Insider Threat Detection Study
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Markus Kont, Mauno Pihelgas, Jesse Wojtkowiak, Lorena Trinberg, Anna-Maria Osula Insider Threat Detection Study 1 This publication is a product of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (the Centre). It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of the Centre or NATO. The Centre may not be held responsible for any loss or harm arising from the use of information contained in this publication and is not responsible for the content of the external sources, including external websites referenced in this publication. Digital or hard copies of this publication may be produced for internal use within NATO and for personal or educational use when for non- profit and non-commercial purpose, provided that copies bear a full citation. www.ccdcoe.org [email protected] 2 Executive Summary This study focuses on the threat to information security posed by insiders (i.e., insider threat) as the recent cases of Edward Snowden, Chelsea Manning, and Herman Simm have highlighted the significant risks of “good guys gone bad” within a defence structure. Insider threat has to, in particular, be explored as most security frameworks focus on intrusions by external actors. But what happens if the malicious user is able utilise internal channels to access your systems? What if the perpetrator is someone who you trust? How do you detect and deal with a destructive and hostile insider with a security clearance? Our work provides a comprehensive overview of insider threat, examines a selection of high-profile incidents and existing research. The analysis takes an interdisciplinary approach, discussing insider threat from technical, legal, and behavioural perspectives. The authors outline the key components of an Insider Threat Programme and propose guidelines to assist organisations that are planning to implement their own programme. Additionally, the study provides legal analysis of seven scenarios that combine the questions and concerns that surfaced during the study. In order to understand what drives different insiders to malicious deeds, it is essential to establish profile types. We analyse five distinct insider profiles: Sabotage; Theft (of intellectual property); Fraud; Espionage; Unintentional insiders. An Insider Threat Programme is not a product that can be bought off the shelf, but rather a continuous process. The programme offers the organization the ability to identify and prevent changing risks, detect an incident as it occurs, and once an incident has occurred, respond to the incident in an efficient manner. The analysis and lessons learned from incidents will feed information back into the planning phase, allowing to continuously develop and improve the programme. The main idea is to notice various technical and non-technical detection indicators that can lead to incidents. We propose six different categories of detection indicators – three are related to behavioural aspects, while the remaining three are more technical. For every indicator, we assess its relevance to each of the insider profiles. Most importantly, when analysed and handled properly, these indicators act as precursors that accompany different threats. Early or timely detection allows to minimise the damage, or in best case prevent the incident altogether. This research topic was brought forward by the German Armed Forces within a Request for Support to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE) dated 25 March 2014. The request was submitted through the NATO CCD COE Steering Committee and was approved for implementation. 3 About the NATO CCD COE The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence is an international military organisation accredited in 2008 by NATO’s North Atlantic Council as a ‘Centre of Excellence’. Located in Tallinn, Estonia, the Centre is currently supported by the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America as Sponsoring Nations and Austria, and Finland as a Contributing Participants. The Centre is neither part of NATO’s command or force structure, nor is it funded by NATO. However, it is part of a wider framework supporting NATO Command Arrangements. NATO CCD COE’s mission is to enhance capability, cooperation and information sharing between NATO, NATO member states and NATO’s partner countries in the area of cyber defence by virtue of research, education and consultation. The Centre has taken a NATO-oriented interdisciplinary approach to its key activities, including academic research on selected topics relevant to the cyber domain from the legal, policy, strategic, doctrinal and/or technical perspectives, providing education and training, organising conferences, workshops and cyber defence exercises, and offering consultations upon request. For more information on NATO CCD COE, visit the Centre’s website at http://www.ccdcoe.org. 4 Table of Contents 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 7 1.1. Scope ....................................................................................................................................... 8 1.2. Motivation ............................................................................................................................... 8 1.3. Outline ..................................................................................................................................... 8 1.4. Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................. 8 2. High-profile Examples ..................................................................................................................... 9 2.1. Edward Snowden ..................................................................................................................... 9 2.2. Chelsea Manning ..................................................................................................................... 9 2.3. Daniel Ellsberg ......................................................................................................................... 9 2.4. Herman Simm ........................................................................................................................ 10 2.5. Nidal Malik Hasan .................................................................................................................. 10 2.6. Summary................................................................................................................................ 10 3. Introducing the Insider Threat Programme .................................................................................. 12 3.1. Insider Threat Definition ....................................................................................................... 12 3.2. Insider Threat Programme in Comparison to Counter-Intelligence ...................................... 13 3.3. Insider Threat Profiles ........................................................................................................... 14 3.3.1. Sabotage ........................................................................................................................ 15 3.3.2. Theft of Intellectual Property ........................................................................................ 16 3.3.3. Insider Fraud .................................................................................................................. 16 3.3.4. Espionage ...................................................................................................................... 17 3.3.5. Unintentional Insider ..................................................................................................... 18 3.4. Complexity of Insider Threats ............................................................................................... 18 3.5. Threat Timeline and Detection .............................................................................................. 19 3.6. Key Components of Insider Threat Programmes .................................................................. 20 3.7. Summary................................................................................................................................ 22 4. Creating an Insider Threat Programme ......................................................................................... 23 4.1. Insider Threat Programme Roadmap and Life Cycle ............................................................. 23 4.1.1. Initial Planning and Identifying Stakeholders ................................................................ 24 4.1.2. Achieving Leadership Buy-in.......................................................................................... 24 4.1.3. Ensuring Sustained Buy-in From Leadership ................................................................. 25 4.1.4. Completing the InTP Life Cycle ...................................................................................... 26 4.2. Exploring the Road Less Travelled ......................................................................................... 26 4.3. Detection Indicators .............................................................................................................. 28 4.3.1. Personal Indicators .......................................................................................................