Iraq: Creating a Strategic Partnership

IRAQ: CREATING A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, with the assistance of Adam Mausner and Elena Derby [email protected] Rough Review Draft: October 7, 2009 Cordesman: Iraq: a Situation Report 10/7/09 Page ii Executive Summary Iraq is changing rapidly, although the outcomes of many of these changes remain unclear. Iraq face major challenges in many areas ranging from ongoing violence to political accoomodation and economic stability. Iraq must deal with a wide range of challenges: Defeat the threat posed by the remnents of the Sunni insurrection and neo-Baathists, and challenges from Shi’ite militias, and deal with the risk of new forms of ethnic and sectarian violence – especially ethnic conflict between Arab, Kurd, and other minorities in the North. Create effective Iraqi security forces that can fully replace US forces, defeat or reduce the various injsurgent and terorrist groups to acceptable levels of activity, establish a rule of law and grow strong enough to ensure Iraq’s security from threats or pressure from neighboring states. Carry out an election in early 2009 that will involve a major realignment of virtually all the political factions in Iraq, easpecially Arab Shi’ites and Arab Sunnis, and then restructure the Iraqi government to both relfect the results of the election and crate a level of effective governance that can bring together all of natikon’s major factons. Accelerate the slow pace of political accommodation, and the need for stable political compromises between each major faction that can rebuild full national unity over time. Findi a new balance between central, provincial, and local governance that effectively serves the needs of the Iraqi people aids political accomodation, and moves from a climate dominated by counterisurgency to one focused on the rule of law. Cope with the immedaite challenges of poverty, unemployment, and underemployment; poor distribution of income, and key problems in the agricultural, inudstrial, and service sectors than affect large potions of the population. Move Iraq towards economic development in ways that deal with the complex heritage of nearly 30 years of war and internal conflict; massive population growth; and the need to create a competitive Iraq national economy. Put Iraq’s budget on a stable path towards developing effective Iraqi security forces and goverment services, help fund economic reconstruction and development, deal with the near phase out of international aid and continuing foreign debt and reparations issues, and reduce the dependence of the government on uncertain levels of oil export earnings for the vast majority of its revenues. It may well be a decade before Iraq can meet these challenges to the point where it acheives a convincing level of stability and security by regional standards. Iraq faces serious immediate problems in each area, but all of these challenges are ―structural‖ in the sense that they require major changes in Iraq’s present politics, governance, security structure, and economy that will take years to accomplish. This does not mean Iraq cannot make progress much earlier, and it already is in some areas. The scale of each challenge, however, is too great for such progress to quickly reach the point of lasting success. History takes time in Iraq, just as it does everywhere else in the world. This, in turn, makes any current claims of ―victory‖ premature. It is far too early to say that Iraq can achieve lasting security and stability, maintain a pluralistic form of government, or avoid becoming caught up in another violent round of internal or regional power stuggles. Cordesman: Iraq: a Situation Report 10/7/09 Page iii The outcome will depend on Iraq’s own leaders and decisions. Iraq is now a fully soveriegn state that is rapidly assuming resposiblity for every aspect of its policy and security. The US can, however, play a constructive role in helping Iraq as it withdraws its forces and over the years to come. The US-Iraqi strategic agreement provides a potential framework to build upon that can serve boths nation’s strategic interests. Much will depend, however, on how quickly the U.S. shows Iraq that it is a responsbile strategic partner, that it respects Iraqi sovereignty and leadership, and that the US is willing to provide continuing aid and support. The Challenge of Continuing Violence The level of violence in Iraq is sharply lower than the levels that peaked in 2007. It is now dropping below average levels that existed at the beginning of the insurgency in 2004, and most of the violence related to the Sunni insurgency is now concentrated in Baghdad, and Diyala, Ninewa, and Salah ad Din provinces in the center and north. The threat posed by the Sadr militia, various Shi’ite factions like the Special Groups, and other Shi’ite militias has also been sharply reduced and the Sadr faction is now part of the Shi’ite political alliance. The Iraq War war, however, is anything but ―won‖ if this means reducing violence to levels that allow civil society and the economy to function without bombings and other large-scale incidents of violence, and reducing all of these threats to a level that largely eliminates the risk of new outbreaks of major ethnic and sectarian violence. Al Qai’ida in Iraq, other Sunni Islamist factions, and various neo-Ba’athist groups still carry out bombings and targeted attacks in parts of the country. Insurgent groups continue to try to trigger a new round of Sunni-Shi’ite fighting. Since April 2009, these attacvks have included a series of large-scale bombings seeking to exploit the divisions between Shi’ite and Sunni, and Arab and Kurd; and to provoke a new round of civil conflict and sectarian and ethnic reprisals. The Sadr Militia, or ―Mahdi Army,‖ has fragmented into a mix of largelty ineffective factions and its influence and capabilities continue to diminish. The Sadrist movement seems focused on politics, rather than violence, and Sadr has done little to revitalize its military capabilities since the Iraqi Army’s operations in Basra and Sadr City in early 2008. However, there are still violent ―special groups‖ that have splintered from the Mahdi Army, and that attack US and Iraqi government targets. Iran still provides some supplies and training for such groups, as well as some support and training to both the Sadrist and Supreme Council militias. The decline in the Sunni Jihadist and Sadrist threats has also been offset by rising internal political tensions. These include serious tensions between Iraqi Arabs, Kurds, Turcomans, and other minorites in the north. Arab and Kurdish tensions are now the most serious near-term threat to Iraq stability and involve power struggles over control of a broad band of disputed territory from Mosul to the Iranian border in the area south of the three provinces that make up the Kurdish zone, as well as over control of the nation’s petroleum reserves and income. These internal threats interact with Iraqi politics. Prime Minister Maliki is exploiting Iraqi nationalism in his search for re-election, and has increasignly restricted the role the Cordesman: Iraq: a Situation Report 10/7/09 Page iv US can play in dealing with the insurgency and preventing clashes between Iraq’s various factions. This may well lead the US to accelerate reductions in its forces and in its aid programs, and could affect efforts to create a stable partnership in implementing the US- Iraqi Security Agreement. At the same time, Prime Minister Maliki may be taking excessive risks in rushing reductions in security barriers and through operations that create the image of a more secure Iraq but do not act decisively against the insurgents in Ninewa. Polls shows that most Iraqis do see ongoing improvements in their security, but are still deeply concerned about their security outside their immediate neighborhoods. The threat posed by insurgents and terrorists, and by ethnic and sectarian tensions, is also only part of the problem. Iraq must now establish a rule of law to deal with crime and extorition and provide the civil order needed for lasting political accommodation and for economic reconstruction and development. In short, the levels of violence in Iraq are significantly lower, but Iraq is still years away from lasting stability and security. It will need substantially more political accommodation, successful national elections and improved governance, better security forces, and more economic realism to succeed. In the interim, jihadists, other violent factions, and the risk of new civil conflict will pose a significant threat. Finally, Iraq faces real and potential threats on all of its borders. Sunni insurgents still receive support from Syria. Iran still supports elements of various Shi’ite militias and Shi’ite extremists, and actively seeks to influence – if not dominate – Iraq’s Shi’ite majority. Turkey has steadily improved its cooperation with the Kurdish government in the north, but is still deeply concerned over the presence of PKK elements near its border and the impact of Iraqi Kurdish autonomy on Turkey’s Kurds. Saudi Arabia still sees infiltration from Iraq as a threat, and the Arab states have not yet fully accepted the Iraq’s Shi’ite-led majority. Regional security will be an eduring problem for Iraq, and it must further develop its military forces and internal security capabilities if it is to deter outside pressure and threats. The Challenge of Political Accomodation Public opinion polls show that the vast majority of Arab Sunnis and Arab Shi’ites want a united Iraq, and the provincial elections in early 2009 showed that Arab Sunnis participated fully in the political process and that elections could peacefully change the leadership in many provinces.

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