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Review of the Re-Listing of Abu Sayyaf Group, Jamiat Ul-Ansar and Al-Qa’Ida in Iraq

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The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Review of the re-listing of Abu Sayyaf Group, Jamiat ul-Ansar and Al-Qa’ida in Iraq Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security February 2009 Canberra © Commonwealth of Australia 2009 ISBN 978-0-642-79136-8 (Printed version) ISBN 978-0-642-79137-5 (HTML version) Contents Membership of the Committee ............................................................................................................ v Terms of reference.............................................................................................................................vii List of recommendations .....................................................................................................................ix 1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................1 The Government’s procedures ................................................................................................ 2 Procedural comments .............................................................................................................. 5 2 The Listings ...........................................................................................................7 The criteria for listing an organisation.................................................................................... 7 Overview..................................................................................................................................... 8 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)............................................................................................................ 8 Engagement in terrorism........................................................................................................... 12 Ideology and links to other terrorist groups/networks................................................................ 14 Links to Australia....................................................................................................................... 17 Threats to Australian interests................................................................................................... 17 Proscription by the UN or like-minded countries ....................................................................... 17 Engagement in peace/mediation processes.............................................................................. 18 Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA)............................................................................................................. 19 Engagement in terrorism........................................................................................................... 23 Ideology and links to other terrorist groups/networks................................................................ 24 Links to Australia....................................................................................................................... 26 Threats to Australian interests................................................................................................... 26 iv Proscription by the UN or like-minded countries ....................................................................... 26 Engagement in peace/mediation processes.............................................................................. 26 Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI)............................................................................................................. 26 Engagement in terrorism........................................................................................................... 35 Ideology and links to other terrorist groups/networks................................................................ 36 Links to Australia....................................................................................................................... 37 Threats to Australian interests................................................................................................... 37 Proscription by the UN or like-minded countries ....................................................................... 37 Engagement in peace/mediation processes.............................................................................. 38 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 38 Appendix A – List of Submissions ...........................................................................39 Appendix B – Witnesses appearing at private hearing ..........................................41 Canberra................................................................................................................................... 41 Membership of the Committee Chair The Hon Arch Bevis MP Deputy Chair The Hon Philip Ruddock MP Members Mr Daryl Melham MP Senator Michael Forshaw Mr Mark Dreyfus QC MP Senator Gavin Marshall Senator Julian McGauran vi Committee Secretariat Secretary Dr Margot Kerley Inquiry Secretary Mr Robert Little Research Officers Ms Philippa Davies Office Manager Mrs Donna Quintus-Bosz Terms of reference This inquiry and report is conducted under the following powers: Criminal Code Act 1995 Section 102.1A Reviews by Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security Review of listing regulation (1) If a regulation made after the commencement of this section specifies an organisation for the purposes of paragraph (b) of the definition of terrorist organisation in section 102.1, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security may: (a) review the regulation as soon as possible after the making of the regulation; and (b) report the Committee’s comments and recommendations to each House of the Parliament before the end of the applicable disallowance period. And Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Criminal Code Amendment Regulations 2008 (No 4) Registered: 31 October 2008 (FRLI: F2008L03611) Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA) Criminal Code Amendment Regulations 2008 (No 6) Registered: 31 October 2008 (FRLI: F2008L03610) Al-Qa’ida in Iraq Criminal Code Amendment Regulations 2008 (No 5) Registered: 31 October 2008 (FRLI: F2008L03612) viii List of recommendations 2 The Listings Recommendation 1 The Committee does not recommend the disallowance of the regulations, made under the Criminal Code section 102.1, to list the three organisations: Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA) Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) as terrorist organisations 1 Introduction 1.1 This review is conducted under section 102.1A of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (the Criminal Code). Section 102.1A provides that the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (the Committee) may review a regulation specifying an organisation as a terrorist organisation for the purpose of paragraph (b) of the definition of terrorist organisation in section 102.1 of the Criminal Code and report the Committee’s comments to each house of the Parliament before the end of the applicable disallowance period. 1.2 The regulations under review have specified the following organisations as terrorist organisations for the purposes of section 102.1 of the Criminal Code: Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA) Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) 1.3 This is a review of the re-listing of these three organisations. 1.4 The Committee notes that the Attorney-General recently considered advice from the Director-General of Security and the Australian Government Solicitor that the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) did not meet the requirements for listing under the Criminal Code. He stated he would not be re-listing GIA as a terrorist organisation under the Criminal Code after the current listing expired on 2 November 2008.1 1 Submission No. 1. 2 1.5 ASG and JuA were last re-listed as terrorist organisations by Criminal Code Amendment Regulations 2006 (No. 4) and (No. 5) respectively, with effect from 3 November 2006. 1.6 AQI was last re-listed as a terrorist organisation under its previous name, Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, by Criminal Code Amendment Regulations 2007 (No. 1), with effect from 17 February 2007. 1.7 In a letter to the Committee on 23 October 2008, the Attorney-General advised that he intended to re-list these three organisations prior to the lapsing of their current listing as provided for in section 102.1(3). The Attorney provided statements of reasons for the re-listings. These are accepted as submission number one to this review. 1.8 The regulations were signed by the Governor-General on 31 October 2008. They were then tabled in the House of Representatives and the Senate on 10 November 2008. The disallowance period of 15 sitting days for the Committee’s review of the listing began from the date of the tabling. Therefore the Committee was required to report to the Parliament by Monday 9 February 2008. 1.9 Notice of the review was placed on the Committee’s website. 1.10 In its first report, Review of the listing on the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Committee decided that it would test the validity of the listing of a terrorist organisation under the Criminal Code on both the procedures and the merits. This chapter will examine the Government’s procedures in listing the three organisations and chapter two will consider the merits of the listings. The Government’s procedures 1.11 In a letter sent to the Committee on 3 November 2008, the Attorney- General’s Department informed the Committee that it had adhered to the following procedures for the purpose of listing the organisations: The following processes
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