Pool Re Terrorism Research and Analysis Centre

Post Incident Report: Westminster Attack Wednesday 22 March 2017 14:40

1 Westminster Bridge Car drives into people along the pavement Multiple people injured or killed

Portcullis House 2 Car crashes into railings 3 Masood enters Carriage Gates, stabs police officer and is shot

Palace of Westminster

82 6 dead 35+ 76 mph 1,500 seconds injuries potential witnesses

Approximate route of attacker’s vehicle Approximate route of attacker on foot Location of injured or dead The methodology of the Westminster attack is consistent with the current trend across mainland Europe of extremists using a vehicle and weapons against crowded places at iconic sites, targeting figures of authority such as the police.

As the UK threat level was not raised employees attending the site, rather than the actual after the attack it is a likely sign Khalid building which has been the traditional target for attacks. Masood acted alone and the incident The timing, audible impact of the vehicle against the was not part of a coordinated campaign. perimeter fence and the likely surge of pedestrians This may be corroborated as the 12 towards Parliament Square are relevant factors in the attack. The timing may lead to a review of the police people arrested after the attack have patrol strategies. The noise and location of the impact now all been released without charge. could have been an initial distraction to the police, potentially directing their attention away from Carriage Prior to the incident, Islamist extremists appeared to Gates. The likely surge of pedestrians away from the have shown little interest in mounting attacks against vehicle would have been in the direction Masood the Government Security Zone or Government ultimately ran, thus potentially concealing him within a Estate. Whilst iconic government sites and individuals crowd. An indication of the amount of people present have featured in Islamist extremist media, overseas in the area may be derived from the 1,500 potential encouragement for their targeting appeared aspirational witnesses cited at the opening of the inquest into and not linked to credible attack planning in the UK. Masood’s death at Westminster Coroners Court. Masood, however, specifically targeted Westminster above other locations after driving from Brighton that day. The staffing of Carriage Gates by unarmed police was routine, with their primary role likely to be affording the It is highly likely Masood sought maximum casualties entrance or exit of vehicles from the Palace grounds by using the vehicle in the manner he did. His approach and managing the pedestrians at the roadside. Close- over Westminster Bridge afforded an acceleration route armed support would be provided by both static and not possible from the opposing Parliament Square patrolling armed officers nearby. Numerous media direction. By driving the full length of the bridge (around reports suggest the gates were subject to an existing 250 metres) in a zig-zag formation and reaching security review, awaiting local authority planning a reported speed of 76mph, Masood was able to permission for physical changes. intentionally use the kinetic energy of the car to cause mass casualties. Armed-police vehicle check points, Whilst it is not currently clear if police officers were previously held on both Westminster and Masood’s intended target, it is likely considering the bridges, were absent which is noticeable considering probable Islamist extremist rhetoric to the incident, other road based mitigation measures recently supported by the attack in Paris on 20 April 2017. implemented in the capital. Those include road closures Notably, whilst Daesh claimed Masood as ‘a soldier of and barrier installations around Buckingham Palace the Islamic State’, he was not specifically named unlike for the Changing of the Guard ceremony. the Paris attacker, Karim Cheurfi. This may suggest that whilst Masood was inspired by Islamist extremism, Hostile vehicle mitigation measures have been a he was not under overseas direction and control. long standing part of security architecture in the UK, either overtly with bollards and fences or covertly with The use of knives in the attack is typical of current concealed protection afforded through innovative and methodology in the UK. Such weapons do not require decorative building designs. The attack highlights any formal training and the implements are easy to the extent to which those designs may now need to obtain. They have frequently featured in counter-terrorism be extended around buildings or sites to include the cases, with a disrupted plot in Birmingham on 29 March approach roads and pavements, thereby affording 2017 involving a further intended knife attack by an protection to members of the public and potentially Islamist extremist. 2010 2013 2013 2014 2017 Al Qaeda (AQ), Murder of al-Shabaab urged Abu Mohammed Westminster attack highlighted the use of Fusilier Lee Rigby Muslims in the al-Adnani directed followers trucks as “the ultimate UK to attack with to kill with a knife or run mowing machine” “a simple knife” over with your car

Use of firearms or explosives by extremists in the Luton has strong links with and the al UK remains less likely, due to gun control laws and Muhajiroun network and considering Masood’s presence penetration of criminal networks by there, a historic association with al Muhajiroun is possible. law enforcement agencies. Birmingham has been recognised as a focal point in UK attack plots in recent years. Masood’s age, however, is Extremists using vehicles and knives in a UK attack is notably older than recent terrorists in Europe, which not new, illustrated by the murder of Lee Rigby in 2013. makes the profiling of likely lone actors harder for the Al Qaeda (AQ), in the second edition of Inspire magazine police and MI5. in 2010, highlighted the use of trucks as “the ultimate mowing machine”. In 2013 al-Shabaab urged Muslims Whilst the UK is a desired target, it is a difficult environment in the UK to attack with “a simple knife from your local for extremists to operate in. The police and MI5 have B&Q will do the job”, whilst in 2014 Daesh spokesman successfully disrupted at least 14 plots against the Abu Mohammed al-Adnani directed followers to “kill homeland since 2013, but with the frequency of low (the disbeliever) in any manner or way however it may complexity attacks spreading across Europe, adjustments be…slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with in protective security operations will be key in preventing your car”. Since then, attack planning advice has been further attacks. The intent and capabilities of UK extremists a common theme in extremist publications, including show no sign of declining. Successful mitigation of the Daesh’s Rumiyah. As such, the ideological influence on terrorist threat seems to be focused around maintaining UK extremists to adopt such methodology is strong, resilience through reducing vulnerability and the impact of an along with being relatively easy to access on the internet. attack should it take place. Pool Re continues to work with It is likely Masood would have accessed extremist agencies such as the National Counter Terrorism Security propaganda over many years. Office in identifying and supporting, through insurance discounts, the implementation of intelligence led protective The trigger for the attack is not currently known. It is security and risk mitigation measures minimising the impact reported in the media Masood was active on an instant of some attack types. messaging platform immediately prior to the attack, although the recipients and content of any potential Defence against terrorism does not rest solely with the messages have not yet been publically reported. authorities. The public, communities and business all These potential messages may give an indication of his have a fundamental role to play in reducing the threat of exact mind-set, motivation and associations. Masood contemporary terrorism. had connections to areas of known extremist activity in the UK, particularly Luton and Birmingham.

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