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Fraud and the Darknets
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S. Department of Education Technology Crimes Division Fraud And The Darknets Thomas Harper Assistant Special Agent in Charge Technology Crimes Division OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S. Department of Education Technology Crimes Division What is an OIG? • Established by Congress • Independent agency that reports to Congress • Agency head appointed by the President and confirmed by Congress • Mission: protect the taxpayer’s interests by ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the associated agency OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S. Department of Education Technology Crimes Division Technology Crimes Division • Investigate criminal cyber threats against the Department’s IT infrastructure, or • Criminal activity in cyber space that threatens the Department’s administration of Federal education assistance funds • Investigative jurisdiction encompasses any IT system used in the administration of Federal money originating from the Department of Education. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S. Department of Education Technology Crimes Division Work Examples • Grade hacking • Computer Intrusions • Criminal Forums online selling malware • ID/Credential theft to hijack Student Aid applications • Misuse of Department systems to obtain personal information • Falsifying student aid applications by U.S. government employees • Child Exploitation material trafficking OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S. Department of Education Technology Crimes Division Fraud and the Darknets Special Thanks to Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S. Department of Education Technology Crimes Division Fraud and the Darknets OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S. Department of Education Technology Crimes Division OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S. Department of Education Technology Crimes Division OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S. -
August 10, 2011 Broadcasting Board of Governors International
August 10, 2011 Broadcasting Board of Governors International Broadcasting Bureau Office of Engineering Cohen Building, Room 4300 330 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC 20237 Attn: Malita Dyson Dear Ms. Dyson, Below is our thirty-ninth invoice for contract number BBGCON1808C6700, Accounting Appropri ation Data 9568-08-0206-E009701048A. There are no travel costs. Services rendered include blocking resistance architecture and testing, scalability and promotion and advocacy for the Tor network, and other detailed tasks under 0001 of our contract as confirmed in our status reports to BBG. Please do not hesitate to email me at [email protected] or call me at (b) (6) if there are any questions. Invoice 39: Period Months Rate Cost 06/17/2011 - 07/17/2011 1 $15,000 $15,000 Thank you. Sincerely, Andrew Lewman Executive Director TorProject Invoice BBG08102011 The Tor Project, Inc. 969 Main Street, Suite 206, Walpole, MA 02081-2972 USA https://www.torproject.org/ From: Andrew Lewman. Executive Director To: Kelly DeYoe, program officer, BBG RE: contract BBGCON1807S6441 Date: August 10, 2011 This report documents progress in July 2011 on contract BBGCON1807S6441 between BBG and The Tor Project. New releases, new hires, new funding New Releases 1. On July 7, we released Torbutton 1.4.0. The addon has been disabled on addons.mozilla.org. Our URL is now canonical. This release features support for Firefox 5.0, and has been tested against the vanilla release for basic functionality. However, it has not been audited for Network Isolation, State Separation, Tor Undiscoverability or Interoperability issues[l] due to toggling under Firefox 5. -
Dark and Deep Webs-Liberty Or Abuse
International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism Volume 9 • Issue 2 • April-June 2019 Dark and Deep Webs-Liberty or Abuse Lev Topor, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1836-5150 ABSTRACT While the Dark Web is the safest internet platform, it is also the most dangerous platform at the same time. While users can stay secure and almost totally anonymously, they can also be exploited by other users, hackers, cyber-criminals, and even foreign governments. The purpose of this article is to explore and discuss the tremendous benefits of anonymous networks while comparing them to the hazards and risks that are also found on those platforms. In order to open this dark portal and contribute to the discussion of cyber and politics, a comparative analysis of the dark and deep web to the commonly familiar surface web (World Wide Web) is made, aiming to find and describe both the advantages and disadvantages of the platforms. KeyWoRD Cyber, DarkNet, Information, New Politics, Web, World Wide Web INTRoDUCTIoN In June 2018, the United States Department of Justice uncovered its nationwide undercover operation in which it targeted dark web vendors. This operation resulted in 35 arrests and seizure of weapons, drugs, illegal erotica material and much more. In total, the U.S. Department of Justice seized more than 23.6$ Million.1 In that same year, as in past years, the largest dark web platform, TOR (The Onion Router),2 was sponsored almost exclusively by the U.S. government and other Western allies.3 Thus, an important and even philosophical question is derived from this situation- Who is responsible for the illegal goods and cyber-crimes? Was it the criminal[s] that committed them or was it the facilitator and developer, the U.S. -
Tor and Circumvention: Lessons Learned
Tor and circumvention: Lessons learned Nick Mathewson The Tor Project https://torproject.org/ 1 What is Tor? Online anonymity 1) open source software, 2) network, 3) protocol Community of researchers, developers, users, and relay operators Funding from US DoD, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Voice of America, Google, NLnet, Human Rights Watch, NSF, US State Dept, SIDA, ... 2 The Tor Project, Inc. 501(c)(3) non-profit organization dedicated to the research and development of tools for online anonymity and privacy Not secretly evil. 3 Estimated ~250,000? daily Tor users 4 Anonymity in what sense? “Attacker can’t learn who is talking to whom.” Bob Alice Alice Anonymity network Bob Alice Bob 5 Threat model: what can the attacker do? Alice Anonymity network Bob watch Alice! watch (or be!) Bob! Control part of the network! 6 Anonymity isn't cryptography: Cryptography just protects contents. “Hi, Bob!” “Hi, Bob!” Alice <gibberish> attacker Bob 7 Anonymity isn't just wishful thinking... “You can't prove it was me!” “Promise you won't look!” “Promise you won't remember!” “Promise you won't tell!” “I didn't write my name on it!” “Isn't the Internet already anonymous?” 8 Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups. Anonymity “It's privacy!” Private citizens 9 Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups. Anonymity Businesses “It's network security!” “It's privacy!” Private citizens 10 Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups. “It's traffic-analysis resistance!” Governments Anonymity Businesses “It's network security!” “It's privacy!” Private citizens 11 Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups. -
Guide De Protection Numérique Des Sources Journalistiques
Guide de Protection numérique des Sources journalistiques Mise en œuvre simplifiée Par Hector Sudan Version du document : 23.04.2021 Mises à jour disponibles gratuitement sur https://sourcesguard.ch/publications Guide de Protection numérique des Sources journalistiques Les journalistes ne sont pas suffisamment sensibilisés aux risques numé- riques et ne disposent pas assez d'outils pour s'en protéger. C'est la consta- tation finale d'une première recherche sociologique dans le domaine jour- nalistique en Suisse romande. Ce GPS (Guide de Protection numérique des Sources) est le premier résultat des recommandations de cette étude. Un GPS qui ne parle pas, mais qui va droit au but en proposant des solutions concrètes pour la sécurité numérique des journalistes et de leurs sources. Il vous est proposé une approche andragogique et tactique, de manière résumée, afin que vous puissiez mettre en œuvre rapidement des mesures visant à améliorer votre sécurité numérique, tout en vous permettant d'être efficient. Même sans être journaliste d'investigation, vos informations et votre protection sont importantes. Vous n'êtes peut-être pas directement la cible, mais pouvez être le vecteur d'une attaque visant une personne dont vous avez les informations de contact. Hector Sudan est informaticien au bénéfice d'un Brevet fédéral en technique des sys- tèmes et d'un MAS en lutte contre la crimina- lité économique. Avec son travail de master l'Artiste responsable et ce GPS, il se posi- tionne comme chercheur, formateur et consul- tant actif dans le domaine de la sécurité numé- rique pour les médias et journalistes. +41 76 556 43 19 keybase.io/hectorsudan [email protected] SourcesGuard Avant propos Ce GPS (Guide de Protection numérique des Sources journalistes) est à l’image de son acronyme : concis, clair, allant droit au but, tout en offrant la possibilité de passer par des chemins techniquement complexes. -
Tor: the Second-Generation Onion Router (2014 DRAFT V1)
Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router (2014 DRAFT v1) Roger Dingledine Nick Mathewson Steven Murdoch The Free Haven Project The Free Haven Project Computer Laboratory [email protected] [email protected] University of Cambridge [email protected] Paul Syverson Naval Research Lab [email protected] Abstract Perfect forward secrecy: In the original Onion Routing We present Tor, a circuit-based low-latency anonymous com- design, a single hostile node could record traffic and later munication service. This Onion Routing system addresses compromise successive nodes in the circuit and force them limitations in the earlier design by adding perfect forward se- to decrypt it. Rather than using a single multiply encrypted crecy, congestion control, directory servers, integrity check- data structure (an onion) to lay each circuit, Tor now uses an ing, configurable exit policies, anticensorship features, guard incremental or telescoping path-building design, where the nodes, application- and user-selectable stream isolation, and a initiator negotiates session keys with each successive hop in practical design for location-hidden services via rendezvous the circuit. Once these keys are deleted, subsequently com- points. Tor is deployed on the real-world Internet, requires promised nodes cannot decrypt old traffic. As a side benefit, no special privileges or kernel modifications, requires little onion replay detection is no longer necessary, and the process synchronization or coordination between nodes, and provides of building circuits is more reliable, since the initiator knows a reasonable tradeoff between anonymity, usability, and ef- when a hop fails and can then try extending to a new node. -
UC Irvine UC Irvine Electronic Theses and Dissertations
UC Irvine UC Irvine Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title The Role of Corporate and Government Surveillance in Shifting Journalistic Information Security Practices Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9p22j7q3 Author Shelton, Martin Publication Date 2015 License https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ 4.0 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE The Role of Corporate and Government Surveillance in Shifting Journalistic Information Security Practices DISSERTATION submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in Information and Computer Science by Martin L. Shelton Dissertation Committee: Professor Bonnie A. Nardi, Chair Professor Judith S. Olson Professor Victoria Bernal 2015 © 2015 Martin Shelton This document is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF FIGURES v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS vi CURRICULUM VITAE viii ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION ix SECTION 1: Introduction and Context 1 CHAPTER 1: The Impulse for Information Security in Investigative 2 Journalism 1.1 Motivations 6 1.2 Research Scope 9 CHAPTER 2: Literature Review 12 2.1 Journalistic Ideologies 12 2.1.1 Investigative Routines and Ideologies 15 2.2 Panoptic Enforcement of Journalism 17 2.3 Watching the Watchdogs 21 2.4 The Decentralization and Normalization of Surveillance 27 SECTION 2: Findings 30 CHAPTER 3: Methods 31 3.1 Gathering Surveillance -
Mitigating the Risks of Whistleblowing an Approach Using Distributed System Technologies
Mitigating the Risks of Whistleblowing An Approach Using Distributed System Technologies Ali Habbabeh1, Petra Maria Asprion1, and Bettina Schneider1 1 University of Applied Sciences Northwestern Switzerland, Basel, Switzerland [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Abstract. Whistleblowing is an effective tool to fight corruption and expose wrongdoing in governments and corporations. Insiders who are willing to report misconduct, called whistleblowers, often seek to reach a recipient who can dis- seminate the relevant information to the public. However, whistleblowers often face many challenges to protect themselves from retaliation when using the ex- isting (centralized) whistleblowing platforms. This study discusses several asso- ciated risks of whistleblowing when communicating with third parties using web- forms of newspapers, trusted organizations like WikiLeaks, or whistleblowing software like GlobaLeaks or SecureDrop. Then, this study proposes an outlook to a solution using decentralized systems to mitigate these risks using Block- chain, Smart Contracts, Distributed File Synchronization and Sharing (DFSS), and Distributed Domain Name Systems (DDNS). Keywords: Whistleblowing, Blockchain, Smart Contracts 1 Introduction By all indications, the topic of whistleblowing has been gaining extensive media atten- tion since the financial crisis in 2008, which ignited a crackdown on the corruption of institutions [1]. However, some whistleblowers have also become discouraged by the negative association with the term [2], although numerous studies show that whistle- blowers have often revealed misconduct of public interest [3]. Therefore, researchers like [3] argue that we - the community of citizens - must protect whistleblowers. Addi- tionally, some researchers, such as [1], claim that, although not perfect, we should re- ward whistleblowers financially to incentivize them to speak out to fight corruption [1]. -
Examining Older Users' Online Privacy-Enhancing
EXAMINING OLDER USERS’ ONLINE PRIVACY-ENHANCING EXPERIENCE FROM A HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION PERSPECTIVE BY HSIAO-YING HUANG DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Doctor of Philosophy in Informatics in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2019 Urbana, Illinois Doctoral Committee: Assistant Professor Masooda Bashir, Chair Associate Professor Nikita Borisov Professor Wendy Rogers Professor Michael Twidale ABSTRACT The advancement of Internet technologies, including instant and unlimited access to information and services, has been an excellent source of support for older adults. However, pervasive and continuous online tracking can pose severe threats to older adults’ information privacy. Surprisingly, very few empirical studies have focused on older users’ online privacy-enhancing experience from a Human-Computer Interaction perspective. Therefore, it remains unclear how older users protect their online information privacy and what factors influence their online behaviors. Thus, my thesis aims to study older users’ online privacy-enhancing experience by examining the following questions: 1) what older users know and do to protect their online information privacy, 2) how their emotional state influences their adoption of privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs), and 3) what usability challenges they encounter while using one of the most popular PETs currently available to the public. To examine these questions, a diverse set of empirical approaches was adopted, including a survey, a quasi-experiment, and a usability study. My research findings suggest that three are three elements that play a crucial role in older users' online privacy-enhancing practices. First, older users' knowledge of online privacy has a significant influence on their daily online privacy protection behaviors. -
Technical and Legal Overview of the Tor Anonymity Network
Emin Çalışkan, Tomáš Minárik, Anna-Maria Osula Technical and Legal Overview of the Tor Anonymity Network Tallinn 2015 This publication is a product of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (the Centre). It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of the Centre or NATO. The Centre may not be held responsible for any loss or harm arising from the use of information contained in this publication and is not responsible for the content of the external sources, including external websites referenced in this publication. Digital or hard copies of this publication may be produced for internal use within NATO and for personal or educational use when for non- profit and non-commercial purpose, provided that copies bear a full citation. www.ccdcoe.org [email protected] 1 Technical and Legal Overview of the Tor Anonymity Network 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 3 2. Tor and Internet Filtering Circumvention ....................................................................................... 4 2.1. Technical Methods .................................................................................................................. 4 2.1.1. Proxy ................................................................................................................................ 4 2.1.2. Tunnelling/Virtual Private Networks ............................................................................... 5 -
The Tor Dark Net
PAPER SERIES: NO. 20 — SEPTEMBER 2015 The Tor Dark Net Gareth Owen and Nick Savage THE TOR DARK NET Gareth Owen and Nick Savage Copyright © 2015 by Gareth Owen and Nick Savage Published by the Centre for International Governance Innovation and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Centre for International Governance Innovation or its Board of Directors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution — Non-commercial — No Derivatives License. To view this license, visit (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc- nd/3.0/). For re-use or distribution, please include this copyright notice. 67 Erb Street West 10 St James’s Square Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2 London, England SW1Y 4LE Canada United Kingdom tel +1 519 885 2444 fax +1 519 885 5450 tel +44 (0)20 7957 5700 fax +44 (0)20 7957 5710 www.cigionline.org www.chathamhouse.org TABLE OF CONTENTS vi About the Global Commission on Internet Governance vi About the Authors 1 Executive Summary 1 Introduction 2 Hidden Services 2 Related Work 3 Study of HSes 4 Content and Popularity Analysis 7 Deanonymization of Tor Users and HSes 8 Blocking of Tor 8 HS Blocking 9 Conclusion 9 Works Cited 12 About CIGI 12 About Chatham House 12 CIGI Masthead GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE PAPER SERIES: NO. 20 — SEPTEMBER 2015 ABOUT THE GLOBAL ABOUT THE AUTHORS COMMISSION ON INTERNET Gareth Owen is a senior lecturer in the School of GOVERNANCE Computing at the University of Portsmouth. -
Paul Syverson U.S
Theory and Design of Low-latency Anonymity Systems (Lecture 2) Paul Syverson U.S. Naval Research Laboratory [email protected] http://www.syverson.org 1 Course Outline Lecture 1: • Usage examples, basic notions of anonymity, types of anonymous comms systems • Crowds: Probabilistic anonymity, predecessor attacks Lecture 2: • Onion routing basics: simple demo of using Tor, network discovery, circuit construction, crypto, node types and exit policies • Economics, incentives, usability, network effects 2 Course Outline Lecture 3: • Formalization and analysis, possibilistic and probabilistic definitions of anonymity • Hidden services: responder anonymity, predecessor attacks revisited, guard nodes Lecture 4: • Link attacks • Trust 3 Tor Demo Background Tor is an onion routing system for anonymous communication • Initially a project at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory • The Tor Project Inc. is now a U.S. nonprofit 501 (c) (3) • Network comprised of thousands of volunteer nodes from around the world • Free and open software maintained by the Tor Project, used by hundreds of thousands 4 Getting Tor 5 Vidalia: Tor’s GUI 6 Vidalia: Tor’s GUI 7 8 The Web through Tor and TorButton 9 10 Low-latency systems are vulnerable to end-to-end correlation attacks. Low-latency: Alice1 sends: match! Bob2 gets: Alice2 sends: Bob1 gets: match! Time High-latency: Alice1 sends: Alice2 sends: Bob1 gets: ..... Bob2 gets: ..... These attacks work in practice. The obvious defenses are expensive (like high-latency), useless, or both. 11 Multiple relays so that no single one can betray Alice. Alice Bob R1 R3 R4 R5 R2 12 For Onion Routing: A corrupt first hop can tell that Alice is talking, but not to whom.