United States V. Nicholas Young
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Case 1:16-cr-00265-LMB Document 127 Filed 10/10/17 Page 1 of 29 PageID# 990 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) ) v. ) Criminal No. 1:16-CR-265 ) NICHOLAS YOUNG ) GOVERNMENT’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S OMNIBUS MOTION IN LIMINE Defendant Young asserts that he was entrapped into supporting terrorists and obstructing justice, Young’s Brief at 2,1 but moves to bar much of the government's evidence of his predisposition to do so on the grounds or relevance or undue prejudice. His motion should be denied. The defense in this case is based on a claim of entrapment. In light of that defense, the evidence at issue is relevant, and its probative value outweighs the risk of undue prejudice. Background In December 2016, Young was indicted for attempting to provide material support to the Islamic State ("ISIS") and obstruction of justice. In essence, the indictment alleges that, to keep the government from learning that his friend ("Mo") had joined ISIS in November 2014 - - and that Young was still in regular contact with him - - Young tried to mislead the FBI in December 2015 about his contacts with Mo over the previous 18 months. The indictment further alleged that, in July 2016, Young attempted to send money to ISIS by transmitting gift card codes to an account that Young believed was controlled by Mo. 1 “Young’s Brief at __” refers to “Memorandum in Support of Defendant Nicholas Young’s Omnibus Motion in Limine,” Docket #117-1. Case 1:16-cr-00265-LMB Document 127 Filed 10/10/17 Page 2 of 29 PageID# 991 Young claims that he was entrapped. As a result, the government must show that he was predisposed to support ISIS. As best we can tell, Young will argue that his contact with an undercover officer known to him as “Khalil” between 2010 and 2012 contributed to his “entrapment” in 2016. See Young’s Brief at p.1 (“the government will also attempt to prove he had a predisposition to materially support the FTO before the criminal investigation began, in 2010 or earlier”). As a result - - at least according to Young - - the government’s proof of predisposition must predate his encounter with Khalil. In light of that argument, the government’s proof of Young’s predisposition will include evidence that pre-dates 2010. Months ago, the government produced to the defense a draft list of its trial exhibits, many of which will be used not only to establish Young's motive to support ISIS, but also to rebut his claim that he was entrapped into attempting to do so. Young moved to exclude numerous of those exhibits. Dkt. 117. That motion is not supported by the law, and should be denied. Argument In his moving pleading, Young cites to a variety of cases holding that various types of evidence were inadmissible in those cases as irrelevant or unduly prejudicial. As far as we could tell, only one of those cases involved a defense of entrapment. This distinction is vital because, when submitted to prove predisposition, evidence of prior bad acts is not subject to the constraints on the admission of such evidence that are ordinarily applied pursuant to Rule 404(b). Young seeks to have his cake and eat it too: he puts his mindset at issue by claiming entrapment, but simultaneously claims that the government’s evidence of his mindset should be barred as unduly prejudicial. Settled authority precludes this tactic. As the Supreme Court held years ago, “if the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that 2 Case 1:16-cr-00265-LMB Document 127 Filed 10/10/17 Page 3 of 29 PageID# 992 issue. If in consequence he suffers a disadvantage, he has brought it upon himself by reason of the nature of the defense.” Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932), quoted in United States v. McLaurin, 764 F.3d 372, 381 (4th Cir. 2014). Evidence of Young’s support for terrorism is, therefore, admissible to rebut his own claim that his desire to support ISIS was implanted in him by the government. Because Young’s arguments in support of his motion virtually ignore entrapment law, they rest on propositions that are inapplicable to his case. As explained below, the exhibits in question are indisputably relevant. Their probative value outweighs any risk of unfair prejudice, and they should be admitted - - at the least - - to prove his predisposition to support terrorists. I. Character Evidence Is Relevant and Admissible in Entrapment Cases Relevant evidence is any evidence that “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence,” so long as “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed.R.Evid. 401. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution, by Act of Congress, or by applicable rule. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Evidence of other bad acts may be admissible to prove intent or motive. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Indeed, “[e]xtrinsic acts evidence may be critical to the establishment of the truth as to a disputed issue, especially when that issue involves the actor's state of mind and the only means of ascertaining that mental state is by drawing inferences from conduct.” Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988). While evidence of other bad acts may be admissible to prove intent or motive, Rule 404 generally prohibits such evidence to prove the defendant’s character - - except in cases involving claims of entrapment. Indeed, Rule 404(b)’s requirements are relaxed when the defendant claims entrapment. When a defendant claims entrapment, “there is no doubt that proving 3 Case 1:16-cr-00265-LMB Document 127 Filed 10/10/17 Page 4 of 29 PageID# 993 predisposition is one of the purposes for which bad-act evidence may be admissible.” United States v. McLaurin, 764 F.3d 372, 380 (4th Cir. 2014). “Predisposition is itself a broad concept, and a broad swath of evidence, including aspects of the defendant’s character and criminal past, is relevant to proving predisposition." Id. at 381. As a result, and “[g]iven the range of evidence that is relevant to the predisposition issue, certain bad-act evidence may be admissible under Rule 404(b) in entrapment cases that would not be admissible in cases where entrapment is not an issue." Id. As the McLaurin panel stated: Proving disposition to commit a crime is very close to proving “criminal propensity,” the very type of prejudice against which the general prohibi- tion on admission of evidence of other crimes is directed. In an entrap- ment case, however, the issue is precisely whether the accused, at the time of the government inducement, had a propensity to commit crimes of the nature charged — that is, whether he was predisposed to do so. Id.2 Thus, "assertion of an entrapment defense does not justify admission of every bad act ever done by the defendant, but distinguishing the unwary innocent from the unwary criminal nonetheless requires a “searching inquiry.” Id. See also United States v. Thomas, 134 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 1998) (since character is an essential element of the entrapment defense, “even if the proffered evidence were not admissible under Rule 404(b), we would still hold that it is admissible [in an entrapment case] under Rule 405(b)”). Young’s claim that this case is just a “gift card” case, Young’s Brief at 1, is an epic understatement of the conduct at issue. The indictment charges that Young attempted to provide material support to ISIS, both by trying to protect an individual that he believed to be an ISIS fighter, and also by sending money for the purpose of financing ISIS’s recruitment of other 2 Internal quotations and citations are omitted from quotations throughout this pleading. 4 Case 1:16-cr-00265-LMB Document 127 Filed 10/10/17 Page 5 of 29 PageID# 994 fighters. Nevertheless, even if Young’s characterization were true, his claim that this is just a "gift card" case would not limit the predisposition evidence that would be admissible. When used to show predisposition in a terrorism case, the relevant prior design to commit the crime or similar crimes need be only a rather generalized idea or intent to inflict harm on interests of the United States. United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 207 (2d Cir. 2013). See United States v. Hackley, 662 F.3d 671, 682 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Predisposition is not limited only to crimes specifically contemplated by the defendant prior to government suggestion”). Evidence of conduct occurring both before and after the defendant was contacted by the government is admissible to prove predisposition. United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 566 (4th Cir. 2000). By claiming entrapment, Young asserts that his desire to support ISIS was implanted by the government. As discussed below, evidence of Young’s support for terrorism in general (or ISIS in specific) is relevant and admissible to disprove this assertion. II. Evidence of Young’s Predisposition Is Not Unfairly Prejudicial Young claims that numerous categories of evidence are unfairly prejudicial. “Where the evidence is probative, [however,] the balance under Rule 403 should be struck in favor of admis- sibility, and evidence should be excluded only sparingly.” United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 525–26 (4th Cir.