Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mandeles, Mark David, 1950- The development of the B-52 and jet propulsion : a case study in organizational innovation / Mark D. Mandeles. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Aeronautics, Military-Research-United States-History. 2. B-52 bomber- Research- History. 3. Jet propulsion-History. I. Title. UG643.M35 1998 98-14703 358.4070973-dc21 CIP Printed March 1998 Digitize Copy from March 1998 Printing November 2002 NOTE: Pagination changed DISCLAIMER This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States government. This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release. ii Contents Page Disclaimer........................................................................................................................ ii Foreword......................................................................................................................... xi About the Author .......................................................................................................... xiii Acknowledgments......................................................................................................... xiv Chapter 1 Introduction ......................................................................................................1 Chapter 2 Innovation and Military Revolutions ..............................................................4 Chapter 3 Logic and Procedure of Analysis ..................................................................17 Chapter 4 Prelude: Jet Propulsion and the Air Force.....................................................29 Chapter 5 The Introduction of Jet Propulsion into the B-52..........................................54 Chapter 6 Conclusion.....................................................................................................99 Table 1 USAF Engine Development Time....................................................................42 Table 2 B-52 TimeLine..................................................................................................56 Table 3 Maximum Takeoff Weights and Combat Radii................................................66 Table 4 XB-52 Performance Requirements...................................................................75 Table 5 Boeing Company Comparison of Basic Turbopropand Basic Turbojet Models ...................................................................................................87 Appendix XB-52 Program Select Senior Personnel ....................................................115 v Foreword The B-52 and Jet Propulsion: A Case Study in Organizational Innovation is a coherent and nonpolemical discussion of the revolution in military affairs, a hot topic in the national security arena. Mark Mandeles examines an interesting topic, how can the military better understand, manage, and evaluate technological development programs. We see Murphy’s Law (anything that can go wrong, will go wrong) in operation. No matter how carefully the military designs, plans, and programs the process of technological development, inevitably, equipment, organizations, and people will challenge the desired expectations. Mandeles argues convincingly that recognizing the inevitability of error may be the single most important factor in the design of effective organizations and procedures to foster and enhance innovative technology and concepts. The book focuses on the introduction of jet propulsion into the B-52. This case study illustrates the reality that surprises and failures are endemic to development programs where information and knowledge are indeterminate, ambiguous, and imperfect. Mandeles’ choice of the B-52 to illustrate this process is both intriguing and apt. The military had no coherent search process inevitably leading to the choice of a particular technology; nor was decision making concerning the B-52 development program coherent or orderly. Different mixtures of participants, problems, and solutions came together at various times to make decisions about funding or to review the status of performance projections and requirements. Three aspects of the B-52’s history are striking because they challenge conventional wisdom about rationally managed innovation. First, Air Force personnel working on the B-52 program did not obtain the aircraft they assumed they would get when the program began. Second, the development process did not conform to idealized features of a rational program. While a rationally organized program has clear goals, adequate information, and well-organized and attentive leadership, the B-52 development process exhibited substantial disagreement over, and revision of, requirements or goals, and ambiguous, imperfect, and changing information. Third, the “messy” development process, as described in the book, forestalled premature closure on a particular design and spurred learning and the continuous introduction of new knowledge into the design as the process went along. Military innovations involve questions about politics, cooperation and coordination, and social benefits, and like other development efforts, there appears to be no error-free method to predict at the outset the end results of any given program. This study offers a major lesson to today’s planners: improving the capacity of a number of organizations with overlapping jurisdictions to interact enhances prospects to innovate new weapons and operational concepts. We can mitigate bureaucratic pathologies by fostering interaction among government and private organizations. xi The B-52 and Jet Propulsion integrates a detailed historical case study with a fine understanding of the literature on organization and innovation. It is a story of decision making under conditions of uncertainty, ambiguity, and disagreement. I have seen such stories unfold many times in my work on technological development projects. In the pages that follow those who plan, manage, and criticize technological development programs will find new insights about the process of learning how to make new things. DOV S. ZAKHEIM CEO, SPC International Corporation xii About the Author Mark D. Mandeles won research and university fellowships from the University of California, Davis, and Indiana University. In 1982 he won the USAF Dissertation Fellowship in Military Aerospace History, and subsequently received a doctor of philosophy degree in political science from Indiana University. He also earned a master of arts degree in political science from the University of California, Davis, and a bachelor of arts degree in political science (with honors) from the University of California, Berkeley. For the last 15 years, he has been an analyst or consultant for government and private analytical firms, including the Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force's Gulf War Air Power Survey, the Air Staff (Office of Long-Range Planning), Institute for Defense Analyses, Center for Naval Analyses, US General Accounting Office, Office of Chief of Engineers (US Army Corps of Engineers), Center for Air Force History, Science Applications International Corporation, OC Inc., ANSER, and Delex Systems. He founded the J. de Bloch Group, a research and analysis firm, in 1993. Currently he is analyzing structures of future military organizations for the Office of Net Assessment. His published research and reviews (in Security Studies, Naval War College Review, American Political Science Review, National Defense, Military Affairs, Journal of America's Military Past, and Middle East Insight) include essays on the revolution in military affairs, weapons acquisition, innovation in naval aviation, and ballistic missile and nuclear weapons proliferation. He coauthored Managing "Command and Control" in the Persian Gulf War (Praeger, 1996), and The Introduction of Carrier Aviation into the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy (Naval Institute Press, forthcoming). Dr. Mandeles lives in Alexandria, Virginia, with his wife, Laura, and children, Samantha and Harry. xiii Acknowledgments I have had outstanding help from knowledgeable, kind, and gracious colleagues in preparing this manuscript, including Thomas C. Hone, Laura L. Mandeles, Andrew W. Marshall, Jacob Neufeld, and Jan M. van Tol. Of course, I alone am responsible for any errors they were unsuccessful in persuading me to remove. I also wish to thank the wonderful staff of the John Marshall branch of the Fairfax County (Virginia) Public Library for securing many books through interlibrary loan and Col Allan W. Howey, director of Air University Press, and the AU Press editorial team, Emily Adams and Lula Barnes. xiv To Martin Landau and Andrew W. Marshell Chapter 1 Introduction When asked why he had not submitted more work for publication, Henry Roth, the author of the critically acclaimed 1934 novel, Call It Sleep, responded, “If I had been in a more stable society, one that hadn’t changed so abruptly (due to upheavals of the Great Depression and World War II), I could have gotten-oh, like Dickens. He could count on his society, and his attitude toward that society, being the same from his first novel to the last. I didn’t feel I could