977)' 287 erce an Nuclear Proliferation: Germany and Brazil 281 . p. . ' the Council on Foreign Relations, Feb. 14, 1994, p. 3. t also seems that Brazil may have turned to German b supplying fuel for Angra I and anoth I d Y ecause of doubts over U.S. ability to 22Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, pp. 197,204-5,218. " er p anne reactor In July 1974 h USA ' C 23Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 47. , ommlSSlOn (AEC) retroactivel classified as " "',, "t e .. tomlC foreIgn reactors including two l'n BY 'I Th' dcondltlOnal the ennchment contacts for 24Spector with Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, pp. 228, 388, 391. d ' raZl . IS was one b h AE ' 25David Albright, "Bomb Potential for South America," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , emand was exceeding its enrichment'S ecause t e C projected at the time Relations International 0 ' ,capaCldty· ee U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on 1989}: p. 16. , rgalllzatlOn an Secur't A ' 26Leonard S. Spector and Mark G. McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide' Acting Assistant Secretary Bureau f 0 1 Y greements, testlmony by Myron B. on July 22 1975' and Gall' "At Of cBean~ and International Affairs, State Department Maps and Charts, 1995 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Pace, 1 " ,oms or raZlI," pp. 163-166. ' p.147. ------17 Argentina and Brazil 315 NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, SECURITY, AND NONPROLIFERATION 314 Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation . . . d h e ever roduced any significant quantities Like Argentina, BrazIl IS not beheve. to. av . P fforts to do so 29 The military's A key feature of the decisions to foreswear nuclear arms in Argentina and Brazil is the high . I despIte ItS extensIve e '. I f weapons-usable nuc1 ear matena , N' h have gone beyond expenmenta degree of bilateral cooperation between the nuclear policies of the two states. This coop­ O . f Tt at IPE mIg t never ... laboratory-scale. repro~essmg aCl ~ Y. IPEN and the Aramar Research FaClhtles never eration was possible because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other operation and ItS ennchment faClhtles ;t d HEU 30 Both facilities are now under were never overriding. This fact weakened national security arguments for the develop­ overcame'the technical obstacles neede to pro, ucle. .' September 1987 that the IPEN ment of nuclear weapons. Instead, both countries saw an opportunity to improve their secu­ d P .d t Jose Sarney s c aim m h international safeguar s. res 1 en 1 nrichment of uranium appears to ave rity and economic prospects through a reduction in the tensions produced by the nuclear facility had conducted the successfullabo~atory-s~ahe ~ t 3-4% U-235, material that is con­ competition.35 referred only to minute amounts of urajilUm ennc e 0 Ironically, bilateral nuclear cooperation also evolved from mutual opposition to the sidered unsuitable for.nuc~ear weap?n~ which is shipped to foreign countries for .conver- nuclear nonproliferation regime. During the completion of negotiations for a Latin American Currently, BrazIl mmes uramu , '1 where it is fabricated at the civilian ennch~ent nuclear free zone (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) in 1966 and 1967, Argentina and Brazil jointly sion and enrichment, and retur~ed to Braz~ , wer reactors. When completed, a uramum opposed any prohibitions on peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) and differed with other plant at Resende into fuel for ItS. two nuc :~d~:ill allow the country to make its own low­ regional states on issues such as the transportation of nuclear weapons through the zone, the enrichment plant under constructlon at Res , d t The plant initially will produce 60 Yo of entry-into-force process, and treaty reservations.36 Ultimately the two states refused to bring enriched uranium fuel for its ~1Uclear power, m us rY'1 ar power reactors. Brazil has indicated the Treaty of Tlatelolco fully into force on their territories until 1990. d b B z11's two operatlOna l nuc e the nuclear fue I use y ra ff' t f el for its reactors and for export. As time progressed and nuclear cooperation deepened, it appears that Argentina and that eventually it hopes to produc~ su lCle~ hUt facility was formally opened on 1:1ay 6, Brazil became more concerned with avoiding the constraints of the international nonprolif­ Brazil's new Resende centnfuge ennc men . 1 t'I2010 Negotiations wIth the eration regime than with one another's nuclear energy development programs.3? This view . f t be fully operatlOna un 1 • 2006 but the plant IS not orecast 0 II 'f t ry safeguards for Resende that pro- is supported by Argentina's support in the mid-1970s of Brazilian efforts to import repro­ , t mutua y satls ac 0 , . 'II IAEA took over two years to enac, , . h t hnology 32 Brazil claIms It WI save cessing and enrichment technology from Germany. This support was reciprocated by Brazil , . t m ItS ennc ment ec· h tect Brazilian pr~pn~tary m:eres s . I rather than sending it overseas to Urenc~, ,t e in the late 1970s, when Washington objected to Argentina'S efforts to buy a third power money by enrichmg ItS uramum domestlcall ~, ' hment facility is 25% more efhClent reactor and heavy water production facilities without accepting full-scope safeguards.38 This . 'It also c alms ItS ennc , B 'I European ennchment consortlU.m. In addition to domestic energy productlOn, raZl mutual support in opposing supplier restrictions extended the pattern of political coopera­ than those in France or th~ ,umte? StatesS_billion_a_ ear global nuclear fuel market.33 Abo~t tion between Argentina and Brazil for maintaining independent nuclear policies. hopes in the future to partiCIpate m the $ d Yforei n enrichment services to get theIr In the late 1960s and early 1970s the nuclear policies of Argentina and Brazil con­ 90% of the world's nuclear pow.er plants d~pen o~ de~ades could justify Brazil's invest­ verged against what they saw as an unjust nuclear order imposed by the nuclear weapons fuel. Demand for enriched uramum over t e next wo states.39 For example, the two states opposed the NPT as unequal and discriminatory, object­ 'I' 34 ment in the capa b1 lty. ing in particular to the prohibition on PNEs and the lack of binding security guarantees to non-nuclear weapons states. Both nations also rejected the efforts of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to restrict nuclear exports, a move they saw as threatening their independence and Domestic Determinants of the Rollback Decisions , . development objectives. In 1977 U.S.-Brazilian relations deteriorated over U.S. attempts to , . . 1 la a role in explaining the deCISIons by dissuade West Germany from selling Brazil reprocessing and enrichment technology. Many factors, both domestIC and mtlernatlOna , P MY ost officials from these countries wh() Shared hostility to the international nonproliferation regime provided incentives Argentina and BraZl'l to ren ounce nuc earI weapons. h h tudied the events agree t h at d ome- s for increased bilateral cooperation oJ,1 nuclear policy. In January 1977, the Argentine and , h d" and scho ars w 0 ave s . h' participated m t ese eClSlOn , d h I tion of their bilateral relatlOnS lp Brazilian foreign ministries issued a joint communique stressing the importance of nuclear 'h' the two countnes an t e evo u f tic factors WIt m t e The actions and policies 0 policy cooperation and the initiation of technological exchanges between the two countries' the most convincing reasons for the ~u c~m. more significant after the two nations respective nuclear energy commissions. The exchanges between CNEA and CNEN under munity also played a role, but one t ~t ecampe ons states. Some of the main domestic l-dICl~~,~" this agreement provided the original foundation for later development of the joint Argentine­ alread on a course to become nonnuc ear :vea , Brazilian Accounting and Control System (SCCC) and its administrative body, the Brazilian­ of thisYoutcome are discussed in the followmg sectlOns. Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). This joint

35Julio C. Caras ales, "The Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Rapprochement," The Nonproliferation 2 (Spring/Summer, 1995). h 1: ackin Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 153-157. . 36Redick, Nuclear Illusions, p. 17. 29Spector and McDonoug, r g db' fl A thor's conversation with LeWIS 30 Some "hot cells" at IPEN may have operate ne y. u 37An alternative view is that neither country had confidence that the nonproliferation regime halt the nuclear ambitions of its rival. If so, the objective of avoiding restrictions on one's March 1997, nuclear program would be more important than having ineffective curbs applied to one's 31Reiss Bridled Ambition, p, 56. bb k12/hi/"",pr.,r;1 sJ"'t;'o , S 6 2006' http·llnews. C.cO.u In this case it would be reasonable to oppose all supplier restrictions. 32Steve Kingstone, BBC News, ept, , , . 0 I' (IEEE) March 2006; see ." 'I S h Atom" Spectrum n me , . 38Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, "Argentina and Brazil," in Security with Nuclear Weapons? 33Erico GUlzZO, How BraZl ,pun t e f l' f 1 oduction at Nuclear Industnes of quotes by Samuel Fayad Filho, dIrector 0 nuc ear ue pr Perspectives on National Security, Regina Cowen-Karp, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University www.spectrum.ieee.org/mar06/3070. for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1991), pp. 229-256. 34IAEA INFCIRCI640, p. 49, para. 129; Nuclear Illusions, p. 19. .' ' df# h= 0/ 22IAEA %2C%20INFCIRC%2F640%22. mfClrc640.p searc /0 L.

316 NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, SECURITY, AND NONPROLIFERATION 17 Argentina and Brazil 317 communique was followed in May 1980 by an agreement between CNEA and CNEN on a of Iguazu. This declaration reemphasized the t " wide range of joint projects, which included research and development on experimental and nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful wo natIOns mu~ual commitment to develop power reactors, exchange of nuclear materials, uranium prospecting, and the manufacture Nuclear Policy to continue the bilateral JUfPoses. It also establIshed a Joint Committee on of fuel elements. 40 Under the agreement, Argentina leased uranium concentrate to Brazil and ~osed of the foreign ministers, officials ;;0:u~~~lu~!~a~~atters.45 T?is committee, com­ sold zircalloy tubing for nuclear fuel elements. Brazil, in turn, manufactured part of the pres­ ~Ives, became a mechanism for continuous co t I EN, ~nd mdustry representa­ sure vessel for Argentina's Atucha II nuclear power reactor.41 Issues. n act on nuc ear polIcy and nonproliferation The ABACC system of nuclear materials accounting and control that ultimately . In July 1986 Alfonsin and Sarne si n d . resulted from bilateral nuclear cooperation with Argentina is a unique, two-state regional natIOns to the phased elimination of t;ad g ~ ~ maJo~ trade agreement committing their nonproliferation regime employing a rigorous state system of accounting and control Common Market (MERCOSUR) Th' e arn~rs an the creation of a Southern Con £ . . IS agreement mcl d d I f e (SSAC) over its nuclear materials. The subsequent quadripartite agreement (signed by Brazil, sa ety m the event of an accident and a b u ~ pans or cooperation on nuclear Argentina, the IAEA, and ABACC) provides for full-scope IAEA safeguards of Argentine and resulted in agreements for joint :esearch St s~quent presidential meeting in December 1986 Brazilian nuclear installations, full rights over any proprietary technology developed by both guards techniques.46 or reeder reactors and the development of safe- countries, and nuclear energy for the propulsion of submarines. In December 1986, Brazil allowed A . scale facility at IPEN where th rglentme nuclear officials to visit the laborator ' e navy secret y cond t d h y- Political Rapprochement and Confidence Building men~ an d reprocessing outside of international safe uc e 4r7esearc on both uranium enrich- publIc announcement of the successf I . guards. In advance of a September 1987 This deepening of nuclear cooperation between the two countries was facilitated by a warm­ B '1" u operatIOn of the . . h ing political relationship and the resolution of key bilateral disputes. In October 1979 razi Ian ~resldent Sarney sent a letter to President Alfura~lUm ennc ~ent facility at IPEN, Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay signed the Rio de la Plata agreement that resolved a dispute the u~commg public announcement. This action . onsm of Ar!Sentma notifying him of over the use of water resources and the construction of a hydroelectric dam on the Parana had .glven Bra~il regarding its enrichment plant f~ci;~~at~~ the pn.or notice that Argentina River that flows from Brazil into Argentina.42 This agreement eased bilateral tensions that prevIO~s meetmgs led to an invitation from Pr' . ~se actIOns and the Presidents' had persisted throughout the 1970s over exploiting the fertile Rio de la Plata basin, which Argentma's unsafeguarded Pilcaniyeu enrich es~de~~ Alfonsm to President Sarney to visit lies astride the two states. The agreement marked the beginning of an improved phase of :~87, was an important confidence-buildin ment aCllIty. The visit, which took place in July Argentine-Brazilian relations. In May 1980, Brazil's military leader, Joao Figueiredo, became !Zmg the process. g measure and prompted discussions on regular- the first Brazilian president to visit Buenos Aires in 40 years. During this visit the nuclear " The proc~ss of reciprocal inspections and confd b" . agreement between CNEA and CNEN was finalized. VISit by Argentme officials to Brazil's IPEN fT' I enc~ Ulldmg contmued with a second Despite the improved political relationship, the two states encountered problems to Argentina's Ezeiza pilot reprocessing facil~Cl ~~ ;:; Apn~ 1988 and Brazilia~ officials' visit in implementing the May 1980 nuclear agreement. This was due in part to suspicions that ~asl boosted by domestic political developmen;s In ;vem e{9~~8~ Once agam, the process ar os Menem, met with Sarney I'n B '1' ugust ,rgentina's new President remained between the two regarding their regional intentions and their nuclear programs. . razl to agree dd" I ' Argentina's 1982 occupation of the Malvinas/Falklands Islands led Brazil to proceed cau­ cooperatl.on and to intensify bilateral political and on ~ lt1on~ m,easures of nuclear tiously in dealing with Argentina's military regime. Moreover, in December 1983, Argentina CongreSSIOnal pressure in Brazil President S h ~conom~c coordmatIOn. In response to informed Brazil that the Pilcaniyeu facility was capable of enriching uranium, a fact that tary nuclear programs under a r~or anized arney a combmed the official and secret mili­ 43 Presidency.48 In December. 1989 F g d CCNIEI N that reported directly to the office of the raised concern in Brazi1. did .' ernan 0 0 or de M 11 I . Another breakthrough that improved political relations and nuclear cooperation an rj: ace Sarney m March 1990. e 0 was e ected preSident in Brazil between Argentina and Brazil was the emergence of civilian governments in the mid-1980s. ~ere were now popular presidents in Ar' . In Argentina, military defeat in the MalvinaslFalkland Islands war with Great Britain led to economic reform, increased trade ahd £ . . gentma and BraZil who were committed to the October 30, 1983, election of President Raul Alfonsin. In 1984, an economic crisis in ence, and the exclusively peaceful use ~:elgn Imvestment, reduction of the military's influ­ Brazil forced the military government to step down and permit civilian elections. Brazil's new cooperation as a way to accelerate the bi~~~r:fr ef.e:gyj ThJ two pr~sidents saw nuclear president-elect Tancredo Neves met Alfonsin in February 1985. The two leaders promised to was already under way. On November 28 po It~ca an economIC coordination that revive nuclear cooperation and to work toward the goal of mutual inspections of each other's landmark Joint Declaration of Common N19/,0, ~re~ldents Collor and Menem signed the nuclear installations.44 pledge~ to use nuclear energy only for eace~~1 ear olIcy at Foz de Iguazu. Both countries Unfortunately, Brazilian president-elect Neves died before taking office in March, mspectlOns, forsake the right to cond Pt l~rposes, create a formal system of bilateral and his successor, Jose Sarney, did not support the proposed nuclear inspection arrange: the Treaty of Tlatelolco. They also ple~~el;~cJe~elnuclearhex~losions, and adhere jointly to ment. Sarney nevertheless met with Alfonsin in November 1985 and signed the Declaration, scope IAEA safeguards.49 op mec amsms for the acceptance of full-

40The text of the agreement can be found in FBIS Nuclear Development and Proliferation, 45Th' .IS .committee evolved into the Permanent St' . 25, 1980, pp. 4-16. Also see John R. Redick, "The Tlatelolco Regime and Nonproliferation in CommiSSIOn of ABACC Th' andmg CommIttee and later into the f . . e committee had three sub d' Latin America," International Organization 35 (Winter 1981): pp. 130-131. orelgn policy coordination and th I I d . groups to eal With technical cooperation 46 . ,e ega an techmc If' 41Spector with Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, pp. 388-389. Redick, Nuclear Illusions p 21 a aspects 0 nuclear cooperation. 42Redick, Nuclear Illusions, p. 20. 47Ri ,. . chard Kessler, "Sarney Visit to Pil ani eu W: . 43Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 54. 48 ]~Iy 23, 1987. q Y as Key to ReCIprocal Inspections," Nucleonics 44Richard Kessler, "Argentina, Brazil Agree to Mutual Inspection of Nuclear Facilities," 49 Red~ck, Nuclear IllUSions, p. 23. Nucleonics Week, March 14, 1985, p. 14. Redick, Nuclear IllUSions, p. 24. 17 Argentina and Brazil 319 NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, SECURITY, AND NONPROLIFERATION 318 Alves,infor whod TIdhad coordinated the para11 e1 ml'1' Itary nuclear program as head of CNEN d This declaration was implemented at a July 1991 foreign ministers meeting in me mlltary ea ers that he was going t d' 1 h '1.' ' an summer 1990 Collor brought m mb f h 0 Ism ant e t e mlltary nuclear program. In Guadalajara, Mexico. The Guadalajara Accord established the Joint System of Accounting witness its official closing FI'nallye I' ers °dtd e press hto the suspected test site at Cachimbo to and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC), the purpose of which was to verify that no . , n an a ress to t e U N G 1 A bl' nuclear materials were diverted for military purposes. To implement this control system, 1990, Collor renounced Brazil's right to conduct PNE '53 ·Th~nera. ssem y m September the accord created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear rationale for the parallel program and k' s: IS actIOn removed an official Materials (ABACC), which was modeled on the multipartite inspection system set up by the international nonproliferation regime.54 a ey Issue of disagreement between Brazil and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).50 ABACC began operations in July 1992 The move toward greater openness and bT d' was promoted by civilian 0 . I Ity regar mg nuclear programs that and initially monitored nuclear installations in Argentina and Brazil which were not under acc~)Unta IAEA safeguards. Although these bilateral safeguards arrangements went a long way toward cal acceptability of chang! :~~:~~~r IfI Arg~ntma and Brazil inc~eased :he domestic politi­ demonstrating that Argentina and Brazil were no longer seeking a nuclear weapons option, activitie.s at Cachimbo and related revel:ti~:sci~a~:8°;tu~~. In BrazIl, publIc awareness of the they were not yet sufficiently integrated with the IAEA safeguards system to convince major by prevIous military governments to im t . a f 1989 of secret bank accounts used nuclear suppliers such as the United States, Canada, and Germany to lift nuclear export a new constitutional provision that limi~~r al~qUlp~ent ~r .t~e secret nuclear program, led to jected them to approval by the Con res 55 Thnuc ear activities to peaceful purposes and sub­ controls.To satisfy these concerns and fulfill the pledge regarding full-scope safeguards made naval nuclear propulsion program ~l s. e c~st of the nuclear pr~grams, particularly the at Foz de Iguazu, Presidents Collor and Menem flew to Vienna in December 1991 to sign a enc~ declined markedly after the Mal~fn~:;;=l~~n~ attack. In.Argentma, t.he militar'y's influ­ tUnIty to reduce government spending on th 1 s war. PreSident Alfonsm used thiS oppor- Quadripartite Agreement among Brazil, Argentina, ABACC, and the IAEA. Under this agree­ Of co . h' e nuc ear program, to ease an economic crisis 56 ment the two countries affirmed that international safeguards would apply "on all nuclear material in all nuclear activities within their territories [... ] for the exclusive purpose of been made ~~~h:~~~~ :C~:i:~~e:: n~tl::r p~i~cies of Argentina and Brazil could not have verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive countries began to realize the opportunit ec:S1 Ita? F?rtu?~tely~ military figures in both devices." The Quadripartite Agreement was ratified by Argentina and Brazil and entered into grams. Resources devoted to such ro y tSl 0 mamtam~ng mdependent nuclear pro­ force on March 4, 1994. All nuclear activities in Argentina and Brazil would now be under as improving conventional militar/for~~:m~;ou ~ nft be.a~~llable for other priorities such difficulties in the mid-1980s led to d : ~ ardrIvfa of CIVIlIan governments and economic international safeguards. In addition, by the end of May 1994, both countries had ratified a ' . 1 re uctlOns m e ense budgets As '1' 51 o ff!CIa s questioned the logic of in t". 1 . a consequence, ml Itary revised Treaty of Tlatelolco in which the IAEA played a larger role. sense in a regional context. 57 ves mg m a nuc ear capability that made little strategic Another key domestic p!"t. 1 d 1 Domestic Politics both countries was the rising i~A~~~ce e~et~p~ent. that. c?nt~ib~ted to nuclear rollback in Nuclear rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil was facilitated by domestic political nuclear matters.58 The Declaration at FO de Iorelgn minIstrIes m government decisions on changes within each country. Newly elected civilian governments needed to assert control nuclear cooperation. This workin oz he d guazu created a bilateral working group for over their respective military institutions. One method for doing this was to establish greater operation, foreign policy coordinati~n g~~~~he ~eg:r:~~ t:u~g~O~PS to de~l w\th technical co­ control over their nuclear activities. If the new governments were to convince their own pop­ Staff for these working groups was ~stabr h d' h AC nIC~ aspects 0 n.~c ear cooperation. ulations and the world that they indeed had a firm grip on political power, they needed to be tries. This action accelerated and institutio~:l~ednbi~a e ~gent~ne and Braz~lIan foreign minis­ seen as having total control over national programs as crucial as nuclear research and devel­ nuclear expertise to this area of the b lItera nuc ear cooperation and transferred . ureaucracy. t a so placed the so f' 1 opment. One way to gain better control over nuclear activities was to publicize them. Once matters m the bureaucratic sector of the h urce 0 action on nuc ear exposed, nuclear programs would have to justify economic and political costs, just like other economic costs of remaining outside the t at of the political and i~~e:er~~entlna IOna non prowal~fmos~ I eratlon awar~ regime. government activities, and compete with other government priorities for resources. On taking office in 1983 in Argentina, President Alfonsin sought to distinguish his government from previous military regimes. He opposed the pursuit of nuclear weapons and Economics committed his government to ending the nation's diplomatic and economic isolation. One of Economic considerations pIa d 1 'f and Brazil to forswear nucle~: a:m:r=~d I. ~ot ~en.tral, ro~e in the decisions of Argentina the reasons that Alfonsin suggested to Brazilian President Sarney in 1985 that they create a Jom t e mternatlOnal nonproliferation regime.59 bilateral nuclear inspection system was to symbolize that he was in full control of Argentina'~ nuclear program and, by extension, of the military and the country.52 . A similar pattern developed in Brazil, albeit more slowly. Beginning in 1986, after th~ Brazilian press exposed military preparations of a deep shaft for possible nuclear explosiv~( tests at Cachimbo in western Brazil, steps were taken within the Sarney government to gairi. pp~:~~~~ Albright, "Brazil Comes in From the Cold," Arms Control Today, Dec. 1990, greater control of the clandestine nuclear program and guarantee that it was devoted to}· 54R . . peaceful purposes. After his December 17, 1989, election, President Fernando Collor moved>; 55 elSS, Bridled Ambition,. p 59 . aggressively to establish civilian control over all nuclear activities. Collor replaced "Bra~~,~i~:~r~ta~:~~:~r a~~g~:ob~I'O"Nbuc(ISear Rapprochement," p. 113. Also see Jean Krasno, 56p I m, r IS ummer 1994}: p. 430. 57 au 0 Wr~bel, "Brazil-Argentina Nuclear Relations," pp. 12-14. 58IbidConversatIOn Al Rwith d' John R ed' IC, k U'nIVerslty . 0 f Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia Feb. 1996 50Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 61. 59 . so see e lck, Nuclear IllUSIOns, pp. 42-43. ,. 51 "Brazil, Argentina, and Chile Bring into Force the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Paulo :;ob~~, a Brazilian. scholar, believes that the desire to remove barriers to advanced Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean," U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fact Sheet, ACDA Office of Public Information, June 3,1994. _"v

320 NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, SECURITY, AND NONPROLIFERATION 17 Argentina and Brazil 321 Over time support for maintaining a nuclear weapons option was eroded by growing recog­ scientists, and businessmen k" d nition of the high costs of the nuclear programs and the denied access to advanced technol­ development. 63 see mg Improve access to foreign high technology for economic ogy that resulted from refusals to accept safeguards on sensitive nuclear activities. Economic development driven by trade, increased foreign investment, and advanced technology became Supplier restrictions imposed because of A' , , dered their development goals I'n oth 'd ,rglentma and BrazIl s nuclear stance also hin- a national priority in both countries. This priority undercut the view that a nuclear weapons 'f ' er m ustna sectors U S t hid ' prol 1 eratIOn reasons slowed the d 1 f " . ec no ogy ellIed for non- option should be maintained despite the political and economic consequences. 60 National " eve opment 0 BrazT S II' L ' mcreased ItS costs. For example C 1 1 A' 1 Sate Ite aunchmg Vehicle and nuclear programs could be successfully used as vehicles for industrial and technological S ' , , 0 one ntOllIO Carlos Pdf d' development only if they did not trigger international sanctions that blocked access to tech­ pac~ ActIVIties Institute, estimated in November 1988 e rosa, or~er, Irector of Brazil's sales mcreased the costs of the sat lrt 1 h that U.S. restnctIOns on technology nology or foreign investment. It became increasingly difficult for Argentina and Brazil to Although some advanced n:ti~~s aunc er,p~ogram from $6 million to $14.4 million.64 avoid such penalties without renouncing nuclear arms and accepting full-scope safeguards on Argentina and Brazil despite theI'r r f WI ere wIllmg to export nuclear-related technology to their nuclear activities. So economics, a clearly international activity, influenced thinking on e usa to renounce a nucl ' became less willing to do so over time Th b ' ear weapons optIOn, these states the nuclear issue due to its domestic impact in Argentina and Brazil. nuclear deal with Brazil After . f e est ex:a~pl: IS Germany, which signed the 1975 A similar logic prevailed in the bilateral context. Argentina and Brazil came to see sus­ . years 0 not reqUInng Its I h I picions regarding one another's nuclear programs as an obstacle to bilateral and regional acc~pt full-scope safeguards as a condition of s I nuc ear tec no ogy customers to polIcy at the 1990 NPT review co f Th upp y, Germany announced a change to this technical cooperation in nuclear energy. Both countries had high expectations that such I n erence. e new German r ' , , cooperation would yield economic benefits, including growth in other industrial sectors and new nuc ear cooperation agreements with states that d'd po ICy was not to mltlate any 61 guards and to require this acceptance from all st t 'hI hn,ot ~cc~Pt full-scope IAEA safe­ increased trade. The diplomatic process that started with agreements on nuclear coopera­ a es WIt w IC h It dId cooperate by 1995.65 tion in 1980 led to greater interaction on commercial relations. In late 1985, the two sides announced the Argentine-Brazilian Integration and Cooperation Program (PICAB), which facilitated Argentina's reintegration into the regional and international community after the Inte~~ational Factors Influencing the Argentine and Falklands/Malvinas war. The 1986 Act for Argentine-Brazilian Integration expanded bilat­ Brazilian Rollback Decisions eral trade relationships that were initiated in the 1985 Foz de Iguazu declaration. In the late 1980s governments in Argentina and Brazil realized that this strategy of Argentina and Brazil were motivated to renounce h ' , using nuclear cooperation to promote economic integration and expansion would be more ~ns option by, the changing nature of their bilater:trte~pectI,ve quests for a nuclear w~ap­ likely to succeed if the impediments to cooperation that were imposed by secret nuclear activ­ tIOn that contmued ambiguity regard in th' I re atIO~~hIP and by the mutual realIza­ ities and mutual suspicions were removed. This view provided motivation for a series of joint economic costs. In short political elite ~ belr h nuc ear ambmons would entail political and declarations on nuclear policy and mutual reciprocal inspections of sensitive nuclear facilities ing outside the nuclear ~onproliferatio~ m ,ot ~~~tes conclud,ed that the benefits to remain­ that began in December 1986 and culminated in the 1990 Joint Declaration of Common tude occurred over a period of approxir::!~me151 not outweIgh, the costs. This shift in atti- the most salient of which have been d' dYh years and was mfluenced by many factors Nuclear Policy. This policy contained the mutual renunciation of nuclear arms and formal­ ISCusse ere ' ized the inspection process. , ,International and U.S. nonproliferation oli~ 1 d' , , As mentioned, however, the common nuclear policy still did not go far enough to shIft m Argentina and Brazil f 'f P y P aye a mmor role m mfluencing the , h rom pursUIt 0 a nuclear weap , f 11 satisfy the major nuclear suppliers. Because Argentina and Brazil did not accept full-scope m t e nuclear nonproliferation re ime This w d ons ?I?tIOn to u membership safeguards until the Quadripartite Agreement of 1991, they could not purchase nuclear tech­ rectly buttressed domestic politi!1 f' ,ahs. °Ane thr~ugh polICIes that directly and indi- t' f I orces WIt m rgentma and Br 'I th f d nology or services from states that required such acceptance as a condition of supply. The IOn 0 nuc ear weapons and highli hted the ' , , ~ZI, at avore rejec- United States and several other industrialized nations refused to sell certain specialized prod­ nonproliferation regime. Some of th~se t ~~teEtial benefIts of JOInIng the international ucts such as computerized precision machine tools, electronic components, and supercom­ cussed in the following sections. I ex erna m uences on the rollback decisions are dis- puters.62 Not only did this practice slow the nuclear program and increase its costs, it led to increasing opposition to the independent nuclear policy from finance ministry officials, Increasing International Pressure A general strengthening of the internation I r' , the end of the Cold War and th I' a ~o,npro IferatIOn regIme corresponding with 60Etel Solingen, "The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint," International Security 19 (Fall t~ nuclear rollback in Argentina :;~s~r~~J ~:~~ca~ pre~sures also ,could have contributed dIscussions between Presidents R Id R' m, U.S.-SOVIet nuclear arsenals and 1994): pp. 126-169, and Etel Solingen, "Macropolitical Consensus and Lateral Autonomy in ~tIO~s of el~minating nuclear arms repr~~~t d eagan an b MIkhaIl Gorbachev embracing the goal Industrial Policy: The Nuclear Sector in Brazil and Argentina," International Organization 42 meetmg their obligation under Article ~I ~~~t:e~pi 6~h~h~uperpowers at t~~t time toward (1993): pp. 263-298. Also see Wrobel, "Brazil-Argentina Nuclear Relations," pp. 6, 11,27. arguments, made frequently by Ar t' d B:I IS weakened tradmonal anti-NPT ' gen ma an raZI ag' t 'b 1 ' 61Specifically, it was thought that nuclear development would stimulate growth in metallurgy, an d be h aVIOr between nuclear weap t d ' ams an 1m a ance of oblIgations chemistry, mineralogy, welding, nondestructive testing, quality assurance methods, and the ons sates an nonnuclear weapons states. application of improved industrial standards. See the chapter on "Industrial and Economic Benefits of Latin American Nuclear Cooperation" in Averting a Latin American Nuclear Arms Nuclear Illusions, p. 43. Race, Leventhal and Tanzer, eds., pp. 76-144. ;:~edick, U.S. Pohcy Hinders Satellite Pr '" FB ' 62"Import of Nuclear-Related Material Difficult," in Joint Publications Research Service 6sReiss, Bridled Ambition p 63 ogram, m IS Latin America, November 9, 1988, pp. 2-3. (JPRS), Sept. 12, 1991, p. 15. Despite the restrictions imposed by most suppliers, Argentina and 66 ,. . Article VI of the NPT obligates the nuclear Brazil both acquired some nuclear-related technology by using clandestine means and offering U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms reduction ' I dWdeaPhons states to seek the elimination of nuclear false assurances on intended end uses. s me u e t ose resultmg fr th I d' Forces Treaty (INF) START I d h " om e nterme late-Range , ,an t e PresIdentIal Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992. -...... ------

322 NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, SECURITY, AND NONPROLIFERATION 17 Argentina and Brazil 323 In addition, the French, Chinese, and Ukrainian decisions in the 1980s and early 1990s safeguards as a condition of su I 70 I f h 0 0 to adhere to the NPT strengthened the nonproliferation regime and isolated countries like in 1979 to require full-scope s:fe:~ard~ f~~t~ t ;oUlllteJ Stres dId convince West Germany Argentina and Brazil. This increased political isolation came at the same time when both water plant to Argentina. However Bo n °th! P?se sa oe of a power reactor and heavy Argentina's and Brazil's profiles on the international scene were in decline. In the 1970s their after it decided to supply a react~r 0~1 ':;;.1 D re~ Its {eqUlremen.t for ~ull-scope safeguards close ties with the advanced industrial world and their economic growth established them as became clear that Germany France a dY'th Ues-!,Itde t oese exceptIOns, m the late 1980s it

leaders of the developing worldo Their independent stance on nonproliferation issues and the o h U 0 "n e lllte Kmgdom wer 0 th f 0 0 mg t e lllted States and Canada in rOO fIle m e process 0 JOln- global economic order also made them strong members of the nonaligned movement. These supply. 72 equmng u -scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of relationships attenuated the negative political consequences of remaining outside the NPT. West Germany announced at the NPT ROC f The 1980s economic decline and, in the case of Argentina, the conflict with the U.K. in the require full-scope safeguards as a condOt O f eVflew on erence in August 1990 that it would Falklands resulted in a lowered international stature for Buenos Aires and Brasilia. The end Id h I Ion or uture nuclear exp tEO 0 I wou ave to be renegotiated by 1995 t f 0 or s. xlstmg nuc ear deals of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union undercut the ideological basis for the 10 h d 0 0 0 con orm to thIs new poli Tho hOf 0 G po ICY a Impltcations for both the Ar entine d 0 0 cy. IS SIt merman nonaligned movement and severely weakened that organization. Under these new circum­ have the greatest impact on nuclear act~ities 0 a~ Bo~a~Ia~ nu~lear programs but would stances Argentina and Brazil were left without alternative political relationships that limited Brazil's Angra II power station which w s I::o;azi. t t e tIme of the announcement, the effects of international nonproliferation pressures. Therefore, the effect of these pressures yet been canceled, required German te:hn~~~r 0 complete, and Angra ~II, which had not intensified in the late 1980s and became a factor that contributed to the process of nuclear when German Foreign Minister Klau KO k I ?~ to complete. Moreove~, m October 1993, rollback. Quadripartite safeguards agreement sB mOle vISIted B~a~II to ~ncourage ItS ratification of the $750 million in financial Support t; c;~~l ;a:hne~otlatI~g WIth Germany for an additional Export Controls future financing for the Angra III pI t 73 Ae edo e ngdra loreactor and had plans to discuss o f an . s ISCusse earher Ger 'd 0 0 Other nations first blocked exports in the 1950s to prevent the acquisition of enrichment tIOn uture exports on the acceptance of full-sco e £ ,~any s eClSIOn to condi- or reprocessing technology by Argentina and Brazil. For example, U.S. and British officials Brazil and Argentina to ratify and impl t h PQ sade~uar~s proVIded strong incentives for I 0 emen t e ua npartlte Ag intervened in 1954 in Antwerp and other European ports to prevent the transfer of ultra­ n summary, mternational nuclear and dual-use r~ement. port centrifuges that had been acquired in West Germany by a Brazilian admiral. 67 After the Brazil ultimately slowed the completion f I e:c controls Imposed on Argentina and NPT came into force in the early 1970s, U.S. export controls were designed to encourage increased the domestic constraints fa d ~ nuc ear prOjects and raised their costs. This outcome Argentina and Brazil to accept safeguards on all their nuclear activities. When they refused, in both countries and made them mo;: difl/~~fo?en~fys~f tl~ehunsafeguarded nuclear programs 1 u 0 JUSti m Ig t of other national priorities. U.S. export controls had the additional objective of denying technology or materials that could be used to expand unsafeguarded nuclear activities in these two states. Support for Economic liberalization The United States refused uranium enrichment technology requested by Brazil in con­ Over time the promotion of economic liberalization roo nection with the Angra I nuclear power station purchased from Westinghouse in 1971. The ment, technology transfer and nonprollo£ to po ICIes and the Imks between invest- decision not to transfer this technology was made because Brazil had not joined the NPT. o' era IOn strengthened co t"t 0 0 h O and BrazIl that supported nuclea f d d ns 1 uencles WIt m Argentina Subsequent U.S. efforts to convince Germany and the Netherlands not to transfer enrichment o 74 r sa eguar s an opposed the d I f weapons optIOn. The members of these 0 0 0 eve opment 0 a nuclear or reprocessing technology to Brazil as part of the 1975 deal were unsuccessful. However, from the Foreign and Finance Min° t 0 constltue~cle~ mcluded business interests, officials U.S. diplomacy did succeed in persuading the Germans and Dutch to require stronger bilat­ had frequent contact with internati~n~7s;. rese~rf sdclentists, and university officials who eral and trilateral safeguards (with the IAEA) on declared Brazilian nuclear activities.68 embraced liberal strategies of ec 0 dmanl Cia an commercial interests. These groups With the passage of the U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) the United o onomiC eve opment through f t d d 0 mvestment as a central national obJoectO d h 0 ree ra e an mternational States banned the export of enriched-uranium fuel to countries refusing full-scope safeguards. o Th Ive an t e pnmary means to 0 hOd economIes. is objective conflicted with th -f d 0 Improve t elr omestic This meant that after 1980 it would renege on its 1973 contract to supply Brazil's Angra I nuclear activities and the economic I 0 eo state dmance mamtenance of unsafeguarded o 0 pen a tIes Impose as a cons b b reactor with LEU fuel. In 1981 Brazil contracted with the West GermaniBritishlDutch enrich­ mternatIOnal nonproliferation regime Flo ~quence y mem ers of the

ment consortium URENCO as an alternative supplier of fuel for Angra 1. The NPPA also 1983, Brazil was persuaded t 0 I 0 or examp e, to reheve Its debt crisis in 1982 and 0 Imp ement economic liberaliz to d blocked the previously agreed supply of U.S. LEU for Argentina'S research reactor. However, t h e United States and the Internatio I M Fda IOn measures a vocated by

the Carter Administration approved the transfer of this fuel to Argentina in June 1980, in na onetary un 0 The measures included reductions part due to Argentine threats to buy LEU from the Soviet Union.69 After the 1975 Brazilian/German deal and implementation of the NNPA, a key dimen­

70Leslie H Gelb "N I N 0 0 sion of U.S. strategy to control nuclear exports to Argentina and Brazil was its leadership in 1984, p. AI. . , uc ear atIOns to TIghten Export Controls," The New York Times, July 6, creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and its lobbying within that organization for a har~ 71 5 0 I monization of export control policy among the leading nuclear suppliers. It was within thi~ Wltzer and supplied the hea I I 0 forum that the United States began to pressure Germany and others to demand full-scope "Canada, FRG Dispute Safety Sta:dw~er p;nt, a so WI Ithout requiring full-scope safeguards. See 1979 p 18 AI J h ar on eactor sa e to Argentina," in FBISINDP Dec 10 ,. . so see 0 n M Geddes "Swiss Ge I ' . , Technology to Argentina" W,a'll St 'J I' rmans gnore U.S. Objections, Sell Nuclear

72 0 0 ' reet ourna, June 16, 1980. 73 Re~ss, Br~dled Ambition, p. 70. 67Redick, Nuclear Illusions, p. 6, and Barletta, "Military Nuclear Program in Brazil," p. 5. 74 ReI~so' Brtdled Ambition, p. 63. centrifuges were ultimately delivered to a Brazilian university research center. PoltCles of economic liberalizatio II 0 I

68David Binder, "U.S. Wins Safeguards in German Nuclear Deal with Brazil," The New York and barriers to trade an expan 0 fn g~nera y mc ude a reduction of state control over markets , SlOn 0 pnvate economO tOo Times, June 4, 1975, p. A16. and the privatization of bI" 0 lC ransactlOns and foreIgn investment,

0 pu IC sector enterpnses. See Etel Solingen "Th P 1 0 IE 69Redick, Nuclear Illusions, p. 5. 0" Rest 0 t" I 0 , e 0 ItlCa conomy of ram, nternatlonai Security 19 (Fall 1994): p. 137. 17 Argentina and Brazil 325 NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, SECURITY, AND NONPROLIFERATION 324 . . 1 d' 400/, cut in the Nuclebras Argentina and Brazil during the George H. W. Bush Administration, traveling to Buenos in state-financed infrastructure development proJects, mc u mg a 0 Aries in August 1989 to advocate the acceptance of IAEA safeguards and to propose U.S.­ Argentine joint development of inherently safe reactor designs. 84 budget in 1983.75 . A' d Brazil for economic liberalization policies Advocacy of and assistance to ..rgentm:. an in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1990, By providing a constant reminder of the bargain that was available to them, this dialogue had its greatest effect on nuclear de~lslon ~aC l~f r of Brazil implemented radical economic may have contributed to Argentina and Brazil's ultimate decisions to roll back the ambiguity both Presidents ~~nem ~f Argentma an 'nffatfon balance state budgets, privatize public surrounding their nuclear programs and accept international inspections. In general, the United liberalization poliCies deSigned to redudce I . t' forel'gn debt payment 76 In Argentina, States used this dialogue to propose cooperative activities that would benefit Argentina and . f . . stment an renegotla e '. serVices, attract orelgn mve l' d the control of the director of plannmg. Brazil and to communicate the specific changes in their ambiguous nuclear postures that were President Menem pla~ed the nuc ear progr~m un e~rations and joint ventures, coordinated required to initiate them.85 Jt also helped encourage the shift toward Argentine-Brazilian nuclear This office, with advlCe from large A~g.e?tme ~o~he closing of sensitive nuclear facilities. 77 transparency. This was particularly true during the period 1988-1994, when the United States the privatization of some nuclear ~CtlVI~I~S a.n f lly lobbied the House of Deputies used this dialogue to influence the evolution of the landmark agreements that were signed in . h F' d E nomlC Mlmstnes success u . f In BraZlI t e orelgn an co . S b 1993 78 At the end 0 1990 and 1991 and to promote their ratification. Beginning in late 1988 and 1989, the United , d . . f ards agreement m eptem er· . to approve the Qua npartlte ~~ egu G H W Bush was to visit Argentina and BraZlI States began broadening its nonproliferation dialogue with Argentina and Brazil to include 1990 and just days before Pre~l ~nt. ~org~ de z~ne the two states had signed the Joint potential access to technology such as supercomputers, nuclear safety equipment, environmental 86 to promote the idea of a hem~sp ~l~. ree~ ~~z de Igu'azu that committed them to accepting monitoring techniques, and satellites in exchange for further nonproliferation commitments. The result was a series of agreements with the United States that provided greater access to tech­ Declaration of a Common N~t earl 0 lCy ~'f 79 A strong incentive for acceptance of IAEA international safeguards on a nu~ ear a~lvi les. ment would facilitate access to advanced nology for Argentina and Brazil, removed export restrictions previously imposed upon them, safeguards was the expefctationblt al~ su~ f: :;:~egn investment and economic assistance.8o and allowed them greater participation in international export control regimes. These events technology and create a avora e c lma e proceeded in parallel with Argentine and Brazilian acceptance of international inspections of their nuclear facilities and greater political commitments against nuclear proliferation.87 Maintaining a Constructive Nonproliferation Dialogue .' k d . t in a constructive nonproliferatlOn Succeeding ,u.S. admi.nistrations h~v~ wo.: e ~~i~fl~c:imony over the NPT, the Nuclear Technical Assistance for Nuclear Safeguards dialogue With Argentma and Br~zll ~s1 eJ~PA Even at one of the lowest points of U.S.­ Suppliers Gro~p, and the. constrall:ts 0 : ~ '1 d t~empt to convince Germany not to transfer U.S. and international technical assistance for nuclear safeguards in Argentina and Brazil Brazilian relatlOns f?llowmg Washmgton s a~r~ o~ its 1975 deal with Brasilia, Vice President helped define the technical mechanisms for bilateral nuclear cooperation and thus contrib­ gY reprocessing or ennchment technolo h as P . obstacles to "excellent" relations uted indirectly to the decision to eventually accept full-scope international safeguards. In Walter Mondale stated ~ubli~li-~ha~:a:~~ ';.,~~i:~s::~iC:n, in a similar attempt to avoid a addition, the willingness of the United States and others to increase safeguards assistance has between the two ~ountnes. ~ 'tted the retransfer to Argentina from Germany been essential to the successful implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement. The pros­ potential impasse m n~~lear relatlo~~~ f~r~82 for use in a safeguarded Argentine reactor.82 pect of acquiring advanced safeguards techniques such as nuclear materials measurement of 143 tons of U.S.-ongm heavy wa R" h d K nedy visited Argentina to discuss nuclear In March 1988, Ambassador-at-Large l~na~n ~~formation on nuclear safety issues ~nd matter~ and reac.h ~gree~e?ts .on .exchU ~ ~o ram to develop reduced enriched uranll~m increasmg Argentma s partlClpatlOn 1~3 a A . bp ~ r Kennedy continued the dialogue With 84Richard Kessler, "Kennedy Discourages Argentine Idea for Non-IAEA Safeguards," fuels for research and test reactors. m assa 0 Nucleonics Week, Aug. 31,1989, pp. 12-13. 85This was the basic goal of a nonproliferation strategy of "constructive engagement" as 75D . d M "Brazil" in Limiting Nuclear Proliferation, Jed Snyder and Samuel Wells, practiced by Ambassador Kennedy and others. See Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, p. 216. aVI ~ers'on D.C~: The Wilson Center, 1985), p. 135; and Scott Tollefs~n, "Nucle~r . A key part of this strategy, especially during the Reagan and Bush administrations, was Jr., eds: (WAashmg~ , d Brazil" Paper Presentation, Atlanta, Georgia: InternatIOnal Secunty Restramt: rgentma an , . N 2 1996 pp 35-36. to renew and expand military assistance to Argentina and Brazil. This policy may have been Studies Section of the International Studies Association Annual Meetm.g, In~:st:ial Policy: 'The instrumental in easing regional security concerns, thus undercutting the military rationale for 76Etel Solingen, "Macropolitical Consensus and Lateral Auton~my m(1993)' 263-298. nuclear weapons. It also demonstrated U.S. willingness to improve relations with these two states Nuclear Sector in Brazil and Argentina," International Organtzatlon 42 . pp. across a broad front. See Peter Clausen, Nonproliferation and the National Interest: America's 77JPRS, Aug. 21, 1991, p. 5. . " Response to the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Harper-Collins, 1993), pp. 176-177. 78S I' "The Political Economy of Nuclear Restramt, p. 162. k o mgen, . A' W ons " The New Yor 86For example, the Bush Administration supported the sale of supercomputers to Brazil in 1990. 79Shirley Christian, "Argentina and BrazIl Renounce tomlC eap , However, to overcome the opposition of the U.S. Congress to the sale, Brazil sent two government ministers, including Jose Goldemberg, who directed Brazil's nuclear program as Minister of Science NO~F2~, :~:a~~ment of this expectation, see U.N. Conference on Disarmament, CDIPV.610, and Technology, to reassure Washington regarding Brazil's nonproliferation commitments. The sale 6 1992. . V" B '1" The Washington Post, was ultimately approved. See Albright, "Brazil Comes in From the Cold," p. 16. '81Ch ar Ies A. Kraus, "Mondale Shuns Atom Dispute m ISlt to .raZI, S . f Amencan. 87In August 1991 NASA signed an agreement with the Argentine Space Research Commission . d' W'II' m H Courtney "Brazil and Argentma: trategles or March 23 1979, Cite mila., d (W h' ton the joint development of Argentina's first satellite. For this and other examples of the give Diplomac~,,, in Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy, Joseph A Yager, e. as mg , take that occurred according to the nonproliferation bargain discussed above, see James S. The Brookings Institution, 1980), p. 384. . N I Ad" The Washington Post, Aug. 18, ~·"'~~UVH and Lewis A. Dunn, "Latin America Nonproliferation Game Plan," prepared for the 82Milton Benjamin, "U.S. to Allow Argentme uc ear I, . I Th " National Transportation Support Center by Science Applications International Corp., 83Richard Kessler, "Kennedy Visit Prompts Hopes of U.S.-Argentme Nuc ear aw, 4,1995, pp. A1-A9. Nucleonics Week, March 17, 1988, p. 7. 17 Argentina and Brazil 327 NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, SECURITY, AND NONPROLIFERATION 326 Safeguards (POTAS) supports the purchase of advanced safeguards monitoring equipment by . ., d vironmental monitoring systems that can hav~ other 95 eqUIpment, ren:ote. J?0nlto~m~, an Ien r d some motivation for expanding the bilateral ABACC. industrial or sCIentific applicatIOns a so .supp I~ II 88 The role played by international technical safeguards support has clearly been more sig­ 11 f r IAEA mspectlOns as we . h nificant in the period following the signing of the December 1991 Quadripartite Safeguards safeguards proposaI to .a. ow o .. I h artici ated in IAEA safeguards courses taug t Since 1976 BraZilian .0ffiCla s ave ~ 89 P he United States has supported the safe­ agreement. The cooperative nature of this assistance has been important in easing the con­ in the United States at NatlOn~1 Lab~r~::ft\av! had with the IAEA since the 1960s and cerns held by some who initially opposed the acceptance of international safeguards, fearing that they would be too intrusive or expensive.96 It has also been instrumental in vindicating guards facilities even when neither state was a party.to ag~eements tSa~ ~rg;n~ma ;~uclear those who argued that accepting international safeguards would have tangible benefits in 1970s whICh covere t elr ~c ~re d f b th states' nuclear cooperation agreements with the NPT. These agreements enve romr 0 h Germany Canada and Switzerland.90 terms of increased scientific exchange and access to technology. As discussed previously, the the United States and other nucdl~adr SUp? lerls SUtCh ansuclear facilities of :nost concern to the belief that this bargain was in the interests of Argentina and Brazil was a primary motivating h h· ., tion I not mvo ve e d h force behind the nuclear rapprochement. In this way technical safeguards assistance helped Even t h oug. t IS. pa.rtl~lpa d A . and Brazilian officials t!;l nuclear safeguar s tec - U.S. at the time, It did mtro lucbe rdgentm;. their concept for a comprehensive safeguards facilitate Argentine-Brazilian integration into the international nuclear safeguards regime niques that would eventual yea opte m during a time when that process was still vulnerable to domestic opposition. regime. . . . h I te 1980s U.S. safeguards experts began suggesting that For example, begmnmg m tea A 't" Brazilian nuclear safeguards system was Unofficial Contacts (Track II Diplomacy) a possible model for the evoluti?n of an Crgen me~t (E ratom) 91 This approach was even- . b h E AtomIC Energy ommUnl y u· . Another element of nonproliferation policy that appears to have had some influence in the case proVided y t ~ uropean. f ABACC which allowed the integration of the Argentme- of Argentine-Brazilian nuclear rollback is governmental support for unofficial contacts by non­ tually taken with the format1<~n 0 h IAEA t 92 In this way U.S. technical support for governmental organizations (NGOs) that promoted nonproliferation objectives in the region. Brazilian bilateral safeguards mto .td e .sysl em. pies of mechanisms that could be used . h A . rovi e d practlca exam Within the global community of NGOs and parts of the U.S. government, such contacts are safeguards m Sout menca P I f '1" re not being used for the development . I f d that nuc ear aCI ltles we . referred to as Track II diplomacy.97 In the case of Argentina and Brazil, U.S. NGOs provided to proVide mutua con I ence. I h' I t also helped demonstrate to Argentma both technical and organizational assistance to groups favoring greater civilian controls over of nuclea.r arms. This internatdlOna tl~ b~lf~ ~~:~~ed without being so intrusive or disrup- nuclear programs, including the application of technical safeguards at nuclear facilities. and Brazil that IAEA safeguar s cou P I f '1" . I . d h eration of the nuc ear aCl ltles. One example of this policy dimension was the collaboration between the Commission tive that they negative y Impa~te t f e;lACC th U S Department of Energy began direct for Nuclear Questions of the Brazilian Physical Society (BPS) and the Non-Proliferation After the 1991 formatIOn 0 .' eAr' entina's aseous diffusion enrichment Project of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS).98 Beginning in 1988 the FAS gave assistance for the design of a safeguards regll~e ~rS Jepartme! of Energy and ABACC was technical advice to the BPS commission on nuclear safeguards, noting in particular how 93 plant at Pilcaniyeu. An agree~~nt betwe~ t e . 'nt established the legal basis for a wide uranium enrichment plants designed to produce 20% enriched uranium could be modified signed on April 1.4, 1994. This ramewo~E a:~~~: U.S. national laboratories) and A~ACC array of cooperative ventures between ~ . . ( lear safeguards at facilities in Braz!l and to enhance ABACC's competence to a minister nuc I t re at ABACC safeguards courses . h' ged for U.S. experts to ec u . d Argentma. Was mgt on arran ., f ABACC at US national laboratones, an 95In 1993, the President's Section 601 Report to Congress noted that" ... DOE is assisting for regional inspectors, supported tralfnlng °dr t' naly' s'is (NDA) of nuclear materi- Argentina, Brazil and the ... (ABACC) in developing nuclear safeguards capabilities in preparation . d ACC . h 'pment or non estruc Ive a . has provide AB Wit eqUl f d' f h IAEA's Program of Technical ASSistance to for the application of full-scope safeguards. Specific activities include preparation of inspector als.94 In addition, U.S. voluntary un mg 0 t e and operator training programs, joint development of safeguards systems for uranium enrichment plants and participation in nondestructive assay technology development and evaluation programs and in chemical assay intercomparison experiments." . f A fng and Control of Nuclear 96Gazeta M ercantil, in JPRS-TND-91-014 (Sept. 12,1991), p. 11, and Gazeta Mercantil, in 88ABACC News, Brazilian-Argentme Agency or ccoun I JPRS-TND-93-024 (July 27,1993), p. 14. Materials, Jan.lApri11996, p. 4. '1 ASP pared for the International Nuclear 97In some of these activities there is a high degree of cooperation and coordination between 89J R do Technical Assistance to Brazt : ummary re . I b NGOs and government officials. Government officials usually must approve the participation Tech~ol:~ L~aison Office, Division of Educational Programs, Argonne NatlOna La oratory, of U.S. National Laboratory personnel in such activities and they are often invited to amend Feb. 1988, p. 8. . . d A C Raffo "Nuclear Co-operation in South or approve the content of presentations given by such nongovernmental officials. Sometimes 90Marco A. Marzo, Alfredo L. BlagglO , an na f Sf' d "IAEA Bulletin March 1994, government officials from participating states attend Track II activities in an unofficial America: The Brazilian-Argentine Common System 0 a eguar s, ' capacity. This coordination is usually intended to ensure that U.S. government positions are p.30. M H "S Examples of Multilateral properly represented in these unofficial forums. Sometimes such forums are used intentionally 9lSee William A. Higinbotham and Helen . ~nt, orne h I and by government officials to raise potential policy initiatives on a trial basis. U.S. government Safeguards Agreements," in Averting a Latin Am.erzcan Nuclear Arms Race, Levent a coordination of and influence over Track II activities is strongest in cases where the U.S. R d' k d Argentina and Brazti, p. 13. government has provided financial support for the activity. There is a growing consensus that Ta~~er; alGso ISdee be IC '~iIarold A Feiveson "Denuclearization in Argentina and Brazil," Jose 0 em erg an . , such contacts have advantages for advancing a nonproliferation agenda, especially when official government-to-government contacts are deadlocked for political reasons. CO~:~:~~:~~~:~i~9a~:~~r~Oa~ld: de Souza Barros, .Tran:Pla;~ing Bra~/I::~::!~:~;a's 98David Albright and William Higinbotham, "FAS Nonproliferation Experts Provide Technical Success, ISIS Report, vol. 2, no. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Institute or Clence an Assistance to Brazilian Physical Society," RA.S. Public Interest Report, vol. 42, no. 2 (Feb. 1989), Security, Feb. 1995), p. 6. I' Ch t rs 3A 3B, and 3-4. 94For a description of nuclear materials measurement techno ogles, see ap e , 17 Argentina and Brazil 329 NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, SECURITY, AND NONPROLIFERATION 328 not exclusively dome sf A h' . . so that they could produce uranium of much higher enrichments. At the time, the BPS was transparent, democrati~c'gov:r~~e~~:~~v~~~nt:n bilateral relations,. the transition to more advocating an inspection system controlled by the Brazilian Congress for the unsafeguarded nomlic poh'l~ies are probably the three fact~rs t~::e~~;~~e thg;e:!~f~:f~ueo!cleiberah'hzing ec?­ nuclear facilities in Brazil. FAS representatives conducted a series of workshops in December nuc ear po ICy. on c anges m 1988 at the University of Rio de Janeiro on nuclear safeguards and government oversight of and th~tr~~~ :::~re internatio~alist factors ~Iso came into play, however. Concern for ima e nuclear programs. These workshops were attended by a Brazilian Congressman and resulted in an initiative to bring Brazilian officials to the U.S. to learn about U.S. Congressional over­ polid", a, did :h~o~~,:~,":'~':';'of~';"':'~:~ ;~~;:o;:~~a~ and l~\w,;;ld influ,nc,d th, nud,;, sight of civil and military nuclear programs. Some FAS staff then traveled to Argentina to logICal growth The existence of the E t . wou m er economIC and techno­ tern and the d d .. . ura regIOnal model for a nuclear safeguards sys­ meet with members of the Argentine Physics Association who had also formed a committee te~hnical o~ creation of ABACC a~~ 'ta mmIstr~t~ve aSSIstance offered by outside nations facilitated the to their increase civilian oversight of nuclear activities in their country. A second important Track II activity occurred in October 1989 in Montevideo, sustained diplomatic effo~:s e~~n:~: ~~:;g~:t~~~e;:~t~t t~e I~E~ ~~fegu~rds s~stem. Finally, Uruguay. This was a conference organized by the Nuclear Control Institute of the United encourage membership for Argentina and Brazil in thea ~~Tmc u mg tIe Umted States, to States and financed by the Ford Foun~ation. Three former directors of the Argentine CNEA played a minor role in the outcome I . . . as nonnuc ear weapons states, and many important Argentine and Brazilian officials, including Jose Goldemberg, who on nuclear rollback in Argentina a~d nBsur;ma~Izm1 the mfluence of international factors would later oversee Brazil's nuclear program as Minister of Science and Technology, attended the conference. The American participants included Nuclear Control Institute staff, former ~f n:::Z~;~'~~;;'a~:I;;~~id:~ ;:;' a~::::t:iii~~~o;:,;:a,~1a t~~",~h~;n~~:~n:;;~'u~! government officials, industry representatives, academics, and U.S. National Laboratory per­ ~::r;:;e~~:I~he nonproliferation regime was a fourth a~;~cta~1 i:r:~~at~~~~f;~~c~n~~~:1::~ sonnel. Topics discussed included bilateral and international safeguards, the economic advan­ tages of nuclear cooperation, and the international nonproliferation regime.99 It has been 15 years since Arge f d B '1" d The direct influence of these and similar activities on Argentine and Brazilian decision tion regime, and their international be~~~~:~nd raZI lome. the int~rnational nonprolifera- making was limited and difficult to specify. However, it is likely that these exchanges had bee~ consistent with their nonproliferation obliga:~:~.p~~:~~~g~f ~~~~~~:i~let~ ~rograI?s has a positive influence on the evolution of Argentine and Brazilian thinking on the mechan­ ics of joining the nonproliferation regime. The contacts between FAS and BPS, for example, ~~~ ~~t~n~;~~r a::v~~~~~a~~:~:~~~:~~e~a:u~~n:~n~~: ~~fr~~t~~:!~i:dJbetwee~ ~~e::Eoa~~t~o~~ produced a proposal for an independent Brazilian nuclear inspection organization modeled Umon. Both states are strong advocates of n n' ' apan, an t european IOO partially on the U.S. General Accounting Office and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. the acquisitionI' o~ nuclear weapons by additio~:rS~:t:;~~~nt~~~~~u~~~t;~/~call critics of Unofficial contacts also suggested to Argentine and Brazilian officials that safeguards proce­ ons states to e Immate their arsenals. uc ear weap- dures already developed through the multilateral Hexapartite Safeguards Project could pro­ Th d" h vide a model for safeguards at Brazil's sensitive Aramar enrichment plant. This collaborative not existei~o~t~:~o~::esa~~~~ :~ ~~:t~n~~ciati~n of ~uc~ear arms in Argentina and Brazil do project designed safeguards for gas centrifuge enrichment plants in Europe and Japan that the security concerns in these states are t rea, ran, n?Ia, Pakistan, or Israel. In some cases would not reveal commercial secrets to IAEA inspectors.IOI A safeguards system similar to to acquire th~m. In addition, domestic an~or~~~~~:f p~~~ic~ ;:~~~:i~:e~a~ns or ~he option this type was eventually applied to the Aramar facility. In addition, the Track II process allowed the transfer of information on safeguards and bureaucratic mechanisms for oversight of nuclear activities to Argentine and Brazilian offi­ ~f:~:~~~,i;~~:t~:~:':~~:,~~;:~:;~~~;;;,:~::~~~o~~~n%.~;.~: ~i :~~n:=~i cials in a manner that did not weaken them politically. Thus officials who eventually sup­ efforts to change the perceived balance f' .0mmu~t~.1~ makr~g senous and sustained ported the acceptance of IAEA safeguards safely gained information important to advancing North Korea and Iran and is em 10 in om mcentives an .. IsmCentlves for .nuclear arms in have influenced nuclear proliferatfonYbehg .an~ of thhe pol~tlCal and economIC strategies that their agenda against domestic opposition. The information gained by these individuals . aVIOr m ot er regIOns. Th f through Track II activities in 1988 and 1989 enabled them to more rapidly implement a safe­ e cases 0 Argentma and B '1 d 'd" h efforts directed at other states and .e ts can inform nonproliferation guards system after the decisions to do so were taken in 1990 and 1991. r:ez~iono P~~:I I~SIg thl~t challenges when striving to create and sus~~in :s ~~cl:cause a states face .some of the .same

Summary ~~~ac~e:dt~~n:~~~~~i,a!~e~h;h~:I'gN r£" h:~!~ra~tt~is~icsdof 0 e un amenta ~~ea;~I~ed~~~;~:ti~~~~~~~~e::~i;~,I~~:~ ynamics are unIversal Argentina and Brazil were primarily motivated to accept international safeguards on all tained ~~p~~t~e~:~~on and ~nternational safeguards efforts in South America must 'be main- their nuclear activities by the mutual realization that continued ambiguity regarding their nuclear intentions would hinder the achievement of national goals such as modernization ~ill b~ required to me:i:t~f~I~~n~~:~c~dt~aa~c~~cre~~I~:~h:!f~;~:~c:~:~~t a~~~ional dn;easu:~s and technological development.I02 The causes of this change in thinking were primarily but. tt:; t1~:P~~~~d F~: ~~:~~il~~~r~~1 ~~~~n~~~cti~g industrial-sca.le uranium en~i~~~en~rf~~l~~ denied full access to IAEA ins ect f' IS P ant uses propnetary technology, and Brazil to be protected until the detaifs rs or seve~~l Gears, claiming that industrial secrets had 99Leventhal and Tanzer, Averting a Latin American Nuclear Arms Race, pp. 68-74. seemed to have been resolved to ~ ac~ess C?U e negotiated. As of early 2007 this issue looDavid Albright, "Brazil Comes in From the Cold," p. 15. lenges of this type can be expect~de :~~sf~f~IOn o.f th~I~EA and regio~al states. Future chal­ IOlIbid. The United States, West Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, Japan, Australia, the relationship to the IAEA. WI reqUIre t e urther evolutIOn of ABACC and its and Euratom participated in the Hexapartite Safeguards Project. 102For example, in justifying ratification of the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement, Mario Cesar Flores, former secretary for strategic affairs in Brazil, said, "[E]ither Brazil modernizes and internationalizes or it loses its place in the world and in history." See Jose Goldemberg and A. Feiveson, "Denuc1earization in Argentina and Brazil," Arms Control Today, March 1994, p.