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Sense and Nonsense: Wittgenstein, Idealism and the Limits of Language SENSE AND NONSENSE Wittgenstein, Idealism and the Limits o f Language by Matthewjohn Densley A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD University College London 2000 ProQuest Number: U643775 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest. ProQuest U643775 Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Evety m rd written in memory of my parents: MICHAEL BERNARD DENSLEY and EILEEN ANN DENSLEY Abstract SENSE AND NONSENSE Wittgenstein, Idealism and the limits of Language Matthewjohn Densley It has become fashionable to describe Wittgenstein as some kind of idealist. Encouraged by the Kantian influence evident in his early Tractatus Logko Phiksophicus, commentators have speculated about an implicit commitment to idealism in his mature thought. Unfortunately, the debate has been marred by (a) a lack of an agreed understanding of what it means for a philosophy to be idealist’, and (b) a lack of supporting evidence at the level of detailed exegesis of Wittgenstein’s texts. This thesis endeavours to address these problems and resolve the debate. In part one, I set out to clarify the notion of an idealist doctrine in general, and to define a form of idealism that is most suitable for comparison with Wittgenstein’s work. This involves a brief investigation of the historical significance of idealism, a description of the influence of Transcendental Idealism on the early Wittgenstein, and a discussion of the kind of idealism that is still prevalent today as an approach to metaphysics. Part two provides a fairly detailed exposition of certain aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought. This exposition is used in the first place to motivate the claim that Wittgenstein was an idealist, but finally to argue that he did not, in fact, hold any such metaphysical doctrine. Rather, I defend an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thought that maintains that he consistently held to his anti-theoretical principles, and thus avoided any of the positive metaphysical commitments that would be entailed by an idealist doctrine. The later Wittgenstein is described as a ‘quietist’ with respect to metaphysical discourse. In part three I illustrate a quietist methodology by arguing that it is the only approach that can settle our intuitions about certain problems in the philosophy of subjectivity. TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements......................................................................................................... 6 Introduction.................................................................................................................. 8 Summary of Contents...................................................................................................18 PART ONE: Conceptual Idealism Chapter 1: The Fundamental View of Idealism...........................................28 1.1 Kant’s Transcendental Idealism...........................................................28 1.2 Idealism in Schopenhauer, Kant and Berkeley ....................................33 1.3 Three Kinds of Idealism ...................................................................... 45 1.4 The Fundamental View of Idealism .................................................... 57 Chapter 2\ Idealism and Realism in Early Analytic Philosophy................60 2.1 The Metaphysics of the Tractatus..........................................................64 2.2 The Realism of the Tractatus-. Objects as ‘the Given’ ...........................66 2.3 Showing and Saying..............................................................................71 2.4 The Idealism of the Tractatus-. Logic and the World ............................74 2.5 The Solipsism of the Tractatus.............................................................. 76 2.6 The Quietism of the Tractatus............................................................... 89 Chapter 3'. Conceptual Idealism......................................................................92 3.1 Conceptualism ......................................................................................94 3.2 A Topology of Metaphysics.................................................................99 3.3 A Conceptual Idealist Argument for the Possibility of Metaphysics 104 3.3.1 Step 1: The Rejection of Conceptual Relativism .............................105 3.3.2 Step 2: The Connection Between Language and Reality ................107 3.4 An Irresolvable Dispute ..................................................................... 110 3.5 The Problem of Subjectivity .............................................................. 116 PART TWO: The Later Wittgenstein Chapter 4\ Wittgenstein on Meaning and Rule Following.......................121 4.1 Wittgenstein on Applying A Rule...................................................... 124 4.2 The ‘Sceptical Paradox’ .......................................................................129 4.3 The Sceptical Paradox and Wittgenstein’s Rejection of Scepticism. 133 4.4 The Mythology of Symbolism............................................................139 4.5 The Rejection of Conceptual Realism ................................................145 Chapters-. Wittgenstein on Privacy.............................................................. 151 5.1 Customs and The Community ...........................................................154 5.2 Wittgenstein on Private Language ..................................................... 157 5.3 McDowell on Wittgenstein’s Rejection of the Given .......................162 5.4 Wittgenstein, Idealism and the Limits of Language ...........................173 Chapters-. Wittgenstein, Idealism and Philosophy...................................175 6.1 Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Philosophy ..............................................184 6.2 The Autonomy of Grammar ............................................................. 193 6.3 Wittgenstein and Idealism ..................................................................202 6.4 Wittgenstein and K ant ....................................................................... 212 PART THREE: Quietism Chapter 7: Silence and Subjectivity..............................................................224 7.1 Philosophy and Subjectivity ...............................................................226 7.2 Subjectivity and the ‘Irresolvable Debate’ ......................................... 233 7.3 Silence and the Subject ....................................................................... 245 Summary and Conclusion........................................................................................... 249 Appendix: Longer Footnotes................................................................................. 258 0.1 A Concession to Relativism: Human Centred Metaphysics ....................258 0.2 The “Private Language Argument” and the Transcendental Deduction 262 0.3 Quietism and Disjunctivism ..................................................................... 262 Bibliograply.............................................................................................................. 265 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am indebted to various people for their help, guidance and support. I would like to thank my principle supervisor, Jerry Valberg, and Professor Malcolm Budd, who provided most insightful comments on the chapters on Wittgenstein. Some of my thoughts, especially those expressed in chapter 3 and 4, were provoked by my initial experience of philosophy at the University of Sussex, where I was taught and inspired by Michael Morris. In addition I have benefited from discussions with a number of friends, including Mike, Sharon, Murali, and especially Nadja, who proof read the entire thesis. I would also like to thank those who have given me much needed emotional support during a difficult period in my life. To mention just a few: my family, especially my brother Daniel, and Pauline, Blaise, Maria, Magda and Nell. Habe nun, ach! Philosophie, Juristerei und Medizin, Und leider auch Théologie! Durchaus studiert, mit heiBem Bemiihn. Da steh ich nun, ich armer Tor! Und bin so klug als wie zuvor; ¥aust 354—359. Introduction There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy. Hofn/ei, Act II, scene V. At some point in the history of the universe, minds emerged that gradually came to form a picture of the reality that they found themselves in. That picture evolved, not only with the perceptual capacities available to those minds, but also with their intellectual abilities. Most importantly, the understanding we humans have gained of the universe has depended on our ability to use language: to formulate and share new ideas, to reflect on them and test them against the world. As new and better scientific theories are proposed, our picture of reality continues to evolve. But perhaps what is most striking about the increasingly rapid advance of human knowledge is just how little we comprehend. The task we have set ourselves seems
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