Philosophy of Probability
Instructor: Michael Hicks email: [email protected], [email protected] phone (for academic emergencies): +44 07498 780207 Meetings: Monday 14:00-15:30, 100 Unterrichtsraum 4.011 Office Hours: Thursday 14:00-16:00 or by appointment
Course Description: Probabilities have a number of roles in philosophy: they can be used to describe the confidence of agents, the strength of evidence, and the objective chances governing physical processes. In this course, we will examine each of these roles for probabilities. We will begin by thoroughly laying out the mathematics behind the probability calculus. We will then discuss how this mathematics has been applied to model the confidence levels, or credences, of agents. We will then examine the problems involved in using the probability calculus as a model for inductive confirmation. Finally, we consider what objective chances could be, and how they might normatively constrain our credences. Goals: Students should expect to gain analytic thinking skills by critically examining arguments; students will gain experience writing argumentative papers; students will become familiar with prominent theories in contemporary philosophy of science; students will hone their reasoning abilities through class discussions. Text: Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings edited by: Anthony Eagle, Routledge, 2009. Other readings will be available online. Evaluation: For two credit points, students are required to complete a short (1-2 page) assignment. This will consist of short answers to questions about class topics and will be completed at home after the Pente- cost break. For three or more credit points, students will write essays; please meet with me to determine the length and topic of your essay.
Reading Schedule
April 9: The axioms of probability. Optional readings: Probability Primer [textbook: 1-21]; Skyrms: Choice and Chance, Ch. 6 (online resource)
April 16: Justifying the Axioms Required readings: Ramsey, “Truth and Probability” [textbook]. Optional readings: Bruno di Finetti, Foresight: Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources excerpt, [online]. Joyce, “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism” [textbook]
April 23: Updating Belief Required readings: Lewis, “Why Conditionalize?” [textbook] Optional readings: Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision excerpt [online] Arntzenius, “Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection” [textbook]
April 30: Indifference Principles Required readings: Carnap, “Statistical and Inductive Probability” [textbook] Optional readings: E. T. Jaynes, Probability Theory: The Logic of Science excerpt [online] Pettigrew, “Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference” [online]
1 May 7: Indifference Principles Required readings:van Fraassen, “Indifference: the Symmetries of Probability” text- book Optional readings: Carnap, “Statistical and Inductive Probability” [textbook], Jaynes, Probability Theory: The Logic of Science exerpt [online]
May 14: Inductive Reasoning Required Readings: Howson & Urbach, Bayesian vs. Non-Bayesian Approaches to Confirmation [textbook] Optional Readings: Rosencrantz, Theory and Decision excerpt, Henderson, “Bayesianism and Inference to the Best Explanation” [online]
May 21: No Lecture, Pentecost Break
June 4: Inductive Reasoning Required Readings: Glymour, “Why I Am Not a Bayesian” [textbook] Optional Readings: Earman, “Bayes or Bust” excerpts [online] June 11: Propensity Interpretations Required Readings: Popper, “A Propensity Interpretation of Probability” Optional Readings: Maudlin, “The Metaphysics Within Physics” excerpt [online], Bird, “Nature’s Metaphysics” excerpt [online]
June 18: Propensity Interpretations Required Readings: Humphreys, “Why Propensities Cannot be Probabilities” [text- book]
June 25: Frequentism Required Readings: Hayek, “Mises Redux Redux: Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism” [textbook] Optional Readings: Hayek, “Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequen- tism” [textbook], Richard C. Jeffrey“Mises Redux” [textbook], von Mises, “The Definition of Probability” [textbook]
July 2: The Principal Principle Required Readings: Lewis, “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance” [text- book] Optional Readings: Hall, “Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance” [online], Meacham, “Two Mistakes Regarding the Principal Principle” [online]
July 9: Conditional Probabilities (Tentative guest lecture, Luis Rosa) Required Readings: Hajek, “What Conditional Probabilities Could Not Be” [online] Optional Readings: Easwaran, “What Conditional Probability Must (Almost) Be [online].
July 16: Justifying the Principles Required Readings: Strevens, “Objective Probability as a Guide to the World” online Optional Readings: Beebee & Papineau, “Probability as a Guide to Life” [online]
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