Philippine Political Science Journal Vol. 33, No. 2, December 2012, 250–263

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State structure, policy formation, and economic development in Southeast : The political economy of and the , by Antoinette R. Raquiza, London and New York, Routledge, 2012, 204 pp., £85.00, ISBN 9780415617673

Among the attractions of the institutional approach is that it lends itself so easily to comparative analysis. The combination of institutionalism and comparative politics is a powerful one, enabling more incisive understanding of large phenomena: such as, for instance, the variance in the development experiences of nation states. The combination of analytical approaches allows much more insight than, say, a mere comparison of national accounts over a period. It enables the analyst to avoid the tendency to descend into dogmatism in the highly abstracted debate between one development policy approach against another: as in the worthless debate between “nationalist” economic growth and “globalization.” Antoinette Raquiza demonstrates this in her comparative study of the institutional settings in Thailand and the Philippines in an attempt to explain the variance in economic outcomes between the two countries. Her study is anchored on the characterization of Thailand as a “bureaucratic polity” and the Philippines as a “proprietary polity.” As a “bureaucratic polity,” the Thai state has been better able to take the “commanding heights” in choosing between policy options to ensure more optimal and more sustained paths to development. As a “proprietary polity” where the economic elites directly take a stake in state power, resort to regulatory capture, or otherwise bend policy to suit specific and immediate proprietary interests, the Philippine state produced a fluid regulatory structure and constantly shifting policy architecture. The difference in institutional configurations (and she fails to mention, in order not to clutter her analysis, significant differences in political culture) produced different policy outcomes. The differences in policy outcomes in turn produced different results in the economic evolution of the two countries. There is a growing genre of comparative analysis being done to help explain why the Philippines had done so badly in a neighborhood of rapidly emerging economies. This study is not the first and will not be the last comparing our inferior performance relative to Thailand in particular. The inferiority is quite sharp, indeed. Over the past three or four decades, Thailand outperformed us in every conventional aspect of economic growth despite the mainland Asian economy having more changes in government than we bother to count. Thailand has a strong agricultural base, making her a net exporter of agricultural produce. Income inequality is less pronounced. Thailand’s capital market overshadows ours many times over. Thailand’s sector is strong, helped along by foreign direct many times larger than what we get. By contrast, Philippine manufacturing is hollowing out due to structural constraints. Adept policy-making insulates investor confidence in the Thai economy against sometimes turbulent political episodes. By contrast, the Philippines

ISSN 0115-4451 print/ISSN 2165-025X online http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01154451.2012.734101 http://www.tandfonline.com Philippine Political Science Journal 251 suffers from a shifting environment even in the most placid political episodes due to extensive regulatory capture and a heavily politicized policy-making process marred by sharp discontinuities after every “normal” transfer of power. Using the categories of “bureaucratic” and “proprietary” polities, Raquiza demonstrates the superiority of a strong bureaucracy in ensuring far-sighted policies and institutional continuity. The difference in institutional configuration explains the policy stability in Thailand and the policy chaos that drives away long-term direct investments in the Philippines. It likewise creates differences in the “rent” derived by the elites: in Thailand, retiring bureaucrats are rewarded with seats on the boards of large conglomerates; in the Philippines, gratification is instant. The comparison of “bureaucratic” and “proprietary” polities is a refinement on the older juxtaposition of “strong” and “weak” states. It better represents the continuity of institutional practices and the procedural cultures they nurture even after seemingly turbulent breaks in regimes. Taken from a longer view, after all, an economy’s development performance tends to exhibit only incremental changes notwithstanding sharp breaks in the political sphere. It is one thing, however, to attempt a demonstration of the viability of a theoretical approach and to compellingly explain the shaping of a long historical course (as the once fashionable “grand theories” aspired to do). Raquiza’s study (based on a doctoral dissertation), succeeds as a demonstration of the viability of the theoretical approach she employs. Whether this is a final explanation for the variance in development outcomes of the two countries she compares is, of course, quite another thing. There could be no monocausal explanation for complex historical outcomes. The deeper our examination of historical processes, the more feeble our conceptual instruments often seem to be. That is the exasperation – as well as the joy – of analyzing large phenomena, such as nation states and the forms of development they foster. The configuration of institutions and processes defining policy formation might seem to be the key factor explaining variance in development outcomes, given political scientists’ preoccupation with the state. This is the necessary postulation underpinning Raquiza’s analysis. We do recognize that there are more profound historical factors (as well as more defining historical accidents) differentiating Thailand’s and the Philippines’ development experiences. Thailand has been a kingdom for centuries. The idea of a single community that is the nation (or kingdom) is well rooted, facilitating greater sensitivity for the needs of the more encompassing abstraction over more concrete and more particular interests. The kingdom managed to negotiate its way to remain outside the fold of direct colonial occupation (by Britain and by ), a feat reflected not only in a deep sense of common fate but also institutional apparatuses as well as policies that enabled a deep tradition of self- management. By contrast, the Philippines is an entity defined by the colonial experience. The state formed as an instrument of domination, often insensitive to the welfare of the grass roots. The irresponsible elite that pervaded the archipelago operated on a different set of values and economic goals. The bureaucracy never developed the degree of institutional integrity seen elsewhere. Too, there are glaring topographical differences: Thailand being a contiguous land mass and the Philippines a fragmented archipelago. Early on, Thailand evolved an efficient domestic logistical framework while the Philippines has been handicapped by