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Drug Cartels: the Growing Violence in Mexico

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Drug Cartels: the Growing Violence in Mexico 5/11/2007 DRUG CARTELS: THE GROWING VIOLENCE IN MEXICO Oct. 23, 2006 © 2006 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. 1 5/11/2007 DRUG CARTELS: THE GROWING VIOLENCE IN MEXICO Executive Summary A congressional oversight panel has issued a report stating that U.S. Border Patrol agents are outmanned and outgunned by Mexican drug cartels, which – officials say – are now effectively controlling human trafficking across the border. The House Homeland Security subcommittee’s report, issued Oct. 17, specifically mentions that drug cartels “use automatic assault weapons, bazookas, grenade launchers and improvised explosive devices," whereas “Border Patrol agents are issued 40-caliber Beretta semiautomatic pistols." This description is on target. Mexican drug cartels not only are well-equipped, but exceedingly well organized and entrepreneurial. Their ready access to military weapons suppliers is an important factor behind a spurt in violence -- particularly in areas along the U.S. border – that soon could make 2006 the most deadly year for drug-related violence in Mexico. The violence is receiving more attention in the United States in part because drug cartels have begun adopting increasingly gruesome methods of torture and killing, unlike the patterns that were customary when Colombian cartels began to emerge in the 1980s. Mexican cartels appear to have torn a page from the playbook of terrorist groups and rebel movements from other periods of history: Victims today may be beheaded, burned alive or otherwise brutalized, as opposed to merely being shot, as gang members seek to intimidate their enemies and the public. Such methods, and the fear they incite, can tend to amplify perceptions of a cartel’s actual power. However, the upward trend in violence in Mexico involves both form and substance, with causes deeply rooted in the nature of drug operations that span the length and breadth of Mexico. At this point, most of the drug business is controlled by three fiercely competitive cartels: the Gulf, Tijuana and Sinaloa organizations. Because they battle for market share and territory, conflicts between these groups tend to be most brutal in areas surrounding key shipment nodes, such as coastal ports to the south and U.S. border checkpoints. That said, there also are external factors: Notably, inter-cartel violence tends to swing upward after U.S. or Mexican authorities manage to weaken or disrupt a given organization. At any point, if rival groups sense an organization might not be able to defend its turf, they will swoop in to battle not only the incumbent group, but each other, for control. With the bravado afforded by wealth and superior weaponry, drug cartels also have grown brazen in carrying out reprisal attacks and intimidation campaigns against the “establishment” – police, government security forces and journalists whose reporting exposes or threatens their business. Finding solutions is, clearly, a challenge. Not only are U.S. agents required to beat the violence back from the border, but Mexico City also must confront issues such as rampant corruption in official institutions, deep political division and the weakness of the central government in a highly decentralized system. A U.S.-proposed initiative to help fund and drive countermeasures might not be beyond the question, but implementing a “Plan Colombia” – which was implemented to address a crisis most closely resembling that in Mexico – could prove unworkable, for numerous reasons. © 2006 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. 2 5/11/2007 Drug Cartels: The Growing Violence in Mexico A congressional oversight panel has issued a report stating that U.S. Border Patrol agents are outmanned and outgunned by Mexican drug cartels, which – officials say – are now effectively controlling human trafficking across the border. The House Homeland Security subcommittee’s report, issued Oct. 17, specifically mentions that drug cartels “use automatic assault weapons, bazookas, grenade launchers and improvised explosive devices," whereas “Border Patrol agents are issued 40-caliber Beretta semiautomatic pistols." The statement is far from hyperbole: Ready access to sources of military weapons are is one of the driving trends behind the growing strength of the drug cartels, which have been blamed for soaring violence throughout Mexico – and particularly along the U.S. border – during the past three years. This year is shaping up to be the bloodiest yet: As of mid-September, some 1,500 deaths had been attributed to cartel wars, nearly matching the 1,543 totaled for 2005. The U.S. Embassy in Mexico City issued a travel advisory for Americans in September after a string of incidents in Nuevo Laredo that provide another snapshot of the situation: the abductions of 25 employees of a Texas-based company (mistaken as members of a rival drug gang), the deaths of six teen-agers in a gang-related shooting and a shootout between cartels that raged in the city’s downtown area for more than an hour. Meanwhile, the abductions of at least 20 American citizens this year from Nuevo Laredo remain unresolved. Given the international boundaries, the issue is far beyond the powers of U.S. federal agents to resolve – and, given the weaknesses of the Mexican government, it appears to be well beyond Mexico City’s powers as well. If the House subcommittee is correct in its assessment – that the drug cartels are the strongest forces operating in the U.S. border area – a clear understanding of the groups, trends and issues in play is key for those who live, work and travel through the region, not to mention for those saddled with finding solutions to the violence. Drug Routes: Mapping the Violence Although many cartels operate in Mexico, most of the drug trade is controlled by only three: the Gulf, Sinaloa, and Tijuana cartels. That said, drug operations -- the import, production, shipping and distribution of cocaine, marijuana, heroin and crystal methamphetamine (meth)– are run throughout the country. The drugs flow north from Colombia and Peru to the Pacific ports of Acapulco and Puerto Escondido, as well as to coves along less populated stretches of Pacific coastline in states like Michoacan, Nayarit and Sinaloa. On the Atlantic side, drug cargos sail from Venezuela and Brazil to the ports of Cancun and Veracruz. Some of the traffic comes overland from Guatemala into the southern states. Drug shipments are trucked from there to the north, along both coasts and up through the center of the country, to reach various smuggling routes – known as “plazas” -- into the United States. Some of the most important distribution points are the border towns of Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo, Juarez, Agua Prieta, Nogales, Mexicali and Tijuana. © 2006 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. 3 5/11/2007 Not all the drugs originating in South American countries, such as Colombia, pass through Mexico: A growing percentage of shipments are being sent directly to U.S. ports via shipping containers. This method allows Colombian cartels to avoid paying a customary transport fee (50 percent of the load) to Mexican counterparts that funnel the drugs into the United States – and, in so doing, assume responsibility for shipments that are lost or seized. However, this trade route trend will not greatly impact overland movements through Mexico or the battles for control over those routes. For one thing, the busy international bridges along the U.S.-Mexican border are an attractive venue for smuggling other forms of contraband into the United States; for another, giving Mexican cartels oversight of the final transport stages allows Colombian cartels to offload some of their business risks. Another trend – the shift of methamphetamine production from the United States to Mexico --also will ensure that the country remains a key route for drug traffic. At one point, the United States was a dominant force in meth production: There were no natural or climatological barriers to the drug’s manufacture, and crime groups saw advantage in eliminating the risks encountered at import checkpoints. However, U.S. authorities have cracked down on meth labs and passed laws to make it more difficult to buy key ingredients, such as the pseudoephedrine found in cold medicines, in sufficiently large quantities. However, demand for meth on the U.S. market has not declined, and Mexican gangs can produce it cheaply. Growth of the Mexican meth industry can be expected to keep drugs flowing across the border – and cartel battles over trafficking infrastructure hot. © 2006 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. 4 5/11/2007 Drug Cartels: The Face of Violence As noted, the majority of Mexico’s drug trade currently is controlled by three key cartels – the Gulf, Tijuana and Sinaloa (or Federation) organizations. This has not always been the case, however. Drug cartels, like empires, can rise up, be weakened and fall, giving way to successor regimes that build on the ruins. The interplay between cartels is, in fact, very much like that between states in the international system: The chances for peace are highest when a kind of stable coexistence is maintained and profits flow freely. However, any disruption to the system – such as the arrests or deaths of cartel officials – generates tensions and, frequently, bloodshed. If any of the key groups is seen as weakening, rivals will scramble to fill the void in the power structure. The Gulf Cartel The Gulf cartel is led by Osiel Cardenas Guillen, who was arrested in 2003 after a shootout with police in Matamoros. With Cardenas Guillen in prison, his lieutenant, Jorge Costilla Sanchez, is believed to be responsible for the cartel’s daily operations (though incarcerated kingpins often manage to retain control of their organizations by bribing and threatening prison officials and promising favors to fellow inmates). Though the Gulf cartel's center of operations is in Matamoros, Tamaulipas, its operational territory extends from Matamoros west along the U.S./Mexico border toward Laredo -- through Reynosa, Nuevo Laredo, Miguel Aleman and surrounding communities.
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