California State University, Northridge

Home , August 1981, Death to America, January 1980, January 1981, July 1981, Lester Bernstein

CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE

TIME AND NEWSWEEK'S COVERAGE OF

THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS:

A COUNTERPOINT

TO THE CRITICS

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in

Mass Communication

Peter Charles Flanderka

August 1982

]. _____ ------··------The Thesis of Peter Charles Flanderka is approved:

Dr. Susan Henry, Chair

California State University, Northridge

ii Respectfully dedicated

to Dr. Susan Henry,

who always listened,

always cared

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract vii CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. LITERATURE REVIEW 15

Introduction 15 Sources 17 Indexes 17 Abstracts • 20 Literature 23 Iranian hostage cr1s1s 23 General media coverage of Iran and the hostage crisis • 25 Television coverage of Iran and the hostage crisis • 31 General media coverage of terrorism 37 Time magazine and Newsweek magazine 39 Iran 42 Content analysis 44 Agenda-setting 45 Interview sources 47 Conclusions on the literature 47

III. METHODOLOGY 57

Identification of method 57 Key s.ources of data 57 Thesis design 57 Procedures for overcoming bias 59 Justification of thesis design 60 Special qualifications of the thesis writer 62 Acknowledgement of methodological weaknesses 62

IV. BACKGROUND . 65

Iranian hostage crisis 65 Time and Newsweek magazines 78 Agenda-setting • 87 Criticism of hostage crisis coverage by U.S. news media •

iv V. DATA Al~-IMMEDIATE FINDINGS 98

Coverage from November 4, 1979 through March 31, 1980 98 Coverage emphasis 100 Positive coverage of Carter . 106 Evidence of emotional reporting 110 Absence of bias • 112 Heavy presentation of background material 115 Evidence of variety in use of departmental headings 118 Absence of stereotypes 119 Additional trends 121 Differences and similarities 121 Summary . 122

VI. DATA AND IMMEDIATE FINDINGS 128 Coverage from April 14, 1980 through August 18, 1980 128 Coverage emphasis 129 Carter Administration references 135 Increased negativism toward Carter 136 Continued practice of emotional reporting 140 Continued absence of bias 142 Continued presentation of background material 143 Reduced variety in use of departmental headings 147 Reduced use of stereotypes 148 Additional trends 149 Differences and similarities 150 Summary 151

VII. DATA AND IMMEDIATE FINDINGS 156 Coverage from September 1, 1980 . through February 2, 1981 • 156 Coverage emphasis 159 Carter Administration references . 164 Reduced negativism toward Carter . 165 Continued practice of emotional reporting • 166 Increased bias • 168 Reduced presentation of background ·material 172 Continued reduction of variety in use of departmental headings • 173 Continued reduction in use of stereotypes 175 Additional trends • 176

v Differences and similarities • 177 Summary. • 178

VIII. CONCLUSIONS • • 182

Conclusions on the hypotheses . 182 Hypothesis 1 183 Conclusion • 183 Hypothesis 2 . 184 Conclusion 184 Hypothesis 3 . 184 Conclusion • 185 Hypothesis 4 • 185 Conclusion . 185 Hypothesis 5 • 186 Conclusion . 186 Hypothesis 6 . 187 Conclusion • 187 Hypothesis 7 . 188 Conclusion • 188 Hypothesis 8 189 Conclusion . 189 General Conclusions . 190 Suggestions for future research . 197 Suggestions for action • 198

APPENDIX 201

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . 203

vi ' .

ABSTRACT

TIME AND NEWSWEEK'S COVERAGE OF

THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS:

A COUNTERPOINT

TO THE CRITICS

Peter Charles Flanderka

Master of Arts in Mass Communications

The Iranian hostage crisis, some have claimed, attracted more media attention than any international diplomatic incident in recent history. In turn, that large amount of coverage attracted considerable and severe criticism from several sources, most notably

Edward W. Said of Columbia University.

This thesis is a qualitative examination of that coverage in two of the United States' most widely read and respected news media members: Time and Newsweek magazines. Despite boasting cir culations of more than 4 million (Time) and 2.5 million (Newsweek), and being recognized as legitimate members of the U.S. elite press, the newsmagazines have rarely been studied with regard to their reporting habits.

vii This study offers a systemati_c, chronological analysis of

their reporting of the 444-day hostage crisis, examining several

coverage qualities and focusing on their agenda-setting roles during

the 14~-month period.

The study is based on a page-by-page analysis of every

other issue of the newsmagazines, starting with the November 12,

1979, issues and finishing with the February 2, 1981, issues.

The major finding of the thesis is that, while exhibiting

some coverage flaws, Time and"Newsweek reported the hostage crisis

better than hypothesized. Host of the criticism aimed at U.S. media

coverage generally by Said and others simply do not apply to the two

newsmagazines.

Time and Newsweek, exhibiting virtually identical coverage, were found to have reported the hostage crisis extensively and

equitably, avoiding blatant bias and stereotypical labels. They

offered insightful background material and reported the story from

several approaches, but were, nonetheless, guilty of avoiding the

presentation of important Iranian perspective reports.

viii CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"We need to convey our message to the world. For this, we must use the media," then Iranian Foreign Minister Abolhassan Bani

Sadr told a gathering of journalists on Thanksgiving Day, 1979. "What we want from you is nothing but the revelation of truth to the world ..•• Don't you want this world problem to be the first one that is solved by reporters?" 1

Seven weeks later, on January 14, 1980, the government of Iran officially announced the expulsion of all American news organizations, 2 accusing them of biased reporting.

"Kill Carter!" "Yankee go home!" "Kill Americans!" "Kill them all!" The signs and images were virtually the same day after day on

American television and in American print media as correspondents sur rounded the seized American Embassy in Tehran and reported the hostage 3 crisis. Weapons-brandishing, fist-waving Iranians burned Uncle Sam effigies while condemning the deposed Shah of Iran and the United

States. The picture transmitted to American news consumers was a seemingly lucid and cogent one: all of Iran was in the grip of this 4 frenzy.

But, as NBC correspondent George Lewis later admitted in appar ent contradiction to the image projected by the daily coverage, "Life 5 itself was going on as usual" only blocks from the embassy.

1 2

More than 300 American reporters canvassed Tehran during the first two months of the embassy takeover. Each of the three U.S. television networks reportedly spent in excess of $75,000 a week on its . 6 I ran operat1.ons. The hostage crisis was in the process of generating what some have claimed to be more attention than any event in recent history, including the Vietnam War, the civil rights movement and the 7 Apollo moon missions.

But by the spring of 1980, American news media were reaching a near complete reversal in emphasis. The sudden, and strange, de- emphasis in hostage crisis coverage was blamed on several causal factors, including an increased self-awareness by the media of their influence on the crisis and an acknowledgement by the media of other important national and international developments. The most frequently cited reason, however, was the Carter Administration's admitted desire 8 to have the hostage crisis issue muted.

And so went the often-complex, often-fickle, often-criticized, but always-intensive coverage by American media of, perhaps, the major diplomatic dilemma faced by the United States in the past decade: the

Iranian hostage crisis.

This thesis will examine and analyze that coverage innewsmaga- zines Time and Newsweek, generally acknowledged as thetwo most influential outlets of a major branch of the American news media.

Specifically, the study will focus on coverage qualities that should provide a more complete understanding of exactly how ~ime and

Newswe~k reported the-hostage crisis, both in terms of extent of coverage and shape of coverage. The study will focus on several areas of the magazines' coverage that should help determine which, if any, 3

positions they assumed during the 444 days, while also helping to define areas in which Time and Newsweek were either strong or weak in their reporting. And the study will focus on coverage qualities de signed to illustrate which elements, if. any, the magazines may have used to help establish the news agendas of .the American people.

From these foci naturally are generated eight research questions:

1) To what extent did Time and Newsweek cover the hostage crisis? Was the amount of editorial space devoted to the story con sistent for both newsmagazines and did the extent of their coverage remain consistent throughout the 444-day period?

2) In what ways, if any, did the coverage by Time and Newsweek change during the 444-day period? Were the changes consistent for both newsmagazines and what, if any, causes may have been responsible for the changes?

3) In what ways, if any, did Time and Newsweek use stereotypical labels during the hostage crisis? Were the stereotypical labels con sistent for both newsmagazines and were they consistently the same for 9 the 444 days? Did the newsmagazines utilize traditional stereotypes or did they generate their own?

4) In what ways, if any, did Time and Newsweek practice biased reporting? Was the biased reporting consistent for both newsmagazines and did the intensity of that bias seeminglyfluctate during the crisis?

5) In what ways, if any, did Time and Newsweek merely offer rep licative reporting on the main hostage crisis events? Was fresh infor mation consistently offered during the 444 days, or did the magazines simply concentrate their coverage on the events and individuals im- 4

portant to the crisis at a given time, rarely extending their re-

porting beyond the hostage issue?

6) What coverage elements, if any, did Time and Newsweek use in

their reporting of the hostage crisis to communicate an emotionalappeal

to their readers? Was this a consistent practice for both newsmaga-

zines and was it consistent throughout the 444 days?

7) Did coverage reflect strong involvement by correspondents for

Time and Newsweek with principal participants in the hos,tage crisis

story? Was the evidence of involvement consistent for correspondents of both newsmagazines and was it a consistent practice throughout the

444 days?

8) What coverage elements, if any, did Time and Newsweek use in their reporting of the hostage crisis that may have helped establish the news agendas of the American public? Was this a consistent prac- for both newsmagazines and was it consistent throughout the 444 days?

Comprehensive answers to these eight questions should generate a better understanding of the role played by the newsmagazines in what certainly may be regarded as a critical event in 20th Century United

States history.

By its diplomatic scope and international impact, the Iranian hostage crisis left its mark. Thus, any study addressing the topic takes on inherent importance.

But the significance of the hostage crisis goes beyond pure political concerns. It sparked in the outraged American people a rare show of nationalism. A jingoistic public opinion of uncharacteristic vigor emerged, which, some have claimed, strongly shaped diplomatic d ec1s1ons• . rna d e b y t h e Carter Ad m1n1stra· · t 1on.· lO 5

Closely tied to that high level of public awareness and expression and vitally important to this study was the near-saturation level of media attention periodically directed toward the hostage crisis.

With virtually every major American news organization represented in Iran during the crisis, save periods of official expulsion, it certainly was a concentration based on the event's magnitude. But according to many, it was also a concentration based on profit rna- . 11 t1ves.

Digby Whitman argued in a 1981 New York Times editorial the

Iranian hostage crisis consisted only of three legitimate news items: the embassy takeover, the aborted rescue mission and the hostages' release. The rest, he suggested, was "basic media hype." Of the television networks, he wrote, the hostages simply were better audi- 12 ence attractors than "'Ironsides' or 'Captain Kangaroo.'"

Indeed, the profit motive is a generally acknowledged fact of life for all branches of the news media, both print and broadcast. One relevant question for this study, therefore, is: Through what coverage techniques, if any, did Time and Newsweek appear to use the hostage crisis story to sell magazines?

Time and Newsweek are important for study because they generally are acknowledged as primary news carriers for the American audience and 13 are accorded positions among the so-called U.S. elite press. They are the two most important newsmagazines in the United States and 14 perhaps in the world.

More specifically, they are strong news organizers and surnmari- zers for .their large audiences of more than 4 million (Time) and almost 6

15 3 million (Newsweek). Publishing on a weekly basis, they take a week's worth of complex and diffuse news and add some order to it. 16 They distinguish, define and explain, and in so doing, seemingly play a large role in setting the public's news agenda.

As Time founder Henry Luce explained in the magazine's pros pectus: "Time is interested--not in how much it includes between its covers--but in how much it gets off its pages into the minds of its 17 readers."

Also of significance is the fact that this study examines the agenda-setting function of the media from a focus other than the tradi tional voting-time frame approach. It will offer a fresh look at agenda-setting, examining it as it occurs over an extended period of time in the coverage of an international act of terrorism.

This thesis will describe and analyze the ways in which Time and

Newsweek covered one of the most important and certainly one of the most-extensively reported international events in recent history. It will focus on media qualities and habits, examining ways in which the media might possibly shape an audience's views toward an event, and the event itself, as well as ways in which the event might possibly shape the coverage by the media.

Several hypotheses have been constructed to assist in this exam ination. They are based on the foci and research questions of this thesis and on the literature searched as background material:

1) The coverage by Time and Newsweek of the hostage crisis will be heavy early during the embassy takeover, will slacken during the spring and early summer months of 1980 and then pick up again in the fall of 1980. This coverage pattern will be consistent for both news- 7 magazines.

2) The shape of that coverage also will change, with the Carter

Administration cited regularly during that early period but mentioned only rarely following it. This coverage pattern will be consistent for both newsmagazines.

3) Time and Newsweek's coverage consistently will rely heavily on the use of stereotypical labels, including "crescent of crisis,"

"frenzied mob" and the depiction of all Shi' i te Iranians as martyrs.

4) Time and Newsweek consistently will portray the militant

Iranian students, the Iranian government and the Iranian people in generally negative terms, failing to present in-depth analys.is of the crisis from the Iranian perspective.

5) Time and Newsweek will concentrate their coverage on events and individuals important to the crisis at a given time, rarely extend ing their reporting beyond the immediate hostage issue.

6) Time and Newsweek consistently will include in their hostage coverage reporting elements which could be construed as communicating an emotional appeal to their readers. They will accomplish this through the publishing of reports which, by their content, could arouse feelings of hostility toward Iran and the Iranian people, and through the publishing of photographs, cartoons and other graphic elements which, by their emphasis on symbols such as the American flag, could arouse increased feelings of nationalism.

7) Some correspondents for both Time and Newsweek will demon strate through their reporting strong personal involvement with and empathy for the hostage families and a strong personal involvement with the hostage crisis story itself. The involvement will intensify as the 8 crisis concludes.

8) Both Time and Newsweek will demonstrate qualities of agenda setting in their coverage of the hostage crisis. These will include

their repeated use of hostage crisis cover stories and feature reports,

their placement and display of hostage crisis reports in the tables of contents, their generally extensive coverage of the hostage crisis, and

their reporting of the hostage crisis under any of several sections.

The acceptance or rejection of these hypotheses will be arrived at through the use of qualitative content analysis, because an effi cient way to comprehensively examine coverage patterns of Time and

Newsweek and then offer cogent analysis is through the systematic breaking down of editorial content.

Research questions will be addressed and hypotheses tested in this study through a page-by-page search of every other issue of Time and Newsweek for the entire 444-day period. All editorial content con cerning the hostage crisis will be critically analyzed.

Issues of Time and Newsweek examined for this study are: (1979)

November 12 and 26, December 10 and 24; (1980) January 7 and 21,

February 4 and 18, March 3, 17 and 31, April 14 and 28, May 12 and 26,

June 9 and 23, July 7 and 21, August 4 and 18, September 1, 15 and 29,

October 13 and 27, November 10 and 24, December 8 and 22; (1981)

January 5 and 19, February 2.

Since it was concluded less than two years ago (at the time of this writing), the hostage crisis and details surrounding it might be expected to be fresh in the memories of those who were witness to it.

Its history already has been well documented, as have the histories of Time and Newsweek. Still, some essential background information is 9

necessary to foster a stronger understanding of the topic of .this

thesis and the approach used in its study.

In a sharp response to the United States Government's support

of the then-deposed Shah of Iran, militant Iranian students seized the . 18 U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979. Several Americans were

released almost immediately, several others escaped two months later

with the aid of the Canadian Embassy and another was sent home for

medical reasons 8~ months after the embassy seizure. The remaining 52,

however, were retained as political hostages for 444 days. The embassy

takeover came as a surprise to the ill-informed American people, and, 19 some have argued, as a surprise even to the American government.

Media coverage of the crisis was intense, with newspapers offer-

ing daily, page-one reports, and the country's major newsmagazines

making the hostage crisis a regular source of cover stories. A nightly

ABC special report was born of the crisis, later to become "Nightline,"

and for more than one year Walter Cronkite concluded each of his top-

rated .CBS evening news programs by informing his audience what day it was in the continuing hostage story.

Matching the intensity of the media's coverage was the intensity

of reaction demonstrated by the American public. Flags flown at half- mast, yellow ribbons tied to trees, candles burning in windows, anti-

Iran bumper stickers and billboards all served to illustrate what some

suggest was an unparalled level of outrage and nationalism resulting

from the hostage crisis.

Against this backdrop of patriotism and condemnation, the

Carter Administration negotiated for the release of the hostages. Un-

successful, the administration ordered a rescue mission which failed 10

fatally in the Iranian desert. The negotiations eventually resumed and, finally, the hostages were released in January 1981.

Time and Newsweek are the most widely read of the American news 20 magazines and are bona fide members of the so-called U.S. elite press.

They publish on a weekly basis, offering in departmentalized form their selections of the most important stories of the prior seven days. They present reports under specific section headings, and great importance usually is attached to their cover stories. They serve large national and international audiences and take pride in not only providing enough in-depth coverage to enlighten their readers, but enough comment to direct t h e1r. rea d ers 1 op1n1ons.• • 21

A more thorough development of background on the hostage crisis,

Time and Newsweek is offered in Chapter IV.

Five definitions should be established at this point in the thesis:

1) "Islam" is the religious faith of the Muslims and the dominant religion of the middle eastern countries. It also often is used 22 to characterize various cultural aspects of those countries.

2) "Shi'ites" are members of a branch of the Muslim religion who owe their religious origins to the hostility between Ali (4th

Caliph and son-in-law of The Prophet) and the Umayyad Dynasty (661-750

A.D.). Following Ali's death, the Shia demanded restoration of rule to

Ali's family and broke from Arab hegemony under the Umayyads as a result. Gradually, Schi'ism developed a theological content for its political stand, becoming the official religion of Iran in the 16th century. Centered on the belief in a charismatic leader, the religion often is identified by its practice of martyrdom, also known as the 11

"passion motive."23

3) "Agenda-setting" is a mass communications theory which suggests that mass media select and emphasize certain issues and thereby cause those issues to be perceived as important by the public.

It is a theory closely associated with the reporting function.· Most often researched in voting-time frame studies, the-agehda::..setting theory is traced as far back as Walter Lippmann's Public Opinion in 24 1922, but was more formally introduced in 1972 by Maxwell E. McCombs 25 and Donald L. Shaw.

4) "Promos" are any editorial device (usually a photograph or graphic with accompanying headline) used by a publication to identify reports or other editorial material located elsewhere in the publication. They usually are placed on the cover or table of contents page.

5) "Jingoism" is an extreme form of nationalism usually marked 26 by a hostile foreign policy.

This thesis will not examine every aspect of Time and Newsweek's coverage of the Iranian hostage crisis. Rather, it will focus on specific coverage characteristics deemed important for a broader understanding of the reporting in general. Nor will this thesis examine every issue of Time and Newsweek, opting instead, for reasons of practicality, to examine every other issue' of the newsmagazines. This approach makes possible the study of both.

Following this introduction will be a chapter listing and analyzing literature pertinent to this study, a chapter outlining the methodology used, a background chapter, three chapters detailing significant data and findings, and a chapter offering conclusions and discussion on the findings, discussion on implications for future re- 12

search and discussion on causes for action. 13

NOTES

1 "Dateline Teheran," Newsweek, December 3, 1979, p. 87. 2 "Iran Announces Expulsion of U.S. News Organizations," Los Angeles Times, 15 January 1980, sec~· 1, p. 1. 3 "Dateline Teheran," Newsweek, December 3, 1979, p. 87. 4 "Iran: The Ayatollah Television," Los Angeles Times, 23 January 1980, sec. 5, p. 1. 5 Ibid. 6 "Front Page: The Failure of American media money, manpower and technology in Iran," Media People, March 1980, p. 33. 7 David Altheide, "Iran and the Press in Retrospect: Network News Oversimplified and Underexplained," Washington Journalism Review, May 1981, p. 28. 8 Frederick B. Hill, "Iran and the Press in Retrospect: Media Diplomacy--Crisis Management with an Eye on the TV Screen," Washing ton Journalism Review, May 1981, p. 23.

9Traditional stereotypes used by western media, such as all Shi'ites being martyrs, are discussed by Edward W. Said throughout his book Covering Islam (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981). 10 Hill, "Iran and the Press," p. 24.

11 "52, Yes, but How About the 52,000?" New York Times, 8 Febru ary 1981, sec. 4, p. 19. 12 Ibid. 13 John C. Merrill, in his book, The Elite Press: Great News papers of the World (New York: Pitman Publishing Corp., 1968), defines the elite press on several levels. A viable definition for this study (p. 11) is: "This press is aimed at a rather cohesive audience, and in general its readers are better educated and have a greater interest in public affairs than the average readers of the mass (or popular) press. It is aimed at the educated citizen who is aware of, and concerned about, the central issues of his time, and undoubtedly it is read by more opinion leaders than are other types of [print media]. This press has built a reputation for being well informed and expressing serious, well-seasoned opinion of the 14

nation concerned." 14 "Why the Editor of Newsweek Is Not the Editor of Time, and Vice Versa," Esquire, June 1973, p. 169. 15 The Standard Periodical Directory, 7th ed. (New York: Oxbridge Communications Inc., 1980), p. 1078. 16 James Playsted Wood, Magazines in the United States (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1971), p. 235. 17 Ibid., p. 210. 18 This and the following facts concerning the Iranian hostage crisis were taken from: Doyle McManus' Free At Last! (New York: Signet Books, 1981), Sid Moody's 444 Days: The American Hostage Story (New York: The Rutledge Press, 1981), and Pierre Salinger's America Held Hostage: The Secret ~egotiations (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1981). 19 McManus, Free At Last!, p. 19. 20 Merrill, The Elite Press, p. 54. 21 Wood, Magazines in the United States, p. 209. 22 Encyc 1 oraed. 1a Br1tann1ca, . . 15 t h e d ., s.v. II Is 1 am, II pp. 91 6 -17. 23 Ibid. 24 Werner J. Severin and James W. Tankard,Jr., Communication Theories: Origins, Methods, Uses (New York: Hastings House, Publishers, 1979), p. 253. 25 Ibid. 26 webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 150th Anniversary ed. (1981), s.v. "jingoism," p. 617. CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

For clarity and convenient access, this chapter has been divided into four areas: 1) an introduction; 2) an analysis of indexes and ab stracts; 3) an analysis of literature and interviews; 4) conclusions on the literature.

Introduction

The general topic areas searched for this literature review were: Iran; Iranian hostage crisis; Iranian takeover of American em bassy; United States-Iran relations; Middle East--coverage of; foreign news; terrorism--coverage of; crisis reporting; reporters and reporting; news media; mass media; television news; broadcast journalism; Time magazine; Newsweek magazine; magazines; periodicals; content analysis; agenda-setting. Specific subject headings under which pertinent lit erature was found will be cited in analyses of the indexes, as will subject headings unique to Journalism Abstracts and Dissertation

Abstracts International.

The literature collected under these key terms is presented under eight general subheadings: Iranian hostage crisis; General media coverage of Iran and the hostage crisis; Television coverage of Iran and the hostage crisis; General media coverage of terrorism; Time maga zine and Newsweek magazine; Iran; Content analysis; Agenda-setting.

(While this study concentrates on the performance of a branch of

15 16

the print media, a large body of literature has been produced on tele

vision's role in the coverage of the hostage crisis. For that reason,

a separate subheading has been devoted to that medium.)

Different publications proved most productive for different areas

of this study and to label only one or two as most valuable would be misleading.

Books clearly were the best source of literature on Time, Iran,

the Iranian hostage crisis and content analysis. Journals clearly were

the best source of literature on the general media coverage of terrorism

and agenda-setting. And journals, periodicals and newspapers were the

best sources of literature on general media coverage of Iran and the hostage crisis, television coverage of Iran and the hostage crisis and

Newsweek.

Special commendations should be directed at the Washington Jour nalism Review for a well-focused, three-part analysis of press perfor mance during the hostage crisis, and to Edward Said, whose book offers an insightful examination of media coverage of Islam.

Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature and Public Affairs Infor mation Service clearly were the most valuable indexes, producing a large number of sources in several areas. Communication Abstracts was par

ticularly valuable for locating literature on content analysis and agenda-setting.

Also productive was a thorough--albeit tedious--search of the

tables of contents and "Books" sections of Journal of Communication;

the tables of contents and "Bibliography" sections of Gazette; and the

tables of contents and "Book Reviews," "Other Books and Pamphlets on

Journalistic Subjects," "Paperbacks in Mass Communication," and "Arti- 17 cles on Mass Communication" sections of Journalism Quarterly. The dates searched for this study were January 1971 through March 1982 with Jour nal of Communication, January 1971 through June 1982 with Journalism

Quarterly and January 1971 through July 1982 with Gazette.

Specific topic areas searched in the "Bibliography" sections of

Gazette were content analysis, radio and television, reporting, role of mass media and pressures on mass media.

Specific topic areas searched in the "Articles on Mass Communica tion" sections of Journalism Quarterly were broadcasting, communication theory, criticism and defense of media, history and biography, interna tional, magazine and research methods.

All literature cited in this chapter was located in the Oviatt

Library of California State University, Northridge, and the Journalism

Library of California State University, Northridge.

Sources

Indexes

Public Affairs Information Service (P.A.I.S.) is a subject listing of current books, pamphlets, periodical articles and government documents offered in five cumulations and annual volumes. Subject areas covered are, primarily, political science, economics, law and public affairs. The index often addresses specific aspects of broader topics and is very strong for literature in the areas of politics and diploma cy. For this researcher, P.A.I.S. always has proved a very productive index.

The dates searched for this study were January 1971 through July

1982.

Literature pertinent to this study was found under these subject 18 headings: Iran, Mass media; Foreign news; Iran: hostages; Time; News week; Periodicals; and Television news.

Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature is a semi-monthly, monthly and annual index of articles in,United States periodicals. Ar ticles listed are of a general or popular nature and are indexed by author, subject or title. Categories covered usually are of a broad nature, which often is a limitation. Despite that drawback, the index is, perhaps, the best starting place for a literature search and always has proved productive for this researcher.

The dates searched for this study were January 1971 through June

1982.

Literature pertinent to this study was found under these subject headings: Iran; Iranian seizure of United States embassy;" Reporters and reporting; Time; Newsweek; and Periodicals.

Humanities Index is a quarterly and cumulative listing of arti cles addressing social and cultural activities. Articles are listed by author and subject. Personal experience has found this index,r:arely, offers literature in the areas of politics and diplomacy not already found in P.A.I.S. or Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature.

The dates searched for this study were January 1974 through June

1982.

Topic areas searched for this index were: Reporters and report ing; News, Foreign news; Iran; Time; Newsweek; Periodicals; and Broad cast journalism.

Social Sciences Index is an index once coupled with the Humani ties Index as one reference source. It is predictably similar to the former in content, only rarely offering listings in the areas of 19 politics and diplomacy. It was not a productive index for this study.

The dates searched for this study were January 1974 through March

1982.

Topic areas searched for this index were: Reporters and reporting; News; Foreign news; Iran; Periodicals; Time; Newsweek; Broadcast journalism; and Television news programs.

Business Periodicals Index is a monthly subject index to

English-language periodicals printed in the United States and abroad.

Articles cited usually address accounting, advertising, banking and finance, insurance, labor and management, public administration, or general business affairs. The index is valuable for its regular references to Editor and Publisher and Broadcasting and has proved a valuable reference source for this researcher.

The dates searched for this study were January 1971 through June

1982.

Literature pertinent to this study was found under these subject headings: Iran; Reporters and reporting; News; Periodicals; Time; News- week; Foreign news; and Television. ,' ' rLL~"'~~ ... The Los Angeles Times Index, the Washington Post Index, the

Index to the Christian Science Monitor, and The New York Times Index for the Published News all are indexes which list news reports, feature articles and editorials by subject. Indexes are offered on a monthly basis and provide date, page and column references. The New York Times index includes a brief abstract for each cited editorial item. Arti- cles in each index usually are arranged under major subject headings or names of countries. For this study, the Washington Post and New York

Times proved particularly useful for editorials and column pieces 20

analyzing press performance and for news accounts of actual media activities. Television/radio columns by Howard Rosenberg in the Los

Angeles Times proved valuable, however, somewhat surprisingly, the

Christian Science Monitor was of little help.

The dates searched for this study were January 1979 through May

1982 with the Los Angeles Times, New York Times and Christian Science

Monitor and January 1979 through April 1981 with the Washington Post.

Literature pertinent to this study was found under these subject headings: News media; News media: United States; Periodicals; Time;

Newsweek; and Television news.

Abstracts

Communication Abstracts is a quarterly listing of scholarly works produced on mass communication topics. The indexing is by subject and author with a brief abstract offered with each citation. The scope of areas covered is both broad and topical and it has proven a strong source of literature in the areas of politics, diplomacy and research methodologies. Government documents are cited.

The dates searched for this study were January 1978 through

June 1982.

Literature pertinent to this study was found under these subject headings: Iran; Foreign news; Television news; Magazines, Agenda setting; and Content analysis.

Journalism Abstracts is an annual listing of mass communication related master's theses and doctoral dissertations. The scope of topics offered is broad with research listed under major headings. One limita tion to this index is that while most theses and dissertations are logi cally arranged, many relevant sources often are found under any of 21

several headings. The years searched for this study were 1970 through 1980.

Topic areas searched for this study were: Criticism and defense of the press (media); History and biography; Magazines; Foreign press and international communication; and Miscellaneous.

Dissertation Abstracts International is a monthly compilation of dissertation abstracts provided by more than 300 U.S. institutions and some in foreign countries. Abstracts are arranged by academic disci pline in two sections: humanities and sciences.

The dates searched for this study were January 1975 through June

1981 under the topic areas Mass Communications and Journalism.

Educational Documents Abstracts (ERIC) is a compilation of ab stracts on a broad range of topics indexed under subject headings. The index is a strong source for government documents, conference papers and other unpublished scholarly works and has proved a good source of liter ature in the areas of politics and diplomacy.

The years searched for this study were 1979 and 1980.

Topic areas searched for this index were: News reporting; News media; Journalism; Terrorism; Iran; and Media research. * * * The search of indexes and abstracts was concluded when it became apparent these sources were repeating citations discovered earlier in the search. This occurred following the searches of Reader's Guide to

Periodical Literature and P.A.I.S., although several valuable books and articles later were discovered in Business Periodicals Index, Communi cation Abstracts and the newspaper indexes. Only those indexes and ab stracts which by their subject matter promised no relevant listings were 22

categorically avoided for this literature search.

The list of general topic areas searched is the result of a

large, pre-search grouping of possible topic areas which repeatedly was

modified as literature was discovered under either new key terms or

variations of the original key terms. Key terms discovered as the

search proceeded were later used on the indexes and abstracts previously

examined. The critical time period searched for this literature review

was 1979 through the most current publication of the various indexes and

abstracts--usually June 1982. This period was selected in an attempt to

secure the most contemporary literature sources on the hostage crisis,

the two newsmagazines, agenda-setting and content analysis, and because

a search prior to 1979 promised little if any pertinent literature on

Iran or the hostage crisis. However, extended time frames were searched with P.A.I.S., Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, Humanities Index,

Social Sciences Index, Business Periodicals Index, Communication Ab

stracts, Journalism Abstracts and Dissertation Abstracts International

in a quest for further literature on Time, Newsweek, content analysis

and agenda-setting. Strong sources on Time and, particularly, Newsweek

simply were not discovered during the contemporary-period search, while

sources on content analysis and agenda-setting were felt to be applic

able beyond the contemporary period.

This literature search proceeded with relative ease. Sources

sought usually were in their proper locations and citation details

generally matched up. Besides the usual problem of insufficient

sources in one or more areas, the major obstacle in this search was the

large number of irrelevant or non-productive sources. A disproportion

ately large amount of time seemingly was spent on locating literature which proved fruitless.

A second problem was the inability of Oviatt inter-library loan

to secure several seemingly valuable sources. The block apparently was

not with the Oviatt office but rather with the host universities, which,

for a variety of reasons, refused to cooperate.

Literature

Iranian hostage crisis

Pierre Salinger offers in his 1981 book one of the best--if not

the best--published accounts of the hostage negotiations, from start to

finish. 1 The international correspondent and former presidential press

secretary makes only occasional references to media coverage, and the

book is not strong in that area. However, Salinger's book is a strong

background source for the hostage crisis in general and for the complex negotiations in particular. An ABC television special was based on his knowledge of the diplomacy. The book is a valuable source.

The actual negotiations, by contrast, are only a small part of

Doyle McManus' 1981 paperback chronicling the crisis from embassy take

over to hostage release.2 McManus, a two-time Pulitzer Prize nominee,

reportedly completed his book within months of the release, but it does appear, nonetheless, to be well-researched. McManus was Middle East correspondent for the Los Angeles Times and was in Iran for the entire crisis. He offers documents and a text of the release agreement, and his recounting of the aborted rescue mission is particularly strong.

His book is particularly valuable as an overview source for the hostage crisis.

Sid Moody's 1981 book takes a strict chronological approach to

telling the hostage story. 3 Moody, supervising editor of AP News- 24

features, emphasizes AP photography in his well-structured account of the crisis from embassy takeover to release. However, his capsule analyses of major events during the crisis are clear, concise, and ex tremely valuable for their organizational qualities. This is a strong source.

The failed rescue mission as viewed through the eyes of former

National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski is the subject of News week's April 18, 1982 cover story.4 Brzezinski, a key participant in the mission planning, recounts months of meticulous preparation and spirited debate that led to the rescue attempt. Among his disclosures are that the military had been instructed to stage a collision with a

Russian ship, if necessary, to prevent detection of the mission and that Carter, at one point, planned to seize some of the Iranian captors as counterhostages. This is a good source, offering considerable back ground into the mission.

Also addressing the fatal rescue attempt is Newsweek correspon dent David C. Martin's lengthy, detailed account of what went on behind the scenes in the planning and execution of the mission. 5 Martin, who reports that American undercover operatives slipped into Iran to gather vital information months before the attempt, offers several disclosures, including: that the rescue team was ready to leave for Tehran without a clear picture of where the hostages were, that despite Jimmy Carter's desire to keep casualties to a minimum, the commandos expected an

Iranian death toll in the hundreds, and that the most crucial step of the rescue mission--a helicopter landing inside Tehran--was never ade quately rehearsed. This is a comprehensive, highly detailed, valuable background source. 25

A less direct source under this topic is a 1981 Publishers

Weekly article detailing three books published on the hostage crisis.6

Besides providing valuable synopses on the books, the article makes one interesting point: the expected rush of "instant" books on the hostage crisis never materialized because publishers apparently felt the public already had been saturated with hostage news by the media.

General media coverage of Iran and the hostage crisis

Perhaps the best post-mortem account in a periodical of hostage crisis press performance is a three-part 1981 analysis by the Washington

Journalism Review, two parts of which will be addressed in the following section on television coverage.

Washington Post reporter Don Oberdorfer, in his report, suggests the hostage crisis coverage took on a life of its own, swallowing the media as it grew. 7 He indicts the American press on two counts: 1) journalists were ill informed on Iran and its history, and 2) the coverage was far too parochial. Oberdorfer is a strong writer and his ideas are presented lucidly. His article provides a valuable measuring in- strument in evaluating the coverage of Time and Newsweek.

If there is a definitive source on American media coverage of

Iran, the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis, it is, perhaps,

Edward W. Said's 1981 book on covering Islam.8 Said, Parr Professor of

English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, fervently attacks the press performance in Iran as superficial, stereotypical, frequently inaccurate and unnecessarily inflammatory. Incorporating several media forms into his analysis, Said arrives at one major con- elusion: press efforts in Iran have been poorly conceived and poorly 26

executed. His book is of utmost value to this study, providing the

most intensive examination of hostage crisis coverage by any source dis

covered during this literature search.

In contrast to Said, and in defense of the American media, is

J.C. Hurewitz's May-June 1980 Columbia Journalism Review article.9

Hurewitz, chosen specifically by CJR for a response piece, attempts

to counter Said's accusations by explaining why the U.S. media performed

the way they did in Iran. Hurewitz seemingly comes up short in his

counter-argument, but his suggestions are interesting, particularly in

juxtaposition to Said's work. This is a valuable source for its

alternative-view basis.

Although not specifically designed as a response piece to Said,

John K. Cooley's Autumn 1981 article in The Middle East Journal seeming

ly produces that effect.10 The difference here is that unlike Hurewitz,

Cooley offers no apologies or defenses for America's press, only expla nations. A former Middle East and Pentagon correspondent for the

Christian Science Monitor, Cooley has provided a practical, valuable

analysis of the coverage.

Strikingly similar to Cooley's article is another Autumn 1981

piece in The Middle East Journal, this one by Edward Mortimer.11 Mor

timer again offers answers or explanations to Said's criticisms and makes one major contention: western reporters in general, and American

reporters in particular, tend to treat the Middle East as a unique,

exotic area made up of "irrational savages." This is a strong source,

particularly for its concern with stereotypical reporting by American media.

A more historical, background-oriented source on reporting Iran 27

is William A. Dorman's and Ehsan Omeed's January-February 1979 article 12 in Columbia Journalism Review. Dorman and Omeed suggest inadequate reporting from Iran was a fact well before the hostage crisis. It is a strong source in analyzing the problems U.S. news agencies have faced for years in attempting to cover Iran.

Another retrospective look at coverage of Iran is provided, interestingly, in a January 1979 Time article. 13 Citing, both positive ly and negatively, the preceding Columbia Journalism Review article, the Time piece suggests American media were too superficial and too cautious in covering Iran during the period leading to the revolution.

The suggestion is that American reporters have been playing catch-up in

Iran while practicing "parachute" journalism--arriving like firefighters after a fire is visibly raging. An interesting contention of the arti cle is that by reporting cautiously and avoiding sensational coverage during the pre-revolution period, the American media were in good posi tion to "report whatever happens next." Although a bit outdated, the article is fairly strong as a background source on the coverage of Iran.

Washington Post ombudsman/columnist Bill Green questions the hostage crisis press performance in three areas: 1) Did the media in flame the crisis with their constant probing? 2) Are the American media held captive by their own technology, and did the revolutionaries play to this technology? 3) Did the American media abuse their freedom by playing to the then-fervent nationalism of the American people? Green 14 offers strong food for thought in his January 1981 column. Unfor tunately, he leaves the questions unanswered. Green's thinking is stimulating, but he does not follow through on it. This is a moderately strong source. 28

A fairly strong indictment of the American media is provided by 15 Digby Whitman in a February 1981 New York Times editorial. Whitman suggests there were just three legitimate news items which emerged from

Iran during the hostage crisis: the embassy seizure, the aborted rescue mission and the hostage release. The rest, he contends, was basic media hype. He suggests the hostages simply were better than "'Ironsides' or

'Captain Kangaroo'" for attracting consumer-seeking advertisers. This is a good source for its practical examination of the coverage.

One of the few positive responses to the American media's efforts in Iran is offered in an un-bylined, January 1980 Washington Post edi- tor1a. 1 • 16 The editorial's main contention is that the media did a good, and valuable, job of filtering potentially dangerous rumors throughout the hostage crisis. The editorial is valuable as an alternative view to the overwhelming majority of articles examining hostage crisis coverage.

An October 1980 New York Times news report, by contrast, details the pleadings of one Iranian official who asked American reporters to 17 ca1 m t h erose 1 ves w1t. h regar d to coverage o f t h e cr1s1s . . . The official, at one point, labels the media "inaccurate . crazy and they don't know what they are talking about." The source is valuable because it presents, somewhat superficially, an official view of the coverage from the Iranian side. It also addresses all coverage, not just television.

A specific and important trend during the hostage crisis is the 18 topic of a June 1980 editorial in The New Yorker magazine. The editorial suggests that a sudden drop in media attention toward the hostage crisis in spring 1980 was the result of the media's traditional following of presidents 1 lead_s, but also may have been the result of the 29

media's recognition of their disproportionate coverage and the possible influence it had in bringing about political pressure. This pressure, the editorial contends, may have brought about the ill-fated rescue mission. With a primary aim of this study being an examination of coverage changes during the hostage crisis, this article becomes very valuable. It is a strong source.

The issue of a sudden drop in media attention in spring 1980 19 also is the topic of a June 1980 New York Times report. The report offers several possible reasons for the perceived reduction in coverage, including--and probably most importantly--President Jimmy Carter's desire to de-emphasize the crisis. Again, this is a good source for the examination of reporting trends.

Another New York Times report, this one in May 1980, details how then-Presidential Press Secretary Jody Powell misrepresented facts 20 surrounding the then-planned rescue mission. The report illustrates the difficulty reporters had in covering the hostage crisis not only in

Iran, but also in the United States. It is a good source.

The first of two expulsions from Iran of reporters--a decision which seemingly would have some impact on the coverage--is addressed in 21 a January 1980 New York Times report. Interestingly, Time magazine is not included in a detailed list of publications whose correspondents were expelled. The report also outlines Iranian allegations of misre presentative reporting by U.S. correspondents. This article also is a strong source for the examination of coverage patterns.

The initial return of reporters following that first expulsion 22 is detailed in a March 1980 report in the New York Times. The report does indicate a reporter from Time was en route to Iran. The source is 30

valuable only in a chronological sense, marking the end of the expulsion period.

Problems facing reporters in Iran during the hostage crisis are outlined in a somewhat-paradoxical article appearing in a December 1979 . 23 Newswee k 1ssue. The article reports an initial mood of cooperation between reporters and Iranian officials, but also details the correspondents' obstacles of language, a closed-government system and a general lack of access. This is another strong source for an examination of conditions which may have affected coverage.

Similar in content is a December 1979 Time article outlining 24 cond 1t1ons. . f ace d b y correspon d ents 1n . Iran d ur1ng . t h e h ostage cr1s1s.. .

An issue touched upon in the preceding Newsweek article but strongly emphasized in the Time report was the request by Iranian officials that correspondents participate in "newspaper diplomacy." The source is a strong one, illustrating the important role played by the media during the hostage crisis.

A major issue during the hostage crisis was the relationships which evolved between reporters and hostage families. An account of how the families dealt with and felt about the media coverage is offered 25 1n. a Marc h - Apr1 ·1 1981 Co 1 urn b.1a ·Journa 1· 1sm Rev1ew . ar t•1c 1 e. The report outlines the closeness between some reporters and hostage family members, while also acknowledging the claim that those relationships often were used by the media to secure stories. It is a good source on an important aspect of the media's performance during the hostage crisis.

A January 1981 New York Times report reiterates the issue of reporter-hostage family relationships but uses it to illustrate the em 26 phasis American media placed on the hostage crisis story. One of many 31 examples in the report details how some reporters actually did grocery shopping for hostage families. Again, this article addresses a coverage pattern of the U.S. media pertinent to this study and is valuable for that reason.

Media emphasis on the hostage crisis story is the topic of 27 another January 1981 New York Times report. The article centers on the media crush during the height of the hostage release and the readi- ness at all times of American media to redirect the focus of their coverage toward the hostages. It is a good source.

An interesting aspect of the reporter-hostage crisis story issue is detailed in a January 1981 Los Angeles Times report which captured the affection demonstrated by reporters toward the released hostages 28 at their first official press conference. The report is not particularly valuable outside of illustrating the extent to which many reporters became involved with the hostage crisis story.

A major issue in Time's coverage of the hostage crisis was the naming of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as its Man of the Year for

1980. The Washington Post, in a January 1980 article, offers several 29 1ns1g. . h ts 1nto . h ow t h e se1 ect1on . was rna d e. This is a marginally valuable source.

Television coverage of Iran and the hostage crisis

A second part of the Washington Journalism Review's multi-report analysis of hostage crisis coverage examines amounts of television coverage, typical images, misrepresentations and other flaws. The basic contention of David Altheide's May 1981 article is that network news 30 coverage of the crisis was oversimplified and underexplained. Al- 32

though concentrating on television, Altheide's report probably can be applied to the performance of all U.S. media and is extremely valuable for that reason.

The third part of that May 1981 Washington Journalism Review series looks at the role television played in shaping diplomatic-level decisions regarding the crisis. In his report, Frederick B. Hill addresses the intense attention American media directed toward the crisis and the sudden shift in coverage habits evident in spring 1980.

His main concern, however, is with the way television coverage seem 31 ingly affected decisions made by the Carter Administration. This is a valuable source for its discussion of media emphasis and changes in media coverage patterns.

Although examining television coverage of the entire Middle

East, William C. Adams does reserve one chapter of his 1981 book for 32 ana 1 ys1s• o f te1 ev1s1on• • I s per f ormance d ur1ng• t h e h ostage cr1s1s.• • A qualitative/quantitative analysis, the study addresses major trends in the coverage and discusses the issue of Iran and the news agenda.

The author notes that analysis of newsmagazines was incorporated into his broad explanations of media performance. This is an extremely strong source for its overview approach to the coverage, for its incor- poration of newsmagazines into analysis and for its concern with agenda-setting aspects of the hostage crisis coverage.

A general review of television's efforts in Iran is provided by well-respected press critic Ben H. Bagdikian in his February 1980 Quill art1c. 1 e. 33 Bagdikian examines several criticisms of the American media in general, and television in particular, emphasizing one early charge by United States officials that the ratings-conscious networks were 33

unpatriotic, harmful to the hostages and more concerned with competition than national welfare. This is a good background source on television coverage of the hostage crisis.

An imbalance in reporting is the topic of a December 1979 Time magazine article examining television's performance during the first 34 mont h o f t h e h ostage cr1s1s.. . Th e artie 1 e suggests te1 ev1s1on . . d i d a commendable job of depicting a ranting, cross-legged Khomeini and fist- waving street crowds, but only rarely offered legitimate counterargu- ments from U.S. officials. This perceived self-restraint, the article contends, resulted in one-sided reporting. The report offers one of the earliest examinations of press efforts in Iran, but beyond that is only marginally valuable.

An interesting illustration of television's performance during the hostage crisis is offered by NBC reporter George Lewis in a Janu- 35 ary 1980 Los Angeles Times column by Howard Rosenberg. Lewis provides a behind-the-scenes analysis of conditions which faced American correspondents. The heart of the report, however, is Lewis' observation that television may have misrepresented events in Iran, that while frenzied street crowds were repeatedly depicted, life as normal went on just blocks from the seized embassy. An area of emphasis for this study is the way in which Time and Newsweek may have misrepresented events during the hostage crisis, and this Rosenberg column becomes valuable for that reason.

Rosenberg, in a November 1979 Los Angeles Times column, addresses the issue of American television both misrepresenting events an d b e1ng. man1pu . 1 ate d . 36 He cites three NBC correspondents who claimed they felt demonstrators outside the embassy shouted louder 34

and shook their fists harder when television was present. Rosenberg also discusses the issue of television diplomacy, suggesting television may then have been playing as large a role in international events as it did during the Begin-Sadat summit talks. This is a strong source.

The issue of U.S. media being used by the militant students during the hostage crisis also is the topic addressed by Henry Fairlie, who, in his February 1981 The New Republic article, suggests that tele 37 vision played right into the hands of the students. Fairlie argues the only thing more embarrassing for the United States than the crisis itself was the way the media over-covered it. He contends the media over-reacted to the hostage crisis story to their own advantage. This is a strong source for its concern with media emphasis during the hostage crisis.

A sharp denunciation by State Department spokesman Thomas Reston of the performances by media in general and television in particular during the hostage crisis is the basis for an April 1980 Broadcasting art1c. 1 e. 38 A former journalist and lawyer, Reston argues that reporters are doing an inadequate job of explaining the hostage crisis and should go beyond "triumph or disaster" coverage. The article is valuable for two reasons: it offers an analysis of coverage by a well- respected former reporter, and it offers an analysis of coverage by an administration spokesman during a period when the administration allegedly was attempting to muzzle the U.S. media on the hostage crisis issue.

The accusation that network television, by its hostage crisis coverage, had forced Khomeini into a hard-line position on the hostage 39 issue is the focus of a December 1979 Broadcasting article. The 35

report details responses to State Department spokesman Hodding Carter's

allegations by the three network presidents, each of whom emphasized

his intent to continue covering the hostage crisis as thoroughly as

possible. The article illustrates the important role played by media

in general and television in particular during the hostage crisis but

is only marginally valuable beyond that.

An emphatic example of the Carter Administration's apparently

successful attempt to curb U.S. media emphasis of the hostage crisis 40 is offered in an April 1980 Broadcastin& article. The report details a Carter news conference in which the president urged American journa-

lists to "minimize as severely as possible their presence and their activities in Iran." Reaction from network officials in the article

indicated they would continue to cover the hostage crisis story as best

they can. The source is valuable for an analysis of coverage patterns during the hostage crisis.

The extent of coverage by television during the hostage crisis is examined in a November 1979 Broadcasting article, which detailed the number of personnel and amount of equipment sent to Iran during the 41 early weeks of the crisis. This is a marginally valuable source.

The impact of the initial expulsion of American correspondents on television's coverage is illustrated in a January 1980 Broadcasting art1c. 1 e. 42 This source is valuable only in that it details the ways

in which the networks frantically negotiated to obtain film from other broadcasters, again illustrating the emphasis placed by U.S. media on

the hostage crisis story.

A major source of debate regarding television's performance during the hostage crisis was NBC's airing of an 18-minute interview 36

with U.S. Marine Cpl. William Gallegos, one of the hostages. 43 Virtually identical December 1979 articles in Newsweek and 44 Time detail the conditions and specifics of the interview along with

the strongly critical responses from several sides. One difference be-

tween the magazines' accounts is Time's use of quoted material from NBC

News President William Small, defending his network's decision to air

the interview. The two articles are strong background sources.

Rosenberg, in a December 1979 Los Angeles Times column, ex-

amines one of the more demonstrative acts of critical response to the

controversial NBC interview: the resignation of NBC Pentagon corres- 45 pondent Fred Rowan. Among other reactions, Rowan is quoted as saying

NBC practiced irresponsible journalism and was guilty of being manipu-

lated. This is a marginally valuable source.

Among the stronger condemnations of NBC for its Gallegos interview is a December 1979 advertisement purchased by TV Guide and pub 46 lished in several U.S. newspapers, including the Los Angeles Times.

It is a basic plea to all three networks not to sacrifice traditional

journalistic ethics for the sake of improved ratings. Several examples

of allegedly questionable attempts at coverage are cited, besides the

Gallegos incident. The saurce is valuable, again, for its illustra-

tion of media emphasis and an acknowledgement of profit motives as

part of that emphasis.

Also centering on the Gallegos interview is a March 1980 Media

People article by Robert Friedman, who analyzes several aspects of tele- v1s1on• • I s e ff orts 1n. I ran. 47 Friedman points to several areas in which

American television failed in Iran, recounts the NBC-Gallegos affair, but then ends his piece by defending NBC for its decision. This source 37

is valuable because it is a rare example of positive reaction to the

NBC interview.

A clear defense of NBC for its Gallegos interview is offered in 48 an un-b y 11ne. d , Decem b er 1979.Los An ge 1 es T.1mes e d.1tor1a · 1 . The editorial's main contention is that NBC acted in a journalistically sound manner in airing the interview, and that coverage such as NBC's served only to increase public understanding of the hostage crisis. Again, this source is valuable for its minority view toward the NBC interview. 49 Two 1981 Broadcasting articles--one in January and one in 50 February --detail the extent to which the networks went t~ cover the release of the hostages. The January article outlines how television covered both the release and the presidential inauguration on the same day, while the February article focuses on the efforts that went into television's coverage of the release. Again, these articles are important as indicators of the emphasis placed by the U.S. media on the hostage crisis story.

A strictly practical examination of television in Iran during the hostage crisis is offered in a short November 1979 TV Guide art1c. 1 e. 51 The article discusses what the networks were able to broadcast and how they were able to broadcast it during the first two weeks of the hostage crisis. This is a marginally valuable source.

General media coverage of terrorism

In his spring 1981 study in The Journal of Criminal Law and

Criminology, M. Cherif Bassiouni offers an exhaustive report on the 52 roles played by the media in the terrorist act. Bassiouni does make specific reference to the Iranian hostage crisis and suggests three 38

media-created effects: intimidation, immunization and contagion. The author contends that media often become hostages themselves through their coverage. This source is valuable for its concern with the issue of media being used and for its direct addressing of the hostage crisis.

While not advocating misrepresentation or designed bias, Paul

Wilkinson does suggest in his July 1981 Contemporary Review article that media have an obligation to democratic society not to assist . 53 terror i sts t h roug h t h e1r coverage. Wilkinson emphasizes that the terrorists' goal is maximum favorable publicity. He recommends that media report terrorists for what they are and not glamourize them.

This source is valuable primarily for its concern with the issue of media being manipulated.

The terrorist as media user is the primary topic of Philip 54 Schlesinger's spring 1981 report in Social Research. His is a sound, general background source on the relationship between terrorists and media. Schlesinger refers to terrorists as "the superentertainers" of our time.

Abraham H. Miller, in his 1980 book, discusses the pressure of reporting when lives are on the line and the ways in which that pres- 55 sure can shape coverage. Miller also addresses the problem of media portraying acts of terrorism and how those portrayals can be distorted when reporters become caught up in the drama of an event. A major emphasis of this study is the degree to which Time and Newsweek reporters seemingly became involved with the hostage crisis story and how that involvement may have affected the periodicals' coverage. For that reason, Miller's book becomes an important source.

Media self-regulation--an issue tied to the media's alleged de- 39

emphasis of hostage crisis coverage in spring 1980--is a primary

recommendation of Tim Moore and David E. Clavier in a conference paper 56 presented in November 1980. The authors make occasional reference

to the hostage crisis and emphasize the contagion effect with regard to

media coverage of terrorist acts. The paper is valuable because of

this study's concern with changing coverage patterns and the de-emphasis

of coverage in spring 1980 which has been linked by some to media self-

regulation.

Marcus D. Pohlmann's and Thomas P. Loley's summer 1981 article

in the National Forum is primarily reiterative but worth including for

one interesting observation: as of May 1977, none of the major media 57 had developed a policy for dealing with coverage of terrorism.

Beyond that observation, the source is marginally valuable.

The media's negative role as a vehicle for terrorists' demands

and ideologies is, again, the main topic of a 1979 book by Yonah 58 Alexander, David Carlton and Paul Wilkinson. The authors do casually

address the issue of media influence on the public and the notion that media do sometimes appear to sympathize with terrorists through their

coverage. This is a marginally valuable source.

A 1981 book by Richard Clutterbuck, which is promising by its

title but disappointing by its contents, concentrates on the role of

te 1 ev1s1on. . 1n . t h e t error1st . act. 59 Based on case studies, the book is basically a "how to" manual for military and para-military officials

in dealing with the media during a terrorist crisis. This is not a

good source.

Time magazine and Newsweek magazine

In his 1979 book, David Halberstam examines four media--CBS, 40 the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times and Time Inc.--with a focus 60 on how they grew to be so powerful. His analysis of Time magazine is strong with respect to individuals, anecdotal incidents and broad philosophical changes. He does not analyze in depth the magazine's editorial tendencies, but does address the fundamental grievances which have been voiced against Time. This is a good source.

A comprehensive account of magazine journalism in the United

States through the late 1960s is offered by James Playsted Wood in his 61 1971 book. He devotes sections to the origins and editorial policies of Time and Newsweek. The issue of the magazines' admitted subjectivity in reporting is addressed directly. Although somewhat outdated, this is a good background source.

A comprehensive account of Time founder Henry Luce, with speci- fie reference to the magazine, is offered by W.A. Swanberg in a 1972 62 book. Time's "slanted" coverage, as late as the Vietnam War, is discussed, and the source is valuable for that reason.

Various ethical aspects of media performance--with specific reference to Time and a focus on manipulation of the message--are the 63 basis of John L. Hulteng's 1976 book. He addresses directly the issue of Time's acknowledged "deck-stacking" against those the magazine opposes. An examination of possible subjective reporting by Time and

Newsweek is a major part of this study, and Hulteng's book becomes valuable for that reason.

Perhaps the best background source on Time is Robert T. Elson's 64 two-volume historical account of Luce and his publishing empire. The source may be somewhat outdated for this study but does offer a strong history of Time editorial policy from 1923 through 1960. 41

Another outdated source, albeit a good one, is John Kobler's 65 1968 book on Luce and his publications. The opening sentences of

chapters adequately summarize the content, compensating for the book's

lack of a table of contents and index. Kobler discusses Time's editor-

ial policies, calling the magazine "a monument to subjective journalism."

A 1964 article in Fact magazine illustrates the basic criticisms aimed at Time through the mid-1960s by detailing indictments from 66 famous Americans allegedly wronged by the publication. An informa tive, although probably outdated, analysis of Time editorial policies is included. The basic contention of this marginally valuable article is that the magazine offered fiction as fact.

A collection of speeches by Luce are offered by John K. Jessup 67 in his 1969 book. The speeches give some basic background into the philosophies that shaped the magazine's editorial policies at least through the late-1960s. This is a marginally valuable source.

David Cort, a former Time reporter, presents a strong indictment 68 of Luce and Time in his 1974 book. Cort's claim--valid he says at least through the early 1970s--is that Time deteriorated journalis tically, sacrificing its credibility in a quest for revenue. This is only slightly valuable.

A seemingly promising but ultimately disappointing source on 69 Time and Newsweek is a 1979 book by Herbert J. Gans. Advertising an analysis of news gathering and reporting habits of Time and News week, he offers only broad generalizations applicable to all branches of media. He does provide some insight into the editorial thinking of Time and Newsweek, but beyond that the source is not a good one. 42

Offering some background on the philosophical foundations of 70 Time and Newsweek is a June 1973 Esquire article by Merle Miller.

Miller examines in biographical fashion the careers of Time editor

Henry Anatole Grunwald and former Newsweek editor Osborn Elliott. For the most part, the article is superficial and only slightly valuable for that reason.

Osborn Elliott also is the subject of David Sanford's August

1980 Harper ' s Magaz1ne . art1c . 1 e. 7l Sanford's piece is only marginally valuable beyond providing some biographical and anecdotal material on the man most consider responsible for Newsweek as it is known today.

Elliott's 20-year, Newsweek career--11 years of which were spent as editor--is chronicled by Osborn in his autobiography. The book primarily is anecdotal in structure but does provide some valuable 72 1ns1g. . h t 1nto . t h e 1nner . wor k"1ngs o f t h e magaz1ne. . It is a good background source.

An apparent move toward the right by Newsweek is noted in a 1977 73 National Review article. The article is valuable for the simple observation, but is weak because of its absence of examples illustrating this alleged swing toward conservatism.

Iran

Iran's war with Iraq and the internal struggle between Khomeini arid Bani-Sadr are the topics of an article in the July-August 1981 issue 74 of MERIP Reports. It is a good source on Iran's internal politics through summer 1981.

Another article in the July-August 1981 issue of MERIP Reports 75 concentrates on Iran's economy. Valid through summer 1981, the report focuses on the inflation factor, oil revenues, a corruption 43

factor, deficit financing and the effects of the economic crisis on various Iranian classes. It is a strong source for evaluating Iran's economy.

An easy-to-understand update of political conditions in Iran since the demise of the shah is offered in Leila Saeed's June 1981 arti 76 cle in Index On Censorship. The strength of her article is its sim- plicity; its weakness is that its analysis seemingly stops in late 1980.

It is a good background source through that time period.

Michael M.J. Fischer presents a very intense but comprehensive 77 history and analysis of the Iranian Revolution in his 1980 book.

Offering good background on the ingredients of the revolution, it also is complex and difficult to understand. The hostage crisis is briefly discussed.

Three 1982 articles offer brief but valuable examinations of life in Iran since the end of the hostage crisis. A January article in

Senior Scholastic suggests that the end of the hostage crisis was just 78 t h e b eg1nn1ng. . o f a muc h more ser1ous. cr1s1s . · f or I ran. The article focuses on the war with Iraq and continued domestic political strife, offering illustrative events in chronological form. It is a good background source.

Newsweek's Elaine Sciolino, the first American journalist allowed back into Iran following the hostage release, according to the magazine, reported in a March article that the country still is en 79 gulfed by hostility and suspicion. Sciolino examines the problems of food shortages, reduced oil exports and political squabbling between the ruling mullahs, but reports that the war with Iraq has kept Islamic fervor high and Khomeini popular. It is a good update on the country. 44

An April article in U.S. News and World Report also examines domestic conditions in Iran with a focus on the war with Iraq, food s h ortages and esca 1 at1ng. 1n . fl at1on.. 80 The report does indicate, however, that support for Khomeini is still running at approximately 80 percent. This is a good background source.

A documented history of United States-Iran relations is the 81 basis for a 1980 book by Alexander Yonah and Allan Nanes. The approach of their book is a short introduction to an era followed by supporting documents (usually governmental). The authors provide sound insight into the U.S. views of the shah's fall, the revolution and the hostage crisis. It is a good background source.

Content analysis

In one of the classic examinations of qualitative content analysis, Siegfried Kracauer breaks the method down into understandable 82 terms and defends it against critics in a winter 1952-1953 Public

Opinion Quarterly article. Kracauer details the advantages of qualitative analysis and then discusses technique. It is a strong source on the subject.

A very strong "how to" source on content analysis is Thomas F. 83 Carney's 1972 book. The author's explanations are simple and qualitative research is addressed directly. A nice feature is Carney's detailing of both positive and negative qualities to the two methods.

Qualitative content analysis is the subject of one chapter in 84 Bernard Berelson's 1971 book on content analysis. His is a sound, fundamental approach to the method with a convenient focus on communication research. An exhaustive bibliography of pre-1970 sources is a valuable feature. 45

Ole R. Holsti makes a point of not differentiating between 85 quantitative and qualitative content analysis in his 1969 book.

Holsti strongly defends the use of qualitative methods for certain studies. It is a good background source.

Based on papers presented at the first Scandinavian Conference on Content Analysis, Karl Erik Rosengren's 1981 book offers new think- 86 ing on the methodology. Two promising chapters focus on methodological developments in content analysis and reliability in content analysis. A strong source, the book offers empirical studies as models.

Agenda-setting

An analysis of the agenda-setting function as it relates to the

"all-powerful media" theory is provided by Eugene F. Shaw in his 1975

Gazette art1c. 1 e. 87 Shaw defends the claim that agenda-setting has made the media all-pervasive as well as all-persuasive. His explanations are clear and concise, making this a good source.

Jack M. McLeod, Lee B. Becker and James E. Byrner offer a basic explanation of agenda-setting, some history, some methodology and, 88 finally, a model study in their 1974 Communication Research article.

The authors warn against the uncritical acceptance of agenda-setting as a broad and unqualified media effect. The article is a simple but good background source.

A complex but interesting study and explanation of the media's agenda-setting function is offered by Lutz Erbring, Edie N. Goldenberg and Arthur H. Miller in their 1980 American Journal of Political Science art1c. 1 e. 89 The authors' key point is that rather than focusing on the traditional "mirror-image" media effects theory, more attention should be directed toward an audience-effects theory based on the idea that 46

media signals stimulate pre-existing sensations in audience members.

The source is a good one but too complex for this study.

Based on presidential voting studies from 1968 and 1972, Donald

L. Shaw and Maxwell E. McCombs examine the interplay between mass media 90 an d au d1ence. an d t h e resu1 ts o f t h at 1nterp . 1 ay. Each of the 10 chapters in this 1977 book examines an aspect of the agenda-setting theory, with the opening chapter a strong overview. This is a good source.

Shaw and McCombs also co-authored a 1972 Public Opinion Quarterly . 91 article in which t h ey ad d ress the issue o f po 1 itica1 agen d a-sett1ng.

It is a strong background source on the theory.

A spring 1981 Journalism Quarterly study by McCombs and Gerald C.

Stone concentrates on the period of time necessary for the media to 92 bring a topic to the public's attention. The basis of the study is not particularly pertinent to this thesis, but the study is important for two reasons: the authors used content analysis of Time and Newsweek as the basis for the study, and they justify using newsmagazine content to represent the media agenda.

A rather superficial examination of agenda-setting is offered by Bruce H. Westley in his spring 1976 Journal of Communication arti- 93 cle. Westley's interests lie in political agendas and voting, but his article is valuable for the agenda-setting model it provides.

Bernard C. Cohen's 1963 book on the press and foreign policy may be outdated, but it still is frequently cited in agenda-setting . 94 stud 1es. What makes his book valuable is his concern with the role of the press in disseminating news of international importance. A contention he makes, relevant to this study, is that while the press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, it 47 is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.

It is one of the first advancements of the agenda-setting theory.

Interview sources , The lone interview source for this study is Time National Editor

John T. Elson, who participated in several of the magazine's hostage 95 crisis stories. The most valuable observation offered by Elson is that "The editors of Time felt that the hostage crisis was interesting as a news event at its beginning but became repetitive and tiresome during the long months when negotiations for the prisoners' release were stalemated. That judgment determined_the volume of our coverage."

Conclusions on the Literature

Unfortunately, condemnations far outweigh superlatives when drawing conclusions on the state of literature searched for this study.

The hostage crisis itself has been satisfactorily analyzed by those who have chosen to do so--but few have chosen to do so to date.

Salinger's and McManus' books, however, provide a strong sense of events surrounding the crisis.

The performance of Time and Newsweek, or newsmagazines in general, during the hostage crisis has not specifically been addressed.

While the issue of reporter-hostage family relationships has been well examined, the actual reporting from Iran during the hostage crisis has not. There has been reaction to the coverage and opinion on the coverage, but very little probing analysis of the coverage. Exceptions to this are the Washington Journalism Review's well-designed, well- executed, three-part examination of press performance in Iran and

Edward W. Said's comprehensive report on media failures in Iran. 48

Reflecting what appears to be a strong surge in research toward the medium, television coverage of Iran and the hostage crisis has been widely examined. Again, the Washington Journalism Review's three- report analysis warrants praise, as do William C. Adams' book on television coverage of the Middle East and Ben H. Bagdikian's review of television's performance in Iran. If a flaw exists in the literature on television, it is that many sources analyze trends and characteristics of the coverage but none make an actual value judgment on the overall coverage.

There is an abundance of literature on the issue of the media's role in covering terrorists' acts. Unfortunately, most of those sources are merely replicative. The emphasis usually is directed toward the impact media have on terrorism and how that impact often affects military and para-military personnel in their efforts to effectively deal with those acts. Abraham H. Miller's book is the exception, as he examines the performance of reporters and how their reports can be distorted.

Literature on Time and Newsweek is particularly weak. The sources available are not strong and analyze the magazines no later than the early 1970s.

The problem of unavailability also exists for literature on

Iran. A large number of sources examine the country through the revolution. However, sources detailing Iran, its people and its conditions in the post-hostage crisis period are sparse. Those sources which are available are valid only through summer 1981. I (~~veral strong sources on content analysis were discovered. Un- fortunately, sources addressing the method of qualitative content 49

I analysis are sparse. ~ost sources concentrate on quantitative research with one token chapter devoted to qualitative analysi~··>} Siegfried -,~-·-,0

Kracauer's article on qualitative content analysis--almost 30 years old--seemingly is still the best source.

Literature on agenda-setting is abundant but generally too complex or parochial for this study. Eugent F. Shaw, in his Gazette article, ·is one of the few to offer a general, survey-type approach to the theory. Most sources lack for practicality.

It appears the paucity of strong sources on Iran and Time and

Newsweek will be a consistent problem throughout this thesis--a justification, at least in part, for attempting the study.

Based on readings and a search of the literature, it is apparent that Iran was inadequately covered by American media at least through the latter stages of the revolution. This study will determine how one branch of the American media performed in Iran following the revolution and during the hostage crisis. It will examine how that coverage may have changed and if it improved in any way.

Also ignored by researchers have been Time and Newsweek, two of the more widely read and influential U.S. periodicals. This study will make an intense examination of their reporting tendencies--tendencies that have not been addressed for nearly a decade. It will offer fresh information not only on the magazines themselves but also through a conr parison of the magazines, and it will produce this information by examining the magazines over a protracted period of time.

Most of the literature focusing on U.S. media performance during the hostage crisis has been marked by two qualities: a strong preoccupation with the efforts of television and a tendency to be non- 50 scholarly in format. This study not only will address a branch of the

U.S. media other than television, but it will do so in a systematic, scholarly manner that will result in clear conclusions on the coverage.

Extensive research not only on U.S. media performance in Iran, but throughout the Middle East, is sorely needed. The countries com prising the oil-rich Middle Eastern bloc continue to play an increasing ly important task of informing readers on these countries and shaping their views toward them.

A systematic analysis synthesizing new data with data already accumulated--as this study does--seems a step in the right direction toward a fuller understanding of media performance and impact in this area. 51

NOTES

1 Pierre Salinger, America Held Hostage: The Secret Negotiations (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1981). 2 Doyle McManus, Free At Last: The Complete Story of the Hostages' 444-Day Ordeal and the Secret Negotiations to Set Them Free (New York: Signet Books, 1981). 3 sid Moody, 444 Days: The American Hostage Story (New York: The Rutledge Press, 1981).

4"The Failed Mission: The Inside Account of the Attempt to Free the Hostages in Iran," New York Times Magazine, April 18, 1982, pp. 28-31, 61-72 and 78-79. 5 David C. Martin, "Inside the Rescue Mission," Newsweek, July 12, 1982, pp. 16-25. 6 "New Books Focus on Hostages," Publishers Weekly, February 13, 1981' p. 62.

7 Don Oberdorfer, "Iran and the Press in Retrospect: Now That It's Over ... The Press Needs to Reflect on Its Role," Washington Journalism Review, May 1981, pp. 37-38. 8 Edward ,v. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981). 9 J.C. Hurewitz, "Another View on Iran and the Press," Columbia Journalism Review, May-June 1980, pp. 19-21. 10 John K. Cooley, "The News From the Mideast: A Working Approach," The Middle East Journal 35 (Autumn 1981): 465-80. 11 Edward Mortimer, "Islam and the Western Journalist," The Middle East Journal 35 (Autumn 1981): 429-505.

12william A. Dorman and Ehsan Omeed, "Reporting Iran the Shah's Way," Columbia Journalism Review, January-February 1979, pp. 27-33.

13"Playing Catch-up in Iran," Time, January 29, 1979, p. 74. 14 "Iran and the Press: First Questions," The Washington Post, 8 January 1981, sec. A, p. 16. 52

15 "52, Yes, but How About the 52,000?" New York Times, 8 February 1981, sec. 4, p. 19. 16 "Journalists in Iran," The Washington Post, 11 January 1980, sec. A, p. 14. 17 "Iranian at U.N. Assails U.S. Media," New York Times, 28 October 1980, sec. A, p. 14. 18 "The Talk of the Town: Notes and Comment," The New Yorker, June 2, 1980, p. 29. 19 "Hostage Issue Recedes as the Administration Mutes Its Crisis Status," New York Times, 4 June 1980, sec. A, p. 1. 20 "How Jody Powell Misled Press on U.S. Aim in Iran," New York Times, 2 May 1980, sec. A, p. 10. 21 "Americans, Ordered Out, File Last Iran Dispatches," New York Times, 16 January 1980, sec. A, p. 1. 22 "u.s. Journalists Return to Iran, Resume Work," New York Times, 8 March 1980, sec. A, p. 5. 23 "Dateline Teheran," Newsweek, December 3, 1919, p. 87. 24 "Tehran's Reluctant Diplomats," Time, December 3, 1979, p. 64. 25 Robert Hershman, "Crash Course for the Hostage Families," Columbia Journalism Review, March-April 1981, pp. 25-28. 26 "News Organizations, Seeking an Edge on Story, Court Ties to Ex-Hostages," New York Times, 24 January 1981, sec. A, p. 7. 27 "Crowds of Reporters Vie For News and Facilities," New York Times, 20 January 1981, sec. A, p. 4. 28 "Press Applauds--A Case of Yellow-Ribbon Fever," Los Angeles Times, 28 January 1981, sec. l, p. 22. 29 "Making of the Man: How Khomeini Stood the Test of Time," The Washington Post, 1 January 1980, sec. B, p. 1. 30 David Altheide, "Iran and the Press in Retrospect: Network News Oversimplified and Underexplained, 11 Washington Journalism Review, May 1981, pp. 28-29. 31 Frederic B. Hill, "Iran and the Press in Retrospect: Media Diplomacy--Crisis Management with an Eye on the TV Screen," Washington Journalism Review, May 1981, pp. 23-27.

32william C. Adams, Television Coverage of the Middle East (Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corp., 1981). 53

33 Ben H. Bagdikian, "Patriotic Television?--A Review of the American Press in Iran," The Quill, February 1980, pp. 19-28. 34 "The 'Self-Restraint' Brownout," Time, December 17, 1979, p. 106. 35 "Iran: The Ayatollah Television," Los Angeles Times, 23 Janu- ary 1980, sec. 4, pp. 1-2. 36 "TV Diplomacy Shapes Events," Los Angeles Times, 30 November 1979, sec. 4, p. 42. 37 "Hostages of Television: How the media connived at America's humiliation," The New Republic, February 7, 1981, pp. 9 and 11. 38 "Iran coverage as seen from Foggy Bottom," Broadcasting, April 14, 1980, p. 88. 39 "Ad m1n1strat1on,. . . me d.1a get testy over I ran coverage, II Broa d - casting, December, December 10, 1979, p. 29. 40 "U.S. news teams now getting pressure from home on Iran," Broadcasting, April 21, 1980, p. 28. 41 "Networks get close to story in Iran," Broadcasting, November 19, 1979, pp. 32-33. 42 "Electronic curtain," Broadcasting, January 21, 1980, pp. 27-28. 43 "TV: Held Hostage?" Newsweek, December 24, 1979, p. 27. 44 "The Price of Exclusivity: Did the Network Yield Too Huch for Its Embassy Interview?" Time, December 24, 1979, p. 58. 45 . "Rowan Says NBC Was l1anipulated," Los Angeles Times,. 15 Decem- ber 1979, sec. 2. pp. 5 and 10. 46 "The Hostages and the Ratings," Los Angeles Times, 22 December 1979, sec. 4, p. 11. !..7 · "Front Page: The Failure of American Hedia Honey, Hanpower and Technology in Iran," Hedia People, Harch 1980, pp. 33-34.

48"Trust the Public to Sort It Out," Los.Angeles Times, 13 Decem ber 1979, sec. 2, p. 10. 49 "Television's intercontinental triumph," Broadcasting, January 26, 1981, pp. 20-22. 50 "From Weisbaden to l-lashington, II Broadcasting, February 2, 1981, pp. 52 and 56. 51 "Iranians Place Few Restrictions on U.S. TV Newsmen," TV Guide, 54

November 24, 1979, p. A-3. 52 1-L Cherif Bassiouni, "Terrorism, Law Enforcement and the Mass Media: Perspectives, Problems, Proposals," The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 72 (Spring 1981): 1-51. 53 Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorism, the Mass Media and Democracy," Contemporary Review 239 (July 1981): 35-44. 54 Philip Schlesinger, "Terrorism, the Media and the Liberal Democratic State: A Critique of the Orthodoxy," Social Research 48 (Spring 1981): 74-90. 55 Abraham H. Miller, Terrorism and Hostage Negotiations (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980). 56 Tim Moore and David E. Clavier, "The Mass Media Role in Terrorist Campaigns," paper presented at Mass Communication Division Speech Communication Association Annual Convention, New York City, 16 November 1980. 57 Marcus D. Pohlmann and Thomas P. Loley, "Terrorism in the '70s: Media's Connection," National Forum 61 (Summer 1981): 33-35. 58 Yonah Alexander, David Carlton and Paul Wilkinson, eds., Terrorism: Theory and Practice (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979). 59 Richard Clutterbuck, The Media and Political Violence (London: The Mac Millian Press, Ltd., 1981). 60 David Halberstam, The Powers That Be (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979). 61 James Playsted Wood, Magazines In The United States, 3d ed. (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1971). 62 W.A. Swanberg, Luce and His Empire (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972). 63 John L. Hulteng, The Messenger's Motives: Ethical Problems of the News Media (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976). · 64 Robert T. Elson, Time Inc: The Intimate History of a Publishing Enterprise, 2 vols. (New York: Atheneum, 1973). 65 John Kobler, Luce: His Time, Life, and Fortune (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968). 66 "Time: The Weekly Fiction Magazine."·Fact, January-February, 1964, p. 3-23. 55

67 John K. Jessup, ed., The Ideas of Henry Luce (New York: Atheneum, 1969). . 68 David Cort, The Sin of Henry R. Luce: An Anatomy of Journalism (Secaucus, New York: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1974). 69 Herbert J. Gans, Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979). 70 "Why the Editor of Newsweek Is Not the Editor of Time, and Vice Versa," Esquire, June 1973, pp. 169-71 and 225-32. 71 "The Wizard of Newsweek," Harper's Magazine, August 1980, pp. 72-75. 72 Osborn Elliott, The World of Oz (New York: The Viking Press, 1980). 73 "Glimpse of the American Right," National Review, November 25, 1977, pp. 1346-347. 74 "The War and the Struggle for the State," MERIP Reports, July-August 1981, pp. 3-8. 75 "Iran's Economy: Between Crisis and Collapse," MERIP Reports, July-August 1981, pp. 11-15. 76 Leila Saeed, "Iran since the Shah," Index On Censorship, June 1981, pp. 11-15. 77 Michael M.J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980). 78 "Iran: Diary of A Disaster," Senior Scholastic, January 22, 1982, pp. 10-13. 79 El a1ne. S ClO. 1"lnO, "Inside the New Iran," Newsweek, March 8, 1982, pp. 32-38. 80 "Iran: A Land of Hardship and Hatred," U.S. News & World Report, April 12, 1981, p. 27. 81 Alexander Yonah and Allan Nanes, The United States and Iran: A Documentary History (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, Inc., 1980). 82 siegfried Kracauer, "The Challenge of Qualitative Content Analysis, Public Opinion Quarterly 16 (Winter 1952-53): 631-42. 83 Thomas F. Carney, Content Analysis: A Technique for Systematic Inference From Communications (Winnipeg, Canada: University of Manitoba Press, 1972). 56

84 . B~rnard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1971). 85 o1e R. Holsti, Content Analysis For The Social Sciences And Humanities (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.~ 1969). 86 Karl Erik Rosengren, ed., Advances in Content Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1981). 87 Eugene F. Shaw, "Agenda-setting and Mass Communication Theory," Gazette 25 No. 2 (1979): 96-105. 88 Jack M. McLeod, Lee B. Becker and James E. Byrner, "Another Look at the Agenda-setting Function of the Press," Communication Research 1 (April 1974): 131-64. 89 Lutz Erbring, Edie N. Goldenberg and Arthur H. Miller, "Front Page News and Real-World Cues: A New Look at Agenda-Setting by the Media," American Journal of Political Science 24 (February 1980): 16-49. 90 nonald L. Shaw and Haxwell E. McCombs, ·The Emergence of American Political Issues: The Agenda-Setting Function of the Press (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1977). 91 '! ~~ Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, "The Agenda-Setting ~~ Function of Mass Hedia," Public Opinion Quarterly 36 (Summer 1972): '• 176:87. 92 Gerald C. Stone and Maxwell E. McCombs, "Tracing the Time Lag in Agenda-Setting," Journalism Quarterly 58 (Spring 81): 51-55. 93 Bruce H. i\festley, "What Makes It Change?--Setting the Political Agenda," Journal of Communication 26 (Spring 1976): 43-47. 94 Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). 95 John T. Elson, personal letter, 15 July 1982. CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Identification of method

The method used in this study is qualitative content analysis.

Key sources of data

The primary source of data for this study is issues of Time and Newsweek, beginning with the November 12, 1979 issues and ending with the February 2, 1981 issues.

Also serving as sources of data are a personal letter from Time

National Editor John T. Elson and the secondary literature searched for this study.

Thesis design

Following are the methodological steps of this analysis, in order.

1) Every other issue of Time and Newsweek were selected for anal ysis, starting with the November 12, 1979 issues and concluding with the

February 2, 1981 issues. This sampling was used for purposes of prac ticality.

2) A pre-analysis reading of the major--or most prominently played--reports on the hostage crisis was then made in every fourth issue of the magazines, starting with the November 12, 1979 issues

(to acquire a sense of the repnrting and to assist in the formulation of key categories).

57 58

3) This was followed by the formulation of key coverage cate gories which are used to chart reporting habits and under which cov erage data was grouped. Examples of these categories are "Background

Reports," "Biased Reporting" and "Stereotypical Reporting" (this is the structural framework of the study).

4) Time and Newsweek covers, concentrating on the hostagecrisis, are recorded and analyzed (to determine coverage trends of the magazines and agenda-setting aspects of the coverage).

5) "Promos" for hostage crisis-related reports appearing on

Time and Newsweek covers are recorded and analyzed (primarily to deter mine agenda-setting aspects of the coverage).

6) "Letter from the Publisher" sections of Time, when they ad dress a report on the hostage crisis, are recorded and analyzed (to better understand the details behind Time's coverage and to avoid mis readings of that coverage because of insufficient backgroundknowledge).

7) Mini-photographs and abstracts--concerning the hostage crisis--listed in the ''features" parts of the tables of contents of each issue are recorded and analyzed (primarily to determine agenda setting aspects of the coverage, but also to determine the emphasis given the hostage crisis story by the publications).

8) References to hostage crisis-related reports in the "depart ments" parts of the tables of contents of each issue examined--i.e.,

"World," "Business and Economics," "Press," "Religion"--are recorded

(to determine the variety of subject areas in which Time and Newsweek reporte~ the hostage crisis).

9) Each page of each issue analyzed (rather than the simple reliance on table of contents listings) is examined for hostage crisis- 59 related reports and features, opinion pieces, photographs, cartoons, and letters, followed by the analysis of those editorial items (to determine significant trends in the coverage; changes in the coverage; stereotypical reporting; biased reporting; consistent use of key terms; consistent depictions of individuals, groups or movements; editorial stances of the magazines; agenda-setting qualities of the coverage; and other coverage characteristics which may arise as the study proceeds).

Items are analyzed in the order they appear in each issue.

10) following the analysis of each editorial item within an issue, each report or feature is measured in column inches (to determine, in part, the extent of the magazines' coverage and how that coverage varied during the different time periods of the hostage crisis).

11) A re-examination and re-evaluation of already-analyzed editorial items as significant observations on the coverage are made and important coverage trends are noted. These latter findings will be taken into consideration and the editorial items will, in most cases, be read more than once (to guarantee a true reading of the coverage patterns of the magazines);

12) The complete accumulation of data is followed by a final analysis and formulation of conclusions.

Procedures for overcoming bias

A probable cause of bias in this study is the near-universal in-

'dictment of American media coverage of the hostage crisis and a consistently negative portrayal of the reporting habits of Time and News week found in the literature sources searched as background. 1

Perhaps the most promising technique for addressing this paten- 60 tial bias is simply to be keenly aware of it throughout the analysis period. An overly aggressive search for negative coverage habits should be guarded against, while the recording with discipline of those coverage habits--negative though they may be--which are present should be pursued.

One safeguard against an erroneous analysis of Time coverage habits will be the monitoring of "Letter from the Publisher" features·' which, in some cases, may explain reporting practices otherwise mis understood.

One safeguard against an erroneous analysis of Time coverage habits will be the monitoring of "Letter from the Publisher" features, which, in some cases, may explain reporting practices otherwise mis understood.

One form of bias which likely cannot be overcome is the fact that this researcher is a United States citizen, who, like many United

States citizens, experienced some disillusionment and anger toward the

Iranian government during the period of November 1979 through mid

January 1981.

An obvious way in which this bias could affect the results of this study would be by distorting perceptions of the coverage, making, perhaps, unjustifiably negative coverage appear not only within the limits of acceptable journalistic conduct, but warranted.

Justification of thesis design

The use of content analysis seems clearly justified for this study. The elemental question is whether the content analysis should be conducted qualitatively or quantitatively. 61

Qualitative content analysis provides for a means of examination substantially less rigid in format than quantitative methods. It has been chosen here for that quality and these reasons of appropriateness an d pract1ca. 1. 1ty: 2

First, qualitative analysis allows for interpretations to be made as the study proceeds, rather than at the study's conclusion, as

1s. t h e case w1t . h quant1tat1ve . . ana 1 ys1s. . 3 This is an essential analytical feature in a study which purports to examine not only communicator performance but communicator intention. It also is valuable in a study which may change in format as the analysis proceeds, with, for example, the formulation of new or different categories necessitated by the examination of new data. An important feature of this study is that no predictions regarding the data can--or should--be made. Being highly adaptive, this method is strongly suited to an analysis in \vhich the researcher does not know what to expect in the way of data.

Second, qualitative analysis promotes a greater concern for communicator intentions, rather than content, as is the case with quan 4 titative analysis (the identification of communicator intentions being a key objective of this study).

Third, qualitative analysis allows for the use of more complex themes and categories--promoting more of a Gestalt approach--in contrast to quantitative analysis, which usually is based on rigid, simple 5 categories (an important analytical feature in a study involving a co_mplicated, multi-dimensional topic such as the Iranian hostage crisis).

Fourth, qualitative analysis generally is acknowledged as a good method for analyzing a relatively small sample of data (as is the 62

case in this study, which will examine only every other issue of the

newsmagazines).

Fifth, qualitative analysis also generally is acknowledged as an

ideal method for examining radically different kinds of data (both in

form--i.e. photographs, news reports, news features, cartoons--and

content--i.e. reports appearing under sections labeled "World," "Reli-

gion," "Press").

This thesis design also is justified in that the number of

anticipated editorial items is of such a quantity as to ensure the

thorough examination and analysis of each item. Also, the relevant

issues of Time and Newsweek are readily available for examination in

their original forms (not, for example, on microfilm), which is essen-

tial for the accurate determination of hostage report lengths in

column inches.

Special qualifications of the thesis writer

As a daily newspaper reporter for four years, I have had first-

hand experience with the gate-keeping processes common--in varied

forms--to all news publications. I have experienced deadline pressure,

know the ways in which it can affect reporting, and should be a more

accurate judge of that aspect of coverage because of this practical

experience.

Acknowledgement of methodological weaknesses

Potential methodological weaknesses include an inability to

reach interview sources and an inability to precisely determine column

inch lengths of reports and features because of "odd-set" copy (i.e., 63

the substitution of two wider columns in a space where three normal width columns usually would be used).

Other potential methodological weaknesses are the inherent flaws of qualitative content analysis, including a dependence on data col lected by others, conclusions stated with less precision and a general reliance on subjective examination.

Also, by examining only every other issue of the magazines, the possibility for misreading reporting trends is great. What may appear to be missing from the magazines' coverage in one issue may have been extensively reported the previous week. 64

NOTES

1 .. · sources critical of American media coverage of the Iranian ho.stage crisis--and from which these claims were extracted--are: Edward W. Sai~'s Covering Islam (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981); Don Ob~rdorfer's "Iran and the Press in Retrospect: Now That It's ·.Over • • . The Press Needs to Reflect on Its Role," in the May 1981 Washington Journalism Review (pp. 37-38): and Edward Mortimer's 11 lslam and the-Western Journalist," in the Autumn 1981 Middle East Journal (pp. 492-505). Sources identifying the subjective reporting habits of Time and Newsweek--and from which these claims were ex- ;,tracted--are: John L. Hulteng's The Messenger's Motives: Ethical ·:::Problems of the 'News Media (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, .. Inc·., 1976); John Kobler's Luce: His Time, Life, and Fortune . ·-::(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1968); and James Playsted :._Wood's Magazines in' the United States (New York: The Ronald Press co. , 19 71) . ·.- · ·-·- 2 It should be noted that no secondary sources addressing directly the issue of step-by-step techniques for qualitative content analysis were discovered.

3 Be~nard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1971), p. 122. 4 Ibid., p. 124. 5 Ibid., p. 126. CHAPTER IV

BACKGROUND

Iranian hostage crisis

On January 16, 1979, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi fled Iran

following a reign of 37 years. The victim of a religious revolution headed by the once-exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, he wouhlspend

the remaining 18 months of his life in six different countries, in

cluding the United States.

His seven-week, medically necessitated stay in the United States was much-debated and eventually devastating. Thirteen days after his arrival from Mexico at New York Hospital, militant students in Tehran dramatized their disfavor with the United States' housing of the deposed

shah by seizing the U.S. Embassy there and holding 66 Americans hostage.

The students, whose actions had been sanctioned by Khomeini, made their demands forcefully clear: the shah must be returned to stand trial on charges that he had stolen money from Iran and tortured his political opposition. The hostages would remain imprisoned until

that return.

And so began what would become one of the most trying, suspense ful and widely reported episodes in the history of American diplomacy-

the holding of American hostages in Iran from November 4, 1979, to

January 20, 1981. * * * The first demonstrative display of anger by Iranians toward

65 66

the United States occurred October 23, 1979, one day after the shah checked into his New York Hospital room, when some 30,000 protesters marched past the American Embassy in Tehran screaming and waving their fists. Sparked by Khomeini's appeal to "expand with all their might their attacks against the United States and Israel, so they may force the United States to return the deposed and cruel shah, 11 the student- led protesters--an estimated 100,000 this time--demonstrated in front 1 of the embassy again on November 2, 1979.

Finally, at 10:15 a.m. November 4, the embassy was invaded as an organized, rehearsed crowd of about 600 charged the compound gates.

American officials in the United States were immediately informed and an appeal was made to Iranian Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan. It proved fruitless. The militants overpowered a small corps of U.S.

Marines, collected all who had been in occupation of the embassy and then sorted out their prisoners. Forty-four persons (mostly Iranian secretaries and translators) were released. Sixty-six Americans were . d 2 reta~ne .

They were interrogated at gun and knife point, beaten and left for hours with their hands tied to the backs of chairs. Some were isolated under solitary confinement-like conditions. And always, they could hear outside the street mobs chanting, "Kill the American 3 dogs, Death to Carter."

The Carter Administration's initial strategy was to negotiate with the Iranian government, appealing to its sense of humanity and good faith. But despite several attempts, direct contact with Khomeini never was atta1ne. d . 4

Carter then decided on a more demonstrative track, first 67 ~ '

declaring that the United States would boycott Iran's oil, then, two days later, announcing that Iran's massive dollar and gold deposits, 5 estimated at $7.7 billion, would be frozen in American banks.

Reportedly in an attempt to avoid further American retaliation,

Foreign Minister Abolhassan Bani-Sadr convinced Khomeini to make a gesture of good faith to the Americans. The Imam acceded, ordering the release of five white women and eight black men. Suggesting the release was an illustration of Islam's concern for women and Iran's solidarity with the oppressed minorities of the United States, the militants exhibited the 13 hostages with a painted sign made specifically for the American television cameras: "Oppressed Blacks!! The 6 United States Government Is Our Common Enemy."

The remaining 53 hostageswould, with one exception, spend the next 428 days in the custody of the militant students. * * * Springing from the hostage crisis were two unique and important developments: an unparalled concentration on the hostage crisis by

American media and an unparalled expression of outrage and patriotism by the American people.

Correspondents from several major U.S. newspapers, from the major U.S. newsmagazines and from the major U.S. television and radio outlets flocked to Tehran in the early days of the crisis. The count of American reporters there reached more than 300 by January 1980 as the hostage story continued to attract what would end up being the greatest concentration of U.S. media coverage of any event in recent history. Each of the U.S. television networks, for example, spent in . 7 excess of $75,000 weekly on its coverage, and ABC, boasting the first 68

reporting team on the scene of the crisis, created a nightly report titled "America Held Hostage." The program would outdraw NBC's 8 9 "Tonight Show" and later become the still popular "Nightline."

"We cover this town [Tehran] more closely than any New York affiliate covers New York," admitted a correspondent working with one of the six camera crews ABC had roaming the city's streets at one po1nt. o f t h e cr1s1s. . . 10

And the demonstrators soon learned to play the media game, saving their energy until the camera lights were turned on and then exploding in a flurry of chants, screams and waving fists. Chanting

"Death to America" in English before a group of American network cameras one day, the demonstrators obligingly switched to French 11 when a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation crew suddenly arrived.

There seemed little question that during its first three months, the hostage crisis was the main story in the minds of America's media decision-makers, and little question that the demonstrators knew how to keep it that way.

Fed a daily media diet of hostage reports, the American people responded with a cold, angry display of outrage and nationalism. Anti-

Iranian bumper stickers, billboards and T-shirt transfers became popular sources of expression. Flags flew at half-mast, candles burned in windows and yellow ribbons were tied around trees--all in symbolic acknowledgement of the hostages' plight.

In Beverly Hills, one group of Americans wearing hard hats, wielding baseball bats and chanting "Deport! Deport! Deport!" scattered a group of Iranians protesting the ailing shah's stay in

New York, while in several U.S. cities, workers refused to load Iranian 69

ships or refuel Iranian airliners.12 In Chicago, Marine Corps

officials reported that recruitment inquiries had increased 150 percent 13 s1nce. t h e start o f t h e cr1s1s. . . * * * An important political move in Iran in late November 1979 saw

Bani-Sadr resign as foreign minister, yielding his post to Sadegh

Ghotbzadeh. Like Bani-Sadr, Ghotbzadeh was a principal adviser to

Khomeini. And like Bani-Sadr, he was extremely uncomfortable with the

hostage situation, knowing the price Iran eventually would pay in the

1nternat1ona. . 1 commun1ty. . 14

Despite the apparent anxiousness of Bani-Sadr and Ghotbzadeh

to settle the issue, American attempts at negotiating continued to

prove fruitless as 1979 drew to a close.

Three incidents highlighted the month of December: the shah

left the United States for Panama; four clergymen were allowed to see

the hostages and conduct religious services for Christmas; and Marine

Corporal William Gallegos became the first hostage viewed in any signif-

icant way on American television when NBC aired a controversial

18-minute interview the night of December 10.

Seated between one poster of Khomeini and another offering anti-

shah rhetoric, Gallegos was joined by a militant spokesperson named

"Mary," who delivered six minutes of unedited opening and closing

statements. Responding to unrestricted questions from NBC corres-

pondents Fred Francis and George Lewis, Gallegos said, among other

things, that the 30 or so hostages he had seen regularly were not being mistreated. At one point in the interview, however, the Marine unob-

trusively inserted between two halves of a sentence the word "mushroom," 70 military shorthand for "I'm being kept in the dark and fed a lot of 15 bullshit."

Reaction to the interview was immediate and severe. NBC was castigated from several sides, and the opinions voiced were strikingly similar. In the minds of most, NBC had been manipulated in the purest sense of the term. "NBC should be nominated for the Benedict Arnold

Award for broadcast journalism," Republican Rep. Robert E. Bauman of 16 Maryland suggested. National Security Adviser ZbigniewBrzezinski denounced the network for airing "a propaganda spectacle involving the 17 humiliation of an American citizen." And President Carter? Accord- ing to aides, he simply turned off his television set midway through t h e 1nterv1ew. . 1n . an express1on. o f d.1sgust. 18

The negative reaction was predominant, but not universal.

Rallying to the defense of NBC were well-respected Public Broadcasting

Service correspondent Bill Moyers, National News Council Executive

Director William Arthur and editorialists for the New York Times, 19 Washington Post and Los Angeles Times.

With United Nations~- Secretary General Kurt Waldheim in Tehran at the beginning of January on a fact-finding and negotiating mission that would prove unsuccessful, the Iranian government established a somewhat-paradoxical policy that would carry great impact for the

American media in Iran.

After more than two months of catering to news representatives in an attempt to foster a strong, public relations-based relationship with the media, the country's Revolutionary Council suddenly voted to expel all journalists and technicians working for American news 20 agencies on January 14, 1980. The reason: alleged biased reporting. The Khomeini regime had been strongly intolerant of foreign correspondents in the several months leading to the embassy takeover.

But, with world opinion growing against the Iranians in the weeks following the illegal seizure, student leaders and government officials decided a more amiable association with the media was necessary to establish a favorable international profile. Press buses were provided, press conferences with the student leaders were scheduled and 21 translators were made available.

That mood officially changed, however, when Iranian Oil Minis- ter Ali-Akbar Moinfar announced the expulsions along with this comment:

All American reporters will be expelled soon, since they are reporting in a biased manner and insulting the Islamic revolution and insulting religious beliefs. Th2 government 2 has decided it cannot tolerate this any longer.

Covering the hostage story had been a challenge for most Ameri- can correspondents. The hostages were largely unavailable for interviews, as were the highest-ranking Iranian officials. The language barrier was a consistent handicap. Thrust upon the story unexpectedly, many American journalists were poorly informed on Iranian history, culture and politics and forced to play "catch-up" while reporting . . 23 t h e cr~s~s.

And following that January 14, 1980, vote of the Revolutionary

Council, the challenge for U.S. correspondents was even greater.

The end of January and beginning of February 1980 was a period of positive events for most Americans as the moderate Bani-Sadr was first elected president of Iran and later named to head the Revolution- ary Council. Bani-Sadr was a staunch supporter of Khomeini but also held the conviction that the hostage crisis would hurt Iran if allowed 72 to continue too long.24

Perhaps an even better reason for celebration, however, was the

Canadian Embassy-aided escape of six Americans who had fled the Novem- ber 4 seizure and then hid for nine weeks in the homes of two Canadian officials. Carrying bogus Canadian passports, the six Americans were driven to Mehrabad International Airport, passed a potentially disas 25 trous passport check and then boarded a Swissair flight for Zurich.

In America, radio stations played "O Canada" and billboards in

Detroit announced "Thank You, Canada" across the river to Windsor,

Ontario. It was the first truly bright moment in what had been, for . 26 most Americans, 2~ months of darkness.

Just as suddenly as they had been expelled from Iran, journalists working for American media were invited back by Foreign Minister

Ghotbzadeh on March 7. Ghotbzadeh clearly was anxious for the correspondents to be in Tehran to witness his and President Bani-Sadr's triumph--the formulation of a United Nations commission that would, osten- sibly, visit Tehran, meet with the hostages and student militants, and 27 then negotiate a settlement.

But while the five-member commission was still in flight to

Tehran from Geneva, an ailing Khomeini destroyed any hope the negotiators, Ghotbzadeh, Bani-Sadr and the American people held for a rapid return of the hostages by declaring from his hospital bed that any decision on the hostages would have to wait for the new Parliament-- not yet elected--to convene sometime in April 1980. The commission stayed in Tehran, only to be treated with much the same disdain as had met Waldheim during his visit six weeks earlier. The five men 28 left Iran on March 11 with virtually nothing to show for their stay. 73

With the shah having left Panama and now with his friend, Anwar

Sadat, in Egypt, Khomeini handed down another edict the first week in

April with profound impact upon the hostage situation. The hostages,

he decided, would not be transferred to the control of the government

(a move aggressively sought by the Carter Administration) as once had

been planned. Rather, they would remain in the hands of the militant

students. The response from Washington was prompt and forceful: a

complete break in relations with Iran, a ban on U.S. entry visas for

Iranian citizens and an embargo on American exports to Tehran, except 29 for food and medicine. The return of the hostages had never seemed

further away.

Carter had virtually given up hope of negotiating with Khomeini,

the Revolutionary Council and the militants. He chose, instead, a

different track.

The president's authorization secured, eight Sikorsky RH-53D

Sea Stallion helicopters left the deck of the aircraft carrier U.S.S.

Nimitz the evening of April 24, 1980, and headed for the Iranian

desert town of Tabas. Six C-130 Hercules transport planes were al

ready en route. Approximately 100 commandos would be involved in the mission which, as planned, would culminate with an attack on the 30 seized embassy and the rescue of the 53 hostages. This is what was

supposed to happen had everything gone right. As it turned out, vir

tually everything went wrong.

One Sea Stallion encountered rotor problems and was abandoned

in Iran's southern mountains; another was forced to return to the

Nimitz with navigational malfunctioning caused by a desert dust

storm; a third also suffered rotor problems, limped to Tabas but was 74

I • unfit to proceed on the mission. Only five of the original eight helicopters were still mission ready, and the decision was made in Washing- 31 ton to abort the rescue attempt.

As the commandos were leaving Tabas for their return flight to the Nimitz, one Sea Stallion lifted off, began to bank left and then suddenly slid right, crashing into a stationary C-130. Five men aboard the helicopter were killed as were three Marines in the transport plane.

With flames and exploding ammunition engulfing the runway, two other helicopters were ordered abandoned. The mission was a complete--and fatal--failure. Carter, before a national television audience the 32 following day, accepted full responsibility.

Immediate reaction to the mission, unsuccessful though it had been, was positive. Considerable criticism would come Carter's way later, however, perhaps sparked by the resignation of Secretary of

State Cyrus Vance. Vance, replaced the following day by Edmund Muskie, 33 h a d o bJecte. d to t h e camp licate d m1ss . i on f rom i ts 1ncept1on. . .

In Iran, the militants recovered the charred, fragmented bodies of the American commandos, placed them in cardboard boxes and plastic bags, and displayed them in the embassy courtyard in a macabre, grizzly scene. Later, in a move designed to prevent a second rescue attempt, the militants moved the hostages from the embassy, dispersing 34 them throughout the country.

Serious negotiations would not resume until September--four 35 months after the aborted rescue mission.

Perhaps stimulated by the American failure in the Iranian desert,

Carter decided in May 1980 that his administration's preoccupation with the hostage crisis was not healthy. He announced he would begin 75 actively campaigning for re-election--something he had refused to do while negotiating for the hostages' release was on-going--and also 36 ordered his aides to downplay the hostage story. The latter would be reflected notably in a sudden and sharp decline in hostage crisis coverage by American media.

The American news organizations, criticized as a group at the time of NBC's Gallegos interview for over-reacting to the hostage story in an attempt to boost ratings or circulation, now were being attacked for bending under the pressure of a presidential request.

Carter had asked that the hostage story be downplayed and it was downplayed by American media throughout the late spring, summer and fall months. Some countered that the sudden de-emphasis in hostage coverage was simply the media's recognition of the influential role they had played in the crisis--a role some contended led to the fatal . . 37 rescue m~ss~on.

With the hostages reportedly being moved throughout the summer months, former attorney general Ramsey Clark made some news when he defied Carter's ban on travel to Iran and led a delegation to a Tehran conference on Crimes of America. His trip accomplished little save 38 earning himself a sour reputation in the United States.

It was not until the middle of July that a truly major story developed from Iran--an encouraging story for most Americans. On

July ll, hostage Richard Queen boarded a Swissair flight to Zurich and left Tehran, the first hostage to be released since the 13 Ameri- cans had been set free eight months earlier. The young vice consul had started suffering dizzy spells in the spring of 1980. The dizzi- ness intensified and he began experiencing numbness in his left arm. 76

By the summer, his condition had worsened dramatically. He was examined by Iranian doctors for several days and then pronounced to have one of two ailments: some form of viral brain disease or a de- generative disease such as multiple sclerosis. It would turn out to be the latter. The physicians' report was submitted to Khomeini on a ' Thursday morning. By Thursday afternoon the Imam had ordered Queen released, and by Friday morning he was in flight to freedom. American officials were encouraged if for only one reason: at last, someone in

Tehran apparently was in charge. If Khomeini so desired, he apparent- 39 ly also could release the other hostages.

Two weeks later, in a Cairo hospital, the deposed shah's battle with cancer came to an end. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi died July 27 at the age of 60. In Tehran, the reaction was strangely subdued. There were no demonstrations, no joyous celebrations. It had become cogently clear that the man whose escape from Iran had largely triggered the now nearly nine-month-old crisis was no longer the central issue among the militants. As hostage Kathryn Koob would later say, "The central issue was the breaking of the (Western) sphere of influence in Iran and 40 the putting down of America."

Negotiations picked up momentum as the summer wound down, and a major breakthrough occurred in the middle of September when Khomeini forwarded to America, and then publicly announced in Iran, four conditions for the release of the hostages. For the first time in many months, no mention was made of a U.S. apology for past U.S. policies 41 and no mention of a trial for the hostages.

But the rejuvenated negotiations were complicated first by the Iran-Iraq War, which intensified and then became official on 77

September 28, and then by the November 4 election of Ronald Reagan as

U.S. president, which the militants indicated would delay the negotiating.

Still, on November 10, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christo- pher left Washington for Algiers, where he would deliver to an Algerian negotiating team the United States' counteroffer to Khomeini's four conditions. He returned to Washington to await the Iranians' re- . 42 act1on.

Iran's initial response requesting the clarification of nine points and the inventories of five assets involved was received in

Washington on November 23, and Christopher handed to the Algerians the American reply to those questions 10 days later. On December 19,

Iran's "final offer" was received in Washington: a deposit of $24 billion as the price for the hostages' freedom--$460 million per cap . 43 t1ve.

Christopher and his aides immediately searched the demand for possible points of flexibility, submitted a proposal on December 30 much along the lines of the previous U.S. offer and warned Tehran that the deadline for the final deal would be January 16--four days

1 • • 44 b e f ore R eagan s 1naugurat1on.

Iran submitted a new offer of $9.5 billion and then lowered that to $8.1 billion on January 15--the day before the deadline. United

States negotiators contended that $7.9 billion was the most they could offer, and the Iranians finally accepted. The deal was complete save official signatures. 45 Nobody told the hostages.

Christopher and Iranian negotiator Behzad Nabavi signed the 78

agreements on the morning of January 19, last-minute transactional problems were ironed out the following morning and afternoon, and at

8:06 a.m. Washington time on January 20, the Algerian negotiators informed the Iranian government that the agreed-upon amount of money was 46 in place. It was time for the hostages to leave.

At about 6 p.m. Tehran time on January 20--approximately 9:30 a.m. in Washington--the hostages were ordered to dress. They were blindfolded, led to a waiting bus and then driven to Mehrabad Airport.

They were loaded one by one into an Air Algerie 727 and then, at 12:25 p.m. Washington time, the jet took off, first for Houari Boumedieene

Airport in Algiers and then for Wiesbaden; West Germany, where they 47 wou ld s t ay f our d ays b e f ore return1ng. f.1na 11 y, to Am er1can. • so1.1 .

"They're free! They're free!" flashed an advertising sign in

Manhattan's Times Square. The torch atop the Statue of Liberty was lit.

And the lights on the national Christmas tree--dark for the past two 48 holiday seasons--came back on.

Four hundred forty-four days after being taken hostage, the 52

Americans were free.

Time and Newsweek magazines

In 1952, Henry "Harry" Luce made two important decisions: first, he came to the somewhat painful conclusion that longtime friend Robert

Taft had to be politically destroyed, and then, he came to the somewhat easier conclusion that Democratic presidential hopeful Adlai Stevenson had to meet the same fate.

As was his habit, Luce succeeded.

Through a strategically designed series of Time articles, Luce 79 undermined Taft's support and secured the Republican nomination of

Dwight Eisenhower. He then ordered a brutal editorial attack on Demo- cratic presidential candidate Stevenson. The result was an Eisenhower victory in November of that year followed by consistently positive, supportive Time coverage for the president throughout his administra- 49 tion.

Luce threw the immense weight of his magazine behind Eisenhower for two primary reasons: 1. Eisenhower was Republican, and 2. Luce liked him. Said Luce of the incident:

Eisenhower was right for the country for a large number of reasons, therefore it was Time's duty to explain why the country needed Ike. Any other form of objectivity would have been unfair and uninvolved.SO

Twenty years later, another Time-endorsed Republican president was making headlines, albeit not the kind the then-deceased Luce would liked to have seen in his magazine. Richard Nixon was just starting to feel the tentacle squeeze of an octopus named "Watergate" in

October 1972 when Time addressed the issue. Time had always caressed the presidency--especially those of Republican foundation. But Time hardly sounded like the magazine that had worked so hard to elect

Dwight Eisenhower and then supported him so unfailingly during his tenure when it published an essay arguing forcefully that Watergate simply would not go away and that the Nixon denials did not stand up.

It was signed by senior New York writer Lance Morrow and Washington correspondent Hugh Sidey and was one of the toughest editorial pieces 51 to that date on i-1atergate.

Perhaps no incident better illustrates the philosophical changes which took Time from the strong, self-admitted partisan magazine it was 80 in the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, to the more fair-minded magazine it became in the 1970s.

If Time has been one thing in its nearly 60 years of publishing, it has been dynamic.

It was founded in 1922 by Yale classmates Luce and Briton Hadden, who promised a publication that would fill a void left by magazines and newspapers of the day by "adapting itself to the time which busy men are 52 able to spend on simply keeping informed." Their magazine would de partmentalize the news, pr.esent it in narrative form and describe the people making it. Time would select the facts, tell what the facts meant and, most importantly, state or strongly suggest what the reader 53 should think or feel about them. The magazine was consistently and aggressivly attacked for that third objective: opinion-shaping. But

Luce, who carried on with Time following Hadden's death in 1929, never compromised on his position that journalism of that kind was a necessary part of his product.

"Listen," Luce said once in a moment of complete candor, "I don't pretend that this is an objective magazine. It's an editorial magazine from the first page to the last and whatever comes out has to reflect 54 my view and that's the way it is."

All that has stood for Time was embodied in Luce, who has been called the most powerful conservative publisher in America during the

1940s, 1950s and early 1960s. It has been suggested that during the

1950s, Luce was at least as influential in American politics and di- 55 plomacy as the secretary of state.

Luce was born and raised the son of a missionary in China and maintained a passion for the country even after leaving for the United 81

States as a college student. That lingering affection for China, the

Chinese people and, particularly, Generalissimo Chaing Kai-shek led

directly to one of the more repugnant examples of Time partisanship.

Luce refused to acknowledge the communist drive in China and the even-

tual toppling of Chaing's regime in 1949 and adopted a policy of non-

recognition reflected in the magazine. Time purposely misled its

readers by fostering a belief that China had gone communist not because

of deep historical forces culminating in revolution but because of con- . 56 sp1racy.

Luce's politics hardened in the 1950s as he blamed the demo-

cratic administration of Harry Truman for not salvaging the Chaing 57 reg1me.· T.1me b ecame 1ncreas1ng· · 1 y Repu bl. 1can 1n· 1ts· tone.

To Luce, America was not just a country but an idea and an

ideal--a fact reflected in his magazine. He was an unabashed patriot, 58 and the American flag was never far from the pages of Time.

Luce and Time broke new journalistic ground with a reporting 59 approach that came to be known as "Time Style." Perhaps the most noticeable Time innovation was a practice still utilized by the maga-

zine today: "group journalism" in which reporters, writers, researchers and editors pooled their knowledge and skills to produce copy pub- 60 lished anonymously. Also common to the "Time Style" were an emphasized use of library research to make each news story not an isolated occurrence but part of a continuous historical stream of events

(a reporting quality author Edward W. Said claims was lacking from U.S. media coverage during the hostage crisis), a repeated use of the terms

"tycoon," "pundit," or less-flattering epithets in labeling people and the somewhat unusual practice of inverting sentences so as to suggest 82

they were spoken by someone relatively unfamiliar with the English lan- 61 guage.

Always concerned with the photographic aspect of journalism,

Luce employees also developed an improved printing process which by 62 1935 made the publication of slick, photographic magazines possible.

Like the use of anonymous group journalism, another Time characteristic born early in the magazine's history but still prevalent today is the significance attached to its covers. An illustration of the impact of a Time cover occurred at the end of 1961 when the magazine named President John Kennedy its Man of the Year. After hearing of the cover from one of his aides, Kennedy called Time Washington correspondent Hugh Sidey and voiced his displeasure: "I hear you sons of bitches have done it again ..• you've ruined me." Sidey--aware the cover consisted of a painting of the president by Italian artist

Pietro Annigoni--asked Kennedy what the problem was. "He's made me 63 1 oo k cross-eyed , " t h e pres1 . d ent comp 1 a~ne . d .

Time continued to grow both in influence and circulation during the middle third of this century as some of this country's finest journalists found themselves spending time in front of a Time type- writer. Among those who have worked for Time are celebrated Asian correspondent and Making of the President . • . author Theodore White,

Washington correspondent Side, Vietnam reporters Charley Mohr and

Frank McCulloch, Watergate reporter Sandy Smith, managing editor Otto

Fueringer and former Fortune magazine managing editor Hedley Donovan.

It was Donovan who took over control of Time in 1964, three years 64 before Luce's death.

Donovan was possessed of three qualities which set him apart 83

from Luce and which were reflected in a changed Time magazine: he was more of the center than Luce, he was more fair than Luce, and he was more orthodox than Luce. Between he and managing editor Henry

Grunwald--named to replace Fueringer in 1968 and now editor of Time-- they continued a slow but steady metamorphosis in Time. The magazine, while retaining its right to project a certain viewpoint upon the rea d er, wou ld b ecome more f a1r. w1t . h.1n t h at v1ewpo1nt. . . 65 66 T1me. ' s ro b ust c1rcu . 1 at1on . 1s . now 1"1ste d as. 4 . 3 m1"11" 1on.

Unfortunately, no serious, detailed examinations of Time's editorial tendencies have been undertaken since David Halberstam's

1979 book, The Powers That Be. Therefore, analysis of Time's reporting philosophies during the hostage crisis and currently are made virtually impossible. However, it seems relatively safe to assume that with the fair-minded Grunwald continuing in an editing capacity at Time, the magazine proceeded in the late 1970s and early 1980s on a path of increasingly open and equitable coverage. * * * Time magazine never worried too much about the other two burgeoning newsmagazines in the 1950s--Newsweek and U.S. News & World

Report--according to Osborn Elliott, then a Time reporter in 1955.

And when Elliott left Time to become Newsweek's business editor, he found, much to his surprise, that his new employer measured itself not so much against the healthy Time but against the ultra- conservative U.S. News & World Report.

That soon changed. Following editor John Denson's "We've gotta end-run 'em" gameplan," Elliott has written, Newsweek's 67 editorial side "set out after Harry Luce's Time." 84

Newsweek's chase continued through the editorship of Elliott from 1961 through 1976--and it continues today. It has been a successful battle for Newsweek. While circulation figures continue to place

Time comfortably ahead, it is not often that mention of Time is made without due acknowledgement of Newsweek. Today, they are virtual journalistic twins, similar in content, similar in presentation and, on occasion, even greeting their readers with similar covers.

Newsweek was founded in 1933 by English newspaperman Thomas

John Cardel Martyn and consolidated in 1937 with Today, which was owned by Vincent Astor and W. Averill Harriman and edited by renowned

New Dealer Raymond Maley. The magazines ' name--originally News-l~eek- 68 was dehyphenated and Maley remained as editor.

Originally, Newsweek resembled Time in format, coverage and editorial departmentalization. It did, however, differphilosophically, insisting on an objective presentation of the events of the day and the . . h peop 1 e prom1nent 1n t em. 69 The magazine's slogan in the early days was to "separate fact from opinion," a promise it attempted to carry out through the use of signed editorial reports. Instead of offering news reports built upon a foundation of editorial opinion, Newsweek carried columns of political opinion by Maley, cultural criticism by the likes of George Jean Nathan, Sinclair Lewis and John O'Hare, and, later, sports pieces by John Lardner. Newsweek was labeled, "The magaz1ne. o f news s1gn1 . "f" 1cance. .. 70

A significant change occurred in the Madison Avenue offices of

Newsweek in 1960 when the magazine was purchased from the Vincent Astor

Foundation by Phil Graham for approximately $15 million. Graham, then publisher of the Washington Post, had married Katharine Meyer in 1940 85

and was named publisher of the paper by her father, who had purchased the struggling daily for a miniscule $825,000. Some 15 years later,

Graham purchased the Washington Times-Heral~ for $8.5 million, merged it with the Post and started building a radio-television division for diversification. When Newsweek was made available in 1960, Graham aggressively pursued the publication, beating out Doubleday Publishing

Co. for ownership. Graham brought a new energy to Newsweek, but there was no mistaking the major contribution he brought to Newsweek: a large bankbook that allowed people like Elliott to hire competitively on the e d 1tor1a. . 1 Sl . d e, h ence b u1'ld 1ng. up t h e Newswee k reputat1on.· 7l

One move Elliott made with the increased Newsweek budget that would set it apart from its newsmagazine competition was the hiring of well-known columnists. Those who have written opinion pieces for

Newsweek include Kenneth Crawford, Stewart Alsop, Milton Friedman and

Henry C. Wallich. Newsweek's true coup in the area of column writers, however, came with the securing of Walter Lippmann in 1962 to a $100,000- a-year contract. As Elliott would later write, "it told people out 72 there that Newsweek now counted."

Also distinguishing Newsweek from the competition of Time and

U.S. News & World Report was its decision in 1970 to include bylines with all reports. The magazine kept to its group journalism format but now identified all reporters and writers involved with a particular 73 report.

"I believe that this move • . • significantly increased

Newsweek's credibility among its readers at a time when the American press ~vas frequently under 2.ttack," ·wrote Elliott, who later introduced the "My Turn" column, where non-Newsweek writers could express their 86

views. 74

As is with Time, great significance is attached to the Newsweek cover. And, perhaps, no single incident better illustrates the empha

sis placed on the cover by Newsweek people--and the rivalry with Time

felt by Newsweek people--than the assassination of President Kennedy in

1963. Besides. devoting 12 more pages to the assassination than did

Time, Newsweek also broke with the tradition of never putting the picture of a dead person on its cover by running a full-color profile 75 of the slain president. Time ran a photograph of Lyndon Johnson.

"We felt we had bested Time on the biggest news event since the war," Elliott wrote in his autobiography. II Newsweek, we believed, had arrived. Cockily, we began to refer to Time as 76 'Brand X. '"

Relative to that concern with covers and the ever-present compe tition with Luce's publication is this scenario provided by Ben Bradlee, who before taking over as editor of the Washington Post, was Newsweek's

Washington bureau chief and a close friend of President Kennedy. "Sev eral times, when the editors of Newsweek felt they really had to know what Time had on its upcoming cover, I was able to get the answer from 77 the president--and he was never wrong."

By the early 1970s, Newsweek's once religious devotion to objec tivity was gone. Like Time, it began offering both sides of the story but left little doubt as to where its reporters stood. What once was called editorial comment suddenly became apparent in Newsweek's news 78 reports.

Elliott was fired in 1976 and replaced by Ed Kasner, who was replaced in 1979 by Lester Bernstein. Bernstein remains today as the 87 I '

editor of a thriving Newsweek, whose circulation has now reached 2.5 m1."11" l.on. 79

Even more than Time, little has been written on Newsweek since

the early 1970s, and a full, contemporary analysis of the magazine's editorial tendencies is, therefore, virtually impossible. However, as with the editors of Time, it is assumed Bernstein has continued on the course established for him by Elliott and Kasner.

Agenda-setting

The theory of agenda-setting in its most simplistic form is this: editors and news directors--the gate-keepers in news media systems-- decide each day which news items to pass on to their readers, viewers and listeners and which news items to reject. Those news items chosen to be passed on are then treated in strategically different ways. Some reports lead off radio and television broadcasts while some are slipped in between the sports and weather; some newspaper reports are placed at or near the top of page one with large headlines stretching across the page while others are sandwiched between furniture advertisements at the bottom of page 40; and some magazine articles receive cover recognition while others become lost among the sometimes large number of reports grouped under any of several departmental headings. Besides the placement of reports, agenda-setting qualities--in print--can in- elude whether a report is "promoed" on the cover of a magazine or in its table of contents, whether special editorial devices such as attention-attracting logos are attached to the report, whether the report is located in a prominently played, special department such as

Newsweek's "Periscope" or "Update" sections, or whether the publication 88

frequently run letters addressing a particular issue.

Through this selective placement and display, editors and news

directors attach salience to .news reports and features. And it is

through this selectivity--agenda-setting asserts--that audiences ac-

quire their saliences regarding the important events of the day, incor-

porating this same selectivity into their agendas. Hhile these

saliences are acknowledged as only one part of the complex message

system transmitted from news carrier to audience, they are--agenda-

f sett~ng. asserts--among t h e most ~mportant . o t h ose message components.80

Donald L. Shaw and Maxwell E. McCombs, pioneers in the study

of agenda-setting, offered one of the more lucid explanations of the

theory:

This notion of the agenda-setting function in the mass media is a relational concept specifying a strong positive relationship between the emphasis of mass communication and the salience of these topics to the individual in the audience. This concept is stated in causal terms: increased salience of a topic or issue in the mass media influences (causes) the salience of that topic or issue among the public.81

Shaw and HcCombs are responsible for much of the contemporary agenda-setting research and are, in fact, largely credited with formally introducing the theory in 1972 with their study on North Car- olina voters. That study--the first empirical test of the agenda-

setting hypothesis--focused on the 1968 presidential election in

Chapel Hill, N.c.·, comparing the actual campaign content of the mass 82 me d ~a. t h ere w~t . h w h at peop 1 e sa~.d were t h e most ~mportant . ~ssues..

To determine the public's agenda, interviews were conducted with

100 randomly selected voters who had not yet decided how to vote.

Respondents were asked to outline the key issues as they saw them, regardless of what the candidates might be saying at the moment. 89

These responses were used to prepare a list of issues ranked according

to the importance by the public. To determine the mass media's agenda,

a content analysis was conducted of the five newspapers, two newsmaga-

zines and two television network evening newscasts widely used in the

Chapel Hill area. This was done from September 12 to October 6, with news and editorial content items placed in 15 categories representing

key issues and other kinds of campaign news. Items were classified as major or minor, depending on the amount of space or time allotted to

them. This content analysis was used to prepare a list of issues

ranked according to importance by their frequency of appearance in the . 83 news me d1a.

The crucial agenda-setting test was to determine if the mass media's rankings of issues correlated with the public's ranking of

issues. The similarity was strikingly strong, with a .967 correlation 84 for major items and a .979 correlation for minor items.

Although seemingly convincing, the 1968 study by Shaw and

McCombs suffered from the same weakness that has continued to plague agenda-setting proponents: an inability to establish causal direction.

Agenda-setting assumes it is the media agenda that influences the public's agenda. Equally plausible, however, is the view that the public's agenda determines the agendas of mass media, a contention

logically supported by the concept of an active audience or the sugges-

tion of the Westley-MacLean model that media survive to the extent that 85 they give their audiences what they want.

Shaw and McCombs often are referred to as the fathers of the agenda-setting hypothesis. The concept, however, was not new when they

formally introduced it in 1972. Rarely is an agenda-setting study 90

published that some mention is not made of Bernard C. Cohen's 1963 book on the press and foreign policy, in which the author says of mass media: "It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers 86 what to think about."

Some devotees of the agenda-setting theory have even traced the concept back to Walter Lippman's 1922 book, Public Opinion, in which he discussed the role of mass media in shaping the "pictures in our 87 heads."

More recently, noted presidential campaign chronicler andauthor

Theodore White wrote in his book, The Making of the President, 1972 that:

The power of the press in America is a primordial one. It sets the agenda of public discussion; and this sweeping political power is unrestrained by any law. It determines what people will talk and think about--an authority that in other nations is reserved for tyrants, priests, parties and mandarins.BB

Although usually associated with a concern about media impacton political thought, the agenda-setting theory also has been applied in the study of three other media concepts: status-conferral, image- making and--of critical importance to this thesis--stereotyping.

Status-conferral, the basic notion of press agentry in the Hollywood sense, addresses the ability of the media to influence the prominence of an individual in the public eye. Image-making deals with the manipulation of the salience of both the individual and individual attributes. And stereotyping is concerned strictly with the influencing of the prominence of attributes (i.e., all Scots are thrifty; all

Frenchmen are romantic; all Shi'ite Iranians are martyrs). Stereo- 91

typing has been criticized as invalid characterization of objects 89 because of its overemphasis on a few selected traits.

Led by the work of Shaw and McCombs, research on agenda-setting has continued with a decided emphasis on the concept of time order-- the element missing from that trailblazing, 1968 study on the voters of

Chapel Hill.

Interest in the youthful theory remains keen, but a caveat perhaps lost at times in the enthusiasm of ground-breaking research is that agenda-setting should not--as it has been in some books--be presented as established fact. Stuart Oskamp states in his 1977 book that, "Probably the most important effect of the mass media is their 90 agenda-setting function," while Robert D. McClure and Thomas E.

Patterson wrote in their 1976 book that, "The media's agenda-setting 91 role affects the public's view of presidential elections."

While several studies have supported views such as these, other studies have provided results which can be called ambiguous at best.

To this point, then, the research on agenda-setting must be labeled

1nconc. 1 us1ve. . 92

Criticism of hostage cr1s1s coverage by U.S. news media

Although the U.S. news media were criticized from several sides for their coverage of the Iranian hostage crisis, several specific criticisms stand out as being prominent.

Chief among these criticisms was that U.S. media were manipulated first by the Iranian student militants (i.e., the William Gallegos interview by NBC) 93 and then by the Carter Administration (i.e., his 94 reguest that the crisis be downplayed in the spring of 1980). 92

Also common criticisms of U.S. media performance in Iran 95 were that they over-covered the crisis ("overkill"), that they relied too heavily on stereotypes in their reporting, that they failed to report beyond the crisis itself, ignoring background material which would have added depth and insight to the coverage, that they were overly patriotic in their reporting, and that they frequently were biased in their reporting. 93

NOTES

1 Doyle McManus, Free At Last (New York: Signet Books, 1981), p. 38. 2 Ibid., p. 15. 3 Ibid., P· 40. 4 Ibid., p. 50. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid., pp. 55 and 57. 7 "Front Page: The Failure of American Media Money, Hanpower and Technology in Iran," Hedia People, March 1980, p. 33. 8 David Altheide, "Iran and the Press in Retrospect: Network News Oversimplified and Underexplained," Washington Journalism Review, Hay 1981, p. 29. 9 Ibid. 10 McManus, Free, p. 59. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., p. 45. 13 Ibid., p. 55. 14 p 1erre· Sa 1"1nger, Am er1ca. He ld Hostage: Th e Secret N egotla- . tions (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1981), p. 43. 15 "Front Page," p. 33. 16 "TV: Held Hostage?" Newsweek, December 24, 1979, p. 27. 17 "Front Page," p. 34. 18 "TV.· He ld Hostage.?" p. 27 • 19 "The Price of Exclusivity: Did the Network Yield Too Much for its Embassy Interview?" Time, December 24, 1979, p. 58. 94

20 "rran Announces Expulsion of U.S. News Organizations," Los Angeles Times, 15 January 1980, sec. A, p. 6. 21 "Dateline Teheran," Newsweek, December 3, 1979, p. 87. 22 "Iran Announces Expulsion," p. 6. 23 "Playing Catch-Up in Iran," Time, January 29, 1979, p. 74. 24 McManus, Free, pp. 101-102. 25 Ibid., pp. 101-105. 26 McManus, Free, p. 107. 2 7 Ibid . , p . ll5 . 28 Ibid., pp. 113-23. 29 Ibid., p. 138. 30 rbid., pp. 142-145. 31 Ibid., p. 147. 32 Ibid., pp. 145-48. 33 Ibid., pp. 142-49. 34 Ibid., PP· 151-52. 35 Ibid., p. 158. 36 Ibid. 37 Frederick B. Hill, ''Iran and the Press in Retrospect: Media Diplomacy--Crisis Hanagement with an Eye on the TV Screen," Washing ton Journalism Review, May 1981, p. 23. 38 McManus, Free, PP· 169-70. 39 Ibid., PP· 172-74. 40 Ibid., p. 179. 41 Ibid., p. 187. 42 Ibid., p. 196. 43 Ibid., pp. 198-202. 44 Ibid., PP· 203-04. 95

45 Ibid., PP· 206-09. 46 Ibid., p. 213. 47 Ibid., p. 219. 48 Ibid., p. 219. 49 navid Halberstam, The Powers That Be (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), pp. 59 and 90. 50 Ibid., p. 59. 51 Ibid., p. 673. 52 James Playsted Wood, Hagazines In The United States, 3d ed. (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1971), p. 207. 53 Ibid. 54 Halberstam, Powers, p. 62. 55 Ibid., P· 58. 56 Ibid., P· 86. 57 Ibid., p. 89. 58 Ibid., p. 59. 59 Wood, Magazines, p. 209. 60 Ibid., p. 207. 61 I b.d1 • , p. 209 • 62 Halberstam, Powers, p. 66. 63 I b.d1 ., p. 359 • 64 Halberstam, Powers, p. 467. 65 Ibid., p. 549. 66 The Standard Periodical Directory, 7th ed. (New York: Oxbridge Communications Inc., 1980), p. 1078. 67 osborn Elliott, The World of Oz (New York: The Viking Press, 1980), pp. 33-34. 68 Wood, Magazines, p. 229. 69 Ibid. 96

70 Elliott, Oz, p. 31. 71 Ibid., P· 14. 72 Ibid., P· 15. 73 Ibid., P· 65. 74 Ibid., P· 66. 75 1b1"d., PP· 47 - 48 · 76 Ibid. 77 Herbert J. Gans, Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979), p. 179. 78 Wood, Magazines, p. 232. 79 The Standard Periodical Directory, p. 1078. 80 Donald L. Shaw and Maxwell E. McCombs, The Emergence of American Political Issues: The Agenda-Setting Function of the Press (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1977), p. 11. 81 Ibid., p. 12. 82 Werner J. Severin and James W. Tankard Jr., Communication Theories: Origins, Methods, Uses (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1979), p. 254. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 13. 87 s ever1n . an d Tan k ar d , Commun1cat1on . . Th eor1es,. p. 253 . 88 Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1972 (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1973), p. 327. 89 Shaw and McCombs, Agenda-Setting, p. 12 90 Stuart Oskamp, Attitudes and Opinions (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 161. 91 Robert D. McClure and Thomas E. Patterson, The Unseeing Eye: The Myth of Television Power in National·Politics (New York: 97

G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1976), p. 75. 92 severin and Tankard, Communication, p. 255. 93 "The Price of Exclusivity: Did the Network Yield Too Much for Its Embassy Interview?" Time, December 24, 1979, p. 58.

94::The Talk of the Town: Notes and Comment," The New Yorker, June 2, 1980, p. 29. 95 The following criticisms are reiterated throughout Edward W. Said's Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981). CHAPTER V

DATA AND IMMEDIATE FINDINGS

Coverage from November 4, 1979, through March 31, 1980

The shrill telephone ring broke the early marning silence in the

New York City home of Stan Opotowsky, director of news for the American

Broadcasting Company. It was a desk man at ABC headquarters in New

York working the early shift on that November 4, 1979. He had a mes-

sage that, while somewhat alarming, probably was not completely sur-

prising to Opotowsky: Iranian students had seized the American Ern-

bassy in Tehran and were holding 50 to 60 embassy personnel as hostages.

Opotowsky, a veteran of both newspapers and television, had no trouble

deciding what to do. For weeks he had been telling his correspondents

that Iranian authorities had been so antagonistic to American news-

people that he would send them to Tehran only in the event of a truly 1 major development. Such a development had occurred.

ABC/had only one reporter working that Sunday in its London

bureau--radio correspondent Bob Dyk. Opotowsky called, and within hours, Dyk was the only network television correspondent in Tehran.

It was a coup in every sense of the word for ABC. The other networks had failed to move immediately and would soon regret it. When they

finally did send correspondents, they were barred at the Tehran airport 2 and would not be granted entrance for several more days.

Dyk, one of only nine correspondents in Tehran the first week

98 99

of the crisis, transmitted vivid reports along with footage showing,

among other images, one hostage being paraded before a jeering crowd

and an American flag being burned. His efforts sparked ABC to its

climb from the bottom of the television news ratings and earned himself 3 a promotion to permanent TV correspondent.

But if those initial reports by Dyk and his eight fellow corres-

pondents that first week can be characterized as the first rivulets of

information flowing from Tehran, the flood certainly was not far behind.

An estimated 300 journalists were in Tehran during the first two months of the crisis, filing what some have called an unprecedented 4 number of reports. And while statistics concerning the amount of print

coverage generated during that period have not been discovered, numbers

reflecting television's performance certainly are startling and no doubt

representative of the overall media output. For 43 days and nights, the hostage crisis was the lead story on all three major U.S. networks,

generally commanding two-thirds of the 22 minutes of evening news time.

On several occasions, ABC, in addition to its daily late-night hostage specials and morning shows, devoted virtually all of its evening news--

19 to 21 minutes--to Iran. The number of hostage specials generated by the three major U.S. networks has been called the largest in network . 5 h1story. One graphic illustration of the emphasis placed on the hos-

tage crisis by American media during the first 10 weeks of the embassy

seizure is the estimated bill run up by CBS which, for starters, paid

the salaries of its bureau chief, 23 journalists, a cameraman, an audio man, film and technical experts, 12 Iranian interpreters, a car driver, and a guide. There also was $6,000-a-month rent on a hotel suite which served as operations center, $70 a day for 35 additional rooms that 100

housed the journalists and other personnel, payment for the use of private planes, cars, Telex machines, and telephones, and a $100-a- minute charge for the use of a telecommunications satellite that was 6 used an average of four hours a day.

With those kinds of figures no doubt representative of the general emphasis directed toward Iran by American television, it is not difficult to appreciate the poignancy of Washington Post television critic Tom Shales, who wrote early in the crisis: "The Ayatullah 7 Khomeini has the world by the networks."

But as has been underscored, the intense concentration on the hostage crisis (some have called it "overkill") during the final weeks of 1979 and first weeks of 1980 was not a characteristic unique to television, but one shared by all U.S. media. And it was just such a heavy emphasis by Time and Newsweek during the first 2~ months of the crisis-- followed by a sudden and dramatic drop in the amount of coverage--that serves as the dominant coverage trend for the first five months of this study.

Coverage emphasis

In the 19 issues (10 by Newsweek, nine by Time) of the two magazines sampled during the period of November 12, 1979, through March 31,

1980, more than 1,950 column inches of hostage-related copy were pro- 8 duced. Time generated 1,192~ inches while Newsweek produced 762~ inches. More importantly, of those more than 1,950 inches, nearly

1,600 were published in the eight sampled issues (four by each magazine) running from November 26 through January 7. Time produced a somewhat- staggering 1,017 inches of hostage-related copy (an average of 254~ 101

inches per issue) during that six-week period, while Newsweek produced

555~ inches of copy (an average of 139 inches per issue). Accounting

for a great part of Time's abundant copy during those first months of

the crisis was the magazine's controversial January 7, 1980, issue in

which it named Ayatollah Khomeini as its Man of the Year. Incorporating

seven major hostage reports and 26 hostage photographs, the magazine de

voted more than 370 inches to hostage-related copy. Included in the

coverage was a 160-inch cover story detailing Khomeini's rise to power,

his political status at that point in the crisis and a general analysis 9 of the crisis itself.

(Time and Newsweek both average approximately 1,000 columninches

of editorial space per issue, according to Time National editor John T.

Elson and Newsweek Director of Design Tom Lundy.)

The magazines, combined, published 68 hostage-related reports

during the November 12 through March 31 period (34 by each magazine), with 48 of those reports appearing in that initially heavy, November 12

through January 7 period (26 by Time, 22 by Newsweek). The magazines,

combined, also published 148 hostage-related photographs during the

November through March period (86 by Time, 62 by Newsweek), with 117 of

those photographs appearing in the first eight sampled issues of the

magazines (76 by Time, 41 by Newsweek).

Time and Newsweek left little question during the first sixweeks

of the crisis as to the degree of importance they had attached to the

story originating from Tehran. But certainly as convincing were the

implications left by the magazines' coverage habits during the second

half of that first five-month research period--implications that Time

and Newsweek had suddenly and dramatically changed the foci of their 102

coverage.

Starting with the January 21, 1980, issues and continuing

through the March 31 issue, Time and Newsweek sharply reduced the

number of reports, photographs and total column inches devoted to the

hostage story. Although official explanations by the publications

have not been discovered, two contributing factors seem likely: the

escalating interest at that time in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

and--perhaps more importantly--the categorical expulsion on January 14

of all journalists and technicians employed by U.S. news organizations.

Contending that American correspondents were "reporting in a biased manner and insulting the Islamic revolution and insulting religious

beliefs," Iranian Oil Minister Ali Akbar Moinfar announced the decision

of the Revolutionary Council. He indicated that reporters of news

organizations, including the networks, "will be expected to leave

quickly." Most did, including a corps of correspondents for Newsweek.

Time reporters Bruce van Voorst and Roland Flamini had been ordered to

leave more than a week before the official government proclamation, an

action addressed by the magazine in its January 7 "Letter from the Pub 10 lisher" section and an action perhaps at least partly responsible for

the magazine's failure to publish any hostage-related reports in its

January 21 issue.

In the 11 sampled issues that followed the expulsion, the maga

zines published 382~ inches of hostage-related copy, a decrease of

almost 1,200 inches from what they had published in their first eight

issues following the embassy seizure. Newsweek produced 207 inches of

hostage-related copy from January 21 through March 31 for an average

of just 34~ inches per issue (compared to the 139 inches per issue it 103

published during the first six weeks of the crisis), while Time generated 175~ inches of copy during that same post-expulsion period for an average of only 35 inches per issue (compared to the 254~ inches per issue it published during the first six weeks of the crisi~.

Newsweek published 12 hostage-related reports and 21 photographs from

January 21 through March 31 (compared to 22 reports and 41 photographs during the first six weeks) while Time ran just eight reports and 14 photographs following the expulsion (compared to 26 reports and 72 photographs during the first six weeks).

But the amount of coverage was not the only way in which Time and Newsweek indicated the importance they attached to the hostage crisis during the November through March period. Besides publishing a large number of hostage-related reports and photographs, the magazines consistently displayed those reports and photographs, along with other hostage~related editorial items, in a prominent manner that implied significance.

Of the nine Time issues sampled from the November through March peiod, four included covers that either directly addressed the hostage issue or carried hostage crisis implications (November 26 and December 10, 1979; January 7 and March 17, 1980). A fifth cover focused on harsh winter weather conditions being suffered in the

United States but carried a promo in the upper right-hand corner for a report on Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari's potential threat to the . . . 11 Kh ome1n1 regJ.me. None of the 10 Newsweek issues sampled from this period carried covers directly addressing the hostage crisis, however, the magaine's November 26, 1979, and January 21, 1980, issues did include covers with hostage implications. 104

The tables of contents were another area of the magazines in which they were able to indicate the weight assigned to the hostage crisis. Five Newsweek issues carried hostage reports that were promoed in the tables of contents with a short abstract of the report and an accompanying mini-photograph. Another Newsweek issue included a hostage report that was incorporated with five other reports into a large ab stract for a promo of that week's cover story. Time promoed hostage reports with an abstract and mini-photograph in four of its issues, while using hostage reports as parts of broader promos in three other issues. In each case, the promoed reports were set apart from the issues' departmentalized material.

Following the trend of reduced emphasis seen in the amount of coverage generated by the magazines, the number of promos focusing exclusively on the hostage crisis were reduced in the latter half of the initial five-month research period. However, of the 19 issues of

Time and Newsweek examined during that period, only five (four by

Newsweek, one by Time) failed to promo a hostage report either ex clusively or as part of a broader promo.

Placement of hostage reports also reflected the significance attached to the crisis by Time and Newsweek as the magazines made a hostage report the first report in an issue 10 times during the

November through March period (five by each magazine). The magazines agreed in placing hostage reports first in their issues on November 26,

December 10 and December 24, 1979, and on March 3, 1980. Again, how ever, the general de-emphasis in the post-expulsion period was re flected as hostage-related reports appeared farther back in the maga zines during the final 2~ months of the research period. Main hostage 105

reports were played no farther back than page 34 in Time and page 38 in Newsweek through the January 7 issues. During the January 21 through

March 31 period, however, main hostage reports were displayed more prominently than page 33 only twice by Newsweek and twice by Time.

Another editorial element which reflected both Time and

Newsweek's initial emphasis of the hostage crisis and then their post expulsion de-emphasis was the "Letters" sections. Newsweek published

14 hostage-related letters in its December 10, 1979, December 24, 1979, and January 7, 1980, issues, but only two letters following that, in its February 4 issue. Time ran 19 hostage-related letters during the first five months of the crisis, with all 19 appearing in its December

10, 1979, December 24, 1979, and January 21, 1980, issues. Indirectly focusing on the hostage crisis were the 24 letters that made up Time's entire January 21 "Letters" section. All 24, however, were addressed to the issue of Time's naming of Khomeini as its Man of the Year. Nei ther magazine carried any letters even indirectly addressing thehostage crisis following their January 21 issues.

Newsweek also provided front-of-the-magazine prominence for the hostage story on several occasions through its "Periscope" department, a one-page section usually located within the first 20 to 30 pages of the magazine and devoted to news of a somewhat exclusive, clandestine nature. Newsweek published hostage-related "Periscope" reports in its

December 10, January 7, February 4 and February 18 issues.

Other editorial devices used by the magazines during the Novem ber through March period to attach a peculiar significance to hostage reports were the grouping of those reports under unique contentheadings such as "The Crisis in Iran" (Newsweek, December 24) or "Special Report" 106

(Newsweek, January 7 and January 21), and the embellishment of hostage reports with special hostage crisis logos such as an Uncle Sam-Khomeini caricature split down the middle (Time, December 10) or a hostage cari cature bound by ropes and wearing a United States flag-like blindfold

(Time, March 17).

Positive coverage of Carter

A second major trend of the November through March period was the frequency with which Time and Newsweek published hostage-related news of a more positive nature, usually indicating at some point a support for the ideological stances and diplomatic maneuverings of

President Carter or emphasizing events and rhetoric that might be construed as promoting a sense of patriotic unity among the American people.

Reporting of a generally favorable posture toward Carter and his policies on the hostage crisis--a reporting trend that would take a near 180-degree turn later during the crisis--was evident in each magazine on several occasions during the initial five months of the embassy seizure.

In Time's first major report on the hostage situation in its

November 26 issue, the magazine quoted several highly respected Ameri cans reacting to Carter's first sanctions against Iran--the cutting off of Iranian oil to the United States and the freezing of all Iranian assets in American banks. "'He [Carter] acted wisely and well,'" the magazine reported AFL-CIO head George Meany as saying. New York Senator

Daniel Patrick Moynihan was quoted as saying Carter was handling the crisis with "'great competence, steadiness and assuredness.'" And even praise from Senate Republican Leader Howard Baker--perhaps the 107

ultimate show of support--was detailed by Time when it quoted the

high-ranking Republican as offering Carter the "'unwavering'" backing 12 of his colleagues. In that same issue, Time offered an "Essay"

in which it defined the sensitive diplomatic task facing the Carter

Administration at that point of the crisis and then defended the presi-

dent in the wake of attacks by critics who had accused him of an overly

cautious approach toward the Iranians. Suggested Time Essay writer

Strobe Talbott:

In a game that began because the other side broke the rules, the U.S. must play the long shots. Carter deserves credit for the right measure of firmness and prudence. The charge of ineffectuality does not wash--not in this extra ordinarily ticklish test of his leadership.13

Time later would illustrate the support being generated for

Carter during those first months of the crisis in graphic form by

publishing the results of its own survey in which it sought the

opinions of Americans on several aspects of the hostage issue. Time wrote that:

The poll documented the widespread view that Americans have united strongly behind the President in his efforts to free the hostages. In the survey, 66% rated Carter's handling of the crisis as just right, while 27% felt that he had been too soft, and only 1% thought he had been too hard. The break down of support [for Carter] bl party affiliation: 66% of Democrats, 58% of Republicans. 4

Newsweek, too, demonstrated a willingness to publish news supportive of the beleagured president, although to a notably lesser degree than Time. Much of this type of coverage by the magazine emphasized international backing toward a general U.S. stance in Iran.

Newsweek did, however, focus on support specifically for Carter on several occasions, indicating that "World opinion was behind Carter," 15 in its December 10 issue and detailing in its November 26 issue the 108

president's speech to a group of AFL-CIO leaders who saw Carter off by lean'ing from their hotel room windows and shouting, "Give 'em hell, . 1116 J l.mmy. More reflective of the generally positive reporting offered by Newsweek early in the crisis were its main hostage report on Decem- ber 24, in which it paraphrased Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as saying the United States had received support for its economic sanc 17 tions from the World Court and its Western European allies, and a sidebar it published in that same issue suggesting that, "With the

NATO allies rallying round, the World Court bolstering the U.S. cause against Iran and the U.N. Security Council open to at least delibera- tion on an embargo, the President's hand suddenly looked a good deal 18 stronger."

Reports and, predominantly, photographs addressing the issue of national unity were frequently apparent in both magazines. Newsweek in its December 24 issue, reported that "The nation crossed its fingers and hoped for the best 11 as Amy Carter threvl a switch to light 50 small

Christmas trees--one for each hostage. In that same article, the president was quoted as saying:

We will not forget those hostages one day. We will con tinue to keep the issue of their illegal incarceration in the forefront of the consciousness not only of Americans, but of the entire world."l9

Time was more aggressive in its coverage of the increased U.S. patriotism and national unity drives through the use of photographs.

The magazine accompanied its main hostage story on December 10 with a large, 7~-inch-by-4-inch color photograph of townspeople in Seaside

Heights, N.J., parading with .Ainerican flage in what Time called "a patriotic rally against Iran." One of the signs being carried in the rally read: "God Bless America," while another declared: "United We 109

Stand."20 The magazine's main hostage report on December 24 included

a 3-inch-by-4-inch color photograph of shoppers in a Natick, Mass.,

shopping mall signing cards for the hostages. A sign above the shoppers

read: "Send a Christmas Card To The Hostages In Iran They Need 21 Your Moral Support!" And in its March 3 issue, Time published with

its main hostage report a large, 7-inch-by-4-inch color photograph de-

picting a man adding another flag at Hillcrest Cemetery in Hermitage,

Pa., where one flag was flown for each day of the hostages' captivity.

The photograph was dominated by the image of approximately 20 American 22 flags.

It should be noted that much like the amount of coverage, the

number of incidents of positive reporting decreased during the latter

half of the first five-month research period.

The American media have been accused of acting in concert with

the American government during the hostage crisis to create a country-

wide mood of nationalism that bordered on jingoism. Wrote Edward

Said in his book examining the media's performance in Iran: "Was the

press simply interested in diffusing news seemingly in keeping with a

United States government policy to keep America 'united' behind the

unconditional demand for the hostages' release, a demand . itself

subordinate to the real priority, which wasn't their release but 23 'keeping America strong'?"

Whether Time and Newsweek were participants by design in this

alleged journalistic scheming may never be known. What is apparent from

the research, however, is that, through premeditation or not, the maga-

.zines did seem to subscribe at times to a brand of reporting supportive

of both the president and national unity. 110

Evidence of emotional reporting

Closely tied to this perceived positive reporting was a noted tendency by the magazines for reporting in a highly emotional manner, presenting editorial material in a way that conceivably could create within their readers feelings of animosity toward Iran or exacerbate such feelings already held by those readers. Again, photographs were heavily used in this area, with letters also frequently communicating this type of message. Unlike reporting characteristics previously mentioned, this trend remained relatively consistent throughout the

November through March period.

This form of emotional coverage was rare in actual hostage reports but was in slight evidence in a November 26 Time report which indicated that Carter had secluded himself in an attempt to "resolve this most dangerous and infuriating crisis of his presidency. Most infuriating because the mightiest power on earth found itself engaged in a test of will with an unruly gang of Iranian students and an ailing 24 zealot of 79." Newsweek saved one of its more emotional appeals for a December 24 column by George Will in which he detailed the rather forceful measures he would have used in dealing with Iran. It should be noted that this article was clearly labeled as opinion, was an isolated example of this type of reporting and in no way reflected the tone of Newsweek news reports on the hostage crisis. It was, nevertheless, a scathing attack on Iran worth examining. Will suggested that:

The U.S. could have bombed the dam that supplies much of Tehran's electricity. If Iranians want the Dark Ages, we can provide the dark. The Abadan kerosene refinery could have been put out of commission. Iran has cold winters. Shi vering in the dark would concentrate Iranian minds on the cost of Khomeini. Iran is mountainous. Railroads 111

can be cut easily by bombing tunnels and bridges. And don't forget the pipeline that sends natural gas to the Soviet Union.

Later in his opinion piece, Will referred to the United Nations' call for Iran and the United States to resolve peacefully the issues between

them. "Issues shmissues," he wrote. "They've stolen our citizens. 25 That's not an 'issue,' that's an act of war."

Some of the most inflammatory material arising from the magazines during the initial research period came not from reporters in

Tehran or Washington but from Americans venting frustration and anger through the "Letters" sections of the publications. A large number of these letters were printed during the November 12 through January 7 period. And their tone is reflective of the tone carried by most of the letters addressing the hostage issue. Time seemingly was the more willing of the two magazines to offer this form of expression. Sug- gested one letter in its December 10 issue: "When the pot boiled in 26 Iran last winter, the scum floated to the top." l.J'arned another

Time letter two weeks later: "Let us hope that the U.S. will never bow to Khomeini's blackmail. If the Carter Administration agrees to Iranian demands, it will be a blow and a very bad example to those who love democracy." 27 A letter in Time's January 7 issue sarcasti- cally read: "I'm quite surprised that Ayatullah Khomeini hasn't blamed the U.S. for the recent earthquakes in northern Iran--or maybe 28 he just hasn't thought of it yet." And in its January 21 issue, Time ran a short, invective letter attacking the magazine's choice of

Khomeini as its Man of the Year. "In the future," it counseled, "try ,29 not to pick a snake in the grass but a dove in t h e s k y. 112

Photographs and cartoons in the magazines also frequently

carried seemingly emotional messages for the reader. And perhaps

none was more effective than the photograph published by both Time

and Newsweek in their November 26 issues. The photograph (run 6 inches

by 5 inches in Newsweek and 7~ inches by 4 inches in Time) carried a

seemingly simple message. It showed two militants carrying the garbage 30 out--in an American flag. A cartoon accompanying Time's first major

hostage report in that same issue also carried a direct message as it

depicted a group of shackled, blindfolded individuals grouped closely 31 together beneath a large sword dangling by the thinnest of strings.

Newsweek no doubt stirred the anger of many Americans who read its

December 10 issue, which included a 3~-inch-by-S~inch photograph of 32 a Tehran mob brutalizing a Carter effigy. The magazine also likely

evoked pathos from those who saw the photograph in its January 7 issue

depicting the mother of Kevin Hermening staring sadly at a photograph 33 of her son, who was being held in Tehran.

Perhaps, however, none of the reports, letters, photographs and cartoons better illustrated this brand of emotion-evoking reporting

than the similarly prominent play given a quote from Lillian Carter by

the magazines in their December 10 issues. Time played the quote high in its hostage report, while Newsweek used it as a "take-out" quote above the story and in italics. "If I had a million dollars to spare," she reportedly told a New Hampshire men's club, "I'd look for someone 34 to kill [Khomeini]."

Absence of bias

Biased reporting did not manifest itself glaringly in either

Time or Newsweek during the November through March research period. 113

Isolated cases of apparent bias were discovered, such as Time's

defense in its November 26 issue of the oil embargo and freezing of

Iranian assets ordered by Carter as "a necessary response to irrational 35 provocations," or the suggestion in Newsweek's March 17 issue that

Iran's wavering policies toward negotiations were "the most sadistic

of masquerades, a maddening spectacle of deceptive bluffs and broken 36 prom1ses.. " An overa11 posture o f bias against Iran, however, was

not apparent in the reporting of either Time or Newsweek. If a claim

of bias could be directed at the magazines, it would likely not be for what they reported, but for what they failed to report.

Several reports focused on the remarks or observations of

individuals largely negative toward Khomeini, his regime or the

Iranian position in the hostage crisis but failed to offer equitable

counter-comment from pro-Khomeini, pro-Iran factions. A December 10

Newsweek article examining the character of then Iranian Foreign

Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh serves as a cogent illustration. The report,

headlined "No More Mr. Nice Guy?," presented a predominantly negative

image of Ghotbzadeh, quoting several sources highly critical of him.

Included among those sources was an "administration analyst" who said 37 of the foreign minister, "I think he's generally bad news." Notably absent from the article was comment from Ghotbzadeh himself or those who support him. Another example was a December 10 Time article in which the magazine reported that "the President said that the hostages have not been allowed to bathe or change their clothes, that some have

been punished for speaking and that others have been threatened at

pistol point. Said Carter: 'This is a reprehensible thing, a disgrace 38 to every person who believes in civilization or decency. '" Again, no 114

effort was visible on the part of Time to reach Iranian authorities who may have affirmed or denied those claims.

It should be emphasized, however, that these were isolated

inciden~s and represent only the material searched in the 19 sample

issues for the period. By and large the evidence of blatant bias was very small, and the magazines did, in fact, regularly report both sides

of the hostage story in a seemingly even-handed manner.

Closely tied to this coverage characteristic was the magazines'

general failure to offer reports in which the Iranian point of view

toward the hostage taking might be expressed--a negative reporting habit evident throughout the 14~-month crisis. Newsweek offered no reports of this kind during the initial five-month period, while Time managed to publish only three. In its first issue addressing the hostage situation (November 26), Time presented a brief question-and- answer interview between correspondent Bruce van Voorst and Islamic scholar and Revolutionary Council member Mohammed Javad Bahonar. The report did present some of the Iranian perspective on the crisis but was much too short (four questions and answers) to provide in-depth analysis. Also, three of VanVoorst's four questions were couched in suggestive leading language, much like his opening question, which read:

"Isn't the reaction in Iran to the shah's presence in the U.S. out of 39 all proportion to reality?" A December 10 question-and-answer report with Ghotbzadeh--again conducted by Van Voorst--was longer,

seemingly more fair in approach and more illustrative of the Iranian

po1n. t o f v1ew. . 40

Van Voort's final interview in Tehran before being expelled

early in January of 1980 resulted in a lengthy question-and-answer 115

article with Khomeini that may have been the best effort by either rna- gazine during the entire crisis to present the Iranian side. The 16- question article appeared in the January 7 issue and touched on several aspects of the hostage situation and Khomeini's regime. It offered the

Imam a platform to express several Iranian points of view, including 41 the precise crimes Iran felt the deposed shah had committed.

However, these three reports were the only reports by either magazine during that initial five-month sample period devoted to presenting the Iranian perspective. Of the nearly 2,000 inches of hostage- related copy generated by Time and Newsweek from November through March, little more than 100 inches went to the telling of Iran's side of the crisis.

Heavy presentation of background material

In sharp contrast to the paucity of Iran perspective reports-- and in apparent contradiction of critics such as Said and Don Oberdorfer of the Washington Post--were the large number of background reports published by the magazines. The charge directed at American media by

Said, Oberdorfer and others was that U.S. news agencies had reported the hostage crisis too parochially, rarely venturing beyond the crisis itself to present any kind of historical insight into events which precipitated the fall of the shah and the taking of the hostages, insight into the culture of Iran and the people attached to that 42 cu1 ture, or ins1g. h t into t h e vo 1 ati 1 e d omest1c . po 1·1t1cs . o f I ran. The popular view among these critics was that American correspondents vividly reported the chanting, fist-waving crowds outside the embassy gates, but reported little beyond that. 116

Research for this study exonerates Time and Newsweek from such accusations.

The magazines combined to publish 13 reports in the sampled issues from November through March that were considered to be legiti mate attempts at providing background into the hostage situation. Near ly 500 inches of this type of coverage were produced (nearly one-fourth of the total hostage coverage for the magazines combined), with the reports appearing consistently throughout the five-month period.

Early in the hostage crisis, the object of the militants' anger clearly was the deposed shah and the United States for providing him with medical care. Newsweek attempted to illustrate exactly why these militants were so angry in a December 10 sidebar headlined, "Is The 43 Shah Guilty?" The article separated the militants' main charges into three categories--"Torture and Repression," "Corruption" and

"Treason"--and then detailed within each section representative actions by the shah resulting in those charges. The product of the report is a clear understanding of the reasons behind the revolution and the embassy seizure.

Two weeks later, Time offered an examination of the political turmoil within Iran in a pair of December 24 sidebars. The first pre dicted that if Khomeini's regime should fall, it likely would be a party from the Iranian left that would rise to power. The report then outlined the history and fundamental doctrines of the three major 44 Iranian leftist parties: the Fedayan, Mujahedin and Communist Tudeh.

The second sidebar identified the revolting Azerbaijanis people from northern Iran and their leader, the Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari as a legitimate threat to the Khomeini regime. Among the more fundamen- 117

tal pieces of information offered by the report was that the

Azerbaijanis made up more than one-third of Iran's total population and dominated Tehran's bazaars as the country's true middle class. Also examined in the article was the impact an Azerbaijanis revolt might have on the Kurds, Arabs, Turkomans and other unsettled minorities

WJ..t. h"J..n I ran. 45

In its March 31 issue, Newsweek offered a glimpse of the depressed economic conditions facing the Iranian people. The report examined the country's broader problems of unemployment, inflation and import-export fluctuations. But it also took pains to inform that the shelves of Tehran's bazaar shops were missing refrigerator 46 compressors but were well stocked with Skippy peanut butter. That same week, Time detailed the political tug-of-war being played out within the innermost circles of the Iranian government. The report outlined the rise to power of the Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammed Beheshti-- the secretary of the Revolutionary Council, president of Iran's

Supreme Court and head of the Islamic Republic Party--and then explained how he was mounting a movement that represented a serious 47 challenge to then-Iranian President Bani-Sadr.

But perhaps the best illustration of the magazines' willingness during this initial research period to go beyond the crisis itself in their reporting was the January 7 "Man of the Year" issue by Time, an exemplary effort in which three reports were devoted to what could be considered legitimate background material. The magazine's first report--a 160-inch cover story--examined Khomeini's rise to power, his overthrow of the Pahlavi regime and the difficulties he faced at that time with the various political factions jockeying for power 118

within Iran. 48 The subsequent report again focused on Khomeini. But rather than examining him as a revolutionary leader, it attempted to identify the personality behind the dour-looking face so often portrayed by American media. The article was somewhat flawed by its reliance only on western "experts," but was, nonetheless, a seemingly . . 49 sincere attempt at uncovering the otherwise-mysterious f~gure.

A third report in that issue was not unlike the article

Newsweek would publish on March 31, examining the Iranian lifestyle.

But Time's report focused more on how that lifestyle had changed following the revolution, from the increasingly strict censoring of films to the issuance of new paper currency modified by the excising of the deposed shah's picture. Other lifestyle qualities touched on in the report ranged from the economy to food shortages to the increasingly large obstacles faced by upper-class Iranian women hoping 50 to advance in their careers. Again, the magazine seemingly made a sincere, laudable effort to present information pertinent to the hostage crisis that reached past the fist-waving crowds surrounding the embassy.

Evidence of variety in use of departmental headings

That January 7 issue of Time also served to identify a coverage technique repeatedly observed in Time throughout the 444-day crisis, but one rarely observed in Newsweek: the reporting of the hostage crisis under several different departmental headings.

Newsweek published reports twice under the heading "Special

Report," once under the heading "The Crisis in Iran," four times under its "Periscope" section and offered the one George.Will column 119

in the issues sampled for the November through March period. But beyond those exceptions, the magazine never published hostage-related reports under any regular departmental heading other than "National

Affairs" and "International."

Time also published the majority of its hostage-related reports under two regular departmental headings--"Nation" and "World"--but also listed hostage-related articles under "Essay," "Press," "Behavior" and "Man of the Year." This practice could be viewed as contributing to Time's perceived exercise in agenda-setting, with the magazine conceivably attaching importance to the hostage story by suggesting the variety with which it had affected American life.

Time's willingness to vary the focus of its coverage in this way works, again, to help defend the two American newsmagazines from the charge that all U.S. media only rarely strayed from the same hostage story day after day, practicing a kind of replicative reporting.

"Insistence, not analysis or in-depth coverage of the story's rich 51 complexities," was the way Said voiced his complaint.

The research suggests that both Newsweek and, particularly,

Time earned themselves exemptions from that form of criticism.

Absence of stereotypes

The heavy use of stereotypical labels in the magazines' report ing--another expected coverage trend--was not evident to a degree great enough to warrant significant consideration. Key descriptive words or phrases did reappear in both magazines throughout the initial five-month period, but never with regularity. Words (or variations there of) that appeared with some frequency were "fanatacism," "frenzy," 120

"anarchy" and "zealot." Time reported in its December 10 issue that,

"The confrontation between President Carter and the fanatical Imam has 52 caused a wave of anti-Americanism in the Muslim world." In its

January 7 issue, the magazine suggested that "the flames of anti-

Western fanatacism that Khomeini fanned in Iran threaten to spread

through the volatile crescent of crisis that stretches across the 53 southern flank of the Soviet Union." (Also important here is the reference to a "crescent of crisis, 11 which Said includes in his 54 list of "recklessly general and repeatedly deployed cliches.") In that same issue, Time made reference to Khomeini "whipping his 55 followers into a mass frenzy" and later, in describing a demonstra- tion at the U.S. Embassy, reported that "The frenzy reached a climax 56 at sundown Thursday." Time made mention of "a wave of anarchy un- 57 1 oose d 1n. I ran " 1n. 1"t s J anuary 7 1ssue, . wh"l 1 e Newswee k suggested in its December 24 issue that "More and more, Iran began to look like an 58 anarchy wrapped in a theocracy's robes." In their respective

December 10 issues, Time cited "Khomeini's brand of revolutionary 59 zealotry" while Newsweek referred to "The zealots who are running 60 Iran."

Besides the aforementioned reference to a "crescent of crisis,"

Time and Newsweek made one other use of what Said would call a tradi- 61 ditional stereotype: the assumed Shi'ite penchant for martyrdom.

This stereotype, Said has claimed, is "nonsense parading as relevant 62 'information' on Iran." The major observation with regard to the use of stereotyp~cal labels, however, is that they were used by Time and Newsweek so infrequently in their reporting that they failed to evolve as a serious coverage issue. 121

Additional trends

Other reporting tendencies detected in the magazines during the November through March period included an increased concern with the Sav.iet invasion of Afghanistan, starting with the January 7 issues, a preoccupation with possible hostage crisis impact on international economics and the Soviet role in Iran, a generally favorable portrayal of Bani-Sadr as an Iranian official the United States could deal with, and a heavy reliance on unnamed sources for information originating from the Carter Administration.

While Time and Newsweek regularly quoted Bani-Sadr, Ghotbzadeh, various members of the Revolutionary Council and, even, Khomeini, direct comment from the U.S. side usually was limited to President

Carter and State Department spokesman Hodding Carter. Conspicuously absent from reports during this initial period were direct quotes from

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew

Brzezinski. Among the nebulous U.S. sources cited by the magazines were: "U.S. official," "senior White House aide," "close associate of the president's," "Washington topsider," and "State Department brain-trusters."

Also, there was no strong evidence of either replicative re porting or blatant reporter involvement with the hostage crisis story during this initial research period.

Differences and similarities

Several innocuous but interesting discrepancies in coverage between Time and Newsweek were observed during the first five months of the hostage crisis. Among those discrepancies were the magazines' 122

spelling of key names such as Bani-Sadr (Newsweek spelled it "Bani

Sadr," Time "Banisadr"), Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari (Newsweek spelled it "Shariat...,.Madari," Time "Sharietmadari"), and the holy city of Qum (Newsweek spelled it "Qom," Time "Qum"). The magazines also differed in their spelling of Ayatollah (Newsweek spelled it "Ayatollah;'

Time "Ayatullah"), in their phonetic spelling of Ghotbzadeh (Newsweek spelled it "GOAT-buh-za-day," Time "Goht-zah-deh") and in their listing of an age for the spiritual leader Shariat-Madari (Newsweek reported 63 him to be 76, Time 81).

A major discrepancy in coverage involved the magazines' Febru ary 4 issues. Time carried no hostage reports that week, while

Newsweek detailed the important presidential election victory of 64 Bani-Sadr and a "Periscope" report suggesting that Carter's freeze of Iranian assets was "apparently having the desired effect in 65 Tehran."

The magazines were virtually identical with regard to their generally supportive reporting toward Carter, their presentation of emotional material, their avoidance of bias and stereotypical labels, and their frequent use of background material. Time and Newsweek differed in the amount of their coverage and in their placement of hostage reports under departmental headings. Time produced more hostage copy and displayed more variety in its use of reports and departmental headings.

Summary

The November through March research period clearly was domi nated by the overwhelming amount of coverage and the prominent play 123

given that coverage by Time and Newsweek. Equally important, how ever, was the fact that the majority of that coverage appeared during the first 2~ months of the crisis, before dropping off dramatically from mid-January through March. It was a period marked by the maga zines' willingness to publish material supporting the president and promoting national unity, by their occasional tendency to report emotion-evoking material (primarily through the use of photographs), by their general avoidance of bias and stereotypical labels, and by their generous use of important background material. It was, however, also a period marked by Time and Newsweek's failure to adequately publish reports presenting the Iranian perspective on the hostage situation--their greatest reporting flaw throughout the first five months of the crisis.

In this researcher's estimation, the first five months of the crisis represented a period of commendable reporting by Time and

Newsweek. Although there were obvious flaws, the magazines covered the story extensively, but also comprehensively through their use of background material. 124

NOTES

1 Frederick B. Hill, "Iran and the Press in Retrospect: Media Diplomacy--Crisis Management with an Eye on the TV Screen," Washing ton Journalism Review, May 1981, p. 26. 2 Ibid.

3"Dateline Teheran," Newsweek, December 3, 1979, p. 87. 4 David Altheide, "Iran and the Press in Retrospect: Network News Oversimplified and Underexplained," Washington Journalism Review, May 1981, p. 28. 5 Hill, Diplomacy, p. 27. 6 Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), p. 97.

7"Tehran's Reluctant Diplomats," Time, December 3, 1979, p. 64. 8 All figures involving the measurement of copy are based on the standard 13.5-pica column employed by both Time and Newsweek.

9"The Mystic Who Lit The Fires of Hatred," Time, January 7, 1980, pp. 9-21. 10 "Letter from the Publisher," Time, January 7, 1980, p. 3. 11 "A Challenge to Khomeini," Time, January 7, 1980, cover. 12 "Iran: The Test of Wills, Time, November 26, 1979, p. 23. 13 "The Symbolism of the Siege," Time, November 26, 1979, p. 44. 14 "u.s. Attitudes: Unity and Strength," Time, January 7, 1979, p. 18. 15 "What The U.S. Can Do," Newsweek, December 10, 1979, p. 40. 16 "u.s. vs. Iran: Calm But Tough," Newsweek, November 26, 1979, p. 34. 17 "Exit The Shah: Will It Help?" Newsweek, December 24, 1979, p. 20. 125

18 Ibid., p. 26. 19 I b'd1 ., pp. 20 -21 . 20 "The Storm over the Shah," Time, December 10, 1979, p. 25. 21 "Good Will Toward Men?" Time, December 24, 1979, p. 9. 22 "Two Steps Forward . " Time, March 3, 1980, p. 13.

23s a1'd , Islam, p. 98. 24 "Test of Wills," p. 20. 25 "How To Deal With Iran," Newsweek, December 24, 1979, p. 84. 26 "Iran's Revenge," Time, December 10, 1979, p. 5. 27 "The Iran Crisis," Time, December 24, 1979, p. 3. 28 "Hating the u.s.' " Time, January 7, 1980, p. 6. 29 "Han of the Year," Time, January 21, 1980, p. 10. 30 "Test of Wills," p. 22; "U.S. vs. Iran:," p. 34. 31 "Test of Wills," p. 20. 32 "Iran: Is There A Way Out?'' Newsweek, December 10, 1979, p. 38.

33u'We Wept Together,'" Newsweek, January 7, 1980, p. 23. 34 "The Storm," P· 27; "What U.S. Can Do, II p. 40. 35 "The Economy Becomes a Hostage," Time, November 26, 1979, P· 40. 36 "Pawns in Iran's Power Struggle," Newsweek, March 17, 1980, p. 27. 37 "No Hare Mr. Nice Guy?" Newsweek, December 10, 1979, p. 42. 38 "The Storm," p. 27. 39 "A Mullah's View: 'No Deal, Sir,'" Time, November 26, 1979, P· 31. 40 "'The U.S. Doesn't Give A Damn,"' Time, December 10, 1979, P· 41. 41 "An Interview with Khomeini," Time, January 7, 1980, pp. 26-28. 126

42 This general criticism of U.S. media performance in Iran is detailed throughout Edward W. Said's book, Covering Islam (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981). 43 "Is The Shah Guilty?lf Newsweek, December 10, 1979, p. 44. 44 "'Through Blood and Fire,"' Time, December 24, 1979, p. 12. 45 "Another Ayatullah Is Angry," Time, December 24, 1979, pp. 15-16. 46 "How Iran Keeps Ticking," Newsweek, March 31, 1980, pp. 40 and 43. 47 "Beheshti Flows with the Tide," Time, March 31, 1980, p. 29. 48 "The Mystic," pp. 9-21. 49 "Portrait of an Ascetic Despot," Time, January 7, 1980, pp. 22 and 25. 50 "'People Are Scared to Death,'" Time, January 7, 1980, pp. 30-33.

51saJ. "d , Covering Islam, p. 96. 52 "The S torm, " p. 24 • 53 "The Mystic," p. 10. 54 s a1.·d , c over1.ng· I s 1 am, p. x1..· 55 "The Storm," p. 24. 56 Ibid., p. 26. 57 "Portrait," p. 25. 58 "Exit The Shah:," p. 21. 59 "Precautions Against Huslim Anger," Time, December 10, 1979, p. 42. 60 "Is The Shah Guilty?" Newsweek, December 10, 1979, p. 44. 61 "An Ideology of Hartyrdom," Time, November 26, 1979, p. 32; "Iran's Hartyr Complex," Newsweek, Nove~ber 26, 1979, p. 40.

62s aJ."d ' Covering Islam, p. 92. 63 When the magazines differed in style, the preferred usage of the New York Times was used. However, the magazines' preferred style 127

was used when quoting the magazines directly.

6411A Sick Imam, a New President," Newsweek, February 4, 1980, pp. 55-56. 65 "Iran Complains About the U.S., 11 Newsweek, February 4, 1980, P· 21. CHAPTER VI

DATA AND IMMEDIATE FINDINGS

Coverage from April 14, 1980, through August 18, 1980 1 Newsweek called the statement "breath-taking." The New 2 Yorker was not as kind, labeling it "incomprehensible." A senior

White House aide tried to explain it, saying: "He's recognized that a President's got to do other things. You can't hold the nation 3 hostage indefinitely."

Only days after the tragic, April 24 failure of an attempted

U.S. rescue of the hostages in Tehran, Jimmy Carter decided to tell the American people he would end his six-month seclusion in the White

House and begin campaigning for re-election. The problems before him, 4 the president said, "were manageable enough now."

His choice of words may have been questionable. His timing even more so. But for regular White House observers, the statement no doubt came as little surprise. The president had been building up to just that kind of action. Carter had ordered a ban on travel to Iran and on financial transactions between anyone in the United States and persons 1n. I ran. 5 He had urged American journalists to "minimize as 6 severe1 y as poss1"bl e t h e1r . presence an d t h e1r . act i v1t1es . . 1n . I ran, and by mid-May, it was widely acknowledged that administration sources were "hinting" to reporters that they should consider devoting less 7 attention to th_e hostage issue. Even within the White House, where

128 129

for several months every opportunity had been taken to emphasize the 8 cr1s1s,. . t h ere were s1gns. o f c h ange. 111 ln almost every one of those

three-minute speeches that the President made to some group visiting

the White House, he brought up the hostages, 111 the New York Times

-quoted one White House official as saying at that time. "'Now, he

never brings the subject up. ' 119 Flying the flag at half-mast and the

use of other symbols to remind Americans of the hostages, the Times 10 also reported, had stopped. It was clear at that time that Carter was seeking both a downplaying of the hostage issue by his administra-

tion members and an accompanying de-emphasis of hostage news by the

American media. It is clear from the research of Time and Newsweek

that--whether in response to Carter or not--that is exactly what hap-

pened. In the major trend of the April 14 through August 18 period,

the magazines continued and intensified a practice of reduced hostage

story coverage, first detected in January, and exhibited for the first

time a tendency not to include Carter Administration statements in

their Iran reports.

Coverage emphasis

After publishing almost 2,000 inches of hostage-related copy combined during the November through March research period, Time and

Newsweek, in the 16 issues sampled from April 14 through August 18, published fewer than one-half that amount (986 inches). Averaging almost 103 inches of hostage-related copy per sampled issue during the first five months of the crisis, the magazine dropped to an average of 61~ inches of hostage-related copy per issue from April through

August. 130

As it had been during the inital research period, Time was

the more prolific of the two magazines from April through August, de-

spite publishing only seven issues containing hostage reports to

Newsweek's nine. Time printed 513~ inches of hostage-related copy

(an average of 73 inches per sampled issue), while Newsweek ran 472~

inches of hostage-related copy (an average of 52~ inches per sampled

issue). Even more dramatic was the drop in coverage by the magazines

following both the aborted rescue mission and Carter's request that the

media de-emphasize the hostage story. In the sampled issues from

April 14 through May 12 (the May 12 issues being the last in which the

magazines heavily addressed the rescue mission), Time and Newsweek,

combined, published 673~ inches of hostage-related copy (an average of

112~ inches per sampled issue). During the 12-"l...reek period from

May 26 through August 18, however, the magazines published just 312~

inches of hostage-related copy (an average of 31~ inches per sampled

issue).

An interesting comparison--and a graphic illustration of the o\ ~rap in hostage coverage--shows that in its January 7 "Man of the Year"

issue, Time published more inches of hostage-related copy (374~ inches)

than the magazines did together in their sampled issues from May 26

through August 18 (312~ inches). The glaring exceptions to this

general trend of reduced coverage were Time and Newsweek's May 12

issues, examining in post-mortem fashion the aborted rescue mission.

Time published three reports, totalling 190 inches of hostage-related

copy, and 10 photographs, while Newsweek ran five reports totalling

180~ inches of hostage-related copy, 13 photographs, one cartoon and

one graphic. Included in Time's coverage that issue was a 74-inch 131

report detailing administration changes resulting from the aborted 11 rescue mission. An 81-inch report recounting the rescue mission was 12 the main Newsweek report that week.

Also reduced during the April 14 through August 18 period were the number of hostage-related reports and hostage-related photographs published by the magazines. After running 68 reports from November through March, Time and Newsweek published only 33 during the second research period (18 by Newsweek, 15 by Time), and after publishing 148 hostage-related photographs during the initial five months of the crisis, the magazines printed only 85 during the April through August period (47 by Newsweek, 38 by Time). More than one-fourth of those photographs (23) appeared in the magazines' May 12 issues. Also interesting in comparison is the use of sidebars by the magazines.

While almost two-thirds of Time and Newsweek's hostage-related reports during that first five-month period were sidebars (42), only five of

33 took that form from April through August.

Several possible explanations for American media's reduced coverage of the hostage crisis during the late spring and summer months of 1980 have been voiced, including the dispersal of the hostages from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran following the rescue attempt, increased interest in other international and national developments (i.e., the flight of Cuban refugees to the United States), and a second expulsion 13 of U.S. journalists from Iran. Some have speculated that the reduction in coverage and emphasis was self-imposed by the media, which suspected its own disproportionate attention to the crisis had created an atmosphere of political pressure leading to the fatal rescue . . 14 ffil.SSJ.On. 132

Certainly all of these proposed factors played a role in the coverage de-emphasis, but the most widely tendered theory--and perhaps the most plausible--was that the media simply acquiesced under presidential pressure. As John Herbers revealed in his New York Times report on the trend, "A number of officials and public opinion special ists cite the Iranian situation as an example of how even a weakened

Presidency has the power to set the context in which, and the degree 15 to which, public issues are discussed around the country."

A complete explanation of this trend may never be discovered.

What is clear from the research, however, is that after strongly em phasizing the hostage crisis in their coverage for much of the initial five-month research period, Time and Newsweek turned almost 180 degrees from that policy in the second five months of the crisis, de-emphasizing their hostage coverage significantly.

Also reflecting this trend of de-emphasis during the April through August period was the magazines' presenting of hostage-related reports, photographs and other editorial elements in a less-prominent manner.

Of the 16 issues sampled during the period, none included covers directly addressing the hostage crisis, and only three had covers that carried hostage crisis implications (Time, May 12 and July 21; News week, May 12). Time published two covers which promoed hostage reports in the upper right-hand corner (May 12 and July 21), while Newsweek chose not to promo hostage reports on any of its covers during this period. Surprisingly, neither magazine chose released hostage Richard

Queen as the subject of its July 21 cover, although Time did promo the 133

16 story in the upper right-hand corner with a photograph of Queen.

By comparison, Time and Newsweek had devoted seven covers to hostage

reports or reports with hostage implications during the November

through March period.

Although both magazines' May 12 covers focused on the naming

of Edmund Muskie to succeed Cyrus Vance as secretary of state in the

rescue mission aftermath, it was Newsweek's cover that week that came

the closes·t to addressing specifically the hostage crisis. Pictured on

the cover were 2-inch-by-3-inch photographs of Muskie, Vance and

Carter and a headline reading: "Rescue Mission in Washington." All

four elements were superimposed against a large photograph of a des 17 troyed C-130 plane and the charred remains of an American soldier.

The trend of reduced prominence carried into the tables of

contents, as well, where Time promoed only two hostage-related reports with an abstract and mini-photographs and incorporated only three

other hostage-related reports with unrelated reports into a broader

promo abstract. During the first five months of the crisis, the maga

zine had promoed five hostage-related reports, by themselves, with an abstract and mini-photograph, and used three other hostage-related

reports in broader promo abstracts. By contrast, Newsweek continued

to prominently play hostage reports in its tables of contents during

the April through August period in what was a major coverage difference between the magazines. Newsweek promoed four hostage-related reports with an abstract and mini-photograph and one hostage-related report with only an abstract in five of the nine issues sampled in the period.

From November through March, the magazine had promoed five hostage

related reports with an abstract and mini-photograph and used another 134

hostage report as part of a broader promo abstract.

As was the format in the initial research period, all promoed

reports were set apart from the departmentalized material.

After making hostage reports the first reports in 10 of their

issues during the November through March sample period, Time and News

week devoted that type of prominence to hostage reports only five times

from April through August (three times by Newsweek, twice by Time).

More importantly, the five hostage-related reports that served as lead

stories all were published in the May 12 rescue mission issues or

earlier in the research period. Neither Time nor Newsweek used a

hostage-related report as the first report in any of its issues from

May 26 through August 18. Hostage-related reports were placed first

in the April 14, April 28 and May 12 issues of Newsweek and in the

April 14 and May 12 issues of Time, but were never placed higher than

page 24 in Time and page 30 in Newsweek following those May 12 issues.

Letters, too, reflected the general de-emphasis by the magazines

during this second five-month period. Newsweek included hostage

related letters in only three of its issues (April 28, May 26 and

August 4); publishing just five letters for the entire April through

August sample period. Only two Time issues included hostage-related

letters (May 26 and July 7) and the magazine published just seven

letters for the entire period. By comparison, Newsweek had published

16 hostage-related letters in four issues and Time 19 hostage-related

letters in four issues from November through March.

Other editorial devices frequently used to attach prominence or

significance to hostage reports during the November through March

period were conspicuously absent in the second five-month period. Only 135

two such devices were utilized from April through August, both by

Newsweek and both in its May 12 rescue mission issue. The magazine

grouped its four hostage-related reports under the rarely used depart

mental heading "Special Repore' and accompanied each of these reports

with a small logo in the upper left-hand corner depicting the damaged

propeller of an abandoned C-130 plane.

A significant aberation from the general trend of coverage de

emphasis during this period was Newsweek's use of its "Periscope"

section to communicate hostage-related news. The section is devoted

to reports of a more exclusive nature and carries with it strong agend~

setting implications through its placement and unique label. Newsweek

had provided front-of-the magazine prominence for hostage-related

reports four times during the initial five-month period and continued

that practice during the April through August period by displaying hostage-related reports in that section of its May 12, June 9, June 23,

July 21 and August 18 issues. None of the five hostage-related reports

placed there by Newsweek during the April through August period were

located farther back in the magazine than page 25.

Carter Administration references

Accompanying the reduced emphasis in coverage during the April

through August period--and serving as a second major trend--was Time

and Newsweek's marked departure from the use of quoted material either

from President Carter or his administration members. Whether causally related or not, the trend does reflect the successful mani

festation of a major part of Carter's quest for de-emphasis of the hostage issue, a quest that included his ordering of aides to downplay 136

the hostage crisis.

After quoting Carter and various administration spokes-

persons on a regular basis throughout the initial five-month crisis

period, Time and Newsweek radically reduced their use of those individ-

uals as sources from April through August. The magazines, in the 16

sampled issues of the second research period, quoted Carter only nine

times (five times by Time, four by Newsweek) and quoted "administration

spokesmen," "administration officials," "Carter aides," (or variations there of) only 15 times (11 times by Newsweek, four by Time). The magazines did not, during this period, reduce their use of quoted material from Khomeini, Bani-Sadr, Ghotbzadeh or other prominent

Iranian officials.

By comparison, Time and Newswee~ quoted Carter or administration sources more times in the four sampled issues comprising their Decem- ber 1979 hostage coverage than they did in the 16 sampled issues making up the entire April through August period. In December, the magazines quoted Carter 10 times (six times by Newsweek, four by Time), while quoting various administration spokespersons 16 times (nine times by Time, seven by Newsweek). Significant with regard to this trend, also, is that of the nine quoted references to Carter during the second research period, only two occurred during the 12 weeks following both the rescue mission and his appeal for de-emphasis. Similarly, of the

15 quoted references to administration sources during this period, only six occurred during those latter 12 weeks.

Increased negativism toward Carter

Another trend of the April through August period may best be 137

characterized as a subtle, but distinct, change in coverage tone

that saw both magazines more willing to report generally negative

news about the policies and decision-making of President Carter with

regard to the hostage crisis. This increased negativism was concen-

trated within the first two months of the research period, was apparent

only occasionally and was never the entire focus of a report. But it was, nevertheless, a distinct change in approach for Time and News- week, no doubt made more recognizable because the magazines had so

rarely published reports or parts of reports negative toward Carter

during the November through March period.

Interesting is the timing of this subtle change in reporting

tenor toward Carter, which emerged shortly after severe accusations were directed at the White House claiming that: 1) Carter had manipulated the media in an attempt to enhance his chances in the

Wisconsin and Kansas primaries, and 2) Presidential Press Secretary

Jody Powell had misled the press regarding the then-planned rescue mission.

The charge against Carter centered on his calling of a 7:20 a.m. press conference the morning of the April 1 Wisconsin and

Kansas primaries to herald a major breakthrough in the hostage nego-

tiations--a breakthrough that never materialized. Perhaps a hint of irritation is apparent in an account of the incident by Newsweek, which described it as "a stagy bit of media manipulation that led

Republican critics--and even a few Democrats--to accuse him [Carter] o f p 1 ay1ng. po 1"1t1cs . w1t . h t h e cr1s1s. . . 1118 Also detailed in the article was the disclosure that Powell had been directed to "stonewall" reporters about a letter sent by Carter to Khomeini containing an 138

"oblique" apology for past U.S. actions in Iran. Reported Newsweek:

"He [Powell] dutifully denied Carter had sent 'any such' message to

Khomeini 'or to any other Iranian official,' only to duck for cover the next day when the Swiss Embassy in Tehran confirmed it had relayed 19 the President's other messages to Bani Sadr."

The New York Times outlined Powell's deception of the press on the rescue mission in its May 2 issue, indicating that the press secretary had actually read histories of World War II to see how the

Allies had misled the public about D-Day. "The lengths to which Hr.

Powell went to mislead the public in general and the White House press corps in particular--for instance, by getting reporters to focus on mid-May as the headline for possible military action--are likely to serve as an interesting footnote to the luckless mission in the Iranian 20 desert," the newspaper wrote.

Whether these episodes in the late spring of 1980 piqued

American media in a way that would lead to increasingly negative coverage of the Carter Administration is pure speculation. What is apparent through the research of Time and Newsweek, however, is a change in their reporting tone that coincided ironically with those incidents. Examples of this change included an April 28 Time report on mounting tension between the United States and its allies on the hostage issue. The magazine explained that:

Probably no factor has more impeded America's ability to lead the alliance in the current crisis than the disdain that allied leaders have for Jimmy Carter. He is generally regarded as being inept and naive, and as a politician who has demonstrated his inability to set a foreign policy course, stick by it and execute it. • • • Concludes a top-ranking chancellery official in Bonn: "Carter's motives have been beyond question, as has been his integrity. It's been yis 2 lack of aptitude that has undermined his reliability." 139

Other isolated illustrations of this change were Time's suggestion that the resignation of Vance as secretary of state "raised questions about nothing less than President Carter's methods and judgment in forming foreign policy,'-,22 Newsweek 1 s reference to "the 23 chaotic style of Carter foreign policy., " Time's publishing of a question-and-answer session with Henry Kissinger in which the former 24 secretary of state was moderately critical of Carter, and Time's labeling of a Carter quote on the rescue mission as "one of the year's 25 more improbable euphemisms."

Although Time did publish one letter commenting favorably on the president in its May 26 issue, the section also included two lettem highly critical of Carter. The first read: "The raid seems so child- lishly conceived that one must assume it was not intended to succeed. 26 Was it Carter's Watergate, an attempt to self-destruct?" The second was more blunt: "The myth of King Midas is that everything he touched turned to gold. The reality of President Carter is that everything he touches turns to ruin. America needs a President who was born 27 under a lucky star." These were the only letters published during the five-month sample period directly addressing the performance of

Carter.

Tied to this trend was a marked avoidance by Time and Newsweek during the second research period to publish editorial material supporting or promoting national unity. There were no reports in the sampled issues in which Carter or other administration officials appealed for a bonding together of Americans, there were no photographs depicting

U.S. flag-dominated patriotic rallies, there were no photographs of shoppers signing cards for the hostages--all three of which were 140

heavily used by the magazines from November through March. The Ameri-

can flag, in fact, appeared in photographs only three times during the

five-month sample period: once each in the August 4 Time and Newsweek 28 (released hostage Richard Queen holding a small flag) and once in

the May 12 issue of Time (flag flying at half-mast during memorial 29 service for commandos killed in rescue attempt).

Continued practice of emotional reporting

Much as they had during the November through March period,

Time and Newsweek did make occasional use of editorial material during the second research period that could be viewed as an attempt

to create within their readers feelings of animosity toward Iran, or fan such feelings already held by those readers. This style of reporting, however, did occur to a far lesser degree during the April

through August period. Time and Newsweek presented such material heavily in photographs and occasionally in parts of reports--as they had in the initial five-month period--but discontinued their use of letters in this way. They had made regular use of inflammatory letters from November through March.

Certainly the numerous photographs published by the magazines depicting the grizzly aftermath of the failed rescue mission aroused

the emotions of Americans who viewed them. But perhaps none evoked more pathos than a 5-inch-by-3~-inch photograph placed at the bottom of page 27 in Newsweek's May 12 issue. It showed, simply, a grim- faced Joe Mayo leaning against a truck in the front of his Florida home, holding a photograph of his son, Joel, who had been killed during 30 the rescue attempt. Newsweek used a large photograph depicting the 141

mangled remains of a C-130 plane and the charred body of an American commando as the background for its t1ay 12 cover. The magazine had published the same photograph in its issue the previous week and suffered some criticism for running it again. Counseled one letter printed in the Hay 26 issue of Newsw·eek:

Printing the picture of a charred body of an American commando in your first issue after the rescue attempt was a crude but necessary part of reporting the story. Using a full-color blowup of the same scene as the ba§fground of your }fuy 12 cover was blatant sensationalism.

And a series of three photographs published in Newsweek's

August 18 issue left little question as to the message being communi- cated. They showed a crowd of what the magazine called "angry

Americans" taunting pro-Khomeini marchers, a Khomeini effigy strung up in a noose, and one screaming protester holding a sign that read: 32 "Go Back To Iran S.O.B's."

The use of reports to convey this kind of quasi-inflammatory material was even less prevalent from April through August than it had been during the initial five months of the crisis. And, as with the photographs, the reports used in this manner were concen- trated in the issues surrounding the rescue mission. This was a milder form of emotional reporting by the magazines and usually took the form of isolated quotes from any of several administration sources.

A representative example appeared in Time's Hay 12 issue. Carter, addressing the macabre public display by Iranians of American bodies following the disastrous rescue mission, was quoted as calling the display a "goulish action •.. a horrible exhibition of inhumanity.

This indicates quite clearly the kinds of people with whom we have been 33 dealing." 142

Emotional letters--:which had during the November through Harch period referred to Khomeini as anything from "scum" to "a snake in the grass"--were conspicuously .missing from the sampled issues of Time and

Newsweek during the second five months of the crisis. Neither magazine published any letters during this period which could fairly be called condemning of Iran. In fact, several of the published letters were critical of individual American actions, attacking hostage mother

Barbard Timm and self-appointed hostage negotiator Ramsey Clark for their trips to Iran against the wishes of Carter.

Continued absence of bias

Continuing a trend established in the initial research period,

Time and Newsweek did not demonstrate, consistently, any semblance of blatantly biased reporting in the sampled issues of the April through August period. As in the first five months of the crisis, the magazines were guilty of isolated instances of apparent bias. News- week, in its May 26 issue, referred to Khomeini as "the increasingly feeble old man," while in its April 14 issue, introduced its main hostage report with a somewhat subjective headline that read: "Iran 34 Breaks Another Promise." It must be emphasized, however, that these examples were exceptions to coverage almost completely void of glaringly biased references. In fact, as they had during the November through

March period, the magazines were com.rnendably fair in their reporting, regularly providing an Iranian answer .to U.S. charges and vice versa.

Rare aberations from this practice included an April 28 Time article which suggested Khomeini had violated the edicts of the Koran by 35 . hal d ing the hostages ~-but offered little counter-argument from 143

Khomeini--and an April 14 Newsweek report in which U.S. charges that

Iran had reneged on a negotiating promise were detailed, but Iranian 36 answers to that charge were not offered.

Closely linked to this--and representing a major trend in the reporting of Time and Newsweek during this period--was their failure to publish, in the sampled issues, any reports devoted largely or ex- elusively to the presentation of the Iranian perspective on the hostage crisis. The magazines had published only three reports of that kind during the November through March sample period and then, surprisingly, avoided that type of coverage entirely in the 16 issues making up the

April through August period. Of the almost 1,000 inches of hostage- related news published by the magazines during that period, none went toward the telling of Iran's side of the hostage story.

Continued presentation of background material

In marked divergence from the dramatic lack of Iran perspective reports--and continuing the repudiation of a widespread criticism aimed at American media's performance during the hostage crisis--was the comparatively large number of background reports again published by

Time and Newsweek during the April through August period. In apparent contradiction of Edward Said, Don Oberdorfer and others who had assailed the U.S. media for their failure to report beyond the crisis itself, Time and Newsweek had devoted nearly 500 inches in the sampled issues of that initial research peri~d to historical accounts of Iran, to reports on Iran's culture and people, and to articles analyzing the country's then-volatile domestic politics. 144

It was a reporting approach the magaaines not only continued but intensified during the April through August period.

Time and Newsweek, combined, published 10 reports in the 16 sampled issues of the second research period that were considered to make legitimate attempts at providing background into the hostage situation. Almost 300 inches of hostage-related copy were devoted to this type of coverage, with reports of this type appearing throughout the five-month period. And, when compared proportionately, it is evident the magazines actually increased their amount of background material during the April through August period. Time and Newsweek devoted 13 of 68 reports (19 percent) and 497~ of 1,950 total inches (25.5 percent) to background material on the hostage situation during the November through March period. By contrast, the magazines devoted 10 of 33 reports (30.3 percent) and 299 of 986 total inches (30.3 percent) to background material on the hostage situation during the April through

August period.

Although neither magazine assigned as much editorial space to background material in any single issue as Time had in its January 7

"Han of the Year" issue, they did spread their background coverage throughout the five-month period. Each magazine had one background report in April and one in May, Newsweek published one in June while

Time did the same in July, and Newsweek ran two background articles in 37 August to Time's one.

During the late spring and summer months of 1980, it had become clear to most hostage crisis observers that the return of the deposed shah to Iran was no longer the central issue for the militants who had seized the embassy. Rather, as hostage Kathryn Koob would point out 145

later, "The central issue was the breaking of the [Western] sphere of 38 influence in Iran and the putting down of America."

Still, the shah and developments which led to his overthrow re mained popular subject matter for Time and Newsweek during the April through August period. In its April 28 issue, Newsweek detailed the final months of the shah's regime and the diplomatic maneuverings 39 between Iran and the United States that occurred during that period.

The article, based on a Washington Quarterly report, discussed the bureaucratic rift which developed between National Security Adviser

Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance over whether to support the shah as well as Carter's reported inability to align him self with either side on the issue. Time and Newsweek published strikingly similar articles in their August 4 issues addressing the death of the shah and providing an historical analysis of his reign 40 and the events which led to its end. The reports provide a basic understanding of how and why Khomeini came to power.

Also frequently used as subject matter for background reports by the magazines during the initial research period were the teachings of Islam and the unsettled political atmosphere within the country.

Time and Newsweek touched on the first and emphasized the second during the April through August period. An April 28 report in Time focused on the claims of several "Islamic scholars" that Khomeini violated edicts of the Koran by retaining the hostages. Several aspects of Islamic law were addressed in the report with at least a better un 41 derstanding of the religion a probable result for most readers. The internal political strife infecting Iran at that time was an obvious area of reporting emphasis for the magazines during the second five- 146

month period as they examined the situation from several sides.

The attempt by Iran's leftist clerics to undercut the popularity and influence of then-Iranian President Bani-Sadr was detailed in a 42 May 26 Time report. The continual battles between Bani-Sadr and

Islamic Republic Party leader Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammed Beheshti for control of the revolutionary government were well documented in the article, which also presented a strong overview analysis of the major leftist parties vying for power within the country. The apparent goal of the report was to provide a fundamental understanding of the political turmoil that embraced Iran at that time.

An interesting examination of Ahmad Khomeini's role both as influential adviser to his father and as a force within the political power plays waged in Iran during that period was offered by Newsweek 43 in its June 9 issue, while Time, in its July 21 issue, presented a more in-depth analysis of the diminishing political clout of Bani-Sadr, whom the magazine called, "the saddest political casualty of the Islamic

Republic; his clerical enemies in the Revolutionary Council have reduced him to a figurehead chief executive, frustrating his every 44 move." An update on those political battles was offered by Newsweek as the major part of a report in its August 4 issue. The magazine out lined Khomeini's increased irritation with the Bani-Sadr regime, the rumored resignation of Ghotbzadeh as foreign minister and the impor 45 tant nomination of Hojetolislam Rashemi Rafsanjani as prime minister.

Through both the extent and variety of their background reporting, Time and Newsweek clearly established their willingness to go beyond the hostage crisis itself during the April through August research period. Once again, the magazinesacquitted themselves of the 147

charges of journalistic parochialism.

Reduced variety in use of departmental headings

One area in which the magazines were parochial during the April through August period was their presentation of hostage-related reports under departmental headings. Time and Newsweek simply did not cover the hostage crisis from April through August from as many foci as they had during the first months of the crisis, limiting their reports to only six regular departments. The trend marked a continuance in practice for

Newsweek but a radical change for Time.

Time had demonstrated diversity in its hostage coverage during the initial five months of the crisis by publishing hostage-related articles under the headings "Nation," "World," "Essay," "Press," "Behavior" and "Man of the Year." It was a practice that carried strong agenda- setting implications as the magazine showed--by design or not--the variety with which the hostage crisis had affected American life.

From April through August, however, Time restricted its hostage coverage to three departments: "World," "Nation" and "Religion."

Much as it had during the initial research period, Newsweek limited the majority of its hostage coverage from April through August to "International," "National Affairs" and "Periscope." The magazine did group its hostage-related reports in the May 12 issue under the heading "Special Report." Interesting with regard to Newsweek's coverage during this second research period is the frequency with which the magazine published hostage-related reports under the heading

"International." Newsweek ran reports under that heading in six of its issues, while running them under the heading "National Affairs" only 148 $

twice. Time, by comparison, published reports under its comparable

"World" heading in four issues and under its "Nation" heading in three.

This reduced variety in the use of departmental headings serves

to illustrate, again, the general de-emphasis of hostage-related coverage that dominated this period. Apparently placing the crisis

lower on their news agendas, the magazines correspondingly viewed it from fewer angles or approaches. Another important trend illustrated by this practice--and particularly by Newsweek's overwhelming use of

its "International" section--was the magazines' increased focus during

this period on the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) and Iranian politics and their reduced focus on the Carter Administration. Five sampled

Newsweek andfuur sampled Time issues carried hostage-related reports following the rescue mission. Four of those five Newsweeks and all four Times contained reports devoted either exclusively or in great part to discussion of Iranian politics or the Iranian Parliament.

Reduced use of stereotypes

The use of stereotypical labels in reporting the hostage crisis--a practice rarely resorted to by Time and Newsweek during the

November through Harch period--was apparent even less frequently from

April through August. Only four key words (or variations there of) appeared with any semblance of regularity in sampled issues of the magazines during the first five months of the crisis: "fanatacism,"

"frenzy," "anarachy" and "zealot." Of those four, only one appeared during the April through August period, and it appeared only once.

Newsweek, in its April 14 issue, made reference to "Iran's anarchic . . .. 46 po 1 J..tl..CS. The only other instances during the period which could 149 be claimed to legitimately approach the use of stereotypical labels were Time's charge in its May 26 issue that Khomeini's regime had 47 "slipped even closer to chaos," and Newsweek's reference in its

August 18 issue to militant attempts to "whip up the crowds. ,AS Only once did either magazine touch on what Said has called a traditional 49 stereotype of Iran or Iranians. In its August 18 issue, Newsweek described pro-Khomeini marchers as having "the defiant expression of

Islamic martyrs."50

The overwhelming observation for this period is that the magazines--by design or not--consistently avoided the use or misuse of stereotypical labels in their reporting on the hostage crisis. This trend can be seen only as a tribute to Time and Newsweek in this area.

Additional trends

Other coverage tendencies detected in Time and Newsweek during the April 14 through August 18 period included a distinct lack of reports focused on demonstrating crowds or other events which occurred in the immediate area surrounding the U.S. Embassy in Tehran (perhaps reflecting the correspondents' mandated absence from Iran for the great majority of the five-month research period); a general ignoring of the hostages themselves, their condition or location during the period of the rescue mission and then again later during the peak of Iranian

Parliament action; a general shift away from concern with the Soviet influence on the hostage situation; the continued use of unnamed administration sources (i.e., "White House topsider"); and, starting in July, a dramatically increased focus in reporting on the presidential campaign. 150

Differences and similarities

Discrepancies in reporting by Time and Newsweek were rarely detected during the April through August period, although the magazines did differ in their ·spellings of Ahmad Khomeini (Time spelled it

"Ahmed," Newsweek "Ahmad"). One interesting discrepancy occurred between two issues of Time, which reported on May 26 that Iranian oil 51 exportation was running at 2 million barrels per day, and then reported two weeks later in its June 9 issue that oil exportation was 52 running at 700,000 barrels per day --a difference that, while feas- ible, seems unlikely.

More significant were the differences in coverage between the magazines in their June 23 and August 18 issues. Time offered no hostage-related coverage in either issue. Newsweek, however, reported on June 23 that Khomeini had publicly confessed that Iran was in a 53 state of chaos, and then, in its August 18 issue, reported on the important arrest of nearly 200 Iranian men and women who had demon- 54 strated in front of the White House. The June 23 report was short and not prominently played in the magazine, but the August 18 article ran two pages and was promoed in the table of contents with an abstract and mini-photograph.

As they had been during the November through March period,

Time and Newsweek were strikingly similar, overall, in their reporting on the hostage crisis from April through August. Only in the June 23 and August 18 issues did they not virtually parallel one another in terms of amount, placement and focus of their coverage. Only twice did

Time publish reports addressing in some way the hostage situation that

Newsweek failed to match, and only three times did Newsweek have 151

hostage-related reports not matched by Time. As might be expected,

their coverage, overall, was very close, with the magazines virtually

identical in terms of amount and emphasis of coverage, references to

the Carter Administration, their increased negativism toward Carter,

their presentation of emotional material, their avoidance of bias and

stereotypical labels, their use of background material, and their

placement of hostage reports under departmental headings. One dif

ference was in the use of table of contents promos, with Newsweek making more frequent use of them.

Summary

Clearly, the April through August period was dominated by the distinct de-emphasis in hostage-related coverage by Time and Newsweek, both in amount and prominence of coverage. It was a five months that saw the magazines willing to be more critical of President Carter's policies and actions with regard to the hostages, and a five months in which they also dramatically reduced the frequency with which they quoted administration sources. Time and.Newsweek continued, during this period, to occasionally report in an emotional manner (particular ly through the use of photographs), continued to avoid blatant bias in their reporting, continued--and actually increased--their presenta tion of background material, and reduced the frequency with which they used stereotypes in their coverage.

In this researcher's estimation, the second five months of the crisis again saw commendable reporting on the parts of Time and News week. Although the extent of their coverage dropped, .their concern for insightful background reporting did not. Given the problems of an 152

expulsion from Iran and a presidential administration unwilling to discuss the crisis, their efforts were certainly adequate and, at times, exemplary. 153

NOTES

1 "Another Rescue Mission," Newsweek, May 12, 1980, p. 26. 2 "The Talk of the Town: Notes and Comment," The New Yorker, June 2, 1980, p. 29. 3 "Another Rescue Mission," p. 26. 4 Ibid. 5 "U.S. news teams now getting pressure from home on Iran," Broadcasting, April 21, 1980, p. 28. 6 Ibid. 7 "Another Rescue Mission," p. 25. 8 "Hostage Issue Recedes As the Administration Mutes Its Crisis Status," New York Times, 23 May 1980, sec. A, p. 17. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 "A Surprise at State," Time, May 12, 1980, p. 16. 12 "A Grim Postmortem Begins," Newsweek, May 12, 1980, pp. 29-35. 13 American correspondents were expelled from Iran again on April 23, not to be invited back until November, and then only to cover the Iran-Iraq War. 14 "The Talk of the Town: , " p. 2 9. 15 "Hostage Issue Recedes," p. 1. 16 "Iran Frees A Hostage," Time, July 21, 1980, cover. 17 "Rescue Mission in Washington," Newsweek, May 12, 1980, cover.

18 "Iran Breaks Another Promise," Newsweek, April 14, 1980, p. 24. 19 Ibid., p. 25.

20"How Jody Powell Misled Press on U.S. Aim in Iran," New York Times, 2 May 1980; sec. A, p. 10. 154

21 "Storm over the Alliance," Time, April 28, 1980, pp. 15-16. 22 "A Surprise at State," p. 12. 23 "Another Rescue Mission," p. 27. 24 "Kissinger: What Next for the U.S.?" Time, May 12, 1980, pp. 23-24. 25 "Raging Debate over the Desert Raid," Time, May 12, 1980, p. 32. 26 "Failed Rescue," Time, May 26, 1980, p. 4. 27 Ibid. 28 "A Glimpse into the Embassy," Time, August 4, 1980, p. 24; "Hostage Queen Looks Back," Newsweek, August 4, 1980, p. 31. 29 "Raging Debate over Raid," p. 32. 30 "Another Rescue Mission," p. 27. 31 "New Man at State," Newsweek, May 26, 1980, p. 4. 32 "Turnabout Is Foul Play," Newsweek, August 18, 1980, p. 37. 33 "Raging Debate over Raid," p. 32. 34 "Iran Breaks Another Promise," p. 24. 35 "Is the Ayatullah a Heretic?" Time, April 28, 1980, p. 55. 36 "Iran Breaks Another Promise," pp. 24-26. 37 "Who Lost Iran? The Postmortem Begins," Newsweek, April 28, 1980, pp. 24~25; "Is Ayatullah a Heretic?" p. 55; "The Leftists: A Waiting Game," Time, May 26, 1980, p. 31; "The Mullahs Chip Away at Bani Sadr," ~week, May 26, 1980, pp. 47-48; "The Son Also Rises," Newsweek, June 9, 1980, p. 61; "The Man Who Would Be President," Time, July 21, 1980, p. 29; "The Man Who Meant Well," Newsweek, August 4, 1980, pp. 41-42; "Food for Iran," Newsweek, August 18, 1980, p. 17; "The Emperor Who Died an Exile," Time, August 4, 1980, pp. 36-37. 38 Doyle HcManus, Free At Last! (New York: Signet Books, 1981), p. 179. 39 "Who Lost Iran?" pp. 24-25. 40 "Iran: The Death of the Shah," Newsweek, August 4, 1980, pp. 30-32; "Emperor Who Died Exile, 11 pp. 36-37. 155

41 . . 11 ls Ayatullah a Heretic? 11 p. 55.

4211 The Leftists, 11 p. 31.

43uThe Son Also Rises, 11 p. 61.

4411 11 Would Be President, p. 29.

4511Death of the Shah, 11 pp. 31-32. 46 11 lran Breaks Another Promise," p. 24. 4 711 The Leftists, 11 p. 31. 48 ••Turnabout Is Foul Play, 11 p. 36. 49 Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), p. xi. 50 11 Turnabout Is Foul Play, 11 p. 36. 5111 The Leftists, 11 p. 31. 5211 Pistol-Packin 1 Parliament," Time, June 9, 1980, p. 41. 53 "Khomeini Faces the Facts," Newsweek, June 23, 1980, p. 38. 54 11 Turnabout Is Foul Play, 11 pp. 36-37. CHAPTER VII

DATA AND IMMEDIATE FINDINGS

Coverage from September 1, 1980, through February 2, 1981

Total cost? Untold millions of dollars, easily. Manpower commitment? Hundreds if one only counts reporters, anchorpeople and the like; thousands, no doubt, if editors, producers, technicians and other staff personnel are included. Amount of planning? Weeks, certainly, and months in many instances. And why not? After all, a presidential inauguration occurs in .the United States no more than once every four years!

Everything seemed to be proceeding smoothly that second week in January 1981 as journalists representing every corner of the world began flooding in and Washington, D.C., tidied up for what regularly is one of its biggest shows. The expectations for thorough--if not brilliant--coverage of Ronald Reagen's taking of the presidential oath certainly appeared promising. This wasn't the first inauguration in

Washington. Many of the journalists had been there before, some many times. And they had become pretty good at covering this type of event.

Then, the reports began flooding in. First, ABC's Sam Donaldson reported on January 16--five days before the inauguration--that a final agreement between the United States and Iran had been reached in principle. NBC followed two day$ later with the claim that an agree-

156 157

ment had been concluded with Iran. And then the next morning--one day before Reagan was to be sworn in as 40th president of the United

States--CBS Radio interrupted its regular programming for a bulletin quoting a spokesperson for the Iranian news agency, Pars, as saying an 1 agreement had been reached.

What had appeared to be do-it-every-four-years, report-it-from- every-angle inauguration coverage suddenly, dramatically was made more complex. The media attention that had been so narrowly focused on what soon would take place in Washington now was sharply divided.

After more than 400 days in captivity, the American hostages apparent ly were on their way home. Jeff Gralnick, executive producer for ABC's

"World News Tonight," no doubt captured the feelings of most American media representatives at that time when he said: "We'd better be ready! 2 We'd better be damned ready!"

And they were, as they had been throughout the 14~-month crisis whenever the opportunity for extensive coverage had presented itself.

Nearly 1,000 journalists converged at the Air Force hospital in Wies baden and the nearby Rhein-Main Airport in Frankfurt to await the ex hostages.3 ABC alone estimated that ithad devoted between 200 and 225 4 people to its hostage coverage. And the coverage was, as might be expected, overwhelming. The Washington Star and rival Washington Post both published extra editions on January 21 to handle their hostage- inauguration news--the first Washington Post extra since the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963. The Milwaukee Journal began printing a special, eight-page wraparound section moments before the planes carrying the hostages left Tehran. It sold an extra 45,000 5 issues over the paper's normal press run of 320,000. NBC claimed 158

that it had more than 12 hours, 35 minutes of special programs on the ·6 hostages and their return. .ABC Radio reported that from January 16

through January 21, it aired 60 hours of live special coverage on the hostages, cancelling all non-news radio network broadcasts the day before the release. And Gralnick admitted that at one point on Janu- ary 19, so much hostage information was being transmitted via satellite from Frankfurt that "the signal had to be routed the otherway around 7 the world."

So intense was the competition among journalists for interviews with the hostages in Wiesbaden, said one State Department publicaffairs spokesperson, that attempted bribes in excess of $10,000 to government 8 officials and military personnel were not uncommon. That type of behavior by American correspondents was not, however, limited to West

Germany. Theresa Lodeski finally heard from her son, former hostage

Bruce German, at 4 a.m. January 21. But just moments after she had answered, one reporter grabbed the telephone away and started asking

German questions. Said German's half-brother, Ari Benjamin: "We had no idea how ruthless the press could be."

Perhaps capturing the mood of that one-week period best was

Marjorie Moore--wife of former hostage Bert Moore--who, at one post- release press conference, held up a T-shirt. It said, simply: "I 9 Survived The Media Seige."

The journalistic blitz that accompanied the release of the hostages was not one avoided by .Time and Newsweek. In fact, the voluminous coverage of the release by the magazines in their february 2, 1981, issues--along with a continued de-emphasis in hostage 159

coverage preceding those issues--serves as the highlight of the

September 1, 1980, through February 2, 1981, research period.

Coverage emphasis . I Perhaps the best way to analyze these five months of coverage with regard to emphasis is to divide the period into two parts: the first consisting of all sampled issues of Time and Newsweek-from

September 1, 1980, through January 19, 1981, and the second consisting only of the February 2, 1981, issues. So different was the coverage between those February 2 issues and the other issues in the period, that to group them would be misleading.

In the 20 sampled issues from September 1 through January 19, the magazines combined to publish only 722 inches of hostage-related copy (441~ inches by Newsweek, 280~ inches by Time), marking the con tinuance of a trend noted in the April through August period when the magazines combined in 16 issues to publish just 986 inches of hostage-related copy. Time and Newsweek actually reduced the amount of their coverage from September l through January 19 over what they had published the previous five months, averaging 36 inches of hostage-related copy during this third research period compared to the 61~ inches of hostage-related copy per issue they had published from April through August.

This general reduction in coverage by the magazines is madeeven more dramatic when compared to what Time and Newsweek did in their

February 2 issues. The magazines combined for an overwhelming 695 inches of hostage-related copy (355~ inches by Time, 339~ inches by

Newsweek), publishing nearly as much hostage-related material in those 160

two issues as they had in the sampled issues comprising the rest of that entire, 20-week, September 1 through January 19 period.

Time and Newsweek, combined, published 29 hostage-related reports from September through January (16 by Newsweek, 13 by Time), again down from the 33 published by the magazines during the April through August period. By comparison, the magazines combined to run

20 reports, alone, in their February 2 issues (11 by Time, nine by

Newsweek), the largest total for any one sample publication date during the entire 15-month research period, and the most reports published in any single sample issue by either of the magazines during the 15 months.

In a somewhat surprising aberation from this general trend of reduced coverage, Time and Newsweek increased their number of hostage related photographs from September through January over what they had published in the second research period. The magazines published

90 photographs in the 20 sampled issues from September 1 through

January 19 after publishing a combined 85 from April through August6

Use of hostage-related photographs was expectedly heavy in the maga zines' February 2 issues, with Newsweek running 38 photographs and

Time 33, again high totals for the 15-month research period in terms of combined use of photographs per publication date and number of photographs used per issue by the individual magazines.

Unlike the initial November through March and subsequent April through August research periods, no distinct trend involving the prominence assigned to hostage-related material was detected in Time and Newsweek during the final five~month period (February 2 issues included). The magazines had consistently displayed hostage-related 161 p • reports and photographs in a prominent manner implying significance during the first five months of the crisis, and then demonstrated a marked and consistent divergence from that policy during the April

through August period. The magazines had played hostage-related material less prominently during that period in covers, tables of contents promos, the editorial bodies of the magazines themselves, letters and other devices. From September through February, however, the magazines were inexplicably split with regard to the prominence they devoted to hostage-related material.

As they had during the de-emphasis-dominated second research period, Time and Newsweek published few hostage-related letters

(none by Newsweek and only five by Time) and only occasionally made hostage-related reports the first reports in their issues. Hostage crisis reports were the lead stories for Newsweek in its January 5,

January 19 and February 2 issues, while Time led with a hostage crisis report only in its November 10 issue. Important here was the difference in hostage crisis play by the magazines in their February 2 issues, with Newsweek giving the release front-of-the-magazine promi nence over the presidential inauguration and Time doing just the opposite.

Also continuing the de-emphasis trend during the September 1 through January 19 period was Time and Newsweek's reduced publication of editorial devices commonly used to attach significance to a story.

The magazines grouped hostage-related reports under unique departmental headings only in their February 2 issues ("Special Section" in Time and "Free At Last" in Newsweek) and only Time accompanied hostage related reports with special logos (an exploding oil barrel in its 162

October 27 issue and a yellow ribbon sash in its February 2 issue).

But, after failing to publish any issues from April through

August that carried covers directly addressing the hostage crisis,

Time and Newsweek published four such covers during the September

through February period. In addition, the magazines each had one

cover during this period that included a hostage-related promo (News week, January 5, Time, January 19), with Time also publishing one

cover that carried hostage crisis implications (October 27). The

covers directly addressing the hostage situation were from the magazines' respective November 10 issues and, of course, their

February 2 issues.

Worth discussing at some length are the November 10 covers, which included so many of the agenda-setting and emotional reporting

elements already discussed in this study.· Newsweek's cover that week was comprised of a background photograph of the always dour-looking

Khomeini, flanked on the right by a calendar showing the month of

November 1979 with the fourth circled in red and an armed militant

guarding the embassy gate in Tehran. Flanking Khomeini on the left was an American flag wrapped in barbed wire, with, placed in front of

it, a billboard-type sign reading "Pary For The Hostages 366 Days," a photograph of a wrecked C-130 plane and a framed, black and white

photograph of a blindfolded hostage. Laced around the flag, sign and photographs was a wide, yellow ribbon. The fact that it was the

cover, was so elaborately designed and carried with it the cover head

line "Year of the Hostages," implied strong significance being attached

to the hostage story by the magazine. The cover, therefore, carried

strong agenda-setting implications. Also, the use of an American flag 163

wrapped in barbed wire, the use of yellow ribbon, the use of a "Pray

For the Hostages " sign and the use of a photograph of the blindfolded hostage certainly could be viewed as attempts at evoking emo tional responses from Newsweek readers.

Time's cover that week took on more of a collage approach as it included photographs of Khomeini's eyes, the blindfolded hostage, an

American flag being burned, Bani-Sadr, an armed militant, and wreckage from the aborted rescue mission. In large yellow letters covering the middle third of the cover was the headline: "The Hostage Drama." Again, for many of the same reasons as Newsweek's November 10 cover, this effort by Time carried strong agenda-setting and emotional reporting implications.

Also breaking somewhat from the de-emphasis trend noted in the

April through August period was the magazines' use of table of contents promos, another indicator of attached story emphasis. Newsweek main tained its moderately heavy use of such promos from September through

February, promoing hostage-related reports by themselves with an abstract and mini-photograph in its November 10, January 5, January 19 and February 2 issues. The magazine also had promoed four hostage related reports by themselves during the April through August period.

Time, which had promoed only two hostage-related reports alone and had incorporated only three hostage-related reports into broader promo abstracts from April through August, promoed three hostage-related reports by themselves and incorporated five other such reports into larger abstracts during the September through February period. Hostage related reports used by them~elves as promos appeared in the November 10,

January 10 and February 2 issues of Time. 164

Newsweek, which deviated from the general de-emphasis trend of

the April through August period with its "Periscope" section, continued

in that direction from September through February. The magazine gave

hostage-related reports front-of-the-issue prominence four times in

its "Periscope" section (September 1, October 13, November 10 and

January 19) and twice in its similarly played "Update" section (Septem

ber 29 and December 8). Of those six reports published in the two

sections, only two were located farther back in the magazine than

page 17.

Carter Administration references

Another area in which the magazines broke from a trend first

noted during the April through August period was in their use of

President Carter or his administration members as quoted sources in

hostage-related reports. After quoting administration sources, in~

eluding Carter, on a regular basis during the initial five months of

the crisis, Time and Newsweek quoted the president only a combined

nine times and members of his administration only 15 times from April

through August. That tendency reverted back during the final five months of the crisis, however, as the magazines combined to quote

Carter 21 times (13 times by Time, eight times by Newsweek) in the 22

sampled issues making up the September through February period. Impor

tant to note here, however, is that of Newsweek's eight quoted refer

ences to Carter, seven occurred following the presidential election.

And of Time's 13 quoted references to the president, 12 occurred in the

three months following that November 4 election. Quoted references to

administration members similarly increased as the magazines--as they

had during the November through March period--regularly cited "Carter 165

strategists," "administration officials," "White House aides" (or

variations there of). Eleven such references were made in a single, 10 47-inch hostage report appearing in the November 10 issue of Newsweek.

Reduced negativism toward Carter

Another departure from what had become a common practice during

the April through August period was Time and Newsweek's reduction from

September through February in the amount of generally critical report-

ing directed toward Carter with regard to the hostage crisis. Much as

it had been during that second research period when the magazines in-

creased their negativism toward the president, the change to decreased negativism during the final five months of the crisis was distinct, but subtle. Time and Newsweek quoted individuals critical of Carter

less frequently while sharply reducing their own criticism and suspicion of the president's acumen into the hostage complexities. That is not to say the magazines renewed the style of reporting that marked

their performances during the initial November through March period when they regularly presented information supportive of Carter's actions. They were no more supportive during this period than they had been during the April through August period. And that is not to say Time and Newsweek categorically eliminated all negative references

to Carter. They continued to offer that general kind of comment, but

it was of a much less caustic nature and appeared far less frequently.

An illustration of this milder posture toward the president and his policies was offered in a November 10 Newsweek report, which,

in analyzing Washington's hostage gameplan, revealed that, "a number of officials now believe the Carter Administration mismanaged the 166

11 approach that was adopted at a number of critical points." This

assertion by Newsweek was the harshest criticism of the president

observed in the sampled issues from September through February and

represented a strong departure from the type of negative Carter comment

commonly seen in the April through August period. One reference with negative overtones worth mentioning--if only for its interesting nature--was made by Newsweek in its February 2 issue. Describing the

tension accompanying Carter's first meeting with the former hostages

in Wiesbaden, the magazine quoted one of the 52 as saying, "If he had 12 stayed any longer, I was going to pop him one."

Time and Newsweek did not, however, change their approach

toward publishing material supporting or promoting national unity during the September through February period. As they had from

April through August, the sampled magazines failed to include a single report in which Carter or an administration official appealed to

Americans to unite, and they published no photographs depicting

Americans gathering for patriotic rallies or the like--both of which were practices common during the initial five months of the crisis before dropping off dramatically from April through August.

Continued practice of emotional reporting

The letter was dated August 22, 1980:

There's so much I'd like to say, but I know an embrace would do more and mean more. • • • There's so much to say about how much I miss Barbara and the children. I love Barbara so much and will need her so much when this is over. • It's the understanding and compassion that will be so important. • • • As for the children, I have so many hopes and dreams for them, and I would like to be around and see them come true. Moreover, I want to be part of their lives and laugh with them while they're small 167

and really need me ..•. Let's hope and pray that this whole situation will end soon. I've been writing this for close to ten months now but, God in heaven, please, please answer our pleas.13

Then-hostage Barry Rosen's letter to his mother was not unlike many of the hostage letters Newsweek reprinted in its November 10 issue, showing in the hostages signs of despair, courage and even grim-faced humor. But Rosen's letter also was representative of a general reporting trend by Time and Newsweek during the September through February period. While occasionally offering emotion-evoking quotes or see- narios in their hostage reports, the magazines had, largely,relied upon photographs during the first two research periods to transmit any kind of emotional message to their readers.

As represented by Rosen's letter, however, that changed moderately during the September through February period. While still offering 14 photographs of a burning American flag, a Carter effigy being 15 16 flogged, and the charred remains of an American C-130 plane, among other visual images, Time and Newsweek used, more than at any other other time during the total research period, hostage reports to convey what might be called an emotional appeal. These apparent appeals appeared only occasionally--although consistently throughout the final five months of the crisis--and usually were visible only in parts of reports. They were, however, apparent with enough frequency to signify a distinct change in reporting approach by the magazines.

In addition to that November 10 Newsweek report devoted entirely to the reprinting of hostage letters--many of which were highly emotional in tone--both magazines assigned large amounts of space in their

January 5 issues to the recounting of Christmas messages relayed from 168

the hostages to their families by television. Representative of those

January 5 reports was this vignette which Newsweek used as the lead to

its main hostage article headlined: "Christmas Held Hostage":

She wore a yellow ribbon in her hair, and her voice trembled as she peered into the Iranian television camera. "Can you sing with me?" hostage Kathryn Koob, 42, asked her nieces and nephews back home in the United States. Then she broke into the old Christmas carol "Away in a Hanger." "Be near me Lord Jesus," she sang bravely. "Bless all the dear children in thy tender care--and take us to Heaven to live with thee there."l7

t1ilder, isolated instances of emotional coverage in parts of

reports--as had been the rule during the November through Harch and

April through August periods--also were evident in the final five months

of the crisis, including this lead to a December 22 Time report:

On the 400th day of captivity for the 52 Americans in Iran, the father of hostage Kevin Hermening raised the 400th U.S. flag at Hillcrest Cemetery in Hermitage, Pa. The flag had once flown over the U.S.S. Arizona, which 39 years ago fell under attack from the Japanese at Pearl Harbor.l8

As was the case during the second research period, no letters were published by the magazines from September through February which

fairly could be called emotion-evoking, the closest being a letter printed by Time in its September l issue in which hostage Donald R.

Hohman thanked all who had written letters to the hostages for "taking

the time to show your concern for us in this most trying situation."19

Increased bias

In another subtle change in reporting habits, Time and Newsweek went from a near complete avoidance of blatant bias during the initial

November through Harch and subsequent April 'through August periods to a

slightly more subjective coverage approach during the September through 169

February period. The magazines had been guilty of isolated instances of bias during those first 10 months of the crisis, but the instances were so mild and so infrequent as to completely invalidate any accusations of blatant bias. Those same instances of isolated bias mani~ fested themselves again during the September through January period, but with much greater frequency and much greater vehemence. The change was obvious, with a charge of increased bias completely justified.

Consistently apparent throughout the final five months of the crisis, the magazines' subjectivity intensified in concert with a stepping up of the hostage negotiations. It reached an apex during the final month of the crisis as it became clear that serious bargain- ing was taking place and a resolution of the hostage situation was near.

Newsweek left little question as to its position when it addressed President Carter's reaction to the televised hostage Christmas messages and Iran's initial demand of $24 billion for return of the hostages. The January 5 report declared:

The President's sense of frustration was understandable. Iran appeared to consider its demand for blood money a con cession and its propaganda broadcast a gesture of Muslim charity.20 The $24 billion ransom demand was patently absurd.

Time's main hostage report that same week may even have been more to the point. Although avoiding discussion of the $24 billion demand, the magazine made its feelings quite clear on the televised hostage messages. The lead of the report read: "The second annual Christmas scenario for exhibiting the American hostages was cruelly strung out by 21 Tehran's outrageous propagandists." Time did, however, focus on the 170

demand two weeks later when it reported that, "An intermediary Algerian role seemed important to the Iranian leaders, chiefly as a face-saving 22 device for backing down from their extortionary demands."

Evidence of bias also was apparent earlier during the five-month period in both magazines. Newsweek, in its November 10 issue, led off a hostage report with the question, "Why has the ordeal of the American hostages.lasted so long?" and then subjectively answered it in the next paragraph with this explanation: "The simplest answer is that the revo- 23 lutionary regime in Tehran doesn't play by the rules." That same week, Time reported a Khomeini intervention into an Iranian Parliament session might have produced a solution to the hostage situation, but that the Imam shm..,.ed no inclination to act. The magazine wrote: "On the contrary, in a major speech to the nation on Thursday, Khomeini reiterated his absurd charge of U.S.-Iraqi complicity in the invasion 7 of Iran, but he pointedly ignored the hostage issue:' ·4

And evidence of bias also was apparent in the magazines' last issue focusing on the hostages. In its February 2 issue, Time quoted

Rochester, N.H., patrolman Joseph McDermott as saying, "I am overjoyed.

I feel proud again," after receiving news of the hostages' release.

The magazine then added in the following paragraph: "Joy at the restoration of pride to a nation that had been humbled for too long by a puny tormentor was but one of the many reactions of Americans 25 to Iran's final release of the 52 U.S. hostages last week." Newswee~ in its February 2 issue, reported that Carter had hoped the hostages would be released before the inauguration. But, as the magazine forcefully contended:

It was not to be. Teheran, having helped in his ruin, piled on a final insult by holding the freedom flight on the 171

ground until just after the rite of succession and so ge priving Carter of a bow and a bit of refracted glory. 2

Time, however, reported that same week that the departure may have been . 27 delayed because of unruly crowds at the Tehran a~rport.

In counterpoint to the increased bias observed in the magazines from September through February was their continued practice of presenting opposite sides to most issues. As they had during the first 10 months of the crisis, Time and Newsweek regularly provided Iranian reaction to American charges and vice versa during the September through

February period. Rare exceptions to this included similar January 5 reports in which the magazines accused Iran of propagandizing through 28 the televised hostate Christmas messages and a February 2 Time report which detailed alleged acts of brutality committed against the 29 hostages by their captors. None of the three reports offered Iranian reaction to those charges.

Continuing a trend consistent throughout the November through

March and April through August periods, Tim~ and Newsweek only rarely published reports or devoted parts of reports to the Iranian perspective on the hostage issue. Time offered two such reports while News- week published none. In its September 1 issue, Time presented a question-and-answer article with Sadegh Ghotbzadeh in which the foreign minister addressed several important issues including why his government was insisting the United States compensate Iran for damages in 30 flicted by the shah's regime. And in its February 2 issue, the magazine offered a short report examining Iranian reaction to the final 31 hostage agreement. These were, however, the only reports of this kind, accounting for only 34 inches of the more than 1,400 total 172

hostage-related inches published by the magazines during this period.

Reduced presentation of background material

In an extremely significant break from previous reporting trends, Time and Newsweek all but ceased their presentation of background material in the sampled issues making up the September through

February period. The magazines, during the initial sample research period, had devoted nearly 500 inches of copy to historical accounts of Iran, to reports on Iran's culture and people, and to articles analyzing the country's then-volatile domestic politics. They then increased the percentage of copy devoted to those kinds of reports from April through August, publishing 10 background articles in the

16 issues comprising that sample period.

From September through February, however, Time and Newsweek reduced dramatically their propensity toward this form of coverage.

With the magazines focusing strongly on the presidential election during the initial two months of the period and on the escalated hostage negotiations during the last three, only three legitimate background reports were offered in the sampled issues. The first such report appeared in the October 27 issue of Time as part of a special section examining the Iran-Iraq War. The report con- centrated on the city of Tehran and how it had changed since the start of the border conflict with Iraq. Among several observations made in the article are that despite some panic hoarding of bread and other staples at the outset of the war, shops and supermarkets are well stocked with both Iranian and imported food, but that a shortage of fuel has resulted in rationing, which in turn has resulted in 173

cleaner air. 32

A second background report appeared in Newsweek's February 2 issue and speculated as to what would become of Iran following the release of the hostages, whose captivity, the magazine contended, "was one of the few elements binding the nation together." Among the possi- bilities suggested by Newsweek were that Iran and the United States would likely reach a reconciliation based on their shared interest in the stability of the Persian Gulf and that Iran's slumping economy would likely realize some relief following the dropping of trade sanctions against the country by Japan and Western Europe. 33 Iran's domestic politics, the subject of several background reports by the magazines during the first 10 months of the crisis, was touched on one last time by Time in its February 2 issue. Perhaps the most important observation of the report was that after a stormy summer, President 34 Bani-Sadr's popularity appeared to be rising.

Those three reports during the September through February period--while seemingly legitimate attempts at reporting beyond the crisis itself--represented a strikingly stark departure from what

Time and Newsweek had done during the first two research periods. The magazines had, during the first 10 months of the crisis, made not only a sincere, but a seemingly concerted, effort to present relevant background material. The final five months of the crisis, however, saw a near complete reversal in that kind of reporting by the magazines.

Continued reduction of variety in use of departmental headings

With the exception of their February 2 issues, Time and Newsweek 174

did, during the September through February period, continue their practice of running hostage-related reports under a limited number of departmental headings. Time, after displaying hostage-related articles under several different headings during the initial November through

March sample period, limited such reports to its "World," "Nation" and

"Religion" sections from April through August. The magazine altered little from that second approach in the sample issues running from

September 1 through January 19, placing hostage-related reports only under the departmental headings "World" (six issues), "Nation" (three issues) and "Economy and Business" (one issue).

The final five months of the crisis saw Newsweek simply continue a trend it had established and maintained from that first November 12,

1979, issue. In the sampled issues from September 1 through January 19, the magazine ran its hostage-related articles under the departmental headings "International" (seven issues), "National Affairs" (three issues), "News Media" (one issue) and "Periscope" (four issues). Also, for the first time in any of the sampled issues examined since the start of the crisis, Newsweek ran hostage-related reports under the departmental heading "Update" (two issues). Standing apart from this general trend were the magazines' February 2 issues.

Time, which had on several occasions during the first five months of the crisis shown great variety in its placement of hostage related reports under departmental headings, reverted to that initial approach in its final hostage issue. Besides its main "Special Sec tion," the magazine also placed hostage-related reports under the headings "Economy and Business," "Press" and "Embassy." Newsweek's comparable issue that week saw hostage-related reports displayed under 175 the unique heading "Free At Last" and under the more common "News

Media." Again, with the magazines concentrating strongly on the presidential election during the first two months of this period, this continued reduction in variety perhaps reflects a placing of the hostage crisis lower on the news agendas of Time and Newsweek.

Continued reduction in use of stereotypes

A commendable reporting quality observed in the magazines throughout the November through March and April through August periods was continued during the final five months of the crisis as Time and

Newsweek consistently avoided the use of general stereotypical labels of Iran, its culture and its people. Key descriptive words ("fanati- cism," "frenzy," "anarchy" and "zealot," or variations there of) which had appeared only seldomly during the first two research periods, were avoided entirely by the magazines in the sampled issues from September through February. The only references during the five-month period which could be claimed to remotely approach stereotypical label usage were Newsweek's discussion of Iran's "Whirligig" Parliament in its 35 November 10 issue, and Time's reference to "the pandemonium that 36 passes for government in Iran" in its November 10 issue. Most of the stereotypical references during the initial 10 months of the crisis had suggested that Iran's revolutionary government was tending toward either anarchy or chaos.

Neither magazine, during the final five months of the crisis, made any use of what Said has termed traditional stereotypes of Iran 37 (i.e., the "crescent of crisis" or "Shi' ite martyrdom"). An interesting reporting habit somewhat linked to the stereotype issue and noted 176 in the magazines' final three issues of the sample period was their frequent use of the term "Great Satan" as a euphemism for the United

States. Time and Newsweek seemingly used the reference--so often ob served in quoted material from Iranian officials throughout thecrisis- in a sarcastic mocking of the Iranians.

As was the case in the November through March and April through

August periods, the magazines' near categorical avoidance of stereo typical labels from September through February can only be viewed as an encomium to their efforts in this area.

Additional trends

Other coverage tendencies detected in Time and Newsweek during the September 1 through February 2 period included an increasing focus by the magazines on the presidential campaign from the start of the period through the November 4 election date, the continued heavy reliance on unnamed administration sources for quoted material, a general ignoring of the hostages' condition or location except in the magazines' November 10, January 5 and February 2 issues, a near com plete concentration on the hostage negotiations from the magazines'

November 10 issues through the end of the crisis, and a frequent con solidating of Iran-Iraq War and hostage stories into single reports.

That final trend perhaps reflected, in part, the Iranian govern ment's policy change toward American correspondents which allowed them into the country on November 15, but only to cover the war. Reports leading with the hostage situation but incorporating information on the escalating border confrontation appeared in the October 27, November

24 and December 8 issues of Newsweek, and the October 27, November 24 177

and January 19 issues of Time.

Continuing a trend established in both the November through

March and April through August periods, neither magazine evidenced replicative reporting or strong reporter involvement during the final five months of the crisis. The latter, however, was most evident in reports focusing on the hostage families that appeared in the January

5 and February 2 issues of Time and Newsweek.

Differences and similarities

As they had during the April through August period, Time and Newsweek rarely offered discrepancies in their reporting from

September through February. The major factual difference in their coverage was tied to the financial aspects of the negotiations, with

Newsweek consistently claiming the United States held $12 billion in frozen Iranian assets, and Time consistently reporting that the figure was $13 billion.

Another interesting difference involved the magazines' descrip tions of the near-simultaneous release of the hostages and swearing in of Ronald Reagan as president of the United States. Newsweek led into one of its February 2 hostage reports with a scenario depicting the hostages boarding two Air Algerie jets at Mehrabad Airport in Tehran and then taking off. The following paragraph read: "He [Reagan] stood at almost precisely that moment on the West Front of the Capitol • . •

He had placed his hand on a crumbling family Bible and been sworn as 38 the 40th President of the United States •.• " Time, by comparison, reported that "Reagan, at 11:57 a.m., took the oath of office," and later indicated that "the Algerian crew at the first plane's controls 178 was not permitted to roll the craft down the runway until 12:33 p.m., . . .. 39 Was h1ngton t1me • • • Doyle McManus, in his comprehensive book on the entire hostage crisis, reported a 12:25 p.m. (Washington time) 40 liftoff for that first plane, seemingly contradicting the Newsweek report of simultaneous release and swearing in.

Again, the principal differences in the reporting of the magazines concerned when they did and did not offer hostage reports and how they played the reports they did publish. While Newsweek presented hostage-related reports of some kind in all 12 issues comprising the sample period, Time failed to report on the hostage situation in its October 13 and December 8 issues. Newsweek's October 13 report was marginally important--detailing the cessation of night flying by the 41 Iranian Air Force following the attempted April rescue mission --but its December 8 article offered a valuable, one-page update on the nego tiations42 not carried by Time.

A significant difference in placement between the magazines also centered on the February 2 issues. Newsweek gave the hostage release top play in the issue (starting reports on page 16) while running its inauguration reports second (starting on page 46). Time did just the opposite, giving top play to reports on Reagan's swearing in (starting on page 8) and running its hostage reports second (starting on page 24).

Summary

The September 1 through February 2 sample period was one marked by an initial continuation of de-emphasis first observed in the second five months of the crisis, and then an overwhelming crush of prominent 179

coverage on the hostages' release in Time and Newsweek's February 2 issues. The period saw the magazines increase their use of adminis tration sources for quoted material and reduce their presentation of editorial material generally negative toward President Carter. Time and Newsweek continued, from September through February, to occasional ly offer emotion-arousing material (increasing their use of reports or parts of reports in this practice). They also evidenced a subtle increase in biased reporting, (somewhat surprisingly) decreased their presentation of background reports, and continued to avoid the use of stereotypical labels in their coverage.

It was, overall, not as strong a coverage period for the maga zines as had been the November through March and April through August periods. The magazines' coverage was, no doubt, affected by the em phasis expectedly devoted to the presidential campaign, by the sometimes-clandestine nature of the hostage negotiations and by the simple duration of the crisis--after 10 months, Time and Newsweek may simply have exhausted their approaches to covering the story.

Nevertheless, the magazines' coverage was, overall, not as aggressive or intensive as it had been during the initial five months of the crisis and not as insightful and probing as it had been during the second five months. 180

NOTES

1 "Television's intercontinental triumph," Broadcasting, January 26, 1981, p. 20. 2 "'We'd Better Be Ready,"' Time, February 2, 1981, p. 73. 3 rbid. 4 "Television's intercontinental triumph," p. 20.

5"'We'd Better Be Ready;r•':~p.-.73. 6 "From Weisbaden to Washington," Broadcasting, February 2, 1981, p. 52. 7 "Television's intercontinental triumph," p. 20. 8 "From Weisbaden to Washington," p. 56. 9 '"We'd Better Be Ready, "' p. 73. 10 "Grim Lessons of the Long Crisis," Newsweek, November 10, 1980, pp. 57-60. 11 I b 1"d ., p ••58 12 "The Hostages Return~" Newsweek, February 2, 1981, p. 31. 13 "Letters From the Hostages," Newsweek, November 10, 1980, p. 63. 14 "Year of the Hostages," Newsweek, November 10, 1980, cover. 15 "Year of Torment," Time, November 10, 1980, 17. 16 "A Grim Pentagon Critique," Newsweek, September 1, 1980, p. 20. 17 "Christmas Held Hostage," Newsweek, January 5, 1981, p. 12. 18 "Gambits in the Hostage Game," Time, December 22, 1980, p. 17. 19 "A Hostage's Thank You," Time, September 1, 1980, p. 4. 20 "Christmas Held Hostage," p. 13. 21 "She Wore A Yellow Ribbon," Time, January 5, 1981, pp. 66. 181

22 "Wheeling and Dealing," Time, January 19, 1981, p. 31. 23 "G r1m. Lessons, II p. 57 • 24 "Hope for the Hostages," Time, November 10, 1980, p. 16. 25 "An End to the Long Ordeal," Time, February 2, 1981, p. 24. 26 "A Day to Remember," Newsweek, February 2, 1981, p. 19. 27 "America's Incredible Day," Time, February 2, 1981, p. 12. 28 "Christmas Held Hostage," pp. 12-15; "She Wore a Yellow Ribbon," pp. 66-69. 29 "Tales of Torment and Triumph," Time, February 2, 1981, pp. 30-34. 30 "An Interview with Ghotbzadeh," Time, September 1, 1980, p. 39. 31 "unrest in Iran," Time, February 2, 1981, p. 46. 32 "Tehran: Clean Air and Less Fuel," Time, October 27, 1980, p. 48. 33 "Iran: What Next?" Newsweek, February 2, 1981, p. 45. 34 "Unrest in Iran," p. 46. 35 "The Hostage Breakthrough," Newsweek, November 10, 1980, p. 48. 36 "Hope f or t h e Hostages, II p. 14 .

37 Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), p. xi. 38 "A Day to Remember," p. 18. 39 "Long Ordeal," p. 27. 40 Doyle McManus, Free At Last! (New York: Signet Books, 1981), p. 218.

41 "No Night Fighting in Iran," Newsweek, October 13, 1980, p. 37.

42"'The Wheels Are Spinning,'" Newsweek, December 8, 1980, p. 56. CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

As all significant research should do, this systematic analysis of Time and Newsweek's coverage of the Iranian hostage crisis not only answered several important questions regarding their performance in Iran, but also generated several more which, if addressed in the future by mass communication researchers, promise to shed additional light on the important role played in this country by the major newsmagazines.

Time and Newsweek were shown to be thorough disseminators of several levels of hostage-related news (overwhelmingly thorough at times), able, by virtue of their weekly publishing structure, to address significant topics from a variety of approaches or angles not always visible in other American news media. They were shown to be dynamic in their coverage, changing tone or focus to reflect changing conditions in Iran, changing conditions in the United States, or changing conditions throughout the rest of the world.

They were shown, for the most part, to be fair in their reporting during an emotional, tense, 444-day crisis that few Americans viewed as being fair. The hostage crisis largely was seen in this country as a one-sided argument. Working within that environment,

Time and Newsweek regularly sought out the.other sides and presented

r them in what almost universally were balanced hostage-related reports.

182 183

But Time and Newsweek also were shown, at times,to be negligent in their reporting of the crisis, failing to address issues which, if reported, would have supplied additional insight and depth to their hostage coverage.

Several strong conclusions on the magazines' coverage have resulted from this study, conclusions addressing not only the hypotheses which served as the structural foundation for the research, but conclusions which reach beyond the hypotheses. The rest of this chapter is divided with respect to that separation,- first presenting conclusions on the hypotheses and then presenting general conclusions.

Conclusions on the Hypotheses

The eight hypotheses of this study--with accompanying conclu sions--are:

HYPOTHESIS 1: The coverage by Time and Newsweek of the hostage crisis will be heavy early during the embassy takeover, will slacken during the spring and early summer months of 1980 and then pick up again in the fall of 1980. This coverage pattern will be consistent for both newsmagazines.

CONCLUSION: Although initially very heavy, the coverage by

Time and Newsweek actually began to decrease 2~ months into the crisis (not in the spring and early summer months, as hypothesized) and continued, with rare exception, at a reduced level throughout the final 12 months of the hostages' captivity. The coverage, as hypothesized, did not increase again in the fall of 1980 and did not approach the levels of intensity observed early in the study until the final, February 2 issuas (See Graphs 1 and 2 in Appendix). 184

HYPOTHESIS 2: The shape of that coverage also will change, with the Carter Administration cited regularly during that early period but mentioned only rarely following it. This coverage pattern will be consistent for both newsmagazines.

CONCLUSION: The shape of Time and Newsweek's coverage did change following the first five months of the crisis, as the magazines quoted President Carter and members of his administration far less frequently during the April through August period.

Those second five months also saw the magazines change their general portrayals of the president, occasionally presenting editorial content more critical of Carter's handling of the hostage situation.

Time and Newsweek regularly had presented editorial content generally supportive of Carter during the first five months of the crisis.

Although emphasizing neither supportive nor critical content on the president during the final five months of the crisis, the magazines did resume frequent quoting of both Carter and his administration members (See Graph 3 in Appendix).

These coverage tendencies, with regard to both the amount of hostage coverage and the shape of that coverage, were consistent for both magazines.

This hypothesis was established only in part: the amount of hostage coverage did not fluctuate according to the hypothesized time frame, but the shape of the magazines' coverage did, in fact, change, particularly with regard to the Carter Administration.

HYPOTHESIS 3: Time and Newsweek's coverage consistently will rely heavily on the use of stereotypical labels, including

"crescent of crisis," "frenzied mob" and the depiction of all Shi'ite 185

Iranians as martyrs.

CONCLUSION: Neither magazine made heavy use of stereotypical labels during the initial five months of the crisis and actually re duced their use of such labels during the second and third five-month periods. References to all Shi'ite Iranians as being martyrs were only infrequently made. Besides those rare references to Shi'ite martyrs, 1 only one other mention of what Said has called traditional stereotypes was observed in the sampled issues--that occurring when Time addressed 2 the so-called "crescent of crisis," in its January 7 issue. What little stereotyping was observed in Time and Newsweek usually addres~ the then-unstable Iranian political system.

This infrequent use of stereotypical labels was consistent for both magazines.

Clearly, this hypothesis was not established.

HYPOTHESIS 4: Time and Newsweek consistently will portray the militant Iranian students, the Iranian government and the Iranian people in generally negative terms, failing to present in-depth analysis of the crisis from the Iranian perspective.

CONCLUSION: Although Time and Newsweek did make negative or biased references toward Iran during the first two five-month periods, those references were isolated in occurrence and extremely mild in intensity. The references did, however, increase in occurrence and vehemence during the final five-month period, particularly during the final month of the crisis as the hostage negotiations intensified.

And while regularly presenting Iranian answers to American charges, and vice versa, in hostage-related reports throughout the 14~ months,

Time and Newsweek only rarely devoted entire reports or parts of 186

reports to the Iranian perspective on the hostage issue. The maga

zines offered only three such reports during the initial November

through March sample period (little more than 100 inches of the nearly

2,000 hostage-related inches published by the magazines during the period), offered no such reports during the April through August period (of the nearly 1,000 hostage-related inches published by the magazines during the period), and published only two such reports during the September through February period (only 34 inches of the more than 1,400 hostage-related inches published by the magazines during the period) (See Graph 4 in Appendix).

The incidence of negative or biased references and the general lack of Iranian perspective reports were consistent coverage features for both magazines.

This hypothesis is established only in part: negative or biased portrayals of Iran were not consistently made by the magazines during the 15-month sample period, but, both Time and Newsweek failed to adequately present reports addressing the Iranian perspective on the crisis.

HYPOTHESIS 5: Time and Newsweek will concentrate their cover age on events and individuals important to the crisis at a given time, rarely extending their reporting beyond the immediate hostage issue.

CONCLUSION: Time and Newsweek combined during the November through March sample period to publish 13 reports which examined the historical chain leading to the fall of the shah and the rise to power of Khomeini, the culture of Iran and its people, the framework of Iranian domestic politics and other topics which may have resulted in a better understanding of the country. The reports accounted for 187

one-fourth of the total hostage-related copy published by the magazfues during that period. The trend increased from April through August as

Time and Newsweek reported beyond the crisis itself in 10 reports that accounted for almost one-third of their total hostage-related copy.

The presentation of this kind of background material dropped sharply during the September through February period, however, with the magazines combining to publish only three such reports accounting for less than five percent of their total hostage-related copy.

The presentation of this background material (or lack there of during the final five months) was a coverage feature consistent for both magazines.

Clearly, this hypothesis was not established: despite the reduced publishing of background reports by Time and Newsweek during the September through February period, the magazines demonstrated an effort to provide readers with more than a fundamental accounting of the crisis itself. Their presentation of background material was enterprising and, many times, extensive.

HYPOTHESIS 6: Both Time and Newsweek will include in their hostage coverage reporting elements which could be construed as communicating an emotional appeal to their readers. They will accomplish this through the publishing of reports which, by their content, could arouse feelings of hostility toward Iran and the

Iranian people, and through the publishing of photographs, cartoons and other graphic elements which, by their emphasis on symbols such as the American flag, could arouse increased feelings of nationalism.

CONCLUSION: During the first two five-month sample periods,

Time and Newsweek occasionally used parts of reports for the presen- 188

tation of emotion-evoking material, but regularly used photographs to that end. From September through February, the magazines not only continued their use of emotion-evoking photographs but dramatically increased their presentation of emotional material in reports and parts of reports. Also used extensively in this way by the magazines during the initial five months of the crisis were their "Letters" sections. Examples of this type of reporting include Time and News week's publishing in their November 26, 1979, issues of photographs 3 showing militants using an American flag to carry garbage out,

Time's publishing of a cartoon showing a group of shackled, blind 4 folded individuals clustered beneath a dangling sword, and Newsweek's reprinting of hostage Barry Rosen's letter to his mother in which he says, among other things, "God in heaven, please, please answer our 5 pleas."

This presentation of emotional material was consistent for both magazines, and was one of the few reporting trends which remained consistent throughout the 14~ months of the crisis.

Clearly, this hypothesis was established.

HYPOTHESIS 7: Some correspondents for both Time and Newsweek will demonstrate through their reporting strong personal involvement with and empathy for the hostage families and a strong personal in volvement with the hostage crisis story itself. The involvement will intensify as the crisis concludes.

CONCLUSION: At no time during the 14~-month sample period did correspondents for Time or Newsweek openly demonstrate strong personal involvement with the hostage crisis story itself or the hostage families through their reports. The coverage by reporters 189

for both magazines suggested emotional detachment throughout the crisis--even during the final weeks when hostage family reports became more prevalent. Although such reports carried an implication of closeness between reporter and family members through the nature of the coverage, that implied closeness never was flaunted or abused by correspondents for either magazine. Overall, the coverage re flected the objective, uninvolved tone expected from reporters at that level of journalism.

Clearly, this hypothesis was not established.

HYPOTHESIS 8: Both Time and Newsweek will demonstrate quali ties of agenda-setting in their coverage of the hostage crisis. These will include their repeated use of hostage crisis cover stories and feature reports, their placement and display of hostage crisis reports in the tables of contents, their generally extensive coverage of the hostage crisis, and their reporting of the hostage crisis under any of several sections.

CONCLUSION: Of the 57 issues of Time and Newsweek comprising the 14~-month sample period, one-fourth (14) included covers either addressing the hostage crisis directly or carrying hostage crisis implications. Thirty-five of those 57 issues included tables of contents that promoed hostage-related reports either alone or as parts of broader promos. And of those 57 issues, one-third (19) included hostage-related reports as the first reports in those par ticular magazines. During the 14~ months, Time ran hostage-related reports under nine different departmental headings, including the attention-attracting "Han of the Year" and "Special Report." News week, during this same sample period, also published hostage-related 190

reports under nine different departmental headings. including "The

Crisis in Iran" and "Free At Last."

From this data, it appears clear that the hostage crisis re mained high on the news agendas of Time and Newsweek and was an event the magazines sought to keep high on the news agendas of the

American people for much of the 14~ months. Qualities of agenda setting unmistakably were present in the magazines' coverage.

Clearly, this hypothesis was established.

General Conclusions

In the reporting of any newsworthy event which extends over a protracted period of time, news media usually will exhibit both commendable and reprehensible coverage habits. Sustained brilliant reporting over a period of weeks, months or years is a quixotic notion certainly rarely observed at most levels of pro fessional journalism.

And such was the case with Time and Newsweek in their reporting of the 444-day Iranian hostage crisis.

In some areas, the magazines' efforts in Iran were notably questionable. Time and Newsweek certainly overpowered their readers early during the crisis and then again in their final hostage issues with a deluge of hostage-related reports and photographs that repre sented journalistic overkill at its classical finest. There were other areas, however, where the magazines would have done well to tell their readers a little more. A broad example would be the pre sentation of Iranian perspective reports. Only rarely did Time and

Newsweek exhibit a concerted effort in bringing to their readers 191

Iran's side of the hostage story. More parochially, the magazines failed to examine the student culture which, afterall, had initiated the hostage taking. Who were these young militants? What was their socioeconomic makeup? What political faction or factions did they subscribe to? Time and Newsweek overlooked telling their readers this in all 57 sampled issues comprising this study.

Like their counterparts in other American news media, Time and Newsweek were both manipulated and exploited by the student militants (particularly early in the crisis) and by the Carter Admin- istration. Then-Iranian Foreign Minister Abolhassan Bani-Sadr had made a frank appeal to the press three weeks into the crisis, explaining that, "We need to convey our message to the world. • For 6 this, we must use the media." America's two most powerful newsmagazines graciously obliged as their correspondents and photographers skillfully, and habitually, portrayed the chanting throngs and ubiquitous placards denouncing the deposed shah and the United States for crimes committed against Iran. But the manipulation was not limited to Iran. When it was obvious the president sought to use the hostage situation as a rallying point around which he could unite the country and gain badly needed support for his re-election interests, Time and Newsweek responded enthusiastically. Their reporters and photographers captured every slice of newly patriotic America from flag-waving townspeople in Seaside Heights, N.J., parading during an 7 anti-Iran rally, to shoppers in Natick, Mass., stopping to sign 8 Christmas cards for the hostages.

But when Carter made it clear in April 1980 that he wanted the hostage crisis de-emphasized, it was de-emphasized in both Time and 192

Newsweek. Certainly other factors can be claimed as the sources for

the magazines' suddenly decreased focus on the hostages in the late

spring of 1980. The timing of that de-emphasis, however, adds weight

to the argument that Time and Newsweek--as did all U.S. news media-

simply bent under presidential pressure, reducing the amount of their hostage coverage and playing what hostage coverage they did provide less prominently.

But for these faults, Time and Newsweek also provided reporting on the hostage crisis that only can be termed laudable. And here is where the main conclusion on this study lies. From this researcher's point of observation, the magazines' reporting efforts during the hostage crisis were largely commendable, at times exemplary and fre quently absolved from the common criticisms aimed at the American media's performance in Iran during those 444 days. Time and Newsweek were, overall, extensive in their coverage, they reported the crisis from several angles, they made sincere attempts at providing needed background, they were enterprising enough in their reporting to avoid the use of stereotypical labels and cliches, and they largely were fair in their coverage.

Stated directly, Time and Newsweek simply did a better job of reporting the hostage crisis than they have been given credit for by many critics.

Edward Said is recognized as one of the most ardent critics of U.S. media performance during the hostage crisis. His views have been widely disseminated, and most criticisms of American mediaefforts in Iran are contained in his book addressing the issue. A brief re counting of Time and Newsweek's hostage coverage with respect to 193

several of Said's main criticisms will illustrate this major con-

elusion on the magazines' reporting efforts.

Said's strongest criticism--and the criticism most frequently

repeated throughout his book--is that U.S. media failed to adequately

report beyond the crisis itself. Wrote Said:

When the American hostages were seized and held in Teheran, the consensus immediately came into play, de creeing more or less that only what took place concerning the hostages was important about Iran; the rest of the country, its political processes, its daily life, its per sonalities, its geography and history, were emminently ignorable: Iran and the Iranian people were defined in terms of whether they were for or against the United States.9

Certainly, Said must have been unaware of Time's December 24

report detailing the three major Iranian leftist parties and the broad

contention at that time that if Khomeini's regime were to fall, one of 10 those three factions likely would assume control; or Newsweek's

March 31 article examining the depressed economic conditions facing

the Iranian people, including unemployment, inflation and import-export 11 fluctuations; or Newsweek's June 9 report analyzing Ahmad Khomeini's

role as influential adviser to his father and as a force within the 12 political power struggle then being waged in Iran.

Another strong criticism leveled by Said is that U.S. media

failed to adequately examine Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, spiritual

leader of the revolutionary government. Wrote Said: "Ayatollah

Khomeini's image and presence took over the media, which failed to make much of him except that he was obdurate, powerful, and deeply 13 angry at the United States."

Certainly missed by Said in his research was Time's January 7,

1980, issue in which it named Khomeini its "Man of the Year." In- 194

eluded in that issue were a 160-inch cover story examining Khomeini's

rise to power and his status at the time of the hostage crisis, 14 a

43-inch sidebar offering a behind-the-scenes examination of the Imam's 15 personality and homelife, and a 71-inch question-and-answer article 16 with Khomeini, again helping to capture his character.

Also lacking in the coverage of American media, Said has con-

tended, were reports detailing the political in-fighting taking place

throughout much of the crisis between Bani-Sadr and Ayatollah Seyyed

Mohammed Beheshti, leader of the Islamic Republic Party. Said claimed

that:

. • • at moments Bani-Sadr seemed to triumph, then at others- principally during the late winter and early spring of 1980- the clergy (with Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti at their head) dominated. Very little of this struggle was reported in the United States while it was taking place.17

Again, Time and Newsweek are exempt from this criticism.

On March 31, Time examined the rise to power of Beheshti and the 18 threat he was mounting against Bani-Sadr's support. Newsweek

followed in its May 26 issue with a report detailing how Beheshti's

IRP party had captured 130 of 270 parliamentary seats in the country's

general elections, while Bani-Sadr's supporters had gained only 41

seats. The voting was analyzed as a severe blow to Bani-Sadr's posi-

t1on. as pres1.d ent. 19 And Time continued to follow the Bani-Sadr-

Beheshti struggle throughout the summer, reporting in its July 21 issue

that Bani-Sadr had become "the saddest political casualty of the

Islamic Republic; his clerical enemies in the Revolutionary Council 20 have reduced him to a figurehead chief executive."

Said claims that U.S. media practiced a form of replicative

reporting during the early part of the hostage crisis, merely re- 195

presenting the hostage-embassy oriented reports day after day and week after week. Wrote Said: "Not surprisingly •.• one did not learn very much from what was published during the first three months of the crisis. The media provided insistence, not analysis or in-depth coverage o f t h e s t ory I s r1c• h comp 1 ex1t1es.• • 1121

But, Time and Newsweek, during those first three months, reported the hostage crisis under 10 different departmental headings, offering reports ranging from the role being played by television in t h e cr1s1s,. . 22 to d omest1c . cond. 1t1ons . 1n . Iran s1nce . t h e revo 1 ut1on, . 23 to the possible psychological stress being suffered by the hostages wh 1.l e 1n. capt1v1ty. . . 24

Another specific complaint of Said's is that U.S. media largely ignored the influence of Henry Kissinger, David Rockefeller and others in securing the deposed shah's entrance into the United

States for medical care. Wrote Said:

.•• these facts, as well as the ex-shah's long-standing association with the Chase Manhattan Bank--which would have helped to explain Iranian animosities--were not connected causally to the embassy takeover. Instead, we were given numerous euphemestic explanations of the hostage crisis as the result of Khomeini's manipulation, difficulties at home, and the like.25

Both Time and Newsweek reported the pre-revolution relationship maintained by the shah, Kissinger and Rockefeller in their December 10 issues, detailing the steps taken by the Americans in bringing the 26 ailing shah to the United States.

Also argued by Said is that U.S. media made repeated use of a reporting tool during their coverage of the hostage crisis that he claims has become a staple of American reporting from that part of the world--stereotypical labels. Wrote Said: 196

• . . there is an unquestioned assumption that Islam can be characterized limitlessly by means of a handful of recklessly general and repeatedly deployed cliches. • They are used to cover a great deal of what the reporter knows nothing about.27

As has been repeated throughout this study, neither Time nor

Newsweek relied on stereotypical labels or cliches in their reporting on the hostage crisis, and what little incidence of stereotyping there was decreased strongly as the crisis proceeded. * * * Said's mistake with regard to Time and Newsweek lies in his failure to qualify those magazines as being frequently exempt from the criticisms voiced against U.S. media generally. The effect has been a grouping of Time and Newsweek's performances in Iran with several U.S. media representatives, including strongly conservative publications like The New Republic and the Atlanta Constitution.

Certainly applying a strong influence on the overall image of media efforts in Iran was the performance of American television. The medium's hostage coverage has been extensively analyzed and strongly criticized. Said, in fact, devotes large sections of his book to just that kind of criticism (in a three-page section of Covering Islam Said 28 strongly attacks the hostage coverage of the MacNeil-Lehrer Report).

Again, the problem with regard to Time and Newsweek is that Said seemingly has allowed the magazines' efforts to be lost among the diatribe aimed at television.

Also worth noting is Said's sample period. Although he does indicate his data was taken from a 10-week sample period in which he monitored eight daily newspapers, the three networks~ Time, Newsweek and PBS, he never indicates which 10 weeks were used or what precisely 197

made up his sample period. It can be assumed, however, from the coverage qualities he addresses, that he examined the first 10 weeks of the crisis. Yet, Said offers extremely broad criticisms of U.S. media encompassing the entire 444-day period, criticisms which hardly seem valid based only on a sampling period comprised of 10 of a total

63 weeks. Certainly, if Said had extended his research time frame and had examined Time and Newsweek throughout the 14~ months, his analysis of the magazines' performances would have been different.

In short, Said's criticisms against U.S. media performance during the hostage crisis are much too general. And while applying, perhaps, to some media agencies, they proved largely invalid when applied to Time and Newsweek.

Suggestions for future research

Often cited favorably by Said in his analysis of press coverage in Iran was the work of the French newspaper Le Monde and its corres pondent Eric Rouleau. A comparison of hostage coverage between U.S. news media and European news media seems promising, with, perhaps, a focus on how the reporting of correspondents whose country has no in volvement in an international event varies from those whose country does.

Also promising would be a study comparing Iranian hostage coverage with coverage of the similar, 1968 U.S.S. Pueblo incident in which 82 Americans were held captive 11 months; a cross-media study comparing, for example, the performance of U.S. newsmagazines with the performance of U.S. network television; a time-frame study to deter mine if, in fact, Time and Newsweek (or other media) did successfully 198

set the news agendas of the American people; and a more precise study

analyzing elements of media coverage of the hostage crisis quantita

tively, instead of qualitatively.

Suggestions for action

The major suggestion for action arising from this study with respect to newsmagazines in particular and news media in general involves the practice of media manipulation. The recommendation here is that news agencies take more aggressive steps to identify events in which manipulation is a distinct possibility and to avoid such manipu lation. Certainly there always is a degree of give and take during the most simple of interviews, but the degree of giving by U.S. media during the hostage crisis seemed particularly great. It was a level of exploitation they likely wish not to see matched in the future.

A second suggestion for action involves not the newsmagazines, nor the news media in general, but those who make regular practice of criticizing them. As evidenced by this study, strong, media-wide generalizations based on inadequate sampling is a dangerous exercise.

Such analysis should be based only on valid samples truly reflecting media performance and generalizing on overall media performance should be done judiciously and only when categorically applicable. 199

NOTES

1 Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (New York: Pantheon Books, .1981), p. xi. 2 "The Mystic Who Lit The Fires of Hatred," Time, January 7, 1980, p. 10. 3 "Iran: The Test of Wills," Time, November 26, 1979, p. 22; "U.S. vs. Iran: Calm But Tough," N~eek, November 26, 1979, p. 34. 4 "Test of Wills," p. 20. 5 "Letters From the Hostages," Newsweek, November 10, 1980, p. 63. 6 "Dateline Teheran," Newsweek, December 3, 1979, p. 87. 7 "The Storm over the Shah, Time, December 10, 1979, p. 25. 8 "Good Will Toward Men?" Time, December 24, 1979, p. 9. 9 said, Covering Islam, p. 50. 10 "Through Blood and Fire," Time, December 24, 1979, p. 12. 1111 How Iran Keeps Ticking," Newsweek, March 31, 1980, pp. 40 and 43. 12 "The Son Also Rises," Newsweek, June 9, 1980, p. 61. 13 s a1·d , c over1ng· I s 1 am, p. 6 . 14 "The Mystic," pp. 9-21. 15 Ibid., pp. 22 and 25.

16 Ibid., pp. 26-28. 17 said, Covering Islam, p. 94. 18 "Beheshti Flows ~ith the Tide," Time, March 31, 1980, p. 29. 19 "The Mullahs Chip Away at Bani Sadr," Newsweek, May 26, 1980, p. 47. 200

20 "The Man Who Would Be President," Time, July 21, 1980, p. 29. 21 s a~'d , c over~ng· I s 1 am, p. 96 •

2211 TV: Held Hostage?" Newsweek, December 24, 1979, p. 27. 23 "People Are Scared to Death, 11 Time, January 7, 1980, p. 30. 24 "The Trauma of Captivity," Time, December 24, 1979, p. 59.

25s 'd a~ ' Covering Islam, p. 111. 26 11Who Helped the Shah How Nuch?" Time, December 10, 1979, pp. 37-38; "The Kissinger Flap," Newsweek, December 10, 1979, pp. 49-50. 27 s a~'d , c over~ng· I s 1 am, p. x i . 28 Ibid., pp. 89-91. 201

APPENDIX

GRAPH 1

AMOUNT OF COVERAGE PER MAGAZINE MINUS FEBRUARY 2 ISSUES

,______.! Time ~ Newsweek 1,20 1,10 1,00 90 80 70 60 50 40 - 30 - 20 - 10 - Nov, 12- Apr. 14- Sep. 1- March 31 Aug. 18 Jan. 19

GRAPH 2

AMOUNT OF COVERAGE PER MAGAZINE INCLUDING FEBRUARY 2 ISSUES

Time 1\:'\.'\.SJ Newsweek 1,20 1,10 1,00 90 80 - 70 - 60 - 50 - 40 - 300 - 200 - 100 -

Nov. 12- Apr. 14- Sep. 1- March 31 Aug. 18 Feb. 2 202

GRAPH 3

NUMBER OF QUOTED CARTER REFERENCES PER MAGAZINE

Time f\\\\\1 Newsweek

Cll 14 Q) (.)r:: 12 Q) 1-1 Q) 10 4-1 Q) 1-1 8 4-1 0 6 . 4 z0 2

Nov. 12- Apr. 14- Sep. 1- March 31 Aug. 18 Feb. 2

GRAPH 4

INCHES OF COMBINED IRAlliAN PERSPECTIVE COVERAGE VS. TOTAL HOSTAGE COVERAGE

I I Total hostage f\S\'\1 I:anian perspec- coverage t~ve coverage

2,000 -- ;-- 1,800 -- ~ 1,600 -- -5 1,400 ,.....--- r:: -- •r-1 1,200 -- r:: 1,000 -- ,....._- ~ 800 -- '6 600 -- u 400 -- 200 --

['\. "'l '\ _:\._"! Nov. 12- Apr. 14- Sep. 1- March 31 Aug. 18 Feb. 2 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

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"Making of the Man: How Khomeini Stood the Test of Time." The Washington Post, 1 January 1980, sec. B, p:-1.

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"TV Diplomacy Shapes Events." Los Angeles Times, 30 November 1979, sec. 4, p. 42.

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Unpublished materials

Moore, Tim, and Clavier, David E. "The Mass Media Role in Terrorist Campaigns." Paper, Mass Communication Division Speech Communication Association Annual Convention, New York City, N.Y., 16 November 1980.

Correspondence

Elson, John T. Personal letter. 15 July 1982.