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Russian Intervention in European Elections S. HRG. 115–105 RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN EUROPEAN ELECTIONS HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 2017 Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 26–127 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Sep 11 2014 09:42 Nov 07, 2017 Jkt 026127 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 C:\DOCS\26127.TXT SHAUN LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California MARCO RUBIO, Florida RON WYDEN, Oregon SUSAN COLLINS, Maine MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico ROY BLUNT, Missouri ANGUS KING, Maine JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia TOM COTTON, Arkansas KAMALA HARRIS, California JOHN CORNYN, Texas MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio CHARLES SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio CHRIS JOYNER, Staff Director MICHAEL CASEY, Minority Staff Director KELSEY STROUD BAILEY, Chief Clerk (II) VerDate Sep 11 2014 09:42 Nov 07, 2017 Jkt 026127 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 C:\DOCS\26127.TXT SHAUN LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER CONTENTS JUNE 28, 2017 OPENING STATEMENTS Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina ................ 1 Warner, Hon. Mark R., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Virginia .............. 2 WITNESSES Burns, Ambassador Nicholas, Professor of Diplomacy, Harvard Kennedy School of Government .......................................................................................... 4 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 Garcevic, Ambassador Vesko, Professor of Diplomacy, Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University .................................................................................. 13 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 15 Sarts, Janis, Director, Nato Strategic Communication Center of Excellence ..... 27 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29 Stelzenmueller, Constanze, Ph.D., Bosch Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution 35 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37 (III) VerDate Sep 11 2014 09:42 Nov 07, 2017 Jkt 026127 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 C:\DOCS\26127.TXT SHAUN LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER VerDate Sep 11 2014 09:42 Nov 07, 2017 Jkt 026127 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 C:\DOCS\26127.TXT SHAUN LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN EUROPEAN ELECTIONS WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 2017 U.S. SENATE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m. in Room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr (Chair- man of the Committee) presiding. Committee Members Present: Senators Burr (presiding), Warner, Risch, Rubio, Collins, Blunt, Lankford, Cotton, Cornyn, McCain, Feinstein, Wyden, Heinrich, King, Manchin, Harris, and Reed. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA Chairman BURR. I’d like to call the hearing to order. Today, the Committee convenes its seventh open hearing of 2017 to examine Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections, and the twelfth open hearing this year. To date, our open hearings have largely focused on the domestic impact of Russia’s activities. Today’s witnesses, however, will high- light for the Committee and for the American people Russia’s inter- ference in the European elections. We hope to gain additional un- derstanding of Russian efforts to undermine democratic institutions worldwide as the Committee continues its inquiry. The Intelligence Committee assessed in January that Moscow will apply lessons learned from its campaign aimed at the United States presidential election to further influence efforts worldwide. It further assessed that Russia has sought to influence elections across Europe. Director of National Intelligence Coats echoed those words as recently as May when he testified before the Senate that Russia is seeking to influence elections in Europe, including France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The intelligence community assesses that the Russian messaging strategy blends covert intelligence operations such as cyber activity with overt efforts by Russian government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users, or trolls. Russia is employing a whole-of-government approach to un- dermining democratic institutions globally. Facing down Russia’s malicious activity is no longer just a bipar- tisan issue. To successfully protect our institutions and the integ- rity of our electoral systems, we must work as a global community to share our experience. Collective awareness of Moscow’s inten- (1) VerDate Sep 11 2014 09:42 Nov 07, 2017 Jkt 026127 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\26127.TXT SHAUN LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER 2 tions spanning borders and continents will help us to enhance our security measures and thwart these disinformation campaigns. Just as Germany is learning from the recent events in France and Montenegro, we will lean on our allies to inform our approach of the 2018 elections. We must advance more quickly than our ad- versaries and only together will we do so. I’d like to welcome our distinguished witnesses today: Ambas- sador Nick Burns, the Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at Har- vard Kennedy School of Government. Nick, that’s a mighty long title there that you’ve got. We’re delighted to have you. Janis Sarts, Director of NATO’s Strategic Communications Cen- ter of Excellence. Hopefully, I’m getting these names right. I’m try- ing my best. Ambassador Vesko Garcevic, Professor of the Practice of Diplo- macy and International Relations at Boston University Frederick Pardee School of Global Studies. And Constanze Stelzenmueller, the inaugural Robert Bosch Sen- ior Fellow in the Brookings Institute Center on United States and Europe. Thank you all four for being here to help us better understand Russia’s activities and the underlying intentions that Russia might have. With that, I will turn to the Vice Chairman. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me commend you on your—on your brilliant introduction of our wit- nesses. And welcome, witnesses. Today’s hearing continues the Committee’s efforts to address the issues surrounding Russia’s active interference in our democratic process and in the 2016 elections here in America, as well as Rus- sia’s similar and in some cases ongoing efforts to undermine demo- cratic institutions amongst many of our closest allies. At this point, I believe we have a pretty good understanding of the Russian playbook. Russia’s goal is to sow chaos and confusion, to fuel internal disagreements, and to undermine democracies whenever possible, really to basically cast doubt on the democratic process wherever it exists. There’s nothing unusual about Russia’s scheming to influence the American elections. We all know their efforts date back to the Cold War. But Russia’s blatant interference in the United States’ 2016 presidential elections was unprecedented in both scale and scope. And we’ve seen it replicated across Europe. In fact, Russia’s ac- tive measures are only growing bolder and more brazen in the dig- ital age. Russia has interfered or attempted to interfere in elections from France to the Netherlands, from the Balkans to the Baltics. We’ve seen Mr. Putin’s government use of quote-unquote, ‘‘active measures,’’ including support for far-right and far-left parties op- posed to historically successful European institutions and post- World War II Western alliances. For example, Russia has provided support and financial assist- ance to the far-right party of Marine Le Pen in France in a very VerDate Sep 11 2014 09:42 Nov 07, 2017 Jkt 026127 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\26127.TXT SHAUN LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER 3 blatant and obvious way. Russia has launched cyber attacks against political parties and government institutions in several Western countries. They’ve also released stolen information in an effort to steer elections in a particular direction, as we saw in the French elections with their release of information about then-can- didate Macron. Germany’s parliament has been cyber-attacked with members’ e- mails hacked and stolen. Most observers expect this stolen informa- tion to be utilized before this fall’s national elections in Germany. As in the United States, Russia aggressively uses trolls and bots to spread fake news and disinformation, with the goal of weakening European institutions and driving a wedge between the United States and Europe. These active measures have been supported by state-controlled Russian media, including RT and Sputnik. So far, these Russian efforts have not been as successful
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