Countering Daesh Propaganda: Action-Oriented Research for Practical Policy Outcomes Experts Workshop

February 2016

Countering Daesh Propaganda: Action-Oriented Research for Practical Policy Outcomes Experts Workshop

February 2016

One Copenhill 453 Freedom Parkway Atlanta, GA 30307 (404) 420-5100 www.cartercenter.org About The Carter Center The Carter Center was founded in 1982 by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and his wife, Rosalynn, in partnership with Emory University, to advance peace and health worldwide. A not-for-profit, nongovernmental organization, the Center has helped to improve life for people in 80 countries by resolving conflicts; advancing democracy, human rights, and economic opportunity;­ preventing diseases; and improving mental health care. Please visit www.cartercenter.org to learn more about The Carter Center.

© 2016 by The Carter Center. All rights reserved. Contents

Foreword Grassroots Perspectives: Ambassador (ret.) Mary Ann Peters...... 4 Voices From the Ground A First-Person Narrative: From Introduction Recruiter to Challenger Houda Abadi...... 5 Mubin Shaikh...... 51 Brand Architecture Countering Extremist Propaganda “Look, Look; See the Glorious Fighters!”: With an Islamic Approach The Visual Persuasion of ISIS and Manal Omar...... 55 the Fanboys of Terror A Dutch Perspective: History, Politics, David D. Perlmutter...... 9 and Outcomes Visual Images: Distinguishing Sam Cherribi...... 63 Daesh’s Internal and External The Settlement House Model of the Communication Strategies Arab-American Family Support Center Carol Winkler...... 15 Ambreen Qureshi...... 72 Filtering Meta-Narratives: Kompass–Muslim Youth Education: From Global to Local Empowerment and Prevention Aaron Y. Zelin...... 20 Through Education Visual Imagery of the Islamic State Misbah Arshad...... 77 Cori E. Dauber...... 24 HAYAT Germany: The Paris Attacks: Terror and Recruitment A Programmatic Approach Jad Melki and Azza El-Masri ...... 28 Ava Linea...... 81

Engaging With Religion Return and Reintegration Religious Diplomacy Best Practices: Rehabilitating and Bawa Jain...... 34 Reintegrating Foreign Fighters Preventing the Synapse: Transmission Rohan Gunaratna...... 84 of Daesh Religious Signals in Nigeria’s Response to Terrorism Search of Receivers Fatima Akilu...... 93 Ebrahim Rasool...... 38 Countering Daesh Recruitment Notes on Religion and Countering Propaganda Experts Workshop: Violent Extremism Participant Biographies ...... 97 Muhammad Nuruddeen Lemu...... 43 Foreword

Daesh, which needs no introduction, currently bloodiest attack since 2003, leaving more than 215 poses one of the greatest threats to global peace. dead. Under pressure and on the defensive, Daesh Daesh has capitalized on conditions conducive is intensifying its terrorism campaign by pressuring to the the spread of violent extremism, including its followers in the West to carry out attacks in the political vacuum created by failed states, their home countries. the failure of national governments to address To challenge and defeat Daesh’s recruitment socio-economic grievances, and the increasing propaganda machine, we must adopt nuanced alienation of Muslims in the West. An estimated strategies that address the socio-political issues 30,000 citizens from 100 countries have joined that are critical to the success and operational Daesh in Syria and Iraq. Libya is increasingly capabilities of Daesh. At The Carter Center, our becoming the new destination for foreign fighters. mission is to “wage peace” and “build hope.” Our Yet to date, discussions concerning how best initiative to counter Daesh propaganda wages to deal with Daesh’s violent ideology remain peace by working with grassroots religious and superficial. Increased militarization and the rise community leaders to provide them with a more of Islamophobia have spread in the wake of this nuanced understanding of sophisticated Daesh violent group. The debate needs to move beyond communication strategies, recommendations military options, and instead, adopt nuanced to delegitimize Daesh narratives, and effective approaches that will better diminish the allure of approaches to engage with alienated youth. Daesh’s violent actions and address the emotional This interdisciplinary guide is a collection of appeal that has been attracting foreign fighters. articles written by leading scholars and practi- In the last few months, we have witnessed a tioners who participated in the Carter Center’s series of deadly Daesh attacks outside its controlled February 2016 Countering Daesh Experts territory in Syria and Iraq, targeting Muslims and Workshop. These experts were brought together non-Muslims alike. This marks a new turn in its to identify new approaches to countering Daesh tactics aimed at diverting attention from its recent propaganda and to assist governments and battlefield losses and adjusting its military strate- religious/community leaders in deterring violent gies. The first week of July 2016 marked Baghdad’s extremism among their youth.

Ambassador (ret.) Mary Ann Peters Chief Executive Officer, The Carter Center

4 Introduction Houda Abadi Associate Director, Conflict Resolution Program, The Carter Center

This report contains articles presented at the their religious credibility. The Center will assist Countering Daesh Experts Workshop convened by religious and community leaders in understanding The Carter Center Feb. 22–24, 2016, in Atlanta, Daesh’s propaganda and in developing ways to Ga. The workshop brought together 21 leading counter the Daesh narrative. These efforts will scholars and practitioners from 10 different coun- include online and offline activities to raise aware- tries to discuss Daesh recruitment strategies and ness, social media training, mobilizing youth, and its use of social media technologies to appeal to education. Finally, the Center will inform and alienated youth. In addition to developing insights provide evidence-based recommendations as well into recruitment and social media use, the work- as inputs to regional and international government shop aimed to develop nuanced counternarratives actors for related policy measures and practical that engage religious resources, leaders, and insti- approaches to countering Islamophobia. tutions in peacebuilding in their local contexts The project addresses six problems: and to promote a deeper understanding of religion 1. The increasing use of media for extremist in conflict. propaganda purposes The Carter Center’s Approach to Countering 2. The information gap on Daesh recruitment Daesh Recruitment Propaganda strategies Since 2015, the Center has been working to 3. The lack of capacity and media resources of counter Daesh’s recruitment propaganda efforts by religious leaders to discredit Daesh ideology undertaking in-depth analysis of its videos, print, 4. Flaws of existing government measures to and social media publications. The Center has address radicalization developed a detailed coding methodology allowing 5. Women’s roles in prevention and recruitment for a structured analysis of the range of Daesh’s propaganda and branding efforts. These analytical 6. Return, reintegration, and rehabilitation metrics offer a more nuanced understanding of ways Daesh’s strategies vary by region, race, The Need for Countering Daesh and language. Recruitment Propaganda The Center is collaborating with media training Daesh has capitalized on the political vacuum institutions in Europe, the Middle East, North created by failed states and their inability to Africa, and the United States. In partnership address core socio-political grievances. The success with religious and community leaders, efforts are of Daesh’s recruiting efforts has become a major underway to identify the flaws in Daesh narra- challenge for the international community. In tives and to develop approaches to discredit its recruitment, Daesh has taken advantage of

5 young people’s feelings of disenfranchisement Countering Daesh Recruitment and marginalization by emphasizing the idyllic Propaganda Experts Workshop notion of “Islamic State” that supposedly addresses Carter Center workshop discussions centered on Muslim grievances across the globe. the supply of fighters; paths to extremism; and Daesh has developed a modern, technologically government responses, ranging from security to savvy brand, enabling its leadership to recruit community engagement models. Academics, prac- marginalized youth across borders. For Daesh, the titioners, and policy makers reviewed multiple case media battlefield is as important as the physical studies to illustrate the elasticity of Daesh’s appeal battlefield. The breadth of technology access with respect to the potential recruit’s background, and rapid communication across social media gender, age, culture, or location. applications are key components in its recruit- Participants agreed that Daesh-type ideolo- ment strategy. Increasingly, those countering the gies will continue to exist under different names, Daesh narrative understand the need to tap similar whether it be Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda, or Al communication mediums to disseminate counter- Shabab. Furthermore, counterrecruitment messages. The development and deployment of measures must engage trusted religious and well-crafted and localized narratives are critical to community leaders. Daesh’s use of social media countering Daesh recruitment strategies. and exploitation of religious texts must be met Daesh has been systematically misrepresenting with countermessages, using the very same religious doctrines and manipulating political communication mediums. However, countermes- grievances to legitimize violence and attract new sages must be complemented with “counteroffers” recruits. Many individuals involved in violent addressing local grievances. religious extremism lack religious literacy and The articles in this guide are organized themati- have no prior connection to Syria. To diminish cally: Brand Architecture examines Daesh’s this trend, radicalization of these youth needs to communication strategies. Engaging With Religion be understood fully, moving beyond political and reviews the role of religion in countering violent religious appeals and looking into Daesh’s various extremism. Grassroots Perspectives examines branding efforts that have been employed to tran- factors that may lead to radicalization and the scend physical borders. important role of community and religious leaders Daesh’s manipulation of religious texts calls for in countering Daesh. Return and Reintegration an approach that amplifies the voices of religious offers recommendations on the reintegration of leaders. Religious leaders have denounced Daesh returnees into society. Key findings are summarized and made it clear that their actions and beliefs in this introduction. The views expressed in the are un-Islamic. However, they have relied on articles of this publication are solely those of the traditional forms of communication, and as such, authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions have not engaged with marginalized youth. Their of The Carter Center. response includes nonengaging sermons in classical Arabic, long letters to Al Baghdadi, and responses Brand Architecture that do not counter Daesh’s main narratives. In order to promote its brand globally and to These responses lack emotional appeal and identi- expand its caliphate, Daesh has developed an fication with youth. elaborate marketing campaign that utilizes Islamophobia and religious violent extremism different media platforms to appeal to its intended are two sides of the same coin. With the rise audience. Daesh highlights the social grievances of anti-Muslim sentiment in the West, Daesh experienced by marginalized youth, appealing to creates a perfect breeding ground for recruit- their emotions and struggles. In order to sustain ment. Both types of extremist ideologies need to its campaign and expand its territory, Daesh must be challenged.

6 The Carter Center attract fighters, workers, women, and children. narrative. Counterefforts must also include women Daesh’s communication strategies allow religious leaders, as women are the gatekeepers them to recruit foreign fighters as well as main- of their communities and are essential actors tain the support of their internal audience. in countering extremism. Additionally, there is Communication efforts differ for each audience a need to confront ignorance, as Islamophobia and include the use of humor and cultural codes, further fuels extremism. reappropriation of Western media, tech-savvy videos, and Daesh-created media events distrib- Grassroots Perspectives: uted through print, visual, and social media. Voices from the Ground Daesh utilizes both imagery and graphics for It is important to understand and address the root its branding campaign. However, the group relies causes that drive fighters to join Daesh. Social, heavily on visual imagery such as infographics, economic, and political grievances are the main videos, and images to attract new recruits. Images factors that lead to recruitment. Potential recruits overcome cultural and linguistic barriers and are often are individuals who have been excluded from more likely to leave a long-lasting impression on their society. Daesh capitalizes on these grievances a viewer. Daesh has created videos and images and offers a space where alienated youth can feel a that resemble action movies and games, appealing sense of community and belonging. to its younger audience. Youth in traditionally Daesh has built a robust infrastructure on nearly protected environments have access to romanti- every continent, and not just in Syria, Iraq, and cized Hollywood-style videography, depicting a Libya, creating a clash of civilizations where the world with glorified violence, accessible sex slaves, West and the entire Muslim community must and camaraderie. confront each other for survival. The Paris attacks committed or claimed by Daesh in November Engaging With Religion 2015 created a heightened sense of fear and stirred The battle against Daesh is a battle of ideolo- emotions of both Islamophobia and radicalism, gies. While grievances can make a radical cause further alienating European Muslims living in attractive, misinterpretation of religion is used Western countries. as a vehicle to justify a call for violent action. By emphasizing cultural isolation and the The extreme religious rhetoric that Daesh uses rise of anti-Muslim sentiments, Daesh creates a is deployed to declare war not only against non- perfect dichotomy and breeding ground for youth Muslims but also against mainstream Muslims. extremism. Gender, as well, is a critical entry The role of religious and community leaders point for engaging communities in countering is vital in countering Daesh. Most disaffected Daesh. Addressing the complexities of gender youth who have joined Daesh have little religious helps counter Daesh’s power on the ground in a literacy and no prior connection to Syria, which more holistic fashion. provides Daesh a blank canvas for their brand of Islam—a “path to jihad” through destruction and Return and Reintegration desperation. Trust, credibility, and loyalty are Daesh has capitalized on the political vacuum qualities that local religious leaders possess in their created by failed states to address core socio- community; therefore, they are key actors who can political grievances. Yet to date, discussions effectively counter Daesh’s message and manipula- concerning how best to deal with Daesh’s violent tion of religious texts. ideology have been superficial. The debate Recognized religious leaders have strongly needs to move beyond military options and condemned Daesh’s actions, and they have adopt nuanced approaches that will diminish the power to deradicalize and change Daesh’s the emotional appeals that have been attracting foreign fighters.

Countering Daesh Propaganda 7 Practitioners who work with defectors and fami- in order to fully reintegrate and rehabilitate lies of radicalized youth urge governments to view returnees. Governments, with the help of civil returnees as opportunities rather than challenges: society actors, could provide psychological and They can be a first-hand resource to understand societal support through different educational Daesh’s ideology and can serve as a powerful voice and recreational programs. More importantly, against violent extremism. deradicalization efforts cannot succeed without Most governments use quick, short-term addressing the social and economic grievances that solutions in dealing with returnees. This practice played a role in radicalization. has proven to be ineffective in deradicalizing ex-fighters. Long-term solutions must be utilized Keywords: Daesh, countering violent extremism, media, religion, recruitment, reintegration

8 The Carter Center Brand Architecture

“Look, Look; See the Glorious Fighters!”: The Visual Persuasion of ISIS and the Fanboys of Terror David D. Perlmutter Professor and Dean, Texas Tech University

My interest in the visual propaganda grand the president of a university. He is also a respected strategy and individual persuasion tactics of ISIS scientist and one of the most decent, calm, reason- has two origins, one dispassionate and scientific able, intelligent men I know. He is a Muslim, and and the other intimate and personal. his parents still live in their native Near Eastern First, from a research perspective, for 25 country that borders Syria. Three years ago he years I have studied how institutions, countries, went to visit them, taking a country bus. He found groups, and individuals try to persuade others himself sitting next to a young man, no more through visual means (film, video, photos, than a boy really, probably 14–16 years old, who maps, cartoons, graphics, etc.) and via new was fascinated by a video he was watching on modalities of communication such as social media his iPhone. (see Perlmutter, 1998, 1999, 2007, 2011, 2014). The boy nudged my friend and said, “Look, ISIS, by any measure, is spectacularly successful look; see the glorious fighters.” It was, of course, in its marketing, especially to the target audi- an ISIS video showing its combatants riding ence of young males it seeks to recruit to fight tanks, blowing up enemy emplacements, firing and die in its battles in Iraq and Syria and now heavy artillery pieces and machine guns, all to globally with groups in Libya, Afghanistan, and the accompaniment of stirring music and the Nigeria — “pledging allegiance” to ISIS and constant chant, “Allah Akbar!” My university attacks being carried out in Europe and the United president friend proceeded to lecture this young States in its name. Tens of thousands of such young men, despite obstacles, are giving up literally everything to travel from Saudi Arabia and Toronto, Lebanon Whereas on a 1–10 scale using visuals and social and China, to fight under the black flag (Cohen, media to convince someone to change his brand of 2015; Schmitt & Sengupta, 2015). Simply as a case study, the phenomenon is intriguing: toothpaste might be considered a 2, convincing him Whereas on a 1–10 scale using visuals and social to die for you is an 11. media to convince someone to change his brand of toothpaste might be considered a 2, convincing him to die for you is an 11. man, making the case emphatically that ISIS was Second, the story of ISIS visual/social media evil, the enemy of all people, and an abomina- recruiting is written and pictured in the lives tion in the sight of true Muslims. The young man of individuals, not just aggregates (Evans & taunted and mocked him, claiming the video was Giroux, 2015). One particular tale illustrated the proof that ISIS was not only the “good guys” but poignant and horrific to me. A friend of mine is exciting and cool to boot. My friend recalls to

9 this day his frustration at “losing” this argument Make no mistake: One overwhelming observa- in front of a bewildered audience. But then, how tion by all the participants in our meeting was many of us ever win disputes with even our own that ISIS, at least in the realm of propaganda if teenage children? not always in battlefield tactics, is one of the most The Carter Center meeting on countering successful persuasion case studies of the modern Daesh propaganda was revealing of what most era. As accounts written just within late 2015 and people who have been following the ISIS story early 2016 attest, ISIS, despite financing and mili- since its early days know well. Just like every tary failures, is still drawing thousands of recruits major phenomenon, it is complicated. Among who, at least initially, are willing to leave their the reasons regularly cited for the rise and success homes in Toronto, London, Sarajevo, or Beirut of ISIS — success in propaganda (Kfir, 2015), and take up arms under the black-and-white flag. achieving global prominence (Byman, 2016), My main argument is one born of my long and initial exponential growth through combat study of visual persuasion in relation to military (Cronin, 2015) — are: The fissuring of Iraq recruitment going back to the earliest representa- because of the American intervention and the tional visual images anatomically modern humans fall of the centralized Saddam Hussein regime created — those of the Paleolithic era (Perlmutter, 1999). I base my research on some fundamental insights of social psychology as well as visual communication. Premier among these is, as I tell The master truth of understanding the interaction my students: The master truth of understanding the interaction between the brain and visual between the brain and visual media: believing media: believing is seeing. is seeing. It is the scientific reverse of the popular apho- rism “seeing is believing.” In essence, pictures do not affect us as much as we affect what we see and what we think about pictures. To every encounter (Fishman, 2014); the brutal crackdown by the with a visual image, from a cartoon to a video, we Assad regime in response to initially peaceful bring a pre-existing set of already-seen imagery calls for reform and change (Katulis, al-Assad, & and more or less fixed beliefs, attitudes, tastes, Morris, 2015); the terrible drought and desertifica- sympathies, empathies, inclinations, hypotheses, tion of much of eastern Syria (De Châtel, 2014), and theories. We are much more likely to take causing further resource inequities; the rebranding an image and fit it into what our prejudiced mind of Saddam’s old guard into a religious move- already asserts is truth than have an image over- ment (Coles & Parker, 2015); anti-Shi’a Iranian turn our believed — sometimes sacred — truths. sponsorship by Sunnis abroad, including in Saudi Applying this to ISIS persuasion, what any Arabia (Crooke, 2015); the Obama administra- marketing and branding company would do if tion’s failure to intervene early and decisively to asked to “sell a product” is, first, identify the target end the Syrian civil war (Kaplan, 2016); and yes, audience (demographics) and second, identify religion — the apocalyptic millenarian brand of their existing mindset (psychographics). An adept Islam that ISIS expounds (or claims to expound). marketing and branding company would conduct As causes or influences, the above reasons all a series of surveys and focus groups — generally have merit, but none can solely explain ISIS and known as neuromarketing research (Meckl-Sloan, all its attributes. My focus, as a student of political 2015) — and present a detailed report to its client. communication in general and persuasion by As Paul Bolls, one of the leading neuromarketing social, digital, and visual means in particular, is on researchers, puts the task: “Marketers first and ISIS’s visual propaganda, especially as relates to one foremost need to fundamentally understand both of its main target audiences: young men whom it the implicit and explicit emotional associations wishes to entice to join ISIS as combatants. targeted consumers make with their product’s

10 The Carter Center current design, packaging, and brand messaging.” and Arma. They differ widely in the storyline and (Bolls, 2010). setting, from the far past to the far future, but all Thus, I would contend that, while there are no involve the player acting through an avatar, firing doubt cultural differences between an 18-year-old weapons, and causing mass destruction, mayhem, man in Moscow and a similarly aged subject in and killing. Relevantly, ISIS has masterfully Nairobi, some of the most important tastes and created recruiting videos that mimic the forms preferences, and even attitudes and beliefs, cut of action movies and first-person digital games. Top: ISIS action across national, ethnic, and cultural distances At the conference, I presented two examples: movie trailer Bottom: ISIS digital and disparities. the action movie and the first-person-shooter game first-person We begin with the sheer breadth of access to digital game. shooter information and communications content that almost anyone with a computer — or, more likely, a smart phone — has access to almost anywhere in the world. Yes, individual nations like China and Iran have extensive virtual policing and firewall filters for content they deem objectionable, but trying to stop teenagers from getting access to something online is an almost impossible task anywhere, especially in more open societies. A corollary point worthy of attention by parents and local religious leaders is that this universal access turns upside down the normal instincts of parental and cultural protectiveness. Some parents, for instance — especially those from less educated or more culturally restrictive backgrounds — may still believe that the way to keep their children “safe” or away from “bad influences” is to keep them at home. Most modern parents, though, are at least vaguely aware that the bad influences one can find on an iPhone are far more dangerous than those prowling the local streets or schools. Next, in terms of actual content, what is a universally popular item of mediated enjoyment? The Hollywood-style action movie, where a hero slaughters innumerable evil enemies, blows up half a city, and wields often absurdly powerful guns, is one that filmmakers know needs little or no cultural translation. A violent action movie, if only breaking even in terms of meeting production and marketing costs in the United States, often makes its profits globally, especially in developing countries (Brook, 2014). Another escapist fantasy platform that crosses all boundaries, especially for young males, is the first-person-shooter digital game. These include, most notably, Call of Duty, Far Cry, Halo, Battlefield, Half-Life, Red Dead, Counterstrike,

Countering Daesh Propaganda 11 It is vital when viewing such imagery to It is both an old and a modern romantic take into account audience and the context of fantasy, commonly offered by militaries trying modality. Imagine being a sullen 17-year-old in to recruit. ISIS just does it much better — and, I suburban London — famously, in 2014 it was would argue as an American, for a cause that is reported that there were more British citizens wholly evil. The reality of being an ISIS fighter signed on to fight for ISIS than there were in the spring of 2016 may be that you will end up active-duty soldiers in the British army (Shute & half-starved and diseased or die under American, Oliver, 2014). Perhaps you come from immigrant Iraqi, or Russian bombs, your life thrown away parents whose own culture makes them difficult like the proverbial cannon fodder of 19th to communicate with; you feel they and other century armies. But again, try arguing “facts” elders are “stupid” and “don’t respect you.” You with your teenage son bent on engaging in some may not be materially deprived but you may, like dangerous thrill. many teenagers, be chafing at the restrictions of Digital games and action movies sell fantasy your household. You are told by society that to and make huge profits, as does ISIS in its own achieve wealth and influence you must put in an way. So what are the takeaways for governments, secular and religious community leaders, and even parents of the ISIS visual persuasion campaign? Almost instantly, you can travel to a romantic far- First, most obviously, we need to inculcate an understanding of the new digital social–online off land and, rather than watch the movie, you world. At the conference, several participants emphasized the need for “media literacy” to be can play the starring role. Instead of blowing up generally taught, and not just in schools. I agree, virtual tanks and killing avatar enemies, you can but I think we have to expand an antiquated ride a tank or fire a machine gun among a band of brothers in thrilling combat for a glorious cause. How We Live in the “IDS” Era Internet + Instant + Interactor incredible amount of work, study hard, and seek Everyone can be a producer, the approval of others. disseminator, receiver Then, perhaps a “friend” (in person or online) Blogs, podcasts, YouTube, Twitter, tells you, “Hey, look at these glorious fighters!”, Facebook, Digital Game MODS, etc. and you watch one of the videos. An alternate reality of your life is now available for projection. Digital You can short-circuit the long, dull, drudgery- Fauxtography, Photoshopping laden path your parents and society seem to No “original” photo or document expect of you. Almost instantly, you can travel to a romantic far-off land and, rather than watch Satellite the movie, you can play the starring role. Instead “Live from Ground Zero” — anywhere of blowing up virtual tanks and killing avatar to anywhere enemies, you can ride a tank or fire a machine gun among a band of brothers in thrilling combat for “ID” + Self-cast a glorious cause. Moreover, you will be cheered by Expression of inner wants, the ordinary populace and score some sex slaves as needs, ideas, feelings additional incentive. Personal > Global Not a few teenage boys might reply, “Sign me Acting out any fantasy virtually up!” As indeed they have.

12 The Carter Center media literacy curriculum that exists in many mentioned to her that he had watched one of the K–12 schools, if at all, to one that explores the ISIS videos I was presenting. She promised me startling revolutions that have occurred, some that there would be a long conversation on this within recent years, in our online, social media, topic in their home. At another table, religious digital, visual, interactive media world. leaders of different faiths discussed a history of One part of this matrix that is absolutely crucial is that audiences do not simply encounter images nowadays without a storm of chatter by those who The basic question of why some individuals fall prey seek to exploit those images for political purposes. So, in the present case study, we must pay atten- to extremism and willingly give themselves up to a tion to the online fanboys who promote the cult of exponential violence is one that is obviously recruiting message as well as the people who create and consume it. not just academic. Second, and somewhat more extensively, we need more directed conversations in vulnerable communities while understanding that no commu- violence in the names of their respective faiths. nity, even if insular, is truly isolated. Let me give All to the good, as dialogue is necessary. an example from my own activities. For the last In summary, the threat of ISIS is real, if not decade, I have been honored to collaborate with as substantial as the masterminds of ISIS pretend the Hizmet movement. They are a complicated it to be. I do not particularly think that ISIS is sisterhood of entities, but basically Hizmet is an acting in Syria and Iraq with greater evil and alliance of mostly Turkish Muslim groups, inspired destructiveness than, say, the government of by the Turkish religious leader M. Fethullah Syria or half a dozen groups in the region. But Gülen, who is as of this writing in political exile the basic question of why some individuals fall in the United States (Gülen, 2010). In brief, the prey to extremism and willingly give themselves Gülen movement sponsors an incredible number up to a cult of exponential violence is one that is of charities, from math and science schools to obviously not just academic. We in the academy interfaith dialogue conferences and publica- have known for years that big problems require tions. Almost half a dozen times in recent years big working groups across disciplines to find a they have asked me to present my work on ISIS solution. The modern challenge of extremist ideo- persuasion. logical groups will not be addressed and solved by Invariably, at these assemblies — conducted in the leaders of any one faith, any one government, Southwestern and Midwestern cities — the audi- or any one body of research. Hence, The Carter ence would be quite varied, from members of the Center gathering should be seen as an introduc- group and their families to allied professionals and tion to a much bigger project among a much community leaders of other faiths to FBI agents larger interrelated set of communities. The central and the curious public. What I saw happen, and observation of visual persuasion remains true: To was reported to me later as happening, was that combat images that are deployed to propagate the dialogue was both intragroup and intergroup. evil, one must study the beliefs that make evil so One mother told me that at her table her son had easily suggestible and not just the technology of distribution.

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14 The Carter Center Brand Architecture

Visual Images: Distinguishing Daesh’s Internal and External Communication Strategies Carol Winkler Georgia State University

To maintain and expand its caliphate within the identifying implications for the crafting of effec- Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, tive response options. Daesh needs to accomplish multiple objectives The first 12 issues of Dabiq, the official online simultaneously. It must recruit Muslims to resupply magazine of Daesh, serve as the media platform the thousands of fighters lost in its ongoing analyzed here for targeting external audiences. military campaign. It must attract skilled workers Published by Al Hayat Media in Arabic, English, necessary to stand up a functional social infrastruc- Chinese, French, Russian, and Turkish, among ture for territories under its control. It must entice other languages, Dabiq was first released in June women to join, marry, and have children for the 2014 and released its 12th issue in November long-term sustainability of the group. It must 2015. The online periodical takes its name from acquire funds to pay for the salaries and supplies the location specified in a hadith for the final needed for its fighters, families, and social service battleground for Islam. The first 18 issues of entities. It needs to effectively subdue its oppo- al-Naba, an Arabic-only news magazine Daesh nents, maintain the loyalty of its own members, members distribute by hand in the group’s defend and expand its territory, and goad opposing controlled territories in Iraq, Syria, and Libya,2 leaders into responses useful for encouraging will serve as the media platform targeting internal supporters around the globe to become active audiences. Named for a chapter in the Quran, group members. In an effort to achieve its multiple objectives, Daesh is implementing a sophisticated, strategic communication campaign comparable to those of Daesh’s approach is not uniform across media many nation states.1 The group’s approach relies on a multilingual, multiplatform propaganda effort products, as the group’s producers purposefully craft that, after the original dissemination of media their messages to reach intended target audiences. products, has ubiquitous circulation through social media. Daesh’s approach is not uniform across media products, as the group’s producers purposefully craft their messages to reach intended al-Naba released its first issue online on March 31, target audiences. As a first step toward under- 2014. Issues 2–9 were not distributed online, but standing such nuance, this essay will demonstrate certain pages of those editions have appeared on how Daesh distinguishes its media messaging Telegram. The remaining al-Naba issues in their strategy when targeting audiences internal and entirety have been posted online, with the 18th external to its territories and will conclude by issue appearing first in February 2016.

15 The most obvious distinction between Daesh’s Daesh relies much more heavily on infographics message strategies for targeting internal versus in its publications targeting internal audiences external audiences involves the use of visual than it does in those aimed at external audiences. images to convey the group’s message. On average, In al-Naba, 9 percent of the images in the first each issue of Dabiq includes 88 photographs, 18 issues are infographics, with the vast majority or a total of more than 1,100 images in the first appearing as showcased full-page images. In Dabiq, 12 issues. Conversely, al-Naba includes only 18 less than 1 percent of the online magazine’s images images on average per issue, for a total of 176 in the first 12 issues utilize infographs and, in each images across the first 18 issues. The relative case, those cover less than a full page. de-emphasis on visual messaging in the inter- For external viewers, the use of infographics nally targeted publication is consistent with the in Dabiq lacks any clear strategic message. Dabiq traditional oral culture of the MENA region. By presents only two infographics, and both of those contrast, the highlighted visual focus in Dabiq appear in the first issue. One uses a diagram to positions viewers external to the group from a visually identify Daesh’s enemies through circular diverse set of language communities to understand cutouts of flags linked to each other by a series of the messages in the propaganda. colorful, connecting lines. The other infographic While many differentiating factors characterize displays the pathway to the caliphate. This graphic the media products that Daesh aims at internal stacks a series of five text boxes, ascending from and external audiences, the remainder of this essay the bottom to the top with the words hijrah will focus on two prominent areas of distinction. (immigration), jama’ah (group), destabilize taghut (destabilizing tyrants), tamkin (empowerment), and khilafah (caliphate). Upward pointing arrows in each of the stacked text boxes clarify the Each issue of al-Naba typically includes two full- progression needed for the caliphate. Apparently page infographics: one that addresses issues of lacking strategic intent, neither Dabiq’s focus on enemy alliances nor the path to the caliphate physical security and the other focusing on topics of receives reinforcement through subsequent use psychological security. of infographics. By contrast, the infographics in al-Naba provide clear strategic messages for Daesh’s internal audi- Use of Infographics ence. Each issue of al-Naba typically includes two full-page infographics: one that addresses issues of One obvious difference between Daesh’s media physical security and the other focusing on topics content targeting internal and external audiences of psychological security. These two infographic involves the use of infographics. Infographics are subgroups are easily distinguishable based on both visual elements that display icons, signs, graphics, their content and distinctive design elements. diagrams, and maps in ways that simplify and Infographics in al-Naba that focus on topics summarize information for the viewer. Studies of physical security work to establish Daesh as show that infographics make information more a credible entity capable of safeguarding those likely to attract viewer attention,3 more under- living within its territories. By providing full-page standable,4 more believable and trusted,5 quicker accounts detailing the number of the suicide to process,6 and more likely to be retained.7 Such bombers, explosions, enemies killed, rockets fired, displays function as stand-alone messages that tanks destroyed, and the like across a range of summarize abstract information to viewers in specific locations,9 al-Naba’s infographics imply 8 concrete terms. Despite their appearance as a that Daesh’s military victories are numerous, wide- transparent vehicle for conveying information, spread, and effective. Heavy reliance on the use of infographics often present embedded persuasive timelines in the infographics invites viewers to see content as if it were factual. Daesh’s military successes as ongoing.

16 The Carter Center The physical security infographics also work district), repeated use of logos, and graphical to establish the Daesh media outlets as the most presentations of self-help information to empower transparent, trustworthy source of information the citizenry (e.g., how to avoid getting the swine regarding the outcomes of the group’s military flu, the basic tenets of Islamic faith observation, campaign. By supplying only aggregated counts and best practices for learning). Taken together, of various aspects of military victories and by the psychological security infographics position including disclaimers when their data might be Daesh to be a trusted source of information on open to question, Daesh insulates itself from religion, health, education, and other common competing, less flattering accounts of the group’s state functions. military accomplishments. al-Naba’s recurrent use of a standard cache of graphics to represent mili- tary victories (e.g., a black silhouette of a soldier carrying a limp body to illustrate the number of enemy killed) establishes a visually consistent About-to-die images appear in three forms: certain and credible set of criteria for evaluating the death, possible death, and presumed death. success of future military operations. Finally, by providing infographics that instruct individuals how to empower themselves (i.e., by giving blood or by seeking alternative shelter during and in About-to-Die Images the aftermath of enemy airstrikes), al-Naba works to establish Daesh as a concerned, trustworthy A second distinction between Daesh media partner with the logistical knowledge necessary for targeting internal and external audiences is the ensuring the physical well-being of those under use of about-to-die images. About-to-die images its purview. show impending death in ways that position them The remaining infographics in al-Naba focus on to circulate frequently within the online environ- the topic of psychological security. A number of ment. Such photographs invite viewers to use these graphical displays work to discredit all infor- their imaginations to fill in events before and after mation coming from Daesh’s enemies, including the snapped moment of the photograph. They Muslim governments allied with Western forces evoke unpredictable emotional responses because (e.g., Turkey), outside media sources (e.g., satellite individual viewers interpret the events preceding broadcasts, the internet, etc.), and rumors spread and following the snapped photograph in different 10 by ignorant Muslims duped by the externally ways. While both al-Naba and Dabiq use about- incited rumor campaigns. Using more textual to-die images frequently, the relative amount of information and fewer graphics than their physical emphasis is distinct. Forty-three percent of the security counterparts, infographics related to images in Dabiq qualify as about-to-die, while a psychological security argue that information from full 63 percent of images in al-Naba employ the outside sources is false, irrelevant, a mockery of visual strategy. the Muslim faith, or otherwise unworthy of the About-to-die images appear in three forms. The viewer’s attention. Other infographics detail the first is certain death, where the text accompanying expansive network and programming of Daesh’s the photograph (albeit tagline or story) verifies multimedia platforms as a reliable, trustworthy the subsequent loss of life. The second is possible alternative, accessible regardless of viewer death, where impending death appears probable, literacy level. but the viewer lacks sufficient information to Like physical security infographics, psycho- draw any definitive conclusion. The final type is logical security graphics work to increase Daesh’s presumed death, where the scenic elements of a credibility as an information source by presenting photograph suggests that future death is at hand nonverifiable aggregated numbers related to because of the appearance of guns, explosions, 11 community (e.g., the amount of alms given by bombs, or other incendiary devices.

Countering Daesh Propaganda 17 Daesh’s differential use of about-to-die images other incendiary devices, invite viewers to imagine for publications targeting internal and external who will be targeted in the future. Presumed-death audience is evident both in the distribution images work to bolster emotional responses from and content of the image types. Al-Naba, for viewers in and outside of Daesh territories, given the possibilities of their future use.

Implications The subjects in al-Naba’s certain-death images • Effective response options must consider Daesh’s show Daesh martyrs shortly before their deaths in target audiences. Daesh’s textual and visual message strategies in print publications differ an apparent effort to model exemplary behavior based on the targeting of internal or external of Muslims who join the group. Dabiq’s certain- audiences or even subgroups of those two groups. Unique content and design/formal elements death images, by contrast, display Daesh’s enemies of publications targeting particular audiences just before their executions, which arguably works should be analyzed and incorporated into the production of competing message campaigns. to inspire fear, anger, or delight, depending on the • Daesh’s internal and external message strategies viewer’s perspective. are suggestive for effective response options. Use of visual images in limited quantities and use of infographics (or other efficient summaries) example, uses approximately half the number of appear to attract young audiences from the certain-death images as a percentage of its total MENA region interested in joining Daesh. More image count than its externally focused counter- extensive use of visual images, however, appears part (3.6 percent of the total number of images fruitful when targeting potential Muslim recruits for al-Naba versus 7 percent for Dabiq). The around the globe subjects in al-Naba’s certain-death images show • Strategic responses to Daesh’s infographics should Daesh martyrs shortly before their deaths in an consider the multipurpose functions of the propa- apparent effort to model exemplary behavior of ganda form. Rather than simply contradicting Muslims who join the group. Dabiq’s certain-death data summarized in Daesh’s infographics (e.g., images, by contrast, display Daesh’s enemies just military successes, religious guidelines for before their executions, which arguably works to serving as a good Muslim, or availability of inspire fear, anger, or delight, depending on the media programming), effective responses need viewer’s perspective. to address why Daesh is not a credible source of The percentage of possible-death images is military, medical, logistical, educational, reli- roughly equivalent between the two publications gious, or other information and why alternative (5 percent for Dabiq versus 6 percent for al-Naba), sources can and should be trusted more. with each periodical using Daesh’s enemies as • Avoiding use of Daesh’s about-to-die images in photo subjects. The possible-death images serve a media coverage and response campaigns is needed. disciplinary function for both internal and external While traditional media outlets frequently audiences by showing the consequences of failing portray about-to-die images to attract viewers, to pledge allegiance to the Daesh cause. The one non-Daesh media outlet has replaced percentage of presumed-death images are slightly about-to-die images with a full black screen higher for publications targeting internal audi- with small white text announcing Daesh killings ences (91 percent in al-Naba versus 87 percent in and offering regrets to family and friends of the Dabiq). Scenic elements, such as guns, bombs, and executed individual. Such an approach avoids

18 The Carter Center magnifying Daesh’s media campaign without Daesh visual narrative that their members who further provoking intense emotional responses. die in their operations will have preferable after- • Daesh’s differential use of about-to-die image types lives. Further, message strategies emphasizing for internal and external audiences provides oppor- security and hope, rather than violence and tunities for effective message response. Reporting death, convey the needed message that positive certain deaths of Daesh members through means alternatives await those who choose not to other than martyrdom operations undercuts the join Daesh.

1 Alex P. Schmid, Challenging the Narrative of the Islamic State (working 6 Becky K. Peterson, “Tables and Graphics Improve Reader Performance paper, The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2015), 1. and Reader Reaction,” Journal of Business Communication, 20 (1983): http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ICCT-Schmid-Challenging-the- 47–55 Narrative-of-the-Islamic-State-June2015.pdf. Confidential U.S. intelligence 7 Mark Snicklas, The Power of Infographics: Using Pictures to Communicate assessments; Neville Bolt, The Violent Image: Insurgent Propaganda and the and Connect With Your Audiences, New York: Pearson, 2012 New Revolutionaries (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 50 8 Toth, p. 448 2 Information regarding the distribution of al-Naba was drawn from photo taglines showcasing Daesh members handing out the news magazine 9 The infographics in al-Naba include summaries of military successes in Telegram. Ramadi, Sinai, Diyali, Mahin, Faluja, Khanasser, Tunisia, Dawwa, Damascus, Bangladesh, and West Africa. 3 James D. Kelly, The Effects of Display Format and Data Density on Time Spent Reading Statistics in Text, Tables, and Graphics. Journalism Quarterly, 10 Barbie Zelizer, About to Die: How News Images Move the Public. New 70.1(1993): 140–149 York: Oxford University Press, 2010 4 Sandrea H. Utt and Steve Pasternak, “Update on Infographics in American 11 Zelizer, About to Die: How News Images Move the Public Newspapers.” Newspaper Research Journal. 21.2 (2000): 55–66 5 Christopher Toth, “Revisiting a Genre: Teaching Infographics in Business and Professional Communication Courses,” Business Communication Quarterly, 76.4 (2013): 446–457

Countering Daesh Propaganda 19 Brand Architecture

Filtering Meta-Narratives: From Global to Local Aaron Y. Zelin Washington Institute for Near East Policy; International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence

The Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS, ISIL, First, the Islamic State contends that its leaders and Daesh) provides an unprecedented amount of and members are the only people truly following documentation on its own nature and the messages the original interpretation and practice of Islam it hopes will inspire others to join in IS territory or from the time of the Muslim prophet Muhammad to conduct terrorist attacks in one’s home country. and the sahaba (Muhammad’s companions). Therefore, IS is protecting Islam from a series of enemies that are attempting to destroy it. In no The Islamic State contends that its leaders and particular order, IS claims these groups of entities are un-Islamic and must be fought to preserve members are the only people truly following the Islam: rawafidh (a derogatory term for Shi’a); nusayris (a derogatory term for Alawites); taghut original interpretation and practice of Islam. (tyrants), a term to describe Sunni leaders, whom they view as apostates; munafiqin (hypocrites), a This paper hopes to shed light on the ways term to describe Muslims that do not live up to IS transforms its broader meta-narratives into a their religion in the eyes of IS; murtadin (apos- local message. It will examine three of IS’s meta- tates), those who have left Islam (since IS has a narratives and provide two case studies on how IS very narrow definition of Islam, this encompasses filters these ideas to a local context; in particular, many ordinary Muslims); and sahawat (awak- looking at Tunisia and Saudi Arabia. This filtering ening), a term that originally referred to the tribal allows IS to shape its message based on local ideas awakening in Iraq against IS’s predecessor orga- and conditions that will resonate most strongly nization last decade. Further, it has taken on the in a particular location. It also illustrates the elas- symbol of any Sunni insurgent faction that goes ticity in IS’s ideas, giving insights into why it has against IS on the battlefield: silibiyyin (crusaders), become so potent at recruiting individuals from all a reference to Western countries; and sahyuniyyin backgrounds, cultures, and regions of the world. (Zionists), a reference to Israel. Secondly, the Islamic State displays itself in its Top Meta-Narratives propaganda as always winning battles and never admitting when there have been setbacks. Part In its messaging, the Islamic State deploys four of this argument is imbued through the slogan it overarching arguments: 1) the war against Islam, has used, baqiya wa tatamaddad (remaining and 2) winning [on the battlefield], 3) the caliphate expanding). The idea originated from a speech state-building project, and 4) the imminent by Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi, the leader after the apocalypse. announcement of IS of Iraq (ISI) in October 2006.

20 In Abu ‘Umar’s April 17, 2007, speech, which has even named its English-language magazine assessed ISI’s jihad (religious military struggle) after after the town of Dabiq. Many of the end-times four years of fighting the Americans in Iraq, he prophecies are supposed to play out in Syria and concluded with a series of statements that started the Levant in general, which gives them extra with baqiya that began by saying wa ina dawla potency.6 al-islam baqiya (verily, the Islamic State remains).1 Since some of these arguments are more The exact words were later cited by ISI’s official relevant to IS’s core territory in Iraq and Syria, spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, in an not all of these messages are fully relevant when Aug. 7, 2011, speech to attempt to convince the distilled for other local audiences for recruitment troops to remain positive since ISI had been weak- and inspiration. For instance, IS’s governing ened so greatly by the tribal awakening and the capabilities are really only on display in Libya, American military surge of troops in the prior four while the apocalyptic messages also have reso- years.2 From that point on, the term baqiya became nance in Afghanistan and Yemen. That said, a rallying cry for its fighters and supporters. The the war-against-Islam angle works in all cases, Islamic State and its supporters only later added allowing IS to discuss its winning under multiple the term tatamaddad after ISI’s successor enti- circumstances rather than in a traditional military ties, ISIS and IS, began to retake territory in sense only. 2013–2014. The state-building project of IS began to come more into focus after the leader of IS, Abu Bakr Many of the end-times prophecies are supposed to al-Baghdadi, formally announced the caliphate in his July 2, 2014, speech to usher in Ramadan for play out in Syria and the Levant in general, which 3 that year. In it, he said, “We make a special call gives them extra potency. to the ‘ulama (religious scholars), fuqaha (experts in Islamic jurisprudence), and da’i (callers), espe- cially the judges; as well as people with military, Messaging in Tunisia administrative, and service expertise and medical The first two talking points of IS’s messaging doctors and engineers of all different specializa- can be applied to Tunisia. In the Islamic State’s tions and fields. We call them and remind them first video message directed at Tunisia in mid- to fear God, for their emigration is wajib ‘ayni (an December 2014, Abu Muhammad al-Tunisi, individual obligation), so that they can answer the a Tunisian foreign fighter based in al-Raqqa, dire need of the Muslims for them.”4 This call to Syria, explained how the murtadin leaders of service highlighted how IS began to bureaucratize Tunisia oppress Muslims.7 This perception is a and systematize its state-building infrastructure, result of state policies going back to Tunisia’s which it would then show off in its media to illus- independence when the first president of country, trate how it was taking care of the affairs of IS and Habib Bourguiba, made a series of legal reforms daily lives of its ri’aya (subjects).5 that pushed Islam to private life. In 1963, he Lastly, the Islamic State has pushed the idea even drank orange juice on live television during and importance of the coming apocalypse. One of Ramadan, the holiest month of the year for its main points is related to one of the end-times Muslims, in which they fast from dawn until dusk. battles between good and evil (Muslims and the IS, along with many other Islamists, believe that unbelievers) that will take place at Dabiq, a city Bourguiba and his successor, Zayn al-‘Abidin Bin in northern Syria. IS hopes that the West — or ‘Ali, destroyed and distorted Islam. in their vernacular, the crusaders — takes the bait In the aftermath of the Sousse beach attack in and fight them there to prove the truth of the mid-July 2015, Muhammad al-Baji Qa’id al-Sibsi, prophecy. This battle, according to IS, will then the current Tunisian president and leader of the bring about the events that will lead to the Day conservative secular party Nida Tunis, said that of Judgment where Muslims will be victorious. IS

Countering Daesh Propaganda 21 Tunisia would never become an Islamic state. In assassination of two Tunisian leftist politicians response, an IS-fronted media foundation, Ajnad who were assassinated in early and mid-2013. It al-Khilafah bi-Ifriqiyyah, retorted by saying, also was involved in the 2015 spectacular attacks “Those who try to substitute earthly laws for the at the Bardo Museum in Tunis and a beach resort shari’a (Islamic law) are unbelievers who must be in Sousse, along with smaller, less-reported attacks killed, illustrating that IS does not take such words in the interior of the country on the Tunisian lightly.”8 Similarly, IS takes issue with the main- military and police.11 In addition to the Islamic stream Islamist political party al-Nahdah, which State’s perceived successes, Tunisians represent it sees as giving up on implementing shari’a and, the highest number per capita of foreign nationals therefore, betraying its origins and true aims. The fighting with IS in Iraq/Syria and Libya, up to Islamic State also views this giving up as a process 6,000 in the former and up to 2,000 in the latter. of the Christians and Jews co-opting them. It has This showcases the potential projection of power also argued that this proves that democracy is not back into Tunisia if IS attempted to exert more a proper vehicle for making true change in society activity there. that will bring Islam back to glory; instead one must undertake jihad. As Abu Mus’ab al-Tunisi Messaging in Saudi Arabia noted in a late January 2016 video message, IS Like Tunisia, Saudi Arabia lies next to a country Tunisian members will return and rule Tunisia in which there is an active war zone — Libya for with shari’a.9 Tunisia and Yemen for Saudi Arabia. Similarly, the first two IS narratives are applicable in this The Islamic State still views Saudi as directing a war case. Regarding the war against Islam, IS has much to say about Saudi Arabia. Although Saudi Arabia against “true” Islam. is known for its austere interpretations of Islam, through the teachings of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahab, IS still views Saudi as directing a war Lastly, the Islamic State even goes after against “true” Islam.12 On the political front, the Al-Qaeda and its branch in that region, Al-Qaeda Islamic State argues that Saudi’s involvement in in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM). It has argued the coalition bombing campaign in Iraq and Syria that AQIM has hidden the truth of caliphate and against IS exemplifies how Saudi Arabia is fighting no longer truly follows shari’a.10 All this highlights Islam not only intellectually but also militarily.13 how — depending on the particular party or In terms of religious arguments, in a video faction and even level of religiosity of engage- message in mid-December 2015, a Saudi member ment in prior terrorism — all elements together, of IS based in Anbar province, Iraq, claimed that according to IS, are conspiring against Islam in an Saudi Arabia had strayed away from implementing ultimate war. the hudud (fixed Quranic and Hadith penalties) While the Islamic State has not taken over within shari’a.14 Moreover, IS called out Saudi territory in Tunisia, it has been involved in the Arabia for its hypocrisy in the ways it talks about deadliest terrorist attacks in the country’s history and relates to Shi’a. On the one hand, Saudi and is part of the “we are winning” narrative. IS Arabia describes the Huthis in Yemen, a Zaydi unsuccessfully attempted to conquer the town of Shi’a revivalist movement, as infidels, while Bin Gardan, which is close to the Libyan border on the other, it calls for respect and unity with to try to make a territorial strip that stretches from the Shi’a of eastern Saudi Arabia.15 Further, IS there to Sabratha, Libya, a town on the other side explains that Saudi Arabia accommodates the of the border. Sabratha is also where IS has based practice of Shi’a Islam and the practice of ashura one of its training camps, which includes a number within its own borders. IS does this to undermine of Tunisian foreign fighters in Libya. Saudi Arabia’s Islamic legitimacy and to illustrate Besides the recent attempted takeover of that it is the only true bearer of Islam. Bin Gardan, IS has taken responsibility for the

22 The Carter Center Likewise, IS criticizes the interfaith efforts In addition to its attacks inside of Saudi Arabia, that were started under King ‘Abd al ‘Aziz, which IS members from Saudi Arabia based in Iraq, contravenes the Salafi ideas of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ Libya, Sinai Peninsula, Syria, and Yemen — which (loyalty [to the Muslims] and disavowal [of the encompass a few thousand individuals — boast unbelievers]).16 Lastly, IS directs its ire at average about how they are training to come back home Muslims from Saudi Arabia — calling them out and return the land of the two holy places of Islam for a lack of manliness or tribal pride — explaining (Mecca and Medina) to show intent and also as a that in the land of the revelations of Islam, the way to motivate others to join with the cause and people are asleep and not fighting for Islam while fight against the taghut Saudi government. European Muslims are joining up in droves and helping out the inchoate caliphate.17 From all of Conclusion this, IS argues that it is the true heir of the legacy Showing how the Islamic State manipulates its of the original Saudi Islamic State founded with broader meta-narratives to local environments Wahab in the late 18th century.18 highlights its flexibility — ways it is able to appeal To remedy these issues, IS has since the fall of to those in many locations by focusing on both 2014 conducted what it describes as qualitative general ideas with which people are familiar as military operations against Shi’a, Saudi security well as societal debates and ideas people have been forces, and Westerners inside Saudi Arabia. These exposed to in a particular locale. While this paper operations allow it to claim that it is winning only provided examples from Tunisia and Saudi on the battlefield because it is opening up the Arabia, this could be equally applied to countries battle and forcing the Saudi state to choose sides. from France, Bosnia, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Further, this highlights Saudi hypocrisies related Malaysia to China. It shows not only the potency to its public practice and implementation of Islam. with which the Islamic State pushes its messaging By mid-February 2016, according to an IS-front but also how effectively it has packaged it to media group, al-Yaqin Media Center, IS conducted varying audiences with completely different histo- nine attacks inside Saudi Arabia.19 The majority of ries and backgrounds. those targets were against Saudi Shi’a.20

1 Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi, “Hasad al-sinayn bi-dawla al-muwahidin,” 11 The Islamic State, “al-Amaliyat al-amaniyyah fi tunis,” al-Naba newsletter, al-Furqan Media, April 17, 2007 Issue #7, Nov. 28, 2015 2 Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, “Ina dawlat al-islam baqiya,” al-Furqan Media, 12 For more on comparing the ideology of Saudi Arabia and IS, see Cole Aug. 7, 2011 Bunzel, “The Kingdom and the Caliphate: Duel of the Islamic States,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Feb. 18, 2016. http:// 3 To see the evolution and history in IS’s state-building enterprise, see carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/18/kingdom-and-caliphate-duel-of- Aaron Y. Zelin, “Experts weigh in (part 3): Is ISIS good at governing?,” islamic-states/iu4w Brookings Institution, Feb. 9, 2016. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/ posts/2016/02/09-experts-weigh-in-isis-governance-zelin-mccants 13 The Islamic State, “Qal ini ‘ala bayyinah min rabi,” Wilayat Salah al-Din Media Office, Dec. 16, 2015 4 Abu Bakr al-Hussayni al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi, “Risalat ila al-mujahidin wa-l-ummah al-islamiyyah fi shuhri ramadan,” al-Furqan Media, July 2, 2014 14 The Islamic State, “Ikhraju al-mushrikin min al-jazirah al-arab,” Wilayat al-Anbar Media Office, Dec. 17, 2015 5 For more on how IS governs, see Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Islamic State’s Territorial Methodology,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Research 15 The Islamic State, “Aal al-salul: al-wala’ wa-l-bara’,” Wilayat al-Janub Media Notes 29, January 2016. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/ Office, Dec. 17, 2015 view/the-islamic-states-territorial-methodology 16 The Islamic State, “al-Bakhrah al-khabithah fi bilad al-haramayn al-asirah,” 6 For more on the apocalyptic ideas and messaging that IS uses, see William Wilayat al-Khayr Media Office, Dec. 19, 2015 McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision 17 Ibid of the Islamic State, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015 18 The Islamic State, “Wa-ina ghadan al-nadharahu qarib,” Wilayat al-Barakah 7 The Islamic State, “Risala ila ahl tunis,” al-I’tisam Media, Dec. 17, 2014 Media Office, Dec. 18, 2015 8 Ajnad al-Khilafah bi-Ifiiqiyyah Media Foundation, “Hadha biyyan li-l-nas” 19 The Islamic State, “Amaliyat al-dawlah al-islamiyyah fi bilad al-haramayn 9 The Islamic State, “Bilad al-maghrib al-islami: mardin al-jadidah,” Wilayat hata 5-7-1437 H,” al-Yaqin Media Center, Feb. 16, 2016 al-Barakah Media Office, Jan. 21, 2016 20 For more on why IS chooses to target Saudi Shi’a, see Aaron Y. Zelin, “The 10 The Islamic State, “al-Haqq bi-l-rakab,” Wilayat al-Jaza’ir Media Office, Islamic State’s Saudi Chess Match,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Jan. 20, 2016; The Islamic State: “Alaykum ya bini qawmi: risala,” Wilayat Hims Policy Watch 2432, June 2, 2015. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy- Media Office, Jan. 20, 2016 analysis/view/the-islamic-states-saudi-chess-match

Countering Daesh Propaganda 23 Brand Architecture

Visual Imagery of the Islamic State Cori E. Dauber University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

The so-called Islamic State (IS), or Daesh, be confronting serious ethical issues, if only for produces an astonishing amount of propaganda the amount of these materials many of us tend to materials on a regular, systematized basis.1 A large expose students to in our classes. percentage of these materials include visual images Rather, it is a claim that the process of radical- of some kind. It would be an enormous mistake to ization is a complex one, as yet only incompletely attempt to analyze the propaganda of IS without understood. Given how much research has clearly incorporating an analysis of the way their visuals demonstrated images to be extremely powerful, work: The weight of research in multiple academic the amount of effort these groups put into their disciplines (including communication, journalism, production — and the fact that in virtually every case where someone has been arrested for partici- pation in terrorist violence in Western nations The process of radicalization is a complex one, as (or conspiracy to commit such acts) these videos have been in their possession — it makes sense to yet only incompletely understood. treat these materials as one element contributing to this process. That is more than enough to justify and mass communication; advertising; psychology; analyzing the visuals produced by IS, particularly and film and cinema) over many years makes their videos — the more since analysis of the text clear that in many contexts the image may well alone when there is a strong visual presence will be more powerful than the word.2 It is the image often produce a distorted analytic result.3 that is more likely to draw a viewer’s attention, that produces more accurate and longer-lasting Multiple Factors recall, and that is processed more rapidly, perhaps IS videos must be analyzed for, as has often been because it is more visceral, more emotional. noted, they are a generation ahead of every other terrorist group in this area. Effective counter- A Complex Process radicalization will require understanding what To be clear, this is not a claim of causality. drives the persuasive power of these materials. In It is not the case that someone who watches particular, it is counterproductive in the extreme propaganda videos produced by IS (or any other to look for the singular counternarrative. There group), even a large number of videos, becomes will be no such thing, because there is no singular radicalized — much less radicalized to the point narrative structure in these materials, and never of violence. Indeed, were that the case, most of has been.4 us doing this kind of research would not only Furthermore, when looking at the materials likely have been radicalized ourselves, we would produced by IS, there is not a simple question of

24 an overall difference in vaguely defined “produc- legitimacy, are central to its persuasive campaign. tion values” relative to other groups. It is far more They are also central to its theological campaign, complicated than that. because if IS is, in fact, a state, established, with Every aspect of these videos embeds infor- real control over its territory, then those who mation that must be understood if effective already are in agreement with its theological counternarratives are to be developed. position are obligated to concede its demand • First, all the elements of composition, lighting, for obedience and to immigrate to territory it editing, camera angles, special effects, and so controls.7 forth are used to powerful rhetorical effect.5 • Second, visual arguments (arguments that are made implicitly through the imagery) will be Effective counterradicalization will require more powerful, not less, because while they are there and will have persuasive force, viewers understanding what drives the persuasive power of who are not specifically trained to unpack visual these materials. In particular, it is counterproductive materials will not necessarily understand how or why the material is persuasive. That which is in the extreme to look for the singular argumentatively implicit is much more difficult counternarrative. to stand up against as a viewer. For example, when the subjective or first-person camera angle is used, putting the viewer directly Government Responses into the scene and allowing them to imagine The problem in responding to these videos, themselves in the Islamic State, the effect is a and others like them, is that government-run powerful one, but viewers who do not recognize programs to do so have been utter failures, judging the nature of that camera angle or why it is being by the numbers who continue to immigrate to used are much less likely to see it as strategically IS-controlled territory in order to join the orga- deployed as a mechanism, as artifice. Similarly, if nization. This is no surprise if one considers the the scene is a well-stocked store, with shelves and American program, run by the U.S. Department bins full to overflowing with fresh produce, meat, of State. Called “Think Again, Turn Away,” it and luxury items such as soda, the naïve viewer has been managed by the now-defunct Center will not necessarily be aware that the argument for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications being made implicitly (“there is plenty to eat and has been recently, mercifully, terminated. in the Islamic State”) is, in fact, being carefully (For some reason the Twitter account, at least the constructed in order to persuade him or her that English language version, continues, so perhaps this is not something that just “happens.” rumors of the program’s demise are exaggerated.) Having made a number of videos that appeal There were never nearly enough U.S. videos to the quality of life in the Islamic State for produced to compete, just in sheer quantity of families, IS is now releasing videos one might call output, with ISIS. On every measurable level, a the “Day in the Life” series. These videos purport qualitative comparison would, by far, have favored to take viewers behind the scenes of the most the terrorists: graphics, images, and editing. Every banal aspects of administration and governance element of production made the U.S. govern- in the state — following the traffic police, or fire ment’s videos look amateur by comparison. And and rescue, or food inspection services on what just to make sure no one missed the point, many is presumably a typical day. These videos, too, of the State Department videos featured long clips make carefully constructed and implicit arguments of IS videos.8 It was embarrassing. Even when the about the nature of life in the Islamic State: that videos were professionally produced — when all it is peaceful, orderly, and normal.6 These argu- the State Department was doing was reposting, for ments, which are central to IS’s establishing its

Countering Daesh Propaganda 25 example, network news pieces — they would make designed to shock, horrify, even terrify, main- sure to downgrade the quality by superimposing stream Western audiences. Though it is also in graphics far worse than anything IS was doing.9 English, the video “Eid Greetings,”11 given its There is no intrinsic reason why only terror- arguments about how wonderful it is for Muslims ists can produce high-quality videos. Look, for to live in dignity without the corrupting influ- example, at the beautifully produced video, ence of the kuffar, is probably not meant for a “Happy British Muslims.”10 This was not profes- mainstream audience. It is intended to recruit sionally shot or produced, and there is no reason Muslims living in the West. Many of the to believe it took a particularly large budget. speakers explicitly appeal to the viewer to come live in the new state. Evaluation • How are compositional elements used? For The question then is, “How can Islamic State example, how are camera angles used in the videos be properly evaluated so that we can video? It is a truism in this type of analysis begin to understand their persuasive power and that filming something from below will make the role visual images play in making them it look larger, more imposing, more authorita- persuasive — and thus begin to develop effective tive — possibly more frightening. By the same counters?” It helps to ask a series of questions as token, filming from above will make a subject part of an iterative process in order to build an look smaller, less threatening, and more vulner- understanding of what drives any given video. able. The type of camera used can be just as This is an attempt to quickly walk the reader important. A hand-held camera provides a “first through a complicated process. person” angle that gives the viewer an immer- sive perspective. A drone gives a “God’s eye” • What language is the video in? This actually is view that can be used in a number of different a more complicated question than it might seem ways, and so on. Are subjects lit in warm light, at first blush. There is the language spoken by making them look happy, friendly, attractive? those in whatever scene is shown on camera. Or is the lighting darker, more oppressive, There is the language of any narration. There giving the scene a claustrophobic, threatening is the language of any subtitles — and there are feel? How are special effects used? Are they often several, sometimes in several different obvious — such as using a color filter over the alphabets. What is important to keep in mind entire scene or superimposing video game-like is that the language is important — but not effects? Or subtle, such as using slow motion for definitive — because it’s a clue pointing toward just a few seconds in sync with the music? Is the the real question: What audience is the video editing done so seamlessly that it isn’t apparent? intended for? Or so poorly that it draws attention to itself and • Consider English-language commercials. detracts from the overall message of the video? Though all in English, TV commercials for • Symbology: For an analyst who is not a mothers may sell toys for infants, for teenage Muslim — or who is Muslim but is not boys may sell first-person shooter video games, Salafist — this aspect of analysis poses the most or for older men may sell hair loss cures. All are risk. However, it cannot be avoided, particularly targeted to specific audiences, and what is meant when dealing with the Islamic State: Their shots for one group will not be particularly effective are too carefully composed and, in most cases, on another. the symbolism too rich. It is absolutely essential • What argument is being made? This is another to have a guide to the use of symbols in this clue toward determining the audience. If you kind of propaganda. The Combating Terrorism look at the arguments made in many of the Center’s Islamic Imagery Project serves as a kind English-language atrocity videos, it is doubtful of codex, a form of visual dictionary that is enor- their primary purpose is recruiting: They are mously helpful when doing this type of work.12

26 The Carter Center • Is all of the footage from a single source? A number of conclusions can be drawn from The Islamic State is not different from earlier studying the visual imagery of the Islamic State. groups in “borrowing” heavily from whatever First, the visual imagery is a key aspect of under- is available digitally and from whatever strikes standing the persuasive power of IS propaganda. them as useful. But earlier groups were happy At a minimum, analyzing IS visuals makes clear to use “prorsum” or “mash-up” styles: They had that no single counternarrative will work, because no overall, guiding visual aesthetic. IS does. So they are not producing and distributing a single while it will borrow and repurpose other mate- narrative. Second, regarding personal responses to rial, it will only do so in a way that permits it to IS propaganda, visual images must be both taken retain a consistent look and style. For example, into account and be central to an effective coun- like every other jihadist group, it uses material terresponse. Finally, government responses have so from earlier groups. However, those videos are far failed. Whatever the response going forward, it almost all of lower quality, and they tend to take needs to be something different. the audio track only, leaving IS free to use visual material consistent with all its other videos.13

1 Charlie Winter, “Fishing and Ultraviolence,” BBC.com, Oct. 6, 2015. 8 See “ISIS Inside the Tent,” Posted by “Think Again, Turn Away,” Jan. 22, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-88492697-b674-4c69-8426- 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vqT9gp3yXDo as an example. 3edd17b7daed Notice that it isn’t a “Think Again, Turn Away” channel — so a wide variety of other material is in between the few videos they do have up. 2 For a survey of this literature, see Cori E. Dauber and Carol K. Winkler, “Radical Visual Propaganda in the Online Environment: An Introduction,” in 9 “Daesh Defectors: Yahya,” Posted by “Think Again, Turn Away,” Aug. 7, Winkler and Dauber, eds., Visual Propaganda and Extremism in the Online 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t5ghRrkKx_Y. This is obviously Environment (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War a ripped Al Jazeera report and a powerful one. The question is whether College Press, July, 2014): 1–30 young people used to high-quality graphics will make it through to the reporting given the disservice the State Department does to the start of the 3 Doris Graber has written, “Purely verbal analyses not only miss the video. information contained in the pictures and nonverbal sounds, they even fail to interpret the verbal content appropriately because that content 10 “Pharrell — Happy British Muslims! #HAPPYDAY,” Posted by BENIstream, is modified by its combination with picture messages.” Doris A. Graber, April 15, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gVDIXqILqSM. Note “Content and Meaning, What’s It All About?” American Behavioral Scientist, that where State Department videos typically have below 10,000 views, this 33, no. 2 (1980), p. 145 one has, as of this writing, well over 2 million. 4 See Cori E. Dauber, “ISIS and the Family Man,” Small Wars Journal, July 11 “Eid Greetings From the Land of Khilafah,” Posted by Naz Brown, Aug. 7, 1, 2015. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/isis-and-the-family-man and 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nju-cygQ5_g. Accessed Feb. 21, Charlie Winter, The Virtual “Caliphate”: Understanding the Islamic State’s 2015. It has since been taken down for violating YouTube’s terms of service, Propaganda Strategy (London, U.K.: Quilliam Foundation, 2015). http:// but it has been taken down before and returned. www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/ 12 The Combating Terrorism Center, The Islamic Imagery Project: Visual the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf Motifs in Jihadi Internet Propaganda (West Point, N.Y.: Department of 5 Cori E. Dauber and Mark Robinson, “ISIS and the Hollywood Visual Style,” Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy, March 2006). https://www.ctc.usma. Guest Post: Jihadology, July 6, 2015. http://jihadology.net/2015/07/06/ edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Islamic-Imagery-Project.pdf guest-post-isis-and-the-hollywood-visual-style/ 13 See the very slickly produced, “Islamic State of Iraq and Sham _ Sheikh 6 These examples are all taken from Aaron Zelin’s indispensible website: Osama bin Laden _ Im-1.” In it, when bin Laden speaks in Arabic, what he “New Video Message From the Islamic State: ‘Control and Inspection in says is subtitled in English, and when Awlaki speaks in English, his words Wiliyat Ninewa,’” Jihadology.net, Posted by Aaron Zelin, Sept. 13, 2015. are subtitled in Arabic. (The original seems to be gone, but a copy has http://jihadology.net/2015/09/13/new-video-message-from-the-islamic- been preserved—identical in content, but not nearly as high in resolution.) state-control-and-inspection-in-wilayat-ninawa/; “New Video Message See “ISIS: Sheikh Osama bin Laden and Imam Anwar al Awlaki Establishing From the Islamic State: ‘Protection and Safety Office — Wiliyat al-Raqqah,’” Khilafah,” TRAC Yemen, posted June 25, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/ Jihadology.net, Oct. 22, 2015. http://jihadology.net/2015/10/22/new-video- watch?v=QGVoN5m4BRw accessed May 25, 2014. There is a virtually message-from-the-islamic-state-protection-and-safety-office-wilayat-al- identical version produced not by Al Hayat Media but by Al Hayat raqqah/; “New Video Message From the Islamic State: ‘The Traffic Police Deutschland. In that version, the graphics that are ordinarily in English in in Wiliyat Ninewa,’” Jihadology.net, Aug. 30, 2015. http://jihadology. most Al Hayat productions are in German, and Awlaki’s words (only the net/2015/08/30/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-the-traffic- Awlaki section is used) are subtitled in German only. “al-Hayat Deutschland police-in-wilayat-ninawa/ - Shaikh Anwar al-Aulaqi - Die Etablierung des islamischen Staates Teil 1,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Njt73bS8sjg posted by al Hayat 7 See Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” The Atlantic Monthly, Deutschland, May 14, 2014. There is an identical version currently posted March 2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what- in which Awlaki’s portion has been cut. See “Sheikh Osama bin Laden isis-really-wants/384980/ Islamic State of Iraq and Sham ISIS ISLAMIC STATE,” Posted by ali abdullah, Feb. 13, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_fQ56kmZsfU accessed Feb. 22, 2015

Countering Daesh Propaganda 27 Brand Architecture

The Paris Attacks: Terror and Recruitment Jad Melki and Azza El-Masri Institute of Media Research and Training, Lebanese American University

To many analysts, the Nov. 13, 2015, Paris attacks The Paris Attacks: Consistent signaled a shift in the Islamic State in Iraq and Trends and Narratives Syria’s (ISIS) strategy toward attacking Western targets (Schmitt and Kirkpatrick, 2015), but For the purpose of this report, we will define that largely missed the point. With a continent the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as a spiraling into anxiety and all media attention virtual state (Seib, 2011). This helps us more turning toward the group, the elaborate ISIS objectively and rationally examine this nonstate media machine had actually succeeded yet again in actor’s sophisticated military, political, financial, promoting its brand globally. The terror campaign and communication apparatuses and not naively that targeted Paris was not only meant to instigate underestimate its abilities by dismissing ISIS as a group of fanatic maniacs with psychological disorders. In a mission to win Muslims’ hearts and minds, ISIS has sought to establish its legitimacy The terror campaign that targeted Paris was not through synchronized mediated real-time action only meant to instigate horror but was also utilized built around terrorism spectacles. These violent attacks are justified within an apocalyptic religious as a public diplomacy tool to effectively reach narrative, which emphasizes an impending clash of foreign publics. civilizations that will restore Islam’s lost glorious days and vindicate Muslims around the world. This report uses the Nov. 13, 2015, Paris attacks horror but was also utilized as a public diplomacy as a case study to elaborate the ISIS media–terror tool to effectively reach foreign publics. By ques- model. tioning mainstream media’s extensive coverage of On the heels of twin suicide bombings in the attacks, this report analyzes the way in which Beirut that killed 43 people, ISIS struck France’s ISIS actually imposes such coverage and uses it capital in a series of coordinated terrorist attacks. to simultaneously attract potential recruits and The attacks, which have been described as “the terrorize its enemies. As a case study, the report worst […] since the Madrid bombings in 2004,” chronicles how the Paris terrorism campaign left 130 people dead and hundreds more injured offered the group an opportunity to apply its (Werber, 2015). At 9:20 p.m., six locations were sophisticated media model, which synergisti- targeted in a series of shootings and suicide bomb- cally uses terrorism, mass and social media, and ings — including the Stade de France stadium branding tools to gain recognition, reach potential and the Bataclan, a popular concert hall. At the recruits, and spread fear among its enemies. time, ISIS took no official stance, despite French officials’ quick accusations. The speculation spilled

28 over into social media an hour after police put an with some Muslims around the globe (Shane & end to the Bataclan siege, where 89 people were Hubbard, 2014). By framing this struggle as a killed and two gunmen detonated their suicide religious clash of civilizations, which has seen the vests. rise of a united ummah (nation) with the establish- In a clear indication of how ISIS takes ment of the caliphate against a Judeo-Christian advantage of crowd-sourcing on social media, world order, the group’s extreme violence becomes numerous pro-ISIS tweets emerged so quickly and justified. As such, ISIS has branded itself as the so systematically that one suspects at least some of de facto representative of all Muslims, imbuing them were preplanned to be part of the terrorism its brand within a definitive understanding of campaign. Indeed, ISIS supporters clamored online Islam. Unlike other Islamist movements, the to cheer for the group that had committed the Islamic State’s theologians stress the concept of Paris ghazwa (raid). In parallel with international ijmaa (consensus) whereby the group borrows from outcry that condemned the attacks, extremists the four schools of Sunni Islamic legal tradition on social media quickly rejoiced and credited and uses them as justification in its governance, the attacks to ISIS. One Twitter user posted in executions, and attacks (Amarsingam and Arabic: “France, do you think that the Islamic Al-Tamimi, 2015). caliphate will forget you. By God, no…” Another also tweeted in Arabic: “Even if the Islamic State does not claim responsibility for this operation, we rejoice when we see the West trembling. God is ISIS has branded itself as the de facto representative Great.” Other users changed their profile images to of all Muslims, imbuing its brand within a definitive a French flag stamped with a boot’s footprint and included in their posts the hashtag #ParisOnFire, understanding of Islam. which became a worldwide trending hashtag along with #PrayForParis. This social media activity effectively creating a Twitter storm — a common For example, the Jordanian pilot’s brutal execu- trend in ISIS media campaigns that are associated tion was justified by citing five different instances with major terrorism campaigns (Stern and Berger, in Islamic history where burning was an accepted 2015) and that effectively manipulate existing punishment (Al Hayat Media Center, 2015a, grievances. p. 7–8). As such, the group’s desire to extinguish The immediate happiness of certain ISIS what it calls “the gray zone” is essential (Al Hayat supporters taps into longstanding resentment Media Center, 2014). Usually understood as an toward Western powers, which ISIS has long inte- area of uncertainty (Crelinsten, 2002), ISIS’s grated into its branding strategy in order to attract definition of the gray zone is largely based on a alienated Muslim youths around the world. For speech by Osama bin Laden in the aftermath of millions of Arabs and Muslims, the colonial legacy the Sept. 11 attacks. Bin Laden draws the line that left their regions weak, decades of injustice in between Muslims who adopt the jihadist lifestyle Palestine, and the brutality of Arab authoritarian and “everyone who treads behind Bush in his puppet regimes propped up by Western powers plan [who] has apostatized from the religion of remain widely legitimized grievances. Within its Muhammad” (Al Hayat Media Center, 2014, propaganda, ISIS’s jihadist narrative is constantly p. 44). ISIS’s branding strategy exacerbates this contextualized to reiterate these tropes and paint othering narrative, which has long been utilized itself to be the only viable solution, as opposed to in every major ideological conflict, as it ties it into Al-Qaeda and the many other extremist groups a prophecy signaling the end of time. In an epic operating today inside Syria. battle in Syria’s northern city, Dabiq, the jihadists ISIS strives to “restore idealized eras of earlier of the caliphate will rise triumphant against their Islamic history,” an idea that still resonates enemies. In order to do so, it must attract Muslims

Countering Daesh Propaganda 29 of the world to its side by showing it is able to Hayat video promised “soon very soon, the blood rule through God’s laws and its ability to terrorize will spill everywhere” (Al Hayat Media Center, the enemy. 2015b). Only three days after the attacks, the 12th The Paris attacks, in that sense, fit into this issue of the official Dabiq magazine was released, strategy, as they help justify ISIS’s cause while with the Paris attacks featured on the cover. also anticipating retaliation from the French On social media, some Twitter users affiliated government, which had first entered the U.S.-led with the group had already begun circulating a coalition against ISIS in September 2014. photo that purports to show the inside of one of Calling it an “act of war” (Heneghan, 2015), the locations attacked. The picture, which was French President Francois Hollande vowed in a featured in several online news outlets’ coverage live address a day after the attacks to intensify despite its graphic content (Charlton, 2015; airstrikes on ISIS locations in Syria. At the Batchelor, 2015), was taken inside the Bataclan. time, France had only carried limited operations, ISIS-linked Twitter users co-opted the rapidly primarily in Iraq. By justifying its terror within trending topic #PrayForParis in order to diffuse an apocalyptic religious prophecy and playing on similarly gruesome pictures and advance ISIS’s Muslims’ long-held grievances, ISIS not only uses narratives. This strategy, referred to as a Twitter social media to propagate its narratives but also storm (Stern and Berger, 2015), creates a synergy guarantees that mass media coverage of its terrorist with the online communication campaign and operations will reproduce them. ensures at least brief mass media attention. For those who were sympathetic to the group’s cause, the attacks were considered a victory for Muslims The extreme violence the ISIS brand relies on also worldwide that offered an opportunity to recruit more alienated youth to the ranks of ISIS. serves to send a warning to those who oppose Unlike previous Islamist movements, ISIS provides both real action and a distinct story. The the caliphate. Paris attacks allowed frustrated youths to believe the ISIS brand’s promise of extreme adventure, conquest, and revenge. Enticed by Hollywood-like The ISIS Brand From Social videos, potential recruits are drawn toward the to Mainstream Media fantasy of earning larger-than-life status as heroes and martyrs and winning a place in history (Spens, By opting for a more decentralized strategy built 2014; Sachs, 2012). In the propaganda material it on crowdsourcing, hashtag hacking, and in-house would later produce, ISIS exalted the fighters who designed apps and bots, ISIS is able to bridge carried out the attacks in Paris for their bravery the gap between new and traditional media and and heroism. On the other hand, the extreme target different audiences. Two hours after the violence the ISIS brand relies on also serves to French president’s announcement on Nov. 14, a send a warning to those who oppose the caliphate. statement by ISIS began circulating online and In that sense, the group is able to promote a simul- was quickly picked up by different news outlets. taneously terrifying and alluring image of itself In the statement, ISIS claimed responsibility for built on terrorism acts that are synchronized with the attacks and hinted that they had been months media acts and both propagated via online and in the making. Similarly, the stealth and rapidity offline media. in which both the group’s official media arm, Terrorism may ensure a temporary media boost, Al Hayat Media Center, and other provincial but it does not necessarily guarantee the perpe- media centers produced and published media trator will win continuous media access. ISIS’s content in the aftermath signaled a coordinated media strategists seem to be aware of this matter and preplanned media operation. Indeed, a day and often quickly follow up the terror/media- before the Paris attacks, a widely circulated Al boost campaign with a recruitment campaign. For

30 The Carter Center instance, a few hours after the Paris attacks, ISIS on terrorism” frames that dominate much of pushed a recruitment video that targeted French global news coverage of the Middle East. In that Muslims. Snippets of the official ISIS statement sense, the group advances a narrative that the and the recruitment video were continuously press can already place within existing media broadcast on several news channels, allowing ISIS frames (Wolfsfeld, 1997). As the subject of the to reach its audiences and promote its intended Paris attacks dominated all major news outlets, news frames. A quick scan of the available digital ISIS’s claim of responsibility propelled the group archive of ISIS media compiled by the Jihadology into the spotlight, allowing it to manipulate its blog showed that the video was an unedited double-pronged discourse into mainstream media. version of a previous one, released in May. The Terrorism spectacles such as the latter can often latter, titled “Pledge Your Allegiance,” included create powerful news frames. Seib and Janbek snippets from a blue-eyed French-speaking fighter’s (2011) described media as “terrorism’s oxygen.” speech that urged French Muslims to migrate to When news institutions cover terrorist attacks, ISIS territories in Syria and Iraq. In the aftermath they are simultaneously serving the terrorist of the attack, the full video that first appeared on attackers by offering them publicity, recognition, ISIS’s Telegram channel revealed more testimo- and legitimacy. News institutions, particularly nies. The French fighter, identified as Abu Osama in a democratic state, can rarely resist covering Al-Faranci, taunted French Muslims watching the terrorism, especially when these attacks target video: “What are you waiting for?” Joining him their own compatriots or the interests of their were a group of silent, uniformed, and heavily nations (Seib and Janbek, 2011). armed men, looking foreboding. Another fighter, Abu Maryam Al-Faranci, encouraged those who couldn’t make hijrah (migrate) to “fight the kafir wherever you find him” (Al Hayat Media Center, When news institutions cover terrorist attacks, they n.d.). are simultaneously serving the terrorist attackers by Even seemingly uncoordinated ISIS terror attacks seem to carry this feature of post-attack offering them publicity, recognition, and legitimacy. recruitment media campaigns. ISIS, unlike Al-Qaeda, has largely endorsed lone-wolf attacks as part of its decentralized terror strategy. A year Taking the Paris attacks as a case study, a earlier, fresh from the Charlie Hebdo shootings in survey of six news channels — three of which cater Paris, an attack on a kosher grocery store east of to a pan-Arab audience — showed coverage of ISIS the city left four dead. In a telephone interview, spiked just as Europe spiraled into anxiety amid the assailant, Amedy Coulibaly, told BFMTV security concerns of some terrorist attackers having that he operated under ISIS’s command. After fled France. We examined the main YouTube his death, his bayaah (pledge of allegiance) was channels of CNN, Sky News, and Russia Today as included in ISIS’s propaganda material, and an well as Al-Jazeera, Al Arabiya, and Al Mayadeen. in-depth feature appeared in Dabiq’s seventh issue. A total of 292 televised reports between Nov. 14 and Jan. 18 were surveyed. CNN had the most ISIS’s Marketing of Terror extensive coverage with 96 reports, 25 of which focused primarily on ISIS. This is contrasted with The ISIS brand looks to spreading an image of Saudi-owned Al Arabiya (11), Qatar’s Al Jazeera a united caliphate that is strong and prosperous. (10), Rupert Murdoch’s Sky News (8), Beirut- Yet in order to guarantee continuous promo- based Al Mayadeen (6), and Russia Today (1). tion, it utilizes spectacular terrorist events to Simultaneously, the continuous coverage of maintain control over access and meaning. In the group’s recruitment video coincided with the post-9/11 era, ISIS has been able to capitalize different reports speculating on the identities of on — rather than be damaged by — the “war the terrorist attackers as a European manhunt was

Countering Daesh Propaganda 31 underway. France closed its borders and declared tolerated. For alienated and disenfranchised a state of emergency (Gander, 2015); Belgium Muslims, the caliphate becomes a response to was in lockdown (Taub, 2015); and British Prime the incoherence and tensions many recruits face Minister David Cameron announced that the in their lives in Western societies, a response United Kingdom was placed on high alert for that offers closure, coherence, and a resolution an imminent terrorist attack (McTague, 2015). to a deep existential crisis. The caliphate, then, Despite the negative mass media coverage on ISIS, embodies a world where Muslims retake their the group enjoyed immense access to a global agency, their power, and their glory. audience, allowing it to spread its two key narra- To balance out the extreme violence, the group tives: one recruiting and for keeping the support also diffused propaganda material that emphasized of its domestic audience, and one for an audience its unity in celebrating the Paris attacks across it considers its enemy although, in most cases, its territories. This theme, which succeeds in the same message achieves both aims. Terrorism, promoting a successful ISIS brand, is understood therefore, is utilized as a psychological warfare through Stengel’s (2011) conception of “funda- tactic to undermine the enemy and demoralize mental human values” that are used by successful its fighters (Melchior, 2014) and simultaneously brands. These fundamental values are represented to promote the ISIS brand to potential recruits through five fields that improve people’s lives: and sympathizers. eliciting joy, enabling connection, evoking pride, inspiring exploration, and impacting society. In the aftermath of the Paris attacks, 16 ISIS-linked Despite the negative mass media coverage on videos were released between Nov. 14, 2015, and Jan. 24, 2016, of which 75 percent were released ISIS, the group enjoyed immense access to a by provincial media outlets. In them, men are seen celebrating the terrorist attacks and praising global audience. the attackers across the Islamic State. In a photo report from the ISIS-occupied Libyan city of Sirte, uniformed fighters distributed sweets to citizens With the brutality of the Paris attacks domi- in celebration. This brand image is important in nating headlines and broadcasts around the world, ISIS’s recruiting strategy, especially in relation ISIS also capitalized on the violence “to awaken to its potential foreign audiences and supporters. potential recruits to the reality of the jihadis’ war” Indeed, the propaganda material emphasizes (Stern and Berger, 2015, p. 115). This strategy is the harmonious life in the Islamic State despite largely credited to a 2004 document, titled “The France’s promise of intensifying airstrikes. The Management of Slavery,” penned by the pseudony- caliphate is, therefore, portrayed as a functioning, mous Abu Bakr Naji. In it, Naji offered a blueprint better, and viable alternative to the West. for jihadists to establish a caliphate in which he This report summarized the impact of ISIS’s advocated the escalation of violence in order to use of terrorism, social media, and branding strate- attract supporters and effect polarization between gies in the aftermath of Paris’ Nov. 13 attacks. enemies and advocates (Stern and Berger, 2015, In the post-9/11 era, extremists online have p. 46). The second section of the document, titled expanded from secretive online communities “Path to Empowerment,” explicitly explained to take a more prominent role with the advent how “to attract new youth through… conducting of real-time news and ubiquitous social media. operations that attract people’s attention” (Stern ISIS, which has sought to tap into this new and Berger, 2015, p. 17). dynamic, has succeeded in creating a brand that ISIS’s “media model” bases itself on the promotes a utopian community in which alien- marketing of savagery while also promoting a ated Muslim youths are encouraged to pursue a utopian, united Islamic front — the caliphate — dangerous, exciting life akin to the one they’ve where all forms of discrimination will not be grown accustomed to through video games and

32 The Carter Center Hollywood action films. At the same time, the media’s attention from its territorial losses in order ISIS brand targets the enemies of the Islamic to retain supporters’ enthusiasm to their cause. In State and utilizes terrorism as a psychological 2015 alone, the group lost 14 percent of its terri- warfare to thwart its foes’ efforts in undermining tories in Syria and Iraq (Hutt, 2015). The physical the caliphate. By taking the Paris attacks and its threat that ISIS poses to the world is undeniably aftermath as a case study, the paper analyzed the real, and while efforts to curb its territorial gains way in which ISIS was able to engage in mediated have proved successful, they must be synchronized public diplomacy by framing its narrative for main- with a serious reconsideration of the role of mass stream media. Similarly, ISIS is able to divert mass media in the group’s ideological success.

References Melchior, J. (2014). ISIS Tactics Illustrate Social Media’s New Place In Modern War. TechCrunch. Retrieved from http://techcrunch. Al Hayat Media Center. (n.d.) “What Are You Waiting For?” com/2014/10/15/isis-tactics-illustrate-social-medias-new-place-in- Retrieved Nov. 14, 2015, from https://drive.google.com/file/ modern-war d/0B2ti2hHSsEZaUG1BNUh4anpDX2s/view Sachs, J. (2012). Winning the Story Wars: Why Those Who Tell (and Live) Al Hayat Media Center. (2014). Reflections on the Final Crusade. Dabiq, 4, The Best Stories Will Rule the Future. Boston, Mass. Harvard Business 32-44. Retrieved from http://jihadology.net/category/dabiq-magazine/ Review Press Al Hayat Media Center. (2015a). The Burning of the Murtadd Pilot. Dabiq, Schmitt, E., & Kirkpatrick, D. (2015). Strategy Shift for ISIS: Inflicting Terror 7, 5-8. Retrieved from http://jihadology.net/category/dabiq-magazine/ in Distant Lands. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes. Al Hayat Media Center (2015b). “Soon, Very Soon.” Retrieved from com/2015/11/15/world/europe/strategy-shift-for-isis-inflicting-terror-in- https://halummu.wordpress.com/2015/11/12/%D1%81%D0%BA%D0 distant-lands.html?_r=0 %BE%D1%80%D0%BE-%D0%BE%D1%87%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%8C- Seib, P. (2011). Public Diplomacy, New Media, and Counterterrorism. %D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE-soon-very-soon/ CDP Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, 2. Retrieved from http:// Al-Tamimi, A. (2015). The Paris Attacks Reflect Intelligence Failure — Not a uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/legacy/ Change in ISIS Strategy. The Huffington Post. Retrieved March 10, 2016, publications/perspectives/CPDPerspectives_P2_2011.pdf from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aymenn-jawad-altamimi/paris- Seib, P. and Janbek, D. M. (2011). Global Terrorism and New Media: The intelligence-failure-isis-strategy_b_8582708.html Post-Al-Qaeda Generation. London and New York: Routledge Amarsingam, A. and Al-Tamimi, A. (2015). Is ISIS Islamic and Other “Foolish” Shane, S. and Hubbard, B. (2014). ISIS Displaying a Deft Command of Debates. Jihadology. Retrieved from http://jihadology.net/2015/04/03/ Varied Media. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes. guest-post-is-isis-islamic-and-other-foolish-debates/ com/2014/08/31/world/middleeast/isis-displaying-a-deft-command-of- Batchelor, T. (2015). GRAPHIC CONTENT: Horrifying picture shows bloody varied-media.html aftermath of Paris concert massacre. Express. Retrieved from http://www. Spens, C. (2014). Shock and Awe: Performativity, Machismo, and ISIS. express.co.uk/news/world/619536/Bloodbath-Paris-89-killed-mass- E-International Relations. Retrieved from http://www.e-ir.info/2014/11/02/ execution-Bataclan-theatre shock-and-awe-performativity-machismo-and-isis Crelinsten, R.D. (2002) Analysing Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Stengel, J. (2011). Grow: How Ideals Power Growth and Profit at the World’s Communication Model. Terrorism and Political Violence, 14:2, 77–122. Greatest Companies. New York: Crown Business DOI: 10.1080/714005618 Stern, J. and Berger, J.M. (2015). ISIS: The State of Terror. New York: Gander, K. (2015). Paris Attacks: France Declares State of Emergency HarperCollins After Over 100 People Killed in the Capital. The Independent. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/paris-attacks- Taub, B. (2015). Belgian Terror: Brussels on Lockdown. The New Yorker. france-declares-state-of-emergency-after-dozens-killed-in-french- Retrieved from http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/belgian-terror- capital-a6734321.html brussels-on-lockdown Heneghan, T. (2015). Hollande Says Paris Attacks “An Act of War” by Islamic Werber, C. (2015). Paris Has Suffered Europe’s Worst Terror Attack State. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france- in 10 Years. Here’s What We Know. Quartz. Retrieved from http:// shooting-hollande-idUSKCN0T30JG20151114 qz.com/550169/paris-has-suffered-europes-worst-terror-attack-in-10- years-heres-what-happened/ Hutt, R. (2015). How Much Territory Has ISIS Lost in 2015? World Economic Forum. Retrieved from https://www.weforum.org/ Wolfsfeld, G. (1997). Media and Political Conflict: News From the Middle agenda/2015/12/how-much-territory-has-isis-lost-in-2015/ East. U.K.: Cambridge University Press McTague, T. (2015). Paris Attacks: David Cameron Warns U.K. Terrorist Attack Is “Highly Likely.” The Independent. Retrieved from http://www. independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/paris-attack-david-cameron-warns-a- terrorist-attack-on-uk-is-highly-likely-a6734931.html

Countering Daesh Propaganda 33 Engaging With Religion

Religious Diplomacy Bawa Jain Founding Secretary-General of the World Council of Religious Leaders

Islam is the fastest-growing faith in the world.1

In 2010, there were 1.6 billion Muslims, approximately 23 percent of the global population.2

It is estimated that by 2050, the number of Muslims in the United States will more than double, and Islam will become the second largest religious group.3

If current demographic trends continue, the number of Muslims is expected to equal the number of Christians by 2050 and exceed the number of Christians by the end of this century.4

For centuries, an overwhelming number of the Despite its relevance in our lives, religion is rarely world’s conflicts have been fueled by religious used as a positive force in diplomacy — one that tensions and ethnic differences. How then can complements the political process. As religious we arrive at a sustainable solution without the hostilities continue to rise in nearly every major active engagement of religious leaders? It is time region around the globe, we can no longer afford to bring the collective wisdom and resources of to exclude religious leaders from the process of religious leaders to bear on key issues that threaten building an integrated framework for peace. humanity, from global climate change to interna- There is an urgent need for all three pillars of tional terrorism. society — political, business, and civil — to work Religious leaders have an important role to play together with the religious component of our lives. in addressing the critical needs of humankind. It is time to be proactive on these matters rather They can exert enormous influence on public than allowing tensions to build to the point where opinion and have the ability to mobilize the we can only respond reactively to a crisis. This is masses in a way that transcends national borders particularly true of the issues confronting Islam, and cultural boundaries. the fastest growing and most misunderstood reli- • 84 percent of the world’s population considers gion in the world today. themselves religious.5 • 5.8 billion people follow a faith tradition6

34 The fundamental mission of every religious to build an unprecedented collaboration among tradition is to have peace. There are no sacred religious leaders who will commit to cooperate in texts that advocate the use of violence in any of building more peaceful societies. the world religions. Therefore, the concept of In 2000, 1,200 eminent leaders representing “holy war” is an oxymoron. Yet throughout history the many faith traditions gathered at the United there have always been leaders who misinterpret Nations for the Millennium World Peace Summit scripture and mislead followers to perpetuate their of Religious and Spiritual Leaders. They took own agendas. The greatest challenge Muslims face the historic step of presenting a Commitment is to isolate those who are trying to destroy their to Global Peace to the U.N. secretary-general, religion. They are the biggest enemies of Islam. declaring their intent “to manage and resolve nonviolently the conflicts generated by religious The problem oftentimes is not with the and ethnic differences and to condemn all violence committed in the name of religion while faith but with the faithful. seeking to remove the roots of the violence.”7 If we are to foster a global society capable of — Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations achieving peace, one of our tasks is to confront the war of words by creating a new narrative The Supreme Leader of Iran, the Grand Imam of that actively promotes the true meaning of jihad. al-Azhar, the King of Saudi Arabia (the monarch Muslims must convey and practice the true who serves as custodian of the two holy mosques meaning of jihad. It is not a violent concept. It is at Mecca and Medina) — as well as some of the not a declaration of war against other religions. It highest-ranking scholars of Muslim religious simply means “to struggle and to strive.” Jihad is law — have issued statements strongly condemning an inner battle for self-control that must be waged ISIL/ISIS/Daesh. In fact, the ullema (clergy who on our own “demons” in order to become better are ultimate authorities of both the Sunni and human beings. How can we help to propagate that Shi’a) have not only strongly condemned but also issued strong statements and fatwas (religious edicts) against Daesh. They are all actively engaged in countering the scourge of Daesh and If we are to foster a global society capable of defeating them. They hold the power of words — a power that can alter perceptions, shape behaviors, achieving peace, one of our tasks is to confront and begin to change what is said and done in the the war of words by creating a new narrative that name of religion. The media does not often cover efforts to actively promotes the true meaning of jihad. defeat the ideology of radical extremists. However, these pre-eminent religious leaders are bridging a message throughout the wider Muslim world and 1,400-year divide between Sunnis and Shi’as for educate the broader community? the greater good. Much needs to be done to bridge the divide among the Sunni and Shi’a if we are to Countering Islamophobia have peace and end the current cycle of height- ened tensions and conflict. The United States is committed to the principles Perhaps one can learn from how the Protestants of tolerance and religious freedom — ideals that lie and Catholics overcame their differences and at the heart of our nation. Yet the overwhelming now have active ecumenical relations. One can majority of Americans say they know very little certainly learn from the Orthodox, Reform, (57 percent) or nothing (29 percent) about Islam. Conservative, Hasidic, and Kabbalah sects of They have no knowledge about core beliefs and Judaism, who set aside their differences to stand practices or even about Muslim holy days and united behind the state of Israel. The goal here is when they are celebrated.8

Countering Daesh Propaganda 35 Despite this lack of understanding, many goal, they often discover their common humanity. Americans report unfavorable feelings toward the This initiative will dispel some of the myths about Muslim culture. What’s more, they believe the a community that is misunderstood. values of Islam are at odds with their own values.9 Statistics are compelling, but they do not paint What steps can be taken today to create a future a complete portrait of any experience. Studies in which we all coexist in harmony? The key is to have shown that many U.S. Muslims still feel focus on creating a more inclusive environment alienated in their communities. That may explain instead of relying on individual behavior. There why Muslim Americans are the least likely of any has never been a better time to launch an initia- religious group to take civic responsibility, such tive to improve race relations and ease religious as registering to vote.15 How can we encourage tensions across the nation. Muslim Americans to feel more patriotic toward • Invite elected officials, religious leaders, business the country they reside in and to contribute more leaders, and members of the community to a fully to public life, particularly when it comes to series of town hall meetings. countering radical extremism? • Present a program that is designed to educate • 48 percent of all U.S. Muslims believe their and inspire interfaith dialogue, fostering a spirit own leaders have not done enough to speak out 16 of understanding. against Islamic extremists. • Encourage communities to participate in local • U.S. Muslims must share in the responsi- projects that improve a condition or fix a bility of educating their communities about problem they collectively face. Daesh — who they are, what they believe — and brand this violent organization as the biggest When people from different faiths and diverse enemy of Islam. backgrounds join together to achieve a common The Global Community A majority of Muslim–Americans are assimilating and As concern about Islamic extremism continues to adopting customs that reflect our way of life. grow throughout the global community, there is • U.S. Muslims alerted law enforcement about more much that can be done to prevent terrorist organi- terrorism suspects than were discovered through zations like Daesh from radicalizing and recruiting U.S. government investigations.10 new members. It is essential to confront ignorance head-on to ensure that it does not continue • Only 2 percent of U.S. Muslims are in the lowest fueling hatred and violence, especially in regions income bracket.11 where there is also a rise of Islamophobia. There • U.S. Muslims have the second-highest level of are initiatives to mobilize this kind of engagement, education among religious groups in the country. but they are, at present, too splintered to have a A greater proportion have college degrees significant impact. Religious leaders have their (49 percent) than the general U.S. population fingers on the pulse of the communities they serve. (29 percent).12 They know who is inciting violence and can do • U.S. Muslim women are as likely as U.S. Muslim men more to bring about change. to have earned a college or postgraduate degree.13 We need a broader-based coalition of Islamic scholars and religious leaders who are prepared to: • U.S. Muslims are the most racially diverse religious group in the country. They are predominantly • Provide a strong moral conscience, disavow all African-American — not Arab — and also include violence committed in the name of religion, Asian, Hispanic, and Caucasian members.14 and work together to increase understanding and tolerance

36 The Carter Center • Educate Muslims on an ongoing basis about the It is difficult for many Americans to imagine true tenets of the faith, using traditional tools as that Catholics, Jews, and Mormons were once well as social media the object of prejudice and discrimination — or • Issue fatwas (religious edicts) against Daesh and that President Roosevelt ordered the deportation formally denounce extremists as enemies of the of more than 110,000 Japanese–Americans to be faithful — enemies who must not be allowed to incarcerated in internment camps during World dwell under the shelter of Islam War II, an act that was later concluded to be the result of widespread racism and hysteria.17 Can we • Actively engage in intrafaith understanding to forget the civil rights movement and the discrimi- bridge the differences within Islam nation against people of color? Even today we are If enough religious leaders begin to address these witnessing the scars of prejudice and bias. critical issues on the level of ideas, the fatwas will eventually filter down from international scholars to local imams to disaffected youth on the street, gradually reducing the rate of radicalization and It is essential to confront ignorance head-on to recruitment in violent organizations like Daesh. ensure that it does not continue fueling hatred and Migration and Assimilation violence, especially in regions where there is also a We are in the midst of a global struggle centered on religious, racial, and ethnic diversity, and the rise of Islamophobia. increasing polarization of popular opinion can turn these into incendiary issues. Nevertheless, it is helpful to remember that these battles have It may take generations to sow the seeds of been waged and resolved, previously. The world peace, but each new group will assimilate and help is full of migrant populations that have success- change our idea of what America is in ways that, fully integrated into the larger culture, the case ultimately, strengthen and enrich the tapestry of throughout American history. As a nation defined our society. by immigration, new religious, racial, and ethnic groups have continuously arrived on our shores.

1 Pew Research Center, April 2, 2015, “The Future of World Religions: 9 The Brookings Institution and Public Religion Research Institute, “What Population Growth Projections, 2010–2050” It Means to Be American: Attitudes in an Increasingly Diverse America Ten Years After 9/11,” September 2011 2 Pew Research Center, April 2, 2015, “The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010–2050” 10 Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security at Duke University, UNC RTI, “Muslim-American Terrorism in 2013” (published Feb. 5, 2014) 3 Pew Research Center, April 2, 2015, “The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010–2050” 11 Council on Foreign Relations, “Muslims in the United States” by Toni Johnson, Sept. 19, 2011 4 Pew Research Center, April 2, 2015, “The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010–2050” 12 The Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, “Muslim Americans: A National Portrait,” 2009 5 Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life, Global Religious Landscape, December 2012 13 The Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, “Muslim Americans: A National Portrait,” 2009 6 Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life, Global Religious Landscape, December 2012 14 The Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, “Muslim Americans: A National Portrait,” 2009 7 Commitment to Global Peace Declaration, Millennium World Peace Summit of Religious and Spiritual Leaders at the United Nations, 15 The Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, “Muslim Americans: A National August 2000 Portrait,” 2009 8 The Brookings Institution and Public Religion Research Institute, “What 16 Pew Research Center, Muslim American Survey, 2011 It Means to Be American: Attitudes in an Increasingly Diverse America Ten 17 Commission on Wartime Relocation of Civilians (1997). Personal Justice Years After 9/11,” September 2011 Denied. Washington, D.C.: Civil Liberties Public Education Fund. p. 459

Countering Daesh Propaganda 37 Engaging With Religion

Preventing the Synapse: Transmission of Daesh Religious Signals in Search of Receivers Ebrahim Rasool Former South African Ambassador to the United States

It was Louis Althusser who employed the notion The signal finds various means for its transmis- of “interpellation” to explain how ideology embeds sion. Sometimes it interpellates directly to the itself in a given subject. A subject is “hailed,” subject through personal contact, media (social or “called,” or “interpellated” to assume an identity, conventional), or proxy agents. At other times, it to be mobilized to thought or action, or to be paci- interpellates its intended subjects by harnessing fied. This calling happens when an idea or message the agency of its intended objects — the institu- (a signal) is transmitted and connects (synapses) tions or media that it opposes — whose responses with a receiver’s reptilian brain (an ancient often act to strengthen or actualize the signal. memory) that activates an aspiration or amplifies I invoke Althusser’s idea of interpellation to a humiliation. assist us in our understanding of how, for at least the last three decades, religion-based extremism has been able to shape discourses, shift policy, and hold large parts of the world in thrall. We need A century of secularization has not diminished the to find new ways of thinking about this process because, clearly, a century of secularization has not power of religion to command its core following. If diminished the power of religion to command its core following. If anything, religion has made its anything, religion has made its fight more dogged fight more dogged and ominous, from the asser- and ominous, from the assertiveness of the religious tiveness of the religious right in the United States to the extremism in the name of Islam globally. right in the United States to the extremism in the After the last two decades of battling name of Islam globally. extremism — utilizing a combination of militarism in the Muslim heartlands and moral indignation or Islamophobia against Muslims in the West — we must admit that the chickens are coming home The sender is in control of the big idea and the to roost on both strategies. Extremists have been ultimate agenda, while the subject, the receiver, able to feed off these strategies to find recruits, battles the disparate fragments of memory, experi- even from the West, and they have exploited ence, and identity competing within. A collection the absence of strategy toward the Arab Spring, of subjects, individually interpellated, respond first in the creation of political vacuums where diversely to the signal once a synapse is made. regime change was pursued and, secondly, in the Unwittingly for most and wittingly for some, they tacit approvals granted the counterrevolutions act to allow or facilitate the realization of the to the Arab Spring. We need fresh understand- sender’s big idea and ultimate agenda. ings — even from fading concepts — to inform our

38 approach to extremism, not by berating religion or on the values and intents of faith or ideology Islam or Muslims but by putting on our political despite being tempted to respond to situations thinking caps. instinctively — thus potentially betraying the We must accelerate our search for an alterna- nobility of the values ostensibly being defended. tive religious paradigm. Muslims, like people of The aqaba has the potential to make the middle other faiths and ideologies, are reeling under the ground coherent, purposeful, and mobilized, articu- cynicism of a postmodern world that proclaims an lating grievance and humiliation, directing anger absence of grounding beliefs and values and the constructively, and sometimes securing significant irrelevance of a transcendent source of account- gains. Its strength is that by respecting continuity ability. This often has the impact of stripping with history it can authentically induce change traditional communities of their anchors in life. and proactively immunize against extremism by Fundamentalists and extremists of all faiths are embracing complexity and teaching nuance. in one way or the other engaging in battle with this, because they do not trust their orthodoxies to rouse themselves for this battle. They see in orthodoxy only inertia, feebly coexisting with Muslims, like people of other faiths and ideologies, postmodernism or impotent against it. Further, they have taken it upon themselves to reassert are reeling under the cynicism of a postmodern the fundamentals of faith in society, even world that proclaims an absence of grounding nihilistically. This, of course, does not preclude intraextremist battles and wars, some formal and beliefs and values and the irrelevance of a mainstreamed and others informal and on the transcendent source of accountability. margins of society. An alternative paradigm or mindset cannot be constructed by increasing the dose of seculariza- tion or by militarism alone. An alternative must The absence of such immunization, however, be founded on contesting for the wisdom of reli- shapes the synapse that potentially occurs when gious sources — salvaging values and intents and the extremist signal is transmitted to its intended spurning literalism or originalism. An alternative receivers. Ideally, the synapse is rejected, as is the must be based on reviving the critical regenera- case with the overwhelming majority of Muslims tive motor of religious intellectualism. (This does receiving the signal. They recoil from the signal, not have to be an oxymoron.) Otherwise, we having imbued the higher values of Islam and are doomed to those who seek only to imitate recognized their perversion in the hands of the their preferred segments of the past or cherry- sender (the extremists) even though there is an picked scriptural quotes. But an alternative is attempted interpellation based on shared griev- also necessarily dialectical: as it fights extremism, ance, humiliation, and aspiration. For a significant it must also fight for justice, the absence of minority, however, the synapse occurs, and the which is the fertile feeding ground for extremism signal — the siren call to extremism — can result in because it bequeaths humiliation and creates the subject being interpellated. perpetual victims. Such interpellation has as its entry point equiv- The Quran calls this alternative the aqaba, the ocation: the inability to reject or refuse the signal steep and difficult path founded on a profound immediately or unequivocally. When confronted vertical relationship with God. From this relation- with that which is ordinarily repulsive, horrible, ship emanates broad and inclusive horizontal or atrocious, the subject being interpellated does responsibilities — founded on personal resilience not recoil but equivocates because the filters are and social compassion — to all creation. It enables disabled and paralysis and ambiguity set in, at the a person to navigate complexity despite experi- least. At worst, the subject is recruited. The former ences of injustice and humiliation — and to focus results in silence or condonation, while the latter

Countering Daesh Propaganda 39 results in one or another form of participation. It The Muslim sensibility is further roused to becomes crucial, therefore, to identify the sources equivocation by the abundance of signals extrem- of equivocation so that we both understand how ists draw from the West’s political and military subjects are interpellated as well as seek appro- engagement with the Muslim world. These priate ways to intervene through campaigns to signals include: immunize potential subjects to prevent the synapse • Support for Israel’s constant humiliation of from occurring. Palestine and the Muslim impotence in the face There are at least three broad sources of thereof equivocation. Hypocrisy and inconsistency are popular sources of equivocation. The West is seen • The fact that Muslim lands have continuously as leading an anti-extremist agenda, yet the West’s been occupied, initially by the Soviets, and then favorite Muslim allies are both the fountainhead for three decades by the United States following and main exporter of the extremist gene among the spurious War on Terror Muslims. Wahabi interpretation of Islam — the • The Western preference for dictators in the state interpretation of the main Western allies in Middle East, despite calling Muslims to democ- the Middle East — are intrinsically intolerant of racy, human rights, and freedom — and when other Muslims (Shi’a, Sufi, and modern) as well the response was positive, allowing the counter- as other faiths and ideologies. They invest in such revolution to snuff out the yearning intolerance through building mosques, hiring • Rising Islamophobia against Muslim minorities, imams, and exporting madrassah syllabi that prop- some already confined to ghettos of dysfunction, agate intolerance. The products are condemned, in the West and the sources are feted. The extremists, in turn, transform these signals to amplify grievance, humiliation, and hatred of Muslims and send them back to search for willing receivers, interpellating them into subjects who The West is seen as leading an anti-extremist either condone or participate in the agenda of agenda, yet the West’s favorite Muslim allies are the sender. Muslims have it within their power to work both the fountainhead and main exporter of the on the religious and theological sources of extremist gene among Muslims. equivocation. The sources arising from perceived hypocrisy or political grievance lie largely in the domain of the powerful, whereas religious and theological sources of equivocation should be This phenomenon is manifested in the prioritized as areas of endeavor. In a globalized inconsistency between decrying the anti-Shiism world of ambiguity and uncertainty, in a religious of ISIS and condoning the anti-Shi’a war in sphere of inertia or nihilism, and in a Muslim Yemen. A further inconsistency is in the instinc- community hobbled by identity crises and political tive Western suspicion of any manifestation of impotence, the search for belonging and fixity may political Islam — thus condoning the coup against instinctively direct an individual’s antenna to that Mohammed Morsi for potentially being nondemo- which appears familiar in the religious memory cratic — and yet embracing states in which a and history. This is where the dog whistle is version of Islam is politically institutionalized and sounded — eloquent to those sharing the frequency democracy is spurned as non-Islamic. Similarly, and confounding to those witnessing the result. apparently hypocritical discourse on matters like If we are to deal with this phenomenon with a human rights, torture, and dictatorship are cannon scalpel rather than the machete, then we need to fodder for extremists to transmit signals to ignore understand these religious and theological sources Western appeals to higher values.

40 The Carter Center of equivocation in accordance with the following means either civil recognition for a marriage basic ground rules: officiated by an imam, the availability of halaal • The sender (the extremist) always possesses the food, time off for the Friday prayers, the right to big picture and ultimate agenda. wear the headscarf, a place to worship, or any one of the things that would make life livable • The receiver (the interpellated subject) starts by as a Muslim. Accepting this signal from the possessing a small fragment of memory, griev- extremist may well mean unwittingly subscribing ance, humiliation, and aspiration. to Daesh’s totalitarian vision of shari’a. • The objective of the extremist is to widen • When Daesh transmits the signal that violence adherence to the agenda and the scope of and killing are germane to their methodology participation of the subject. and present this as jihad, the synapse is meant to Confusion about these rules easily results in disable Muslim outrage and recoil by associating wielding the machete blindly and accelerating Daesh violence with the battles fought by the the achievement of the extremist’s objective. In Prophet Muhammad, potentially recruiting our attempts to disable the synapse or immunize those Muslims whose anger may be in search of the receiver, we must intervene in how religion a violent outlet. and theology are activated and, therefore, we must understand why extremists — especially Daesh — have been successful in reaching a small but critical mass of their target market. The Muslim sensibility is further roused to The Muslim mind, at the moment of potential synapse, has to reconcile fragments of memory equivocation by the abundance of signals extremists from the Islamic history — something familiar, a draw from the West’s political and military recollection from what it has been taught — with a modern sensibility and a new contextual reality. engagement with the Muslim world. Success of the reconciliation depends on the degree to which the sources of equivocation are managed in relation to the depth of adherence to • When Daesh and Boko Haram abduct girls and the values and spirit rather than the rules and the women, enslave them (as they have done with letter of the religion. If the rules have an edge on the Yazidis) and then legitimate a variety of the values, the literal supersedes the spirit, and sexual abuses, some Muslims may equivocate the past overwhelms the contextual reality, the on such horrors because they cannot point to Muslim response to the extremist signal could a definitive verse in the Quran that outlaws easily be silence, condonation, or even participa- slavery. However, they could point to a verse in tion. But for this to happen, the extremist needs the Quran that regulates sexual relations with to have the subject recall the fragment of memory, slaves that “your right hand possesses.” decontextualize it, strip it of higher Islamic values and intents, and then put it at the service of the • When Daesh desecrates the Palmyra antiquities extremist’s big picture and ultimate agenda. and the Taliban bombs the Buddhas of Bamiyan, In this process, some of the most potent issues and Charlie Hebdo is attacked for their that have constituted the interpellation, caused cartoons, ordinary Muslim sensibilities shudder the theological equivocation, induced the silence, about the disrespect for history, other faiths, and solicited the condonation, or recruited the partici- freedom of speech. However, the signal sent by pation have been the following: the extremists is that they are the true custo- dians of Islam’s uncompromising war on idolatry • When Daesh transmits the signal of living by and depiction, from the earliest aversion when shari’a (Islamic law), the synapse is meant to the Prophet refused to pray to the false gods activate the Muslim for whom shari’a simply around the Kaaba in Mecca.

Countering Daesh Propaganda 41 • When Daesh and all extremists apply sexism • Neither disparage religion as a factor in society and misogyny as the defining features of gender nor exaggerate its role in driving extremism: relations, the signal appeals to those who yearn Religion is a shunting ground for other agendas for less complicated times when women were and a dog whistle for recruitment of particular neither educated nor employed, neither seen nor constituencies. heard. They cling to Quranic descriptions that, • Simultaneously work to close the space while revolutionary in a time of institutional- of extremists in the social and political ized femicide, still moved too slowly toward full terrains — where hypocrisy, grievance, and equality. humiliation are manufactured — as well as the religious and theological terrains — where equivocation and legitimacy are induced for atrocity in the name of God. Success of the reconciliation depends on the degree • Engage in a battle for ideas, language, and meaning with extremists to deny them a to which the sources of equivocation are managed monopoly of interpretation of the Quran, in relation to the depth of adherence to the values prophetic tradition, and Islamic history through intervening in learning and scholarship. and spirit rather than the rules and the letter of • Populate the aqaba, the alternative path and the religion. mindset, by focusing on values, spirit, and intent; by teaching appreciation of complexity and nuance rather than binaries and judgment; and by preparing for a world of coexistence In our quest to collapse particularly the religious in shared spaces, where cosmopolitanism will and theological sources of equivocation — thus require multiple identities and the exercise of preventing the synapse from occurring — we need choice and where we must create a world safe to ensure that we: for difference.

42 The Carter Center Engaging With Religion

Notes on Religion and Countering Violent Extremism Muhammad Nuruddeen Lemu Director, Research and Training, the Da’wah Institute of Nigeria, Islamic Education Trust, Minna

The Landscape of Violent Extremism the framing of the ideology that allows it to mimic religious orthodoxy and to hijack its narratives for Violent extremism is not a new phenomenon. It its own purposes. It makes “liberation” from griev- has a shared history with various groups and move- ances its end and its theology or religious ideology ments across the world. Time and again, violent the means. extremist groups have operated under varying There is a need for careful diagnosis of narra- banners — religious, racial, ethnic, national, or tives, so that the religious vocabulary that is to be political. A growing contemporary phenomenon used does not act as a distraction or smoke screen of clashes of extremisms everywhere — whether that prevents an insight into, and appreciation of, secular, religious, racial, ethnic, nationalist, or the real underlying grievances and their remedies. other — contributes to spiraling intensities and degrees of prejudice, discrimination, abuse, and violence. There appears to be a consensus that there Grievances are the foundation upon which an are many pathways to violent extremism, with ideology is built. numerous push-and-pull factors (or drivers) unique to individuals and causes. It should, however, not be assumed that the push-and-pull factors The Evolutionary Path to that radicalize one group are identical to another. Violent Extremism There is always an interplay of factors that act in concert to create violent extremists in particular Before becoming radicalized and violent, most contexts. Consequently, and unfortunately, there people pass through a series of evolutionary is no singular cause or solution. stages or phases. The first step is usually simple No doubt, an extremist religious ideology is curiosity for answers about extremism and violent sometimes an important cause and/or a catalyst extremism, followed by greater interest and preoc- toward violent extremism. For some it is a major cupation with learning and discussions on the pull factor, while for others, it is used to comple- subject matter. Next comes gradual acceptance ment, justify, or support the need for violence in of the validity of some of the arguments (but not redressing perceived injustices. Ideology without all or most); then conversion to their side and grievances produces no action. Grievances are passive support for/defense of their positions. This the foundation upon which an ideology is built. is followed by actively promoting the ideology However, a religious halo grants the ideology and narratives and recruiting followers. The final easier acceptance by the less critical. The religious stage may be one where violent action is taken terminology of a “liberation theology” is sometimes or supported.

43 challenges make it difficult for such groups to It is worth focusing significant attention on recruit intelligent and charismatic leadership that countering the foundation of the ideology and roots can sustain and defend the ideology from external or internal challenges. Without intellectual and of the narratives instead of countering only the religious credibility, unity, cohesion, and effective endless and ever-changing narratives. succession by sincere and committed followership are practically impossible.

It should be expected that the number of Preparing Counternarratives people involved reduces with each stage or phase and Building a in the evolutionary process; hence the need for Counternarratives Network greater pinpoint-accuracy in the targeting of the Radicalized youth tend to hide their new identi- messaging with each later stage of radicalization. ties from their parents, teachers, and community Countermessaging should also be designed to leaders. Therefore, friends or peers are the most encourage debate and discussion at each and important gatekeepers. However, they would often every phase, to revive curiosity in the heart and be reluctant to speak up about a friend who is minds of those who have taken the extremists showing extremist tendencies for fear of getting narrative as true, and to pose critical open-ended into trouble, getting their friends into trouble, or questions that may assist the extremist in sincerely being identified. The use of more familiar grass- reassessing evidence and assumptions — as many roots organizations and groups — nonintrusive, violent extremists have not given sufficient safer, and more anonymous ways of getting thought to the accuracy of the ideology and narra- in touch, such as having an SMS texting tives they have bought into. hotline — may be appropriate in some contexts. Consequently, there is the need to empower Counternarratives gatekeepers with the necessary skills in contextu- Development and deployment of well-crafted ally sensitive ways to prevent and counter violent narratives are critical to the success and recruit- extremism or to refer cases to more competent and ment strategies of violent extremists. It is appropriate persons. “Nothing about us without crucial that the extremists’ narratives are very us!” Consultation must include those who the well-understood. It is important to know exactly resolutions will affect the most or at least those what their “storyline” is and what logic they closest to them. use to attract, engage, convert, or radicalize and recruit individuals. This understanding is Networking and essential for effective debunking and negating Information Sharing the claims of violent extremists and for providing The efficacy of counternarratives has to be tested realistic alternative mechanisms to address their with audiences that have a close cultural affinity legitimate grievances. and ability to connect with the target groups. As the ideology behind violent extremism After such testing and appropriate readjustment can result in numerous narratives to suit various and fine-tuning of messages and arguments, they contexts and needs, it is worth focusing significant might be ready for use by credible voices with attention on countering the foundation of the rational and faith-based arguments. ideology and roots of the narratives instead of countering only the endless and ever-changing narratives. Ideological challenges and counternar- Violent Extremism and Women ratives should be designed to drain the intellectual For various socio-cultural, religious, and other recruitment capacity of violent extremists. These reasons, most women would rather socialize

44 The Carter Center The Nine Pillars of the Ideology of Violent Extremist Muslims The beliefs that are unique to violent extremists and to “associating partners with Allah” (shirk) and hence which make it easier for them to excommunicate other disbelief (kufr). Muslims from the fold of Islam and to justify violence 6. The concept of jihad is narrowly defined as fighting against them (and others) are based on a foundation and war as the only realistic way of establishing an of at least nine major interrelated ideas, concepts, or Islamic state or caliphate. This is also interpreted to beliefs. Together these constitute the major unique permit spreading Islam by coercion and the “sword.” ideology of violent extremists. They regard suicide bombing as permissible and regard 1. Their very simplistic and literalist understanding it instead as a “martyrdom operation.” They disregard of Islamic text related to creed (aqidah) such as the the concept of proportionality in combat and believe concept of tawhid (faith in the Oneness of God), which that if innocent people have to be killed, they will still they tie to and regard as necessarily expressed through go to Paradise, while the guilty will be punished upon the political and judicial system (tawhid al-hakimiyyah). resurrection. The extremely literalist understanding of concepts such 7. Their concept of treaties and alliances (sulh) regards as kufr (disbelief), shirk (associating partners with God/ only their leader or imam as having the authority polytheism), and ridda (apostasy), and all carry the to make peace treaties with non-Muslims states. All death sentence if committed by Muslims. other peace treaties between Muslims and others are 2. Their belief that following a political or legislative declared nullified because those Muslim leaders who system other than one that is “Islamic” from their agreed on these treaties are guilty of disbelief (kufr) definition is also an act of disbelief (kufr) and apostasy because they agreed on constitutions that were not (ridda). “Islamic.”

3. The belief that the most important proof for the 8. The belief in a siege against Islam and Muslims in genuineness of an Islamic system of governance is the which Muslims have been oppressed, humiliated, and implementation of the prescribed (hudud) punishments not allowed to govern themselves by their own laws, for theft, adultery, and other crimes. and that only through violent jihad can Muslims regain their pride and right to self-determination. Civil strife 4. The belief that all Muslims in the world must submit (fitna) through fighting and loving death is seen as a to only one ultimate political leader (imam or caliph) desirable reality and a test of true faith. and be united under one caliphate (imamah), and that it is compulsory (fard) for all true Muslims to migrate 9. The exclusivist definitions of positive terms used (hijrah) there and defend and support it, as it is the in the Quran and hadith refer only to themselves. only temporal authority recognized by God. There is no These include mu’minun (believers), jama’ah or recognition of any other political or legal authority. To ummah (community of believers), ta’ifatun mansurah do so is disbelief (kufr). (victorious group), firqat al-najiya (saved sect), and others. 5. Their policy and understanding of “loyalty and disassociation” (al-wala’ wa-l-bara’), which Most violent extremists are not intellectually oriented is understood to consider any actions that show and do not know or even properly understand all these recognition, submission, obedience to, or admiration arguments. But many of them know some of them on of any other system of socio-economic, educational, a basic level as a source of religious support for their or political life besides their own as an expression of policies and missions. loyalty (wala’) to “other than Allah” and tantamount with other women. Naturally, therefore, women There is an urgent need to nurture religious are the greatest and most effective recruiters of scholarship among more women and empower one another. them to become more active in public religious

Countering Daesh Propaganda 45 discourse and to be more accessible to other Packaging the Message women. There are very few female scholars in Violent extremists have a very good understanding most Muslim communities, so even a little scholar- of youth and their personal identity problems ship can go a long way and will have a tremendous and how global issues hurt most Muslims. The impact on other women. extremist’s narrative often simply focuses on The Counternarratives frustrations and injustices that youth can relate to (the problem) and then offer them a way out (the Network and the Trust Factor: simple solution), albeit violent and potentially Very Few Clean Hands tragic (or heroic). Trust is the most important currency in coun- The extremist’s story line for some common tering violent extremism and in the credibility of narratives can be broken down into two major counternarratives. Therefore, countering violent questions. extremism moves at the speed of trust. The success 1. Can a true Muslim choose to do nothing of a counternarrative argument is based largely after witnessing all the injustice taking place on the trustworthiness of its source, its veracity against Islam and Muslims — discrimination, and soundness, the extent of its distance from Islamophobia, violence, misery, humiliation, ulterior motives, and its independence of some suffering, human rights abuses, etc.? “other” authority. 2. What will your response be to the suffering of innocent Muslims and the attack on Islam — if indeed you have faith — especially when no Any program headed by or linked to any peaceful solutions are practical or realistic? government will instantly lose credibility in the eyes On Whose Authority Should of violent extremists or their supporters as soon as Counternarratives Be Based? the links are known or even suspected. In countering the simplistic and literal interpreta- tions of texts of the Quran and hadith by violent extremists, the most respected group of scholars Violent extremists view governments of all to quote are those of the first three generations of types and especially Western governments and Islamic history, starting with the companions of nongovernmental organizations with cynicism and the Prophet Muhammad. Studying and quoting as having dirt (or even blood) on their hands. Any this generation of Muslims are important because program headed by or linked to any government most misinterpretations of the Quran (or hadith) will instantly lose credibility in the eyes of violent that are used to justify violent extremism and extremists or their supporters as soon as the links terrorism were identified and responded to by are known or even suspected. Loss of credibility some of the surviving companions of the Prophet equals failure! Muhammad and some of the early (Salaf) scholars The more independent of any government a when they faced a variety of violent extremist scholar is believed to be, the more credible he groups such as the Khawarij during their times. or she is likely to be in the eyes of most youth. Anti-Western and anti-government rhetoric and polemics are often viewed as proof of inde- Which Voices Should pendence from them and as a sign of empathy Carry the Narratives? toward the grievances of violent extremists. It is Tendencies and Inclinations important for those who publicly present counter- On the ideological spectrum, the violent narratives to be people who are also ready to be extremist is closer to a paradigm of the Salafi critical of governments and the leadership. than to the Tariqa or Sufi groups among Muslims.

46 The Carter Center Critical Elements of Counternarratives Identify and acknowledge what is good and lofty about study of Islam and the world, respect for scholarship, specific aims of violent extremism — such as liberation compassion and forgiveness of human weaknesses, from discrimination, restoration of Muslim/human sincerity of purpose and humility, greater commitment dignity, greater self-determination, a more just world to the sunnah and trust in Allah’s qadr (decree), and order. Empathize with and do not dismiss legitimate patient perseverance and effort (other nonviolent grievances. This also shows sincere readiness for finding forms of jihad). Show also where these approaches solutions. have worked in contemporary society. Show the effect of the strategies adopted by violent Show what is wrong with the methodologies and extremism groups — whether they have actually helped principles used by violent extremists to interpret in furthering the claimed aims of the group or whether specific religious texts to justify violence and give these they have, in fact, been counterproductive. Show the texts their correct interpretation based on classical real and full cost of this type of violent approach to the juristic principles (usul al-fiqh) and objectives of Islamic present and future of Islam and Muslims everywhere. law (maqasid al-shari’a). Show how alternative nonviolent approaches Explore also the issue of whether some are closer to the prophetic method (sunnah) even extremists have ulterior motives for preferring more if such alternative approaches might require more indiscriminately violent means and sticking to their self-sacrifice and discipline, collaboration and unity, ways and mission.

Consequently, the most authoritative counternar- key topics and concepts related to classical Muslim ratives would have to be developed, presented, and juristic reasoning and Islamic legal philosophy. argued by a Salafi who is closer to understanding These are usually covered when studying the the heart and mind of the Salafi jihadist or Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh and violent extremist. maqasid al-shari’a). Some of these key topics and concepts include Charisma and Public Appeal Matter the following: Charismatic leaders of any age are potentially 1. The specializations of various scholars in the powerful recruiters within the recruitment field Islamic sciences — especially Muhaddithun, of the general population of Muslims. Therefore, Mufassirun, Usuliyyun, Mujtahidun, Fuqaha, those involved in presenting counternarratives and Muftis. This helps the lay Muslim remain need to have both charisma and sincere empathy sensitive to every scholar’s human and intel- for the target audience. “What comes from the lectual limitations and more critical of divisive heart goes to the heart!” or strange proclamations made by scholars speaking outside their fields of specialization Need for Criteria for Distinguishing and expertise. Narratives From Counternarratives Many who are susceptible to the narratives 2. The degrees of certainty (qat’i) or presump- of violent extremists are very often unable to tion (zanni) in the authority, authenticity distinguish between right and wrong, legitimate (thubut), and interpretation (dilalah) of and spurious narratives once these are couched religious texts. This helps Muslims develop the in religious vocabulary. Messaging should not understanding that there are many texts of the only counter the narratives of violent extremists, Quran and hadith literature that are open to they also should help sharpen faith-based critical legitimate alternative interpretations and differ- thinking so as to assist and empower the audience ences in understanding. It aids in explaining, to identify and counter wrong narratives for them- less simplistically, the boundaries of tolerance selves. This can be achieved by teaching certain and the width of the “straight path” in Islam.

Countering Daesh Propaganda 47 3. Appreciating the various textual and rational 7. Understanding and applying the five core sources and principles of Islamic law (usul maxims of Islamic jurisprudence (qawa’id al-fiqh), the primary and secondary sources of al-fiqhhiyyah al-asliyyah). Understanding the shari’a. This topic is essential for removing the meaning, implications, and applications of each misconception that Islamic law is all divine, of these five maxims assists the lay Muslim in eternal, and fixed and not open to critical easily identifying religious positions and rulings re-evaluation and reinterpretation and juristic that are out of sync with the core principles and reasoning (ijtihad). spirit of the faith and which are most likely to 4. The contexts and prophetic intent on legisla- be extreme or at least suspect. tions — i.e., the legal implication of the Sunnah 8. What to do when scholars differ on particular (tradition) versus Seerah (biography): what issues. Here, the lay Muslim learns how is binding and what is not. This highlights to make wiser and more relevant choices the contextual role the prophet played as a from diverse scholarly positions and not feel Messenger of God, but also as a political leader, compelled by their “ignorance” to accept judge, adviser, mentor, and as an Arab man clearly harmful or destructive views just because living and responding to his cultural realities. they have been articulated or preferred by a 5. The values and objectives (maqasid) of particular great scholar. shari’a. These fundamental values, purposes, 9. Presenting the Golden Age of Islam, along and objectives of Islamic teachings serve as a with its legacy and contributions to science and text-based criteria or standards for assessing the subsequent world civilizations, acknowledges validity and quality of juristic reasoning (ijtihad) the (often-concealed) fact that Muslims and and religious verdicts (fatwa). This subject also Islam have made indelible positive contribu- emphasizes the importance of fulfilling societal tions to human history, which Muslims should obligations and of constant concern for espe- also be rightly proud of. It shows that such a cially justice (‘adl), compassion (rahma), wisdom period actually did exist in world history, side by (hikma), and the common good (maslahah) in side with people of other faiths, and that Islam all affairs. is not a new kid on the block of human history and development that is yet to prove its worth to humanity. More importantly, it would high- light how different that period of Islam was from Islamic organizations and institutions that teach the kind of society being propagated by violent extremists today. Islam and Islamic studies should be encouraged These nine critical topics or concepts are essential to develop and adopt a more maqasid (values- ingredients for an effective “intellectual vaccina- tion” that could contribute toward building oriented) approach in their curricula. resilience and immunity against many extreme ideologies and the hijacking of the religious narra- tive of mainstream Islam. 6. The implications of the legal maxim (qa’idah) of the assumed permissibility of everything: The Curricula for Islamic Studies “Everything is permissible except what is clearly Islamic organizations and institutions that teach prohibited.” This particular maxim emphasizes Islam and Islamic studies should be encouraged the fundamental premise of freedom to act in to develop and adopt a more maqasid (values- creative and innovative ways to achieve the oriented) approach in their curricula for presenting objectives of shari’a on any issue related to Islamic teachings. A very useful educational mundane transactions (mu’amalat).

48 The Carter Center resource in a similar vein is presented in the paper play in contributing to preventing and countering Living Islam With Purpose by Sheikh Dr. Umar violent extremism. Faruq Abd-Allah of the Nawawi Foundation The role of interfaith engagement. Besides (available online). better mutual respect and understanding, there is important symbolic relevance in sustained Beyond Narratives, Beyond Words dialogue between the various religious group leaders. It shows most people that those in Counternarratives are reactive, not proactive. authority are still talking, working with, and are While their importance cannot be overempha- civil or friendly toward each other and will most sized, counternarratives are only reactions to probably not tolerate or support interfaith aggres- extremist narratives and are defensive in nature. sion or violence. Simply countering the narratives of violent Where possible, the renovation of mosques and extremists, whether religious or otherwise, will churches demolished by extremist groups (such not do away with those underlying drivers or as Boko Haram) should be done by interfaith push-and-pull factors (and causes) that lead to organizations. This will change the symbolic violent extremists in the first place. The narratives message and significance of the church or mosque are effects (the propaganda) and not causes of to one that will be re-established by both Muslims violent extremism. and Christians. The leadership and others in positions of As Islamophobia is now financially self- authority have to show youth that it is not to sustaining and lucrative, it is not likely to die a anyone’s advantage to live in societies that are natural death. It will continue to grow with more resistant to change or societies where meaningful aggressive marketing strategies and products. change can only come through violent means. This calls for urgent sensitization of Islamophobia Policy makers have to listen not only to the (along with xenophobia, sexism, ageism, and grievances of young people but also address their others) as another form of discrimination and hopes and aspirations for the future. They have should be treated as such, with the same legal to provide the enabling environment for young implications. If not appropriately dealt with, such people to actively and collaboratively shape their aberration will grow into a major push factor for own future in a pluralistic and globalized world. violent extremism. Preventive actions. Collaborative networks Religious bigotry with its attendant volatility and social structures need to be designed, can easily spiral into hate crimes, potentially implemented, and adequately funded to cater to causing a clash of extremisms leading to violence individuals who are gravitating toward extremism. and increased support and sympathy for violent These should be known and easily accessible to extremism and recruitment for such groups. parents, teachers and, especially, friends so that Interfaith organizations and members of non- they know what safe actions to take, where to go, Muslim faiths have a greater chance of countering and who to speak to if they sense or notice radical- Islamophobia than do Muslims by countering the ization taking place. broad issue of religious discrimination under which Empowerment and life skills. As many of the Islamophobia falls. Consequently, Muslim scholars push factors are related to economic, political, and and leadership must also be willing and ready to social opportunities, it is important to explore, actively counter religious discrimination against publicize, and support as many alternative career others when committed by members of their and empowerment pathways as possible, especially own faith. They cannot afford to be indecisive for those who are at risk. This underscores the regarding whether or not to be against all forms of very important role that many community and religious discrimination. development nongovernmental organizations can

Countering Daesh Propaganda 49 Mediums of Delivery: Specific 3. The need to support train-the-trainer courses Projects to Consider that are managed by credible grassroots nongovernmental organizations or educational 1. Half of the battlefield is the media. There is institutions, especially for young imams, reli- the need for mass production of diverse high- gious leaders, and activists. quality media content that is easily accessible, 4. The need to support the production, transla- which responds constructively to the grievances, tion, distribution of, and easy access to free arguments, and narratives/ideology of extrem- well-researched and good-quality literature ists, and which also proactively inoculates the (and other learning resources) on all subjects general public with faith-based critical thinking relevant to the prevention and countering of skills. especially violent extremism. Literature should 2. There is need to support the training of not be bulky! Such resources should be made charismatic resource people (especially among available to all religious scholars, activists, youth) in critical skills and competences for community leaders, religious organizations, media content production and presentations on teachers, and student-leaders of tertiary and preventing and countering violent extremism. secondary schools.

50 The Carter Center Grassroots Perspectives: Voices From the Ground

A First-Person Narrative: From Recruiter to Challenger Mubin Shaikh University of Liverpool

Initially, I celebrated the 9/11 attacks. In 2010, when the hearings were over, I went Extremists are made and not born. I was born on Facebook and Twitter to stay abreast of world in Canada, where two sets of cultural values pulled events. Following the so-called Arab Spring, me in opposite directions. I wasn’t bullied or war broke out in Syria. Suddenly, in late 2012, a picked on — in fact, we were the cool kids. I was group calling itself the Islamic State in Iraq had pressured by my community to “become religious” entered into Syria. I spent at least all of 2013 and and, on their direction, undertook a trip to the 2014 engaging numerous Western youth who border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan where I had expressed interest in traveling to Iraq, and would have a chance encounter with the Taliban. especially Syria, to fight. Quite a few undertook They were heroes from an Islamic Golden the perilous journey successfully. Using Islamic Age, a romanticized past of companionship and scripture, I began engaging them and challenging caliphate. “If you want to bring about change in their interpretations, trying to dissuade them from the world,” they said, “you do it with the AK-47.” joining and encouraging those who had gone to I returned to Canada in the fall of 1995 and come back. Many to whom I spoke were killed. became a supporter and recruiter of the global jihadist cause. On Sept. 11, 2001, I knew the world would never be the same. I went to Syria in 2002 for two years, spending Extremists are made and not born. time to study the faith with scholars who showed me mercy and love and, verse by verse, debunked my deviant and violent interpretations. I returned to Canada in 2004 and began On the basis of this wide spectrum of experi- working with the Canadian Security Intelligence ence, I have come to give advice and guidance on Service as an undercover operator. I worked various topics related to radicalization and violent numerous classified operations. I then joined the extremism — including the use of social media for Integrated National Security Enforcement Team of message amplification and recruitment — counter- the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in what came messaging, deradicalization, and the reintegration to be known as the “Toronto 18” terrorism case, of returning foreign terrorist fighters. which culminated in a series of arrests in 2006. I In this context, experts from around the world would spend four years in five legal hearings where gathered at The Carter Center. The panel on seven defendants had their charges “stayed” and which I spoke related to social media and Daesh. 11 individuals either pled guilty or were found I highlighted how Daesh was using specific guilty by the Superior Court of Ontario. messaging that exploited youth discontent.

51 Why They Join Why They Join Ideology Ideology The term “ideology” implies a number of concepts. Grievances At its root, it is the collection of ideas and Sense of Meaning and Belonging beliefs that people use to construct the paradigm Peer Grouping and Sense of Family through which they view the world around them and by which they perceive and receive knowl- sought to re-establish a perceived lost Golden Age edge. It can also be the source of how a person of socio-political superiority of the Muslim world. constructs their identity and how they view This idea of Islam-centric governance based on their sense of belonging and meaning. It is often the laws of the Quran and the sunnah (prophetic difficult to separate the latter from an individual’s example) has been continuously promulgated thought process where they have been exposed by numerous thinkers and theologians. There to a comprehensive ideology throughout their has, in effect, been a priming of the Muslim formative years. mind to aspire to see this caliphate restored. The announcement by Daesh of having accomplished this has provided a powerful call to the sense of duty to the caliphate. It is for this reason so many have flocked to answer the call of the so-called “caliph.”

Grievances Ideology without grievances doesn’t resonate, and grievances without ideology are not acted on. The failure to acknowledge feelings of humiliation, deprivation, and political discontent features prominently in extremist narratives. Some griev- ances can be perceived only — without an actual basis in fact — but others are most certainly real. The desire to alleviate the suffering of members of the aggrieved and/or deprived can drive people to action. This need is accelerated by social media in which images and videos of the said-suffering force viewers to make decisions based on emotions rather than reason. Constant viewing of the suffering of others may also cause posttraumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) to develop, which will compromise rational decision making.

Sense of Meaning and Belonging (Outside of Ideology) We have grievances, The specific ideological appeal of Daesh, For those who have not been exposed to a but no one is attracting both men and women, is rooted in the systematic ideology that would influence their acknowledging concept of the caliphate, which has been a regular them or listening to sense of meaning, belonging, and identity in their feature of revolutionary Islamist thought since us. Violence is the formative years, the individual will naturally seek only way to get that the abolishment of the Ottoman caliphate in the this out using other mechanisms. This search message across. early 1920s. Since then, many Islamist groups have may result in the acceptance of an ideology and

52 The Carter Center a conversion experience into a new faith. It may give the individual a completely new identity to replace a previous one and may also be accompa- nied by a new peer group with a completely new set of values.

Peer Groupings and Sense of Family Another factor contributing to recruitment is peer networks of kinship and friendship. In the case of Daesh, a great many foreign terrorist fighters were encouraged by their colleagues and comrades to make the trip. Those who had already traveled over could then vouch for them and welcome them into the new network of others who shared their ideology and their notion that only violence would suffice as an ideal means of change. This network offered an opportunity to effect immediate and instant change, having rejected nonviolent alternatives.

How to Get Them to Leave Challenges Related to Deradicalization and Rehabilitation of Returnees A main area of discourse focuses on foreign terrorist fighters who no longer wish to continue identities of foreign terrorist fighters will bring No matter your their involvement in the group. They may have raids and arrests, but the ideology will remain in background — become disillusioned for several reasons, including some form. especially if you’ve the contradiction of what they thought they would been rejected on A long and serious conversation will need to the basis of it — we find versus reality on the ground. Disillusionment discuss what to do with foreign terrorist fighter have a place and could relate to the brutality of the group, disparity returnees. The full spectrum of responses will a role for you. We in the sharing of resources, missing their family, include public court prosecutions; recirculating can turn it into injury, infighting with other Muslim groups, and some as undercover agents; or giving some level something positive. a change of heart and mind about whether the of amnesty based on the intelligence they give group was as noble as it presented itself to be. regarding people, networks, phone numbers, However, disillusionment is not equal to email addresses, and the like. Some should be deradicalization, and returnees may face a myriad encouraged to come forward — with government of psycho-social challenges. Most certainly, PTSD would be at the top of that list. Tactical ability — with specific training in urban terrorism, hostage-taking, and kidnapping — is a huge Former extremists are the most important lever security concern. Additional resources will have to be deployed to continue surveillance (on the for convincing youth not to join Daesh, and street ground and online), for police operations to gather credibility is vital for this effort. Not all returnees are evidence of criminal wrongdoing, especially of citizens accused of fighting as a member of Daesh a threat, and we must not treat them this way. or aspirants thereof. Recent data leaks about the

Countering Daesh Propaganda 53 support — to appear in TV and radio commercials or to give speeches at public events. Others can be redirected to work as youth counselors in prisons or as part of social, cultural, and religious institu- tions. Former extremists are the most important lever for convincing youth not to join Daesh, and street credibility is vital for this effort. Not all returnees are a threat, and we must not treat them this way. Without a doubt, a strict vetting process will have to be in place as well as a training and counseling component for returnees. Messaging will need to be polished, and teaming up with communications specialists to construct and implement the right message must be embedded from the start of any such reintegration regimen.

You can re-enact the video games you play, first-person-shooter scenarios in which you are the hero fighting a noble cause. You don’t die; you are just reborn in a next life in jannah (paradise).

54 The Carter Center Grassroots Perspectives: Voices From the Ground

Countering Extremist Propaganda With an Islamic Approach Manal Omar Acting Vice President for the Middle East and Africa Center at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.

Since 2015, the Islamic State (ISIS) has spread addressing violence after it has already occurred to nearly two dozen countries, with official and center our efforts on bringing warring parties branches in 15 of those countries. Hundreds of with guns to the table for peace negotiations. The followers and supporters are recruited every day, human cost of allowing violence and extremism to expanding the organization and threatening to escalate to that point is unacceptable and has not destabilize communities across the Middle East, led to sustainable peace. Furthermore, by focusing Africa, and some parts of Europe. Unlike its early on bringing violent groups to the negotiating days, where most of ISIS fighters stemmed from table after violence has occurred, we often exclude Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, ISIS now boasts nonviolent groups from the discourse and the members from countries and regions as diverse reshaping of society post-conflict. as Pakistan, the North Caucasus, and Nigeria.1 It Our current approach to countering violent is no longer only war-torn states that are vulner- extremism, specifically who we target and how able. Tunisia, known for the success of the Arab we utilize resources, is ineffective and unsustain- Spring, is the largest exporter of foreign fighters, able. The West’s constant demands for Muslim and Belgium is the larger exporter from Europe.2 apologies for every single attack, act of violence, The group’s intense and effective recruiting or religiously motivated hate incident have not strategies have utilized Twitter, Facebook, and led to decreased violence but rather to a growing Instagram, attracting supporters from the United frustration among Muslims at being scapegoated Kingdom, the United States, Southeast Asia, and for the crimes of thugs and political opportunists.3 other places around the world. Feeding on societal Continued profiling of Muslims as a demographic discontent, feelings of marginalization and exclu- likely to become extremist may lead to the next sion, and failed government policies, the ISIS generation of Muslims being self-haters, embar- narrative has built a large, strong, and effective rassed to be Muslim and constantly apologizing propaganda machine that targets youth and the for incidents to which they have no ties. This will disenfranchised from around the world. create a fertile ground for extremism in the future, Why are youth drawn to the exceedingly when a leader steps in to restore their pride. In the violent tactics of ISIS? What drives people to short term, it may lead to further radicalization choose violence instead of nonviolence? Our and the manifestation of the clash of civilizations. peacebuilding approach is not working and is not This makes them even more ripe for a Trump-like deterring youth from seeking violence as a means leader within the Muslim community to restore of redressing grievances. Rather than concen- their pride a decade from now or further radicalize, trating our efforts on identifying the root causes pushing them into ISIS’s hands today. of violence and extremism, we focus heavily on

55 Why Violence? Tunisia, youth have been active participants in civil society initiatives to stabilize the country To effectively counter extremist propaganda, post-Ben Ali.6 Across the Middle East, there are we need to get to the root of why people are countless cases of nonviolent movements: In fact, choosing violence to solve grievances and societal more people participate in nonviolent initiatives problems. In my interviews with youth around than in radical movements in the region. We the world, I have rarely heard Islamic scripture aren’t giving enough credit or attention to these quoted as the justification for young people’s movements, creating a false perception that there decisions to radicalize. In Nigeria, youth spoke are no alternatives to violence. Furthermore, these endlessly about corruption and how the govern- nonviolent movements are often disconnected ment has lowered Nigerian pride in the face of and fragmented, leaving them weaker and less the continent. Extremism serves as a means of cohesive. We need to connect nonviolent activists rectifying societal ills that the government fails around the region and build a support network. to address. In Indonesia, extremist groups often At the same time, we should not wear rose- recruit youth who see government corruption colored glasses and deny that there is a religious and failure to distribute the benefits of economic component to the extremist narrative. Islam is being manipulated by ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and other groups that pick and choose versus pushing Counternarratives aren’t enough to combat extremist a political agenda out of context.7 Thus, our approach to countering extremist propaganda must propaganda: We need to present counteroffers. be rooted in an Islamic foundation that provides a multidisciplinary Islamic approach to activism and the redress of grievances. growth to the poorest communities in society as justification for violence against the state and Forget Counternarratives: minority communities.4 There are many issues at the center of violent extremism, not just one. We Need to Present Counteroffers Violence manifests itself in different ways, arising Counternarratives aren’t enough to combat in communities for diverging reasons. Violations extremist propaganda: We actually need to present of human dignity, lack of democratic processes, counteroffers. People want action, not words, and local ethnic and religious conflict, corruption, ISIS offers concrete actions that its supporters and other factors all feed into the frustration and can take to rectify wrongs and social injustices. feelings of helplessness of youth and others who Through its extensive and culturally tailored join extremist movements. ISIS has provided a outreach initiatives, ISIS speaks to each potential nice quick simple answer to all of the nuanced, recruit within his or her local context, appealing contextual problems that communities face. Yet to personal frustrations, trauma, and violations we offer no counter movement that people can of human dignity. Current countering extremism join that emphasizes nonviolent solutions. Our measures focus primarily on rhetoric but fail to counterextremist approach needs culturally and offer concrete, nonviolent physical solutions that situationally nuanced strategies tailored to local act as an alternative to the violence promoted by needs and concerns, advocating nonviolent means ISIS. of redressing grievances and pushing for change. Furthermore, there is growing frustration that At the same time, we’re not paying sufficient non-Muslims in Europe and the United States are attention to effective nonviolent movements more worried about potential security threats in in Muslim communities. In Palestine, there are the Middle East than they are domestic terrorist often youth-led peaceful demonstrations against attacks in their own countries, committed by the Israeli occupation; yet these initiatives are radical xenophobes who use violence to spread often not covered by mainstream media.5 In

56 The Carter Center hate and fear. The 2015 shooting of three young crimes — Islamophobia launches an attack not just Muslim college students at Chapel Hill demon- on Muslims but on pluralistic values. Concerted strates one of many examples in which Muslims efforts are needed to dismantle the structures have been singled out and targeted for violent that perpetuate Islamophobia, including holding attacks.8 Muslims grow frustrated with apparent authorities and public figures accountable for Western apathy at violence conducted against racism, discrimination, and hate speech. Muslims both in the West and abroad.9 Working with the media to combat Countering extremist narratives requires Islamophobia is also key to successfully coun- providing a counter offer that addresses grievances, tering violent extremism. Changing the way violations of human dignity, and security threats in which the media portrays Muslims requires against Muslim citizens in the United States and holding reporters, news anchors, and pundits Europe. It requires empathy and a contextualized accountable for stereotyping and racism. We understanding of the underlying concerns and also need to provide a counternarrative, one that frustrations that Muslims face around the world. emphasizes the contributions of Islam to social Rather than focusing on the rhetoric, we need justice and peacebuilding, not one that spews to offer concrete solutions and steps to recti- Islamophobic hatred. fying problems, allowing people to have agency and support in addressing social problems in their communities. To combat extremism, we need to acknowledge that Combating Islamophobia discrimination and ostracism of communities breed Islamophobia and violent extremism are two resentment and reaffirm the claims of extremist sides of the same coin. To fight extremism, you groups that the West hates Islam. must also fight Islamophobia. Continued assaults on and hate crimes against Muslims in Europe and the United States only add fuel to the fire What strategies should be employed of the extremist narrative that seeks to recruit to effectively counter the ISIS marginalized and disenchanted individuals.10 narrative and propaganda? How The racist and xenophobic rhetoric of right-wing should we restructure our approach individuals and politicians has provided fodder to countering violent extremism? to ISIS and other extremist groups that the West is engaged in a fight against Islam itself rather 1. Avoid the Temptation of than against extremism. ISIS recruiters frequently Religious Reductionism point to Islamophobic rhetoric to lure in recruits, There needs to be an understanding of the role of claiming that the West is unleashing a “clash of religion, secularism, and fundamental secularism civilizations” bent on destroying Islamic values in the narrative of violent extremism. Media and norms. narratives focus heavily on extremist repression To combat extremism, we need to acknowledge of women’s rights, like the Taliban’s draconian that discrimination and ostracism of communi- societal restrictions for Afghan women or Boko ties breed resentment and reaffirm the claims Haram’s attacks on women’s schools. Yet the of extremist groups that the West hates Islam. media rarely focuses on secular assaults on Islamic Islamophobia is a violation of human rights values that feed into the clash of civilizations and human dignity that adds to the grievances rhetoric of the Islamic State. News outlets ran of communities. Through institutionalized coverage on the Brussels and Paris attacks for days violence and discrimination — from local anti- after the incident but failed to mention the anti- shari’a laws to local law enforcement’s failure Islamic and socially isolating policies of France and to prosecute anti-Muslim violence as hate Belgium that fueled extremist reactions against

Countering Daesh Propaganda 57 those two countries. Little coverage is given to Engaging religious leaders in countering violent the decrepit living conditions of France’s Muslim propaganda is different from instrumentalizing banlieues or the discriminatory anti-veil policies them. Engagement recognizes that religious leaders that France has enforced on Muslim communi- play a crucial role in encouraging tolerance, ties.11 Furthermore, media conglomerates ignored providing moral support, and preventing violence Muslim-on-Muslim violence and terror attacks in through their outreach to their communities.14 Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq that occurred at the Instrumentalizing religious leaders capitalizes same time, further adding to the idea that the on the work those individuals are doing in their West cares little for Muslim lives. communities and manipulates it and the leaders to serve an underlying political agenda. Current initiatives around countering violent extremism often do not recognize the nuances between these Engagement recognizes that religious leaders play two concepts. This makes our partners ineffective at best — and targets at worse. a crucial role in encouraging tolerance, providing Emphasis needs to be on the contributions reli- moral support, and preventing violence through gious leaders have made to countering extremism apart from Western assistance. For example, Imam their outreach to their communities. Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s public statements and condemnations of ISIS have inspired hundreds of Iraqi Shi’a to join the fight against ISIS.15 In ISIS did not create Huntington’s theory of the United Kingdom, local imams have taken an a clash of civilizations.12 However, increasingly approach to countering violent extremism that xenophobic and Islamophobic rhetoric on the part treats radicalization and recruitment of youth in of American and European citizens allows ISIS the same manner that community leaders would to manipulate an existing double standard — the address gang influence — through after-school Western implied concept that some lives (non- community programs, interfaith dialogue sessions, Muslim lives) matter more than others and are and community service projects for at-risk youth. worthy of global outrage and media coverage. The 3. Allow Authentic Space for Dialogue more the West ignores the violence perpetuated on Issues That Concern Communities against Muslims and frames extremist violence Another mistake that counterextremism initiatives as “Islamic” violence, the stronger ISIS’s clash of make is supporting the creation and dissemination civilizations narrative becomes.13 of planned sermons and talking points for imams 2. Engage, Don’t Instrumentalize and other religious leaders across communities. In Religious Leaders this digital age of social media, youth are quick There is substantial discussion among policy to recognize inauthentic sources of messaging circles of the need to engage religious leaders in and won’t accept narratives coming from sources countering violent extremism. However, well- they deem having an ulterior agenda. By planting meaning efforts to bring in religious leaders and Friday sermons with anti-extremist messaging in organizations can easily be co-opted by Western mosques, policy makers and activists strip agency governments and policy makers to serve a broader away from religious leaders, weaken potential agenda about countering violent extremism religious role models, and feed into conspiracy that can be counterproductive for communities. theories (that ISIS spreads) that leaders have Propping up local religious leaders as tools in the been bought by the West to serve an anti-Muslim fight against extremism causes those leaders to lose agenda. In my community, we used to joke about credibility and legitimacy in their communities, as “scholars for dollars”: We knew which leaders were people perceive them to be manipulated by politi- being paid off to push another group’s agenda and cians for a hidden agenda. which leaders were speaking truth.

58 The Carter Center People tire of hearing the same “don’t fall for Muslimgirl.com focuses on engaging Muslim youth extremism!” narratives, which fail to address the voices in solving community problems and inter- underlying societal problems that lead to radi- preting Islamic scriptures in a manner that focuses calization in the first place. Muslim communities on grassroots social empowerment for change.18 By need to step up and address societal problems not including women religious leaders in our strat- that lead youth down a path to radicalism. This egies for countering violent extremism and in our means that we need to allow an authentic space peacebuilding initiatives, we are missing a signifi- for dialogue in communities so people can discuss cant demographic that is already contributing to local concerns and social problems and brain- community change.19 storm ways in which to rectify those problems. At the same time, women religious leaders have This means including all voices, even those with been calling for a mass reinterpretation of the whom we disagree on principle or who have Quran and deeper understanding of Islamic shari’a more conservative approaches to peacebuilding and jurisprudence for decades. Their call for more and community outreach. Our approach of only female interpretation of Islam is a crucial potential including like-minded partners in dialogue and strategy to combat ISIS. Rather than reinventing planning may hurt us in the long run, as we miss the wheel, Islamic scholars and Western policy opportunities to engage a wider variety of actors makers could tap into Muslim women’s strategy and come up with comprehensive solutions that for Islamic revival that builds on concepts such target a wider audience and have a more substan- as ijtihad (independent thought), shura (consulta- tial impact. tions), and maqasid al shari’a (purpose of laws). The United States and other international Women scholars have been using Islamic tradition actors need to define the nonnegotiables in as ammunition against Islamic extremism. Plenty building a coalition against ISIS. The reality is of organizations, such as Women Living Under that defeating ISIS remains a second priority Muslim Laws, the Women and Memory Forum for many of our allies. Other priorities — from in Egypt, and Sisters in Islam in Malaysia have the removal of Assad to neutralizing the developed a crucial knowledge base for practitio- sectarian proxy wars between Iran and Saudi ners to refer to when making Islamic arguments Arabia — remain at the top of the list. Only by for positive change.20 Extracting lessons learned having inclusive, authentic dialogues can we get to the root causes of violence and create appropriate, nuanced solutions to social issues. 4. Understand the Role of Women Rather than reinventing the wheel, Islamic scholars as Religious Leaders and Western policy makers could tap into Muslim Women religious leaders remain an untapped resource for combating violent extremism. Women women’s strategy for Islamic revival that builds on religious leaders are often ignored and excluded concepts such as ijtihad (independent thought), by both the secular and faith-based groups in decision-making processes and community; yet shura (consultations), and maqasid al shari’a Muslim women are crossing red lines daily to (purpose of laws). change the narrative and emphasize nonviolent, peaceful solutions to community challenges.16 For example, AltMuslimah — an online forum for and strategies of success from women scholars Muslim women to discuss issues of faith, family, is an essential first step to a broader discussion sexuality, and community — provides an opportu- around the need for Islamic revivalism that brings nity for Muslim women from around the world to back pluralism and nonviolence as the center of address community concerns and brainstorm ways Islamic teachings. to solve problems through an Islamic approach.17

Countering Daesh Propaganda 59 5. Understand the Power of the Invisible are the ones that are not seen. There need to be It is also crucial that we enable actors on the avenues to build in support and stronger donor ground to work on their community outreach and education of the dangers of pushing partners to nonviolence programs without drawing attention the forefront. to Western efforts to combat violent extremism. 6. Ownership and Responsibility of Policy makers and peace builders often desire to the Growth of Extremist Groups draw attention to their own efforts to prevent and Too often, violent extremism is presented as a combat violence, highlighting their contributions problem of the countries in which the extremists to the counterextremism narrative. Unfortunately, have emerged. The crisis may be emerging from this undermines the credibility and legitimacy countries across the Middle East and Africa, but of the leaders who we are trying to help, giving the reality is this is a global crisis that is impacting the impression that leaders are puppets of non- communities worldwide. Just as it impacts the Muslim actors with hidden political agendas. As global community, it also originates from actions policy makers and peace activists, it’s crucial that of the global community. That there would be no we step back and allow community leaders and ISIS without Islam is just as true as the fact that there would be no ISIS without U.S. intervention in Iraq. As the Muslim community steps into their The crisis may be emerging from countries across role in combating ISIS, so must the international forces that led to its creation. the Middle East and Africa, but the reality is this In much of the Middle East, people are convinced that ISIS is not theirs — that the is a global crisis that is impacting communities movement is not a product of failed governance, worldwide. sectarian discrimination, and inability of states to provide basic social services and safety nets to local communities. Instead, conspiracy theories organizations to take ownership of nonviolent from Egypt to Syria to Saudi Arabia frame ISIS counterextremist initiatives. In many cases, our as a creation of the United States, a convenient contributions might not be recognized, and the enemy that enables the United States to interfere credit may go solely to the grassroots leaders and in MENA politics and the reshaping of the Middle activists at the heart of the communities. We need East once more in the tradition of Sykes–Picot. to recognize that there are times we need to step To combat extremism, we need to take a hard out of the spotlight and not receive attribution look at the events and policies of the global war for the peacebuilding work we’ve done. We need on terror that led to the propping up of violent to acknowledge that our footprint on projects, regimes and enabled political leaders to crack particularly sensitive projects in which communi- down on dissident populations without condemna- ties are suspicious of ulterior motives and hidden tion. Nouri al-Maliki’s discriminatory policies agendas, may not need to be visible. toward Iraqi Sunni Muslims allowed ISIS to take At the same time, we need to take the cue root in Iraq, feeding off of public discontent and of visibility of our partners directly from them. suffering under Maliki’s government. This came Too often organizations, particularly those that hand in hand with U.S. unconditional support are dependent on the donor community, need to of Maliki.21 document success stories. There are many times Support in the war on terror for autocratic when donor-driven agendas push local community regimes was not limited to the Middle East. In organizers into the spotlight prematurely. I have China, for example, Chinese officials framed the often referred to this practice as “hugging our allies Muslim Uighur separatist movement in Xinjiang to death.” Some of the most effective strategies as a terrorist movement designed to undermine

60 The Carter Center the stability of the state. Ignoring the centuries- rates, rapidly declining oil prices, lack of service long history of discrimination and marginalization provision by weakened governments, and growing of the Uighur people, Chinese officials framed crackdowns from authoritarian officials are greater Uighur dissidents as terrorists and used Western priorities to communities that see ISIS as a Syrian support to implement a slew of anti-Islamic problem or a Western problem rather than a policies in the region.22 The same case holds for regional problem. Our enemy is occupation. Our Russian policies toward Chechnya. The incidences enemy is the authoritarian regime. Our enemy of Western support for autocratic regimes under is corruption. Our enemy is rise of sectarianism. the global war on terror have created a strong Violent extremism is merely a product of and compelling case to which ISIS can point out failed governance. global persecution of Muslims. This allows ISIS to carefully construct a culturally and nationally appropriate framework in which the West is By arguing that the West is to blame for ISIS, portrayed as waging a war on Islam. However, the fault does not lie solely with communities fail to take responsibility for their the West. Weak civil societies, corrupt elections, role in developing good governments and a robust mismanagement of public finances, and failure to develop sustainable and strong infrastructure private sector that would allow for growth, stability, are governance problems that the Middle East and peace. itself needs to fix, not the West. By arguing that the West is to blame for ISIS, communities fail to take responsibility for their role in developing If we want to deter youth from joining good governments and a robust private sector extremist movements, we need a more effective, that would allow for growth, stability, and peace. contextual, nuanced approach that recognizes Growing apathy among communities needs to be community ownership of projects, the role of addressed, and we need to work on a way to help religious leaders (including women) in promoting communities recognize and address the radicalism peace, the role that Western media plays in that emerges from poor governance and resource exacerbating grievances, and the root causes of management. violence that are compelling youth to pursue We also need to acknowledge that while ISIS extremism rather than nonviolence. Only then may be the West’s primary priority (the Obama can we create effective, sustainable solutions to administration has identified ISIS as its No. 1 global problems. priority), activists and local communities see ISIS The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of research assistant as a second-tier priority. High unemployment Rachel Palmer to this project.

Countering Daesh Propaganda 61 1 “Spreading Its Tentacles.” The Economist. July 4, 2015. Print and online. 11 Witte. Griff. “French Muslims Caught Between Islamophobia and http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21656690- Extremism.” Washington Post. March 22, 2015. Online. https://www. islamic-state-making-itself-felt-ever-more-countries-how-much-influence washingtonpost.com/world/europe/french-muslims-caught-between- rising-islamophobia-and-growing-extremism/2015/03/22/7359329c-c739- 2 Sullivan, Kevin. “Tunisia, After Igniting Arab Spring, Sends the Most 11e4-bea5-b893e7ac3fb3_story.html Fighters to Islamic State in Syria.” The Washington Post. Oct. 28, 2014. Online. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/tunisia- Holland, Joshua. “Islamic Extremism Is Not the Cause of Europe’s Terror after-igniting-arab-spring-sends-the-most-fighters-to-islamic-state-in- Problem.” The Nation. March 30, 2016. 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Oct. 28, 2014. 8 Talbot, Margaret. “The Story of a Hate Crime.” The New Yorker. Online. Online. http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-10-28/film-traces-how-nouri-al- June 22, 2015. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/22/the- malikis-treatment-iraqi-sunnis-helped-isis-get-stronger story-of-a-hate-crime Al-Ali, Zaid. “How Maliki Ruined Iraq.” Foreign Policy. June 19, 2014. 9 Vidinli, Suna. “Why Brussels Mattered and Istanbul Didn’t: The Double Online. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/19/how-maliki-ruined-iraq/ Standard on Terror.” Mashable. March 23, 2016. http://mashable. 22 Chung, Chien-Peng. “China’s ‘War on Terror’: September 11 and Uighur com/2016/03/23/double-standards-on-terror-attacks/#U3Q.Uek3kGqJ Separatism.” Foreign Affairs. July/August 2002. https://www.foreignaffairs. 10 Jones, Owen. “Islamophobia Plays Right Into the Hands of ISIS.” com/articles/asia/2002-07-01/chinas-war-terror-september-11-and- The Guardian. Online. Nov. 25, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/ uighur-separatism commentisfree/2015/nov/25/islamophobia-isis-muslim-islamic-state-paris Denyer, Simon. “China’s War on Terror Becomes All-Out Attack on Mansour, Nadine. “One Year On: Mapping Islamophobic Attacks Since Islam in Xinjiang.” The Washington Post. Sept. 19, 2014. https://www. Chapel Hill.” Al-Jazeera. Online. Feb. 11, 2016. http://www.aljazeera. washingtonpost.com/world/chinas-war-on-terror-becomes-all-out- com/indepth/interactive/2016/02/islamophobia-attacks-chapel-hill- attack-on-islam-in-xinjiang/2014/09/19/5c5840a4-1aa7-4bb6-bc63- map-160211105352070.html 69f6bfba07e9_story.html

62 The Carter Center Grassroots Perspectives: Voices From the Ground

A Dutch Perspective: History, Politics, and Outcomes Sam Cherribi Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia; Member of Parliament in The Netherlands 1994–2002

In the city of Rotterdam, 9/11 was a turning point of the filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam that amplified a dormant Islamic debate. that shifted the national debate to its extreme. Between 1997 and 2002, a series of incidents This time, it was not an animal rights activist had occurred: protests by Muslims against the that killed van Gogh but a homegrown Muslim play “Aicha” (named for the youngest wife of terrorist. Amsterdam, the city of Spinoza, Prophet Muhammad), Imam Khalil El-Moumni, Descartes, and Anne Frank, became the center of and controversy around gay marriage that Islamic evil. culminated in “De Islamisering van Nederland, The Islamization of the Netherlands,” a book by Pim Fortuyn, a sociologist, columnist, and media personality who became a star politician. A simple map of the electoral success of extreme Just days before the elections of May 2002, won by Fortuyn’s party, Fortuyn was killed by an right-wing parties in Europe show the hold of animal rights activist in the media park of the city these parties on the political configuration of the of Hilversum. It was the first political murder in the nation since the assassination of William of continent. Orange in 1584 and was in the most renowned tolerant country in Europe (Jonathan Israel, 2001; Russell Shorto, 2013). Never had so many people Islamophobia in the Netherlands voted for a dead man in the history of politics. Fortuyn — whose real first name was This article addresses three questions: What are Wilhelmus, set the stage and created the frames the characteristics of Dutch Islamophobia? What and the intellectual foundations for a Dutch makes the Dutch Islamophobia different from Islamophobia. This Islamophobia flourished with other forms of Islamophobia? What arguments are two members of the liberal party (the People’s used to legitimize hatred against Islam, Muslims, Party for Freedom and Democracy or VVD) — one and, especially, Moroccans? white, Geert Wilders, and one black, Ayaan Hirsi To answer these questions, it is important to Ali of Somalian origin. Through the political prac- look at the time frame of the rise of Islamophobia. tices of these two men, Fortuyn essentially created This time frame coincides with the emergence and a roadmap to full-fledged Islamophobia (Cherribi the amplification of key insecurities that charac- 2010). terized European societies post 9/11, such as: If the Islamophobia — in its Fortuynian 1. The quick enlargement of Europe with new outlook — was the product of ethnic and religious Eastern European countries and the ongoing tensions in Rotterdam, it was the assassination debate about Turkey’s accession

63 2. The fear of Eastern Europeans taking over Moroccan migrants and their offspring are the Dutch jobs (Telegraaf, 2004) ideal target since they represent the underclass and 3. The Roma, for whom a job moratorium the stereotype of Muslims, especially the imams was imposed for a couple of years in many who wear djellabas (traditional Moroccan gowns). European countries The focus on Moroccans is astounding, illustrated by the fact that a word like kut-Marokkanen (cunt- 4. The economic crisis that hit all European Moroccans) made it to Het Groene Boekje, the countries, especially Portugal, Spain, Italy, bible of the Dutch spelling. (The Netherlands and and Greece Belgium have joint parliamentary commissions 5. The rise of far right and anti-European local and an institution called the Taalunie (Language parties that promoted national identities Union) that monitors spellings of words. Het as the only alternative to the expansion of Groene Boekje defines the official spelling of the European Union and the outsourcing of Dutch words used in the Taalunie for all Dutch- jobs globally and Flemish-speaking populations.) Rob Oudkerk, a former politician from the Labor Party (PvdA), coined the word kut- Marokkanen. Oudkerk has a show on BNN public What makes Dutch Islamophobia different can be radio that embodies the institutionalization of summarized in one distinct characteristic: The Partij the hatred of a segment of the population — an anti-Moroccan attitude shared across the political voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom or PVV) that spectrum from left to right (Cherribi, 2010). thrives on Islamophobia is tolerated by almost all Dutch–Moroccan citizens are an easy target because of their low social position and their political parties. overrepresentation in dropout, unemployment, and crime statistics, and they are seen as living on Dutch welfare. Further, any radical imams, Islamophobia generalizes state vulnerability who speak Arabic even if they are a different at all levels, including cultural, political, and nationality, are labeled Moroccans since they economic. It is impacting European societies, preach in mosques built or attended by members which has allowed single-issue parties to thrive. of the Moroccan community. Often, the distinc- A simple map of the electoral success of extreme tion is ignored. Due to the globalization of Islamic right-wing parties in Europe, even in the most radicalization of youth, the Dutch have their share immune countries such as Sweden, shows the hold of Western youth fighting with radical Islamist of these parties on the political configuration of groups in Iraq and Syria. the continent. What makes Dutch Islamophobia different can be summarized in one distinct characteristic: Characteristics of Dutch The Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom or Islamophobia PVV) that thrives on Islamophobia is tolerated by almost all political parties, including allowing Classical racism in the Netherlands connected the co-signing of motions and amendments in anti-immigrants and allochtones (emerging Parliament and municipalities (www.tweedekamer. from another soil) with organizations such as nl). In Belgium, a cordon sanitaire, a kind of the Centrum Democraten (CD) party, led by official boycott, has been imposed for years on the uncharismatic and buffoonish leader Hans Vlaams Belang and its predecessor, Vlaams Blok. Janmaat. It metamorphosed under a charismatic, In France, Le Front National is stigmatized by all photogenic, and gay leader, Pim Fortuyn, into other parties. However, the PVV is used as buiten- a more acceptable form of bashing Muslims boordmotor1 or as an outboard engine to support and Moroccans. certain coalitions.

64 The Carter Center While the former leader of the far-right party The Seagull and the Centrum Democraten was not taken seriously, the Geblondeerde Beethoven leader of the Party for Freedom, Geert Wilders, is building on the aura of Pim Fortuyn. This Geert Wilders’ favorite subject is: Muslims, association has propelled him to national fame. Moroccans, and Islam. He legitimizes his extreme In addition, Wilders is woordvoeder sociale zaken, hatred with the following arguments. First, Islam is spokesman for social affairs with the VVD party, a totalitarian ideology, has the same characteristics which gave him a standing in the political arena. as cancer, and should be eradicated from its roots. Second, the European Union and naïve politicians Can Islam Be Framed As Race? are culprits, inundating the Netherlands with Muslim migrants and asylum-seekers. Remedies Beyond what Jan Mohamed call “fetishization” of for both problems are easy according to Wilders: racial discourse, Magali Bessone (2013) redefines restore the physical boundaries (borders) of the race beyond the biological reality in order to grasp country in order to be free. it as a “racialized social reality.” This complex racialized reality, according to Luc Foisneau (2013), is that being black, white, or Arab in France is having a different social destiny and The seagull symbol is not neutral. It has a historical trajectory. Foisneau, who agrees with Bessone, meaning anchored in a fascist tradition that dates sees that European countries have a thick screen in front of their eyes through which they look at back before the Second World War. society, ignoring the complex realities of race. He adds that it suffices to read surveys about social exclusion and its victims to see the size of dysfunc- Freedom is the key to every effective solution, tion in society. according to Wilders. Therefore, the logo he Racism in society is responsible for all forms chose for his party is a seagull, the two blue wings of exclusion and social tensions. The merit of outlined with white, the red plumage of the tail the work of Bessone is to redefine race as a more also white outlined, and the breast white. This inclusive notion in order to solve the enigma seagull is not neutral. It has a historical meaning of exclusion. So the discourse of the far right anchored in a fascist tradition that dates back introduces a process of rationalization in society, before the Second World War. According to and the discourse of Geert Wilders re-Islamizes historian Gjalt Zondergeld2 the seagull of the this racialization process or even sometimes PVV has a striking resemblance to the seagull Moroccanizes it. of the National Socialist Movement of The The efficacy of Wilders’ exclusionary discourse Netherlands (NSB), a Dutch fascist movement lies in the fact that the visible minorities in large that went through a transformation and became cities happen to be Moroccans and Muslims. a national socialist party from the 1930s until Interestingly, he never mentions the Turks by the end of WWII. Since the Netherlands is a name and just calls them Muslims, even though seagull-rich country, the bird symbolizes freedom the debate about Turkey’s accession to the and national unity. Zondergeld sees similarities European Union was the watershed moment between the seagull logo, which is placed next to between him and his former Liberal party, the the word “freedom,” just like the poster of 1941 on VVD. His stance against Turkey led to the which the NSB put the word “freedom” next to creation of his own party, the PVV — perhaps the seagull. because Moroccan youth figure more in crime and The political manifesto of the PVV is titled maybe also because Turkey is a member of NATO “Hún Brussel, óns Nederland” (Their Brussels, and has a stronger economy than many European Our Netherlands), with an emphasis on the “u” countries while still a potential member of the for hun, which means “theirs” and the “o” of ons, European Union.

Countering Daesh Propaganda 65 which means “ours” (2012–2017).3 According to a pentagonal star is placed. Under the picture, the the manifesto, the European Union is misleading page is titled “Our migration policy,” linking Islam its members in order to take away their sover- to immigration as a double outsider-ness in the eignty. The manifesto begins with a broken country or the two sides of the same coin. Greek one-Euro coin. The PVV legitimizes its The manifesto contraposes two statements: one Euro-skeptic attitude by making an analogy to the by the slain filmmaker Theo van Gogh, who was attitude of Willem Drees, one of the great national shot by a young Dutch Moroccan radical Islamist; figures, the historic leader of the socialist party, and one by the former mayor of Amsterdam and former prime minister of the Netherlands. The and former leader of the labor party, Job Cohen. Cohen said to Moroccans, “You belong here” (jullie horen bij ons). The PVV rejects his state- ments and attitude and agrees with the one of The Party for Freedom argues in its manifesto that Theo van Gogh, who asked himself “wat doen jullie eigenlijk hier?” (what are you actually doing here?). Islam is not a religion but a totalitarian political The PVV elaborates on the statements of Van ideology with a religious touch. Gogh by asking, “Who let the Moroccans come to this country?” The answer, according to the PVV, is that the generation of “politically correct politi- cians” are responsible. “The floodgates were open manifesto asks whether Drees was xenophobic and for hundreds of thousands of Muslims who were populist from behind the dykes. Of course not, lured here with jobs, benefits, housing, and educa- says the manifesto, he was patriotic: He didn’t tion. The consequences are disastrous. By now, want to sell out the power of the Netherlands and everybody understands that.” to export the well-being of the Netherlands to The PVV argues in its manifesto that Islam is Greece and European countries, mainly Bulgaria not a religion but a totalitarian political ideology and Romania. with a religious touch. According to the manifesto, The Euro-phobic attitude has to do with non-Western allochtones cost 7.2 billion Euros a what the PVV called “the many nightmares of year; therefore, the Netherlands has to stop immi- Europe” — that the “Islamic Turkey” will be gration from Muslim countries. Here again, the the biggest country in Europe after Germany in presence of non-Western citizens is equated with terms of population. The other nightmare will the presence of Islam as if all immigrants in the be the flocking of the Turks to our country. The Netherlands are Muslims, which is misleading. manifesto has four maps of the Netherlands: Again, a picture of a colossal minaret is printed. 2010, 2020, 2030, and 2040. Coloring that shows Then comes a list of the measures to stop immigra- percentages of non-Westerners in the Netherlands tion. The measures related to Islam are: is confusing on the maps. The 2040 map looks • Islam should not be considered a religion. like a total invasion of non-Western migrants. Therefore, Muslims should not benefit from Immediately after the four maps, you see a big arrangements that other religions enjoy. picture of a trash bin with the European flag in it, • No single new mosque should be built. Further, suggesting that the solution for the problems of a ban should be imposed on mosques in urban migration is leaving the European Union. areas and on minarets. The PVV has reclaimed the sovereignty of the Netherlands, replacing the European Union with • Any mosque where violence is signaled should a new treaty for free trade. On page 34 of the be closed. manifesto, there is a picture of the Taiba mosque • Financing mosques from outside sources should in Amsterdam with four minarets and two domes. be banned. On the domes and the minarets, a half-moon with • All Islamic schools should be closed.

66 The Carter Center • No headscarves should be worn in healthcare, as free men. The prime minister is disconnected education, municipalities or government build- from the people.” He asked the prime minister to ings, or any subsidized organization. close the borders from “mass immigration and mass 4 • Not even a single headscarf should be worn Islamization.” in the Parliament, “the heart of our democ- The PVV put the government and the police racy,” not by the Cabinet, civil servants, force under pressure because they, according to members of Parliament, or even visitors to the the PVV, deny the Moroccan problem. According Parliament — “by no one.” to the PVV, 65 percent of the Moroccan youth between 12 and 23 years old were accused of • People who have dual nationality have no criminal offenses,5 an exaggerated interpretation voting rights. of available statistics. The PVV asked in written • The burqa and the Quran should be banned, questions in the Dutch Parliament to clarify what and headscarves should be taxed. the PVV calls Marokkanen gemeenten (municipali- • People who don’t speak Dutch or who wear a ties with a lot of Moroccans) in order to proceed burqa should not receive social benefits. to territorial racialization of locations with bigger concentrations of ethnic groups. • Multicultural grants should be banned. On the website of the PVV, there is a link to (The PVV uses the word “multi-culti” in an article in English from the NL Times stating, a pejorative sense.) “Half of all Dutch people agree with Geert Wilders’ opinion that there should be fewer Tweeting Hatred: Islamophobia Moroccans in the country.”6 Anti-Moroccan and Europhobia tweets went viral after a YouTube video showed a crowd chanting “less, less Moroccan” at one of Wilders is becoming the most famous member of Wilders’ rallies in The Hague before the European Parliament who uses Twitter, and surprising tweets parliamentary elections. The video went viral are becoming almost a daily talk of the town. One around March 19, 2014. From Jan. 19, 2014, until of his famous tweets that has also been a subject March 19, 2014, there were a total of 17 tweets on his website is “insane.” It says, “If you can’t deal with a negative tone against Moroccans. From with Zwarte Piet, then leave The Netherlands.” March 19 to May 19, 2014, there were more than Wilders blurs the lines between color, race, and 60,000 negative tweets. The tweets were composed religion, which makes the interchangeability of of insults such as Rif-apen (apes of the Rif, the the categories of stigma and objects of racism Berber region in Morocco) zand negers (sand a salient argument. A picture of a blacked face negroes), and kut-Marokkanen. Most of denigrating with a white and blue beret with red feathers and discriminatory tweets came three days after and a 17th century collar was posted. The PVV the video went viral. On March 22 alone, there is targeting Amsterdam, the largest multicultural were 4,489 denigrating tweets (De Telegraaf, May city in the country, blaming the mayor, Eberhard 20, 2014). van der Laan, of changing the Dutch tradition of Moroccans are the key to the European Union Zwarte Piet and turning Sinterklaas into a “nega- hatred. In order to demonstrate its anti-European tive stereotype.” According to the PVV, the mayor attitude, on May 20, 2014, Geert Wilders cut off belongs to the generation of politically correct one of the European stars from the European flag politicians. next to the European Parliament building, symbol- On April 13, 2014, Wilder wrote an open izing the rejection of the European project and the letter to the prime minister about Moroccan street European Union. Wilders said, “I take this star thugs. Linking political murder to the Moroccan back with me to the Netherlands, and Brussels will community, he said, “In a decent country, Pim never get it back from us.” He also said that the Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh could have lived Netherlands must get out of the European Union.

Countering Daesh Propaganda 67 “We don’t like Brussels; we are not the boss in example of the tradition of tolerance that created our own country, our own money, our borders, new Amsterdam New York. (Russel Shorto, our budget; and it costs us a lot of money” (De Amsterdam the most liberal city in the world). Telegraaf, May 20, 2014). The Vrije Universiteit explained that the space for Muslims is not new; they have had it for years The Netherlands: the Largest as part of the university tradition. One of the Islamic Empire in the World? questions asked by members of Parliament of the PVV was, “Is it true that a Christian prayer space The PVV obsession with Islam goes beyond the was moved to the basement?” The framing of the presence of Muslims in the Netherlands. This question was to show that Christianity is losing obsession colors and influences every single ground in its own institution that represents its discussion or issue in politics; that is, the PVV own cultural Christian identity.7 sees Islamic imagery and uses words that describe political phenomena through an Islamic lens. C. ISIS-tuig / ISIS-thugs The mayor of The Hague, Josias van Aartsen, is A. Klimaatminaretten the party leader who ousted Geert Wilders from To show their rejection for the wide, long, steel his own caucus in Parliament in 2004–2005. The windmills, with three or four rotor blades, wind- mayor issued a protest ban after pro- and contra- energy parks were labeled “climate-minarets.” Gaza riots in the Schilderswijk (a nationally PVV sees Islam in everything — even in wind stigmatized neighborhood in the Dutch political energy — just like Don Quixote de la Mancha capital, The Hague). According to the PVV, (PVV Brabant Tegen Klimaatminaretten, some of the protesters chanted slogans that were De Telegraaf, Aug. 15, 2014). pro-ISIS. The story was contested in the media because of a right-winged framing of the issue. After these protests, the mayor issued a protest ban for the neighborhood. Leon de Jong, the PVV This obsession colors and influences every single spokesman and leader in the municipal council, discussion or issue in politics; that is, the Party said, “The mayor kneels for ISIS thugs, Islam, and jihad,” and he added that the ethnic neighborhood for Freedom sees Islamic imagery and uses words the Schilderswijk forms the caliphate of the thugs that describe political phenomena through an in the Netherlands. The PVV wants to respect the right to protest Islamic lens. “except for the ISIS-thugs.” However, the PVV itself wanted to organize its own march in the ethnic neighborhood in order to protest the pres- ence of what they call the fundamentalist Islam in B. Christian Identity the Netherlands. After stirring up a lot of contro- The party made a plea to stop the funding of the versy in the news, the PVV put the demonstration Vrije Universiteit (University in Amsterdam), on hold for security reasons.8 Muslim leaders saw one of the landmarks of Christian identity in the march as a provocation in a neighborhood the country. The reason was that the university where a Muslim majority exists. Muslim leaders decided to open a space for prayer for Muslims, rejected any link to fundamentalist Islam or the usual in many American universities where you radical jihadi group ISIS. The situation became have chapels for all faiths, even in the most more complex when right- and left-wing groups secular universities. Those chapels are an expres- wanted to claim part of the Transvaal neighbor- sion of religious pluralism in America and the hood to protest. Mayor Van Aartsen postponed Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam is a mirror the decision.

68 The Carter Center D. Boycott Saudi Arabia journalists (NRC Handelsblad), Wilders dismissed Another controversy — around whether Geert his own Indonesian heritage by selecting former Wilders and his party represented the govern- professor Hans Jansen, an Arabist from the ment — brought institutions of economic University of Leiden, to join his caucus in the governance in the Netherlands, including trade European Parliament. Jansen doesn’t hide the unions, to write articles in Arabic newspapers fact that his essential interpretation of the large such as Asharq Al Awsat, Al Riadh, and Al Islamic tradition reduces the diverse corpus of Youm asking the Saudis not to impose economic Muslim traditions to the contested notion of sanctions on the Netherlands. At issue was an jihad. Also, Wilders denies any contribution by anti-Islam sticker in the form of the flag of Saudi Moroccans to the well-being of the Netherlands. Arabia as background, with the following text: Many Moroccan soldiers of the French army “Islam is a lie, Muhammad is a crook, and the during WWII fought for the Netherlands against Quran is poison.” Nazi Germany, and Moroccan tombs in Capelle Prime Minister Mark Rutte argued that any (Zeeland) are the visible archives of their heroic sanctions against the Netherlands would cost a lot contribution to the Netherlands. of jobs (nu.nl, May 22, 2014). The volume of trade between the Netherlands and Saudi Arabia is in the billions of Euros (roughly, 4.7 in imports and 2.2 in exports in 2012). The issue of Saudi Arabia The Dutch University of Leiden hosts treasures of played out in the Netherlands on May 22, 2014, around the time of the European parliamentary Islamic civilization and Indonesia, the largest Islamic elections. Timing may be one of the reasons the country that was once part of the Dutch empire. PVV did not win the elections. Another reason could be that the ally of Wilders, the National Front in France, made a statement that the Ebola virus could “eradicate the immigrants from Africa Framing Fatigue: Boomerang to Europe” (De Telegraaf, May 21, 2014). Many of “Fewer Moroccans” Dutch-Moroccan organizations in the Netherlands asked Saudi Arabia not to impose sanctions on the When the media feel that an incitement to hatred Netherlands. can turn into potential physical elimination (fewer Moroccans), restraint is advised. When words start E. Road to Salvation: Hope for the Muslims to have fascist connotations — a kind of authori- Wilders sees one solution to the Moroccan tarian bite such as “I will make it happen” — the problem in the Netherlands. He believes that goal of having fewer Moroccans if Wilders party is integration has a chance of success only if Dutch voted in becomes more real. It is embarrassing for Moroccans choose to vote for the PVV. the media to experience déjà-vu from World War In sum, Wilders thrives on cutting any links to II when members of the Jewish community were the great traditions of Islam in the Netherlands. deported to concentration camps. Hatred is toler- The Dutch University of Leiden hosts treasures ated but not suggesting extermination. Otherwise, of Islamic civilization and Indonesia, the largest what is the meaning of fixing the call to fewer Islamic country that was once part of the Dutch Moroccans? To their credit, even some politicians empire. Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, the of the PVV took distance from the statements of erudite Dutch scholar of Oriental cultures and Wilders about “less Moroccans.” Some members languages and adviser on native affairs, believed of the European Parliament couldn’t deal with the in the integration of Islam in the modern world level of Wilders’ discrimination. His words reso- (Cherribi, 2010). Wilders denies any link by nated as fascist. How would Wilders achieve the doing two things: According to some investigative goal of “fewer Moroccans”? Does he plan to deport

Countering Daesh Propaganda 69 them or put them in prison, or does he have other racial labels but function as mechanisms of exclu- means in mind? sion and shame as if being Muslim or Moroccan The impact of Wilders’ words such as “fewer is something to be ashamed of. Being Moroccan Moroccans” on Moroccan youth and Muslim in the time of Wilders, in the Netherlands, is to children is enormous. Many stories were reported belong to the lowest of the low ranks in society. of little children scared to death to be deported The discourse of Wilders legitimizes and repro- or to be killed, reported Fatima Elatik, former duces segregation into a society based on religion alderman of the Oost district in Amsterdam. The and country origin. As a result, the neighborhood reaction of the Dutch media to Wilders “fewer of Schilderswijk in The Hague becomes quickly Moroccans,” including in the populist newspaper labeled as the center of the Islamic caliphate, De Telegraaf, was more robust than during the something mythical and imaginary that draws its year that followed the killing of Van Gogh. The saliency from the news in the Middle East mainly statements of Wilders were critically covered by after the disintegration of Iraq and the start of the the Dutch media. It seems like the Dutch media civil war that is ravaging Syria. Every neighbor- learned from the criticism they were subjected to hood with a Muslim majority or ethnic majority is after the period of Fortuyn and after the killing of a potential territory for jihadists, according to the Van Gogh. PVV. In parallel, Schilderswijk becomes the new Gaza of the political capital of the Netherlands according to the PVV. This authoritarian drift on the level of free If citizenship is inclusive, then all citizens should be speech doesn’t bode well for the future of democ- equal; no one should be excluded from belonging to racy. If citizenship is inclusive, then all citizens should be equal; no one should be excluded from the Dutch “nation.” belonging to the Dutch “nation.” Moroccans and Muslims in the Netherlands are just the name of the hatred phenomenon that is widespread in The statement about “fewer Moroccans” trig- Europe. In some places, they are called Roma, gered more critics than ever. But it is not the or Beurs in the banlieus of France, or Türken in critical tone about Wilders that counts: It is his Germany. Even in Scandinavia, far-right parties almost daily appearances and coverage in the rose after they discovered the new migrants. media, which hang on his every word. Wilders That which characterizes the new far right in succeeds in setting the tone in the media and Europe is the touch of erudite exclusive populism, political debate. Wilders continues to make the with leaders like the former Austrian leader Jörg headlines. It is almost like the media are secret Haider, the Belgian Philip Dewinter of Vlaams admirers of somebody who helps the media Belang, the French Marine le Pen of the National industry generate more readership and income. Front, and the Dutch Geert Wilders of the PVV. Muslims and Moroccans are becoming inter- European extreme right populist parties discovered changeable in this discourse. These categories an ethnic religious difference that they framed are stigmatized and refer to an underclass in as race and as an expression of a complex reality. society that is defined not by race but by reli- All the categories of race, ethnicity, and religion gion. Therefore, religion — and also ethnicity (specifically, Islam) were simplified and put in and country origin — becomes substitutes for one-size-fits-all categories. As such, because racial characteristics. of their religious and ethnic belonging, they The discourse of Wilders turns the existing are not ready for assimilation and will remain predispositions — possible discrimination on basis outsiders forever. of the visibility of Muslims and Moroccans — into The United States is much more pronounced permanent dispositions in the public sphere. about its secularity, being inclusive of all religions; These durable dispositions do not function as therefore, it accepts religious pluralism as a fact of

70 The Carter Center life. Geert Wilders, who made a furor in European United States than Muslim in Europe. According media with his short documentary Fitna, didn’t to Essed and Hoving, “The Netherlands echoes, receive much attention in the United States. It if not leads, a wider European trend, where offen- could be concluded by drawing on the Dignity of sive statements about Muslims are an everyday the Working Man, the work of Michele Lamont phenomenon (Essed, Hoving, 2014–9). The in her comparative study about the United States authors argue that “the moral rejection of racism vs. France, that it is easier to be Muslim in the seems to be losing ground in Europe” (Ibid).

1 Term used by Frits Bolkestein, former Euro Commissioner and former References leader of the Conservative Liberal Party (VVD) in interview on the political Bessone, Magali. “Précis de Sans distinction de race? Une analyse critique talk show Buitenhof in 2011 (VPRO TV) du concept de race et de ses effets pratiques.” In Philosophiques. Vol. 40, 2 Bas Kromhout (accessed Sept. 6, 2014) No. 2, Autumn 2013, p. 457–460 http://www.historischnieuwsblad.nl/nl/nieuws/10749/wilders-gebruikt- Cherribi, Sam. In the House of War: Dutch Islam Observed. New York. besmet-logo.html OUP. 2010 3 Wilders party program (accessed Sept. 6, 2014) Essed, Philomena and Isabel Hoving. Dutch Racism; Amsterdam, Rodopi http://pvv.nl/index.php/visie/verkiezingsprogramma-2012.html BV, 2014 4 Accessed Sept. 1, 2014 Foisneau, Luc. Comments on Magali Bessone book in Philosophiques. http://pvv.nl/index.php/36-fj-related/geert-wilders/7566-open-brief-geert- Vol. 40, No. 2, Autumn 2013, p. 479–485 wilders-aan-minister-president-mark-rutte.html Janmohamed, Abdul. ”The Economy of Manichean Allegory: The Function 5 Accessed Aug. 4, 2014 of Racial Difference in Colonialist Literature.” Critical Inquiry. Vol. 12, No. 1, http://pvv.nl/index.php/in-de-media/persberichten/5721-schrikbarende- Autumn 1985, p. 59–87 criminaliteitscijfers-niet-westerse-allochtonen-funest-voor-integratie.html Rodrigues, Peter & Jaap van Donselaar. Racisme & Extremisme (Anne Frank 6 Accessed Aug. 10, 2014 Foundation, Ninth Report) Anne Frank Stichting/Amsterdam University See more at http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/component/content/ Press, Amsterdam, 2010 article/87-news/1858-pvv-43-percent-agree-fewer-moroccans#sthash. MIUfw7jO.dpuf Shorto, Russell. Amsterdam: A History of the World’s Most Liberal City. Doubleday; First Edition. 2013 7 Accessed Aug. 20, 2014 PVV Wil Financierings Stop. Vrije Universiteit om Gebedsruimte, Het Parool, Aug. 18, 2014 8 Accessed Aug. 19, 2014 Nieuwe mars in Schilderswijk is erg riskant, De Telegraaf, Aug. 13, 2014

Countering Daesh Propaganda 71 Grassroots Perspectives: Voices From the Ground

The Settlement House Model of the Arab-American Family Support Center Ambreen Qureshi Arab-American Family Support Center, Brooklyn, New York

The Arab-American Family Support Center individuals, families, and communities. Settlement (AAFSC) is a 501(c)3 nonprofit, nonsectarian houses flourish nationally, with over 450 orga- organization. Established in 1994, AAFSC is nizations, and internationally, with over 3,400 the first and largest Arabic-speaking, trauma- organizations. In New York City alone, 37 settle- informed social service agency in New York ment houses exist, including AAFSC. All are a City. As a settlement house and member of part of UNH, a membership organization founded United Neighborhood Houses (UNH), AAFSC in 1919 that currently provides services to over has taken the initiative in providing cultur- half a million New Yorkers each year. ally and linguistically sensitive services to the The settlement house model incorporates four Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim, and South Asian core principles: embeddedness, multiple points (AMEMSA) immigrant communities throughout of entry, reciprocity, and community building. the five boroughs. Guided by these principles, the work of the settle- ment houses generates three outcomes known as the Settlement House Advantage for participants: The Arab-American Family Support Center a sense of belonging, a sense of efficacy, and a sense of possibility.1 operates out of five sites and has 35 full-time For more than a century, settlement houses and 12 part-time staff who are as diverse as the have, and continue to this day, to be a vital part of neighborhoods and communities across the United communities it supports. States and globe by staying true to their historic mission and model while reinterpreting it for present-day concerns. For AAFSC and others, one Grounded in the history and methodology of of these present-day concerns is preventing violent the settlement house movement that began in extremism and the rise of Islamophobia that often the late 19th century, AAFSC presents a model of comes hand in hand with it. community engagement and youth empowerment as a strategy to help with efforts to prevent violent Settlement House Model in extremism as detailed in this paper. Operation at the Arab-American Family Support Center The Settlement House Advantage The Arab-American Family Support Center Settlement houses are multiservice, neighbor- adopted the settlement house model and officially hood-based organizations that provide services became a settlement house (and member of UNH) designed to identify and reinforce the strengths of in 2009. Through our trauma-informed, culturally

72 and linguistically competent social services, we provide a model of community engagement, inte- When I first came to America, I didn’t gration, and youth empowerment that can help know a single word of English. I was like in efforts to prevent violent extremism by offering a viable, supportive path for those who might a lost leaf from its tree. I was lonely and be targets of Daesh recruitment propaganda for had no place to go for friends. Until my violent extremism. classmate L., who was also Arab, helped Over the last 23 years and counting, we have helped countless AMEMSA (Arab, Middle me with my English. She brought me Eastern, Muslim, and South Asian) immigrants to this place called the Arab-American emerge out of isolation (i.e., overcoming language Family Support Center. It was like starting barriers, employment challenges, financial hard- ships, and racial or religious discrimination) and a new life in a new place. I met many acclimate to their newly adopted communities in people there, and that place became my New York City. AAFSC operates out of five sites second home and family. I never loved and has 35 full-time and 12 part-time staff who are a place this much. They help me with as diverse as the communities we support. Our staff are competent in 13 languages: American Sign homework, and we go on trips. They Language, Arabic, Bangla, English, Farsi, French, would always try for us to have a smile on Hindi, Nepali, Pashto, Punjabi, Spanish, Tibetan, our faces. No matter what the problem and Urdu and understand the cultural nuances necessary in serving immigrant communities. I always smile. I learned many things at Many of our clients must cope with the trauma the AAFSC, and the biggest thing I ever and unrest that comes from flight, migration, learned, was to never forget the family I and resettlement in a new place, along with the everyday challenges that many low-income have here. individuals across New York City face. AAFSC — F., age 16 became a trauma-informed organization in 2014 and invests heavily in ongoing trainings for staff members at all levels of the agency. We build resil- immigrants learn English, adjust to a new culture, iency through community support and engagement and successfully adapt to life in the United States. using cultural humility as one of our core tenets. Our BENL classes provide literacy skills to women The Arab–American Family Support Center in English and Arabic simultaneously. Our Civics serves over 6,000 people each year through ESL course focuses on American history, govern- six main programs designed to empower and ment organization, civics, and ways to successfully strengthen AMEMSA communities, while attain American citizenship. Our program’s core creating an environment of tolerance and under- objective is to transform our students into future standing for all nationalities and beliefs. AAFSC’s and active actors in their respective communities. mission is to empower new immigrants with the Through our program, AAFSC empowers new tools they need to successfully acclimate to the immigrants by ensuring that they understand and world around them and become active participants are equipped to exercise the civil liberties and in their communities. rights before and after their naturalization process. The Adult Education and Literacy Program AAFSC students have a 100 percent pass rate on has been providing English Speakers of Other the U.S. citizenship exam. Languages (ESOL), Basic English in the Native The Youth Program encourages students, ages Language (BENL), and Civics ESL services to 7 to 18, to excel academically, prepare for college, AMEMSA immigrant communities of New York develop positive leadership skills, participate in City since 1995. Our literacy classes help recent the community, and work with students of other

Countering Daesh Propaganda 73 Principles of the Settlement House Model Outcomes of the Settlement House Model Embeddedness. Settlement houses are entrenched Sense of Belonging. The sense of belonging is one in the social fabric of their communities and become of the most fundamental of human needs and a a trusted and safe space. They are “of, by, and for” key outcome of the settlement house model. This the neighborhood or communities that they serve, outcome positively affects short- and long-term and many settlement house staff come from these mental health, increases self-efficacy and self-esteem, communities. reduces stress, and improves coping abilities. It lessens Multiple Points of Entry. Settlement houses offer the sense of feeling alone or isolated. Settlement many different activities, programs, and services as house participants feel that they fit into and add value part of their comprehensive and holistic approach. to the settlement house and their neighborhood Programs often serve as gateways to each other. or community. Participants and their families may access these across Sense of Efficacy. Cultivating the sense of efficacy their life span and across generations as part of a empowers settlement house participants to foster settlement houses’ provision to provide services “from a greater interest in activities, feeling confident and the cradle to the grave.” equipped to overcome hurdles and to bounce back Reciprocity. Settlement houses fundamentally believe swiftly from difficulties and disappointments along that all participants have strengths and talents to build the way. on to advance the programs, the organization, and the Sense of Possibility. Settlement house principles are community. Guidance, feedback, insight, and other grounded in the Progressive era traditions of optimism contributions are actively sought from participants by and hope. Individuals with a strong sense of possibility settlement houses and incorporated into all aspects of tend to adapt better to adverse incidents, learn from their work. negative situations, and focus on problem-solving. Community Building. Settlement house programs Settlement House participants have shown that hope foster connections and bonds among participants and the sense of possibility can be learned. across generational, cultural, and racial divides. These healthy interactions build a sense of community Source: “Overcoming the Odds: The Settlement House Advantage.” United Neighborhood Houses. December 2014. by creating new networks, renewing the spirit, celebrating diversity, fostering civic engagement, and championing social justice.

nationalities to learn to embrace diversity, toler- experiences. Our youth have created over 35 short ance, and peace. The program offers a wide range films to date, some of which can be viewed on of free services including after-school homework our YouTube channel, and three of our youth had help and tutoring, ESL instruction, college access their films selected for various film festivals. counseling, educational excursions, a six-week The Legal Program provides family-based immi- summer camp, and SAT preparation courses. gration services for immigrants throughout New Last year, 99 percent of our students successfully York City by our staff attorney. Services include transitioned to the next grade, and we saw one of guidance and counseling in the areas of immigra- our students improve his SAT score by 500 points tion law; a full range of immigration services, after completing our program. including visa assistance and adjustment of status In January of 2014, we began a partnership with to lawful permanent resident; and citizenship the New School’s Engage Media Lab to create “I and naturalization services. Last year we served Need to Be Heard!”, a youth participatory media approximately 1,250 clients — over 90 percent project in which students learn and implement from Arab communities. the technical and creative tools of filmmaking as The Health Program enrolls low-income indi- a method of expressing and exploring their lived viduals and families across New York City in free

74 The Carter Center or low-cost health insurance. The program also Academy (KGIA), a public high school in provides referrals to low-cost culturally competent Brooklyn that concentrates on Arabic language health care providers and conducts workshops and culture. Open to all New York City youth, on health-related issues. As a New York State of KGIA offers a competitive, world-class education Health IPA/Navigator Site, AAFSC is part of a as an International Baccalaureate school with over consortium of organizations that works closely 230 students currently enrolled. with our lead sponsor, the Coalition for Asian American Children and Families, to facilitate the Youth Engagement and implementation of the Affordable Care Act within Preventing Violent Extremism the AMEMSA communities. Last year we signed up 1,004 clients for health insurance, 91 percent In his address “The Role of Youth in Countering of them low-income individuals. Violent Extremism and Promoting Peace” to the The Anti-Violence Program provides culturally U.N. Security Council in 2015, anthropologist and linguistically competent prevention and inter- Scott Atran, director of research at France’s vention services to survivors of domestic violence, National Center of Scientific Research, offers teen dating violence, stalking, and sexual assault. three conditions from a social sciences perspec- The program equips survivors with the tools they tive that youth at risk need in order to prevent need to heal and empower themselves. In addition them from taking the path of violent extremism. to crisis intervention and individual counseling, These conditions align with the Settlement House the program also offers support and empower- ment groups, information and referrals to service providers, court accompaniments and translation Our further recommendations include continued and assistance, community outreach and education, elevated advocacy on behalf of settlement houses and trainings for professionals. We operate out of three satellite offices in partnership with the and their communities, investment in community- Family Justice Centers in Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island. Last year, AAFSC served over 400 led programs, engaging additional stakeholders, and individuals through this program. creating new partnerships as well as maximizing The Preventive Services Program aims to ensure the safety of children in homes where there further involvement and furthering knowledge have been allegations of child abuse, neglect, development in this area. or maltreatment. AAFSC strengthens families by offering assistance and services that lead to improved familial relationships and more effective Advantage and AAFSC’s programming: problem-solving skills and coping mechanisms. 1. Offer youth something that makes them dream The program offers a wide range of services, of a life of significance through struggle and including individual and family counseling and sacrifice in comradeship. This is an example of crisis intervention as well as education efforts community-building and sense of belonging. about relevant laws and norms around issues 2. Offer youth a positive personal dream, with such as truancy and corporal punishment. The a concrete chance of realization. This is an program consistently receives high marks from the example of a sense of possibility and a sense NYC Administration for Children’s Services. We of efficacy. offer parenting classes in English, Arabic, Urdu, and Bangla. Last year, 99.5 percent of children 3. Offer youth the chance to create their own local 2 in our program stayed in their homes and out of initiatives. This is an example of reciprocity, foster care. community-building, and sense of efficacy. Furthermore, AAFSC is the lead community Youth engagement has been a cornerstone of partner for the Khalil Gibran International AAFSC’s work since its founding and we have

Countering Daesh Propaganda 75 Settlement House History Middle class social reformers in Britain in the late The most well-known settlement house in the 19th century began the settlement house movement United States, Hull House in Chicago, was established with the creation of Toynbee Hall, the first settlement during this time by Jane Addams, a prominent house, in East London in 1884 to provide social reformer of the Progressive era. Women played many services and education to low-income workers important leadership roles in the establishment of in the area.3 Settlement houses are multiservice, settlement houses in the United States during a time neighborhood-based organizations that provide when it was rare for women to have leadership roles services designed to identify and reinforce the in any sector of society. The British reformers also strengths of individuals, families, and communities. promoted the idea of different classes working and Galvanized by the British reformers and in response coming together. They advocated that people of means to the burgeoning industrial poverty in the United “settle” in low-income neighborhoods to become part States, the movement quickly picked up stateside in of the community and work with their neighbors to major urban centers, especially New York, Chicago, improve their shared community together.5 and Boston in the late 1880s. The first settlement Settlement house staff traditionally lived in the house in the United States, Neighborhood Guild, was same neighborhood (and sometimes even the same founded in 1886 in New York City’s Lower East Side building) where they worked, and this continues in and was later renamed University Settlement. There many settlement houses today. The original settlement were 74 settlement houses across the United States in houses were primarily located in predominantly 1887, and that number dramatically expanded to over immigrant neighborhoods. They worked to help ease 400 in the next three years.4 the transition of immigrants into their surroundings and advance the local standards of living.

a successful track record of positive results over and internationally; and the cumulative impact the last 23 years and counting. Our work as a and multiplier effect of the Settlement House settlement house presents a model of community Advantage, we present a strategy that can aid in engagement, integration, and youth empower- efforts to prevent violent extremism. Our further ment as a strategy for the prevention of violent recommendations include continued and elevated extremism in line with research culled by leading advocacy on behalf of settlement houses and experts in the subject matter. their communities, investment in community-led programs, engaging additional stakeholders, and Conclusion and Recommendations creating new partnerships as well as maximizing further involvement and furthering knowledge By shedding light on the settlement house development in this area — all while being mindful movement, history, and model; the work of the of and addressing Islamophobia, xenophobia, and Arab–American Family Support Center; the structural racism at every level. network of other settlement houses nationally

1 “Overcoming the Odds: The Settlement House Advantage.” United 3 “Settlement House Movement.” Open Collections Program: Immigration Neighborhood Houses. December 2014 to the U.S. Accessed March 18, 2016. http://ocp.hul.harvard.edu/ immigration/settlement.html 2 Scott Atran, “Here’s What the Social Science Says About Countering Violent Extremism.” The Huffington Post. Accessed March 18, 2016. 4 Ibid http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-atran/violent-extremism-social- 5 Retrieved March 18, 2016. http://www.unhny.org/about/history science_b_7142604.html

76 The Carter Center Grassroots Perspectives: Voices From the Ground

Kompass–Muslim Youth Education: Empowerment and Prevention Through Education Misbah Arshad Founder and Director, Kompass–Muslim Youth Education

German Muslim youth live in a social envi- to empower young Muslims against anti-Muslim ronment in which they have to cope with racism and religious extremism. I founded the major challenges. Young Muslims are not only program in 2013 and am offering it with my confronted with anti-Muslim prejudices but also colleague Mustafa Cimsit in mosques in the cities have to deal with the ideas of religious radicals of Mainz and Wiesbaden, Germany. and extremists — ideas they hear not only in the media but also in school, on the job, in peer Can Islam Belong to Germany? groups, and in family environments. I often feel Since I can remember, there has always been a that we Muslims have to fight on two fronts: We debate on this issue, and Germany is still divided are forcibly confronted with both extremes and, on the question. On the one hand, some people whether we want to or not, we have to take a say that, of course, Islam belongs to Germany, stand for our faith. because Muslims have lived in Germany since the If youth have no solid identity, they may be middle of the last century. On the other hand, confused by such a confrontation, because they some try to show that Islam in Germany has no cannot respond appropriately to questions or historical roots and that Europe is only rooted in established theses. This uncertainty may not the so called Judeo-Christian culture and tradition. only project anti-Muslim racism but also could Although this thesis does not make sense from prepare a breeding ground for religious radicaliza- a scientific and historical perspective, it has an tion. Kompass–Muslim Youth Education wants

Biographical Remarks At the age of 2, I migrated with my family from compliment that I speak German so well. Meanwhile, Pakistan to Germany. Although I grew up in the very I got used to saying: “Thanks, but your German is not international and multicultural city of Frankfurt, the bad either.” As a teenager I had so much to fight. I question of whether I’m German or Pakistani was always had the feeling that I had to decide whether I central for me in my youth. At home it was a taboo want to be Pakistani or German. And no matter how I to say that I felt German, although I had mastered the decided, there would always be someone who would German language as a child better than my mother be displeased with me. tongue. And moreover, in comparison to my cousins in Later, when I started to identify myself more and Pakistan, I felt better off as a young girl in the German more with my religion and started to study Islam as culture. On the other hand, outside the family I was an academic, a bigger trouble began. Suddenly it was always perceived as a foreigner and stranger. Even no longer about nationalities but whether a particular today I’m still asked where I come from and get the national identity can be compatible with Islam.

77 Program Modules 1. We are Muslims. Goal: to become mature in the Muslim scholars also took part in the shaping of the own cultural and religious identity. European and Western cultural heritage in historical 2. We all are Germany. Goal: to learn intercultural times. I try to offer a space for the teenagers where and interreligious skills and to promote tolerance we are deconstructing stereotypes like Occident and respect for people of a different belief, culture, and Orient. way of life, or other creed, and empower for a peaceful discourse. 3. We belong to Europe. Goal: emphasize the We are Muslims! multicultural heritage of European history and show We are at home in Germany! to our young participants how Jewish, Christian, and Muslim scholars worked together in Europe. Yes, We belong to Europe!

impact on identity discourses in Muslim communi- • Both divide the world into a Muslim and non- ties. Even though many Muslims have now lived Muslim sphere, in which one is good and the in Germany for four generations, by such debates other is evil. they remain foreigners in their own country, a • Both share the conviction that there are people country where they were born and grew up and who are worth more than others. that is their home. For the Muslim refugees who now mostly come • Both work only through the discrimination from Syria to Germany, social inclusion is not against other groups of people. easy. And with the rise of the Patriotic Europeans • Both think that there is a clash of civilizations Against the Islamization of the West (Patriotische in which the West and the Muslim world face Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, each other and have to fight each other. If need PEGIDA) movement, anti-Muslim racism arrived be, even by force. in the middle of German society. In my opinion, anti-Muslim racism and religious extremism are both built on the same basic mechanism and have the same world view. We must combat both extremes at the same Anti-Muslim racism and religious extremism are time, and we have to resolve this dichotomy in both built on the same basic mechanism and our minds if we want to live in a peaceful world without racism and terror. This is a major task have the same world view. We must combat both for our societies, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. extremes at the same time, and we have to resolve And as a practicing Muslim, I feel religiously committed to counter both extremes and to find this dichotomy in our minds if we want to live in a the middle path. peaceful world without racism and terror. Kompass is a platform for a critical and reflexive analysis of different forms of discrimination and their defense. It wants to encourage the opposition to prejudice and discrimination. Further, it enables Empowering Young Muslims Muslim youth to counter anti-Muslim racism and The Kompass program started in 2013, and it offers an orientation between emancipatory and empowers young Muslims against anti-Muslim oppressive elements of religious beliefs to prevent racism and religious radicalization. I think it radical and extremist tendencies. Here, the criteria makes great sense to tackle both at the same time, of life affirmation and promotion of personal because both extremes share similar viewpoints: development serve as correctives.

78 The Carter Center Kompass is also religious education to convey and social learning. Such a holistic approach is Islamic values, with the aim of taking respon- an effective complement to forms of individual- sibility for justice and peace in society and for ized learning. Besides theoretical mediation, the the integrity of creation. Of course, intercultural program is distinguished by a high proportion of education is not absent. We embedded it to practical exercises — learning by doing — which promote tolerance and respect for people of a also ensures a fun factor and is offered in the form different belief, culture, way of life, or creed, and of process-oriented seminars and workshops. we empower to dispute by peaceful means. At the Kompass provides a safe space for personal end of the program, youth have learned how to development and for addressing the religious engage in their communities, raise awareness of needs and questions of young Muslims. Logically their existence in social contexts, and engage in consistent, we refuse fundamentalist readings of solidary action. the Quran and Sunnah. We contextualize the Furthermore, we try to encourage our youth history of the Quran and the life of the Prophet in our workshops to accept their hybrid identity. Muhammad to show youngsters how they can They can be Muslims and Germans and Arabs or integrate spiritual knowledge and religious role Turks, for example. They are more than a single- models into their own daily lives. We also convey identity feature. We try to stop the dynamic of Islamic values with the aim to take responsibility “othering” in their minds. for justice and peace in society and for the integ- Kompass consistently follows a perspective rity of creation. from the individual and provides spaces for the development of a personality to open up ways in which young people bring their own cultural and religious affiliation and develop a reflective and We try to encourage our youth in our workshops to self-determined identity. accept their hybrid identity. They can be Muslims An important conceptual basis of Kompass is the principle of holism as “learning with and Germans and Arabs or Turks, for example. head, heart, and hand” as well as the Socratic method of “teaching through self-knowledge,” an approach that is also reflected in the tradition of We are working in mosques, and we refuse the Prophet Muhammad. In this spirit, Kompass gender segregation — a big issue in German links methodological learning content with group- mosques. We insist on teaching girls and boys dynamic processes, enabling cognitive, emotional, together. We talked to the communities and to the imams in the mosques to help them under- stand that Muslim girls and boys don’t have to be Goals ashamed to sit and to learn together. Their daily • To encourage to counter prejudices and life is not separated into male and female genders discrimination at school, so we try to overcome gender-based • To empower to deal with anti-Muslim racism stereotypical role models. • To concern oneself with internalized aspects of The diversity of Islam is also a big issue for dominance and suppression and options for change us: In our work, we feature the diversity and • To stimulate critical thinking about prejudices and the cultural heritage of Islam. We are not depu- the awareness that no one is free from prejudices ties of “Turkish Islam” or “Pakistani Islam.” • To offer an orientation between emancipatory and We encourage our teenagers to recognize how oppressive elements of religious beliefs to prevent multifaceted the history and the cultures of Islam radical and extremist tendencies. Here, the criteria actually are. We work together on theological of life affirmation and promotion of personal issues and questions that result from daily life development serve as correctives or from problems in families. We also analyze

Countering Daesh Propaganda 79 propaganda videos from German Salafi groups social life in Germany to include their cultural and discuss the impact of these groups in German and religious identity. Only if we empower Muslim and non-Muslim society. Muslim youth and help them find a solid identity Kompass–Muslim Youth Education wants to and enable them to become responsible citizens, empower young Muslims to realize their personal we can prevent fundamentalist and extremist and social living conditions in order to participate thinking. To achieve this goal, we need good proactively in society. With empowerment, they cooperation between Muslim and non-Muslim can participate and cooperate in the shaping of communities and societies.

80 The Carter Center Grassroots Perspectives: Voices From the Ground

HAYAT Germany: A Programmatic Approach Ava Linea

HAYAT (Turkish and Arabic for “life”) is the first responsible for Berlin and East Germany as well as German counseling program for people involved in for international, high-security cases. radical Salafist groups or on the path of a violent HAYAT also provides its own hotline and can jihadist radicalization, including those traveling to also be contacted directly via email. Its method is Syria and other combat zones. Established in 2011, based on a passive-approach system, which means the program works directly with radicalized people that the initial contact to HAYAT needs to come to demonstrate the prerequisites and possibilities from respective families or the individuals them- of desisting from radical behavior, ideologies, and selves. During the first contact, HAYAT experts groups. HAYAT is available to parents, siblings, will conduct an analysis and risk assessment of the friends, teachers, employers, and anyone else who respective situation to determine the counseling has a relationship to a person potentially on the demand and to answer the most important ques- path of a (violent) radicalization. tions in the beginning: Is the relative in danger of becoming (violently) radicalized? Or is it a How We Work harmless case of conversion to Islam? Once the counselor gains a clear picture of the concrete HAYAT is one part of the umbrella organization situation, an individual counseling process and Center for Democratic Culture, which includes step-by-step plan will be designed, including the following initiatives: ZDK Gesellschaft various measures to prevent further radicalization Demokratische Kultur (deradicalization, preven- or to stop and reverse the process. The counseling tion, family counseling, research, education); is systemic, situational, problem- and solution- EXIT-Germany (first deradicalization program oriented. All services are free, confidential, and for right-wing extremism in Germany); HAYAT available in German, English, Arabic, Turkish, (family counseling and deradicalization in realm and Farsi. of Islamist extremism); Institute for the Study of Radical Movements; and the Journal for De-radicalization and Democratic Culture. Three Pillars of Our Work Since 2012, HAYAT has been the partner Pragmatic Level. On the pragmatic level, one of the German Federal Office for Migration and major goal is to disrupt the respective infrastruc- Refugees, which established a national counseling ture. It is important to get people out of their hotline on deradicalization. Taking calls from isolation and to reintegrate them into a “normal” relatives and other concerned people, the hotline life. Some people might seek advice regarding provides a first-line assessment to redirect the calls lawyers, new apartments, new work, or educa- to local, nongovernmental partners. HAYAT is tion. The counselor has to support the social

81 environment to do anything needed to stabilize the situation in real life. The most important thing Case Load is to find new attractive perspectives for the future. Since 2012, HAYAT counseled 266 cases. In 176 Ideological Level. HAYAT tries to coach cases, counseling is still ongoing, while 90 cases are families to dismantle the radical ideology and considered closed. These 266 cases include 63 cases deconstruct the narratives. Because it is difficult with high-security relevancy. This means that they to talk with radicalized family members without are related to conflicts in Syria and Iraq, including getting into conflicts, HAYAT counselors help potential departure, supporting militant groups, families with communications skills and practical departure, death, and return. advice. Family members have to learn how to counter narratives and how to try to set doubts or reinforce doubts the person may already have. stars on YouTube, have groupies in the Salafist Affective Level. The counselor attempts to scene, and make use of symbols and elements of stabilize the social situation: for example, by Western pop culture. renewing social contacts. It is also important to improve the relationships with family and Salafist Groups in Germany friends. The goal is to offer opportunities for social The Salafist scene in Germany is very diverse. It is contacts outside the ideological group. The social a heterogenic movement, recruiting openly since environment is an emotional anchor in real life. 2004.We distinguish four different groups within On this level, family and friends should be very the Salafist movement, and HAYAT works with emotional and authentic in order to strengthen groups 3 and 4. emotional bonds and form an effective alternative to the radical group. 1. Puristic Salafists. The puristic Salafists live parallel to society and live in an orthodox and Germany’s Salafist Scene strictly religious way. They might be compared to the Amish people in the United States. Young people called Salafists are teenagers born 2. Political missionaries (majority). They reject and raised in Germany with or without immigrant violence and only do mission in a religious way. background. We identify four groups of young individuals: with Muslim background, with non- 3. Political missionaries (nonviolent). They legiti- Muslim immigrant background, of German origin, mize militant jihad with their ideology and in a and with bicultural families. religious way. Within the Salafist scene, the third generation 4. Jihadist (minority; smallest group). These are of jihadi preachers is active. Most of them have militants. relatively little religious knowledge, and they are doing mission and recruiting via the internet. For youth, social groups and networks in the back- Why Salafist Groups Are Attractive ground are real and could play an important role Salafist groups seem to offer many answers and on the path to radicalization. solutions to young men and women. They provide The main fascination for young people is that religious knowledge (supposedly the “truth and this third generation of jihadi preachers seems to the real and only Way to Islam”); values about act authentically and always refer to their own what is right and wrong; obedience in the form lives and experiences with faith. They argue of strong leaders and role models who provide mostly in a political — not theological — way. structure in their lives; community and identity They also often discuss political problems and that provide acceptance and acknowledgment; and ideas in an emotional manner. Actually, some justice (“helping” oppressed Muslims). could be called “pop jihadists”: They act like pop

82 The Carter Center Girls and Women in Daesh Girls play an active role in supporting the Daesh other girls. Upon arrival, Daesh controls every step, organization and other groups. They might, for takes away the documents and cell phones, and takes instance, translate papers or do social media work. the girls into housing for women. Later they might get They actively recruit other girls via social media such married with a fighter they “choose,” although we know as WhatsApp, Telegram, Instagram, and Facebook. that some girls go there to look for a groom. They build networks and help to organize travel routes, Girls who join Daesh might want to be one of the housing, and money transfer. first women in the “Islamic State,” to be the “mothers of To join Daesh, underage girls often travel with the first caliphate,” to help people (perhaps by working an older female. They receive concrete instructions in a hospital), to marry a strong fighter, and other about how to leave the country. They often travel to reasons. The reality on site however, is completely Syria across the Turkish border. In Turkey, most of different from what they originally expected. them have a hotel reservation. Underage girls have Women are allowed to fight, but they don’t have a written permission from “their parents.” They were to. Daesh does not recruit them for fighting purposes. prepared intensively prior to their travel. Transport They have a “calm down function” for the fighters — to from Turkey is organized, and the girls are picked up stabilize them, to eventually give birth to the next in small groups. If girls begin to have doubts and don’t generation of mujahedin, and also to control the men want to enter into Daesh territory, they are forced by inside the Daesh system.

One example from a German militant Salafist website provides insight to the women’s perspective on the jihadist narrative. Some “Western” girls or young women feel they would be able to live an emancipated life just as they learned in Western societies.

Here in Latakia, there are only a few sisters who are fighting actively. Alhamdulillah (praise to God); there are a lot of muhajerin who settled down with their families. There are also many unmarried brothers who would like to start a family in the secure areas. The mujahedin are willing to take honorable women as second, third, or fourth wives.

Since young men and women feel they have the mainstream. They also obtain maximum atten- found these answers, they can separate and delin- tion from parents, teachers, the media, and others. eate themselves from society and protest against

Countering Daesh Propaganda 83 Return and Reintegration

Best Practices: Rehabilitating and Reintegrating Foreign Fighters Rohan Gunaratna Professor of Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technology University; Head of International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore

The world faces an unprecedented global insurgent If we do not rehabilitate those in custody, what and terrorist threat with the rise of the so-called will happen? When released from prison, they will Islamic State (IS). With fighters from nearly 100 (a) pose a security threat, (b) infect others, and (c) countries, IS is the largest insurgent, terrorist, and join the iconography of the terrorist groups. This extremist movement the world has witnessed. will lead to loss of lives and property, regenerate Governments have built operational capabilities to the threat, and bolster the terrorist group. If terror- fight IS in the core theaters of Iraq and Syria, but ists reflect, repent, and express remorse, they will government and partner capabilities to rehabilitate reenter society as productive citizens. To support and reintegrate both surrendered and returnee the transformation of a terrorist from the extreme fighters are unstructured, ad hoc, or nonexistent. to the mainstream, governments — in partnership A full-spectrum response — from anti-terrorism with civil society and business firms — can play to counterterrorism and from community engage- a pivotal role. This article assesses the global ment to rehabilitation — is paramount to fighting threat and discusses the nonkinetic and nonlethal current issues as well as emerging capabilities. options to the foreign fighter threat.

Understanding the Foreign The Islamic State is estimated to be between Fighter Threat 50,000 and 100,000 members and at least a million Compared to Al-Qaeda, which enjoyed a numerical strength of 2,500 members at its peak, supporters and sympathizers. IS presents a much larger foreign fighter threat. Today, the numerical strength of Al-Qaeda has Today, the threat is not only from IS, diminished to 200, but its overseas branches Al-Qaeda, and their associates but from other enlist a membership between 20,000 and groups. As ideology is the center of gravity, 25,000. Al-Qaeda operated together with both governments and their partners should build the Afghan Taliban (40,000) and the Pakistan deradialization programs to engage recruits and Taliban (20,000). In contrast to the Taliban returnees. Such programs aimed at mainstreaming and Al-Qaeda, IS’s strength at its core and in its the fighters will bring together a range of govern- branches is estimated to be between 50,000 and ment and civil society partners for religious and 100,000 members and at least a million supporters spiritual counseling, educational instruction, and sympathizers. An estimated 50,000 fighters vocational instruction, social and family services, and 20,000 noncombat employees serve IS in the psychological counseling, creative arts therapy, core areas of Iraq and Syria. and recreational rehabilitation.

84 Although 10,000–15,000 fighters perished The current IS strategy is to (1) establish fighting the Russian, U.S., and Syrian–Arab control of territory and administer the caliphate, coalitions, IS’s strength in 2016 is estimated (2) expand the caliphate into permissive areas, at 30,000 Iraqi and Syrian fighters and 20,000 and (3) exploit and destabilize areas. By proving foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria. According to the caliphate concept, IS is generating more Western security and intelligence estimates, IS’s resources, including manpower. By undermining strength grew from 30,000 fighters in 2014 to 50,000 fighters in the core areas of Iraq and Syria in 2015. According to Iraqi, Iranian, and Syrian Between November 2014 and September 2015, U.K. intelligence estimates, an additional 20,000 Iraqis and Syrians serve in the security and administra- authorities recorded IS having staged 270 attacks. tive structures of IS in the core areas. When their Of these, 117 were in West Africa, 47 in Libya, 58 in area is under threat, even noncombat members are mobilized to serve and support IS armies. Sinai, 28 in Yemen, six in Saudi Arabia, one in the Today, IS’s headquarters in Al Raqqah supports Caucasus, eight in Khorasan, and five in Algeria. eight overseas IS branches. Of IS branches, Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya is the strongest with 9,000 members and IS Wilayat al-Haramayn has competing groups and co-opting like-minded about 100 members. About 30,000 serve in the groups, IS is creating support, resources, and eight overseas branches. Between November 2014 capability for future expansion. IS co-opted like- and September 2015, U.K. authorities recorded minded groups and inspired individuals to attack IS having staged 270 attacks. Of these, 117 were both coalition and domestic targets. With recruits in West Africa, 47 in Libya, 58 in Sinai, 28 in traveling to Syria and Iraq to join the caliphate, IS Yemen, six in Saudi Arabia, one in the Caucasus, strategy in the coming years will be both vertical eight in Khorasan, and five in Algeria. and horizontal — from building the caliphate in With IS iconography spreading both in the Syria and Iraq to global expansion into regions virtual and real space, creating pockets of self- where there are support and recruitment. IS has radicalized and militarized supporters worldwide, succeeded in recruiting and generating support the number of attacks will soar. After reclaiming from all the subregions. territory and proclaiming the caliphate, IS strategy is to govern the areas it controls in Iraq and Syria Can We Kill to Victory? and expand in Muslim territories from Morocco By killing insurgents and terrorists, capturing their to the Philippines. IS declared branches after supporters and sympathizers, and disrupting their it accepted the pledges of allegiance from local planning and operations, stability and security groups. With more groups pledging allegiance cannot be restored. To end terrorism and insur- to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi in the Middle East, gency, governments should dismantle the entire Africa, and Asia, IS is likely to accept and declare infrastructure producing the fighter. The propa- additional branches in North Africa, the Middle ganda, recruitment, fundraising, procurement, safe East, and Asia. IS Khorasan, the first IS branch in houses, transportation, travel, communication, Asia, is largely staffed by Afghani and Pakistani training, and other support networks should be nationals. Located in the border regions of relentlessly targeted. Furthermore, governments Pakistan and Afghanistan, IS Khorasan competes should work with civil society and business with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the government communities to rehabilitate and reintegrate of Afghanistan. With IS’s declaration of new prov- captured or surrendered terrorists to civilian life. inces in southeast and northeast Asia, the number Success in the fight depends on the ability and of branches will increase and membership will willingness of military, law enforcement, and grow in the coming years. national security agencies to work in partnership

Countering Daesh Propaganda 85 with a range of actors to build capacity to deliver and their partners should invest in building global a full-spectrum response. At the hard end of the rehabilitation capabilities and capacities. spectrum, lethal and kinetic forces should blunt the operational edge of the terrorists. Unless Background terrorists and insurgents are killed or captured, The world’s most pivotal conflict theaters, they will continue to harm society. At the soft Afghanistan and Iraq, offer important lessons in end of the spectrum, communities vulnerable to government failure to rehabilitate and reintegrate extremist ideas should be engaged. Most impor- their fighters. Al-Qaeda (previously Maktabal- tantly, surrendered insurgents or captured terrorists Khidamat) was the child of the anti-Soviet should be made to repent, regret, and express multinational Afghan mujahedin campaign remorse and rejoin mainstream society as produc- (1979–1989). When the Soviets were about tive citizens. If all these are not done, terrorist and to withdraw, the U.S. visionary leader Charlie insurgent groups can still replenish their human Wilson, who supported the fight, proposed to losses and material wastage because the means the U.S. Congress to fund the rehabilitation of with which they can replicate and regenerate will the Afghan and foreign fighters. Having spent still exist. $3 billion to fight the Soviets, the U.S. Congress When a terrorist surrenders or an insurgent is lacked the foresight to invest with a fraction of captured, the government has a narrow window of the amount to rehabilitate the foreign fighters and opportunity to transform him. Otherwise, he will their families. be both a source and carrier, transmitting, repli- Furthermore, many Arab countries were reluc- cating, and multiplying the ideological virus. Even tant to bring back their nationals, fearing they if incarcerated for life or held incommunicado, would seek to replicate the Afghan experience he can influence and reinforce others both from in their home countries. Many became destitute, inside and outside the wire. Even if quarantined, and their anger was harnessed by terrorist groups he still comes into contact with prison staff or to fight in Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia, and other visitors, and the contact provides him with the conflict zones. The Palestinian ideologue Abdullah opportunity to radicalize others. Unless he is put Azzam, also known as the Father of Global Jihad, to death, sooner or later, most terrorists and insur- envisioned creating “a pioneering vanguard of the gents are released. The vicious cycle of violence Islamic movements,” and his Saudi protege Osama bin Laden brought together foreign fighters to create Al-Qaeda in Peshawar on Aug. 11, 1988 The world’s most pivotal conflict theaters, (Bergen, 2001 and Jacquard, 2002). After the Al-Qaeda operational cell led by Afghanistan and Iraq, offer important lessons in Khalid Sheikh Mohomed, another Afghan government failure to rehabilitate and reintegrate veteran, attacked America’s most iconic land- marks, the threat proliferated. In Iraq, Abu Musab their fighters. al Zarqawi, another Afghan veteran, founded the forerunner of ISIS. Although some govern- ments built rehabilitation capabilities, the United will persist, and the threat will grow if nothing States failed to build such capability. The failure is done. The ideas of extremism and ideology of to build rehabilitation capabilities in Bagram violence will continue to create a landscape of and Guantanamo Bay resulted in those released instability and insecurity. In this regard, both forming new groups or joining or supporting terrorist rehabilitation and community engage- existing groups. ment are powerful tools in deradicalization and Belatedly, the United States started to invest in counterradicalization, respectively. Considering the strategic approach (Stern 2010, 95–108). The the recent developments in the Middle East and United States had built a credible rehabilitation the changing global threat landscape, governments

86 The Carter Center program in Iraq but not a reintegration program. absent or lacking in most programs (Horgan and The United States withdrew from Iraq in 2010 Altier, 2012, 83–90). and handed over the prisons to the new Iraqi administration. The failure to continue to reha- The Challenges of Rehabilitation bilitate and reintegrate the fighters by the new Insurgents and terrorists are not born but created. Iraqi administration led to their return to join Nonetheless, most governments dispense with the the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and other terrorist idea of strategic counterterrorism or countering groups. After their release or prison breaks, these violent extremism. They prefer quick fixes. The experienced fighters joined or were recruited into lethal and kinetic response, the dominant strategy the terrorist rank and file. With the depletion of the West to manage the threat, has had only of experienced fighters, ISI and its successor the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) turned their attention to those who spent time in custody. For instance, Abu Umar al Baghdadi, the leader of ISI, and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, Insurgents and terrorists are not born but created. were previous detainees of Bucca detention center Nonetheless, most governments dispense with the near Umm Qasr in Iraq. Today, the leadership of IS includes a significant proportion of detainees idea of strategic counterterrorism or countering who served either in terrorist groups or in Saddam violent extremism. Hussein’s Baathist administration. Even before 9/11, a few governments invested in rehabilitation of their terrorists. Working with clerics from al Azhar, Egypt was the first country partial successes. Although such operational to rehabilitate Muslim terrorists and extremists. countermeasures are effective, they are not A few governments built their own rehabilitation the most efficient. Traditionally, practitioners initiatives — Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Malaysia, continue to prefer the shorter route. Most govern- Singapore, Indonesia, Uzbekistan, Sri Lanka, ments lack the visionary leadership, knowledge, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Oman. Only a few and resources to invest in strategic initiatives of programs were comprehensive, with multiple counterradicalization, deradicalization, reradical- modes of rehabilitation. With the state failing to ization, reintegration, and promoting moderation. fund the program in Egypt, the program collapsed, As counterterrorism is the domain of govern- and without state patronage, the program in ment, military, law enforcement, and intelligence Yemen collapsed. The program in Indonesia was services, they focus on operational measures of ad hoc and not structured. There was an attempt catch, kill, and disrupt rather than building an to build a program in Afghanistan, but it met with enterprise with a range of actors. partial success as the U.S. military leadership did Governments should work in partnership not understand and support it. There were efforts with civil society and business firms to counter in the U.K., Maldives, Morocco, and Australia to the ideology and message and rehabilitate the send clerics to engage terrorists and extremists, but insurgents, terrorists, and extremists. However, these countries failed to build national programs most civil servants are uncomfortable developing sufficiently to make an impact. Most countries, a whole-of-society approach to the challenges such as the Philippines, Thailand, and Bangladesh, facing the country. The twin approaches to fight have visions for rehabilitation initiatives, but terrorism strategically are to develop community few have leaders with the willpower to build and engagement initiatives to build community resil- sustain comprehensive programs. There are a few ience and rehabilitate and reintegrate insurgents, countries that had built capabilities in custodial terrorists, and extremists. As such, governments rehabilitation but failed to build capabilities in have yet to build the capabilities to counter reintegration. The aftercare component was either

Countering Daesh Propaganda 87 the threat strategically. There should be three of arrest should be exploited to gain a cognitive stages: Countries with no rehabilitation programs opportunity to both investigate and transform should develop a vision to build rehabilitation him. The investigators should be trained in moti- capabilities. Countries with ad hoc rehabilitation vational interviewing. Every offender in custody is programs should transform them into perma- an invaluable source on leadership, organization, nent rehabilitation programs. Countries with ideology, and operations. As security is paramount rehabilitation programs should build community and a priority, the focus during the initial se engagement programs. should be to determine what the threat is and how to prevent the next attack. Although investigations precede rehabilitation, investigators should be mindful of the strategic The twin approaches to fight terrorism strategically intent of eventual reintegrating the suspect or are to develop community engagement initiatives accused. As rehabilitation is a two-way process, the offender should agree to be rehabilitated. to build community resilience and rehabilitate and An offender who accepts rehabilitation should reintegrate insurgents, terrorists, and extremists. be referred to as a beneficiary and not as an insurgent, terrorist, or extremist. There should be provision in the legal and administrative framework of rehabilitation for early release of No custodial rehabilitation program will those who cooperate and genuinely repent, express succeed without an effective reintegration remorse, and embrace peace versus those who are program. Post-release monitoring and aftercare uncooperative and unable or unwilling to reject determine the success of custodial rehabilitation. violence, condemn extremism, and contribute to If the beneficiary of rehabilitation comes into harmonious living. contact with insurgents, terrorists, and extremists, he will relapse. In parallel with deradicaliza- Where to Rehabilitate? tion efforts, there should be an investment in As most prisons and detention centers worldwide countering the radicalization of the masses. are overcrowded, rehabilitation of terrorists is Counterradicalization creates an environment that ideally conducted in a rehabilitation center with is hostile to operatives and unfriendly to supporters dedicated areas for living and dining, meeting by immunizing the general public. Effective rooms and lecture halls, and recreation and counterradicalization prevents ordinary citizens creative arts halls. However, most governments from being transformed into extremists and lack the monetary resources to build a specialist extremists into terrorists and insurgents. Unless center. As such, prisons and detention centers ideological capabilities that empower and motivate can be converted into rehabilitation platforms by terrorists and insurgents to legitimize and justify inviting the public and private sector to invest in violence are countered, the threat will linger and changing inmates’ and detainees’ lives. manifest violently when an opportunity arises Prison staff need to be integrated with the (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies rehabilitation staff. Guards should be trained and The Religious Rehabilitation Group, 2009). and retrained in ways to work with inmates and detainees professionally to ensure that the When to Rehabilitate? beneficiaries are treated with care. If prison When an insurgent, terrorist, or extremist is staff slap or torment a beneficiary undergoing a arrested or surrenders, he or she must be treated critical stage in rehabilitation, the gains made by with the intention of reintegrating them back the rehabilitation staff to transform him will be into society sooner or later. The initial shock lost. When a beneficiary is visited by a religious

88 The Carter Center cleric, psychological counselor, social worker, or his family members, there should be a room No custodial rehabilitation program will succeed dedicated for such visits. Such a room should be without an effective reintegration program. comfortable, with an ambiance to help transform the beneficiary. Although the beneficiary is no longer the breadwinner and head of his household, How to Rehabilitate? he is still the father to his children. A beneficiary should be presented in civilian attire and without To transform captured terrorists to be productive handcuffs when meeting his parents, brothers and citizens, government should partner with a range sisters, wife, children, grandchildren, and other of actors to create a rehabilitation enterprise. To loved ones. win their hearts and minds, there should be three distinct but interrelated components. The compo- Who Will Rehabilitate? nents of a comprehensive rehabilitation enterprise are providing services in (1) custodial rehabilita- The government should enlist the support tion to the beneficiary, (2) aftercare services to both of the public and private sector to build a their families, and (3) successful reintegration back rehabilitation program. The talent in the private to the community. To administer the different sector — from the entertainment industry to the modes of rehabilitation, there should be a resource creative arts community — is huge and should be panel with dedicated staff that will implement the tapped on by government. Rehabilitation is an rehabilitation interventions. The seven modes enterprise in which experts and specialists from of rehabilitation are (1) religious and spiritual diverse fields come together to form a common rehabilitation, (2) educational rehabilitation, (3) platform. As mentors, they seek to bring back vocational rehabilitation, (4) social and family members of their society who have left the social rehabilitation, (5) psychological rehabilitation, (6) mainstream and gone to the extreme. recreational rehabilitation, and (7) creative arts in Rehabilitation is conducted by psychologists, rehabilitation. Each mode of rehabilitation should counselors, social workers, teachers, vocational have a manual of instruction and an accompa- instructors, sports instructors, artists, religious nying guide of administrative instructions on how clerics, and others passionate about transforming to implement the interventions. lives. They will come from government agen- All modes of rehabilitation are important but to cies, nongovernmental organizations, academia, engage Muslim terrorists, religious rehabilitation community organizations, religious bodies, busi- is the magic weapon. It is a process of deradical- ness communities, and others. To anticipate and ization that involves theological refutation and achieve success, rehabilitation staff should assess ideological debate between religious scholars each beneficiary. Together with case officers, and their beneficiaries. For extremist and violent specialists and experts should meticulously plan Muslim groups such as Al-Qaeda and IS, religious and prepare a series of interventions vis-à-vis each concepts such as jihad (struggle), hijrah (migration), detainee and inmate. Assessments on progress and al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal) are in rehabilitation by the case officers, counselors, used as key doctrines in the movement ideology. clerics, prison/rehabilitation center, and other According to the Religious Rehabilitation Group staff will be forwarded to the review board that of Singapore, these concepts are manipulated and will determine release. All staff who work on their interpretations are being twisted to justify rehabilitation need to be trained and retrained the actions of the politico–religious movements. on handling terrorists and extremists. Otherwise, Since they base their actions on manipulated or there is a risk that the unrepentant terrorist will misunderstood Islamic concepts, there is a critical deceive or even try to convince the rehabilitator need to address these misunderstandings for a to embrace his ideology. more effective rehabilitation. Ultimately, the

Countering Daesh Propaganda 89 religious rehabilitation will effect change in their A case officer should facilitate, support, and guide mental paradigm, which will open the doors for the beneficiary to overcome any obstacles he may them to repent from wrongful acts and to prevent face due to his incarceration. There should be them from future violent acts. By correcting the periodic visits by the case officer to ensure that the misinterpretation of these religious concepts, the beneficiary is not harassed and does not come into rehabilitated offender can be guided not only to contact with terrorists or extremists. Similarly, refrain from committing violent acts but also to the case worker should remain in contact with the recognize and accept the deeds as wrong. family, notably the wife and children, to ensure that the beneficiary adapts to the work, family, Primacy of Reintegration and community environment. Both the case officer and case worker should ensure the smooth To ensure maximum success during the custodial transition of the beneficiary and the family into rehabilitation phase and to prevent relapse in the community and society (Stern 2010). the community phase, rehabilitation interven- tions should be comprehensive. Otherwise, upon release, terrorists and their families may go back to Digital Rehabilitation old ways, once again participating in, supporting, In parallel with rehabilitating and reintegrating and advocating violence. Similarly, terrorists who terrorists, governments should build capacities and surrender should also be enlisted and engaged both capabilities to engage communities. By educating in the custodial and community phases. Without communities, they become immunized against going through a comprehensive rehabilitation extremist ideas and ideologies. By empowering program, complete transformation is unlikely even communities to better understand the threat, for terrorists who have surrendered after leaving they become the eyes and the ears of the state. By building trusted networks, community leaders emerge as stakeholders and protect community The rehabilitation process should continue from constituents. In parallel to working in the physical space, a new capability should be built to win in the custodial phase into the community phase, the virtual space. With the rise of Al-Qaeda and IS, the online where the beneficiary is constantly engaged at the threat has proliferated, creating tens of thousands work-place, in the family, and in the community. of supporters and hundreds of thousands of sympathizers. To counter terrorist influence on communities through the internet, governments the group for personal rather than ideological should work with community and other partners reasons. When in custody, the government to counter the online threat. To counter their should lead; when reintegrated, society should attempts to replenish their rank and file, the lead. Custodial and community rehabilitation online counterideology platforms should engage are golden opportunities that the government in digital rehabilitation. Governments working and society must not let go to herald change in a with their community partners should invest in person’s thinking and behavior from the extreme vulnerable communities that visit the extremist, to the mainstream. terrorist, and insurgent platforms by creating Terrorist rehabilitation starts from the point of attractive counterideology platforms. With the rise capture but does not end with the point of release. of social media in 2005, threat groups worldwide The rehabilitation process should continue from use Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, and the custodial phase into the community phase, other platforms. With IS mastery of social media, where the beneficiary is constantly engaged at the the worldwide threat is shifting to IS-inspired workplace, in the family, and in the community. and -instigated attacks worldwide. From Ottawa to

90 The Carter Center Paris, Copenhagen to Sydney, those vulnerable to IS, its associated groups, and homegrown IS ideology killed, maimed, and injured civilians. cells present an unprecedented threat. Like the Although the threat of IS- and Al-Qaeda-directed threat posed by Al-Qaeda, a much smaller group attacks persist, the dominant threat outside IS core with lesser resources that lasted for decades, areas and provinces is by self-radicalized home- IS’s threat is likely to grow and affect regions grown cells and individuals. A new frontier in beyond the Iraqi–Syrian theater. In Egypt’s Sinai, the fight against online extremism, terrorism, and Libya, northern Nigeria, Russia’s Dagestan, the insurgency should be digital rehabilitation to bring Afghanistan–Pakistan border, and in East Asia, IS back those from the extreme to the mainstream. has established robust infrastructure. To mitigate the growing threat, a global strategy is needed to The Future dismantle IS in its theater of operation, provinces overseas, associated groups, and homegrown cells. With the rise of IS, a new global-threat land- To complement the efforts of the military, law scape is emerging. The Al-Qaeda-centric threat enforcement, and national security agencies, there landscape is eclipsed by an Al-Qaeda–IS hybrid should be a parallel strategy of counterradicaliza- global threat. The four components of the Islamic tion, deradicalization, and reradicalization. State are 1) IS theater of Iraq and Syria; 2) IS’s It is impractical for hundreds of thousands of 24 provinces overseas; 3) IS-associated groups in terrorists and hundreds of thousands of supporters Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Caucasus; to be put to death or prosecuted. By countering and 4) IS homegrown cells. Western security IS ideology, it will disrupt IS indoctrination of and intelligence services estimate the number the masses, and by deradicalizing those terrorists of Sunni foreign fighters in the theater of opera- and extremists, they can be rehabilitated. Their tions at 20,000 from nearly 100 countries. While successful reintegration into society will ensure Afghanistan attracted about 10,000 fighters in that they remain with the mainstream and prevent the 10 years of war, Syria attracted double that reradicalization. In addition to non-IS fighters, number in its first five years. IS becomes a global governments, in partnership with civil society and threat because the caliphate as an Islamic idea has business firms, should build an enterprise to reha- global resonance and is being propagated through bilitate the four categories of fighters: IS fighters, its social media content and attractive presenta- IS-associated fighters, IS homegrown fighters, and tion featuring the foreign fighter population who IS supporters. are willing to conduct attacks in the Syrian–Iraqi theater, at home, and in third countries (Islamic State Dabiq magazine). In addition to IS’s vast resources, its graphic violence appeals to a segment of radicalized and militarized youth. Based on The four components of the Islamic State are: frequency of traffic to IS digital platforms, IS has politicized, radicalized, and mobilized tens of • IS theater of Iraq and Syria thousands of fighters and millions of supporters • IS’s 24 provinces overseas and sympathizers worldwide. The scale and magnitude of threat posed by IS have surpassed • IS-associated groups in Asia, Africa, Al-Qaeda in terms of its associated groups and the Middle East, and the Caucasus homegrown cells. It is not surprising that for guid- ance and direction, terrorist groups and extremist • IS homegrown cells cells look up to IS and not Al-Qaeda. IS now is eclipsing Al-Qaeda as the leader of the global terrorist movement.

Countering Daesh Propaganda 91 Conclusion disruption paradigm. The international community should develop the will to address both reality The success in the fight against terrorism depends and ideality of the challenges confronting the on the integration of hard power and soft power. world. The legitimate grievances of those fighting Operational counterterrorism is the most effective should be addressed, and their perceived griev- strategy targeted at terrorists. However, opera- ances should be challenged. Kinetic and lethal tional counterterrorism is not the most efficient operations weakened Al-Qaeda, but its associates strategy to defeat terrorist ideology. To defeat and affiliates, including IS, emerged stronger. terrorism, governments should work in partner- While hard power is essential to dismantle the ship with civil society and businesses to counter terrorist infrastructure and decapitate leaders terrorist ideology and message and rehabilitate and operatives, soft power is essential to engage the terrorists and extremists. Upstream counter- communities vulnerable to radicalization and radicalization and downstream deradicalization are deradicalize captured and surrendered extremists, terrorists, and insurgents. In the life cycle of a terrorist and an insurgent, the government has only two opportunities to While hard power is essential to dismantle the neutralize him: for security forces to either kill or terrorist infrastructure and decapitate leaders to capture and rehabilitate the terrorist. The cost of rehabilitation and reintegration is a fraction and operatives, soft power is essential to engage of fighting the threat kinetically and lethally. communities vulnerable to radicalization and With governments facing a hard time fighting the threat, civil society and business leaders should deradicalize captured and surrendered extremists, come together to play a role to mitigate the global terrorists, and insurgents. threat. Community leaders, especially faith leaders, should work with government to influence and shape the community. There should be greater emphasis on upstream intervention, where the game-changers in counterterrorism. Most govern- role of family, friends, and community is engaged ments are yet to build the capabilities to counter by government to identify early indicators of radi- the threat strategically. The twin approaches calization. Considering the inherent community to fight insurgency, terrorism, and extremism mistrust of government in some countries, it is are to strategically develop community engage- paramount for civil society to build partnerships ment initiatives to build community resilience. with the private sector to fund and formulate Government should get the strategy right by initiatives to counter extremism, the precursor to thinking and acting beyond the catch, kill, and terrorism, both online and offline.

References Islamic State (ISIS) Dabiq Magazine. Rabi’ Al-Awwal 1436H. Issue 6 Bergen, Peter L. 2001. Holy War, Inc: Inside the Secret of Osama Bin Laden. Islamic State (ISIS) Dabiq Magazine. Rabi’ Al-Akhir 1435H. Issue 7 London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson Islamic State (ISIS) Dabiq Magazine. Jumada Al-Akhirah 1436H. Issue 8 Horgan, John and Mary Beth Altier. 2012. The Future of Terrorist Jacquard, Roland. 2002. In the Name of Osama Bin Laden: Global De-Radicalization Programs. Conflict and Security, 83–90 Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood. Durham and London: Islamic State (ISIS) Dabiq Magazine. Ramadan 1435H. Issue 1 Duke University Press Islamic State (ISIS) Dabiq Magazine. Ramadan 1435H. Issue 2 S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and The Religious Rehabilitation Group. 2009. International Conference on Terrorist Islamic State (ISIS) Dabiq Magazine. Shawwal 1435H. Issue 3 Rehabilitation (ICTR). Singapore: Nanyang Technological University Islamic State (ISIS) Dabiq Magazine. Dhul-Hijjah 1435H. Issue 4 Stern, Jessica. 2010. Mind Over Matter: How to Deradicalize Islamist Islamic State (ISIS) Dabiq Magazine. Muharram 1436H. Issue 5 Extremists. Foreign Affairs 89, 1:95–108

92 The Carter Center Return and Reintegration

Nigeria’s Response to Terrorism Fatima Akilu Executive Director of Neem Foundation, Nigeria

Advancements such as technology and science youth to access jobs, education, or social security. that have come with modernity have opened up While there is no defined pathway to terrorism, the world in ways that our ancestors could not poverty, lack of opportunities for self-actualization imagine. But with these advances have also come for youth, political and social marginalization, existential threats that require us to come up poor understanding of religion, and the pull of a with innovative solutions. As our world becomes charismatic leader all play a role. smaller, problems are no longer isolated by region, state, or even neighborhood. The same technology that allows us to communicate with relatives thousands of miles away — and to witness events Nigeria’s countering violent extremism program is unfolding in distant shores as they happen — is both vertical — involving three tiers of government: also used to transport extreme ideas that entice youths to pick up arms against their country and federal, state, and local; and horizontal — involving fellow citizens and, in some cases, abandon their homes to help others fight a war in a distant land. civil society; academics; and traditional, religious, Nations that have been directly affected by and community leaders. terrorism — whether the IRA in Britain, the FARC rebels in Columbia, the ETA in Spain and, more recently, Daesh in Iraq — have shown us A decade-old movement commonly referred how difficult terrorism is to eradicate. The terrorist to as Boko Haram, predominantly domiciled in lacks neither imagination nor capacity for evil; Nigeria’s northeast, began peacefully but has they operate outside the bounds of conventional morphed into one of the world’s most deadly morality, while states must be guided in their insurgencies. In the last year, the group has responses by rules, the law, their own values, and pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, further respect for civilian lives and property. internationalizing the conflict. Any response to terrorism must be long-term, The Nigerian insurgency has in the last three holistic, and robust enough to address its root years alone caused the death of more than 10,000 causes. A military approach can be only part of a people. Hundreds more have been kidnapped, and solution. More importantly, states must begin by almost 2 million have become displaced, their understanding the causes of youth anomie, disil- homes and communities destroyed. Nigeria has lusionment, need for adventure, and search for had to innovate to meet the challenges posed meaning that is at the heart of many radicalization by this deadly group. Terrorism has provided the narratives while also addressing more structural state with unexpected opportunities to reform societal defects that make it difficult for some its criminal justice system, broaden its legal

93 frameworks with the introduction of new bills Deradicalization that address terrorism and money-laundering, and This stream aims to reintegrate convicted violent create a counterterrorism center with an intel- extremist offenders into society by developing ligence fusion unit. targeted programs delivered by imams, psycholo- Beginning in 2012, the federal government gists, therapists, and prison staff who are capable adopted a broader approach to counterterrorism of challenging radical thought and behavior while that encompasses peace, security, and develop- respecting human rights. ment. This was a nonmilitary approach that The purpose of deradicalization is to create involves actors within and out of government, a pathway for violent extremists to grow into civil society, and religious institutions. peaceful citizens. The bulk of this stream is based Nigeria’s broader counterterrorism approach on the formation of a multidisciplinary, prison- was designed to sit within civilian institutions based treatment team trained to manage terror and have reach into civil society while at the suspects. This team was responsible for developing same time complementing the military approach, specialized curriculum and training in religious an encompassing-all-of-society approach. While re-education, cognitive behavior therapy, anger the program is currently undergoing restructuring management, relapse prevention, empathy, risk management, and risk assessment. Additionally, The Nigerian deradicalization program was imams were trained to deal with ideologically driven conflict. The Nigerian deradicalization implemented in two prisons. program was implemented in two prisons and was able to: due to the change in the government occasioned • Train relevant prison staff on countering violent by the 2015 elections, I was privileged to be in extremism, to professionally handle terror government for three years, and I developed the suspects and issues of rehabilitation Nigerian countering violent extremism program • Develop a range of expert psychologists and known as the Soft Approach. counselors to pioneer rehabilitation efforts Nigeria’s countering violent extremism • Introduce a more holistic approach to the program is both vertical — involving three tiers rehabilitation of prisoners in the country, using of government: federal, state, and local; and in-depth psychological analysis and research to horizontal — involving civil society; academics; understand the root causes of extremism and and traditional, religious, and community leaders. other criminal ideologies It consists of four streams with different layers of partners: ministries, departments, agencies, and • Utilize religious scholars to counter extremist civil society. Rather than creating new structures narratives by training them on aspects of that will not be sustainable in the long run, the dialogue and counseling program utilizes existing structures within and • Offer vocational training for inmates to ensure outside government to deliver targeted programs they have a basic level of education and acquire and activities that further the overall goal of stem- skills to assist their reintegration into society ming the tide of radicalization. This was designed • Institutionalize the rehabilitation of suspected to ensure the institutionalization of the program terrorists within the prison system and to guarantee sustainability. It sought to do It was expected that with this stream, radi- four main things: engage people already radical- cals will realize that certain forms of behavior ized, prevent others from becoming radicalized, are incompatible with both their faith and the counter extreme narratives, and provide psycho- society to which they belong, enabling them to social support for traumatized victims of terror. eventually transition into law-abiding citizens

94 The Carter Center through a community-based aftercare program. Female Suicide Bombers. We designed a program This program would be composed of government that would help deradicalize and support failed and civil society working together to develop suicide bombers — mostly teenage girls. We had and implement community-based reintegration one such survivor in a specialized program that interventions. entailed dedicated one-on-one support from In addition to prison-based programs, the derad- a psychologist, social worker, and education icalization stream also worked on the following: specialist. Detailed interaction with this victim National Security Corridor. In 2015, a partner- pointed to the fact that many female suicide ship between the military, some civil society bombers used by Boko Haram were themselves groups, and the Office of the National Security victims, often introduced to the group by Adviser resulted in setting up a safe corridor family members. for Boko Haram members who wanted to give Strategic Communication. This stream worked themselves up voluntarily. This program included to produce counternarratives by presenting a comprehensive categorizing of Boko Haram moderate views as a stark contrast to violent members as well as the development of a compre- extremism while promoting core national values. hensive risk assessment, risk management, and Extremist Islamist views are based on ignorance, reintegration plan. In the first two months of misconceptions, willful misinterpretation, and the program, 47 members of Boko Haram gave twisted ideology. The government worked with themselves up voluntarily, and the program was religious leaders and scholars to research existing aware of at least 500 more who had expressed narratives that informed design of counternarra- interest in laying down their arms. Once in the tives targeting those who hold radical views (not program, the former terrorists underwent the necessarily violent) and the population at large. same kind of deradicalization and disengagement This stream aimed to further diminish tolerance process afforded to those in custody. The program for extremist rhetoric. Media content for TV, included ideological engagement, psychological radio, and the internet was developed in order to counseling, art therapy, vocational and educa- raise public awareness of the illegitimate claims of tional skills-building, and social work support to the terrorists. reconnect with family and community. Additionally, a project to strengthen the public Women and Children in Battle. This program diplomacy efforts of government through the was designed to offer comprehensive psycho-social institutionalization of strategic communication support and rehabilitation for women and children capabilities across the civil service was conducted. kidnapped by Boko Haram and held in Sambisa Working with the Public Service Institute, 225 forest. We were able to develop and run a program public servants across government were trained in for 318 of the very first set of such special victims strategic communication. It is envisioned that this to be rescued in May of last year. All underwent will provide long-term strategic communication medical, psychological, and religious counseling. capabilities for both public servants and the armed Eighteen females between ages 14 and 18 gave forces, giving them greater capabilities in their birth while in the program as a result of rape they fight against terrorism. Efforts in this area have led had endured. to the development of a comprehensive strategic A community-based counterradicalization communications strategy across all government team was set up to track and reunite families. Out agencies, which is being mainstreamed and of a total of 318 families, we were able to trace harmonized with the ultimate objective of creating about 150. The long-term plan was to assign case a one-voice information platform. Additionally, workers — who would continue to monitor and credible voices on various platforms addressing provide support for women and children in their national identity, tolerance, and community own homes — to each victim. resilience are being amplified to communicate Nigeria’s core values.

Countering Daesh Propaganda 95 Counter Radicalization. This program focuses nation would need to train upward of 7,000 health on community engagement and education-based care providers and counselors to meet this demand projects. It was designed to stem the flow of over the next five years. recruits and reduce the potential for radicalization. In what is a first for the Nigerian military, The Society Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) they have recently developed their own policy on project, created in the office of the national PTSD and mental health support for members of security adviser, was responsible for this stream. Its the armed forces. They currently have three PTSD focus is preventive and involves a whole-society units for soldiers who have been in the front line approach. Working in six states and 18 local against Boko Haram. governments, the project aimed to link govern- Terrorism forces us to reinvent, reflect, and ment interventions with civil society efforts, come up with solutions that are not only auda- expanding the reach of both. The SAVE project cious but innovative. We must outthink, match, had the following objectives and surpass the terrorist capacity for imagination. • Countering the drivers of radicalization States facing terrorism must design approaches that complement its military campaign by • Encouraging action around countering violent connecting all government agencies, civil society, extremism in communities, civil society, and community leaders, traditional and religious government institutions leaders — an all-of-society approach. To defeat • Building community engagement and resilience terrorism, we must remake our societies by • Using education as a tool for countering violent eliminating both the push and pull factors that extremism by promoting critical thinking and have been so appealing to youth. Security, peace, logical reasoning in schools and development must be linked in a way that • Promoting intra- and interreligious tolerance promotes inclusion, social justice, and spaces for youth to self-actualize, all within a human rights Framework for Psychology. Terrorism has caused framework. wide-ranging trauma across northern Nigeria, While it is premature to assess the contribu- providing the state with an opportunity to develop tions of this program to achieving national peace a comprehensive trauma response. The response and stability, the strategy is predominantly focused has included a new policy for the provision of on the Boko Haram-led insurgency at a time when posttraumatic stress disorder care nationally more Nigerians are joining Daesh. It does offer through the National Primary Health Care hope and could become a model for dealing with Development Agency. It is envisioned that the other conflicts.

96 The Carter Center Countering Daesh Recruitment Propaganda Experts Workshop: Participant Biographies

Fatima Akilu Religious Radicalization, Rheinland-Pfalz and a Fatima Akilu is the executive director of Neem board member at the Institute for Intercultural Foundation, Nigeria. She is also a university Pre-Primary Education. Arshad studied religious educator and an advocate for marginalized groups, studies and education at Goethe-University, working in the area of psychology and health Frankfurt, and is a Ph.D. candidate in Islamic for more than two decades. Akilu was head of education at Osnabrück University in communication for the senior special assistant to Osnabrück, Germany. the president on the Millennium Development Goals, and she was chairwoman of the editorial Sam Cherribi board of the Leadership Newspaper Group. Until Sam Cherribi is a senior lecturer at Emory recently, Akilu was the director of the Behavioral University, Atlanta, Ga., in the Department of Analysis and Strategic Communication unit at the Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies and Office of the National Security Adviser, which has directs the Emory Development Initiative, working developed a multipronged approach to countering with faculty in Emory’s Institute of Human Rights. violent extremism. Also, she designed Nigeria’s He has been a visiting senior lecturer and interim program for countering violent extremism. Akilu director of the Center for the Study of Public is a children’s writer and hosts a weekly radio Scholarship at Emory. Prior to moving to Emory show, Radio Psych. She holds a bachelor’s degree in 2003, Cherribi was a member of Parliament in in English, a master’s degree in research methods The Netherlands for two consecutive four-year in psychology, and Ph.D. in psychology from terms (1994–2002), during which time he also Reading University in Berkshire, United Kingdom. represented The Netherlands in the Assembly of Akilu has authored more than 17 children’s books the Council of Europe and the Assembly of the and has published articles on homelessness and West European Union. He conducts research mental health. on European politics; Islam in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East; and development Misbah Arshad in low-income countries. His most recent book, Misbah Arshad is the founder and director “In the House of War: Dutch Islam Observed,” at Kompass–Muslim Youth Education. She was published in paperback in 2013 by Oxford also serves as the prison chaplain for Muslim University Press. Cherribi holds a Ph.D. from the women in Frankfurt. Arshad is a freelancer University of Amsterdam. at Leitplanke, Salutogenetic Prevention of

97 Cori Dauber Chevening Scholar, and a master’s degree from Cori E. Dauber is professor of communication the University of Notre Dame, where he was a at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hesburgh Scholar. Hill, where she is also a research fellow at the Triangle Institute for Security Studies. She is Bawa Jain co-editor of “Visual Propaganda and Extremism in Bawa Jain is the founding secretary-general of the the Online Environment” (2014) and “YouTube World Council of Religious Leaders (WCORL), War: Fighting in a World of Cameras in Every which successfully launched at the United Nations Cell Phone, Photoshop on Every Computer” in Bangkok in June 2002. Jain spearheaded (2010). Dauber has been the visiting research WCORL’s Religious One-on-One Initiative and professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the serves as a co-founder of the Religious Initiative of U.S. Army War College. Her research focus is the the World Economic Forum (WEF). By request, he communication strategies of terrorist groups, with integrated a religious dimension into WEF in 2001 a particular focus on their use of visual imagery. and 2002, creating a strategic partnership between Dauber’s research has been published in journals WCORL and WEF delegates. He is also a founder such as Military Review, Armed Forces and of the World Youth Peace Summit and founded Society, and Rhetoric and Public Affairs, and she the Gandhi-King Award for Nonviolence. Jain has presented her research to the Canadian Forces served as vice chair of the board of the Council College, the John Kennedy School for Special for the Parliament of the World’s Religions in Warfare, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2000. From 1998–2000, he was a co-director of and the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic the Season for Nonviolence and from 1997–2000 Studies of the National Defense University served as the vice president of the Interfaith among others. Dauber holds a Ph.D. and B.S. Center, where he created an annual interfaith from Northwestern University and an M.A. from service that continues to mark the opening of the UNC–Chapel Hill, all in communication studies. United Nations General Assembly. Jain conceived and led a 3L—Look, Listen, and Learn—initiative Rohan Gunaratna of WCORL to Israel and Palestine in 2004. Jain Rohan Gunaratna is a professor of security studies coined the term “religious diplomacy,” actively at the S. Rajaratnam School of International pursues it, and speaks about it extensively. He is a Studies at Nanyang Technology University and part of global think tanks and works with leading head of the International Center for Political corporations on current critical issues promoting Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore. responsible leadership. He is a former senior fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at Nuruddeen Lemu West Point and at the Fletcher School of Law and Nuruddeen Lemu is the director of research Diplomacy. In June 2014, Gunaratna received the and training at the Da’wah Institute of Nigeria. Major General Ralph H. Van Deman Award for He also serves as the assistant general secretary advancing international security cooperation. He of Islamic Education Trust in Minna, Nigeria, was invited to testify on the structure of Al-Qaeda and the technical adviser for the Nigerian before the 9/11 Commission and is the author Environmental Society of the Niger State branch. of 15 books, including “Inside Al-Qaeda: Global He is a director of several organizations, including Network of Terror” (University of Columbia Lotus Capital (Halal Investments) Limited, Press), for which he interviewed terrorists and Prostart Consultants Limited, the Development insurgents in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, Initiative of West Africa, and the Inter-Faith Libya, Saudi Arabia, and other conflict zones. Activity and Partners for Peace. Lemu was nomi- Gunaratna received his Ph.D. from the University nated by the Nigeria Supreme Council for Islamic of St. Andrews in Scotland, where he was a British Affairs to represent Nigerian Muslim leaders at

98 The Carter Center the national conference, CONFAB 2014. Lemu Catalyst, and Women’s Voices Now. Omar was is a fellow of the Africa Leadership Initiative of named to the top 500 World’s Most Influential West Africa and of the Aspen Leadership Institute Arabs by Arabia Business Power in 2011 and in the United States. He develops and conducts 2012, top 500 World’s Most Influential Muslims train-the-trainers courses in understanding the by Georgetown University and The Royal Islamic principles and objective of Islamic jurisprudence: Strategic Studies Center in 2009, and top 10 enhancing interfaith dialogue and engagement, young visionaries shaping Islam in America by intrafaith cooperation, clarifying misconcep- Islamic Magazine in 2007. Previously, she was tions about Islam, and countering various forms regional program manager for the Middle East of religious extremism. Lemu holds a M.Sc. in for Oxfam–Great Britain, responding to crises resource management from Edinburgh University, in Palestine and Lebanon. Omar served as a the United Kingdom, and a bachelor’s degree regional coordinator with Women for Women in agriculture from Ahmadu Bello University, International for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan Zaria, Nigeria. and as an international adviser for the Libya Stabilization Team in Benghazi in 2011. She Jad Melki spent three years with World Bank development Jad Melki is associate professor of journalism and economics groups, running training programs in media studies and chairman of the Department Yemen, Bahrain, Afghanistan, Sudan, Lebanon, of Communication Arts at the Lebanese Palestinian Territories, Kenya, and more. Omar American University as well as visiting faculty has had articles in the Washington Post, Foreign at the Salzburg Academy. His research is at the Policy, Azizah magazine, and Islamica magazine. intersection of digital media literacy, media, war Omar holds a master’s degree in Arab studies and terrorism, and gender studies and focuses from Georgetown University and a bachelor’s on Arab media and journalism education. Melki degree in international relations from George was founding director of media studies at the Mason University. American University of Beirut and has taught at the University of Maryland, Johns Hopkins David D. Perlmutter University, and Towson University. As a former David D. Perlmutter is a professor and dean of broadcast and digital journalist, Melki was part the college of media and communication at Texas of the team that won a Webby Award and a Tech University. Perlmutter is the author or National Press Club Award for covering the editor of nine books on political communication, 2006 Lebanon–Israel war. In 2015, he won the war, and persuasion. He has also written several UNESCO–UNAOC International Media and dozen research articles for academic journals and Information Literacy Award for advancing media more than 350 essays for U.S. and international literacy education in the Arab region through newspapers and magazines such as Campaigns founding the Media and Digital Literacy Academy & Elections, Christian Science Monitor, Editor of Beirut, which he chairs. Melki received his & Publisher, the Los Angeles Times, MSNBC. Ph.D. from the University of Maryland, where com, the Philadelphia Inquirer, and USA Today. he was also research director of the International Perlmutter has been interviewed by most major Center on Media and the Public Agenda. news networks and newspapers, from the New York Times to CNN, ABC, and The Daily Show. Manal Omar Manal Omar is the acting vice president for the Ambreen Qureshi Middle East and Africa Center at the United Ambreen Qureshi is the deputy executive director States Institute of Peace. She is on the advisory of the Arab–American Family Support Center board of Peaceful Families Project, the Prosperity (AAFSC). Previously, she served as the director

Countering Daesh Propaganda 99 of development and communications. Prior to leadership awards. He is founder of the World AAFSC, Qureshi was the program director of for All Foundation that rethinks the intellectual the Women’s Islamic Initiative in Spirituality tools available to Muslims and faith communi- and Equality. She has worked for the Jordan Red ties and creates cooperative relations between Crescent Society, where she organized a summer faiths, cultures, and communities at a global level. arts and education program for low-income After serving as ambassador, Rasool became a and refugee youth in East Amman. Qureshi has scholar-in-residence at Georgetown University in extensive experience in developing and managing Washington D.C. international campaigns—from independent initiatives, such as “Friends of Jassim” that Mubin Shaikh helped targeted Iraqi fixers, to global awareness Mubin Shaikh is considered a subject-matter campaigns, including “The End of Polio” with the expert in radicalization, violent extremism, and United Nations Children’s Fund and the World countering violent extremism to the United Health Organization and “Chasing the Dream: Nations Center for Counter Terrorism, Interpol, Youth Faces of the Millennium Development Europol, Hedayah Center, U.S. Department of Goals” project with the United Nations State–Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Population Fund. Qureshi has a master’s degree in Communications, National Counterterrorism international affairs from the New School in New Center, U.S. DOD Strategic Multilayer York and a bachelor’s in biology from the City Assessment Team, U.S. Central Command– College of New York. Special Operations Command (as an expert on ISIS), NATO, and others. As a fully deradicalized Ebrahim Rasool supporter of the global jihadist culture, he has Ebrahim Rasool is the former South African worked undercover with the Canadian Security ambassador to the United States. Prior to serving Intelligence Service and the Royal Canadian as an ambassador, Rasool served as member of Mounted Police (Integrated National Security Parliament in the National Assembly, special Enforcement Team). Shaikh was an integral adviser to the state president of the Republic component of what became known as the of South Africa, and premier (governor) of the “Toronto 18,” resulting in the conviction of 11 Western Cape province. Ambassador Rasool has a aspiring violent extremists. He is also co-author of long history of involvement in the anti-apartheid the acclaimed book “Undercover Jihadi.” Shaikh struggle, including leadership in the United holds a master’s degree in policing, intelligence, Democratic Front and the African National and counterterrorism from Macquarie University Congress. He spent time in prison and was under and is a Ph.D. candidate in psychological sciences house arrest. He has been involved in both the studying radicalization, deradicalization, and Islamic movement and the interfaith movement. violent extremism at the University of Liverpool He has been active in mobilizing Muslims and with the Tactical Decision-Making Research the broader faith communities toward a deeper Group. Shaikh was born and raised in Canada understanding of Islam and faith under conditions and has returned home following over a decade of of oppression (under apartheid) and currently travels in Asia and the Middle East. under conditions of globalization. Ambassador Rasool has extensive experience in government, Carol Winkler having led various departments such as health, Carol Winkler is an associate dean for the welfare, finance, and economic development. For humanities and professor of communication at his contribution to South Africa, Ambassador Georgia State University in Atlanta. She serves Rasool has been the recipient of a number of as co-executive director of the National Debate

100 The Carter Center Project, where she is expanding access to the Carter Center Staff benefits of debate training into traditionally underserved populations. Those programs have Houda Abadi been named the signature school program for Associate Director, Conflict the Bush White House’s Helping America’s Resolution Program Youth initiative, and they serve as part of the Houda Abadi was born and raised in Morocco. technical assistance program for the Obama She holds a graduate certificate from Duke administration’s Youth Engagement and University–University of North Carolina in Violence Prevention Toolkit. She is a scholar of Middle East studies; an M.A. in international presidential foreign policy rhetoric, argumenta- relations and diplomacy, with a concentration in tion and debate, and visual communication. Middle East studies and conflict resolution; and Her recent book, “In the Name of Terrorism” a Ph.D. in political communication and media (2006), won the outstanding book award in studies. She is a recipient of the Transcultural and political communication from the National Conflict Transformation Presidential Fellowship. Communication Association. Her research Abadi has been active in writing, presenting, appears in the Quarterly Journal of Speech, and organizing events related to Arab Spring, Controversia, Argumentation and Advocacy, political Islam, propaganda, terrorism, Muslim Political Communication and Persuasion, Rhetoric women’s issues, and aesthetic forms of resistance. and Public Affairs, and Terrorism. She has won She has taught courses in conflict resolution and the National Communication Association’s mediation, social movements, cultural diversity, Visual Communication Commission’s Award for and social media. She is fluent in English, French, Excellence in Research for her work on linkages Arabic, and Spanish. Prior to joining the Center, between visual images and ideology. Winkler holds Abadi served as the director of education in two a Ph.D. from the University of Maryland. nonprofit organizations that facilitated dialogue between Jewish and Muslim youth, working on Aaron Y. Zelin curriculum development and youth interfaith Aaron Y. Zelin is the Richard Borow Fellow at the dialogue. She also served as a researcher, trans- Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the lator, and writer for Muslim women’s issues at the Rena and Sami David Fellow at the International Women’s Islamic Initiative in Spirituality and Center for the Study of Radicalization and Equality. While in graduate school, she was the Political Violence. He is also a Ph.D. candidate Middle East and North Africa intern in a human at King’s College London, where his dissertation rights organization and acted as a liaison between is on the history of the Tunisian jihadi move- the U.N. Institute of Research and Training and ment. Zelin is the founder of the widely acclaimed Arab diplomats. and cited website Jihadology.net and its podcast Nancy Azar JihadPod. His research focuses on global jihadi groups in North Africa and Syria. He is also the Program Associate, Conflict author of the New America Foundation’s January Resolution Program 2013 study, The State of the Global Jihad Online; Nancy Azar joined The Carter Center in January the June 2014 Washington Institute study, The 2016 and supported implementation activities War Between ISIS and Al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Daesh project from the Center’s Atlanta of the Global Jihadist Movement; and the January headquarters. Prior to joining the Center, Azar 2016 Washington Institute study, The Islamic coordinated all aspects of regional drug prevention State’s Territorial Methodology. programs in more than seven Arab countries for Mentor Arabia, the regional branch of Mentor International Foundation, established and presided

Countering Daesh Propaganda 101 over by Queen Sylvia of Sweden. Azar holds a the Carter Center-brokered 1995 Guinea worm bachelor’s degree in political science and public cease-fire in Sudan, the Great Lakes peace initia- administration from Université Saint Joseph in tive (1995–1997), and the Center’s mediation Beirut. Her professional and academic interests between Sudan and Uganda. Most recently, his include the role of youth, women, and religion work has concentrated on peacebuilding issues in peacebuilding. She was born and raised in in Liberia. Crick received his bachelor’s degree Lebanon and speaks Arabic, French, and English. from Bristol University and his master’s degree from the Queen’s University of Belfast, and he Hrair Balian has conducted doctoral research at the London Director, Conflict Resolution Program School of Economics and at Emory University. Hrair Balian joined The Carter Center in 2008, Prior to joining the Center, he lectured in political where he oversees the program’s efforts to monitor science at a number of polytechnics in the United conflicts around the world and coordinates the Kingdom and worked as a journalist and a project Center’s cross-program efforts in the Middle leader at an interdenominational youth project East. He is also an adjunct professor at the Emory in Northern Ireland. Crick is a licensed mediator University School of Law, teaching an advanced in the state of Georgia and an adjunct faculty international negotiations seminar. Since 1991, member at Emory University School of Law. Balian has worked in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Jordan Ryan the independent states emerging from the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, and Africa, serving Vice President, Peace Programs in intergovernmental organizations (the United Jordan Ryan assumed his duties at The Carter Nations and the Organization for Security and Center in June 2015. He was named an assistant Cooperation in Europe) and nongovernmental secretary-general for the United Nations in organizations (International Crisis Group and 2009, serving as the assistant administrator of the others). He has worked on elections, human United Nations Development Program (UNDP) rights, and conflict resolution. Balian received his and director of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention J.D. degree from Golden Gate University in San and Recovery until his retirement in September Francisco. In May 2009, the New England College 2014. Ryan had a long and distinguished career awarded him the degree of Doctor of Laws, honoris with the United Nations, where he brought a causa, for his “lifetime commitment to the dignity, wealth of development experience, including respect, and self-determination of all people” in post-crisis settings. From 2006 to 2009, Ryan and for his “uncompromising effort to resolve served as the deputy special representative of the international conflicts.” He was born and raised secretary-general (Recovery and Governance) in Lebanon and is fluent in English, French, and and as the U.N.’s resident and humanitarian Armenian, with a basic knowledge of Arabic. coordinator in Liberia. From 2001 to 2005, he was the U.N. resident coordinator and UNDP resident Tom Crick representative in Vietnam, where he was one of Associate Director, Conflict the key inspirations for the U.N.’s “Delivering as Resolution Program One” initiative. Prior to that assignment, Ryan Tom Crick joined the Center in 1994 as a research served as deputy director, and then director, of the assistant in the Conflict Resolution Program, office of the UNDP administrator in New York. becoming executive assistant to the director of Earlier in his career, Ryan held the positions of the Peace Programs and assistant director of the UNDP deputy resident representative and senior Center’s China Village Elections Project prior assistant resident representative in Vietnam. He to his current position. Crick has worked on was also the UNDP assistant resident representa- numerous Carter Center election and conflict tive in China. Before joining the United Nations, resolution projects, primarily in Africa, including Ryan worked as an international legal consultant

102 The Carter Center in China and Saudi Arabia as well as an attorney Karin Ryan in California, New York, and Washington, D.C. Senior Policy Adviser on Human Rights and Ryan holds a master’s degree in international Special Representative on Women and Girls affairs from the School of International and Karin Ryan joined the Carter Center’s human rights Public Affairs, Columbia University; a J.D. degree initiatives in 1988. As senior policy adviser, Ryan from the National Law Center, The George works with former U.S. President Jimmy Carter Washington University; and a B.A. in anthro- and former First Lady Rosalynn Carter on a range pology from Yale University. He was a visiting of issues, including assisting their efforts on behalf fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at of victims of human rights violations through Harvard University in 2001. personal interventions with heads of state. She has Mary Ann Peters represented the Center in many international nego- tiations, including the International Criminal Court, CEO, The Carter Center the human rights of women, the U.N. Declaration Ambassador (ret.) Mary Ann Peters joined The on Human Rights Defenders, and most recently, the Carter Center as its chief executive officer Sept. establishment of a U.N. Human Rights Council. 2, 2014. As CEO, Ambassador Peters provides Ryan has worked closely with the U.N. Office of the vision and leadership for the Center and oversees High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) all operations. to organize expert consultations designed to Ambassador Peters was provost of the strengthen the role of the OHCHR within the U.N. U.S. Naval War College from 2008 to 2014. system. She has coordinated the Carter Center’s Previously, she was dean of academics at the Human Rights Defenders Policy Forum since 2003. College of International and Security Studies Ryan earned bachelor’s degrees in political science at the George C. Marshall European Center for from Emory University in Atlanta, Ga., and in Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, contemporary writing and production from Berklee Germany. College of Music in Boston, Mass. Ambassador Peters spent more than 30 years as a career diplomat with the U.S. Department Berkeley Teate of State. From 2000 to 2003, she was U.S. Graduate Assistant, Conflict Resolution Ambassador to Bangladesh, leading the mission’s Program, Countering Daesh Project efforts in support of the war on terrorism and Berkeley Teate is a master’s degree candidate at other U.S. foreign policy goals. Prior to Dhaka, Georgia State University in Atlanta, Ga., where Ambassador Peters was deputy chief of mission at she is studying public policy. She is scheduled to the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa, Canada. graduate in fall 2016 with a concentration in plan- Previously Ambassador Peters served as deputy ning and economic development. Teate received her chief of mission in Sofia, Bulgaria, as economic bachelor’s degree from Georgia Southern University, counselor in Moscow, and as the last U.S. consul where she majored in political science and interna- in Mandalay, Burma. From 1988 to 1990, she tional studies. Following graduation, she spent the was the deputy director of the Office of Pakistan, fall of 2012 in Washington, D.C., working for the Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs in the State chairman of the Republican National Committee Department. during the general election. She returned to Atlanta Ambassador Peters holds a Bachelor of Arts to begin graduate studies, while serving as a policy from Santa Clara University and a master’s degree adviser for undergraduate students in the Andrew in international studies from the Johns Hopkins Young School of Policy Studies. Teate has worked School of Advanced International Studies. She in the Office of Policy and Legislative Affairs at is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations the state of Georgia’s governor’s office, where she and Women in International Security. focused on education and child welfare reforms for the 2016 legislative session.

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