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PUBLICOPINION Solid and Professional 10/2015 POLISH PUBLICOPINION Solid and Professional 10/2015 ISSN 2083-1714 CONTENTS Political views in the years 1990 -2015. Opinions of the youth against Political views in the years 1990 -2015. the background of the society as a whole Opinions of the youth CBOS measures political views on a 7-point scale, where 1 signifies left-wing against the background views and 7 means the right wing. Respondents are asked to select the point of the society as a whole which best reflects their political orientation. People selecting points 1 to 3 are considered left-wing and respondents choosing points 5 to 7 are considered Psychological right-wing. characteristics of party After systemic change, the proportion of citizens self-identifying as left-wing fell from 28% in 1990 to 15% in 1991. Until 1993 declarations of right-wing identity electorates prevailed, but their magnitude systematically fell. A year later, the left-wing group (27%) was 8 percentage points bigger than the right. However, the good Professional position timesfortheleftlastedayearonly. of Poles In 1995-1998 right-wing declarations dominated. The increase in social support for the left wing started in 1999 and resulted in the electoral victory of the coalition of Alliance of the Democratic Left and Union of Labour (SLD-UP) in IN ADDITION 2001. However, as early as a year after SLD formed the government the support TO THE REPORTS REFERRED TO ABOVE, for the left started to decline. In 2008 it reached its lowest level in the last 25 years THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED (13%) and subsequently Declared political views of Poles in the years 1990-2015* RECENTLY(P IN OLISH ): hovered between 14% Yearly proportion of respondents self-identifying as left-wing and right-wing · Trust in Politicians a Month before and 17%. In 2008 33% of 40% Parliamentary Elections respondents declared Right-wing 30% · Opinions about Refugees on the Eve of having right-wing views. EU Summit Dedicated to Migrant Crisis At present this 20% · School Students Vacation - Rest or Paid proportion is only Left-wing Work 10% · Participation in the Parliamentary slightlysmaller(31%). Elections, Voting Certainty, Worries and 0% Analyses show that right- 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Predictions of the Election Results wing self-identification *In 2015 data for the months Jan-Sep · Party Preferences in October tends to be more radical than left-wing. This is a long-term regularity. Since 1990, · What is the Difference between Supporters of Left Wing, Centrist and the proportion of extreme right-wing declarations (point 7) was generally larger Right Wing Political Views? than the proportion of extreme left-wing views (point 1). The exceptions to this · Forms of Employment and Socio- Declared political views of Poles in the years 1990-2015* rule were the years 1993 political Views Yearly proportion of extreme views in right-wing and left-wing declarations and 1999-2002, when · Who are the Voters – Socio- 40% there were more extreme demographic Portraits of the Largest left-wing declarations, or Potential Electorates 30% the proportions were · Party Preferences before Parliamentary 20% Elections comparable. Since 2002 10% · Opinions about Parliament and Extreme left-wing views in all left the views of right-wing Extreme right-wing views in all right President 0% respondents have 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 · Social Moods before Parliamentary *In 2015 data for the months Jan-Sep becomemoredecisive. Elections In the last two years there has been radicalisation of right-wing views. In the first · Attitude to Government in October three quarters of 2015, people who self-identified as extreme right constituted · Trust in Politicians in the Last Days of Election Campaign 12% of all respondents (37% of right wingers). Such a result was recorded for the firsttimeinCBOSsurveys. Trends among respondents aged 18-24 years are similar to Psychological characteristics of those recorded in the whole society. Young people relatively often declare centrist orientation or answer party electorates “don't know.” This means that for most of the time they held both left-wing and right-wing views less often than all Parliamentary elections held in Poland in October were a Poles. catalystforachangeonthepoliticalscene.Onthepolitical In 2014 the frequency of right-wing declarations among supply side, new programs and personalities emerged. the young people started to rise rapidly, which was Their origin owes to exhaustion with the government of accompanied by a strong decrease in left-wing views. In the coalition of Civic Platform and Polish Peasant Party 2015 the proportion of right wingers among them was (PO-PSL), which led to a surprisingly good result of Paweł higher than in general population. In the first three Kukiz in the first round of the May presidential elections. quarters of 2015 a third (33%) of people aged 18-24 years Two recently formed groupings managed to have their describedtheirpoliticalviewsasright-wing. candidates elected to the Sejm: Modern party Declared political views of Poles aged 18-24 in the years (Nowoczesna - Ryszard Petru) and the movement 1990-2015* Kukiz'15. Moreover, three more parties are in parliament: Yearly proportion of young respondents self-identifying as left-wing and right-wing Law and Justice (PiS), PO and PSL. Who are the people compared with all respondents 40% voting for groupings represented in the new parliament, what differentiates them, what psychological attributes 30% andattitudescharacterisethem? 20% The analysis centres on the following psychological phenomena: optimism-pessimism, reflected in 10% evaluations and attitudes related to the situationi n the 0% country and personal matters; openness to change: 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Left-wing views: of youthRight-wing views: of youth conservatism – innovativeness, reflected in the attitude to of all of all *In 2015 data for the months Jan-Sep changes around the world and willingness to introduce them; willingness to cooperate, which consists in belief in Nevertheless, political views of people aged 18-24 years the possibility of non-antagonistic interpersonal relations are less clearly defined than opinions of the whole society. and is based on trust in other people; paranoid political It is indicated by data on radical attitudes. The proportion thinking, which is reflected in conviction that there are of extreme answers in left and right-wing responses hidden forces ruling the world and in belief in the so-called among the youth is much lower than among all Poles. This conspiracy theory of history; authoritarianism, which is a means that young people are less radical in their political conviction that interpersonal relations are hierarchically opinions. The only time when this was not true was in structured, in a belief in effectiveness of force and 1990. Back then, 25% of right-wing respondents aged 18- necessity to subordinate to authority; anomie, 24expressedextremeviews. understood as the experience of a loss of sense, being lost in the social world, and in uncertainty about its values and Declared political views of Poles aged 18-24 in the years 1990-2015* rules; political alienation, which is a feeling of exclusion Yearly proportion of extreme declarations in all left-wing and right-wing from the political domain, lack of influence and distrust in declarations. Youth compared with all respondents mechanisms of power and political elites. The strength of 40% these psychological attitudes was studied with scales 30% constructed on the basis of questionnaire items. The use of scales allows for showing the results as composite 20% indicators. 10% Voters of PiS are characterised by high levels of political 0% paranoia: they are particularly prone to thinking about 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 politics in terms of a conspiracy of hidden forces. Extreme left-wing views in all left: youth Extreme right-wing views in all right: youth all all Moreover, they are marked by strong authoritarianism. *In 2015 data for the months Jan-Sep The PiS electorate is resilient to change. It also lags behind most other groups of voters in readiness to cooperate with More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in otherpeople.Itispessimistictoalessthanaverageextent. Polish: “Interest in Politics and Political Views in Years 1989–2015. Young People Compared to Others", October 2015. Fieldwork Levels of anomie and political alienation are in this conductedmonthlyfrom1989untilSeptember2015. electoratesimilartotheaverage. 2 Supporters of PO, the party in government until recently, Indicators are characterised by relatively low level of political optimism-pessimism on a scale from 0 (highest optimism) alienation. They are optimistic to a level above average. to 2 (highest pessimism) Among different electorates they are marked by relatively All respondents 0,97 low tendency to perceive politics as a conspiracy of Nowoczesna unknown forces. Anomie and distance to politics (Ryszard Petru) 0,79 (alienation) appear to a low degree. They are more PO 0,85 PSL 0,90 trusting than average and display stronger readiness to PiS 0,90 cooperate. Their level of openness to change is similar to Kukiz'15 1,00 theaverage. 0,00 0,50 1,00 1,50 2,00 The strongest characteristic of the electorate of Kukiz'15 is openness to change on a scale from 1 (conservatism) high openness to change. It is accompanied by above- to 10 (innovativeness) average willingness to cooperate with others. Supporters All respondents 5,58 of this electoral committee are marked by significantly PiS 5,42 higher pessimism than other groups.
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