An Analysis of King Abdullah II's Attitude Towards Palestinian

Home , Hussein of Jordan

FRIEND OR FOE? AN ANALYSIS OF KING ABDULLAH II’S ATTITUDE

TOWARDS PALESTINIAN JORDANIANS, 1999-2019

AN HONORS THESIS

SUBMITTED ON THE TWENTY-THIRD DAY OF APRIL, 2020

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

IM PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

OF THE HONORS PROGRAM

OF NEWCOMB TULANE COLLEGE

TULANE UNIVERSITY

FOR THE DEGREE OF

BACHELOR OF ARTS

WITH HONORS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

______Isabel Morford-Cheibub

APPROVED: ______Mark Gasiorowski______Mark Gasiorowski Director of Thesis

______Geoff Dancy Second Reader

______Brian Horowitz Third Reader

Abstract

This thesis examines the relationship between Jordan’s King Abdullah II and

Jordanian citizens of Palestinian descent during the first twenty years of his reign. By analyzing the impact of social and political campaigns, popular protests, regional events

(e.g., the Second Intifada), and official decisions made by the king, this work seeks to demonstrate that Abdullah’s attitude towards Palestinian Jordanians has changed since he assumed power. Historical divides between East Bank and West Bank Jordanians have persisted throughout his reign, but the threat of a Palestinian uprising has diminished over the past 20 years. This thesis argues that while the Palestinian community in Jordan has become less concerning for the king, he still fears the impact that an influx of more

Palestinians could have on his claim to power. Furthermore, he faces new sources of popular dissent, particularly from young East Bank Jordanians.

Table of Contents

Introduction ……………………………………………………………...………………1

Chapter 1: Hashemite-Palestinian Relations in the 20th Century ..………………………7 a. King Abdullah I and the Early Palestinian Jordanians……………………………8 b. A New King and the Growing Palestinian Liberation Movement ………………11 c. King Hussein Rules Post-Black September ……….……………………………16 d. Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………19 Chapter 2: Defining a New Royal Attitude Towards Palestinian Jordanians …………21

a. The Priorities of the New King ………………………………………………… 21

b. Abdullah’s Crackdown on Hamas in Jordan …………………………………… 23 c. The Second Intifada Sparks Public Unrest in Jordan ……………………………25

d. A Call for Political and Social Change through the Jordan First Campaign …… 29

e. Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………… 32 Chapter 3: Attempts to Minimize the Palestinian Majority …………………………… 33

a. Revoking Citizenship from Palestinians ……………………………………… 34

b. Continued Social and Political Marginalization …………………………………40

c. The Arab Spring in Jordan ……………………………………………………… 43

d. Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………… 48 Chapter 4: Navigating New Domestic and Regional Politics After the Arab Spring … 49 a. The Impact of the Syrian Civil War on Jordan ………………………………… 50 b. Balancing Relationships with Other Leaders ……………………………………53 i. Israel …………………………………………………………………… 53 ii. The United States ……………………………………………………… 57 iii. The Gulf Cooperation Council Countries ……………………………… 61

c. Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………… 63

Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………… 65

Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………… 72

Introduction

The Middle East is notorious for being a region rife with conflict. For decades, there have been frequent civil wars, invasions, coups d’état, and other crises that have caused millions to be displaced. Despite lying in the center of the region, the Hashemite

Kingdom of Jordan has managed to keep its level of conflict low compared to its neighboring countries, largely thanks to the carefully considered decisions made by King

Hussein and King Abdullah II. Jordan is considered one of the most strategic countries in the Middle East due to its history of stability, commitment to negotiating regional peace, and willingness to work with traditionally more powerful countries, such as the United

States. Due to its location, Jordan hosts more Palestinians than any other country in the world. Some are registered as refugees with the United Nations Relief and Works

Agency, while others hold Jordanian citizenship. The Palestinian community has had a great impact on Jordan’s society, economy, and politics. While the impact has benefited the kingdom at times, there is no doubt that the Palestinian presence has created countless challenges for the monarchy to address and continues to threaten Jordan’s stability to this day.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, there have been four major waves of

Palestinians emigrating into Jordan. The majority fled to Jordan in the first two waves that resulted from the Arab-Israeli wars in 1948 and 1967, while the remaining two waves were smaller and followed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the Syrian

Civil War that began in 2011. Today there is widespread disagreement about how to determine who is a Palestinian living in Jordan, making it difficult to find official statistics reporting the percentage of the Jordanian population that is Palestinian.

However, estimates range from 40 percent to 70 percent, depending on the source, and most agree that they form the majority of the population. Those Palestinians who have

Jordanian citizenship are often called West Bankers because of their origin on the western side of the Jordan River. Meanwhile, Jordanian citizens who trace their ancestry to the Bedouin tribes that inhabited the land before Jordan’s founding are referred to as

East Bankers because of their history on the eastern side of the river.

Unlike many European monarchies, the Jordanian king is the supreme leader of the country. In general, the monarchy has expressed support for Palestinian liberation from Israeli occupation and has advocated for the Palestinians’ right to a sovereign state.

However, each king of Jordan has had a unique relationship with the Palestinians and their descendants in Jordan, due to the historic and continued volatility of their presence in the country. Jordan’s first king, Abdullah I, struggled to balance his nation-building agenda with the outbreak of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. He was eventually assassinated by a Palestinian nationalist in 1951, and it is believed that the principal motivation was the secret peace negotiation he had conducted with Israel.1 His grandson,

Hussein, survived the attack and assumed the throne in 1952.

During his reign, Hussein faced two more assassination attempts during the 1970

Black September conflict, when the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) tried to kill him and overthrow the monarchy. His general attitude towards Palestinian Jordanians is best described as wary and strained, although relations between the two parties began to warm in the last decade of his life. While the current Jordanian king, Abdullah II, has not yet faced assassination attempts, his reign is influenced by the turbulent history and

1 Avi Shlaim. Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement and the Partition of Palestine. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989.

tense present of the Palestinian presence in Jordan. However, unlike his predecessors, the current king no longer sees Palestinian Jordanians as his primary existential threat, and in fact views potential in improving his relationship with them.

This potential stems from the role that Palestinian Jordanians play in the

Jordanian economy. Following Black September, West Bank Jordanians were barred from most public sector jobs. As a result, they flooded the private sector of the economy.

By the end of the 1990s they owned 60 percent of the top 500 private companies and 92 percent of the banks in Jordan, and they continue to dominate it today.2 Since 1989 the monarchy has been moving towards a neoliberal framework as an attempt to strengthen the precarious economy. One of the unexpected results has been an increase in West

Bankers’ economic power. As such, they are often considered a political minority whose affluence poses a threat to the kingdom’s stability by potentially enabling them to wield power over the poorer East Bankers. Their dominant role in the economy also makes it impossible for the king to ignore their demands, thus exacerbating power inequality between the two groups.

East Bank Jordanians have been distrustful of West Bankers since the first wave of Palestinian refugees arrived in Jordan and threatened the social harmony of the country, and the economic reforms only aggravated preexisting tensions. Not only do the two groups compete for limited resources and job opportunities, each side also perceives the other as a threat to its own national identity. East Bankers are considered the monarchy’s most important supporters, and their dominance of important governmental positions scares some West Bankers, who fear their interests will be neglected. However,

2 Yitzhak Reiter. “The Palestinian-Transjordanian Rift: Economic Might and Political Power in Jordan.” The Middle East Journal 58, no. 1 (2004): 72–92.

the West Bankers’ economic power and uneasy political history worry some East

Bankers, who fear the same neglect.

This thesis will examine how the current Jordanian king, Abdullah II, has juggled these political, economic, and social concerns regarding the presence of Palestinians in

Jordan and how he has dealt with them over the past 20 years. His approach to the

Palestinian Jordanian community has not diverged far from that of his father in the 1990s.

However, he has had more success in reducing the threat that West Bankers pose to

Hashemite rule. This is largely because of changing external and internal factors weighing on domestic and regional politics. While Hussein reigned during the hopeful years of the Oslo peace process, Abdullah came to power months before the Second

Intifada marked the failure of that same process and a turning point in the Palestinian-

Israeli conflict. Similarly, Hussein initiated the privatization of the Jordanian economy with the promise of long-term benefits, but Abdullah held the throne when it became evident that those benefits were more prevalent in among West Bankers than among East

Bankers. Abdullah has also faced challenges that did not exist during Hussein’s lifetime, such as the role of social media in popular protests during the Arab Spring, the rapid increase of climate change, and the outbreak of a global pandemic.

This thesis will analyze how, in his pursuit of domestic stability, Abdullah has had to, and continues to have to, consider the presence of Palestinian Jordanians and their interests. Domestic stability in Jordan is important to the kingdom itself, as well as to the broader regional pursuit of peace. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the largest obstacles to peace in the Middle East, and Jordan’s geographic location and Palestinian

majority ensure that the country must play a central role in negotiating peace between the two parties.

Jordan also maintains peace with and between other countries in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies that have considerable influence in the region. Furthermore, the Hashemites have maintained amicable relations with world powers outside of the region, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, and continue to do so today. King Abdullah II’s policy decisions affect Jordan’s role in each of these relationships, and his decisions undoubtedly are influenced by his relationship with Palestinians in Jordan. Through a system of moderate repression, deliberate rewards, and a readiness to capitalize on any opportunity, Abdullah has steered his relationship with Palestinian Jordanians away from one of existential fear and towards one of potential alliance. The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate the evolution of this relationship in order to discern how it might develop in the coming years.

The first chapter of this thesis will provide a brief history of the relationship the previous Jordanian kings had with Palestinians living in Jordan, as well as a deeper explanation of the complicating factors, to contextualize the beginning of King Abdullah

II’s reign. The second, third, and fourth chapters will each address a period from

Abdullah II’s reign. The second will look at the king coming into his ruling identity in the shadow of the Middle East’s early 2000s conflicts, such as the attacks of September 11th and the resulting US war on terror. Covering the years from 1999 to 2003, this chapter will examine King Abdullah’s decisions regarding the presence of Hamas in Jordan, the

2002 Jordan First Campaign, and the Second Intifada. The third chapter will cover 2004 through 2012, focusing on Abdullah’s decisions during a time when he contended with

more internal concerns, especially the question of citizenship for West Bank Jordanians and the introduction of more neoliberal reforms. The fourth chapter will study the king’s decline in sympathy towards the Palestinian cause in the era of leaders such as Benjamin

Netanyahu and Donald Trump, over the period from 2013 to 2019. The final section will offer concluding remarks and projections for the future.

Chapter 1 Hashemite-Palestinian Relations During the 20th Century

In order to understand the current relationship between the king and Palestinian

Jordanians, it is necessary to consider the decisions made by King Abdullah I and King

Hussein that still impact the social, economic, and political dynamics of Jordan today.

Each king faced his own conflicts with the Palestinian community in Jordan, including

Abdullah’s assassination in 1951 and the attempted coup against Hussein in 1970. These events created a deep-seated fear of West Bank Jordanians that Abdullah II inherited and struggled to shake when he inherited the throne.

King Abdullah I ruled his independent kingdom for only five years before he was assassinated, but his short reign is important when studying the history of Hashemite relations with Palestinian Jordanians. He welcomed the first major wave of Palestinian refugees in 1948 and set the precedent of extending citizenship rights to them. However, he also failed to integrate them fully into Jordanian society, thereby encouraging the deep division between East Bank and West Bank Jordanians that has plagued the Hashemite monarchy ever since. King Hussein ruled for five decades and ushered the country through important domestic and regional changes. His supporters applaud his ability to suppress the Palestinian threat to the crown in 1970 and his success in starting to transition the economy towards neoliberalism, while his critics accuse him of mistreating citizens of Palestinian descent and betraying them by signing the 1994 peace treaty with

Israel.

The decisions and resulting conflicts from Abdullah’s and Hussein’s reigns continue to create tension today in the relationship between Palestinian Jordanians and

the monarchy. Although King Abdullah II has diverged from his predecessors in terms of his treatment of Palestinian Jordanians, his actions are influenced by the history of the relationship. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the historical context before analyzing the present-day dynamics.

King Abdullah I and the Early Palestinian Jordanians

On May 25, 1946, the Jordanian parliament ratified the Treaty of London, transforming the Emirate of Transjordan into the sovereign Hashemite Kingdom of

Jordan. King Abdullah I had already begun the process of state-building during his time as Emir of Transjordan, but independence meant that he and his government had more work to do. One of his greatest concerns at the outset was the ongoing conflict between

Zionists and Palestinians in the neighboring British Palestine.3 Throughout the 1940s,

Palestinians had been migrating to Jordan to distance themselves from the conflict, but it was not until the events of al-Nakba in 1947 and 1948 that massive numbers of

Palestinian refugees arrived in the kingdom.

Approximately 70,000 Palestinians fled to Jordan during those years. Most of them arrived during the peak of the conflict in the summer of 1948, following the Israeli declaration of independence. Jordan began occupying the West Bank militarily during that summer, and Abdullah formally annexed it in April 1950. This brought an additional

900,000 Palestinians under Hashemite rule, which had extended to only 450,000 subjects previously.4 Although annexation of the West Bank brought economic benefits for Jordan through its better-developed agriculture and tourism industries, the 200% increase in the

3 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. “History.” Last modified 2019. http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/history.html. 4 Luisa Gandolfo. Palestinians in Jordan: The Politics of Identity. London: I.B. Tauris, 2012.

population presented serious demographic obstacles.5 Most of the Palestinians remained in the West Bank, while East Bank Jordanians formed the majority of residents in Jordan proper.

Upon arrival in Jordan, Palestinian refugees registered with the United Nations

Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which had been created specifically for them.

Most of the refugees lived in camps that were meant to provide temporary accommodation until they could return to their homes. It was common for Palestinians to wear the keys to their houses around their necks to symbolize their intent to return home.

However, as the months drew on, they began to establish longer-term residency in

Jordan.6 In 1949, Abdullah I had the 1928 Nationality Law amended so that any

Palestinian residing in Jordan or in the West Bank or East Jerusalem could request

Jordanian citizenship. In April 1950, parliamentary elections were held and Palestinians who had accepted citizenship were able to participate. Shortly thereafter, Majlis al-

Nawab, the parliament’s lower house, approved the official annexation of the West

Bank.7

Following annexation, the Jordanian government instituted a quota that allocated

20 seats in Majlis al-Nawab to candidates from the West Bank. No quota was introduced for Majlis al-Ayan, the upper house of parliament.8 Majlis al-Ayan has considerably more power than Majlis al-Nawab. In light of the larger West Bank population the quota was seen as an insufficient measure to integrate Palestinians into Jordanian society. Similarly,

5 Rex Brynen. “Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 25, no. 1 (1992): 69-97. 6 Museum of the Palestinian People. Keys and the Right of Return. Last modified 2017. https://mpp- dc.org/gallery/keys-of-the-right-of-return/. 7 Usama Halabi. “The Legal Status of Palestinians in Jerusalem.” The Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics, and Culture 4, no. 1 (1997). 8 Gandolfo, Palestinian in Jordan.

Palestinians were encouraged to serve in the Jordanian military but were kept out of most leadership positions. Instead, these positions were filled by East Bank Jordanians as a reward for their loyalty to the monarchy. 9

Prior to Jordanian independence, Abdullah I had struggled to establish his legitimacy as ruler over Jordan because he was originally from the Hejaz region of

Arabia and had only moved to the Levant for a chance to reign. He developed a patronage system with Jordan’s tribal leaders in which he offered them tax breaks, trade benefits, land reform, and employment opportunities so long as they supported him.10

Meanwhile, the Palestine Mandate had developed more quickly than Jordan had, and

Palestinians were accustomed to large cities with health care, employment, and some trappings of democracy. When they began fleeing to Jordan, they were shocked by the nomadism, monarchy, and patronage system they encountered.11 It quickly became clear that East Bank Jordanians were favored over the Palestinians, and resentment stemming from that realization continues to cause problems today.

Following al-Nakba, Palestinians in Jordan began demanding that the Jordanian military take revenge on Israel for its occupation of their land. However, Abdullah I was hesitant to do anything that would jeopardize his state-building mission, especially anything that might upset Israel and its American and European allies.12 In early 1951, rumors began to circulate that Jordan and Lebanon were negotiating a peace treaty with

Israel. On June 20, while visiting al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, King Abdullah I was

9 Philip Robins. A History of Jordan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 10 Anne Mariel Peters & Pete W. Moore. “Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.” Studies in Comparative International Development 44, no. 3 (2009): 256-285. 11 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan. 12 Mary Christina Wilson. King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

shot by a Palestinian nationalist named Abdullah al-Tall. The assassination was supported by many Palestinians, who felt the king was not doing enough to support them. However, it also created strong resentment on the part of East Bank Jordanians and demonstrated the already-deep rift between the two groups.13 Today, Abdullah I is perceived as having been both helpful and harmful to the Palestinian cause: he was the only Arab ruler to offer citizenship to Palestinian refugees, but he also failed to incorporate them fully into

Jordanian society.14

A New King and the Growing Palestinian Liberation Movement

Abdullah I’s son, Talal, assumed the throne after his father’s death. He was in power for only one year before he was pronounced mentally unfit to rule. His son,

Hussein, became king on August 11, 1952 and proceeded to rule the country until his death in 1999.15 During the first few years of his reign, Hussein struggled to find his footing in the wake of his grandfather’s assassination and the continuing tension emanating from the Palestinian community in Jordan. Israeli forces often entered the

West Bank during those years, and their superior military capabilities led to more

Palestinian suffering. As a result, the Palestinian community in Jordan held protests to demand revenge through military action. King Hussein, attempting to maintain peaceful relations with Israel and Britain, refused.16 Simultaneously, military reforms in the mid-

1950s led to near-domination of the armed forces by East Bank Jordanians. The few positions that were open for Palestinians were low-ranking, fueling resentment over the

13 Robins, History of Jordan. 14 Wilson, King Abdullah. 15 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan. 16 Nigel Ashton. “The Bitter Aftertaste of Peace.” In King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008.

community’s second class position in Jordanian society.17 King Hussein also began directing more government spending towards the East Bank to build new schools, roads, and factories, causing complaints that the government favored areas with fewer

Palestinians.18

In 1964, Palestinian interests were advanced by the formation of the Palestinian

Liberation Organization (PLO) at the Arab League summit. The PLO, which based its leadership in Jordan, was established as a pseudo-governing organization to represent the interests of the Palestinian people and advance the movement to reclaim Palestinian land for its people.19 King Hussein declared his support for the PLO and its cause, despite the direct threat its existence posed to his reign. Although the Palestinian community in

Jordan struggled with marginalization, it continued to grow and threaten the demographic majority of the East Bank Jordanians in Jordan proper. If Palestinian Jordanians supported the PLO instead of the Hashemite monarchy, King Hussein would either lose a major portion of the population or be confronted with an uprising.20 Either outcome would endanger the stability of his reign.

In an effort to maintain control over the Palestinian community, the king did not relinquish control of the West Bank. Instead, he insisted that unity between the East and

West Banks was not an obstacle to Palestinian freedom. Palestinians saw Jordan as an occupying force in the West Bank and were angered by his position. As the PLO began to operate within Jordan, its leadership clashed with King Hussein, especially regarding

17 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan. 18 Robins, History of Jordan. 19 Oroub El-Abed., Jalal Husseini, & Oraib Al-Rantawi. Listening to Palestinian Refugees/Displaced Persons in Jordan: Perceptions of Their Political and Socio-economic Status. Edited by Tim Morris. 2014. 20 Avi Shlaim. Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008.

military action towards Israel. Throughout the 1960s, and especially after the 1967 Arab-

Israeli war, Palestinians launched numerous attacks on Israeli civilians and defense forces from Jordan, despite the king’s strong opposition. Furthermore, the PLO sought to establish itself as a ruling body through measures such as imposing taxes, which blatantly disregarded Jordan’s sovereignty.21 These clashes were complicated by the fact that multiple PLO leaders had Jordanian citizenship, and King Hussein could not restrain them without accusations that he was persecuting his own subjects. In 1968, he created a

7-point plan that was meant to improve his relations with the PLO, but this plan ultimately was received as patronizing and ineffective.22

It was in this context that another 250,000 Palestinians fled from Israel, the West

Bank, and the Gaza Strip to Jordan after the Arab-Israeli war in 1967. 140,000 filed as refugees with UNRWA, while the remainder already had Jordanian citizenship.23 Those who fled from the West Bank and did not yet have Jordanian citizenship could obtain it at this time, but after 1967 King Hussein stopped granting citizenship to Palestinians who migrated to Jordan. 11,500 of these refugees had fled from the Gaza Strip and set up a camp in the city of Jerash. Today, the camp is known as the Gaza Camp.24 Up until that point the Gaza Strip had been administered by Egypt, so those refugees were considered

Egypt’s responsibility. Instead of offering them citizenship, King Hussein gave each a temporary two-year passport and other necessary travel documents.25 Only some countries accepted these documents, thus limiting future travel for these Gazan refugees.

21 Ashton, “Bitter Aftertaste.” 22 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan. 23 Asem Khalil. Palestinian Nationality and Citizenship: Current Challenges and Future Perspectives. 2007. https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/8162/CARIM?sequence=1. 24 United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). “Jerash Camp.” Last modified 2013. https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan/jerash-camp. 25 El-Abed et al., Listening to Palestinian Refugees.

Furthermore, their lack of citizenship hindered their ability to integrate into Jordan’s society and economy.26 Today this population has grown to approximately 30,000 stateless residents of Jordan. They are also among the poorest members of the Jordanian population.27

While the 1967 War increased Jordan’s population, it decreased its territorial size, as Israel occupied the West Bank. The loss of the West Bank severely hindered Jordan’s economy, which was dependent on West Bank industries, and produced mass migration to Jordan’s cities. Amman grew from 43,000 residents in 1944 to 350,000 in 1967, when approximately 75 percent were Palestinian. This demographic shift exacerbated the existing hostility between the East Bank and West Bank populations, with each side’s nationalistic identity growing in reaction to the presence of the other.28 At the same time,

Palestinians were barred from most public sector jobs, which formed the bulk of the economy at that time. By 1970, Palestinian Jordanians held only 10 percent of the 35,000 public sector jobs but accounted for approximately forty percent of Jordan’s citizens.29

Furthermore, most families relied on remittances from relatives working in the Persian

Gulf states, which would not become a reliable source of prosperity for Jordanian nationals until the late 1970s. Before these workers started to see the benefits of the growing oil industry, many Palestinian Jordanians faced economic difficulties because of these dynamics.30

26 Khalil, Palestinian Nationality. 27 UNRWA, “Jerash Camp.” 28 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan. 29 Ibid. 30 Yitzhak Reiter. “The Palestinian-Transjordanian Rift: Economic Might and Political Power in Jordan.” Middle East Journal 58, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 72-92.

These social and economic tensions were aggravated in 1970 when Jordan, Egypt, and Israel negotiated a ceasefire and the Palestinian community in Jordan began protesting the decision. In June, there was armed conflict between the Jordanian military and multiple factions of the PLO calling for the overthrow of King Hussein. Although there were several attempts to assassinate the king and create a Palestinian state in Jordan during this period, they all failed.31 In September of the same year, one PLO faction, the

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), hijacked five airplanes with predominantly European, American, and Jewish passengers and landed three of them on an airstrip in Jordan. They took all the Jewish passengers hostage, as well as some who were not Jewish but had connections to the U.S. government. The hostage crisis lasted for five days, and King Hussein found the hijackers’ disregard for Jordanian authority deeply offensive and threatening to his reign.32 He therefore retaliated with a crackdown on

Palestinian guerrillas in Jordan, which produced thousands of Palestinian casualties and the exile of the PLO leadership. Known as Black September, this clash deepened the rift in the East Bank-West Bank relationship, as the king and many Jordanian civilians began to regard Palestinians as a threat to Jordanian sovereignty.33 Although 50 years have passed since this conflict and there has been no clash as severe between Palestinian

Jordanians and the state, the resentment and distrust on both sides, though subtle, continue today.34

31 Shlaim, Lion of Jordan. 32 Ibid. 33 Robins, History of Jordan. 34 Reiter, “Palestinian-Transjordanian Rift.”

King Hussein Rules Post-Black September

The early 1970s saw multiple assassination and coup attempts by the PLO and other Palestinian nationalists towards King Hussein and his inner circle. This included a failed assassination attempt on the king at the Rabat Summit in 1974.35 After that, the king dissolved parliament, which now contained equal numbers of East Bank and West

Bank Jordanians, and called for new elections. Of the 190 new members, only three were of Palestinian origin, reflecting the tension that continued after Black September.36 For the remainder of the decade, King Hussein maintained an uneasy relationship with the

PLO leadership, which moved from Jordan to Lebanon after Black September and then to

Tunisia in 1982, and began to distance himself from the Palestinian liberation movement.

Although the genuineness of his commitment to the movement had been questioned by

Palestinian Jordanians during the 1950s and 1960s, he had tried to portray himself as a true ally to their cause.37 He had also been carrying on the task of state-building and protecting the young nation from external threats, mainly from Israel. After Black

September, King Hussein became more concerned with domestic stability and allotted more of his attention to strengthening his relationship with East Bank Jordanians than to the needs of the Palestinian community in Jordan. The growing international recognition of the PLO helped him place more responsibility on the organization to meet the needs of

Palestinians in the West Bank and Jordan. Consequently, he was able to portray that shift not as a fearful reaction but as a natural decision in the interest of both Palestinians and

Jordanians.38

35 Shlaim, Lion of Jordan. 36 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan. 37 Robins, History of Jordan. 38 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan.

In 1983, King Hussein introduced a system of color-coded travel cards to distinguish between the different categories of Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship.39

East Bank Jordanians and Palestinians who had attained Jordanian citizenship in 1948 were not issued travel cards and needed only their passports to cross international borders. Palestinians who had moved from the West Bank to Jordan and attained citizenship in 1967 were issued yellow cards that allowed them to visit their families in the West Bank but forbade them from living there. Meanwhile, Palestinians with

Jordanian citizenship who still resided in the West Bank in 1983 were given green cards that enabled them to cross into Jordan but forbade them from staying longer than two months. Finally, Palestinians from Gaza who had temporary Jordanian passports were not issued travel cards and were only allowed to travel into the West Bank or Israel with special permission.40 These cards are still in use today.

The function of the green cards changed in 1988, when King Hussein announced that Jordan would disengage from the West Bank and that all West Bank residents holding Jordanian citizenship would lose that status.41 Although Israel had been occupying the territory since 1967, Jordan had maintained some governance authority under the notion that it was temporarily administering the West Bank until a Palestinian government could take over. With the outbreak of the First Intifada, King Hussein declared that severing all administrative and legal ties was the best way for Jordan to

39 Human Rights Watch. Stateless Again: Palestinian-Origin Jordanians Deprived of Their Nationality. 2010. https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/02/01/stateless-again/palestinian-origin- jordanians-deprived-their-nationality. 40 Refugee Review Tribunal. RRT Research Response: Jordan. 2009. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/12/04/JOR35401-Palestinians- West%20Bank.pdf. 41 Khalil, Palestinian Nationality.

show its support for Palestinian liberation.42 However, it is widely thought that he was really motivated by the deteriorating Jordanian economy and widespread domestic and international recognition of the PLO as the supreme authority on Palestinian matters.43

West Bank residents who lost their Jordanian citizenship were given temporary passports, like the Gazan refugees, and most residents who did not already have a green card were issued one.44 Although there are limitations to how long a green card holder can stay in

Jordan, the cards do allow West Bank Palestinians without Jordanian citizenship effectively to live in Jordan. However, they must leave the country regularly, and they do not have the same rights – especially in regards to voting – or opportunities as Jordanian citizens.45

Following Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank, King Hussein called for parliamentary elections in 1989. The electoral map no longer included the West Bank and was drawn in such a way that Jordan’s major cities, which were predominantly

Palestinian, were underrepresented. This resulted in both houses being composed mostly of East Bank Jordanians.46 In 1992, the king legalized political parties. The Islamic

Action Front (IAF) was formed as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and today is the leading opposition party in Jordan. The IAF is also the best representative of

Palestinian Jordanians in the political system, as most of its party members and support base are of Palestinian origin. Some of this support came after King Abdullah expelled the Hamas leadership from Jordan in 1999, leaving the IAF the primary Islamist party

42 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan. 43 Ibid.; Ashton, “Bitter Aftertaste;” Shlaim, Lion of Jordan. 44 El-Abed et al., Listening to Palestinian Refugees. 45 Refugee Review Tribunal, RRT Research. 46 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan.

operating in Jordan. Additionally, the party has opposed economic and political cooperation with Israel since its inception and frequently spoke out against the king’s complacency in the Oslo peace process in the 1990s.47 Although King Hussein had helped the Palestinians get a seat at the table at the Madrid Conference in 1991, he had no role in the Oslo negotiations. Furthermore, just two weeks after the Oslo deal was signed, he began negotiating a Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty. When this treaty was signed in

1994, the Jordanian public received the news as evidence that the king was prioritizing

East Bankers’ interests over those of Palestinians.48

Conclusion

King Hussein was diagnosed with cancer in 1992 and passed away in 1999, just weeks after naming his son, Abdullah II, as crown prince. His relationship with the

Palestinian community in Jordan was strained. Although he tried to leave a legacy of peace, Abdullah II inherited political, economic, and social turmoil.49 The assassination of King Abdullah I and the events of Black September created deep feelings of distrust toward Palestinians on the part of the Jordanian monarchy and the East Bank population.

Similarly, Palestinian Jordanians cite their exclusion from high-ranking military and government positions and policies like the color-coded travel cards as evidence that they have always been treated as second-class citizens.

The assassination of King Abdullah I and the events of Black September showed the monarchy that many Palestinian Jordanians were not satisfied with their status in the

47 Robins, History of Jordan. 48 Bruce Riedel. “The Oslo Accords at 25: The View from Jordan.” The Brookings Institution. Last modified September 11, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from- chaos/2018/09/11/the-oslo-accords-at-25-the-view-from-jordan/. 49 Curtis R. Ryan. Jordan in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002.

kingdom. Abdullah’s annexation of the West Bank may have been an attempt to better integrate Palestinians into Jordanian society, but it was perceived as a power play against an already vulnerable population. Furthermore, his secret talks with Israel were so offensive to Palestinian Jordanians that they were eager to welcome a change in leadership after his assassination. King Hussein lasted much longer than his grandfather had before he faced his own assassination attempt, but Black September demonstrated that there was still tension between the monarchy and Palestinian Jordanians. Throughout his reign, Hussein marginalized Palestinian Jordanians by keeping them out of public sector and military roles. He also displayed anti-Palestinian sentiment by not offering citizenship to Gazan refugees and changing citizenship and residency statuses after disengaging from the West Bank. He tried to disguise this sentiment by presenting these decisions are helpful to the Palestinian liberation movement, but his decision to normalize relations with Israel through the 1994 peace treaty showed that Palestinians were not his priority.

These historical dynamics have remained present throughout Abdullah II’s rule and have shaped his attitude towards Palestinian Jordanians. However, from the beginning of his reign he has taken measures to distinguish himself from his father and great-grandfather. Furthermore, regional and global phenomena, like the Arab Spring, increasing fears of Iran’s dominance of the Middle East, leadership changes, and climate change, have influenced how Abdullah has approached his relationship with Palestinian

Jordanians.

Chapter 2 Defining a New Royal Attitude Towards Palestinian Jordanians

When King Abdullah II took the throne, he was expected to rule in a similar fashion to his father. This included continuing the neoliberal economic reforms that

Hussein had initiated at the end of the 1980s and furthering the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. However, major events, like the Second Intifada signifying the collapse of the

Oslo peace deal, threw new obstacles his way. The Palestinian Jordanian identity began to change as hope for an independent Palestinian state diminished but concerns about inequality, particularly in the social and political realms, remained the same. In light of these developments, Abdullah began experimenting with his own attitude towards

Palestinian Jordanians that differed from that of his predecessors.

The Priorities of the New King

For most of his life, Abdullah expected his uncle, Prince Hassan, to rule after his father’s death. However, just weeks before Hussein passed away, he named Abdullah as crown prince. Abdullah had become a general in the armed forces just a year before and was unexpectedly thrust into the most powerful role in the country.50 To make matters more difficult, Abdullah came into power during a period of economic weakness. The economy had been worsening during the last two decades of his father’s reign, and the measures that King Hussein took to improve it had not paid off. Furthermore, the peace treaty signed between Jordan and Israel in 1994 failed to bring economic benefits to

50 Alan George. Jordan: Living in the Crossfire. New York: Zed Books, 2005.

Jordan that had been promised at the time of negotiations.51 Economic reform was more important to the new king than political liberalization.52 He saw a neoliberal model as the best way to carry out this reform and began privatizing state-owned industries and seeking more foreign investment and trade opportunities.53 By this time Palestinian

Jordanians dominated the private sector, owning more than half the market capitalization of both public and private companies in Jordan.54 Thus, Palestinian Jordanians benefitted more than East Bank Jordanians from the reforms, which did not help ease tensions between the two groups.

While King Hussein had begun the process of implementing neoliberal policies under the guidance of the IMF and World Bank, his son embraced it with more gusto because the economy was at the center of his domestic policy. This focus influenced his ideas for political and social change, such as strengthening Jordanian national identity and furthering the democratization process, as he sought policies that would please

Western countries and encourage them to invest in and trade with Jordan.55 Additionally, he did not have decades of political and emotional baggage complicating his decision- making process.56 With these differences in mind, Abdullah began his reign by initiating reforms and establishing his own relationships with various domestic and international groups, including Palestinian Jordanians.

51 Russell E. Lucas. “Jordan: The Death of Normalization with Israel.” Middle East Journal 58, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 93-111. 52 George, Jordan. 53 Curtis R. Ryan. "Political Opposition and Reform Coalitions in Jordan." British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 38, no. 3 (December 2011): 367-90. 54 Reiter, "Palestinian-Transjordanian Rift." 55 Scott Greenwood. "Jordan, the Al-Aqsa Intifada and America's 'War on Terror.'" Middle East Policy Council X, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 90-111. 56 P. R. Kumaraswamy. "The Jordan-Hamas Divorce." Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 3, no. 8 (August/September 2001).

Abdullah’s Crackdown on Hamas in Jordan

By the time Abdullah became king, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas, had been operating within Jordan for nearly a decade. The relationship between Hussein and Hamas had been amiable because it was mutually beneficial.

Neither side supported Yasser Arafat or his party, Fatah, as the leadership of the

Palestinian people. Additionally, favoring Hamas helped Jordan maintain its influence in the West Bank because of the movement’s large support base there.57 Throughout the late

1990s, Hussein struggled to juggle his tolerance of Hamas with the demands of other foreign actors, such as the United States, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority.58

Supporting Hamas won him some support from the public, who generally saw it as a better alternative to the PA because of its nationalism and charitable work in Gaza, while the United States and Israel were vital for sustaining the economy.59 Up until Hussein’s death, Jordan’s official policy towards Hamas was that its leadership was not based in

Jordan. Instead, there were Jordanian citizens who, by showing their support for Hamas, were simply embracing their freedom of expression.60

Within his first six months as king, Abdullah abandoned the existing policy of tolerance and began to crack down on Hamas. There were three primary forces influencing this decision. First, Hamas had increased its militancy, including by launching operations against Israel from Jordan. Some senior advisors to the king feared the growing similarity between Hamas and the PLO before Black September and warned

57 Kumaraswamy, “Jordan-Hamas Divorce.” 58 Ashton, “Bitter Aftertaste.” 59 Ed Blanche. “Refugees: Jordan's Nightmare.” The Middle East, no. 329 (December 2002): 20-24. 60 Kumaraswamy, “Jordan-Hamas Divorce.”

against allowing another conflict to happen.61 Second, Hamas had repeatedly violated the

1993 agreement between the group and King Hussein that determined how Hamas could exist legally within Jordan. The agreement restricted the scope of permissible activity but allowed certain freedoms, such as independent media.62 Finally, there was mounting pressure from the United States, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority to restrain Hamas.63

The Clinton administration considered the rise of political Islam one of the most important global threats and condemned groups like Hamas and regimes that supported them.64 Furthermore, Hamas was vocal about its opposition to the peace process, specifically under Arafat’s leadership, and there was widespread worry that the group would sabotage the peace process as it entered final status negotiations.65

On August 31, 1999, Abdullah ordered the closure of five administrative offices of Hamas located in Amman, as well as the suspension of the group’s news journal. The police also arrested about 20 members for conducting illegal political acts, such as holding membership in an illegal organization and carrying out military training outside the confines of the Jordanian armed forces.66 Two weeks later, Hamas Bureau Chief

Khalid Masha’al and Party Spokesman Ibrahim Ghosheh were arrested in the airport as they returned from a trip to Iran.67 Most of the members who were arrested held

Jordanian citizenship, while the few who did not were immediately deported. The regime faced a difficult decision regarding what to do with its citizens who belonged to Hamas.

61 Kumaraswamy, “Jordan-Hamas Divorce.” 62 David Hirst. “Jordan Curbs Hamas.” The Guardian (Beirut), November 21, 1999. https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/nov/22/israel. 63 Ibid. 64 Lucas, “Death of Normalization.” 65 Ely Karmon. “Hamas' Terrorism Strategy: Operational Limitations and Political Constraints.” Middle East Review of International Affairs 4, no. 1 (March 2000). 66 Ibid. 67 Hirst, “Jordan Curbs Hamas.”

The constitution forbids the expulsion of citizens, and there was public speculation about the precedent that might be set if Jordanians of Palestinian origin were to be expelled simply for supporting a Palestinian opposition faction.68 After a month of consideration,

Abdullah announced that the prisoners could be freed as long as they renounced their affiliation with Hamas and recognized the group’s threat to Jordanian sovereignty and security.69 Eventually, he negotiated with the Emir of Kuwait to send four of the top officials into exile there. Meanwhile the other members could remain in Jordan but were prohibited from participation in any political activity.70

Although Abdullah succeeded in expelling key members of Hamas from Jordan, the organization continues to have support in the kingdom today, and Khalid Masha’al has been allowed to return to visit family on multiple occasions. The crackdown did send a clear message to all that Abdullah was not interested in continuing his father’s relationship with Hamas and set a precedent for what extent of infringement on Jordanian sovereignty the new ruler would tolerate. Hamas perceived the shutdown as Jordanian betrayal of the movement and loyalty towards Israel, which produced broader distrust of the king by Palestinian Jordanians.71

The Second Intifada Sparks Public Unrest in Jordan

Less than a year after the expulsion of the Hamas leaders the king’s relationship with his Palestinian subjects faced another test with the outbreak of the Second Intifada.

The uprising started with Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount on September 28,

2000, which many saw as a sign of the failure of the Oslo peace process. The Camp

68 Kumaraswamy, “Jordan-Hamas Divorce.” 69 Karmon, “Hamas’ Terrorism Strategy.” 70 Hirst, “Jordan Curbs Hamas.” 71 Kumaraswamy, “Jordan-Hamas Divorce.”

David summit in July of that year had been unsuccessful in negotiating peace, and many were pessimistic about the prospects of future attempts. Furthermore, there had been little economic advancement for Palestinians during the 1990s, leaving many frustrated and disillusioned.72

When the violence did break out, the Palestinian leadership did not try to stop it, much to the dismay of Abdullah. His biggest fear, which was shared by most East Bank

Jordanians and even some Palestinian Jordanians, was that a Palestinian state would be created outside of Palestine, specifically in Jordan.73 The intifada reinforced this fear in two ways. First, the king worried that the conflict would spill over into Jordan and destabilize the delicate peace in his kingdom. Abdullah was also concerned that Israel would respond to the uprising by expelling more Palestinians, which could substantially increase the Palestinian community in Jordan.74 At the same time, he considered the potential economic effect the intifada could have. If the Palestinians managed to create an independent state in the West Bank, it would open markets for Jordanian goods and benefit his goals for economic reform.75 These conflicting interests led Abdullah to support the intifada, as long as it was contained outside of his kingdom.

The Jordanian public was quick to respond to the intifada by organizing protests in support of their Palestinian neighbors. By the end of 2000, they had orchestrated 260 marches and more than 165 demonstrations in support of the intifada.76 One of the earlier protests was held in the Baqa’a refugee camp where an eighteen-year-old was killed by

72 Jeremy Pressman. “The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Studies 13, no. 2 (Fall 2003). 73 Blanche, “Refugees.” 74 Ryan, “Political Opposition.” 75 Joseph Nevo. “Jordan, the Palestinians and the Al‐Aqsa Intifada.” Civil Wars 6, no. 3 (2003). 76 Hillel Frisch. “Jordan and the Palestinian Authority: Did Better Fences Make Better Neighbors?” Middle East Journal 58, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 52-71.

police forces. The government quickly banned such demonstrations, but they continued to occur throughout the next year, both as discreet “sit-ins” and as larger events with up to 20,000 participants.77 Jordanians of all origins took part in these protests, but many had a Palestinian character. In May 2001, the Islamic Action Front organized demonstrations to mourn the 53rd anniversary of al-Nakba, which were broken up by police forces using dogs, tear gas, and water cannons on civilians.78 Towards the end of the year, the regime shifted its strategy by trying to involve government officials in the protests to placate the public. Queen Rania directed a group of 2,000 women in a protest against Israel’s

Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank in April 2002, but the symbolic gesture could not erase the pain of the hundreds of deaths caused by the Israeli offensive.79

As Abdullah considered his response to the intifada and the unrest in his kingdom, he feared two things: the transfer of Palestinians to Jordan and the increase of Israeli military force that would threaten any chance at peace.80 Nearly every protester called for the severing of diplomatic ties with Israel, but the effect this would have on foreign aid to the kingdom made it very unlikely to occur. Instead, Abdullah allowed his ambassador to

Israel to finish his term in November 2000 and did not appoint a replacement.81 On

December 24, 2000, he encouraged Jordanians to join the security forces by announcing a salary increase that would be funded through the sale of his personal property.82

With the new year, he began cracking down on members of the Council of

Professional Associations, which had leaked to the press a list of people and

77 Greenwood, “Al-Aqsa Intifada.” 78 Ibid. 79 Lucas, “Death of Normalization.” 80 Blanche, “Refugees.” 81 Lucas “Death of Normalization.” 82 Frisch, “Jordan and the Palestinian Authority.”

organizations who had supported normalizing peace with Israel. People who were affiliated with the more vocally anti-Israel associations were arrested for punishing members who followed the kingdom’s foreign policy.83 Furthermore, Abdullah blamed the violence that resulted from the protests, such as the death of the youth in the Baqa’a camp, on anti-peace Palestinian factions within the opposition.84 While these two actions were aimed at silencing and punishing the opposition, the strongest blow came when he dissolved parliament in June 2001 and delayed the next parliamentary elections indefinitely. He also used the absence of debate to pass two new laws.85 The first declared that any gathering designed to discuss political or social issues needed permission from the local governor at least 48 hours in advance.86 The second, the 2001

Electoral Law, created more seats in the Lower House and increased the number of constituencies but maintained the gerrymandering that overrepresented rural areas traditionally loyal to the king.87 These decisions were designed to silence the parliamentary opposition, which consisted largely of Palestinian Jordanians and disapproved of the king’s actions throughout the intifada. However, Abdullah was careful not to issue any laws or order arrests that directly targeted the Palestinian community in

Jordan.

While Abdullah’s domestic focus was repressive, he maintained strong support for Palestinians fighting in the intifada to lessen the blow. From the beginning, he received Palestinian victims of the violence as his guests and arranged for their treatment

83 Lucas, Death of Normalization.” 84 Frisch, “Jordan and the Palestinian Authority.” 85 Nevo, “Jordan, the Palestinians.” 86 Greenwood, “Al-Aqsa Intifada.” 87 Ibid.

in Jordanian hospitals.88 He also orchestrated relief efforts to transport supplies from

Jordan and other Arab countries to Palestinians in the West Bank.89 He even donated blood and called on other Jordanians to do the same.90 In 2001, he entered the peace negotiations with a determination to represent Palestinian interests, including the termination of settlement expansion.91 He did shut down border crossings with the West

Bank and enforced a high entry fee to discourage Palestinians from entering the country, but he faced little backlash for these policies because his humanitarian and peace efforts were big enough rewards to facilitate easy forgiveness.92

More importantly, Abdullah used this credit to avoid giving in to the opposition’s call for severing diplomatic ties with Israel. By the end of the intifada, Jordan remained at peace with all of its important foreign allies. Furthermore, the events of the intifada sent a clear message about his feelings towards the Palestinian community in Jordan. While he was quick to help Palestinians in Israel and Palestine fight against the occupation, he felt comfortable using tear gas, imprisonment, and restricted political representation to quiet those living in his country.

A Call for Political and Social Change through the Jordan First Campaign

After he dissolved parliament in June 2001, Abdullah continued to delay new parliamentary elections because he feared that external factors, such as the intifada or the

U.S. War on Terror, would help the opposition win.93 He hoped that the next election would yield a loyalist parliament that would help him achieve his domestic and foreign

88 Nevo, “Jordan, the Palestinians.” 89 Greenwood, “Al-Aqsa Intifada.” 90 Nevo, “Jordan, the Palestinians.” 91 Frisch, “Jordan and the Palestinian Authority.” 92 Blanche, “Refugees’” Nevo (2003). 93 Greenwood, “Al-Aqsa Intifada.”

policy goals. One tool he used to influence public opinion in the interim was the Jordan

First campaign. Announced in October 2002, the campaign aimed to create national unity among the kingdom’s diverse population to improve the quality of life and political participation of Jordanian citizens.94 The king tasked the prime minister with creating a committee to evaluate areas of improvement and recommend policy changes to the government. The identified areas of reform included gender equality, especially in the political arena; political reform, particularly relating to the formation and participation of political parties; education expansion; and reducing poverty and corruption.95 Abdullah had faced criticism that his reforms so far had been too heavily focused on the economy, so the Jordan First campaign gave him a chance to focus on political and social issues and rejuvenate the democratization process.96

The campaign turned out to be more of a public relations stunt than a real effort to reform the political and social apparatuses. For example, the committee suggested requiring more signatures to register political parties, determining financial support for parties based on the size and influence of each one, and institutionalizing regular interaction between parties and the government. Although these were marketed as democratic reforms, the regime’s intention was to shift power away from the troublesome professional associations and solidify the political map into three main parties: leftist, centrist, and rightist.97 This would result in weakening the voice of Palestinian Jordanians who were active in the associations and forcing parties like the Islamic Action Front to

94 Mohammed Ali Al Oudat and Ayman Alshboul. “Jordan First: Tribalism, Nationalism and Legitimacy of Power in Jordan.” Intellectual Discourse 18, no. 1 (2010): 65-96. 95 Nevo, “Jordan, the Palestinians.” 96 Curtis R. Ryan. “‘Jordan First’: Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations and Foreign Policy under King Abdullah II.” Arab Studies Quarterly 26, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 43-62. 97 Greenwood, “Al-Aqsa Intifada.”

compromise on issues with other parties to obtain the required signatures. Similarly, when a parliamentary quota for women was introduced, it was an attempt to gain support from political liberals who were upset by the reduction of freedom and the continued gerrymandering that favored regime loyalists.98

Perhaps more important than any of the suggested reforms was the name of the campaign, Jordan First. It sent the message that national identity should come before all other things, including Palestinian heritage and tribal affiliation.99 This was targeted at both Palestinian Jordanians and East Bank Jordanians who were not loyal enough to the regime. Although Palestinian Jordanians are the traditional threat to Hashemite rule, the economic difficulties at the end of Hussein’s rule reignited fading tribal identities. The regime’s failure to protect its key support base from economic hardship made some question whether their own tribal and clan leaders would be better suited to rule. Riots in

Ma’an in 2002 confirmed that the new king was continuing to lose support from more radical elements of the East Bank population.100 While the riots were critical of both groups, they also encouraged bridging the historic rift by prioritizing national interests, rather than those of any social group that citizens might belong to.101 Furthermore, the regime benefitted from the ability to reprimand civil society organizations for promoting anything but national interests. Thus, any opposition group that was largely comprised of

Palestinians, secular or Islamist, was an easy target for repression.102 Creating national unity certainly would benefit Abdullah, and it was likely a genuine goal of his, but it was

98 Greenwood, “Al-Aqsa Intifada.” 99 Al Oudat and Alshboul, “Jordan First.” 100 Luisa Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan. 101 Nevo, “Jordan, the Palestinians.” 102 Ryan, “Jordan First.”

quickly forgotten as other issues arose. However, the campaign did succeed in influencing the results of the election when it was finally held in 2003. Unlike some later elections, the king did not interfere with this one, likely because his campaign wielded enough influence to produce his desired outcome. The Islamic Action Front won only 17 out of 110 seats, with the majority going to regime supporters.103 Additionally, only 25 seats went to candidates of Palestinian descent, demonstrating the gross underrepresentation of the country’s largest ethnic group.104

Conclusion

By the end of his fourth year as king, Abdullah had come into his ruling identity while leading his country through regional turmoil. When he first came to power, he had been socialized differently than his father had and was dealing with different domestic, regional, and global issues. Therefore, he was eager to institute economic, political, and social reforms. As was the case during Hussein’s reign, there was a great need to address the Palestinian issue, both domestically and in Israel and the Palestinian territories.

Abdullah maintained Jordanian support for the Palestinian cause and was very vocal about this, both during the Second Intifada and in his participation in the peace efforts of the early 2000s. However, when it came to Palestinian citizens of Jordan, he was more subtly intolerant of their dual identities. He took measures to silence and repress them to make them choose between their two identities.

103 Sarah Timreck. The Islamist Spectrum - Jordan's Mosaic. December 13, 2017. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-islamist-spectrum-jordans-mosaic. 104 László Csicsmann. “Responsible Freedom and National Security: Liberalisation and De- Liberalisation in Jordan under King Abdullah II.” Society and Economy 29, no. 1 (2007): 103-122.

Chapter 3 Attempts to Minimize the Palestinian Majority

By the time the Second Intifada ended in 2005, King Abdullah had developed a

more repressive approach towards marginalizing the Palestinian community in Jordan. In

2004, he began revoking citizenship from Jordanians of Palestinian descent. This

unofficial campaign remained prevalent until as late as 2011 and affected more than

3,000 citizens.105 During that period, Abdullah also introduced multiple new election

laws, all of which were criticized for continuing the tradition of inadequate representation

for Palestinian Jordanians. As the political climate within the Palestinian territories

changed with the growth of Hamas as a rival to the Palestinian Authority, Abdullah had

to balance his relations with both groups and navigate the effect that these developments

had on his subjects.

By the time the Arab Spring broke out in Jordan in early 2011, Abdullah faced

serious concerns that the Palestinian community would be inspired by other revolts in the

region and might launch a second attempt to end Hashemite rule. However, he found

unexpected support for his neoliberal policies from Palestinian Jordanians, as his most

loyal support base of East Bank Jordanians became the loudest demanders of reform.

This served as a turning point in the relationship between the king and West Bank

Jordanians. He began to recognize the diminished threat they posed to his reign and

considered the potential benefits they offered to his economic interests.

105 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan.

Revoking Citizenship from Palestinians

In a 2004 speech, then Minister of the Interior Samir Habashneh highlighted the

Jordanian citizenship law that states children acquire citizenship from their fathers and

not their mothers. This aspect of the citizenship law is often criticized for facilitating the

suppression of women’s rights, but it is also used to keep the Palestinian majority from

growing too large. As such, Habashneh clarified in his speech that Jordanian citizenship

would not be offered to children whose mothers were Jordanian and whose fathers were

Palestinian. At the time, nearly 60,000 such marriages existed, so giving those children

the right to citizenship would increase the Palestinian community in Jordan by

approximately 500,000.106 That same year, King Abdullah ordered his government to

begin revoking citizenship from Jordanians of Palestinian descent. Over the course of

eight years, the government withdrew citizenship from over 3,000 citizens.107 Not only

did this render them stateless, but it also removed their civil rights because there is no

refugee law in Jordan to protect such individuals.108 The campaign was slow and

underground at first, but as no strong response to this policy emerged, Abdullah increased

the scope and began appointing government ministers who were sympathetic to the

cause.

The Ministry of the Interior was the primary agent acting on the king’s orders. It

justified the decision by citing the terms of disengagement from the West Bank that King

Hussein had announced in 1988. These guidelines determined that Palestinians from the

West Bank who had attained Jordanian citizenship could only retain it if they also had an

106 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan. 107 Human Rights Watch, Stateless Again, 2010. 108 U.S. Library of Congress. Refugee Law and Policy: Jordan. July 21, 2016. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/jordan.php.

Israeli residency permit.109 In the first year following the disengagement, Hussein

revoked citizenship from many individuals, but this trend diminished within a few years.

By 2004, there was no expectation or fear among Palestinian Jordanians that they would

lose their citizenship, so the Ministry’s return to enforcing the disengagement terms came

as a shock.110

To make matters worse, there was no announcement of the campaign, nor did

individuals receive a warning that their status was going to change. Instead, they learned

they had lost their citizenship when they interacted with the Ministry in another way,

such as registering a birth or renewing a driver’s license.111 Affected Palestinians often

received little to no clarification of why their citizenship had been revoked, although

most explanations revolved around the Israeli-issued residency permits.112

Most people were told that they needed to renew the residency cards. But

considering the Second Intifada, the rising popularity of Hamas, and the growing Arab

population in Israel, the Israeli authorities were not eager to authorize more Palestinians

to live in the West Bank. Furthermore, without valid Jordanian documents, it was nearly

impossible for the affected individuals to travel to Israel in order to renew the permits.113

Others who were affected had lived their entire lives in Jordan and therefore did not have

a residency permit to begin with, yet were given this same reason when their citizenship

109 Elhanan Miller. “Jordan Promises to Stop Revoking Citizenship from Palestinians.” The Times of Israel, June 13, 2012. https://www.timesofisrael.com/jordan-promises-to-stop-revoking- nationality-from-palestinians/. 110 Marwan Muasher. A Decade of Struggling Reform Efforts in Jordan: The Resilience of the Rentier System. 2011. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/jordan_reform.pdf. 111 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan. 112 Human Rights Watch, Stateless Again, 2010. 113 Shaul M. Gabbay. “The Status of Palestinians in Jordan and the Anomaly of Holding a Jordanian Passport.” Political Sciences and Public Affairs 2, no. 1 (2014): 1-6.

was taken away.114 The policy was carried out in such an erratic manner that in some

families, one sibling lost citizenship while another did not.115

The randomness and irregularity of this campaign created fear among the

Palestinian community, such that people began avoiding activities that would bring them

into contact with the Ministry of the Interior.116 Once individuals lost their citizenship,

they were given passports without national identification numbers. Not only did these

documents bestow very limited rights (i.e. the right to travel) on former citizens, but they

also often included false information, such as the wrong city of birth or a statement that

the individual possessed an Israeli residency permit.117 Those who lost citizenship were

unable to access public healthcare, education, or employment opportunities. They were

also kept from jobs in the private sector because certain industries, like engineering,

demand that workers join professional associations, and these organizations require

national numbers.118

One of the most upsetting consequences for many Palestinian families was the

loss of citizenship for their children. The 1954 Citizenship Law declares that children of

male Jordanians automatically get citizenship and that they can keep their citizenship if

their father forfeits his.119 Throughout the campaign, however, the Ministry revoked the

citizenship of most children when their fathers lost theirs, rendering the children

ineligible to attend public schools.120 Jordan signed the Universal Declaration of Human

114 Human Rights Watch, Stateless Again, 2010. 115 Gabbay, “Status of Palestinians.” 116 Assaf David. “Jordan's Troubling New Parliament.” 2011. In Jordan, Forever on the Brink, compiled by Project on Middle East Political Science, 39-41. 117 Sawsan Ramahi. Palestinians and Jordanian Citizenship. 2015. https://palestina-komitee.nl/wp- content/uploads/2018/12/20151209_Palestinians-and-Jordanian-citizenship.pdf. 118 Gabbay, “Status of Palestinians.” 119 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan. 120 Gabbay, “Status of Palestinians.”

Rights (UDHR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the International

Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, all of which consider access to education a human right, but the policy of revoking citizenship has left the country in direct violation of that right.

The policy is also in violation of the Arab Charter on Human Rights, which, along with the UDHR, declares nationality a human right.121 Furthermore, the Jordanian constitution allows for the removal of citizenship only if the individual is working for another government. In such a case, the Jordanian government could remove citizenship only after it had asked the citizen to stop and the citizen refused to obey.122 Thus, by both domestic and international law, it is illegal to revoke citizenship from Palestinian

Jordanians on the basis of their Israeli residency permits. At the same time, there is no law that prohibits random removal of citizenship, which made it difficult to build a legal case against the policy.123 Additionally, the disengagement was not considered an official law, meaning that the High Court of Justice did not have any jurisdiction in related matters. As such, there was no mechanism for affected individuals to try to change the decisions.124 A select few who had personal connections in the higher levels of the

Ministry were able to win back their citizenship, but they were a minority.125 This highlighted a division within the Palestinian community, as rich Palestinians had the money and connections to make the campaign a mere nuisance, while middle- and lower- class families struggled to protect themselves from the consequences.126

121 Ramahi, Palestinians and Jordanian Citizenship. 122 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan. 123 Miller, “Jordan Promises.” 124 Human Rights Watch, Statesless Again, 2010. 125 Ibid. 126 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan.

The first few years of the campaign saw little pushback from the Palestinian

community, but by 2009 the public was demanding answers. The true motivations for

revoking citizenship were likely socio-political and economic. King Abdullah would

benefit from diminishing the Palestinian majority and the arbitrary nature of the

citizenship revocation stirred up fear among the group. The campaign was also carried

out while the kingdom was receiving an influx of Iraqi refugees, and Jordan’s limited

resources were being stretched even thinner.127 However, most official statements

portrayed the policy as beneficial to the Palestinians and their fight against the oppressive

Israeli government.128 One justification was that without Jordanian citizenship and with

Israeli residency permits, Palestinians would have a stronger claim to the right of

return.129 It was also offered as a way to prevent Israel from expelling any more

Palestinians into Jordan, under the assumption that the Israeli government was concerned

with the wellbeing of those individuals.130

Another approach to justifying the removal of citizenship was to put it in the

context of a 1988 Arab League declaration, which stated that individuals could not have

dual citizenship between two Arab countries. As such, the Jordanian government claimed

to be abiding by that decision by rescinding citizenship; although most individuals did

not hold Palestinian passports or residency documents, removing their Jordanian

citizenship supposedly would prepare them to obtain Palestinian citizenship once a state

was established.131 However, this explanation suggested that the Jordanian government

127 Gabbay, “Status of Palestinians.” 128 Mudar Zahran. “Jordan is Palestinian.” Middle East Quarterly 19, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 3-12. 129 Ramahi, Palestinians and Jordanian Citizenship; Human Rights Watch, Stateless Again, 2010. 130 Miller, “Jordan Promises.” 131 Human Rights Watch, Stateless Again, 2010.

was subordinate to the Arab League, which detracted from Abdullah’s image as a powerful, sovereign ruler. Furthermore, the Arab League declaration had been largely ignored in the Palestinian Jordanian context for 25 years, so many questioned why it was being invoked suddenly. Another justification tactic was to shift the blame to the

Palestinian community. Multiple Jordanian government officials posited that Palestinian

Jordanians neglected their Palestinian identity by not traveling to the West Bank. In turn, the Israeli government terminated their residency permits. Therefore, the Palestinians were aiding in the appropriation of Arab land.132

In June 2012, the government announced that citizenship would no longer be revoked under the terms that had been used over the previous decade (although

Mahmoud Abbas and his sons lost their citizenships six years later under the same pretense).133 There were also rumors that about 4,500 Jordanians would regain their citizenship, but most who were affected remain stateless today.134 Thousands of families lost their sources of income and most of their children could not afford to attend school.

Now that many of these children are old enough to enter the workforce, they face enormous barriers because they lack both citizenship and proper education. Furthermore, this policy exacerbated a prevailing cycle of exclusion. As the Jordanian government denies Palestinian Jordanians’ right to exist within the kingdom, it encourages them to withdraw into their own community, rather than integrate into the broader society. This dynamic suggests to Palestinian Jordanians that they are not accepted in Jordan.135

132 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan. 133 Juliane Helmhold. “Report: Jordan to Revoke Citizenship of PA President Abbas.” The Jerusalem Post, April 25, 2018. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/report-jordan-to-start-revoking- palestinian-leaderss-citizenship-552691 134 Miller, “Jordan Promises.” 135 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan.

Continued Social and Political Marginalization

The policy of revoking citizenship from Palestinian Jordanians lasted for nearly a

decade and signified clear anti-Palestinian sentiment. However, it was carried out in a

subtle and gradual way that did not require much attention from King Abdullah or most

of his government. At the same time as thousands of Jordanian citizens were being

rendered stateless, Abdullah juggled domestic and international threats to the stability and

longevity of his rule. After the 2003 parliamentary elections gave only 25 of 110 seats to

candidates from Palestinian backgrounds, popular demonstrations called for electoral

reform that would establish more representative districts.136 In early 2005, a new electoral

law was announced. Once it was enacted in the summer of that same year, it was revealed

that no changes had been made to electoral districts. Furthermore, the law prohibited

professional associations from maintaining relations with their branches in the Palestinian

territories.137 Although there was little demand for change, this law was unpopular with

the Palestinian community in Jordan. Some worried that the groups in the territories

would be unable to maintain operations after the ties were severed and that the king was

indifferent to the impact this could have on the Palestinian cause.138

In January 2006, Hamas ended its campaign to boycott elections in the Palestinian

territories and defeated Fatah in the parliamentary race. Most Palestinian Jordanians and

refugees in Jordan prefer Hamas to Fatah. This is because Fatah is held responsible for

the failure of the Oslo Peace Accords and Hamas is seen as a champion of Palestinian

nationalism and the fight against Israeli oppression. However, despite the great

136 Csicsmann. “Responsible Freedom.” 137 U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues, by Alfred B. Prados and Jeremy M. Sharp. RL33546. 2007. 138 Ibid.

excitement among the Jordanian public, King Abdullah worried about the impact that

Hamas’s success would have on the Islamist opposition in his own country.139 Two

months after Hamas won the elections, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan elected a new

secretary general who was known to have close ties to Hamas.140 He quickly made a

public statement about the autonomy of each of the two organizations, both structurally

and ideologically.141

Seeing cooperation as more fruitful, Abdullah’s prime minister publicly

congratulated Hamas for its victory and invited a delegation of Palestinian Authority

officials to Jordan. However, in April the king cancelled the Palestinian Foreign

Minister’s trip to Jordan, due to supposed arms trafficking by Hamas in Jordan. This

caused an uproar in both Palestine and Jordan, where people believed the claim to be

false and simply an excuse to avoid the visit.142 The Hamas election victory, as well as a

string of al-Qaeda terrorist attacks in Amman in 2005, contributed to the regime’s fear

that Islamism was a strong threat. Before Jordan’s parliamentary elections in 2007, a new

law was introduced that required all political parties to have at least 500 paying members

from at least five governorates, with a minimum of 50 members per governorate. The

goal was to eliminate opposition parties, but the IAF managed to meet these requirements

and participated in the elections.143 The regime was determined to prevent Islamist

success, so it rigged the elections. Only six of the 110 seats went to IAF candidates.144

139 Csicsmann. “Responsible Freedom.” 140 Ibid. 141 U.S. Library of Congress, Jordan: U.S. Relations. 142 Ibid. 143 Csicsmann. “Responsible Freedom.” 144 Ryan, “Political Opposition.”

There were also only seven Palestinian Jordanians appointed to the 55-seat Upper House,

demonstrating the king’s continued commitment to their political marginalization.145

In May 2010, another election law was released that finally added seats to districts

that were historically underrepresented.146 The law added four seats to the districts in

Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa, which are all heavily populated by Palestinian Jordanians.147

Some Palestinians considered the reform a success in increasing their rights, while others

viewed it as insufficient. In November the sixteenth parliament was elected, but only 12

percent of registered voters were Palestinian.148 The two main reasons for this low

registration were fear of losing citizenship by registering and disillusionment with the

electoral process after the rigged elections in 2007.149 Despite the low participation rate

by Palestinian Jordanians, two of the most popular candidates were Palestinian

Jordanians. The new parliament also included several East Bank Jordanians who had run

on promises to address the illegal rescission of citizenship.150 This was significant

because members of the king’s traditional support base were openly criticizing his policy

and supporting one of the strongest opposition issues.

One month later, a soccer game between the two national teams proved that this

East Bank-West Bank camaraderie was merely a passing whim. Al-Wahdat, which is

composed predominantly of Palestinian Jordanians, played al-Faisali, which primarily

has East Bank Jordanian players. Throughout the game, fans on each side chanted

offensive messages about the other that related to their respective identities. The al-

145 Csicsmann. “Responsible Freedom.” 146 Sonia L. Alianak. “Reforming the Jordanian Monarchy.” In The Transition towards Revolution and Reform: The Arab Spring Realised?, 124-58. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014. 147 Ryan, “Political Opposition.” 148 David, “Jordan’s Troubling New Parliament.” 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid.

Faisali chants included discriminatory remarks about Queen Rania and Crown Prince

Hussein and their Palestinian heritage.151 After the game, riots broke out among the spectators and riot police ended up beating multiple people to death.152 King Abdullah remained silent on the matter, which infuriated those who expected the al-Faisali fans and the riot police to be reprimanded for their actions at least.153

Matches between these two teams are always heated, but this one forced fans to pick sides: Jordan or Palestine.154 Officials suggested forcing each team to have a few players from the other origin as a way to ease the tensions, but the idea was unpopular among fans, players, and team managers.155 This game took place one month before the outbreak of the Arab Spring and demonstrates well the political and social climate that preceded it. King Abdullah had been in power for more than a decade and had increased the social and political marginalization of Palestinian Jordanians. The Palestinian community was disillusioned and disappointed, but not necessarily angry, with the king.

On the other hand, East Bank Jordanians did not welcome West Bankers and resented the royal ties to the Palestinians. These feelings influenced the role that each side played once the Arab Spring reached Jordan.

The Arab Spring in Jordan

It is well known that Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation inspired millions of protesters around the Arab world to take to the streets and demand change from their oppressive governments. However, despite the high levels of unemployment and less-

151 Zahran, “Jordan is Palestinian.” 152 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan. 153 Zahran, “Jordan is Palestinian.” 154 Naseem Tarawneh. “Chaotic Football and the Palestinian Jordanian Identity Conversation.” The Black Iris. Last modified December 12, 2010. http://black-iris.com/2010/12/12/chaotic-football-and-the- palestinian-jordanian-identity-conversation/. 155 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan.

than-ideal levels of political freedom, the Arab Spring was relatively peaceful in Jordan compared to countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Libya. Jordanians began protesting in early 2011 and conducted peaceful but persistent demonstrations almost every week throughout the year. The protests became more radical in 2012, but never reached the point of revolt.156 At first, they seemed to bring together different sectors of the Jordanian population, from traditionally loyal East Bank Jordanians to the IAF and other opposition parties to secular Palestinian Jordanians. However, the king quickly realized the power of highlighting divisions between these groups and kept them from forming a strong unified front to rebel against him.

The first protests occurred in early February 2011, after a group of tribal leaders publicly complained about corruption and the concentration of economic power in the country.157 Their claims were clearly directed at Palestinian Jordanians, who controlled the private sector and had been the main beneficiaries of the neoliberal economic reforms that King Hussein had started and King Abdullah continued. The preference for privatization diminished the state’s welfare programs and eliminated many public sector jobs, both of which had been staples of East Bank Jordanians’ economic well-being.158

This frustration inspired huge numbers of East Bank Jordanians to participate in the Arab

Spring protests, highlighting the fracturing relationship between the king and his typical support base.

156 Mohammed Torki Bani Salameh. “Political Reform in Jordan.” World Affairs 180, no. 4 (Winter 2017): 47-78. 157 Alianak, “Reforming the Jordanian Monarchy.” 158 Ryan, “Political Opposition.”

The protests initially offered hope that the relationship between East and West

Bank Jordanians would improve as both sides turned out to protest together.159 However, this hope was short-lived, as was demonstrated in the March 24, 2011 protest held outside the Ministry of the Interior. A group of young Jordanians from different backgrounds called themselves the March 24 Movement and came together to stage a peaceful protest against corruption in the government. Inspired by the protests in Egypt’s Tahrir Square, they claimed to be unaffiliated with any political parties, religious groups, or specific sectors of society. Some protesters were of Palestinian descent, but they did not form a majority or influence the group’s agenda towards Palestinian issues.160 After a day-long sit-in, a group of pro-monarchy counter protesters arrived on the scene and began antagonizing the protestors. They even threw rocks and declared the youth to be Shi’as affiliated with Iran and Hezbollah. Some also vehemently accused the youth of being

Palestinian Islamists who wanted to overthrow the monarchy and create an Islamist

Palestinian state in Jordan.161 Eventually the riot police were called in and before the situation was quelled, the police and pro-monarchy rioters injured over one hundred youth; one was killed.162

Compared to previous protests in which government forces had supplied water to and chatted with participants, the March 24 protest showed the level of threat felt by

Abdullah at the time. It also highlighted that many East Bank Jordanians still strongly feared the Palestinian majority. This fear made it easier for the king to recognize the

159 Ryan, “Political Opposition.” 160 Jillian Schwedler. “Jordan.” In Dispatches from the Arab Spring: Understanding the New Middle East, edited by Paul Amar and Vijay Prashad, 243-65. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013. 161 Naseem Tarawnah. “The Quick Death of Shabab March 24 and What It Means for Jordan.” The Black Iris. Last modified March 26, 2011. http://black-iris.com/2011/03/26/the-quick-death- of-shabab-march-24-and-what-it-means-for-jordan/ 162 Schwedler, “Jordan.”

conflicting interests held by different groups of protesters. While many East Bank

Jordanians demanded economic reforms that would reinvigorate the historically large public sector, Islamists and Palestinian Jordanians demanded political change, and specifically a reduction in the power of the monarchy.163 As revocations of citizenship were still going on at this time, most Palestinian protests centered around greater protection of their civil and political rights through stronger democratic institutions.164

Abdullah also faced pressure to democratize from outside forces, like the United States and Canada, who were, and continue to be, the largest contributors of foreign aid to the kingdom.165

As the protests gained momentum and regimes toppled around the region,

Abdullah chose to prioritize domestic demands over international ones and tried to give concessions to different interest groups. He dismissed the prime minister and promised to orient the new government towards economic reforms.166 When selecting a new prime minister, Abdullah tried to consider all sectors of the population and ultimately appointed a well-known jurist who was from an East Bank family but had close ties with Hamas.167

Next, he created a National Dialogue Commission to assess areas of improvement in the kingdom and develop strategies to enact change. He chose one of the most influential

Palestinian Jordanians to lead the committee, but Palestinians saw this appointment as

163 Zahran, “Jordan is Palestinian.” 164 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan. 165 Ryan, “Political Opposition.” 166 Ibid. 167 Asaf Romirowsky. “Hamas Overtakes the Palestinian Authority in Jordan.” The National Interest. Last modified December 19, 2011. https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/hamas- overtakes-the-palestinian-authority-jordan-6262.

largely symbolic, as the broader demographics of the group left Palestinians underrepresented.168

Although Abdullah’s typical support base among East Bank Jordanians was participating in the protests, his main fear during the Arab Spring still focused on West

Bank Jordanians. Specifically, he feared they would be inspired by uprisings in other countries and try to overthrow the monarchy.169 As East Bank Jordanians criticized the king for prioritizing the economic interests of Palestinian Jordanians, he used their complaints as proof that he did not mistreat his Palestinian subjects. Indeed, many

Palestinian Jordanians found themselves defending the monarchy when debating the need for reform with their East Bank compatriots, which was surprising for all involved.170 It is also worth noting that during the peak of the protests, Abdullah welcomed Khaled

Meshaal, a Hamas leader he had expelled in 1999, to Jordan for the first time since that incident. Meshaal arrived at the end of November from Syria, where part of the Hamas leadership was based at the time.171 His reception was mixed, as pro- and anti-Hamas

Jordanians wondered what the impact would be if the organization returned to Jordan.

Some perceived Meshaal’s visit as a publicity stunt by the king to win more support from

Palestinian Jordanians during a time of political unrest.

Regardless of his motivations, Abdullah managed to subdue most of the protests by mid-2012 by awarding small concessions to different interest groups and emphasizing the stability in Jordan compared to other countries in the region.172 As Arab Spring

168 Alianak, “Reforming the Jordanian Monarchy.” 169 Zahran, “Jordan is Palestinian.” 170 Ryan, “Political Opposition.” 171 Romirowsky, “Hamas Overtakes.” 172 Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan.

protests slowed in Jordan, so too did the practice of revoking Palestinian citizenship. The nation’s collective attention was also quickly diverted to the influx of refugees that came with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. As hundreds of thousands poured in, Abdullah focused most of his energy on responding to the refugee crisis quickly and effectively.

Conclusion

The end of the Arab Spring marked a turning point in Abdullah’s relationship with Palestinian Jordanians. He gained confidence from his ability to avoid an uprising and found common ground with Palestinians’ support for his neoliberal economic policies. However, the Arab Spring also revealed emerging cracks in the way the

Hashemites had been ruling the country, specifically the encouragement of East Bank-

West Bank divisions. The pervasiveness of cross-societal protests, like the March 24

Movement, demonstrated an emerging willingness to cooperate in spite of these labels.

This was especially true among Jordan’s youth and when there was a common enemy, such as a corrupt government. If these youth activists decided to target the monarchy, the king could face an uprising that might not be put down easily.

At the same time, Abdullah’s attention was diverted towards external matters.

These included the emergence of a new phase in Middle East geopolitics, as some historically-oppressive regimes were challenged and others were strengthened. Moving into the new decade, Abdullah had to deal with issues closer to home, like the arrival of

Syrian refugees, new attempts at Israeli-Palestinian peace, and crucial but difficult relationships with emerging leaders like Benjamin Netanyahu, Mohammad bin Salman, and Donald Trump.

Chapter 4 Navigating New Domestic and Regional Politics After the Arab Spring

By the time the Arab Spring protests ended in Jordan, King Abdullah II faced major concerns about the stability of his kingdom and the future of his rule. He had encountered serious protests questioning the legitimacy of his rule, and many of the protesters had been members of his traditional base of support. The resulting violence paled in comparison to that which occurred in neighboring countries. However, it also showed Abdullah the possibility of a popular uprising aimed at toppling his rule, and that

Palestinian Jordanians might not be the ones leading the revolt. As he was coming to terms with these developments, he continued to face domestic pressure from his

Palestinian subjects to improve their social and political integration. This was exacerbated by the influx of refugees from Syria, as their presence intensified the competition over Jordan’s limited resources. At the same time, however, the Palestinian

Jordanian identity has changed as the newer generation identifies less with its Palestinian heritage than previous generations did. These changes have created new obstacles and successes for the king as he navigates that relationship.

The increase of people in the kingdom and the Arab Spring demands for economic reform forced Abdullah to continue to rely heavily on foreign aid from wealthy allies, like the United States and Saudi Arabia. With the rise of leaders like Donald

Trump and Mohammad bin Salman, he has realized a greater need to maintain peaceful relations with Israel. However, despite some shared economic and political interests,

Abdullah and Benjamin Netanyahu have clashed repeatedly over security and peace issues. Furthermore, as Netanyahu has continued to oppress Palestinians and lessened the

possibility of reaching a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both East and West Bank Jordanians have demanded the end of normalized relations with Israel.

Abdullah has also clung to the two-state solution idea because he fears the impact that a one-state solution would have on his kingdom and its stability. Thus, the king has spent the last eight years trying to balance between conflicting domestic interests, international political economics, and threats to his own rule.

The Impact of the Syrian Civil War on Jordan

By 2016, between 600,000 and 1 million refugees had crossed from Syria into

Jordan.173 Over 14,000 of them were Palestinians who had either directly fled to Syria in

1948 or 1967 or had made their way there via another country, such as Jordan.174 Most who had gone via Jordan went to Syria because of Black September and the resulting increase in anti-Palestinian sentiment. As such, some of the Palestinians leaving Syria after the Arab Spring held Jordanian citizenship and hoped that they would be welcomed with full legal rights.175 However, Abdullah reinitiated the campaign of revoking citizenship and some Palestinians were immediately denied entry at the border. Others had their citizenship revoked when they interacted with the Ministry of the Interior. Still others had been unable to renew their documents at the Jordanian embassy in Damascus and hoped to do so in Amman. When they tried to do so in Jordan, they were denied.176

In these cases, these individuals were deported to Syria and often stripped of their documents. Without any form of identification, they could not pass through checkpoints

173 Emmanuel Comolet. “Jordan: The Geopolitical Service Provider.” In The Arab Spring Five Years Later: Case Studies, edited by Hafez Ghanem, 207-39. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2016. 174 Human Rights Watch. Not Welcome: Jordan's Treatment of Palestinians Escaping Syria. 2014. https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/07/not-welcome/jordans-treatment-palestinians-escaping-syria. 175 Chanrok Soh, Yoonjeon You, & Youngsoo Yu. “Once Resolved, Stay Resolved? The Refuse Policy of Jordan toward Palestinian Refugees.” Journal of International and Area Studies 23, no. 1 (2016): 1-16. 176 Human Rights Watch, Not Welcome, 2014.

within Syria and were confined to border towns that often had nearly unlivable conditions.177

To deter Palestinians from entering Jordan from Syria, the government implemented strict admittance standards in April 2012. Young, male Palestinians were especially unwelcome because of their perceived potential to incite violence against the regime. This left many families in difficult financial conditions, as their primary sources of income were stuck in Syria.178 In January 2013, an official change to the admittance policy was made so that no Palestinians could enter. Despite the difficulty of implementing the change, thousands of Palestinians still continued to find a way across the border.179 When such cases were discovered, the individuals in question would be detained in special facilities, such as the Cyber City camp that holds only Syrians and

Palestinians coming from Syria.180 As of 2014, 180 Palestinians were being held in Cyber

City, including former citizens. They were not allowed to leave the facility even if a family member with citizenship sponsored them.181

The arrival of Syrians and Palestinians from Syria increased the strain on already tight resources in Jordan and added fuel to existing sectarian fires. Although the Arab

Spring brought hope for increased unity among Jordanian citizens, the division between

East Bankers and West Bankers continued to exist, especially among older generations.

There was great concern among East Bankers and the monarchy that with more

Palestinians entering the country, the Palestinian majority would be empowered to take

177 Human Rights Watch, Not Welcome, 2014. 178 Soh et al., “Once Resolved.” 179 Human Rights Watch, Not Welcome, 2014. 180 Soh et al., “Once Resolved.” 181 Human Rights Watch, Not Welcome, 2014.

over the country. However, West Bankers were fearful that the Syrians would divert attention and resources away from their needs and contribute to further marginalization.

Members from both groups, especially young Jordanians, were wary of Syrians because of their added competition in the job market. In 2016, the overall unemployment rate was approximately 22 percent and the youth unemployment rate was over 30 percent.182 Most Syrians had been granted work permits and Abdullah vowed to create

200,000 jobs for Syrians specifically, in addition to 1 million for Jordanian citizens.183

Most of the jobs for Syrians were planned in lower-skilled sectors that Jordanians did not want to work in, but the fear of foreign workers taking job opportunities persisted.184

Thus, with the arrival of Syrians and Palestinians, Abdullah struggled to balance the fears of his different constituents. East Bankers feared losing political power to Palestinians and economic opportunity to Syrians, while West Bankers worried that the Syrians would overshadow their social and political marginalization and take jobs away from them. As the Syrian Civil War continued to spill over into Jordan and create domestic pressure,

Abdullah looked for outside help. However, in the wake of geopolitical changes in the region, he found himself in a difficult situation, especially in his relationships with

Mohammad bin Salman, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Donald Trump.

182 Rana F. Sweis. “Jordan Struggles under a Wave of Syrian Refugees.” The New York Times, February 13, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/world/middleeast/jordan-syria-refugees.html. 183 Ibid. 184 Alia Hindawi. “Protecting Migrant Workers' Rights in Jordan.” International Labour Organization. Last modified 2020. http://www.ilo.org/beirut/projects/WCMS_213470/lang--en/index.htm.

Balancing Relationships with Other Leaders

Israel

When the Muslim Brotherhood took over the Egyptian government during the

Arab Spring, Jordan seemed like Israel’s only ally in the Arab world. Similarly, when

Benjamin Netanyahu was reelected in 2013, Abdullah recognized that amiable relations between the two of them would bring him benefits.185 In addition to the economic benefits from bilateral trade, the two countries shared the desire to end extremist terrorist organizations, especially ones with Islamist backgrounds.186 Israel considers Hamas an existential threat, while Jordan sees the Islamic Action Front as the largest political opposition force. Although the two organizations have declared independence from one another, Abdullah has concerns about their shared background as offshoots of the Muslim

Brotherhood and the open support for Hamas from IAF members and followers. As can be expected, as Hamas has gained influence in Gaza and strengthened its image as the only real Palestinian threat to Israel, support for Hamas has increased in Jordan.187 While the two leaders share this common enemy, they cannot approach the situation in the same manner. Where Netanyahu’s reputation would be bolstered by eliminating Hamas,

Abdullah would face too much backlash to openly support any initiative against Hamas that Netanyahu takes.

185 Eleanor Beevor. “Saudi Arabia Is Playing Political Hardball, but Jordan Stands in the Way.” Al Bawaba, February 20, 2018. https://www.albawaba.com/news/original-saudi-arabia-is-playing- political-hardball%2C-but-jordan-stands-in-the-way--1091492 186 Jeffry Heller and Suleiman Al-Khalidi. “Jordan-Israel Relations in Crisis over Al-Aqsa Mosque Strife.” Reuters, November 5, 2014. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-palestinians- israel/jordan-israel-relations-in-crisis-over-al-aqsa-mosque-strife-idUSKBN0IP0OV20141105 187 Ariel Ben Solomon. “Muslim Brotherhood Stages Large Pro-Hamas Demonstration in Amman.” The Jerusalem Post, August 9, 2014. https://www.jpost.com/operation-protective-edge/muslim- brotherhood-stages-large-pro-hamas-demonstration-in-amman-370545

Throughout his premiership, Netanyahu’s increasingly right-wing, anti-

Palestinian policies and rhetoric have made it difficult for Abdullah to justify his alliance with Israel. At the same time, Abdullah must maintain a certain degree of support for the

Palestinians to maintain domestic stability. Consequently, this puts pressure on his relations with Netanyahu. Furthermore, as Netanyahu continues to perform well in Israeli elections, he has become more open about his support for a peace plan that would disregard Palestinian and Jordanian interests. Thus, while Abdullah sees his relationship with Netanyahu as necessary and beneficial, the many conflicting interests place great strain on their interactions.

This balancing act was seen in the king’s response to three incidents in 2014. In

March, Israeli forces killed a Jordanian judge of Palestinian descent at the land crossing between the two countries. Thousands of East and West Bankers took to the streets to protest the unjust murder of a public official and demand that the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty be revoked. The king avoided any stark reactions to the murder and the protests.

Instead, he allowed the demonstrations to dissolve into typical East Bank-West Bank bickering as each side argued for or against the treaty.188 Jordanian protesters took to the streets again after Israel’s Operation Protective Edge led to nearly 1,500 civilian deaths in

Gaza. 15,000 people joined the demonstration in Amman on August 8 to condemn the violence and demand the severing of diplomatic ties with Israel. Abdullah’s response was to donate blood and promise his help in delivering humanitarian supplies to Gaza.189 The

188 Udi Dekel & Orit Perlov. The Question of Identity in Jordan and the Peace Treaty with Israel: Jordanian Discourse on the Social Media. Report no. 546. 2014. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-question-of-identity-in-jordan-and-the-peace-treaty-with-israel- jordanian-discourse-on-the-social-media/ 189 Ben Solomon, “Muslim Brotherhood.”

magnitude of the protests required an official response, but Abdullah also remained wary of upsetting Israel.

Finally, in November Abdullah recalled his ambassador to Israel for the first time since the peace treaty was signed because Israeli forces entered the al-Aqsa Mosque compound without permission. Multiple deadly clashes ensued between Palestinian civilians and Israeli soldiers, so the Israeli forces closed the compound to prayer-goers.190

Abdullah reacted strongly to this third incident for multiple reasons. First, the string of

Israeli offenses against Palestinians had built up over the year and his previous efforts to curb them had not worked. Second, he faced greater pressure to deliver a strong response because Palestinians, Jordanians, and Muslims from around the world were upset by the incursion into their holy site. Third, this incident was a violation of the Hashemite role as the only custodians of the compound. With wider public demands and a threat to his sovereignty, Abdullah had little flexibility in how he could respond.

In February 2015, Abdullah sent his ambassador back to Tel Aviv after

Netanyahu made a public declaration that Israel would not intervene in affairs at the compound.191 However, the subject remained a source of tension, so in March 2016

Jordan announced its plans to install security cameras at the compound. The official justification was to deter further attacks by settlers and Israeli forces on the compound, which would protect Palestinians and other Muslims praying at the mosque. There were concerns that Israel would manipulate the footage or turn off the cameras, either to prove

190 Heller and Al-Khalidi, “Jordan-Israel Relations.” 191 Barak Ravid & Jack Khoury. “Senior Israeli Official Tells Haaretz: Jordan Returning Ambassador to Israel.” Haaretz, February 5, 2015. https://www.haaretz.com/jordan-returning-ambassador- to-israel-1.5368240

the innocence of Israeli soldiers or to frame Palestinians praying at the mosque.192

Nonetheless, the cameras were installed and Abdullah emphasized that the initiative was solely Jordanian to highlight Jordan as the official custodian.

Domestic criticism of Jordanian-Israeli relations was reignited in September of the same year. An Israeli gas-exporting company announced that a contract had been reached with Jordan’s national power company to facilitate bilateral gas trade.193 Huge protests followed as Jordanians demanded that the ambassador be recalled once again. A campaign also developed in which protesters turned off their lights during certain hours of the day to decrease revenue for the power company. This initiative did not last long and had no impact on the deal.194 A trilateral desalination project involving the

Palestinian Authority, Israel, and Jordan announced in 2013 also generated, and continues to generate, considerable protests. However, the realities of climate change and Jordan’s limited resources make it hard for Abdullah to turn down projects and deals like these.195

The relationship between Abdullah and Netanyahu continues to be rocky, especially when domestic pressures increase. This can be seen in the king’s decision in

October 2019 to recall his ambassador to protest Israel’s detention of two Jordanian citizens of Palestinian descent.196 However, the failure of the energy-saving campaign,

192 Ahmad Melhem. “Why Jordan Is Installing Cameras at Al-Aqsa Mosque.” Al Monitor, March 31, 2016. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/03/jordan-cameras-al-aqsa-mosque- palestine.html 193 Oded Eran Jordan-Israel Relations: Normalization in the Shadow of Political Deadlock. Report no. 873. 2016. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/jordan-israel-relations-normalization-in-the- shadow-of-political-deadlock/ 194 Ibid. 195 Ora Coren. “Jordan Won’t Budge on Red Sea-Dead Sea Project – and Israel Will Pay the Price.” Haaretz, January 29, 2019. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-jordan-won-t-budge-on- red-sea-dead-sea-project-and-israel-will-pay-the-price-1.6874643 196 Jeffry Heller and Suleiman Al-Khalidi. “Jordan Recalls Envoy to Israel to Protest Detention of Two Citizens.” Reuters, October 29, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jordan-israel- envoy/jordan-recalls-envoy-to-israel-to-protest-detention-of-two-citizens-idUSKBN1X82JI

the continuation of regular trade relations, and the implementation of projects like the water desalination demonstrate that ideological motivations are not strong enough to outweigh difficult economic realities.

The United States

Another tricky yet crucial relationship for Abdullah is his relationship with the

President of the United States. While Abdullah and Barack Obama shared similar priorities for economic and political developments in the Middle East, Donald Trump’s presidency has been a difficult experience for the king. The United States is the largest donor of foreign aid to Jordan and President Trump has maintained high levels of assistance, with the amount from each year of his presidency ranging between $1.2 billion and $1.5 billion.197 At the same time, Trump has been vocal about his belief that the UN should revoke refugee status from the Palestinian diaspora. Considering Jordan would likely be responsible for absorbing the largest number of Palestinians if such a decision were made, Abdullah is staunchly against the idea.198 As with the rest of

Trump’s stances on the Middle East, the king must deliver his criticism carefully to avoid upsetting both his largest donor and his Palestinian majority.

The first test of Abdullah’s ability to balance between Trump and his subjects came in December of 2017 when Trump announced that the US embassy would move to

Jerusalem. Protests immediately occurred in Amman, where staunch Islamists,

Palestinian nationalists, and pro-monarchy East Bankers joined together out of fear for

197 U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp. RL33546. 2019. 198 Pinhas Inbari. “Mahmoud Abbas’ Recent Meeting with King Abdullah of Jordan.” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, December 23, 2018. https://jcpa.org/mahmoud-abbas-recent-meeting- with-king-abdullah-of-jordan/

the future of Jerusalem, the Palestinian state, and Jordanian sovereignty.199 Abdullah immediately condemned the idea for the blow it delivered to the two-state solution and the regional instability that would follow. He also worried that Trump’s decision was the first step in a peace plan that would involve the transfer of millions of Palestinians to

Jordan.200

Abdullah criticized the Trump administration again the following year when it announced U.S. funding cuts to UNRWA. In 2017, the United States was the top donor country to the agency. It gave $364.3 million, which was more than double the next donor, the European Union.201 First, in January 2018, Trump declared that $65 million would be withheld from the year’s pledged funds because of insufficient respect for the

United States from Palestinians. In August of the same year, his administration announced that $200 million would be redirected from development projects in the West

Bank and Gaza to other causes that aligned better with U.S. taxpayers’ interests.202 The following month, he ended all U.S. funding to the agency.203 The official justification for the decision was the unsustainability of the agency, largely due to the way in which individuals register with it. UNRWA defines refugees such that generations of

199 Ali Younes. "Jordanians Demand Closure of US Embassy in Amman." Al Jazeera, December 8, 2017. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/jordanians-demand-closure-embassy-amman- 171207170857947.html 200 Ibid. 201 United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). "Donor Charts." UNRWA. Last modified 2019. https://www.unrwa.org/how-you-can-help/government-partners/funding-trends/donor-charts. 202 David Brunnstrom. “Trump Cuts More than $200 Million in U.S. Aid to Palestinians.” Reuters, August 24, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-palestinians/trump-cuts-more-than-200- million-in-u-s-aid-to-palestinians-idUSKCN1L923C 203 Hady Amr. “In One Move, Trump Eliminated US Funding for UNRWA and the US Role as Mideast Peacemaker.” The Brookings Institution. Last modified September 7, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/09/07/in-one-move-trump-eliminated-us-funding- for-unrwa-and-the-us-role-as-mideast-peacemaker/.

descendants of refugees retain the status, even though they were born in a host country.

The agency does not prohibit convicted terrorists from accessing its services, nor does it revoke the status for those who hold host country citizenship, like the 1.8 million

Jordanian citizens who are registered with UNRWA.204 Since the beginning of his presidency, Trump has criticized UNRWA for misusing U.S. funds and facilitating a sense of entitlement among Palestinians.205

Again, Abdullah condemned the U.S. President’s decision and called on the international community to pick up the slack.206 Most top donor countries increased their donations, with Germany and Saudi Arabia each giving more than $1 million additional funds, but the efforts did not compensate for the loss of U.S. funding.207 As a result,

UNRWA had to make budget cuts in all host countries, including in its health and education resources, which use 54 percent and 17 percent of the budget, respectively.208

In Jordan, 634,000 Palestinians registered with UNRWA do not have citizenship and thus are unable to access healthcare or schooling if it is not administered through the agency.209 Furthermore, the existing public education infrastructure is already too crowded and cannot take more students, while most private schools are too expensive for families that are relying on UNRWA’s services.210

204 Michal Hatuel-Radoshitzky & Kobi Michael. The End to US Funding to UNRWA: Opportunity or Threat? Report no. 1093. 2018. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/end-us-funding-unrwa- opportunity-threat/ 205 Amr, “In One Move.” 206 Brunnstrom, “Trump Cuts.” 207 UNRWA, “Donor Charts.” 208 James G. Lindsay. “UNRWA Funding Cutoff: What Next?” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Last modified September 6, 2018. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy- analysis/view/unrwa-funding-cutoff-what-next 209 Mohammad Ghazal. “Population Stands at around 9.5 Million, including 2.9 Million Guests.” The Jordan Times, January 30, 2016. https://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/population-stands- around-95-million-including-29-million-guests 210 Felicia Schwartz. “Jordan Scrambles to Recoup Funds for Palestinians Lost to U.S.

Not only is education considered a human right, it is also highly valued in Jordan, where human beings are the country’s best natural resource. Palestinian Jordanians tend to prioritize education as an investment that will increase their economic power and counteract their societal marginalization. Thus, in addition to demonstrating Trump’s utter disregard for their well-being, the UNRWA funding cuts threatened to diminish

Palestinians’ means of empowerment. Abdullah’s condemnation of Trump’s decision and call for more funding seemed superficial to many Palestinian Jordanians, who perceived this response as weak and insufficient. Abdullah also faced renewed criticism for increasing the number of dependents on UNRWA’s services through his policy of revoking citizenship. However, he did nothing more than criticize the decision because he needed to maintain good relations with the United States as he continued to host more than 658,000 Syrian refugees.211 He also feared an alternative scenario in which Hamas would try to fill the funding vacuum. This would increase the organization’s influence in

Jordan, especially through the curriculum of UNRWA schools.212

While Abdullah was dealing with the UNRWA funding cuts, rumors spread that

Trump’s Middle East peace plan would include a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation.

Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas were invited to a meeting with officials from the U.S.

Department of State to discuss the possibility of such a confederation, but Abdullah was initially left out of the discussions.213 Netanyahu had presented a similar idea to Abdullah during secret bilateral talks in 2012, but the king never expressed his support for the idea

Cuts.” The Wall Street Journal, September 19, 2018. https://www.wsj.com/articles/jordan-scrambles-to- recoup-funds-for-palestinians-lost-to-u-s-cuts-1537358400 211 Schwartz, “Jordan Scrambles.” 212 Lindsay, “UNRWA Funding Cutoff.” 213 Oded Eran. The Idea of a Jordanian-Palestinian Confederation, Revisited. Report no. 1092. 2018. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/idea-jordanian-palestinian-confederation-revisited/

because he would have to extend citizenship to approximately 3 million more

Palestinians.214 That number would include Jordanian residents from whom he had revoked citizenship previously or to whom he had not extended citizenship because of their refugee status. Abdullah’s exclusion from the meeting sent the message that his voice was not important enough to be heard. Indeed, throughout the Trump presidency,

U.S. policy in the Middle East has shifted such that while still strategically important,

Jordan is no longer a favored Arab ally.215 As such, the king has less bargaining power to protect Palestinian interests.

The Gulf Cooperation Council Countries

Early in his presidency, Trump focused on improving relations with leaders of

Gulf countries, especially with Mohammad bin Salman after he became crown prince of

Saudi Arabia in June 2017. As American concerns about Iran’s nuclear arsenal have grown, Saudi Arabia has replaced Jordan as the favorite regional ally to the United

States.216 However, Jordan and Saudi Arabia also have strengthened bilateral relations because of a common enemy: Hamas. For bin Salman, Hamas represents Iran, which he perceives to be the ultimate threat to Saudi and Sunni interests. While Abdullah also recognizes the danger that Iran poses to the whole region, he cares more about the way that country strengthens Hamas.217 The king remains wary of Hamas because of its

214 Susan Hattis Rolef. “The Jordanian-Palestinian Confederation.” The Jerusalem Post, September 11, 2018. https://www.jpost.com/opinion/the-jordanian-palestinian-confederation-566971 215 Beevor, “Saudi Arabia.” 216 Ibid. 217 Frederic Wehrey, Theodore W. Karasik, Alireza Nader, Jeremy Ghez, Lydia Hansell, & Robert A. Guffey. “Contention on the Periphery: Saudi-Iranian Relations and the Conflicts in Lebanon and Palestine.” In Saudi-Iranian Relations since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy, 77-91. N.p.: RAND, 2009.

popularity among two of his greater domestic concerns: Palestinian Jordanians and

Islamists.218

Despite this shared enemy, Abdullah has struggled to maintain warm relations with bin Salman because of their conflicting views about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Following his condemnation of the 2017 U.S. embassy move to Jerusalem, Abdullah faced backlash from other Arab leaders. For example, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the

United Arab Emirates decided not to renew a $3.6 billion five-year aid package to

Jordan.219 In addition to losing this source of income, the cooling relations with these

GCC allies was cause for concern, as nearly half of Jordanians working abroad were based in GCC countries. Remittances formed approximately 12 percent of Jordan’ GDP in 2013, so maintaining work opportunities abroad is an important economic interest.220

Furthermore, a high proportion of Jordanians working abroad are of Palestinian descent.

This is because of their high levels of education and the barriers to employment associated with their identity in Jordan.221

Since 2018, bin Salman has maintained pressure on the Palestinian leadership to accept any peace proposal that is offered, even if it does not include the right of return.222

While he continues to advocate for a two-state solution with a Palestinian capital in East

Jerusalem, his dropping of the right to return is significant because he is the first Arab

218 Omar Al-Sharif. “Hamas-Dahlan Détente Keeps Jordan on Edge.” The Middle East Institute. Last modified July 11, 2017. https://www.mei.edu/publications/hamas-dahlan-detente-keeps-jordan-edge 219 Ali Younes. “Is Jordan Paying the Price for Jerusalem Criticism?” Al Jazeera, December 12, 2017. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/jordan-paying-price-jerusalem-criticism- 171212102011205.html 220 Comolet, “Geopolitical Service Provider.” 221 Ibid. 222 Al Jazeera. “MBS: Palestinians Should 'Accept Trump Proposals or Shut Up.” Al Jazeera, April 30, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/mbs-palestinians-accept-trump- proposals-shut-180430065228281.html

leader to do so.223 This has created tension between him and Abdullah, who clings to the right to return in the hopes that it would lessen the number of Palestinians in his kingdom. No other Arab country has abandoned that idea yet. However, given its influence in the region, it would not be surprising if Saudi Arabia approved a peace deal that did not include this right.224

Conclusion

If the right of return is dropped from the negotiating table, Jordan will be left responsible for absorbing at least its 634,000 Palestinian residents without citizenship.

Likely, it will have to accept even more, as Palestinians flee the occupied territories. To do that, Abdullah will need to secure more funds from international partners, which requires good relations with leaders that he does not always agree with. He cannot stop advocating for that right because too many of his citizens would be upset. East Bankers would insist on protection from a Palestinian takeover, while West Bankers would demand that he defend their right to return to Palestine.

However, the desire for the right of return and the importance of the East Bank-

West Bank cleavage may be dying off with older generations. As the Jordanian economy continues to deteriorate and unemployment rises, especially among youth, more and more protests are focusing on economic, rather than social and political, issues. The Arab

Spring demonstrated that new threats to domestic stability have emerged, as young

Jordanians from different backgrounds banded together to demand economic reform.

Abdullah has faced changes in his relationships with key regional and international

223 Adam Rasgon. “Meeting Abbas, MBS Backs Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as Its Capital.” The Times of Israel, February 13, 2019. https://www.timesofisrael.com/meeting-abbas-mbs-backs-palestinian- state-with-east-jerusalem-as-its-capital/. 224 Beevor, “Saudi Arabia.”

actors, including the United States. These developments have led to decreased foreign aid flows to Jordan and have pushed Abdullah to the sideline at the negotiating table.

Fortunately for the king, the domestic criticism has focused less on him and more on

U.S., Israeli, and Saudi decisions. However, Abdullah’s reputation has suffered at a time when he needs to appear strong, rendering him unable to advocate for his own interests, let alone those of his Palestinian subjects.

Conclusion

King Abdullah II became crown prince only two weeks before his father’s death.

Although he was familiar with the government from his military career with the

Jordanian armed forces, he was unprepared to lead the country when he took the throne.

He inherited a kingdom with economic difficulties, volatile neighbors, and deep tensions between East Bank and West Bank Jordanians. In his home life, Abdullah had bridged these tensions through his marriage to a Palestinian Jordanian, Queen Rania. However, throughout his reign he has faced criticism for his attitude towards Palestinians within and beyond his country’s borders. Abdullah has not experienced direct attempts to end his rule, as his father did during the 1970 Black September conflict, but the legacy of this incident has influenced many of his decisions. At the same time, he has distinguished his ruling style as generally unique from his predecessors in his move towards neoliberal economic policies and minor democratic reforms.

His relationship with Palestinian Jordanians also has differed from that of his father. When Abdullah first came to power, he was influenced by the tradition of prioritizing the interests of East Bank Jordanians over those of West Bank Jordanians.

However, he did not have as strong of an emotional connection to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as his father had because he had not been heavily involved in politics before that point. Abdullah also experienced different internal and external factors throughout his reign that affected his relationship with Palestinian Jordanians. He balanced good relations with the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority during the first few years of his reign to appeal to both international and domestic demands. However, by expelling Jordanian citizens working with Hamas, using force against pro-Palestine

protesters during the Second Intifada, and wielding the Jordan First Campaign against supposed unpatriotic citizens, he made it clear that he would not prioritize the demands of his Palestinian subjects. In each of these instances, however, he paired repression with rewards to combat any urges to revolt.

He continued to socially and politically marginalize Palestinian Jordanians through his campaign to revoke citizenship arbitrarily and his refusal to extend better electoral representation to Palestinian-dominated areas. He tried to offset these decisions by showcasing his amicable relations with Hamas and Palestinian Authority leaders, but symbolic visits were not enough to compensate the thousands who were rendered stateless. When the Arab Spring reached Jordan, Abdullah was surprised to find that instead of Palestinian Jordanians leading the protests, his traditional base of support among East Bank Jordanians had a long list of demands. His fear of a Palestinian uprising remained, but he also realized a new threat to his reign from East Bank Jordanians who were unhappy with his economic policies. Furthermore, he saw the possibility for the two groups to unite against him and feared the outcome of this possibility.

As his domestic politics have become more complicated since the Arab Spring,

Abdullah also has dealt with new leaders in countries that have been crucial allies for

Jordan, including the United States, Israel, and the GCC countries. He has struggled to stay on good terms with Donald Trump, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Mohammad bin

Salman, particularly, because of their overt disregard for the Palestinian liberation cause.

He is also wary of conceding too much to these leaders because he fears being left out of

Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations. As can be seen by Trump’s recently proposed peace plan, if he is not consulted, Jordanian interests are likely to be completely ignored.

However, his country’s economic difficulties and the increasingly loud domestic demands to address these issues make him even more dependent on securing aid from the

United States and GCC countries and ensuring economic cooperation with Israel.

The importance of these economic difficulties should not be underestimated, especially among younger Jordanians. Recent protests against normalized relations with

Israel have been sparked by political or social events. Meanwhile, economic cooperation projects, like the Red Sea-Dead Sea desalination project, have been accepted as undesirable but necessary. Furthermore, the way young Palestinian Jordanians relate to their Palestinian identity suggests that the desire to return to Palestine may be dying off with older generations. In 2014, a Jordanians news agency conducted a survey of 43

Palestinians to discover whether they preferred to return to Palestine or stay in Jordan.

Participants were also asked if they would accept citizenship from another country, such as the United States, Canada, or a European country, in exchange for their Jordanian citizenship. Although this sample size is too small to represent the entire community, the results of the survey suggest relevant differences in how older and younger Palestinian

Jordanians feel about their identities.

Of the participants, 27 were over 30 years of age, while 12 were under 30. Twenty three of the older participants said they would prefer to return to Palestine while three said they would stay in Jordan. Many who preferred the right of return expressed that it was a difficult decision to make because their families had been in Jordan for generations and it would be difficult to pick up everything they had built. Eight of the younger participants said they would stay and three said they would return. One young man said he was unsure of his answer because he had never been to Palestine and wanted to be

confident in the stability and living conditions there before committing to return. Every participant, young and old, said they would prefer Jordanian citizenship over that of any other country.225

This survey offers insight into a growing generational gap in attitudes towards

Palestine and its liberation among Palestinian Jordanians. Young people are taught to embrace their Palestinian heritage, and the social and political marginalization they face in Jordan helps strengthen that identity.226 However, there is also a significant disconnect because most have never been to Palestine and have no personal connection to the land.

Furthermore, Jordanian and Palestinian culture have become so intertwined that things from food to music to idiomatic expressions are sometimes attributed to both origins.

Considering the perspectives of Palestinian Jordanian youth on their dual identities is important because more than 50 percent of Jordan’s population is 24 years old or younger.227 They switch more fluidly between their two identities than their parents and grandparents do, and they are also beginning to prioritize other issues over Palestinian liberation.

The most pressing issue among Jordanian youth right now is unemployment. In

2012, the unemployment rate was approximately 12 percent and only 10 percent of the unemployed were over the age of forty.228 By 2019, the overall unemployment rate had risen to 19 percent.229 Most who are searching for jobs hold at least a bachelor’s degree

,Video. Posted by Jordan Days ".لقاءات مع المواطنين في مخيم الوحدات حول حق العودة والتعويض" .Jordan Days 225 February 14, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OukaVlDKf6k&t=314s. 226 Luisa Gandolfo, Palestinians in Jordan. 227 Central Intelligence Agency. "Middle East: Jordan." The World Factbook. Last modified February 18, 2020. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html 228 Comolet, “Geopolitical Service Provider.” 229 The Jordan Times. “Unemployment Continues to Rise in 2019, Hitting 19%.” The Jordan Times. June 4, 2019. https://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/unemployment-continues-rise-2019-hitting- 19

and are deeply frustrated by the lack of opportunity. Although the king pledged to create

1 million new jobs for Jordanian citizens, job growth has been slow and has occurred mostly in the private sector. As such, young East Bank Jordanians are forced to accept that the careers they were promised in the public sector are unattainable.230 A growing private sector means that more East Bank Jordanians will likely look for jobs in areas that are already dominated by West Bank Jordanians. This will lead to more integration between the two groups, which would ease the existing tension. However, this dynamic could be dangerous to Abdullah if they join forces and revolt against the king. Indeed, there were rumors in 2019 of an underground movement that was trying to overthrow the

Hashemite dynasty; multiple members of the movement were said to have close relations to the king.231

These domestic concerns will be exacerbated in the near future by regional and global developments. One of the most important factors will be Israeli policy towards the

Palestinian territories. While Benjamin Netanyahu is strongly associated with disregard for the Palestinian liberation cause, the success of centrist Benny Gantz in the March

2020 election offered some hope that Arab voices would be considered in future peace negotiations. Gantz was tasked with forming a new government, but the outbreak of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) caused so much turmoil that he conceded the premiership to Netanyahu on March 20, 2020.232 With the renewal of his leadership, Netanyahu is sure to maintain his efforts to diminish the power of the Palestinian leadership and

230 Comolet, “Geopolitical Service Provider.” 231 Oded Eran. Concerns for Jordan’s Stability. Report no. 1169. 2019. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/concerns-for-jordans-stability/ 232 Aluf Benn. “Under Coronavirus Emergency, Gantz Surrenders Unconditionally to Netanyahu’s Continued Rule.” Haaretz, March 20, 2020. https://www.haaretz.com/israel- news/elections/.premium-gantz-surrenders-unconditionally-to-netanyahu-s-continued-rule-1.8694153

Palestinians living in Israel. It is unlikely that he will carry out an explicit campaign of expelling Palestinians from the country, but the economic and political fallout from the

COVID-19 crisis may help him annex more of the West Bank. As a result, the Palestinian population in Jordan could increase with a new wave of refugees. It could also spark unrest within the community, which would reignite Abdullah’s concerns about a

Palestinian uprising in Jordan.

The COVID-19 crisis is also worrisome for Abdullah beyond Israeli policy towards Palestinians. The king quickly declared a state of emergency only two weeks after the first case was discovered, but the number of cases per capita in Jordan is comparable to that in the United States. In addition to causing general panic among the population, the outbreak has led to a prison riot, stricter enforcement of media outlets and civil society organizations, and increased unemployment.233 Given that frustration over the unemployment rate was one of the main drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings,

Abdullah has little room for error in his response to the economic effects of COVID-19.

It will be especially difficult for Jordan’s already weak economy to bounce back from this crisis because its richest allies, like the United States, are also facing huge economic hardships. Not only has President Trump already demonstrated his aversion to non- military foreign aid, but the quick and global spread of COVID-19 has provided fuel to his America First attitude. As such, it is expected that he will not be eager to dole out aid packages to American allies struggling to come back from this crisis.

Since Abdullah came to power in 1999, he has become less aggressive in his efforts to marginalize Palestinian Jordanians as other threats have diverted his attention.

233 Human Rights Watch. Jordan: State of Emergency Declared: Government Promises to Respect Rights in COVID-19 Response. 2020. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/20/jordan-state-emergency-declared#

There is still a threat to his rule from that sector of the population, especially if more

Palestinians flood in from the occupied territories, but it may not be the greatest such threat. He is unlikely to try to strengthen his relationship with Palestinian Jordanians overtly because he fears undermining his legitimacy to rule among East Bank Jordanians.

However, West Bank Jordanians represent a wild card given the role they play in the economy and the political arena. If they decide to ally with East Bank Jordanians against the monarchy, Abdullah would face a strong popular uprising that could be just as detrimental as Black September.

After the COVID-19 outbreak eases, Abdullah will be left with a panicked population and greater economic challenges than he has faced before. This could put greater strain on the West Bank-East Bank divide as West Bank Jordanians’ economic superiority will protect them from the harshest fallout. It may also encourage the youth population to demand reforms that will bring more economic security. Abdullah may be able to survive these threats if he can shape the public fear into national unity and initiate genuine economic reform. However, he could capitalize on the younger generation’s growing concern with the state of the Jordanian economy and encourage East Banker-

West Banker integration through reforms that address their shared economic interests.

Moving forward, Abdullah should not take any steps to address domestic pressures that will be perceived as merely symbolic. Whether he prioritizes Palestinians or East

Bankers, his actions will determine if he undermines his own efforts or succeeds in maintaining stability in Jordan.

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