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Mystery of Banking.Pdf The Mystery of Banking Murray N. Rothbard The Mystery of Banking Murray N. Rothbard Richardson & Snyder 1983 First Edition The Mystery of Banking ©1983 by Murray N. Rothbard Library of Congress in publication Data: 1. Rothbard, Murray N. 2. Banking 16th Century-20th Century 3. Development of Modern Banking 4. Types of Banks, by Function, Bank Fraud and Pitfalls of Banking Systems 5. Money Supply. Inflation 1 The Mystery of Banking Murray N. Rothbard Contents Chapter I Money: Its Importance and Origins 1 1. The Importance of Money 1 2. How Money Begins 3 3. The Proper Qualifies of Money 6 4. The Money Unit 9 Chapter II What Determines Prices: Supply and Demand 15 Chapter III Money and Overall Prices 29 1. The Supply and Demand for Money and Overall Prices 29 2. Why Overall Prices Change 36 Chapter IV The Supply of Money 43 1. What Should the Supply of Money Be? 44 2. The Supply of Gold and the Counterfeiting Process 47 3. Government Paper Money 51 4. The Origins of Government Paper ,Money 55 Chapter V The Demand for Money 59 1. The Supply of Goods and Services 59 2. Frequency of Payment 60 3. Clearing Systems 63 4. Confidence in the Money 65 5. Inflationary or Deflationary Expectations 66 Chapter VI Loan Banking 77 Chapter VII Deposit Banking 87 1. Warehouse Receipts 87 2. Deposit Banking and Embezzlement 91 2 The Mystery of Banking Murray N. Rothbard 3. Fractional Reserve Banking 95 4. Bank Notes and Deposits 103 Chapter VIII Free Banking and The Limits on Bank Credit Inflation 111 Chapter X Central Banking: Determining Total Reserves 143 1. The Demand for Cash 143 2. The Demand for Gold 149 3. Loans to the Banks 150 4. Open Market Operations 154 Chapter XI Central Banking: The Process of Bank Credit Expansion 163 1. Expansion from Bank to Bank 163 2. The Central Bank and the Treasury 171 Chapter XII The Origins of Central Banking 179 1. The Bank of England 179 2. Free Banking in Scotland 185 3. The Peelite Crackdown, 1844-1845 187 Chapter XIII Central Banking in the United States The Origins 193 1. The Bank of North America and the First Bank of the United States 193 2. The Second Bank of the United States 199 Chapter IX Central Banking: Removing the Limits 127 Chapter XIV Central Banking in the United States The 1820's to the Civil War 1. The Jacksonian Movement and the Bank War 209 2. Decentralized Banking from the 1830's to the Civil War 215 Chapter XV Central Banking in the United States The National Banking System 221 1. The Civil War and the National Banking System 221 2. The National Banking Era and the Origins of the Federal Reserve System 230 3 The Mystery of Banking Murray N. Rothbard Chapter XVI Central Banking in the United States The Federal Reserve System 237 1. The Inflationary Structure of the Fed 237 2. The Inflationary Policies of the Fed 243 Chapter XVII Conclusion The Present Banking Situation and What to Do About It 249 1. The Road to the Present 249 2. The Present Money Supply 254 3. How to Return to Sound Money 263 Notes 271 4 The Mystery of Banking Murray N. Rothbard Foreword by Gary North You have here a unique academic treatise on money and banking, a book which combines erudition, clarity of expression, economic theory, monetary theory, economic history, and an appropriate dose of conspiracy theory. Anyone who attempts to explain the mystery of banking—a deliberately contrived mystery in many ways—apart from all of these aspects has not done justice to the topic. But, then again, this is an area in which justice has always been regarded as a liability. The moral account of central banking has been overdrawn since 1694: “insufficient funds.” [footnote: P. G. M. Dickson. The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 1688-1756 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1967); John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (New York: Knopf, 1988).] I am happy to see The Mystery of Money available again. I had negotiated with Dr. Rothbard in 1988 to re-publish it through my newsletter publishing company, but both of us got bogged down in other matters. I dithered. I am sure that the Mises Institute will do a much better job than I would have in getting the book into the hands of those who will be able to make good use of it. I want you to know why I had intended to re-publish this book. It is the only money and banking textbook I have read which forthrightly identifies the process of central banking as both immoral and economically destructive. It identifies fractional reserve banking as a form of embezzlement. [footnote: See Chapter 7.] While Dr. Rothbard made the moral case against fractional reserve banking in his wonderful little book, What Has Government Done to Our Money? (1964), as far as I am aware, The Mystery of Banking was the first time that this moral insight was applied in a textbook on money and banking. Perhaps it is unfair to the author to call this book a textbook. Textbooks are traditional expositions that have been carefully crafted to produce a near-paralytic boredom—“chloroform in print,” as Mark Twain once categorized a particular religious treatise. Textbooks are written to sell to tens of thousands of students in college classes taught by professors of widely varying viewpoints. Textbook manuscripts are screened by committees of conventional representatives of an academic guild. While a textbook may not be analogous to the traditional definition of a camel—a horse designed by a committee—it almost always resembles a taxidermist’s version of a horse: lifeless and stuffed. The academically captive readers of a textbook, like the taxidermist’s horse, can be easily identified through their glassy-eyed stare. Above all, a textbook must appear to be morally neutral. So, The Mystery of Banking is not really a textbook. It is a monograph. Those of us who have ever had to sit through a conventional college class on money and banking have been the victims of what I regard—and Dr. Rothbard regards—as an immoral propaganda effort. Despite the rhetoric of value-free economics that is so common in economics classrooms, the reality is very different. By means of the seemingly innocuous analytical device known in money and banking classes as the T-account, the 5 The Mystery of Banking Murray N. Rothbard student is morally disarmed. The purchase of a debt instrument—generally a national government’s debt instrument—by the central bank must be balanced in the T-account by a liability to the bank: a unit of money. It all looks so innocuous: a government’s liability is offset by a bank’s liability. It seems to be a mere technical transaction—one in which no moral issue is involved. But what seems to be the case is not the case, and no economist has been more forthright about this than Murray Rothbard. The purchase of government debt by a central bank in a fractional reserve banking system is the basis of an unsuspected transfer of wealth that is inescapable in a world of monetary exchange. Through the purchase of debt by a bank, fiat money is injected into the economy. Wealth then moves to those market participants who gain early access to this newly created fiat money. Who loses? Those who gain access to this fiat money later in the process, after the market effects of the increase of money have rippled through the economy. In a period of price inflation, which is itself the product of prior monetary inflation, this wealth transfer severely penalizes those who trust the integrity—the language of morality again—of the government’s currency and save it in the form of various monetary accounts. Meanwhile, the process benefits those who distrust the currency unit and who immediately buy goods and services before prices rise even further. Ultimately, as Ludwig von Mises showed, this process of central bank credit expansion ends in one of two ways: (1) the crack-up boom—the destruction of both monetary order and economic productivity in a wave of mass inflation—or (2) a deflationary contraction in which men, businesses, and banks go bankrupt when the expected increase of fiat money does not occur. What the textbooks do not explain or even admit is this: the expansion of fiat money through the fractional reserve banking system launches the boom-bust business cycle—the process explained so well in chapter 20 of Mises’s classic treatise, Human Action (1949). Dr. Rothbard applied Mises’ theoretical insight to American economic history in his own classic but neglected monograph, America’s Great Depression (1963). [footnote: The English historian Paul Johnson rediscovered America’s Great Depression and relied on it in his account of the origins of the Great Depression. See his widely acclaimed book, Modern Times (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), pp. 233-37. He was the first prominent historian to accept Rothbard’s thesis.] In The Mystery of Banking, he explains this process by employing traditional analytical categories and terminology. There have been a few good books on the historical background of the Federal Reserve System. Elgin Groseclose’s book, Fifty Years of Managed Money (1966), comes to mind. There have been a few good books on the moral foundations of specie-based money and the immorality of inflation. Groseclose’s Money and Man (1961), an extension of Money: The Human Conflict (1935), comes to mind.
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