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January 2018 • v. 58, n. 1 NewsNet News of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies Betraying the Revolutions? Anna Grzymala-Busse, Stanford University The following Presidential Address was given on November have been familiar—but the commitment to a radical 11, 2017 at the 49th Annual ASEEES Convention. new organization of political, social, and economic life was not. The Revolution itself was one where conflict and Since this year’s conference theme invited them, violence were frequent on both the mass and elite level, I will indulge in some transgressions. Comparing the and complex and contingent episodes left politicians, incomparable and exploiting the centenary of the Russian soldiers, and workers careening from one unexpected Revolution, I will take a look at two very different turn to another. upheavals—1917 and 1989—and examine the paradoxical results of both. The outcomes, of course, are depressingly familiar: war, collectivization, and authoritarian repression, rather If we compare these two revolutions, two than the promised redistribution and empowerment of striking aspects are the ideological novelty each project the people. Yet precisely because the Revolution was such represented—and the degree of elite consensus or conflict a radically new project, there was enormous conflict and that followed. The regime project of 1917 was innovative, disagreement over both its direction and how to achieve unprecedented, and highly contested. 1989, in contrast, it. The conflict raged over the nature of the project, and with its tropes of a “Return to Europe,” was an attempt who would execute it; over land and collectivization; over to rejoin and to follow an existing template. Subsequently, the state and its reconsolidation; over the party and its the result of these revolutions was that the innovation of direction; over industrialization and economic policy; 1917 produced enormous conflict—and 1989 resulted in a over civil society and its reassertion; over nascent forms surprising degree of elite consensus, one that would prove of civic self-organization and how they could navigate the self-cannibalizing. new environment. And as a result, commissars vanished, as did millions of others, in fits of revolutionary violence and Thus, 1917 was a radical ideological, economic, subsequent authoritarian terror. Innovation begat conflict, social, and political transformation. The entire which led to the annihilation of the involved elites, and the revolutionary regime project was unprecedented, unique, insane persecutions of the masses over whom they would and novel. The promises of peace, land, and bread may exert control. Inside this Issue • January 2018 • v. 58, n.1 Betraying the Revolutions? 2018 ASEEES Board of Directors & Committees 15 by Anna Grzymala-Busse, Stanford University 1 Publications 17 2017 Executive Director’s Report 6 Institutional Member News 21 by Lynda Park In Memoriam 27 From Slavic Languages and Literatures to Russian and 10 Affiliate Group News 28 East European Studies at Penn Member Spotlight 30 by Mitchell A Orenstein, University of Pennsylvania Personages 31 Affiliate Organizations’ 2017 Prize Winners 12 January 2018 • NewsNet 1 The collapse of communism in 1989, in contrast, Yet this mainstream agreement on liberal was a rejection of the very Soviet imperial project that 1917 desiderata had a paradoxical effect. The one set of critics generated. It was neither an innovative nor a particularly to emerge during the 1990s and early 2000s was made violent revolutionary episode. Instead, it was dominated up of illiberal parties, which were often populist and by a nostalgia for a past that never was: the counterfactual frequently extremist. We saw the rise of several parties of a region that did not experience the four decades of that criticize the elite consensus and view it as a corrupt murderous imperial communism. The “Return to Europe” and tacit conspiracy between the governing elites on the became a dominant trope, established through elite one hand, and the international forces that would rob negotiations, mass mobilization, and the stirring images these countries of sovereignty on the other. Such parties, not only of a rising civil society, but of leaders across the whether Samoobrona in Poland or MIÉP in Hungary, generations and regimes calling for freedom and reform. were often dismissed by the mainstream elite parties as marginal extremes, protest parties that could not possibly The “return to Europe,” as articulated by Havel, represent the broader populace. Yet even as these parties Michnik, and others, was not an ideological innovation, but articulated otherwise unspoken grievances and concerns, a rejoining of a community of existing social democracies other political parties began to co-opt their message— and modern economies. It had diverse but familiar actors such as the Party of Young Democrats (Fidesz) meanings to its advocates: a rejection of the communist in Hungary, or the fragmented right-wing forces that era; a reassertion of European practices and norms; the eventually coalesced to form the Law and Justice Party adoption of liberal democracy and market economies; and (PiS) in Poland. In other words, the liberal consensus above all, a reversion to a status quo ante—an irretrievable generated an illiberal—and fundamentally alternative history of a Europe undivided, destructive—backlash. where the postwar trajectories of these countries were not warped by the imposition The resulting irony is that the early of an alien and authoritarian regime. “poster children” of reform—places like Hungary, Poland, or the Czech Republic— The result was an ideological are precisely where we see the the populists consensus among the political and cultural move from the margins of political life to the elites. First, the consensus on the return to center of government. Fidesz, PiS, and their Europe meant the widespread adoption of counterparts fulfill the two criteria of populist liberal democratic institutions (if not always movements: first, that they harbor a deep practices). Parliaments, constitutions, anti- skepticism regarding the corrupt elite cartel; corruption bureaus, and regional governments second, that their primary political category were all duly established and empowered. is “the people,” who are pure and good, in Second, it meant the implementation of free- contrast to the elites that have failed them. market policies, by governments that were nominally both The problem with the populist conception of politics is Left and Right, in the absence of any possible ideological two-fold: a) an anti-institutional stance, since political and alternative. International organizations, whether the economic institutions are the product of degenerate elite International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or the cartels (here, often between communist and “opposition” European Union itself, played a role in generating this elites), and b) the desire for an unmediated expression of consensus, by offering rewards to those who succeeded the will of the people—which all too often translates into in the reform process and incentives to those who lagged the politicization and colonization of state institutions behind. to comport with the “general will”—understood by their party proponents to be identical with a partisan mandate. The crowning moment of the elite consensus was the accession to the European Union. Here, over So how did we get here? The scruffy young the course of several years, mainstream political elites revolutionary, Viktor Orbán, who so charmed articulated an unwavering commitment: there was no international observers in 1989, gradually coopted his alternative but joining the European Union, an unalloyed erstwhile competitors, such as the Christian Democratic good that would benefit these countries enormously— or Smallholders’ Parties. Over the course of the 1990s, he not least because it would finally confirm their status as transformed Fidesz from a party of young liberals to one of returnees to Europe. committed nationalists and populists. As Hungary steadily moved towards the EU, Fidesz called for the defense of January 2018 • NewsNet 2 Hungarian culture and traditions in the face of European and universities were the next targets. Journalists and hegemony and democratic formalism. It made steady program directors were summarily fired for their political electoral gains, and achieved the two-thirds supermajority unreliability, news programming came under renewed of seats in the Hungarian Parliament in 2010 and again scrutiny, new registration requirements were imposed in 2014. Meanwhile, PiS in Poland was conservative in Hungary for civil society and religious organizations, and populist from the start. It viewed the post-1989 and the Central European University became the target changes in Poland as an illegitimate compromise between of a new set of educational laws that were designed to communist and liberals that sold out Poland’s interests. register it out of existence. Fidesz used its supermajority Its chair, Jarosław Kaczyński, openly denounced the post- to introduce a new constitution in 2011, one that skewed communist elite “układ” (arrangement, or cartel) and the playing field towards Fidesz whether in or out of office. divided Poland into the better kind of party loyalists and New supermajority requirements for ordinary legislation, the “worse sort of Poles” who had the temerity to criticize such as government budgets, mean that even if Fidesz is him.