MASARYK UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES Department of Political Science
Modernization of Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic: Coming from Cold War era to the 21st Century
Diploma thesis
Supervisor: prof. JUDr. PhDr. Miroslav Mareš, Ph.D. Author: Bc. Samuel Kolesár ID: 397645 Specialization: Security and Strategic Studies Imatriculation Year: 2016
I hereby solemnly declare that the thesis Modernization of Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic: Coming from Cold War era to the 21st Century is a result of my own independent scholarly work under the guidance of prof. JUDr. PhDr. Miroslav Mareš, Ph.D. To the best of my knowledge, all references contained herein have been correctly cited, and the original authors acknowledged. No materials or ideas other than those listed have been used, except my own.
In Brno, 30. May 2018
Bc. Samuel Kolesár
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to first and foremost thank to the supervisor of this thesis, prof. JUDr. PhDr. Miroslav Mareš, Ph.D. for his guidance while writing this thesis and through my whole studies. I would also like to express my gratitude to Mgr. Lukáš Dyčka, Ph.D., whose dissertation thesis and consultation helped significantly. And last but not least, I would like to give big thanks to my temporary colleagues and mentors at the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, and all the people at the Ministry who were willing to talk to me. Without them, this thesis could not be done. I had the opportunity to see how hard you work, please, keep it up! I also need to thank to my mom, who was always there to share the joy of my achievements and lift me up after my failures. This thesis would also not be possible without my dear Betty, who went through the whole ordeal with me. If we survived this together, nuclear sunset will be the easy part. Huge thanks go to all my friends and colleagues who make my life better, or sometimes worse, it depends. You know who you are! But most importantly, it was team Špona. It is always easier, more secure and more strategic to go crazy together. I believe thanks to that we survived. See you on the other side!
ABSTRACT Slovak military went through a significant change in the organization since the creation of the independent Slovak Republic in 1993. These changes finished in the year 2004 with joining the NATO and 2005 with the abolition of conscription and introduction of an all professional army. But, the other part of changes is still in process – getting rid of the old Soviet-era equipment and becoming fully compatible with NATO standards. The presented thesis is dealing with the issues of modernization of Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic in recent years and in the near future. Based on official documents of The Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic and Ministry of Defense of Slovakia, this thesis will analyze modernization plans of the Armed Forces based on the Long-term development plan accepted in 2017, compare the plans with reality, and present a possible course of action for the near future.
KEYWORDS Military, military policy, arms policy, modernization, Slovakia, NATO, armed forces, Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, ground force, air force
ABSTRAKT Slovenské ozbrojené sily prešli od vzniku nezávislej Slovenskej republiky v roku 1993 veľkými zmenami. Tieto zmeny boli dokončené v rokoch 2004 vstupom do NATO a 2005 zrušením povinnej vojenskej služby a zavedením plne profesionálnej armády. Avšak niektoré zmeny ešte stále prebiehajú – najmä zbavovanie sa starého hardvéru z obdobia Varšavskej zmluvy a postupné dosahovanie plnej kompatibility so štandardami NATO. Predkladaná diplomová práca rozoberá okolnosti modernizácie Ozbrojených síl Slovenskej republiky v ostatných niekoľko rokoch a v blízkej budúcnosti. Stavajúc na oficiálnych dokumentoch Ozbrojených síl a ministerstva obrany, táto práca analyzuje modernizačné plány Ozbrojených síl, najmä s využitím Dlhodobého plánu rozvoja prijatého v roku 2017, porovnáva tieto plány s realitou, a navrhuje možnosti ď alšieho postupu v nasledujúcich rokoch.
KĽÚČOVÉ SLOVÁ Vojsko, vojenská politika, zbrojná politika, modernizácia, Slovensko, NATO, ozbrojené sily, Ozbrojené sily Slovenskej republiky, pozemné sily, letectvo
INDEX
1. Introduction ...... - 6 - 2. Theoretical Background and Methodology ...... - 10 - 2.1. Goals of the thesis ...... - 10 - 2.2. Research questions, concepts, and operationalization ...... - 10 - 2.3. Methodology summary ...... - 23 - 2.4. Literature review ...... - 25 - 3. Historical Context ...... - 30 - 4. Current Situation: Key Modernization Projects ...... - 33 - 4.1. Core capabilities and what is needed to fulfil them ...... - 33 - 4.2. Wheeled combat 8x8 armored vehicles ...... - 38 - 4.3. Multipurpose 4x4 tactical vehicles ...... - 44 - 4.4. Tracked infantry fighting vehicles ...... - 47 - 4.5. Anti-tank rocket weapon systems ...... - 51 - 4.6. Self-propelled 155mm howitzers ...... - 53 - 4.7. DELOSYS – Integrated artillery command, control, and reconnaissance systems- 55 - 4.8. Unmanned aerial vehicles for conventional forces ...... - 56 - 4.9. Communications and cyber systems ...... - 57 - 4.10. Radars ...... - 61 - 4.11. Electronic reconnaissance systems ...... - 63 - 4.12. Air Force communication system VCS 3020 ...... - 63 - 4.13. Multipurpose tactical planes ...... - 64 - 4.14. Transport planes ...... - 69 - 4.15. Training planes ...... - 71 - 4.16. Multipurpose helicopters ...... - 73 - 4.17. Air Defense modernization ...... - 76 - 5. Evaluation: Main shortcomings ...... - 78 - 6. Into the Future: What issues needs to be fixed ...... - 82 - 7. Conclusion ...... - 86 - 8. Literature and Sources ...... - 89 -
TOTAL LENGTH: 208,816 CHARACTERS
- 5 - It is proverbial that generals always prepare for the last war. James A. Field Jr.
1. Introduction
Since the establishment of the independent Slovak Republic on the 1st January 1993, the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic (AF SR) has come a long way. In the course of the last 25 years, we can define three key moments that had an impact on the current outlook of the Armed Forces. First one was the creation of the Armed Forces in their current form, dated 1st July 2002. Next big step was becoming a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in March 2004, and abolition of conscription in 2005. Since then, our Armed Forces are an all-professional force.
However, these are only one side of the coin. The other side is how the Armed Forces work and with what do they work. This „other side of the coin” itself has two parts. On one hand, we have the law, the general strategy, tactics, and various doctrines that govern the use of the armed forces. These might deal with various issues – from the general outlook of the force, the basics of its workings, or, as is the case of the so-called „white books,” the summary of the long-term development strategies. These doctrines are a matter of development and change – the world the armed force functions in is changing, and so the force has to change too. This is one part of what we might view as a modernization process – adapting to the change around you and acting according to it. To keep the pace with the ever-changing and „modernizing” world, you need to do so too.
But also, the question is, what will you according to these doctrines use in the situations you might find yourself in. Besides keeping your pace organizationally, you also need to be up to speed „technologically.” Using Cold war era equipment in the 21st century, when both the standards of the technologies used nowadays and when the organization and the missions that the Armed Forces has to carry out has changed significantly, is just no longer an option. You have to move forward.
Modernizing the way they work and what they use are the main challenges for the Armed Forces of Slovakia. At the time of the establishment of the Armed Forces in their current iteration, they were equipped with legacy hardware coming from Cold War era, inherited from the former Czechoslovakia, which was a member of Warsaw Pact. The equipment of the former Czechoslovak Army was divided. Therefore, the newly established Slovak Army has found itself based on legacy
- 6 - Warsaw Pact doctrines, using relatively outdated equipment from both domestic, Soviet and other Warsaw Pact countries manufacturers. Even in the early 2000s, although this was not a perfect situation, we might have considered it as fair-enough for a newly established state without clear allegiance. But significant challenges were ahead of us. In the late 1990s, Slovakia set a clear course to become part of Western Europe and its security structures – NATO. Despite fighting budget problems, it was clear that we will need to update not only the doctrines of our Armed Forces and tasks given to them but also the hardware they use.
The task in this matter was relatively clear – our organization and equipment must be as much as possible compatible with our NATO allies and provide our Armed Forces with means to counter the challenges and problems that 21st century might bring upon us. Changing the doctrines and inner works of an organization might be a relatively easy and not expensive process. Of course, you can put anything on the paper. The other part is how the proposed changes will look like in reality. And then there is the question of hardware modernization, which is a long-term, costly and complicated process. The goal seems quite clear, but how to get there? We entered the Alliance while gradually changing the operations and organization of how the Armed Forces work, but using now (then too) mostly outdated equipment – both technologically and morally.
Now, in 2018, we should be in a different situation. But the question is – are we? Purpose of this diploma thesis is to find an answer to this question.
But how to come to this answer? Just taking the defense projects that we might consider important by any criteria would be far from responsible. We need to understand how armed forces work, and that they are centered around carrying out missions. For that, they need to maintain specific capabilities. And to be able to have these capabilities, they need to have certain equipment and to be organized in a certain way. Both this equipment and the means of using it need to be on a certain level, can become deprecated, outdated, or need to be changed. They, therefore, constitute the area of modernization.
In the presented thesis, we will first establish a methodology that can be used to analyze different aspects of modernization. We will then define specific projects and processes that are ongoing inside the Armed Forces, describe them, and investigate using the formed methodology. Based upon this, we will identify and analyze the critical issues and propose a feasible way of fixing them. Before the process of identification and subsequent analysis, we will also, in short, describe
- 7 - the historical context.
At this point, I would like to take the liberty to depart for a few lines from the so-called „author’s plural” and while writing in the first person explain why I chose this topic.
In January 2014, I successfully defended my bachelor thesis on the topic of „Active Reserves of the Armed Forces of Slovakia.” In this thesis, I outlined a possible model of development of a reserve component for our armed forces, along with an explanation of why is such a thing needed and why it makes sense for such an armed force as is the one of Slovakia to build a reserve component. While I was consulting the whole concept and certain ideas with some helpful staff at our Ministry of Defense, now more than four years ago in the fall of 2013, it seemed that coming of the existence of anything that would resemble Active Reserves in the Armed Forces of Slovakia was only a matter of a concise period. At the time of the first consultations, the whole issue was numerous times presented as being on the „ministers table” only waiting for his signature and that building of a reserve component will begin shortly. After hearing this, I felt even more pressure to (naively) put my bit into the debate and write something that would make sense and be useful.
Since then, we moved very little. At the time that I am writing this, the only thing that might be getting us closer to any kind of a reserve component is voluntary military basic training for the general population that started in 2017. Over the years I realized that this might take much more time than I, and with me, many others in the Slovakian „security community” have thought. What fascinates me about this the most is the fact that this might not even be a political issue – there is actually a broad agreement in the Slovak political spectrum about the issues of the general defense policy, with the only exception being Kotleba’s national socialist „popular” party, which anyway does not have any say in this. So, my desire to write my bachelor thesis about Slovakia, without pretending to be an expert on an issue or a problem that is happening thousands of kilometers from my desk which I do my „research” from, came in wain.
When I was choosing a topic for my diploma thesis, the same idea occurred in my mind again. Writing about my home country – a place where I can actually at least try to get fresh and accurate information. Maybe I can even be a part of the public and professional discourse, put my few thoughts forward and contribute to much-needed progress in the development of our armed forces for the future.
- 8 - Of course, I admit these thoughts might be in a few cases very naive. But, then I decided to write this whole work in English, and after (hopefully) defending it, to publish it in a foreign media, so foreigners have a chance to read and understand what is happening with the Armed Forces of Slovakia. Maybe I can even stop responding to the same questions again and again and directly refer people somewhere with a link.
While I spent the fall semester of 2017 in the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, I was continually contemplating the idea of changing my topic and writing about Ukraine. I would even have a chance to come across some interesting first-hand information and experience. Nevertheless, that I did, and I’m using it elsewhere. I decided to stick with my original idea of writing about the modernization of Slovak Armed Forces.
Every time that I opened any Slovak newspaper (or, for that matter, for example only my Facebook feed is often more than enough) and came across an article or piece of information about this topic, which in the past few months went through a few very turbulent situations, it only made me surer that yes, this is a right way to go. I hope that the reader will agree.
(Kyiv, 3rd December 2017)
- 9 - 2. Theoretical Background and Methodology
In this chapter, we will outline the inner workings of this diploma thesis – goals of the thesis and the research questions based on them. We will research similar works that have been already done in this field and then create a methodology that could be used for finding answers to the research questions.
2.1. Goals of the thesis We can outline the goals of this thesis in a few points: 1) The first aim of this thesis is to present in a precise manner the current main modernization projects that are underway in the Slovak Armed Forces, along with the desired goals of these projects. The reasoning for describing the presented plans will be given in the corresponding chapter. The process of reaching this goal will be based on using mainly official and open-source documents, complemented by interviews. 2) Secondly, we will describe the current state of these projects as of 2018. The description of the statuses of these projects will be based on the same sources as with the first point, but it is also needed to take into account public information from various sources (typically media) and information provided by the „insiders” from both the Ministry of Defense itself and also the wider Slovak „security professionals” community. 3) The third goal will be examining the relations between these two states – the desired goals of the projects and their current statuses – and will further be evaluated and analyzed. 4) The fourth goal is to identify critical issues, give a proposal for possible future developments, building upon the base of the previous three parts of the thesis.
2.2. Research questions, concepts, and operationalization Based on the stated goals, we can declare the research questions of this thesis.
The first question will be stated as follows: 1, What are the most essential modernization projects that Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic have gone through the recent years, are going through now or will go in the near future? With the second question being closely associated with the first question: 2, How did these projects developed so far as of 2018?
- 10 -
Operationalization of these two research questions is rather simple thanks to the development goals of the Armed Forces being explicitly stated in the official documents issued by the Ministry of Defense. It would not be wise to go through all the documents that have been released by the Ministry in the recent years and are publicly accessible. We will choose documents based upon relevance to the topic of modernization projects, such as general strategies and doctrines, documents that outline development strategies, evaluation documents, etc.
The key to making the answers to these questions relevant lies in finding related things to write about. But what should be clear to anyone with an understanding of military planning is that in armed forces, one does not merely buy whatever one wants. As many authors (Dyčka 2017a, Petráš 2017a, Kugler 2006, but it is possible to go as far back as to Clausewitz) tell us, and it was accented to the author by numerous staff from inside the Slovak MoD, any planning of military procurement starts with capabilities that the armed forces want to achieve, and only then the preparation of everything else comes into the picture.
However, the term „capabilities” itself does not have one clear definition, which is, of course, a bit problematic when it comes to research. Dyčka offers two definitions, one by the European Union and one by NATO. The NATO one is simpler and comes from a document called „Concept Development and Experimentation Handbook” issued by the NATO Allied Command Transformation which also another Czech expert on capabilities planning Col. Petráš cites (Petráš 2017a) too. The definition goes as follows: (capability is) „the ability to execute a specified course of action or achieve a certain effect.”
When it comes to the definition offered by the European Union, it is a little longer, but also better specified. It comes from a document called „Capability Related Terminology in the Framework of the EU Capability Development Process," and again both Dyčka and Petráš (Dyčka 2017a, Petráš 2017a) take it and use it as follows: „Ability to fulfill a specified task or to achieve specified effects. It consists of a complex combination of manpower, deployability, equipment, training, performance, interoperability, sustainability, readiness and concepts." In the case of this diploma thesis, the best description might be offered by a document that we will be working within here. The Proposal for Long-term Plan for Development of Defense with focus on Development of Armed Forces of Slovak Republic with outline for the Year 2030
- 11 - (further on Long-term development plan, Government of Slovakia 2017e:3) defines it like this: „…a complex ability to carry out a specific activity by an organizational unit, for example, a company, battalion, brigade, it's training, and in the sense of corresponding doctrines prepared personnel, armaments, ammunition and material stocks, infrastructure etc.".
What we will do in this thesis will be the identification of the capabilities that the Armed Forces of Slovakia either already have and are trying to improve, or are building from the ground up. We will identify these capabilities from the core strategic documents of the MoD and the Armed Forces. Then, out of these capabilities, we will establish a list of modernization projects that the Armed Forces and the MoD need to carry out to reach the capabilities they are aiming for. It would be probably possible to establish a list of projects right away. However, the pre-research has shown that there is indeed plenty of projects going on inside the Armed Forces that could be taken as a part of modernization efforts. Writing about them and analyzing them all would be very time-consuming and in many cases, any addition to the debate about the development of the Slovak Armed Forces from a scientific point of view would be practically non-existent. Working along the lines of capabilities will, therefore, help us to establish which projects are the most relevant, most important and it is worth it to talk about them in the scope of this thesis.
Since we plan to work mainly with documents, we need to establish which documents to use and take the required information out from. Only the most actual documents will be considered in this choosing, but we also have to outline the period. Many projects that we should consider began a long time ago, sometimes even in the 1990's, but for the sake of this diploma thesis, we'll review only documents created after 2010.
The reasoning behind choosing this time-frame is as follows: since Slovakia is a parliamentary democracy, our government is (or should be) formed every four years after parliamentary elections. After elections, either in the proper date or after early elections that might be held for a plethora of reasons, and forming of a new government, usually the governments lay out their policies. This affects the defense matters, and therefore also modernization policies. Due to this, these policies can change over the years and are not entirely continual. But it also makes our task easier – we can research the needed information from documents issued only in the „eras” of the few previous governments. The year 2010 marked the end of the first government led by the party SMER and the prime minister Robert Fico.
- 12 - Between the years 2010 (where we will begin our research) and 2012, the government was lead by the party SDKÚ and the prime minister Iveta Radičová. This time is significant because in this period was started the first Strategic Evaluation of Defense. This government was changed in the year 2012 after early elections by the second government lead by PM Fico and SMER party. During the time of this government, in 2013, was also issued the first Slovak White Paper on Defense. The new government was formed in the year 2016, also lead by PM Fico’s SMER party (the Program Statement of this government will also be considered in this thesis), and in 2016, a new White Paper on Defense was issued. The year 2017 then marked a significant development in the new security-related strategies of Slovak Republic – four new document proposals were presented: Proposal for Security Strategy of Slovak Republic (Návrh Bezpečnostnej stratégie Slovenskej republiky), Proposal for Defense Strategy of Slovak Republic (Návrh Obrannej stratégie Slovenskej republiky), Proposal for Military Strategy of Slovak Republic (Návrh Vojenskej stratégie Slovenskej republiky) and Proposal for Long-term Plan for Development of Defense with focus on Development of Armed Forces of Slovak Republic with outline for the Year 2030 (Návrh Dlhodobého plánu rozvoja obrany s dôrazom na výstavbu a rozvoj ozbrojených síl Slovenskej republiky s výhľadom do roku 2030).
The reason why these documents are listed as „proposals” (Government of Slovakia 2017a) is that although they were approved by the Government of the Slovak Republic in October 2017, at the time of writing of this thesis (May 2018) they were not yet passed by the Parliament. Nevertheless, for the Slovak MoD, these are all relevant documents by which the further development of the Armed Forces will be governed1.
First slight challenge that we might face when reviewing essential documents is the so- called „Complex Evaluation of Defense" (Komplexné hodnotenie obrany, Ministry of Defense of Slovakia 2018b), which is MoD's internal document issued (almost) every year, that evaluates the overall situation around the MoD, Armed Forces and the Slovakia's security situation. However, for our followed period, this document is available only for years 2010 and 2011. For the years 2012 and 2013 it was not issued, and since 2014 it is classified as „confidential" and therefore unavailable to the general public without the required security
1 At least according to sources from inside the MoD – this information was obtained in February 2018 and is not considered a secret.
- 13 - clearance. This means that in the presented thesis we can work only with the public documents from years 2010 and 2011.2
Therefore, based on this, we can pick these key documents: • Programme Statement of the Government of the Slovak Republic for Years 2016-2020 (Government of Slovakia 2016a); • The White Paper on Defense of Slovak Republic (Ministry of Defense of Slovakia 2016a); • Proposal for Security Strategy of Slovak Republic (Government of Slovakia 2017b) • Proposal for Defense Strategy of Slovak Republic (Government of Slovakia 2017c) • Proposal for Military Strategy of Slovak Republic (Government of Slovakia 2017d); • Proposal for Long-term Plan for Development of Defense with focus on Development of Armed Forces of Slovak Republic with an outline for the Year 2030 (Government of Slovakia 2017e); • Year Book of the Ministry of Defense of Slovakia 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 (Ministry of Defense of Slovakia 2018a); • Complex Evaluation of Defense of Slovakia 2010 and 2011 (Ministry of Defense of Slovakia 2018b).
We will also to some extent use the Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, issued in 2009 (General Staff of the AF SR).
For the second question, we must also include other sources if we want to describe the current statuses of the specified projects and developments. It is possible to base the response to this research question on these documents, but they would not provide a whole and complex answer. Therefore, we need to widen our research and take into account media outputs too. We will look for the answers on an ad-hoc case-by-case research basis when writing about the projects in question, but on this place, we can mention several media resources that might come handy. First of all, MoD itself issues a magazine called „Obrana" (Defense), which tracks news
2 There is a very remote – almost non-existent – possibility that these documents might be obtained by using the so-called „Freedom of Information Act” (Zákon o slobodnom prístupe k informáciám 211/2000), however, basing on the experiences of mainly journalists and other security experts that had tried to obtain information from the MoD this way, the author of this thesis decided not to pursue this path.
- 14 - around newly acquired military hardware or organizational changes in the Ministry and the Armed Forces. It is issued monthly and is publicly available (Ministry of Defense of Slovakia 2018c). We will take into account articles by several Slovak newspapers, out of which mainly the „Denník N" stands out for its original covering of the Ministry and the Armed Forces. Also, foreign media might be useful – for example well known Jane's Defence Journals covers the Armed Forces of Slovakia occasionally, sometimes rather critically. Significant help might also come from the non-governmental (NGO) sector. For example, Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA) issues a yearly „Yearbook of Slovakia’s Foreign Policy” (SFPA 2017a) which also partly deals with security and the armed forces. In the case it is needed, author of this thesis will also consult the outcomes of the analyses with the experts mainly from the Slovak security and foreign policy NGOs.
To a certain extent, we will also be able to build upon information obtained personally from the employees of the Ministry of Defense with which author had a chance to speak during the process of writing this thesis. However, data collected this way might not always be complete due to numerous cases of confidentiality and need for the security clearance, which the author does not have. This might also become one of the main limitations of the presented work.
These two research questions should fulfill the first two goals of this thesis. They will give us an outlook on the modernization underway in the Slovak Armed Forces and the proposed goals of this modernization. This will create the grounds for further analysis that will serve as a means to answer further research questions that will be therefore stated as following:
Stating the third question is a little bit more difficult because it should reflect the goal of analysis and evaluation of the projects and their outcomes as covered by the questions number one and two. If in the first two questions we've been dealing with the „what," meaning what projects are underway in the Slovak Armed Forces, and „how“ meaning how is it going with these projects, now might be the time to move to the third possible question, and that is „why." The need to ask „why" is based on the fact that we stated a goal of analyzing either a compliance or a discrepancy between the goals of the projects and their current state, wherein the case of a compliance we would analyze how it was achieved, and in the case of discrepancy we would investigate what happened and why it exists. Therefore, we can state the third question as follows:
- 15 - 3, Why are the current states of the described projects as illustrated?
While responding to this question we will be building upon the answers to the first two questions, but in this case, a more throughout analysis is needed. For this, we need a corresponding method that will enable us to evaluate all the modernization projects in question. At this point, we are departing from the simple case study method (further description of this methodology will be provided in the next sub-chapter) and moving towards a more specialized analysis tool which will allow us to conceptualize this research question.
Technically speaking, while judging the modernization of armed forces, we are looking at their capabilities – what they can do, what they should be able to do (and in some cases, why they might not be able to do it), and what do they use to do it – both in the meaning of organization principles such as doctrines, strategy and tactics, and the hardware and the use of it. Therefore, when we start to analyze the current states of the projects, we will be primarily looking at the way these projects, and consequently the armed forces they are applied on, perform. Every modernization project that we will be talking about has an aim to enrich the Armed Forces with some form of a capability or make an existing capability better. For the assessment of the performance and abilities of the armed forces, the author proposes the use of a concept known by the acronym DOTMLPFI.
This concept has been recently applied in an environment that is somewhat close3 to the Slovak one – according to Dr. Dyčka from the Czech Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies at the Czech University of Defence (Dyčka 2017a) who used it while building a concept for evaluation of adaptation of the Czech security and defense policies. He argues that one of the most common ways of researching the armed forces is the analysis of their capabilities. Since we have already established how we view capabilities and what stems out of them, this does not need any further explanation. The definition provided earlier, in some sense maybe
3 Both armed forces of the Czech Republic and Slovakia came from a similar background after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and were equipped mainly with legacy Cold war era equipment, using Warsaw Pact doctrines. Although the Army of the Czech Republic is now larger than the Armed Forces of Slovak Republic, in the recent years, both armies were facing very similar problems – acquiring new hardware and changing the doctrines according to modern standards. Therefore, we can describe this as a „similar environment." Of course, not everything that works for one of the mentioned armed forces also works for the other, and vice versa, but very often the transition of experiences works. This is not the only case for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, but also other post-Warsaw Pact countries that had joined NATO.
- 16 - even too specific, gives us a clear picture of what are we looking for when finding the capabilities themselves (for further analysis) but does not help us much with how to analyze them. That is where the mentioned DOTMLPFI concept comes in.
What this concept provides is an ability to asses a military capability along the lines of „functional areas." This way of assessing a level of capabilities is based on comparing the referential unit (which in this thesis might be considered as an „ideal state" that we will describe in regards to the goal n. one/question n. one) with a real unit (being a real state of things as described in regards to goal n. two/question n. two) included in the organizational structure of the armed forces. According to Dyčka and Petráš (2017a and 2017b respectively), this principle of a capability assessment is based on the comparison of the needed/requested capability with a given unit about the parameters assessing the quality of the capability during its projected service life. Perhaps an even better description of this method, which also proves its usefulness as planned for this thesis, is rather short and offered again by Dyčka (2017a), who takes it from an order issued by the Minister of Defense of the Czech Republic n. 66/2012. According to this, DOTMLPFI method is made for „complex and structured description of required changes of the current state." Very simply said, it tells us what to look for when assessing any given capability. To understand this method, one merely needs to follow the meaning of the acronym, which provides us with the key functional areas to follow. As used by Dyčka (2017a)4, the DOTMLPFI method follows this: 1) Doctrines – Assessment of the way the armed forces presume the way they will fight, for example in a new/changed environment and conditions. If they have all the necessary documents, such as doctrines, instructions, conceptual documents, manuals, including the needed agreements and plans, for carrying out a given mission (deploying a related capability). In this functional area, we can find perhaps one of the few differences in how key policy-making actors approach it. For example, it was revealed to the author, that some planners inside the Slovak MoD view it now as a functional area in which documents are the key, but more like the general policy meaning – what the armed forces are supposed to be doing and how to achieve it. 2) Organization – Here we assess what kind of organization the armed forces have for their current or expected mission. More specifically, if it has a sufficient organizational
4 This description of this method is also used by other text, such as (Mičánek, Procházka 2015), but they cite a classified NATO MC 400/3 document, which is not publicly available.
- 17 - structure, and if this structure allows, for example, the creation of task forces or if it is modular and flexible enough. Same as with the functional area above, some planners inside the MoD might view it less as a „bureaucracy" organizational issue, but more as something that is connected with the functional area of doctrines and defines how it should look. 3) Training – Assessment of preparation system for fulfilling the assigned missions of armed forces – meaning, to what extent the current system of training is sufficient and also on which organizational level is this training carried out (indicating the unit level, the issue of readiness of individual persons is part of the „personnel" functional area). 4) Material – or „equipment" – is assessing the availability of any needed machinery, supplies, equipment, in general, any hardware that the armed forces might use. In this functional area, we also asses the economy of the use and servicing of this hardware. 5) Leadership (and education) – This functional area examines whether the existing command and control system is in line with the requirements and the tasks put upon the armed forces including its organizational structure for the execution of routine tasks at permanent dislocation sites. Command and control during operational deployment is considered in the C4 area. In the field of education, the system of preparation of the command corps and the preparation for leadership are assessed. 6) Personnel – In this area, it is evaluated whether the necessary staff is available regarding numbers, rank, expertise and age structure, as well as individual preparedness, education and training, language skills, safety competence, physical fitness and psychological resilience. 7) Infrastructure – This functional area covers the quality and capability of dislocation and real-estate infrastructure, including stationary communication information systems. However, for example, deployable communication information systems are already considered in the „material” functional area. 8) Interoperability – Here the required level of interoperability is evaluated, not only with other (foreign, typically allied) military forces but also between the different branches of armed forces themselves (meaning cooperation between land and air forces, etc.) but also other state institutions, such as police forces and first responders. In the context of planning in the Slovak MoD, it is mostly associated with the interoperability between allied forces.
This analytical concept is sometimes also complemented by the ninth part that also begins with „P" and focuses on Policy aspect of analyzed problems and challenges. For example, the U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command defines it as „DoD
- 18 - [Department of Defense], interagency or international policy that impacts the other … elements” (Dyčka 2017a, US ARMY RDECOM 2016).
To sum it up, the desired purpose of using this concept is to operationalize the third research question. It will help us find what to look for when assessing the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic that are currently or have been in the recent future a subject to modernization efforts. However, from the point of view of this thesis, it does not make sense to evaluate all of the mentioned functional areas, and therefore, the we will take the liberty to simplify the concept for the purposes of this thesis, of course providing a valid justification for it. Streamlining the concept will allow us to focus on the areas that are really important from our point of view and relevant to the field of Security and Strategic Studies. Another reason for simplification is much more pragmatic – the author of this thesis does not from his position have access to all needed information that might be required for evaluation of some of the functional areas. Also, we are working in a limited scope of this thesis, the aim of which is not to cover everything.
The author, therefore, proposes to work only along the lines of five of the functional areas: doctrines, organization, materiel, infrastructure, and policy. These five are the most relevant when talking about modernization, which at first happens in these areas, and the rest of the functional areas are in general adjusted accordingly. The logic behind this is that, for example, when an armed force creates a new doctrine, this doctrine changes the requirements for the capabilities, and then materiel and organization is changed, which in turn changes the requirements for the rest of the functional areas. Also, information on the areas that the author is aiming to follow are possibly accessible by using open public sources complemented by interviews with responsible persons in the MoD and Armed Forces structures, and (mostly) are not classified. These areas are also the most relevant ones when it comes to the view of political science – perhaps with the exception of the infrastructure, to which the MoD gives a lot of importance5. While the rest of the functional areas are strictly military issues, the four mentioned ones (again, except infrastructure, which is less political and more military area) have significant overlap, especially with politics and policy, which is analyzed by itself in the fifth functional area. For example, the doctrines are not defined by purely military means, but
5 Based upon the non-structured interviews and debates with the MoD personnel carried out in February 2018 – the issue of infrastructure came up with almost all of them, both with civilian and military personnel.
- 19 - also reflect other policies of the state (alignment with allies, expected tasks for the armed forces to carry out are in a democratic state defined by political representation, etc.) and the organization stems out from these doctrines. For the purpose of this thesis, when we will be analyzing the doctrinal aspects, we will build upon the Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic (AF SR), in its most actual version from 2009 (General Staff of the AF SR 2009). The issue of materiel, and especially the procurement of hardware, is often largely politicized, mainly because of the enormous costs of it and, in the case of Slovakia, problematic history of the military procurement. We can, therefore, say that for the purpose of this thesis we will be using a very simplified but for this case more relevant version of the DOTMLPFI-P method.
In the fourth and final research question, we will be returning to asking what. This question comes out of the fourth goal of this thesis and will be stated as follows: What would be the best course of action regarding the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic in the near future? This question is playing smaller importance for the aims of this thesis when compared to the previous questions, and mainly the third one. In the limited scope of this thesis, it would simply be impossible to answer it in depth, which probably might be a task better suited for another thesis or similar work. But without describing the course of action for at least medium- term future, this thesis would be left incomplete. That is because when it comes to military planning, and especially hardware procurement, one needs to plan really ahead. In most of the civilian planning, for example, companies, it is scarce to see plans spanning more than let's say five years. However, most of the important military hardware that the Armed Forces of Slovak Republic need to procure now will have 10+ years of expected service life, and the process itself of buying the required materiel, changing your organization accordingly, and training your personnel to use it takes years.
For example, during the pre-research to this thesis, the author found out, that most of the modernization efforts in the Armed Forces will be carried out in two phases (according to the White Paper on Defense 2016, Ministry of Defense of Slovakia 2016a). We are currently in the Phase I., spanning between 2016 and 2020, and the Phase II. will be carried out between 2021 and 2030. Most of this thesis will focus on the Phase I. which is currently ongoing, with overlaps to the Phase II. Since the plans of the MoD for the Phase II. are set out until 2030, what we will
- 20 - not cover while answering the questions 2. and 3., but what still is a part of the Phase II., will be covered by the answer for the fourth question.
To achieve the answers to this question, we can go numerous ways. Of course, unlike journalists, we don't have the liberty of using a pure gut feeling, but we have to approach this a little bit more scientifically.
We will do this by mixing two approaches. First one comes from a „military point-of- view," which says that military planning is something that can be learned from textbooks. This is of course at least partially true, and we can take out inspiration from great military thinkers, both old and modern. For the purpose of this thesis, we can look for answers in texts that deal with military planning, modernization and capability building. Besides the documents of the Slovak Armed Forces themselves, there is a plethora of useful articles and books that deal with this topic in the frame of NATO and allied nations. Secondly, the approach that is probably the best-suited one for the field of political science is the prescriptive approach, which comes after the description. The prescriptive methodology is used for solving issues based on gathering knowledge and information. We obtain this information in a structured, systematic way with descriptive method (which will be much of the first part of this thesis, especially while answering the first and the second research questions), and then we confront them with normative, ideal state of affairs, but also the real state and the realm of our options and possibilities. The goal, therefore, is to widen our knowledge about an issue and then make an informed decision on the best possible course of action based on a rational assessment of the current state, our options, but also the ideal state that we aim to achieve (Riabacke 2012).
So far, we managed to state the four research questions and operationalize them. The last thing that needs to be done in this chapter is conceptualization and explanation of some terms that we might have already used, but not explained, and some that will be used further down the road and might need clarification and clear frame to work with them within.
We’ve already explained the term of capabilities, but another word that has been used here quite a lot is modernization. The definition of this concept is not offered by the U.S. Department of Defense’s Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (U.S. Department of Defense 2018). In the Proposal for Long-term Plan for Development of Defense with focus on Development of Armed Forces of Slovak Republic with outline for the Year 2030 (Government
- 21 - of Slovakia 2017e) in the section 4, it is written that: „The basis for building and developing capabilities that can guarantee the state defense is the modernization of equipment, technology, material and communication and information systems, or total changeover of obsolete equipment, where further improvements are no longer effective. In preparing armament projects, we intend to find the most accurate solution in complying with legislation and the principle of ‘value for money’“.
This, however, is not a definition per se, so the author proposes to look elsewhere. In 2005, the U.S.–based organization National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) issued a book called Strategic Asia 2005-6: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty (Tellis, Wills 2005). Strategic Asia is a series of books that NBR publishes every year, and each issue focuses on a different topic. In 2005, they dealt with the problematics of military modernization, which is in Asia maybe even a bit hotter topic than in the post-Warsaw Pact countries. Although this book deals primarily with a different geopolitical setting than the presented diploma thesis, the theory stays the same. Editors of this book agree that there is not a single, widely accepted and understood the definition of the concept of military modernization and that their book works with a deliberately „broad and inclusive” definition that focuses mainly on improvement of military capabilities. The author thinks that similar approach will also work for this thesis, and therefore we can use the definition from the Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, as follows: „Military modernization is thus defined as the relevant upgrade or improvement of existing military capabilities through the acquisition of new imported or indigenously developed weapons systems and supporting assets, the incorporation of new doctrines, the creation of new organizational structures, and the institutionalization of new manpower management and combat training regimes.”
The main strength of the definition above comes from the fact that it counts in both the „hard" (hardware) side of things, but also the „soft" part which deals mostly with organization or doctrines.
The paragraph cited from the Long-term development plan is giving us one more important information – that there might be a point in the process of acquirement or modernization, where it stops to be useful just to modernize, but a total changeover of equipment is needed in order to reach the aims that we outlined in the definition of
- 22 - modernization. This fact was also pointed out to the author by one of the senior Ministry of Defense officials. As the Ministry and the Armed Forces are aware, in some cases of the equipment used in the Slovak Armed Forces, we can no longer speak about modernization, but, in the military terms instead of re-armament. We can define this again using what is written in the Long-term plan as a total changeover of existing obsolete equipment, where further improvements (meaning modernization) are no longer sufficient. It needs to be noted that, based on the current situation, we might find ourselves talking not about modernization, but rather about re-armament. However, even when talking about re-armament instead of modernization, we are staying inside the frame of one capability that we already have, and we are improving it.
One last thing has to be noted before moving forward. As we will be basing the choice of actual modernization projects that we will be talking about upon the capabilities that the Armed Forces identify as something they need to or have to have, we might essentially find ourselves talking about two kinds of modernization. In the first kind, we are staying inside one capability that we already have, but we need to significantly improve it, as the aforementioned definition says. This can be done either by enhancing the current equipment, re-arming, or merely changing the way we use the current gear to reflect better situations we might find ourselves in. The second kind is when we identify a capability that we don't have, but we need to reflect better the conditions we operate in – the face of the warfare is continuously changing, and the Armed Forces need to adapt. Gaining such a new capability might be thus considered modernization, too. Regarding the Armed Forces of Slovakia, we will be dealing with both kinds.
2.3. Methodology summary Based on the outlined form of this thesis, we can put it in the category of qualitative research. If we would, for example, decide to operate more with economic data and put more significance on the financial aspects of the procurement process, we would also overlap with the quantitative approaches, and we might be able to even precisely count how remunerative is a specific procurement project in the Armed Forces. But for the sake of the consistency of this thesis, we will stay more on the qualitative side of things.
- 23 - This work will be written as a case study with two interconnected parts: descriptive and analytical. According to Hendl (2005), one of the kinds of various case studies is a study of institutions, which is what will be done here; after all, we are exploring a transformation inside an institution. This case study will mainly be based on content analysis of documents and texts that have been outlined in the previous chapter. They will be further complemented by interviews (or rather talks) that the author conducted with key personnel at the Slovak Ministry of Defense between February and March 2018. Another important source of information to complete the whole picture will be news articles from both domestic and international media.
The part of this work concerning the historical development will be built with using the historical-logic method. The primary aim of this chapter is not any analysis or explanation of anything, but rather just introduction of some historical context, so the reader can understand some issues in the broader picture even if he/she has not been interested in this topic before.
The descriptive part will mainly aim to seek answers for the first two research questions, and so it will only describe the modernization projects in the Armed Forces, their short history, current states, and aims, based on the mentioned documents, other open sources, and interviews with the responsible officials. After this will follow the analytical part, which will deal more in-depth with the actual background behind the described projects, their successfulness or their problems, their possible future, etc. The analytical part is further divided into two sections, one answering the third question, and the second answering the fourth question. While answering the third question, we will use the DOTMLPFI-P method as described earlier, and analyze the projects using information acquired while answering the questions one and two by following the functional areas provided by the DOTMLPFI-P concept. In this part, we will also identify any shortcomings, and in the course of answering to the fourth question, we will propose a possible course of action for the near future with the purpose of getting rid of these shortcomings.6 This will be further complemented by the use of strategic evaluation as part of policy analysis, and system analysis, as outlined by Kugler (2006).
This proposed course of action will be developed using a prescriptive method (for example as put forth by Riabacke 2012). The prescriptive methodology can be in general taken
6 Of course, in the case that we do not find any gaps, this part will be concluded as unnecessary, and there will be no need to write it.
- 24 - as a continuation of a descriptive method. In general, it is used to solve problems from acquired information. We systematically acquire this information using the descriptive method, and then we confront them with normative, ideal state that should be reached, but also with the actual, real state of affairs and our possibilities and resources. The aim of this is therefore to deepen and widen our knowledge about a problem at hand and make an informed decision7 based on the rational judgment of the present situation, but also our abilities and the ideal state that is striven for.
2.4. Literature review It is a little bit of a surprise that theory of military modernization is not the best-developed field of military studies – compared to strategy, operational art or tactics, which are subjects of countless books and articles. This might perhaps be because modernization is viewed as an instrument to carry out what we set out in the area of strategy or tactics. Therefore, when theorizing about modernization, we might as well take our theoretical roots in the general topic of military planning. The author argues that the best level to judge the actual issues of hardware and organization is the so-called „operational art," which is supposed to serve as a connection between the strategy and the tactics. While tactics themselves deal with the questions of the actual combat use of a unit on the battlefield, the strategy is supposed to set out goals, which we then use the armed forces to achieve.
The operational art is described as sequencing of tactical actions to defeat the enemy – to achieve the goals the strategy set out (Kelly and Brennan 2009, 20-21). Although many authors today argue that the operational art actually in the long run damaged the real strategic thinking, especially in the West8, we have to admit that a certain level of military planning is today carried out at this level and that we need to take it into account. Even if we might not agree with the prominence of the operational art as it is nowadays often presented, in the area of organization and hardware procurement, it makes sense to analyze it on this level. That is because, on the level of strategy, we might choose what capabilities our armed forces need, but same as in this thesis, then we need to move forward from that to actual decisions of how to achieve these
7 Meaning a decision that is made based on the acquired knowledge, not based on intuition, emotions or other non-empirical means. 8 Žilinčík (2017) says that: „Today, the operational level of war occupies a politics-free zone concerned with the manipulation of war to the actor’s advantage. There is no place in it for understanding the nature of particular wars. Concepts such as Blitzkrieg, Deep Operations, Air-Land Battle and most recently Hybrid Warfare, are now considered to be strategies, when in fact they are all about tactics.”
- 25 - capabilities. Deciding how to organize a unit, and what to equip it with, to achieve the capabilities set out in the strategy needs to be made on a different level. However, when we reach the level of tactics and the actual force deployment, the decisions of equipment and organization have to be made already – which means it has to be made on one level above.
One of the best introductions into the problematics of operational art is perhaps offered by a publication that provides a great insight into the problematics of modern warfare in a broad sense: Understanding Land Warfare, published by Christopher Tuck in 2014 (Tuck 2014). This book might help any reader to understand how armies work on the contemporary battlefield, since the beginning of the 20th century until today. Interesting in this sense is the fact that in contradiction to what many might think, the nature of warfare did not change much since the First world war. Of course, the technology has progressed significantly, but still, we see the same things over and over.9 Understanding Land Warfare quotes U.S. Joint Publication 3-0 from 2011 when describing what operational level of warfare is: it says that „…the focus at this level is on the design, planning, and execution of operations." This complements what we've said earlier: that while the general decisions of what we will be doing lie on the strategic level, choosing what we will use to carry out these assignments is made one level down.
This, however, helps us to understand what we deal with on the topic of modernization only in the so-to-speak „philosophical" level. That will not help us when it comes to analysis, and for that, we have to look elsewhere. Perhaps the most complex work on policy analysis in the security and defense sector was done by Richard Kugler in his book Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs published in 2006 by National Defense University in the USA. In the more than 600-pages long book the author offers a huge insight (perhaps sometimes maybe even too detailed) on how to asses this kind of policies. For the topic of this diploma thesis, especially two chapters are very useful. Chapter 12 „Sizing Conventional Forces" gives us recommendations on how to assess the composition of an armed force. Although most of the
9 For example, Žilinčík (2017) argues, that despite the fact that many military and political leaders are always trying to describe every conflict as something entirely new (the latest example being the so- called „hybrid war"), and make the previous one kind of a caricature of the current one, while in reality, not much changes. For example, the mentioned „hybrid war" is described as something new and unique, but in reality, what constitutes the „hybrid war” has been used for a long time. „Unmarked" soldiers have been used as far as 16th century, as one of the best examples of insurgencies are still used the activities of the Lawrence of Arabia in the Ottoman Empire, the battles on Donbass looked more like something right from the First world war than anything else. How we do things might have changed – insurgents have AKs instead of bolt-action Mausers, and instead of dropping leaflets we use internet for propaganda spreading. What we do changes very little, if even.
- 26 - examples and actual advice deal with the United States, many of it can also be applied in smaller states and armed forces. When it comes to armed forces development, this is often true, as was proven by the author in his bachelor thesis (Kolesár 2014). Some policy might be useful for both big and small nations and armed forces – and when applying them in a different setting, one has to think of both scaling and usefulness. With the organization of military units, the example is obvious. A light armored battalion based on 8x8 armored personnel carriers can easily look the same in Slovakia and United States – in both cases, these battalions will be further organized into brigades. In Slovakia, a brigade will be the highest organizational unit, while in the U.S., more brigades will compose a division. Therefore, tactical and in some cases even operational (for example in the use of special forces) level might look the same in even very differently sized forces. We will be using this fact very often in this thesis because when considering how some aspect of armed forces development in Slovakia is doing, we might find ourselves in need to use a comparison with much bigger armed force. Same goes for the chapter 13, which has a pretty self-explanatory name: „Pursuing Defense Transformation." In here, the author deals with the issues of developing the armed forces in a way that will make them be able to respond to the emerging challenges. This is very important in the case of the military – because as the famous saying goes, the generals often prepare for the wars they fought yesterday.
An exciting book on the possibilities of the development and reform of militaries was published in 2015 by Mikkel Vedby Rasmunssen from the University of Copenhagen, called The Military’s Business (Rasmunssen 2015). The book is very much data-based and explores how could the current military organizational practices and development policies more reflect the ways organization and modernization are done in the business world. He argues that a more radical break from current military organizational practices is needed which would allow them to fit within a nation's overall national security system without ever-increasing budgets. And, as is usual with publications coming from the University of Copenhagen, this book has great theoretical roots.
One of the more complex recent works in the area of military modernization was already mentioned in this work – the Strategic Asia 2005-6 publication Military Modernization in the era of Uncertainty. We can praise this book for both its theoretical and factual plenitude. If even such a work also existed for different regions – for example, the central and eastern Europe.
- 27 - The absence of such a material is striking, but there are specific publications that describe the cases of different countries. The closest example to Slovakia is, of course, the one of the Czech Republic. One publication that was issued in 2009 by the Czech Ministry of Defense itself is the Defense Policy of Czechoslovakia and Czech Republic 1989-2009 (Obranná politika Československa a České republiky 1989-2009, Tůma, Janošec, Procházka 2009). One of the authors of this publication, Josef Procházka, done his dissertation thesis on the topic of Strategic approaches to arming the armed forces and their systemic use (Strategické přístupy k vyzbrojování ozbrojených sil a jejich systémové využití, Procházka 2006). Some of the theoretical approaches described in this work will be further used in the presented thesis. Procházka also published some of his works in Czech Military Review (Vojenské rozhledy) which is a vital source of both theories and information for this thesis. A great work that significantly helped the author of this thesis, mainly in the matters of the methodology, was the dissertation thesis of Lukáš Dyčka from the Czech University of Defense on the topic of Adaptation of the Defense Policy of the Czech Republic on the developments of the security environment (Adaptace obranné politiky České republiky na vývoj bezpečnostního prostředí, Dyčka 2017a).
Well known publishing houses such as Jane's Defense or Sheppard Media also publish a lot about the „technical" side of the military modernization in Europe (Central and Eastern too). The theoretical insight of this type of published works is non-existent, but that is not a problem since it is not their primary aim. However, we can use them very well while doing our analysis by taking the necessary info out of them.
In the recent years, there is a renewed interest in modernization efforts in the Russian Federation. Especially after the conflicts of the early 2000s in Chechnya and Georgia, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation made remarkable progress forward, which could have been seen for example after the start of the war in Ukraine. Relatively modern and well- equipped Russian soldiers that we could have seen in the photos from around Crimea does not have much in common with those that we saw in Georgia 10 years ago that still more resembled their predecessors in Chechnya or even Afghanistan10. What is good about the works about Russian military reforms is the fact that they are usually also useful from the theoretical
10 Ironical in this case is the fact that by this time, the losing Georgian military which was actively involved in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan was at the soldier level equipped mainly with western, mostly US gear.
- 28 - standpoint – such as the article of Renz and Thorton (2012) from the journal Problems of Post- Communism with self-explanatory title Russian Military Modernization. Also, we've already mentioned Ukraine, which itself made massive progress in the military matters since the 2014 occupation of Crimea and although the situation is still far from ideal, it is going in the right direction. However, again, besides pure information about procurement in such outlets as Jane's Defense or Sheppard, not much information is available in the strategic matters. This also goes for information provided in the Ukrainian language, but it is somewhat understandable given the still ongoing war.
After this review, we can see that there is not only an absence of a complex reading about Slovakia but also about the CEE region as a whole. In the case of Slovakia, much of the publications dealing with the issues of military modernization come in the form of newspapers articles, sometimes from foreign media coping with military topics, but mostly domestic. There is an absence of any reading that would put the technical information into a broader context of the development of the Slovak Armed Forces as a whole, not only its equipment. This is therefore what this thesis is aiming to do.
- 29 - 3. Historical Context
The roots of all the modernization efforts currently underway in the Armed Forces reach to the beginning of the 1990s, to the split of Czechoslovakia. As was mentioned in the Introduction, all the equipment inherited from the former Czechoslovak army was divided by the 2 to 1 ratio between newly formed armed forces, with two exceptions. The relatively new Mig-29 jet fighters were split 1:1 and the S-300 PMU air defense rocket system, of which former Czechoslovakia received one battery in 1990, was inherited entirely by Slovakia. The Cold War-era equipment then formed the backbone of the Slovak military, and with a few exceptions, it remains so until today.
After the turbulent 1990s, it became apparent that Slovakia is aspiring to become a full member of Euro-Atlantic security structures. At that time, the first modernization efforts also surfaced. The state entered NATO and EU in 2004 and a short period of economic growth ensued, which also reflected in rising military budget, reflecting the trends in the rest of the western world. Slovakia participated in the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and also continued its presence in the Balkans and other areas as part of UN peacekeeping forces. After becoming a NATO member, Slovak military needed its hardware to become at least minimally compatible with its allies. For example, MiG-29s, which still form the mainstay of the Slovak Air Force, were brought up to NATO standards in 2008. Upgrades were also done for other sophisticated equipment, such as Mi-17 helicopters. The only weapon system in the Slovak arsenal that did not need an overhaul at that time was the S-300 PMU system, which remains one of the most capable anti-aircraft systems in Central Europe even today.
During the economic crisis that began in 2007, the defense budget of Slovakia shrunk considerably, which meant most of the planned rearmament did not happen. For example, after the accident of Antonov An-24 aircraft in January 2006 near the Slovak-Hungarian border, which resulted in the deaths of 42 Slovak personnel, it was decided that the transport planes of Slovak Air Force need to be replaced as soon as possible. According to various sources (confirmed to the author by MoD personnel responsible for equipment procurement), it was decided almost immediately, that old An-24 and An-26 aircraft will be replaced by Italian Alenia C-27J Spartan. The Italian side was able to deliver the planes very soon, by the year
- 30 - 2008, but the deal was postponed due to the Slovak budget cuts. Thus, the first aircraft was delivered only in 2017.
This illustrates the situation of the last ten years – similar scenario was true also for other modernization projects. Progress is being made, albeit very slowly. The latest White Paper on Defence (Ministry of Defense of Slovakia 2016a:24) acknowledges that „the obsolescence of major military equipment materiel shortfalls, communication and information systems limits and in military personnel preparedness shortfalls persist. These are the reason why the [Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic (AF SR)] are markedly lagging behind in both capability development and in meeting NATO interoperability standards – against the 2015 standards, their levels were at about 50% of measurable indicators”. The Long-term development plan from late 2017 reiterates this. When it comes to Air Force, the Long-term development plan states that the current fulfilling of standards of readiness and interoperability is on about 58 percent.
To understand where we are standing right now, we can again refer to the White Paper. Creators of the White Paper acknowledge that the Armed Forces are still largely dependent on Russian (Soviet) military hardware. The White Paper directly says that „…the fundamental change of the security environment followed by EU sanctions placed on the Russian Federation, along with the condition of the AF SR hardware, influenced not only the conceptual designs of AF SR development, but also the course of their armament aimed at reducing the technological dependence of the AF SR on the Russian Federation, which led to preferential investment into the Air Force.” (Ministry of Defense of Slovakia 2016a:25-26). Unfortunately, as we will see later, this is in stark contrast with the reality even two years after the publishing of the White Paper. In a way, the White Paper directly admits this by saying that the „modernization that was undertaken [until now] did not dispose of the long-term shortfalls pointed out in the [2013 White Paper] and manifested themselves as shortfalls in parts of and obsolescence in most equipment, materiel, including communication and information systems (the lifespan of much of the major military equipment has expired). These factors do not permit the achievement of AF SR capabilities required for national defence and most of this kind of equipment is faulty and unserviceable.”
But to conclude this chapter in a more positive note, we can cite from the White Paper also following: „An era of the largest investment projects in the history of the Slovak Republic
- 31 - was begun – the purchase of transport aircraft and multirole helicopters approved by the Government and other major projects were considered – the replacement of radar equipment and ensuring that Slovakia has a multirole tactical airplane capability (fighter aircraft). A 4x4 multirole tactical vehicle project has also been prepared. Both the projects that are underway and those that are being prepared constitute a breakthrough in AF SR rearmament. The practical repercussions of these changes will, however, be felt in 2018 – 2019 and later, after this equipment is delivered” (Ministry of Defense of Slovakia 2016a:25-26).
Finding out how these words reflect in reality will be the focus of the rest of this thesis.
- 32 - 4. Current Situation: Key Modernization Projects
In this chapter, we will first establish what projects are currently underway in the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, based on the key capabilities that the Armed Forces need to maintain and develop. Then we will describe them one by one, and, using the constructed methodology, analyze them.
4.1. Core capabilities and what is needed to fulfil them The primary written material that deals with the capabilities and what the armed forces need to fulfill them is the Proposal for Long-term Plan for Development of Defense with focus on Development of Armed Forces of Slovak Republic with an outline for the Year 2030 (Government of Slovakia 2017e), specifically it's attachments number 1 and 3. Interestingly enough, creators of this document decided to do it the other way around then we'd like to carry it out in this thesis. In the attachment n. 1 called Main capabilities – increasing their utility value through modernization, the main modernization projects are described right away without connecting them to the capabilities. Capabilities themselves are described in the attachment n. 3 and that’s where we will start our work.
The n. 3 attachment named Connection of the main modernization projects with specific capabilities divides the capabilities into five main categories. The reason why the author proposes to start here instead of starting with the attachment #1 is that there is no indication that the 45 items on this list are ordered by any prioritization and writing about them all would be outside of the realm of the possibilities of this thesis.
The five categories that the attachment #3 divides the capabilities to are: • Combat capabilities; • Combat support capabilities; • Combat service support capabilities; • Air forces; • Special forces.
The combat capabilities are carried out by six maneuver battalions and one armored (tank) battalion. The maneuver battalions are organized as mechanized and motorized (in other
- 33 - terms, medium, and light) battalions with different armaments. Two of the mechanized battalions should be based on wheeled infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and three on tracked IFVs. According to the current organizational structure of the Armed Forces, these are further divided to two brigades of three battalions each, but the Long-term Plan for Development takes into account that they might be used as stand-alone combat units. Given the numbers of the Slovak Armed Forces, having separately available units at a lower level of command makes more sense. Given the proposed armaments of the motorized, mechanized and armored battalions, we can identify this hardware that will be subject to procurement or modernization: • Wheeled combat armored vehicles 8x8; • Multipurpose wheeled tactical vehicles 4x4; • Tracked infantry fighting vehicles; • Anti-tank rocket weapon systems; • Main battle tanks.
The combat support capabilities are further divided into main fire support capabilities (carried out by conventional self-propelled artillery and rocket artillery); combat engineering (including EOD); radiological, biological and chemical protection; intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance capabilities (ISTAR); civil-military cooperation and psychological operation capabilities (CIMIC and PSYOPS); and security and protection of information and communication and information systems capabilities (information security11). According to the Long-term plan, these elements of combat support capabilities will undergo modernization: • Self-propelled 155mm howitzers; • DELOSYS – integrated artillery command, control, and reconnaissance system; • Multipurpose wheeled tactical vehicles 4x4; • Heavy combat engineering and salvage equipment; • Tracked infantry fighting vehicles; • Unmanned aerial vehicles; • A plethora of communication and cyber systems.
11 In a true military nature, this has been given an acronym of BOIaKIS from the full Slovakian name of „Bezpečnosť a Ochrana Informácií a Komunikačných a Informačných Systémov". This means exactly what the translation above, and to simplify it, we can further work with the term of „information security."
- 34 - The combat support service capabilities are in this document composed of only two aspects: combat support service brigade and the Office of the Chief Medical Officer. They identify these capabilities that need to be modernized: • Medium cargo off-road vehicles; • Heavy cargo off-road vehicles; • Vehicle service capabilities; • Ambulance vehicles; • ROLE2B combat hospital; • ROLE2E combat hospital; • Tracked medical vehicles.
In the area of air forces, the capabilities are divided into five areas of command, control, and reconnaissance; tactical air wing; transport air wing; helicopter wing; anti-air rocket brigade. Projects that will be subjected to modernization or a similar process are: • 3D radars; • Airport radars; • Electronic reconnaissance systems; • Air force communication system VCS 3020; • Multipurpose tactical planes; • Training planes; • Medium transport planes; • Medium multipurpose helicopters and their armament and other systems; • Combat or multipurpose helicopters; • In the area of anti-aircraft systems, the command, and control system; • Low-Level Air Picture Interface (LLAPI) system; • ASTRA PVO anti-aircraft system • Short and mid-range radars; • Short and mid-range anti-aircraft rocket systems; • Multipurpose wheeled tactical vehicles 4x4.
The last area that the Long-term development plan deals with are the special forces. Here are only three key projects that have to undergo development: • Multipurpose wheeled tactical vehicles 4x4;
- 35 - • Unmanned Aerial Vehicles; • Anti-tank rocket launchers.
Based on this long list, we can see that many needs are shared across the whole Armed Forces. Therefore, we can make a complex list of 33 items of modernization projects that are currently underway or will be in the near future. Dealing with all the 33 items would be outside of the possible for a work with a span of a diploma thesis, which means that we have to somehow narrow down the list. That can be done by establishing what we will not analyze, and why. Based on the analysis of the key documents mentioned in the chapter 2.2., the priorities stated in them, given what we can analyze with the proposed methodology, and what is actually needed to maintain the main capabilities that the Armed Forces need to dispone with, the author proposes to take out from the list of projects for analysis the following: • The projects that have not yet started and are not scheduled to start until the year 2020 or are not yet part of the ongoing modernization processes in the Armed Forces – there will very unlikely be enough information for the analysis and a simple description of them will not have any scientific value for this thesis; • All the projects from the „combat support service" area, for the reason of them being currently second-level priority because they will not directly enhance the ability to maintain the first-level priorities, neither of them will be a brand-new addition to the arsenal of the Armed Forces, but only a change from existing equipment to newer equipment of the same type, and out of this category, only medium and heavy cargo vehicles and ROLE2E field hospital are scheduled to be dealt with prior to the year 2020 (cargo vehicles since 2018, hospital next year), plus, they are currently outside of the public debate, especially when compared to the more high-profile projects; • Special Forces projects – for simple lack of information, since they are not mentioned in any of the materials, and the procurement in the special forces is usually done outside of the conventional acquisition (according to an interview with a colonel at the MoD from the section of modernization with the author took part in March 2018). We can now make a final list of all the projects mentioned above while scratching off the ones that we will not analyze (in regular font, explanation given): • Wheeled combat armored vehicles 8x8;
- 36 - • Multipurpose wheeled tactical vehicles 4x4; • Tracked infantry fighting vehicles; • Anti-tank rocket weapon systems; • Main battle tanks (not planned until 2026); • Self-propelled 155mm howitzers; • DELOSYS – integrated artillery command, control and reconnaissance system; • Heavy combat engineering and salvage equipment (not the be dealt with until year 2024); • Unmanned aerial vehicles for conventional forces; • Communication and cyber systems; • Medium cargo off-road vehicles (combat support service item); • Heavy cargo off-road vehicles (combat support service item); • Vehicle service capabilities (combat support service item); • Ambulance vehicles (combat support service item); • ROLE2B combat hospital (combat support service item); • ROLE2E combat hospital (combat support service item); • 3D radars; • Airport radars; • Electronic reconnaissance systems; • Air force communication system VCS 3020; • Multipurpose tactical planes; • Training planes; • Medium transport planes; • Medium multipurpose helicopters and their armament and other systems; • Combat or multipurpose helicopters; • Anti-aircraft systems command and control system; • Low Level Air Picture Interface (LLAPI) system; • ASTRA PVO anti-aircraft system • Short and mid-range radars; • Short and mid-range anti-aircraft rocket systems (will not be planned before year 2021);
- 37 - • Multipurpose wheeled tactical 4x4 vehicles for special forces (special forces item); • Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for special forces (special forces item); • Anti-tank rocket launchers for special forces (special forces item).
The final list of 21 items makes the basis of what will be further described and analyzed in this thesis. Before we jump to the that, one last information has to be noted: according to The White Paper on Defense of Slovak Republic (Ministry of Defense of Slovakia 2016a:90), the modernization process is divided to two parts: Phase I and Phase II. However, this White Paper is a year older than the proposal of the Long-term Plan, and between the finishing of the White Paper and the Long-term Plan, some of the timelines have been changed. Since the Long-term plan is a newer document, we will prioritize it. The Phase I in the White Paper is supposed to happen between 2016 and 2020, and the Phase II between 2021 and 2030. Unfortunately, there is no added analytical value in „using" these phases, since it seems that many of the projects will start in Phase I, but finish in Phase II. If this makes any difference, however, we will, of course, mention it in the course of the description and analysis.
4.2. Wheeled combat 8x8 armored vehicles Procurement of new 8x8 armored combat vehicles is currently being prioritized since they should be forming the backbone of the maneuverable combat battalions. When it comes to discussing the ground forces modernization and re-armament, the 8x8 vehicles are always in the first place in the documents such as the White paper or the Long-term development plan. What makes this priority even more important is the fact that by 2018, they should have been, at least partially, part of the arsenal. However, according to the last plans set out by the White Paper and the Long-term development plan, main combat elements of the 21st and 22nd mechanized battalions will be formed around these vehicles, with the 21st battalion receiving them no later than 2021 and 2nd battalion no later than 2024. Also, other mechanized and motorized battalions should be receiving the medical/ambulance versions of 8x8 vehicles no later than 2024.
8x8 combat armored vehicles are defined in the Long-term development plan as a „vehicle designed to carry crew and conduct combat activities primarily from turreted weapons
- 38 - of the vehicle and the dismantled part of the crew within the operational task force. Organic vehicle equipment enables continuous combat operations throughout the spectrum of expected battlefield situations. Due to the level of ballistic protection and the character of the equipment, it is ideal for use in both offensive and defensive operations of high intensity. The vehicle is capable of operating under WMD conditions, providing crew protection without the use of individual protective equipment. As a result of procuring 8x8 combat vehicles, the combat capabilities of a mechanized brigade will be secured to meet the needs of securing state defense and fulfilling the tasks arising from NATO's international commitments" (Government of Slovakia 2017e).
The intention to acquire new equipment of this category was made public in 2015 when then-minister Martin Glváč declared that the MoD wants to buy at least 30 new vehicles until the end of the year. In May 2015, on IDEB exhibition in Brno, Czech Republic, an interesting vehicle named Scipio was presented. It was a version of the Polish KTO Rosomak, itself license-made version of Finnish Patria 8x8 IFV made by Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ, albeit with many Polish-made changes, which include for example enhanced ability to swim or to be shuttled by air inside a C-130 Hercules) with Slovak-made TURRA 30 remotely controlled weapon system made by EVPÚ a.s. installed on the top. This was direct cooperation between the Polish and Slovak defense industry, and at the time, it was considered as the top contender for the vehicles for Slovak Armed Forces (Šnídl 2015). It was presented during the dynamic show to the commanders of the Armed Forces a month later, in June 2015, with representatives of Slovak defense industry being present.
However, about a year later the solution presented by Scipio fell out of favor, with „high costs" being cited as the main reason. The „base" of the vehicle was offered for 1,5 million EUR per vehicle, and with all the equipment required by the Slovak Armed Forces (including the TURRA 30), a price per piece rose to 2,4 million EUR (Kováč 2016). At the same time, a requirement for 4x4 armored tactical vehicles was presented as a new priority, which we will talk about later. „Failure" of Scipio was presented as a chance for other manufacturers, for example, the Czechoslovak Group, a conglomerate of Czech and Slovak defense companies. They presented vehicle called Corsac 8x8, which was essentially a license-made version of the Austrian Pandur, used by Czech Army, again with TURRA 30. By that time, 8x8 vehicles were already a part of the broad concept of modernization presented by the White Paper, introduced in 2016.
- 39 -
After this, the project of the new 8x8 vehicle disappeared from the public news again for a while. However, during autumn 2017, further information surfaced – that the MoD signed an agreement with Finnish company Patria about procurement of 81 8x8 IFVs armed with TURRA 30. What is interesting in this is the fact that the agreement was reached in May 2017, long before the deal, which is a part of 1,2 billion EUR land forces modernization effort, was made public. This was criticized much more than the technical solution, which itself can be considered rather good. The most vocal criticism to the IFV itself was aimed at the TURRA 30 turret, the „Slovak" part of the project. For example, prestigious Jane's Defence Weekly, citing „dependable sources" inside the Slovak military wrote, that soldiers are not satisfied with the product at all. Matter of critique was also the weight of the turret and the fact that it uses license- made Russian 30mm automatic cannon (Šnídl 2018).
But TURRA 30, so far being presented as one of the most advanced products of the Slovak defense industry, seems to be a good choice, at least on the paper, and is widely accepted within the professional defense community. Slightly interesting might be perhaps the fact that it was part of all the 8x8 projects that were considered for Slovak military in the past few years, and some other that will be mentioned. Until proven otherwise, this can be only addressed as a success of the marketing and sales departments of its manufacturer. The only weird thing that can be pointed out is the use of Russian 30mm 2A42 autocannon. Its use on the new vehicles being procured by a NATO members state does not make much sense since it uses the Russian 30mm ammunition and is not compatible with other types used inside NATO (Šnídl 2017, 2018).
Criticism was also aimed at the fact that the whole project was not aimed at enhancing the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, but to make a profit for companies closely associated with the Slovak National Party which controls the Ministry of Defense. The apparent lack of transparency only strengthens this argument, but let's refrain from speculations at this point.
These facts say that the Armed Forces will get 81 8x8 wheeler Infantry Fighting Vehicles Patria AMVXP, which will be partially assembled in Slovakia and equipped with EVPÚ TURRA 30 and is currently undergoing military trials. The whole deal could cost up to 400
- 40 - million EUR, including the vehicles and armaments, but also training and service for the lifespan of the vehicles.
Using the outlined methodology, we can now move to assess this project. Doctrinally, this project falls right in the general way of planning operations and organizing the forces that has not changed much since the establishment of the Slovak Armed Forces, the core of which was always formed by mechanized and/or motorized brigades and battalions (or mixed for that matter). According to the current Doctrine that is in place (2009), the leading combat role in an open conflict belongs to the battalion, and when it comes to counter-insurgency or peacekeeping operations, the main maneuver unit might go one or more levels down to platoon or company. But another thing coming out of the doctrine is important here – it clearly stated that Armed Force of SR operate/will operate as a part of a broader NATO coalition forces, and therefore our training, organization, logistics, general behavior in combat, and hardware, has to be compatible with NATO standards. This is further mirrored on the organizational level, but the organization of the AF SR did not have to be changed in any way to accommodate this project – the 8x8 vehicles will become part of the armament of already existing units, mainly 21st and 22nd mechanized battalions from the 2nd mechanized brigade. They will also come with repair and service capabilities, equipped units will undergo training and certification, in both use and maintenance, which covers the infrastructure part of this project. Since this type of vehicles can be moved by its own force even on classic roads, there is also no significant need for support vehicles, as would be the case with tracked vehicles tha require additional transport capabilities.
Here we come to the issue of equipment. In this case, it has two dimensions – the current state, and what is planned. The current state is less than ideal. As we've established earlier, the requirements for what kind of units Slovakia should maintain are agreed upon with NATO. Indeed, exact wording of these so-called „Capability targets" and their fulfilling, which is reviewed periodically by the alliance, is in the case of Slovakia classified. But, from what the author established from the interviews with the MoD personnel, the current outlook of how the Ground Force should be organized and what capabilities should it have is based directly on these „Capability targets." These targets are not „forced" upon the member nations – every member of the Alliance can state what is in his ability to fulfill, then the Alliance either agrees or disagrees. If the rest of the members agree, then it is the responsibility of the nation to reach the set goals. The problem is that it was stated on numerous occasions that the AF SR did not
- 41 - reach its „Capability goals" that have been set a few years ago. If we ask why, answer to this would be that the units responsible for these capabilities do not have enough modern hardware and their combat readiness is sometimes as low as 45%. This is also openly stated in the Long- term development plan and the White paper. This logically means, that the capability targets should have been achieved a long time ago (when exactly is classified), and the MoD failed in the armament process. Here is the right place to continue for another area of analysis, policy.
Reasons for this failure are numerous, first of all, we can perhaps cite lack of funds in the early years of the first government of Robert Fico, which for caused significant delay also in other projects. The problem is when we realize that for ten years out of the past 12 years (2006-2018), the government was led by SMER – Social Democracy, which also until 2016 and with the exception of the center-right government of Iveta Radičová between 2010 and 2012 controlled the resort of defense. Perhaps until 2014-15, when some other significant projects began, it was visible that the defense sector was not a priority for Fico's governments. But after 2016 elections, when SMER was forced to form a coalition government with Most- Híd and Slovak National Party, the latter gained the seat of the minister of defense, and things started moving rather rapidly.
The policy changed when the new White Paper came into force in 2016 under the minister of defense Peter Gajdoš, former high-ranking general. This was further entrenched by the new security, defense and military strategy and the Long-term development plan, all of which we've cited before. The policy shift towards a more focused, more rapid, and better-financed modernization is clear. The only problem is, as the popular saying goes, that „paper can handle everything." Since the new modernization efforts outlined by the Long-term development plan started, numerous issues arose. In this chapter, we will describe the ones connected to the 8x8 acquisition program, and in the following sections, we will also dig deeper into other projects.
There is nothing wrong with how the project is written. 8x8 IFVs are an item that has been requested by both soldiers and the MoD personnel responsible for procurement of hardware for years as a basis for modernized mechanized battalions. They are more flexible and less costly than tracked vehicles, they can be transported by their own means on regular roads, and although their off-road abilities are not as flexible as with tracked IFVs, the firepower they can produce is similar. From a military point of view, there can be almost no objections toward the desire to arm the maneuverable mechanized units with this type of vehicle. Also,
- 42 - from the side of civilian planners, they present more than a sufficient solution, while also being fiscally responsible.
But, there are numerous issues with how this project is carried out in Slovakia. As we have stated before, the final vehicle was chosen without public competition, but it was so-to- speak „given" to Patria. The MoD cited that fact that the vehicle will be partially developed in Slovakia as an „excuse" for this. The problem is that using the word „development" is a tremendous overstatement. According to Patria website, the AMV, and even the newest AMV XP version is a finished product (Patria 2018, Šnídl 2017, 2017b). TURRA 30 will be added, along with fire control and communication systems that should be of Slovak origin. But same as with the turret, they will be an off-the-shelf product and installing these systems is rather common, and definitely does not constitute any kind of development. TURRA 30 itself raises a few questions, although it is one of the parts of the projects that seems to have the least amount of problems. Due to the technology used in the construction of its armor, it is a bit heavier, but this is balanced by the lower cost. Even the use of a license-made 2A42 cannon might be understandable, since it can also be made in different calibers than the original Soviet/Russian 30mm, for example, standard NATO 30mm rounds (probably 30x173mm). Of course, a problem will be if Slovakia chooses to use the original 30x165mm round, which would be an illogical step. A similar problem might arise with the use of Konkurs anti-tank missiles, which we will talk about in detail later. Talking about „development" therefore clearly cannot be used as an excuse to awarding a deal for 400 million EUR without a public competition.
This leaves us in a kind of a schizophrenic position. On the one hand, the technical solution of the project is deemed as good, although there is one significant con. Since the solution does not come out of a public competition, there was no chance to directly compare the offered product with other offerings, in both their technical abilities and also the final financial sum per vehicle. There is nothing that would suggest that in the end, the capability of the received product will not be sufficient, but the lack of public competition raises a red flag. Also, this is not the first non-transparent deal that Patria has been involved in. In 2007, when Slovenia was looking to buy new 8x8 IFVs, they also chose Patria AMV, and also with the involvement of local partner that was responsible for the final assembly of the vehicles. As it turned out, this local partner was funneling money from the Slovenian ministry of defense to corrupt various politicians and officials. In 2014, former Slovenian prime minister Janša spent half a year in prison because of this criminal case. After this, Patria was also involved in similar
- 43 - scandals in Croatia and Egypt. In Finland itself, this was perceived as a minor issue but anyway ended up in the change of almost the whole middle and upper management of the company (Berglund 2008). This history, and other presented facts, combined with the brutal lack of transparency on the side of Slovakian MoD makes it almost impossible to judge this project in any way positively, at least in the policy realm.
In the end, in the two important aspects of materiel and policy, this project can be almost considered as a failure. Only when the Armed Forces will fully reach this capability can the score improve.
4.3. Multipurpose 4x4 tactical vehicles A combat armored vehicle / 4x4 multi-purpose tactical vehicle is operationally designed to carry out the combat and combat support tasks of the armed forces that can be used for a whole range of anticipated combat tasks and missions (fast deployable capabilities with less inventory requirements and deployment to deployments within the operational task forces as well as capable of acting independently with special forces and fast deployment forces with low logistics demands). Due to the level of ballistic protection and the character of the equipment, it is mainly intended for use in both offensive and defensive operations of lower intensity. The vehicle is capable of operating under WMD conditions. Besides securing the capabilities of the 5th Special Forces Regiment, these vehicles will be the backbone of the 23rd Motorized (light) battalion and of course function in support roles in other combat and combat support units. However, the 23rd Motorized battalion should be the first unit receiving these vehicles, starting in 2018.
It is important to note that in this case, we are talking about „heavier” 4x4 vehicles, that would perhaps fulfil the description of the Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP) category better than when comparing them to the light tactical vehicles such as HMMWVs, Land Rovers or Mercedes-Benz G Class, all of which are widely used in the AF SR. Since the introduction of the first complex material dealing with modernization, the White Paper from 2013, 4x4 armored tactical vehicles were seemingly sidelined in comparison to the more prominent projects of 8x8 and tracked vehicles. However, an abrupt change came along in 2016. During the latter part of the year, a new White Paper was introduced, and as we've discussed earlier, a
- 44 - sudden change came along – the priority was changed from 8x8 vehicles to 4x4s. This was criticized by a plethora of security professionals since the 8x8 vehicles were urgently needed to secure the capabilities of mechanized battalions. However, by this time it was agreed that the Armed Forces came to a situation when basically everything needs to be procured or replaced (Kováč 2016). Since then, the project has moved forward with similar pace to the 8x8s, and possible contenders were presented to the representatives of the MoD and AF on an industry day in December 2017 along with the larger vehicles.
In the past, the Armed Forces received vehicles that could count into this category. Between years 1999 and 2005, about 40 pieces of the vehicle called Aligator were procured, out of 250 initially planned. This Slovakian project, which was in the works since 1993, was from the beginning very problematic – the vehicles had many technical issues, the procurement process was rather shady due to the political connections of the involved companies. Despite the initial interest of Czech and Irish armies, Aligator was never exported. A slightly better story is with Iveco M65E LMV. Slovak Armed Forces received 40 of these, which then went on to serve with both regular units and special forces, also being deployed in combat in Afghanistan. Some of them were equipped with a scaled-down version of TURRA 30. Also, 7 International MaxxPro MRAPs were provided for training purposes by the United States, since Slovak soldiers are using these in combat in Afghanistan.
Since the 4x4s became a priority after the introduction of the new White Paper, the project moved slightly forward – the MoD issued a request for proposals, and on the Industry day in December 2017 the entrants presented their bids. The plan is to buy 404 vehicles for 782,70 million EUR including service, training, spare parts and maintenance (Government of Slovakia 2017e). Seven manufacturers presented their products, including one from Slovakia – Kerametal, the company that was responsible for the final assembly of the original Aligator, entered the competition with Aligator II Master. It was publicly presented during the IDEB 2016 exhibition in May 2016. However, the Slovak vehicle is going to compete in a very saturated market. Six other companies offered their entries, with the seemingly favorited being a Czech one – Tatra Patriot, which has been under the name Husar also presented in Poland. The version sold in Slovakia would also be partially made in the country. Other entrants were also not any less attractive – during the Industry day, even other „big names" in the segment were presented, for example the Swiss General Dynamics Eagle, French Renault Sherpa, NIMR
- 45 - Ajban, a product from United Arab Emirates being brought to Europe by Czech company VOP, and very interesting two Turkish entries – Otokar Cobra II, and FNSS Ejder Yalcin.
4x4s should be procured in three phases. First will start in 2018, and continue until 2023. During this phase, the 23rd Motorized battalion will be equipped. Other units will be fitted during phases in 2024-2027 and 2026-2027. This means that no later than 2027, all the units requiring this type of a vehicle should be equipped. That is rather ambitious goals, because (as far as the public knows), no agreement has been reached yet, and the project is still in its early stage. We will analyze whether it is feasible in its current form and if it will be able to secure the capability which it is needed for if the project is completed in the way it is outlined in now.
Looking at this project through our modified DOTMLPFI-P method is a little bit more complicated than in the case of the 8x8 vehicles because the project is in its earlier stage. In the area of doctrines, the same applies – the way how they will be used is explicitly stated. Also, the organizational structures are in place – the Long-term development plan states which units in which capacity will use them. The initial „incoming" of this machinery might even be easier than in the case of the 8x8s because this type of vehicles – armored 4x4 tactical vehicles – is in the Armed Forces already in use. We can extrapolate that it will need less training and fewer adjustments than in the case of the bigger vehicles. The area of infrastructure will strongly depend on the type of a vehicle that will be selected. Since it is expected from the Slovak defense industry to be a part of this project from the beginning, same as with the 8x8s, we can claim that there are no expectations of significant problems. Even if a product that is not yet widely used, such as the Kerametal's one, is selected, thanks to the large in-country industrial capacity of its manufacturer, this aspect should be not the most problematic.
In the area of policy, the government perhaps has a chance to at least partially fix the failures done in the 8x8 project. It is an opportunity to prove that it means business also outside of claims since the current minister and his closest aides were cited on numerous occasions as „taking transparency seriously" and „doing everything transparently“ (Šnídl 2017). The transparency issues were also on multiple occasions criticized from within the ministry itself, by the State Secretary Robert Ondrejcsak12, which means that there is a rather firm push from
12 In the Slovak context, state secretaries are second-in-command within the ministries, responsible directly to the minister, and are nominated by governmental parties.
- 46 - many sides to keep things transparent13. How this turned out will be probably known in the second half of 2018. It will be understandable if the MoD chooses an at least partially domestically produced vehicle. Besides some advantages when it comes to promoting Slovak industry (which actually should not be work of the ministry of defense, especially in cases when the state does not even partially own the companies involved) and perhaps some sentimental patriotism, and to a certain extent economic advantages, because vast sums of money, in this case about 800 million EUR for approx. 400 vehicles, would stay in the country, this also has a slight military advantage. The closeness of already existing repair and maintenance facilities, when the vehicles will require more than a usual service that can be done on a battalion level, is one of them. This might also drive the price a bit down.
When it comes to the area of materiel, the analysis gets tricky again. The DOTMLPFI-P concept does not provide exact instructions on how to use and interpret it14, we can go at it in multiple ways, mainly two. And again, the plans are rather good, but the reality is much darker, just because large numbers of 4x4s should have already been part of the vehicle fleet of the Armed Forces. In a way, they already are – but the number of vehicles is not even slightly close to the amount the MoD is trying to reach. If we would be judging only the plans, then there is almost no room for criticism; the goal is set, and the efforts to achieve it are being made. But if we combine the fact that it is all only in the beginning with the knowledge that it was supposed to be done much earlier, because the units that are part of the Capability targets of the Alliance should already have been on the desired operational level, the judgment is rather negative. Only the actual finishing of the armament process will make the situation better, and it is very far off from now, considering that not even the type of the vehicle that is going to be procured has been chosen as of May 2018.
4.4. Tracked infantry fighting vehicles With tracked IFVs, the situation is a bit different than with the 8x8 and 4x4 vehicles mentioned in the previous paragraphs. The AF SR currently uses this type of equipment, unlike
13 Perhaps one clarification is needed here. Non-transparent does not necessarily need to indicate illegal, but in case of multi-million deals in a somewhat sensitive sector – defense – in a democratic state with civilian oversight over the military, it is evident that non-transparency will raise questions. 14 As anything in social sciences rarely does. In this case, as Dyčka argues (2017a), it is because this concept is defined rather broadly a differently by numerous users.
- 47 - with the previously mentioned types. BVP-1 and BVP-2 (BVP – Bojové Vozidlo Pechoty – Infantry Fighting Vehicle) are now the primary equipment of the five mechanized maneuverable battalions – 11th, 12th, 13th, 21st15 and 22nd (11. mechanizovaný prápor Martin 2018, 12. mechanizovaný prápor Nitra 2018, 13. mechanizovaný prápor Levice 2018, 21. zmiešaný mechanizovaný prápor Trebišov 2018, 22. mechanizovaný prápor Michalovce 2018). BVP-1 and BVP-2 are essentially the well-known Soviet BMP-1 and BMP-2, which were produced in Czechoslovakia until 1990. The need to replace them immediately has been known for some time now and is clearly voiced in the Long-term development plan which states that „…level of usefulness in the context of required standards and interoperability is about 50%. This situation causes a reduced defense capacity of the Slovak Republic and a reduced ability to co-operate with the allies.” (Government of Slovakia 2017e:6). The BVPs, which were mostly made in the 1980s, are both nearing the end of their service life, and for some time now have been deemed obsolete. However, with either buying new vehicles or modernizing the existing ones, Slovak Armed Forces would not be gaining a new capability, so in this case, we are really talking about modernization, since the modern 8x8s and 4x4s would modernize the army as a whole, in this case, an existing capability would be upgraded.
What makes this case even more special is that this capability might be upgraded via literal modernization, meaning the current equipment would undergo an overhaul. Just a few days before the 2016 parliamentary elections, the outgoing Minister of Defense Martin Glváč signed a deal worth 27 million EUR that would go to the modernization of 18 BVP-2s (Šnídl 2016). The deal was then kept secret for next three months, and that is not the only sketchy thing about the whole idea. What was thought is going to be done is that 18 original BVP-2s, whose median age is about 26 years, are going to be taken out of service and then modernized. The „integrator" of the project should be state-owned company DMD Holding. Alas, at the price of 1,5 million EUR a piece, the value and meaningfulness of this project are being vigorously contested.
The idea of extensively modernizing the aging BVP-2 first came along in 2013 when a vehicle called BVP-M2 SKCZ was presented by a consortium of Slovak and Czech companies. The name later changed to a more „marketable" sounding IFV ŠAKAL. The whole program
15 The full name of this unit is „21st mixed mechanized battalion", which means it has more than one main type of equipment, in this case, besides IFVs, this battalion also has tanks (21. zmiešaný mechanizovaný prápor Trebišov 2018).
- 48 - consisted of a broad overhaul of the original BVP, with the aim to make it battle-worthy for the 21st century. The vehicle got new armor, new engine, new turret (if you were guessing TURRA 30, you guessed right), extensive rework of the interior, modern communication systems and one of the main shortcomings of the original design – fuel tanks inside the back doors of the vehicle, was removed. Also, due to the increased weight, the suspension needed to be upgraded too. Despite the particular attractiveness of this project, the limitations of the original design from the 1980s, especially the tragic level of protection from mines and similar devices, were quickly pointed out by several industry professionals (Grohmann 2013).
Then the project took a turn in a very different direction. Despite the initial secretiveness of the MoD, Denník N leaked the information in summer 2016 (Šnídl 2016), and since then we've already learned more interesting information in this regard. First of all, a different type of vehicle had undergone the modernization. Instead of BVP-2, it is BPzV (Bojové prieskumné obojživelné vozidlo – fighting amphibious reconnaissance vehicle) – originally Czechoslovak vehicle, built upon the original BVP-1, with some of the design changes and technology from the BVP-2 included, which was primarily used for reconnaissance missions. The modernized vehicles undergone military trials in the second half of 2016 and before the end of the year, they entered service with ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) battalion (Bednár 2017). Since in the whole project „P1-4 Modernization of IFVs” according to the Long-term plan altogether 44,5 million EUR is allocated, further 17 vehicles should be modernized until 2023 (Government of Slovakia 2017e). Besides being outfitted for the ISTAR role, these modernized vehicles are also usable as a „classic" IFVs. It is because the MoD plans for the ISTAR battalion to primarily use 4x4 vehicles, and the current modernized BPzVs are only a substitute so the unit could be up and running as soon as possible. After the ISTAR battalion is outfitted with 4x4, all the 35 (18 current, 17 future) vehicles will be used to re-arm one mechanized battalion of the 1st mechanized brigade. Since expected service life span of the modernized vehicles is 20 years, we can count to see them in the arsenal of the Armed Forces for years to come.
The basis of the modernization is the TURRA 30, which is becoming the mainstay of practically every new vehicle that the Slovak Armed Forces are procuring. The armament of the turret is 30mm 2A42 autocannon, PKT machine gun, and two anti-tank missiles 9M113
- 49 - Konkurs16. Inside, new communication systems and sensor were installed. The ability of the vehicle to swim was kept, which meant that there was no significant room for adding weight, which in turn resulted in lack of any armor upgrades. That means that protection level against projectiles stayed at the level 2 according to the STANAG 4569 standard, and the protection against mines at level 2a, with the main problem being the floor of the vehicle. Compared to for example Czech 8x8 IFV Pandur, it is at only about 55% ballistic protection. The engine stayed the same as in the original version. It is rated at 200kw, but the power to weight ratio is 16kw/t, which is on par with modern equivalents of this vehicle. However, in the end, that only means the lower weight thanks to less armor. This is slightly compensated for by usage of anti- blast chairs for both the crew and carried soldiers (Bednár 2017).
The problem is that 35 planned vehicles are nowhere near enough to re-equip three battalions of the 1st mechanized brigade, but the aim is to have them completely re-armed until 2030. Due to this, we can either expect modernization of more vehicles or procurement of new ones. We will talk about the possibilities in this are further down the road, after assessing the actual addition of the modernized BPzVs to the capabilities of the AF SR.
But still, if we take the current capability, it is much easier to analyze it, because at least partially it already exists, so there is much less room for speculation. Organizationally, this project is clear since it is exactly stated within which units these vehicles will be used. A bit more problematic is the doctrinal part since it is not clear at all which capabilities and battle roles will be in the future assigned to the tracked and 8x8 vehicles, respectively. For now though, if we focus only on the capability of the ISTAR battalion, it is clear and this project scores rather well. Also, infrastructure area is covered well, mainly thanks to the fact that the used vehicles are of a type with which the Slovak Armed Forces already have a lot of experience and maintain large capabilities for their service and maintenance. The newly installed systems also come from Slovak manufacturers, partially owned by the state.
From the point of view of policy, this project is again aimed at carrying out the goals set by the inter-Alliance agreement. The area of doctrine, which directly affects the area of materiel, are the two ones that at question here. For the doctrine, we can only say that it probably played little to no role in the decision to equip the unit that was in grave need of new vehicles.
16 During the transfer to mechanized battalion, these should be changed to a different type, probably Spike-LR (Bednár 2017).
- 50 - This decision was made on the basis of speed – it was just much faster to take vehicles which the Armed Forces already owned and overhaul them rapidly and stateside. It is without question good solution – but it has one significant BUT.
First of all, the vehicles that were delivered were delivered fast and had undergone a significant modernization. But they are still based on the old BMP-1 design, which dates to the 1950s, and significantly lacks behind its contemporary successors due to the design limitations. And this is not the only problem. What this means is that Slovak Armed Forces now have rather expensive and underperforming vehicles that they will be stuck with the foreseeable future. Even when the ISTAR battalion will be re-armed with 4x4 vehicles, as it is planned, modernized BPzVs will go to serve with different units. This project is essentially a wasted opportunity, with the would-be cure for this was just starting sooner and buying new vehicles that would be up to 21st century standards.
4.5. Anti-tank rocket weapon systems The next modernization project that the Long-term development plan deals with are anti- tank weapon systems. Anti-tank systems are designed to destroy moving or stationary targets. They are part of armored fighting vehicles and support weapon units (along with mortars, medium machine guns, etc.). The aim of this project is to arm the forces with anti-tank missile sets of the new generation and corresponding missile supplies. The result will be the achievement of the required capability of AF SR units in the field of the destruction of armored technology and objects (Government of Slovakia 2017e).
This project is of high importance because besides being a stand-alone weapon system, it is also used on tracked, 8x8 and 4x4 vehicles. The current mainstay of the AF SR in this category is the 9M113 Konkurs (NATO reporting name AT-5 Spandrel), a wire-guided anti- tank missile developed in the Soviet Union. It is being used both in the stand-alone role and on vehicles, including on modernized tracked BPzVs, where it is a part of the TURRA 30. Although this is still a useful piece in the arsenal, the problems with it are two-fold. First of all, the current system in the stocks come from the Cold War era, although some missiles were acquired later. This means that the weapon system as a whole will be nearing the end of its service life. The Konkurs missiles and corresponding launchers are still being made in Russian
- 51 - Federation and underwent upgrades, but here we come across the second problem – procuring new arms from Russia is simply out of the question for numerous reasons. 9M113 will, therefore, have to be replaced with a different system, preferably of a western origin. There are multiple weapon systems that could replace the 9M113, such as Israeli Spike rockets, used for example on Czech Pandur IFVs, or US-made FGM-148 Javelin in the dismounted role.
Konkurs is a compelling case when it comes to Slovak Armed Forces armaments – currently, it fulfills its mission without any significant shortcomings. It will also be a part of new and modernized vehicles due to it being used on the TURRA 30, itself being an interesting case due to using numerous legacy Russian weapons. However, it still will have to be replaced, which we will have to take into account while analyzing it using our methodology.
As of now, this project is in its very early stage, and since the first new systems should be introduced into the arsenal no sooner than 2024, we will probably not see any decision sooner than in four years from now. But in this case, we are not talking about acquiring any new capability, but rather replacement of older systems that will very likely reach the end of their service life. Of course, they will be replaced by more modern and probably bit more capable systems, but still, the difference is unlikely to be very substantial. The fact that this is something the Armed Forces already have allows us to at least look how the environment is prepared for receiving new systems during the overhaul.
Doctrinally, these systems are not something separate like for example howitzers, but they are organically distributed among the armed forces and are used in many. As we've stated above, AT missiles are used in a stand-alone configuration for example by infantry support platoons, but also as a part of the armament of different vehicles. This also reflects in the organization of units and their roles, especially in the case of support fire sections. In the case of infrastructure, there is not much to talk about – perhaps the only thing that might be a bit concerning is securing an adequate volume of ammunition and its distribution.
As we see, currently the system of choice for this role is 9M113, which was not dictated by the current policy (as this project is almost not impacted by the policy choices), but rather by the Warsaw pact legacy. Its use in the stand-alone configuration is logical – it was merely part of the armament already, and its use just continued. Choosing this system for the TURRA 30 is an entirely different question. On the first sight, picking of Konkurs for this role does not
- 52 - make much sense, since its adaptation to different ammunition is not as simple as with the 2A42 cannon. 9M113 does not have much perspective with the Slovak Armed Forces, so why buy more of it? It is an old weapon of non-Western provenience, which will very likely have to be replaced soon. The answer to this might be straightforward – the Armed Forces want to use just one system of this type, because of logistical simplifications when dealing with the ammunition. Unfortunately, we don't have many answers, only questions, such as if this project will also replace the newly acquired systems that will be part of the TURRA 30. If yes, it might be rather expensive, and that might make it unlikely. And if only the stand-alone systems are replaced, it will leave the Armed Forces with two completely different systems fulfilling a similar role. Nevertheless, not even the MoD itself now knows exactly how this project will continue.
4.6. Self-propelled 155mm howitzers Self-propelled artillery gained a renewed importance since Slovakia is the leading nation of European Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project Indirect Fire Support / EuroArtillery. Currently, Slovakia has sixteen ShKH vz. 2000 Zuzana self-propelled howitzers and this year (2018) should acquire eight pieces of ShKH Zuzana 2. The total number of howitzers is therefore planned to be 24 + 1 for training purposes, which means that Slovakia will be able to have three full artillery batteries. New howitzers should be acquired until 2025 according to the Long-term development plan. However, some sources from inside the MoD say that it could also be feasible to finish this until the year 2022 (Grohmann 2018).
Also, until the year 2025, the total number of howitzers including the 16 currently in use should be replaced by new Zuzana 2, with the probable main reason for this being the effort to push Zuzana 2 as part of the EuroArtillery project. However, this came under severe criticism from more than one reason. First of all, the current Zuzana vz. 2000 is one of the newest weapon systems in the Slovak arsenal, has a high capability when it comes to NATO interoperability, and is nowhere near the end of its service lifespan. The second reason is that despite being slightly more modern than the original Zuzana vz. 2000, the new Zuzana 2 is for the price not much of an improvement. Its advantage over the older system is mainly in the fact that it has only one operator in the cabin, which itself has better armor, and thanks to a slightly longer barrel, the effective range of fire is 41 kilometers. The main problem is that it might not be mobile enough to leave its position after firing the initial salvo to avoid being destroyed by
- 53 - counter-fire, plus it can fire only six rounds in the first minute or 16 shots in first three minutes. For example, the biggest competitor of this system, German PzH 2000 can fire three rounds in 9 seconds and 20 rounds in the first two minutes after assuming combat position. To avoid being destroyed by counter-fire, a self-propelled howitzer is supposed to fire as much ammunition towards the enemy, and in the circa 90 to 100 seconds after the first round, end firing and change its position for at least 300 meters. For Zuzana 2, it takes 20 seconds to end firing and about 40 seconds to move the required 300 m17. That leaves about 30-40 seconds for firing, during which Zuzana 2 can fire a maximum of 4 rounds (Bednár 2018). Due to this, the proposed price of 175 million EUR for 25 self-propelled howitzers does not seem to be justified. However, to be fair, we have to admit that both the original and the newer Zuzana systems have the Multiple Rounds, Simultaneous Impact capability. This means that one howitzer can hit the designated target with more than one round at the same time.
We have to analyze it from two points of view – of what it looks like now, with its current capability, and what it will look if carried out in the proposed future form. The paper outcome might look very good; however, much more problems can arise if we would try to analyze the project through the lens of financial profitableness.
What we need to take into the account is the fact that this project is defined by an important policy probably more than any other. Slovakia is the leading country in the PESCO EuroArtillery project, and the drive to replace all the existing Zuzana systems with newer Zuzana 2 stems out of this. It was pointed out numerous times by experts both within and outside of the ministry that there will be a strong push to have Zuzana 2 as a standard in the EuroArtillery project. Now, we can leave aside the technical side of the things – it is genuinely very complicated to judge whether Zuzana 2 is a good system, or something else might be better and more useful. Let's focus on the effort to replace the existing hardware with a newer system.
From the point of view of doctrine, organization, and policy (mainly Capability targets in this context), the third battery is a logical step forward. The need is clear, and the Armed Forces should not have any significant problem with achieving it if the corresponding equipment is
17 It takes around 3 to 6 second for enemy radars to pinpoint the place of origin of incoming artillery fire, about 10 additional seconds to pass the information to automated artillery command systems, further 30 seconds to prepare for firing. It takes around 50 seconds for a standard 155mm artillery shell to reach its target while 24 km away (Bednár 2018). During this time, the artillery piece has to fire as much ammunition, end firing, and move.
- 54 - acquired. The main problem lies somewhere else. It is a replacement of the existing 16 howitzers with newer ones, for a price of approx. 7 million EUR for one. However, as was pointed out (Bednár 2018), these new howitzers would not bring enough advantage for the price to be justified. It makes sense to equip the new, third battery with Zuzana 2 systems, but to replace the existing ones just because we want to promote this weapon system, is an outright waste of money. It would be different if the newer system would bring in very significant advantage, or the older one would not be compatible anymore, but neither of these is the case. Also, representatives of the MoD stated on numerous occasions that this is an opportunity for the Slovakian defense industry. This leaves us with the question – should the MoD spend vast amounts of money in the pursuit of promotion of a new weapon system? Yes, it's made by a state-owned company, and in the equipping of the third battery, it makes absolute sense to buy these systems. But spending additional money with little to no return value at all is not responsible. The only possible explanation is that if the state-owned Konštrukta Defence hopes to sell more of these systems, they need to start mass production, for which they need the initial customer. This makes sense, but still, there is no reason for this to be financed by public funds, especially if the Armed Forces also needs millions for other projects that now have very sub- par capabilities in comparison with the existing artillery.
The only positive outcome of this is the matter of easy infrastructure adaptation, since the Zuzana 2 need less personnel to operate, as is mostly compatible with the older systems in the matter of service and maintenance.
4.7. DELOSYS – Integrated artillery command, control, and reconnaissance systems Project solves system integration and modernization of combat command, automated arms management, artillery reconnaissance and training introduced of the artillery forces of the AF OS under the system called DELOSYS, including ALIGATOR 4x4 used for artillery reconnaissance, the 155mm Zuzana vz. 2000 self-propelled howitzer, RM 70/85 MODULAR rocket artillery, and the MARWIN meteorological station. This system will ensure fast and efficient use of the artillery in the Armed Forces and is fully interoperable with NATO systems (Government of Slovakia 2017e).
- 55 - It was first started to be integrated into the Armed Forces artillery units in 2012 (Glváč 2013), and the integration should further continue until 2022, with the costs between 2018 and 2022 being 7 million EUR (Government of Slovakia 2017e). This might seem to be not a significant sum of money compared to other projects, but its importance is highlighted by the fact that it will bring Slovak artillery forces into the 21st century, and further make them compatible with systems of NATO allies.
What we need to know about DELOSYS is that it is a complex system being developed by state-owned company KONŠTRUKTA Defence. It can collect information from forward observer posts and meteorological stations, relay them to battalion level command & control, which in turn can make a data-based decision, automatically calculate and process a firing solution, and transmit this information to artillery batteries, either conventional or rocket (KONŠTRUKTA Defence 2018).
This project gained additional importance after the introduction of the EuroArtillery PESCO project. It will be part of the newly procured Zuzana 2 systems and also part of modernization packages for the original Zuzana vz. 2000. But despite the political importance of the anything regarding the artillery, surprisingly little information about this system and the current levels of its implementation is available. However, with a certain (high) degree with probability, we can say that the same doctrinal and organizational means as with the abovementioned 155mm self-propelled howitzers apply. Similarly, it goes towards the areas of materiel and infrastructure too. It will be provided by state-owned KONŠTRUKTA Defence, which is also responsible for supplying the howitzers themselves. Therefore we can view these projects as complementary. What is positive is that this project is much less questionable in the aspect of its „value for money" and the advantage it brings to the forces.
4.8. Unmanned aerial vehicles for conventional forces The project deals with the procurement of tactical unmanned vehicle systems with a central control station. The result will be air and ground exploration capability (with emphasis on exploration in hard-to-reach areas) and provide the capability of imaging intelligence, where the current resources of the OS SR have limited capabilities or are not able to carry out exploratory tasks.
- 56 -
The only public knowledge regarding any UAVs used by Slovak army was the procurement of five Skylark LE-1 systems, which the MoD reluctantly admitted in 2009. Two of these systems produced by the Israeli company Elbit Systems were also apparently used to guide the Slovak-Ukrainian border, and the rest was primarily meant to be used within Special Forces during their foreign deployments (Milan 2009).
As of now (May 2018), the procurement of small drones for the special forces and guarding the border was the only project realized in this area. Therefore it does not make much sense to further take it as a modernization effort. The shape of the further development in this area is not yet clear, and the section responsible for the modernization projects disclosed to the author of this thesis in May 2018 that what will be done in this area will be determined by the request of the Air Forces of the Slovak Republic, and that the hardware to be procured in the future will be probably from different category than the drones already operated by the Armed Forces.
4.9. Communications and cyber systems In this sub-chapter, we will deal mainly with MOKYS (P3-2 in the Long-term development plan) – a mobile communication system that the Armed Forces has been in the process of deploying at least since 2005. We will also cover the problematics of cybersecurity in the Armed Forces and related issues.
In the past dozen years, MOKYS became somewhat of a legend in Slovakia. The original agreement for a NATO-compliant mobile communication system was signed between the MoD, and the winner of the tender, BAE Systems through Slovak company VÝVOJ Martin (now part of the MSM Group) worth 7 billion Slovak koruna (about 230 million EUR) was signed in 2005. The system is supposed to provide the communication capabilities at the command point and management of the subordinated units. The aim was to create a unified communication environment for the transmission of information in the form of voice, text, data, and images for a tactical level of command. The result of the project should be a communication system capable of supporting the command and control system of the armed forces in a national
- 57 - and multinational environment (SME.sk 2005, VÝVOJ Martin 2012, Government of Slovakia 2017e).
But, two years later, the tender started to be examined by anti-corruption unit of the Slovak Police and was also challenged by the second contender – French company Thales, who apparently made an offer for about 2 billion SKK less. One of the reasons for this project to be investigated were probably accusations towards BAE Systems of corruption, with the company being investigated in the UK, but also in Czech Republic (Vagovič 2007). Moreover, it was not clear what the proposed offsets, which made one of the advantages of the solution proposed by BAE Systems were, and the MoD was very reluctant to make the information about the project implementation public (Jančík 2007).
After some problems, including some logistical and rather funny ones18, the project was finished entirely and deployed by 2015. However, the deployed number of platforms does not apparently cover the needs of a whole brigade within which it is supposed to be used. For securing the need of one brigade, 72 platforms are needed, plus also the second brigade will have to be equipped. This is the reason why between the years 2018 and 2030, further 209,64 million EUR will be spent toward this system according to the Long-term development plan. Although it would be easy to judge a project that has been in the works for more than 13 years as a failure, during the analysis, we need to look at the bigger picture of current and also future capabilities.
Other projects besides MOKYS that fit into this category are P3-1 MILSEC, P3-3 Cybersecurity, P3-6 BKRS, and P3-7 BSVR.
Project MILSEC consists of a technical tool designed to create, process, view, store, print, and archive national classified information up to the „D” (secret) level and the implementation of encrypted communications. The technical means consists of an interconnected system within the communication network managed and operated under the conditions of the MoD. All information processed under the technical means is transmitted by the communication network of the MoD and technical means protected by national means of cryptographic protection,
18 For example, around 2011, it became apparent, that the mobile containers the system was based in, and which were supposed to be shuffled around on TATRAPAN armored heavy transport trucks, were in this configuration too high and would not fit under most of the bridges in Slovakia.
- 58 - certified by the National Security Office. MILSEC serves to integrate all classified capabilities of information and communication technologies to form a single entity. The MILSEC security domain will gradually integrate all services and applications designed to support combat, combat support and combat support service activities. Given this, it is necessary to ensure the long-term development of the MILSEC system (Government of Slovakia 2017e). This system is planned to cost 97,60 million EUR in years 2018-2030, so we can conclude that besides procurement of the needed technical equipment, these financial resources will also serve for use and maintenance. Unfortunately, there is not much-disclosed information about this project, and therefore it might be difficult to judge it in any way.
Similar goes for the next project on the list, P3-3 Cybersecurity, which the Long-term development plan defines as aiming to „ensure the cybersecurity of the critical infrastructure of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic to ensure competence in the field of cybersecurity, and the defense of its networks in cyberspace... As a result, infrastructure equipment will be protected by active security features and antivirus protection in cybersecurity, to restore security infrastructure to provide adequate protection against new security threats in the critical infrastructure area…” (Government of Slovakia 2017e). As we can see, this is a rather broadly defined project, which will consume 26 million EUR out of the defense budget in the years 2018 to 2026. Essentially, what is covers is an upgrade of IT network of the MoD and the Armed Forces to a contemporary level of cybersecurity. There is not much more that can be said in this regard, besides saying that it is a good thing that the MoD takes the aspect of cyber threats (presumably) seriously. However, not much more about the whole aspect of cyber defense was made public, which is because most of the information about this project belongs to the category of „secret" and cannot be disclosed to persons without a security clearance. This was disclosed to the author on two occasions – both by MoD and AF SR personnel.
Projects P3-6 BKRS (Bojový komunikačný rádiový system) Combat communication radio system and P3-7 BSVR (Brigádny system velenia a riadenia) Brigade command and control system are essentially communication and information systems aimed to secure both inter-force and NATO-interoperable exchange of information and data in combat. They will be implemented between 2018 and 2025 at a total cost of 173 million EUR (Government of Slovakia 2017e). Due to their nature they are also considered secret and until any information
- 59 - is disclosed on at least what kind of technology and hardware will be used – and it was yet not – it is nearly impossible to asses them thoroughly.
Out of this section, only the MOKYS project can be analyzed by the proposed method. It is the only project about which we can gather information to a certain degree, while the rest is carried out in a strictly classified regime and the only information that can be accessed about them comes from the Long-term development plan.
Doctrinally and organizationally, MOKYS has been counted with for a long time, and there are no significant deficiencies. The initial policy decision to implement a system such as this was made a long time ago, and from the start, policy dictated mainly the need for interoperability. However, there are numerous infrastructural and material-wise failures, which we've pointed out above and whose roots we can to a certain degree find mainly in some flawed policy decisions. Firstly, the project continued despite them – which could be understood, because, at a certain point, it becomes too complicated and too costly to simply „pull out." Of course, initial mistakes can be solved in later stages, but if we follow the timeline of this project, we can see that this is was not the case. Not only is the project still unfinished, 13 years after it started, and roughly half of the Armed Forces is „not connected," but its further implementation will cost more than 200 million EUR. To some extent, we could argue that this project is just too big and too complicated to go without issues, but in this case, these issues were just too prevalent and too costly. But since it was decided – to be fair, understandably – that this project just had to continue, we arrive at another problem – later failures along the line of development and implementation.
Since these were not policy decisions anymore – and the decision to abandon the project and start something new would be arguably even worse – we arrive at a realm of a different set of problems, regarding the areas of infrastructure and materiel. These were not caused by the Armed Forces of the MoD, but they are the ones that will ultimately have to deal with them. There is not much to add to this analysis besides the issues we have described above, and to underline the fact that the materiel and infrastructure issues are still present, and will not be entirely fixed anytime soon – if only because of the part of the Armed Forces still not being equipped. There is no doubt that once – and it is tempting to add if – this project will significantly add to the capabilities of the Armed Forces.
- 60 - The problem is, even if we judge the future capability, as we could have done with some projects described above, in here, it is much more problematic. Any systems that are based on information technologies age significantly faster than „traditional” military hardware such as rifles or vehicles. One cannot merely procure information technologies in the same way as for example tanks, the service life of which is usually planned for decades. IT sector progresses so fast that in the moment of buying one system, it is probably already obsolete. If we extrapolate this to the MOKYS system, the problem reveals itself. It is a system originally from 2005, and it is not even yet fully implemented. Even if the system was projected as variable and upgradable, by 2030 when it is supposed to be completely implemented, the whole architecture will be 25 (!) years old. Even by now, it is partially obsolete – since 2005, the standards and procedures of battlefield communication, it's encryption, distribution, ways of use and processing changed significantly.
As with every weapon system, it can only be upgraded to a certain point before it needs to be replaced by something that is on more contemporary standards. With IT systems – and therefore MOKYS – this is especially true. The Armed Forces are still planning to invest a significant amount of money into a project that due to initial failures has not yet achieved full operation capacities. At the same time, it becomes evident that instead of that, they should be already focusing their effort on looking for its future replacement. By the time this project will reach full operability, it will already be in need of replacing. That will make it a problem that our future selves will have to solve. Now it can only serve as a textbook example of how modernization projects should not be carried out and how problematic the IT procurement can become in the military.
4.10. Radars Currently, the Slovak airspace is guided by a set of P-37 radars of Soviet origin, which were upgraded to a level which makes them a counterpart to the modernized Russian version designated 1L117. It was modernized in the first decade of the 2000s by Slovakian company LOBB, while Russian company LEMZ, the manufacturer of the 1L117 version supplied most of the needed components. IFF (identification friend or foe) system MSR2000 was provided by EADS and is fully compatible with NATO standards and systems (Válka.cz 2015a). However, there are two problems with these modernized radars: they are almost at the end of the service
- 61 - life span, which was on some occasions even declared as ending between years 2013 and 2016, and is it no longer feasible to service them or further modernized them since the needed parts would have to come from Russia.
There is, therefore, a need to replace them as soon as possible, because, besides the capability already being lowered by the use of technically outdated systems, there is also a risk of losing it altogether. Due to this, it was decided in early 2015 to procure new, modern 3D radar systems. In April 2015, there was an „Industry Day," during which the ministry announced what it seeks and eight companies presented their products, and the call for bids was opened about a month later (MoD of Slovakia 2015). The plan was to buy three 3D radars for about 60 million EUR with an option of possible one more. However, this competition was closed three years later, in early 2018, without choosing a winner. This was supposedly because the producers were not able to present qualified offers that could enter the competition. Consequently, the ministry decided and through the Minister made public that it will start the competition again and seek a Government-to-Government offer (TREND 2018). Also, in line with the Long-term development plan, the ministry changed what it seeks. In projects P2-4 3D Radar – medium range, P2-5 3D Radar small range, and P2-10 3D Radar – short range, the Ministry plans to buy equipment for 76; 65,09 and 14 million EUR, respectively, totaling 155,09 million EUR. The medium range radars will be procured during years 2018 to 2030, small range between 2018 and 2025 and short-range radars between 2019 and 2022. Also, during this time, new radars for the military airport will be procured. Between 2019 and 2022, three radars that will replace the aging Soviet/Russian RL-4AM and RP-4AM will be acquired for the total price of 18 million EUR. Judging by the number, these radars should be used for air traffic control on three key military airports in Slovakia – Kuchyňa Air Force Base (transport wing), Sliač Air Force base (tactical wing), and the Prešov Air Force Base (helicopter wing) (Government of Slovakia 2017e).
In the aspect of doctrines and organization, there is not much to add to the description of this project, since the way the different kinds of radars are used is already clear. In this capability, not much new will be added, and only the essentials will be modernized. Also, the only policy that influences this project in any way is the push to get rid of Soviet/Russian technologies that is dictated politically. Infrastructure is also in place, and the technology will be replaced 1:1. The current hardware that is in place can fulfill the needed capability to a certain extent but is very much limited by its age and limited means of interoperability with
- 62 - newer systems. Because the process of choosing and acquiring their replacements is only in the beginning, any further analysis would be more of a speculation. Therefore, in the span of this thesis, we will not indulge in it.
4.11. Electronic reconnaissance systems The electronic reconnaissance complex constitutes the project P3-10 and is designed to perform radio-electronic exploration of aerial and terrestrial targets. The project deals with the replacement of obsolete radio-electronic research systems of armed forces. The result of the project will be the ability to perform a radio-electronic survey in line with the requirements of the Armed Forces and NATO standards. This project should be carried out between 2018 and 2020 for total 25 million EUR.
Unfortunately, this project is done in a classified regime, and there is therefore little to none chance to analyze it outside of speculations that would be of very limited use, especially for this thesis.
4.12. Air Force communication system VCS 3020 This project aims to replace the PS 2000 voice communication system introduced between 1997 and 1999. The project will result in the take over the PS 2000 system functionality and will integrate ground-to-air and air-to-air communications into a single voice communication system of the Slovak Air Force, which will provide a basic data-based communication environment for Command and Control Support in the Emergency and Integrated NATO Air Missile Defense and Missile Defense Systems, and will ensure coordination with civil aviation (Government of Slovakia 2017e). It should be implemented between 2018 and 2026 for a price of 30,60 million EUR for the whole system.
Full name of the system which will be implemented is VCS3020X, it is made by Austrian company Frequentis and is a secure Voice-over-IP system compatible with NATO standards (Frequentis 2018). Due to very limited knowledge about this project, it is not very possible to make any further analysis. The author was provided with information that this project is in the state of elaboration about its implementation as of May 2018.
- 63 - 4.13. Multipurpose tactical planes All-purpose tactical aircraft are designed to ensure the inviolability of the national airspace and operate in NATO's integrated air defense and anti-missile defense system. The project is in its preparatory stage, and it aims to replace the MiG-29 fighter jets for new multi- purpose tactical aircraft compatible with NATO armament (Government of Slovakia 2017e).
This project has a long history and has been under tense scrutiny from both the community of security professionals and due to relatively significant medialization also from the broad public. MiG-29, a twin-engine multipurpose tactical plane constitutes the backbone of the Slovak Air Force since its creation in 1993. Before 1993, the Czechoslovak Air Forces received 18 MiG-29A and two MiG-29UB two-seater version from the Soviet Union during 1989. They were divided differently than by the 2:1 principle, but rather 1:1, which means that initially, Slovakia got nine „normal" planes plus one two-seater. After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia also inherited part of the debt that the Soviet Union, and later as a successor state Russian Federation, had against Czechoslovakia. Part of this debt was paid off in the 1990s in the form of planes, and in two batches Slovakia received in total 12 MiG-29A and two MiG-29UB19. Including the machines received during the split and later from the debt pay-offs, Slovakia had 21 one-seaters and three two-seaters. Two crashed in 2002; one had a fatal engine fire. After becoming a NATO member, it was needed to bring the planes up to NATO standards, and therefore modernize them. This was done between 2005 and 2006 in state-owned company Letecké opravovne Trenčín, with parts supplied by both Mikoyan- Guryevich itself, who continued the development of the plane, and various western manufacturers. Planes received compatible IFF modules, avionics and communication systems, which enabled them to be a part of NATINAMDS (NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System). Twelve modernized jets, ten one-seaters with new designation MiG-29AS and two two-seaters with new designations MiG-29UBS were formally accepted into service on 29th February 2008.
However, even during the times of ongoing modernization, it was apparent that MiG-29s will not be able to serve in the Slovak Air Force forever. Slowly, numerous problems surfaced. First of all, on numerous occasions, it was reported that there is a shortage of spare parts and that not all required planes can be kept ready at all times. There was also a problem of cost per
19 Also, in 1998, as part of these pay-offs, Slovakia also received one Tupolev Tu-154M.
- 64 - flight hour and our pilots not logging enough flight hours per year, one reason being high costs of flying and maintenance. Also, due to the nature of the technology and various agreements, Russian technicians dealing with the maintenance of the planes have to be kept at the Sliač Air Base – a NATO base – at all times20, which is a very delicate matter. Also, after the introduction of sanctions against the Russian Federation – and also some Russian counter-sanctions – numerous parts, including the Klimov RD-33 turbofan engines can no longer be obtained. Although it was thought that the modernized MiGs might remain in use as far as 2035 thanks to the fact that the chassis of the plane was projected for 40 years life span, this is no longer the case, and their replacement has been in the works for quite some time now.
The first option on the table was Saab JAS 39 Gripen, plane currently used by two neighbors of Slovakia – Czech Republic and Hungary. First government-to-government negotiations between Slovakia and Sweden, where Gripens are manufactured, started in January 2014. During 2015 and 2016, it was decided that Gripens will be the new replacement for MiGs (Government of Slovakia 2016a, 2016b). What was perceived as a done deal suddenly changed after the elections in 2016, when the Ministry of Defense came under the control of the Slovak National Party. A new option arose – procurement of American F-16s, a legendary plane manufactured by Lockheed Martin. It was considered as an option once before, but was deemed too expensive in comparison to Gripen and was ruled out immediately after the beginning of the negotiations. Even the U.S. Embassy, which often becomes involved in arms trading, generally as a facilitator of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program deals was said to „not care," as long as Slovakia will buy any airplanes of western provenience as a substitute to the MiGs (Petrovič 2018).
MoD declared that both options are currently being considered, with the U.S. government pre-approving a sale of fourteen F-16 Block 70/72 V for approx. 2,91 billion USD21 including accessories, training, and service. What might become a little bit problematic is the fact that
20 It was disclosed to the author by ranking personnel at this base, that despite „having correct working relationship" (with the Russians, who are actually hired through a Slovak company), they are not very happy about it. Perhaps a little bit ironically, Russian flag hangs at the flagpole inside the Sliač Air Base right next to the Slovak and NATO one. 21 This sum is likely to be more than the actual sale would be, but the U.S. State Department, which gives the proposal, needs to seek the approval of Congress. If the sum would be less, it is generally considered okay, but in the case, the deal would, in the end, cost more, the State Department would need to get the Congress to re-approve. Also, it is highly unlikely that Slovakia would buy the F-16s with all the offered accessories, such as GBU-38 GPS-guided bombs.
- 65 - neither the Gripen nor the F-16 are currently being manufactured. Manufacturing of the F-16 stopped in 2016, is now being moved, and when it is restarted, first newly made planes of the most modern Block 70/72 V configuration will be delivered to Bahrain. That means that Slovakia would be able to receive the first planes no sooner than 2022. On the other hand, Saab, the manufacturer of Gripen declares that they would be able to deliver the planes about two years after signing the agreement (Šnídl 2018a, Šnídl 2018b, Kominek 2018, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2018).
What is essential in this case is the fact that even if the Swedish planes would be received sooner and at a lower price, they are essentially very different planes. The reason for that is the version of Gripen being considered is the C/D one, which is also used by Czech Republic, Hungary, and is currently being bought by Bulgaria. Although this fact is hard to use as an argument for the Gripen, since the defense cooperation even between the V4 countries is extremely limited, and so far, it did not bring any real project, much less an actual outcome, outside of some common exercises. Plus, this is an old version, which even at the time of Slovakia receiving the planes let's say in 2020 or 2021 would be obsolete. Production of the newer Gripen E/F version started only in 2017, and not even the Swedish Air Force, as a core customer, is receiving them. On the other hand, F-16 Block 70/72 V is a much modern machine, also incorporating technology developed as a part of the F-35 program. By getting these planes, Slovakia would be buying the next best thing to the Generation 5 jetfighters, which are otherwise entirely out of reach of the Slovak Air Force for at least next few decades.
Getting more modern planes, even if it is for a higher price, makes more sense than getting something that could be considered outdated even at the time of the purchase. This might be a matter of debate, and it seems to come down to economics. One aspect favors the Gripen – the cost of use, which is lower than with the F-16. However, the author argues, that the higher price of more modern planes will be paid off in the long run. They could theoretically serve in the Slovak Air Force for at least next 30 years, with a mild mid-life modernization. However, Gripen C/D or any older generation of F-16 or comparable aircraft would not have any significant advantage considering the price it would cost. Essentially, for a very high price, Slovakia would be obtaining planes that do not bring to the table much more than the current MiGs (perhaps except some improved air-to-ground capabilities), besides the lower costs of use and maintenance. No later than ten years after their procurement, these planes would have to undergo a significant modernization. It would further up the costs that might now seem to be
- 66 - lower and therefore preferable. That would be the worst trade deal in the history of trade deals, maybe ever.
Even if we would decide tomorrow what planes to get, the problem of maintaining and using the MiGs for a few more years remains. The MoD has an agreement with Russian companies until the end of 2019. The cost per year of maintaining the fleet of MiGs is about 30 to 50 million EUR a year. This goes partially to Slovak intermediaries and directly to Russian Aircraft Corporation MiG, but the agreements are kept secret. Prolonging the contracts would mean that about 200 to 250 million EUR is very dubiously spent without any public oversight (Šnídl 2018a, Šnídl 2018b).
But there would be a possible solution even to this. Poland also uses modernized MiG- 29, which besides buying them pre-1989, they also obtained from the Czech Republic in the 1990s and as recent as 2003 further received planes from Germany. They also have large stocks of spare parts, service capacities, etc. In authors opinion, servicing the Slovakian MiGs in Poland would be only a matter of political will. Business was even done in this area before – Polish pilots often come to Slovakia to train on MiG-29 simulators at Sliač Air Force Base. Another option would be Ukraine – it is also our neighbor, and although not a NATO member, it is our at least declaratory ally who happens to have a sizeable MiG-29 fleet, stocks of and even capabilities to manufacture new spare parts. And after Slovakia receives new planes, Ukraine might also be interested in buying off Slovakian MiGs, perhaps in exchange for other military goods – besides Russia, Ukraine is the only country which manufactures Konkurs anti- tank missiles which will be used on the aforementioned TURRA 30, and 30mm ammunition to its 2A42 cannon.
As we can see, this is a rather complicated project that needs careful analysis. First of all, let's start with policy, taken mainly out of the current White Paper since the Air Force Development Concept from 2014 has not been made public. The current policy dictates that the planes will be replaced by a single-engine (nothing else was really ever considered) type from a Western manufacturer, with one of the most critical aspects taken into account being cost for the plane themselves but also for service, maintenance, and use. This limits the aircraft that can be used to the types mentioned above (F-16, JAS-39 Gripen, and surplus Mirage 2000), but it does not limit the abilities that the planes should have. Instead, here we have a rather broad area of possibilities. This will also hugely influence the outcome of the project, and therefore it is
- 67 - extremely important to choose wisely. And that choice must be dictated by doctrine, which is unfortunately lacking.
First, let us backtrack a little to the policy issues, which have so far dictated also the use of the current fleet of MiGs. In the time of their upgrades, this was by far the most reasonable option. Although the MiG-29 has some downsides, as it is a rather older plane and some of the shortcomings have been only addressed in the newer versions, when compared to the „western" jets of similar configuration and era, such as the F-18 Hornet, it is in many aspects even better. But what is – or rather, also was – something that was not done as it should have been is choosing its future replacement. At the time when Slovak Air Force was receiving the upgraded MiGs, in 2008, newer JAS-39 was already used by the Czech Republic for three years. At the time the upgrade went through, its replacement should have been previously chosen, with the limitations of MiGs taken into account. At that time, the additional cost would not have been significant (as we know that at that time, the AF SR were under a rather big budget constrains), but we would have avoided the situation that the pressure to replace the MiGs is bigger and bigger, and there is no replacement in sight. This is, unfortunately, a policy failure.
Getting back to the doctrinal issues, what is the main problem now is the lack of precise definition of what for the new planes should be used for. The anti-air defense role is perhaps the only one clear, besides basic air policing, etc. Other than that, not much is defined – as for example electronic warfare means, and mainly anti-ground capabilities. For example, in the package offered to Slovakia by the U.S. State Department, also advanced anti-ground capabilities are offered. But the question is, do we really need them? And if yes, at what price are we willing to get them?
The author of this thesis argues that anti-ground abilities should be included, but only to a limited extent. It is highly unlikely that Slovak planes would be used in a direct anti-ground combat role, and for ground fire support, there are much better and especially cheaper alternatives. Sure enough, some anti-ground capability should be present, but the question of what exactly needs to be deeply analyzed. It was stated before on a few occasions by some Air Force officials that there is no need for direct anti-ground capabilities, but it was never clearly said why. Especially when direct air-to-air use is rather unlikely, and there is no plan to procure planes which the main role would be air superiority. The lack of the clear direction in which
- 68 - the doctrine of use of supersonic tactical airplanes should go could result in further problems in the procurement process and lead to rising costs, delays, or other problems.
If this is not taken care of, any evaluation of the possibilities in the areas of materiel and infrastructure will again fall back to speculations, and the resulting decisions might become unsatisfying and unnecessarily expensive. We have covered the material possibilities in this subchapter, and the only thing that is necessary to add is that the specific decision should be made only after the doctrinal decisions are made.
As of May 2018, the Slovak government is negotiation prolonging the agreements for the service and maintenance with Russian companies after the end of 2019, when the current contracts will run out. This indicates the will to use MiGs as long as possible, which will be needed since the replacement is nowhere in sight. The representatives of the MoD are also publicly leaning towards the procurement of F-16s. There is no (at least not yet, and it is again a failure stemming out of the lack of clearly stated purpose) objection to had to be against this. But prolonging the service agreements is a problem, and as we've indicated before, there would be more than one possible workarounds for this. Since the deals are going through Slovak intermediaries, this opens too much space for possible speculations about these agreements being lucrative for people and companies close to the Slovak National Party, and that the drive behind the inclination toward the F-16s really has to do with a tendency to prolong these agreements for as long as possible.
Perhaps the only thing that is as clear as possible is the question of organization. New planes would simply go to the General Otto Smik Tactical Air Wing based at Sliač Air Force Base which now uses the MiGs.
4.14. Transport planes This project, which is in the Long-term plan under the number P2-1, is already almost finished. It aims to entirely replace the aged Antonov An-24 and An-26 as providers of the transport capabilities for the Slovak Air Force. These aircraft were replaced by C-27J Spartan, with the first plane arriving in Slovakia in 2017 and the second one in April 2018. Besides being able to transport cargo, these turboprop airplanes are also able to transport up to 60 persons as
- 69 - far as 4000 km (Government of Slovakia 2017e, Dopravné krídlo generála M. R. Štefánika 2018).
However, as far as this project might seem to be very straightforward and solved, it had a rather interesting past. Since the establishment of the independent Slovak Air Force, the backbone of its transport capabilities was composed of different types of Soviet/Ukrainian Antonovs – An-12, An-24, and An-26. But since 1993, it was clear that all the Antonovs will have to be replaced sooner or later. An-12 left the service in 1999, and An-24 in 2006. Slovakia had two An-24s, and one was destroyed in what is considered the biggest disaster in the modern Slovak military history. On 19th January 2006, it crashed near Slovak-Hungarian border during a flight from Kosovo, killing all but one person aboard. After this crash, which cost lives of 42 people, the other An-24 was grounded. Both Antonov An-26B-100, which were re-configured to fill out MEDEVAC roles, were also taken out of service, one in 2010 and one in 2016.
The problems of Slovak Air Force with transport planes became painfully apparent after the crash of one An-24 and grounding of the other one, and the MoD issued a call for proposals for a medium tactical transport airplane. The competition was won by Italian company Alenia Aeronautica (now Leonardo), and an agreement was signed in 2008. However, the deal was almost immediately scraped because of a very prosaic reason – lack of funds. The whole budget of the state and consequently the defense budget were severely hit after the 2007 crisis and the MoD realized it just does not have enough funds to buy even two new planes, plus the budget allocated for the air forces was already drained because of the modernization of MiGs. The procurement was put to ice for nearly a decade and restarted only in 2016.
Nevertheless, by April 2018, Slovak Air Force already had two new C-27Js. Of course, there were voices especially from within the military itself that „something bigger" might have been bought – such as the legendary C-130 Hercules or newer Airbus A400. But even if many would like to see bigger airplanes with the markings of Slovak Air Force, the voice of reason won. First of all, Slovakia does not have money to procure, not even mentioning maintenance and usage costs, planes from the C-130/A400 category. And they are simply not needed for what we need to use them for, plus, if there is a need to use a bigger plane, there is an option to exchange flight hours of our planes for flight hours of basically any plane that is part of the NATO/EU European Air Transport Command ATARES program. However, what is generally
- 70 - agreed upon is that two planes might not be enough, at least in the long term, and Slovakia should consider purchasing two more.
Despite the significant delay, this project is so far one of the more successful ones, with only one questionable policy decision, to which we will get later. Doctrinal and organizational means were in this case rather clear – Slovak Armed Forces need certain air transportation capabilities, that were previously handled by Antonovs. After they became obsolete, they have been replaced, and the capability continues. Much of the older infrastructure is still in use, more complicated maintenance will be carried out externally, and only now there is the talk of possible modernization of some of the airport equipment the Air Forces use.
Materiel-wise, we have already explained in the previous paragraph why the choice of C- 27Js makes sense, with the only reservation being perhaps the fact that the MoD should be already working on the way to secure purchasing of more planes. Now for the policy aspect. One weird political decision was made regarding the procurement of Spartans. The agreement between Slovak government and the manufacturer of the planes was signed in 2014 and then made confidential, citing „business secret." That meant that there is no way for the public to know what the agreement for 100 million EUR includes. As of now, the decision of the MoD was overturned by the court after one activist decided to sue (Šnídl 2017c), but the MoD did not yet comply. Problem with behavior such as this is that it severely undermines the trustworthiness of the Ministry, especially for the future procurements that will be even more expensive.
4.15. Training planes This project addresses the replacement of L-39 training aircraft for new training aircraft. By an assessment of the current planes by the aircraft’s manufacturer, Aero Vodochody, the possibilities of prolonging their technical life will be evaluated. Based on the findings of the analysis, a proposal for a solution of the future of training aircraft will be developed by the end of 2018. The result of the project will be to ensure the ability to perform training tasks (Government of Slovakia 2018e).
- 71 - The current plane type that fulfills the training role in the Slovak Air Force is the legendary L-39 Albatros, which is a backbone of many training fleets around the world. This plane was made since the late 1960s up until 1996. Currently, Slovakia owns eight planes in „flyable" state, three of them being the L-39ZAM version capable of light attack and air-to- ground fire support. They were made between 1972 and 1989, and have undergone a throughout modernization. Nevertheless, due to their physical age and number of flight hours, all of them will have to be retired no later than 2020. If they have to be retired before the replacement is found, this might create a significant gap in the readiness of the Slovak Air Force's tactical wing. Since all of the pilots have to log a certain amount of flight hours per year to remain certified, it might end up being very uneconomical if this has to be in the „main" tactical planes (at this time, still MiGs) and put a further strain on already very busy and at the same time problematic planes. Even if the MiGs are replaced by a newer aircraft, several reasons to operate training planes will remain (economic, logistical, etc.)
Even if there is a slight possibility to prolong the lifespan of some the current modernized L-39s, sooner or later their service lifespan will end, and they will have to be replaced. Unfortunately, the Long-term development plan does not specify how much planes the Slovak Air Force needs to have to maintain its capabilities and readiness, between 2020 and 2025 there should be altogether 100 million EUR allocated towards this project. Possible replacements for the L-39 might even come from the same manufacturer, Czech company Aero Vodochody, owned by one of the biggest Slovak financial conglomerates – Penta Investments. Although Slovak MoD already has a relationship with another successful manufacturer of training aircraft, Alenia Aermacchi, thanks to the procurement of C-27Js, it would be no surprise if the Czech planes would be chosen. Aero Vodochody might offer two types – either the newer L- 159 ALCA, which has already proven itself with the Czech Air Force or L-39NG (New Generation), which is a further development of the L-39 itself. From the military perspective, both planes would be a worthy successor of the current fleet of Albatrosses. The company has a little struggle with gaining a significant export success of the L-159, but at the same time, it is also one of the few planes of this category that was already also deployed in combat, in this case with Iraqi Air Force (Government of Slovakia 2018e, Aero Vodochody 2018).
Unfortunately, since it is not clear how much planes will the Slovak Air Force be needing, and the fact that the price that Aero Vodochody or any other manufacturer would be able to offer is not known, it is rather difficult to assess this project thoroughly. To the request for
- 72 - information about what would Aero be able to offer to the Slovak Air Force for the planned price, the company did not unfortunately respond.
The situation with trainers is, in general, very similar to what we can see with the supersonic tactical aircraft. There is one key difference though – keeping the current fleet of L- 39 does not carry any political disadvantages. Therefore, there is no big policy issue that we might consider as negative. At the same time, if the procurement of new planes or upgrade of the current will be done transparently and cleverly, we do not have to expect any significant problems. On the other hand, there is one doctrinal issue that should be solved before any upgrades or buys of new planes happen. The Air Force needs to decide which capabilities it will want the planes of the category in question to have in the future – and we can bluntly say that it would be a wasted opportunity if they decided for them to serve only the purpose of training. As the example of Czech L-159 shows, which has seven hardpoints and can be equipped with double-barreled 20mm cannon, or a variety of rockets and bombs, which are handy for other roles than training. It can fly low and slow, therefore might serve in the ground fire support role, which the Slovak Air Force now lacks and the only other aircraft that might be able to fill this role are helicopters. Whether the Armed Forces will pursue this ability is not yet clear.
The organization also has no reason to change, infrastructure is already in place, and other things like maintenance capabilities will be upgraded along with the planes themselves. The only question that remains to be solved is the issue of material, possibilities to which we have already outlined in the previous paragraphs.
4.16. Multipurpose helicopters In 1993, the Slovakian Army was beginning with impressive 62 helicopters. But in the next years, this number rapidly went down. In 2006, when the first development plan was presented (Model 2015), MoD was planning for the Air Force to have 15 multipurpose helicopters and four training ones. They were not expecting to sustain the gunship/attack capabilities that the Slovak Air Force had in the form of Mil Mi-24. Strategic evaluation of defense, that was accepted in 2011 as a first „white paper" established that all of the Mi-17s, which was the main type of a helicopter used by the Slovak Air Force, would be used until the
- 73 - end of their service lifespan, which for the last of them was supposed to end in 2016. This should have given the MoD the needed time to find a sufficient successor. The White paper published and accepted in 2013 reflected the need to renew the multipurpose helicopters used mainly for transportation but was also counting with limited air-to-ground attack and ground forces support capabilities. These were provided by a fleet of Mi-24s that were retired in 2011. (Government of Slovakia 2017e, SSPI 2016).
However, the combat capabilities were reduced to „weapons modules for multipurpose helicopters" in the next White paper (2016), but by that time, two important steps were made. It was defined that the Air Force will be needing 18 multipurpose helicopters of different types, including ones for performing training tasks and four machines that can be dedicated to the State's Search and Rescue service, and also be used to other internal functions such as guarding the border, crisis management, and humanitarian reliefs. Another important thing was that the decision to buy nine UH-60M Black Hawks was made by that time (Government of Slovakia 2017e, SSPI 2016).
In January 2015, the MoD informed the public that they were offered a proposal for deal on an undisclosed number of Sikorsky UH-60M Black Hawk, the main workhorse of the U.S. Army Aviation, directly from the United States through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program. The deal was approved by the Slovak government in April 2015, and it was made clear that 9 helicopters + accessories such as service capabilities, training etc. for 261 million USD will be procured (Government of Slovakia 2016e, SSPI 2016). First two helicopters arrived in Slovakia in summer 2017, further two should be received in summer 2018 and the last five in 2019. This constitutes the half of what the MoD plans to procure. Also, at least until significant numbers of 4x4 and 8x8 vehicles will be bought, this presents to the biggest modernization effort of the AF SR up to date. According to the current Long-term development plan, paying for these should be divided into installments that the MoD will be paying off until 2024. Also, the White paper states that between 2018 and 2020, in Phase 1, procurement of weapons and other modules should start, and will conclude in Phase 2 (Government of Slovakia 2016a). The Long-term development plan further states that this will consist of four weapon modules mainly meant for the self-defense of the helicopter (Government of Slovakia 2017e). This also means that, at least for now, these helicopters will be lacking any significant air-to- ground capabilities.
- 74 - In April 2017, solution for what to do about the remaining need for further nine helicopters was said to be decided. For the price of about 150 million USD, nine Bell 429 GlobalRanger helicopters should be purchased, again through the FMS program. This would go in line with the project for light multipurpose helicopters, which is in the Long-term development plan under designation P2-8, and 129 million EUR is allocated for it (Malyasov 2017, Government of Slovakia 2017e). It would be no surprise since it was presented as one of the best possible solutions at least since 2016 (SSPI 2016). However, according to information presented to the author by the MoD officials in May 2018, this project is now not being solved.
As we’ve mentioned earlier, the helicopters are up to today one of the biggest and most important modernization projects that are underway within the Armed Forces. Even despite the significant shortcomings, such as the lack of armaments and anti-ground abilities for the Black Hawks, both helicopter projects will add significantly to the capabilities of the Armed Forces.
Especially the procurement of the Black Hawks was a policy decision – as any deal that is done through the Foreign Military Sales program has to be. Although some of the critics of the agreement voiced their concern, the need of the Armed Forces for a fleet of modern helicopters is without question. Therefore, this decision was good, but some of its implications might be a bit troubling. Mainly the fact that these helicopters were not only expensive themselves, but are also not exactly cheap to use and maintain, and were bought without any specialized equipment signals that this deal has some flaws. Of course, this equipment can be purchased later, and the Long-term development plan counts with it. The only issue that remains is how are the armed forces going to allocate funds to keep this helicopters in the air.
One of the reasons for why the helicopters might have been bought without some specialized equipment is the fact that the Air Force simply did not know what roles exactly it wants these machines to fill. That is a problem on the side of doctrines that is not yet fully solved and will need to be addressed clearly. Only then a thoughtful decision on what kind of equipment for the helicopters can be procured can be made.
Also, doctrine should partially dictate what kind of machines will serve beside the Black Hawks in other roles. We have stated before that the MoD plans to complement the fleet with smaller helicopters, however, as we've mentioned previously, this project is stopped at the moment. On the other hand, buying also a certain number of smaller helicopters would make
- 75 - sense – the Black Hawks are merely unnecessarily powerful and expensive to operate to be used for some of the smaller roles, such as parts of the rescue system. The question of the materiel is nowadays solved kind of in half – when all the UH-60s will be present, still only half of the job will be done. But even if that is not very positive, we can conclude that this project has been up to now at least partially successful and constitutes one of the most important modernization efforts carried out within the Slovak Armed Forces.
4.17. Air Defense modernization Modernization of the air defenses will be carried out in five separate projects – P4-3 mid- range anti-aircraft rocket weapon systems, P4-4 short-range anti-aircraft rocket weapon systems, P3-11 LLAPI system, P3-12 SAMOC + GOC systems, and P3-13 ASTRA PVO (Government of Slovakia 2017e).
Mid-range anti-aircraft weapon systems project deals with the prospect of either replacing or modernizing the current Slovak main anti-aircraft weapon – one battery of Soviet-made S- 300 PMU missile system. It was delivered to Czechoslovakia in 1987, and Slovakia inherited it during the split. Although it is still one of the most-dependable weapon systems that Slovakia possesses, and in the regional context a true rarity22, its service life will be coming to an end soon. Slovakia, therefore, has to choose whether to modernize it, replace it, or get rid of missile air defense capabilities altogether. The latter variant does not seem to be the future course of action, since in the Long-term development plans, years 2018 to 2020 should be dedicated for the preparation of project (Phase 1 in the White paper), which will be consequently carried out during the period of 2021 to 2030 (Phase 2), with planned financial expenses being noteworthy sum of almost 605 million EUR. Analysis of this project might be a little bit complicated because no decision has been taken yet.
Short-range anti-aircraft weapon systems project will be solving possible replacements of 4 batteries of 2K12 KUB. The preparatory phase of the project will take place between 2020 and 2022, and the execution between 2023 to 2030. Price for this project should be 360 million
22 Besides Slovakia, only the neighboring Ukraine also owns S-300. Poland will be receiving a similar weapon – the American MIM-104 Patriot shortly.
- 76 - EUR (Government of Slovakia 2016a, 2017e). It is yet not possible to speculate about the potential replacements.
The third project in this area, LLAPI system, will be the implementation of LLAPI – Low-Level Air Picture Interface system, made by Czech company Retia. It is a NATO- interoperable system that allows communication and exchange of information between air defense command and control centers. It is being implemented since 2014 (Žiak 2014), and it should be fully operational within the Anti-air defense brigade of the Armed Forces in 2020, for the further cost of 5,62 million EUR (Government of Slovakia 2017e).
The further project, SAMOC + GOC, is an automated command and control system for the higher command level of air defense forces (GOC) that in NATO-interoperable, should be implemented between 2018 and 2021 for a cost of 10 million EUR (Government of Slovakia 2017e).
The last project out of the air defenses objective is ASTRA PVO, also an automated command and control system for a company-level headquarters. It has been used within the Slovak Armed Forces with various levels of success at least since 2006 (Válka.cz 2006), and further four sets should be procured between 2018 and 2020 for the price of 10 million EUR (Government of Slovakia 2017e).
The most important, most complicated and also most expensive of these projects will be the replacement of S300 systems. It is in its very beginning, and therefore any further analysis of it would probably not give us much, but few interesting facts can be mentioned. First of all, to have such a capability is without a dispute a political choice. Maintaining this kind of hardware is rather expensive and for smaller states such as Slovakia is a kind of a rarity. We can brand this as a right decision, because it is a capability that we already have, and since we are not planning to maintain a big air force, surface-to-air capabilities might add some strength.
Of course, the question will be how much this will cost in the future. MoD plans to spend 605 million EUR, and when the author asked about how the planners did came to this sum, only answer that could have been provided was that it is just for internal MoD processes. Also, the author was told that this would be a „gradual modernization." Therefore it is possible that if the technology allows, the current S300 systems will not be replaced, but just modernized.
- 77 - 5. Evaluation: Main shortcomings
In this chapter, we will go over the main issues outlined in the previous pages and summarize the main shortcomings. As we have seen in earlier chapters, quite a big part of the described projects is riddled with the same issues. Why is it so and how it could be fixed will be described in the few following paragraphs.
The problem is that when we focus only on the shortcomings, the outcome might sound overwhelmingly negative. However, in the case of the Slovak Armed Forces, not much has been done as it should have been done for an analyst to judge the current state in any positive way. The combat and combat support capabilities of the AF SR are tremendously sub-par, with significant shortcomings in almost every area. Therefore, criticism is more than needed.
One of the most significant problems of some of the high profile projects suffer from is the brutal lack of transparency. It has been criticized for many years now, and despite the claims of the current leadership of the ministry, it does not seem to be changing. We have mentioned that procurement of the Spartan airplanes was overshadowed by unnecessary secrecy around the agreements. It ended up in court, and despite the ruling that the MoD must make the records public, it has not yet done so, basically stalling the whole process in a lawful but borderline way. However, the biggest issue now seems to be the 8x8 vehicles, which were again chosen in a very shady way, from a company with a questionable history of corruption cases. Common development from which Slovakia would profit was also cited, but the available information suggests that nothing that would come close to anything that could be called development, much less research, is being done. If the MoD plans to deliver on its promise of transparency, it has not done it with this project. There will undoubtedly be space to improve in other projects, but it did not produce a good record so far. Moreover, considering that millions of public funds in a susceptible area are at stake, the political conduct – basically of every government in the analyzed timespan – so far has been very unsatisfying.
The next most significant issue is the lack of policy and doctrines. This is apparent in smaller projects as well as the bigger ones. Within the ground force, the goal capabilities and doctrines guiding them are set, but with the air forces, the situation is worse. There was no update of policy and doctrine, mainly in the air-to-ground capabilities. In the past, it was stated
- 78 - that the Air Force would not seek any means in this area, but the current talks are clearly saying otherwise. Even the name of the project, multipurpose tactical airplanes, suggests this. Until this is finished, any procurement will be unguided and therefore problematic. Similarly problematic is the currently ongoing receiving of UH-60M helicopters. These were bought without clearly outlined doctrine for their use, which reflected in the procurement of helicopters that can only fly – but apparently, this is not enough for machines that are branded as „multipurpose." Of course, different modules for different kinds of missions can be bought later, but currently, the project is unfinished. MoD argued that it merely took the offer from the USA, but the lack of preparedness for such an offer on the side of doctrines is also alarming. This situation arose despite the fact that in the past the Air Force used both transport armed helicopters and attack helicopters. According to both the White Paper and Long-term development plan, the MoD plans to procure mission modules for the Black Hawks, but this can hardly be done before the doctrine for the use of multipurpose helicopters is explicitly set.23
Another issue concerns the inability to establish capabilities at the moment they are needed. All the main ground force projects – 8x8s, 4x4s and tracked vehicles were more or less late or are severely behind schedule. The prolonging is catastrophic within the MOKYS project, and all signs point towards delays in the multipurpose tactical planes project. Due to lack of funds, also the transport planes project was delayed for almost ten years. What is behind the so broad lateness is questionable, and lack of funds cannot be cited universally. Without turning to speculations, the most feasible answer seems to be that at least until the introduction of the first Strategic Evaluation of Defence, followed by the White Papers (2013 and 2016), there was no clear concept of how to further develop the Armed Forces, with the Models 2010 and 2015 being majorly outdated. This, together with the financial shortage created the undesirable situation with which we are still dealing today. Nevertheless, we can argue that even with the insufficient financial resources, the situation should have never come to the present state of less than 50% readiness across the force.
This projects into another area with deficiencies – the capability goals. In this issue, Slovakia as a member of NATO is responsible not only for itself but for the whole alliance,
23 One thing that might change this view would be the Air Force Development Concept from 2014, which is still confidential, and therefore there is no possibility to reflect it. However, at least an outline should be made public, since the air force procurements are one of the most expensive and the public oversight of this spending is made almost impossible.
- 79 - which only furthers the issue at hand. The challenge of their setting and if they are set realistically and adequately might be a matter of debate, but before they are agreed upon, and not long after they should have been reached. That is the case now, and what is even more alarming is that they will not be reached anytime soon. For that, the Armed Forces need at least part of the fleet of the 8x8 and 4x4 vehicles, and more of new/modernized tracked IFVs. So far, only the ISTAR battalion armed with the modernized BPzV is fulfilling the set goals, and the situation is very likely to worsen before it starts improving. Especially the Air Force faces the end date of the service life of MiGs, and the replacement is nowhere in sight. This problem is deeply interconnected with other areas, such as the former lack of development policies and non-conceptual procurements coming out of this lacking, irresponsible spending, non- transparent deals, and what is perhaps the most problematic – the visible disinterest of political leadership and broader society in defense matters.
Perhaps the most controversial and still widely debated issue is the ongoing dependence on hardware of Soviet / Russian origin. This is further deepened by the fact that, as we have seen here, it is still counted with for the future, and is a part of modernization projects. Most pressing issue within this area is the Air Force. Its dependence on services and companies based in Russian Federation was long considered unwanted, a stance that only deepened after 2014, with continuing situation in Ukraine and Russian activities in Europe. Slovakia has been trying to get rid of this dependence for a long time, but it seems that now there is a certain backlash against this policy. The Slovak National Party has been long associated with pro-Russian policies, and since it took control of the Ministry of Defense after the 2016 elections, a certain trend can be clearly visible. Firstly, there is a push to keep the MiGs in the air as long as possible. This might have numerous reasons for sure, and from military point of view, the most obvious one would be the effort to have these planes flying until the replacement is ready. But it is rather problematic since the agreements with both the Russians and Slovak intermediaries is confidential and no one really knows what is part of the deal and where does the money go. As was stated before, it is further complicated by the presence of Russian personnel at the Sliač AFB24, complicated procurement of spare parts, and many other issues. Any way we put it, the status quo is simply not satisfying. Moreover, the problematic employment of hardware of eastern origin is also in other areas, such as with the
24 Although they are not military, the espionage record of the Russian civilian – or for that matter, any other nationality – personnel is not exactly innocent.
- 80 - 9M113 Konkurs missiles, that are not exactly legacy hardware and are planning to be used on the newly bought TURRA 30 turrets. This turret also uses the mentioned license-made 2A42 30mm cannon, but this is a lesser issue since the manufacturing of a corresponding ammunition is the less complicated part and it can be also made for different ammunition. All in all, the dependence of on the hardware of post-Soviet provenience is an issue that the MoD has been trying to solve for a long time, at least since Slovakia become a NATO member. Unfortunately, the success rate in this area remains a lapse.
Since this whole work is about projects for millions of EUR, we also need to mention one issue that connects them all, and that is financial heftiness. Even if the defense budget is continually rising, considering the miserable state of the AF SR and complex needs outlined by the Long- term development plan, we need to be prepared for enormous expenditure. This might put the budget under severe constraints, and the outlook for some projects does not always help this. So far, mainly the UH-60M project was financially somewhat tricky, and the replacement of multirole tactical airplanes will be even more expensive. When we consider that the spending on modernization is planned at least until 2030, only slight variations in the state budget for whatever reason might throw the plans out of balance. Careful and frequent re-evaluation of policies and financial outlines will be needed, and the MoD needs to explain how it plans to keep up on its promises. The defense spending has been sidelined for many years, and simply saying that it is going to change is not going to change it. The problem is that so far, the government and the MoD leadership has not been able to deliver on all their promises, and as some projects such as the 8x8 show that there are still burdensome shortfalls.
- 81 - 6. Into the Future: What issues needs to be fixed
In this chapter, we are going to shortly present a few recommendations that might help fixing the general issues outlined in the previous chapter, and to some degree, specific challenges that the described projects face.
So, what needs to be fixed? First of all, we can see clear deficiencies in policies, which also affects doctrines. Only during the fall 2017, Slovak government accepted new security, defense and military strategies. Although the government, and therefore the MoD takes them into account, they did not go through the parliament, which creates a rather weird situation. Of the reasons cited for this is that some of the representatives of the current governmental parties – mainly the Slovak National Party (SNS) – might have a problem with clearly stated Euro- Atlantic and pro-Western orientation of Slovakia. Paradoxically, this party now controls the MoD. Even though the leadership of the Ministry under SNS did not publicly voiced their disagreement with the foreign policy orientation of Slovakia, it is clear that there are at least some tensions with the MoD itself. First of all, the state secretary Ondrejcsák nominated by the governmental party Most-Híd has been branded on numerous occasions as the „voice of reason” that is there to „ensure the pro-Western orientation” and is in an open conflict with the SNS and its members (Kováč 2018a). This is further enforced by the fact that since the beginning of 2018, two important officers with clearly pro-Western orientation had stepped down – firstly, commander of the NATO Force Integration Unit in Slovakia, and then the Deputy of the Chief of General Staff. The latter one, now retired general Pavel Macko, voiced what many has been thinking for a long time – that the ministry is actually under control of the SNS through the general secretary of the HR department of the ministry, Ján Hoľko, and the minister was actually reduced to a role of some kind of an „executioner” (Kováč 2018b). Mr. Hoľko received education from the Political Academy of the Czechoslovak People’s Army, and after the 1989 revolution, did business together with the last general of the communist Czechoslovak State Secretary, Alojz Lorenc. Unfortunately, the pro-Russian political sentiment, or outright ties, of Hoľko and similar post-communist elites, has been long assumed. In November 2017, president of the SNS Andrej Danko, who is the current Speaker of the Slovak Parliament, gave a speech in Duma of the Russian Federation. In such a schizophrenic setting, it might get really difficult to maintain the outlined policies. For the current ones to be taken seriously, they need to get through the parliament as soon as possible. This would at least partially create the opportunity
- 82 - to push also next governments (soonest parliamentary elections will be held in 2020) to keep up to them – which might be challenging mainly with the financially demanding Long-term development plan.
The Long-term development plan itself is a policy statement that is rather specific, but still leaves us with a lot of questions. When we look at its financial aspects, we see one key issue. In real numbers, the defense budget for 2018 is 1,082 billion EUR, and it constitutes around 1,22% of Slovak GDP. Out of this, 247 million EUR went to „capital investments”, which is in this case a little bit more than\ the fifth of the budget that NATO wants its members to give for modernization, research and development (Rozpočet.sk 2018). If we do a little projection, and use the year-over-year projection of economic growth provided by the European Commission (Euractiv.sk 2018), we arrive to the defense budget of 1,125 billion EUR in 2019, which is 1,22% of GDP. In 2020, the defense budget was promised by the current government to be at 1.6% of GDP. That would mean that if we keep the current growth projection, in real numbers it will be around 1,654 billion EUR. Only a certain amount can go towards modernization efforts, but if we conclude that the other expenses will rise slower than the whole defense budget, the sum that might be spent for procurements could be even more than the usual fifth of the whole budget. But there is one significant BUT – the Long-term development plan is working with 6,777 billion EUR for modernization efforts between 2018 and 2030, which gives us approx. half a million EUR needed every year. The biggest question is, is this real? Was the plan made out in a way that would be possible to carry out in reality? For that to be possible, the defense budget would have to keep rising beyond 2020. Another financial concern is with the projects themselves, since in some cases it is not clear how the MoD planners got to the sums presented in the Long-term plan. For example, as we’ve mentioned earlier, when asked about how the Section for modernization (whose former chief become the new Chief of Staff in May 2018) arrived at the sum of 605 million EUR for modernization of mid-range anti-air rockets, the given answer was simply that it is „for internal purposes”. The MoD did not disclose how they get to it, but did not cited confidentiality. The fact that the specific explanation or methodology of how the planners are getting the presented sums can be considered as a shortcoming. How the MoD is planning to secure these funds it is so willingly planning to spend is also not mentioned, but the overall image definitely does not have an aura of fiscal responsibility. Plus, these are only „money issues”. The whole discourse about the projects, their specific shape and implications was kept only inside the MoD, with the broader professional public being kept absolutely out of the debate. This resulted in still ongoing heated
- 83 - arguments, part of which are also the representatives of the ministry. Most problematic issue so far was the fact that despite huge claims, the MoD is not very good when it comes to transparency, despite opposite claims. To a certain extent, the Long-term development plan is laid out in a good way, but along the process of its fulfillment, it will need a lot of clarifications. Because the modernization effort cannot be simply reduced to the process of procuring new hardware; how it is done and what it brings is equally important, too. And in the case when millions are at stake under an already constrained budget, throwing any kind of debate and transparency out of the window and saying „at least something is getting done” is simply not an option. Not in an EU country in 2018, which is on the border of NATO and whose armed forces has been neglected for decades.
Another issue that needs a significant improvement are doctrines and internal policies guiding the use of certain weapon systems. As we have mentioned earlier, the deficiency is prevalent within the Air Force, for both fixed-wing and rotary aircraft. The UH-60Ms were procured without a clearly stated missions for them, and we established before that the Air Force does not exactly know what capabilities should its future tactical aircraft have.
The doctrinal and policy deficiencies could be solved by re-establishing ministry’s internal think-tank, the Institute for Security and Defense Studies (IBOŠ – Inštitút bezpečnosntých a obranných štúdií), which was disbanded during the term of minister Gajdoš in 2017 under very shady circumstances. Such an internal think-tank could serve to identify future challenges and propose ways to avoid them long before they turn into actual problems. If the ministry would use such an institution in a right way, it could have had for example the issue of how to equip and use the Black Hawks (or any other similar type of rotary-wing aircraft) even before the FMS deal was proposed. The reason the author suggests this is that the other departments within the ministry are clearly unable to do so. On the other hand, the author is also aware that certain people inside the ministry have been voicing their concerns about this and other issues for some time now, but it seems that their suggestions are under the current and the previous leadership of the ministry largely unheard. Another way of dealing with this challenge might be closer cooperation between the NGO sector, or perhaps bigger involvement of the Slovak Academy of Armed Forces. Unfortunately, the NGO sector is not viewed as an equal partner for the current leadership of the MoD.
- 84 - Since one of the key issues we have identified is that almost every project, including those that are now at their start, is late, obviously this is an issue that cannot be fixed anymore. What the MoD planners can do is to simply be responsible enough to at least not make the projects outlined in the Long-term development plan late more than they already are. It has been established that money shouldn’t be a problem anymore, but of course there are many other issues that can make things go wrong. But beyond stating this there is little we can do besides hoping that all the means to prevent any mishaps are in place and wish the responsible persons luck.
We have mentioned the capability goals and their fulfillment, or lack of thereof, and why is this so. Problem is that these should have been adjusted in the moment it was clear that they will not be met. This way our Armed Forces are just late, which might negatively affect the image of Slovakia as a NATO ally.
What is also missing now is a clearer push to get rid of off the dependency on Russian hardware, and even more importantly, services. As have been proposed in the chapter 4, there is possible solution to this. The easiest way to secure the service of the MiGs would be to contract an allied country that has them too and might be of help in this matter, as we’ve discussed earlier. There is a certain probability that given the right incentives, the Polish side might be sympathetic to our situation. It would definitely be a better solution than continuing the current deals with the Russians and in a short-term until our MiGs are replaced.
Last thing that should be again mentioned here is the need for the MoD to make its procurement process more transparent. This issue has come up in this thesis in numerous occasions, and it cannot be stressed enough. There is not much we can further add to this at this point, besides closing this with remark that ultimately the issue of transparency will dictate how the current modernization efforts are judged in the near future.
- 85 - 7. Conclusion
Over the course of this academic work, we have answered the proposed research questions. Now, let’s take a look back and summarize our findings. The first question „What would be the best course of action regarding the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic in the near future?” was answered in length in chapter 4. We have identified the main projects according to the currently valid documents with which the development of the Armed Forces is guided. The described sixteen projects constitute the main modernization effort that is being undertaken within the Armed Forces as of this moment. They are in various state of development, with some already almost finished (for example, transport planes), other that are in a further state, but results of which are still not seen (8x8 IFVs), or the ones that have only started (4x4 tactical vehicles, multipurpose tactical planes). Here we are getting the answer to the question n. 2 – „How did these projects develop so far as of 2018?". That was again in length answered with the descriptions of the projects in chapter four. We used the official documents issued by the ministry, researched news articles, and this was complemented by interviews that the author conducted with the key responsible personnel of the MoD between February and March 2018. Alas, all these interviews were conducted off-record, and therefore cannot be directly cited. Another problem with these interviews was that much information concerning the projects is kept confidential, plus the author was reminded numerous times that even if provided with a security clearance, in many cases the given information could not be used in public work. On the other hand, the author is confident that the whole picture created by using all the three types of sources constitutes the best overall representation of the current situation that could be assembled. It needs to be noted that with much of the information that is kept secret, it is unnecessary, which was also one of the main points of criticism towards the leadership responsible for this situation.
While attempting to construct the answer to the third question, we have put the assembled information through an adapted DOTMLPFI-P method. This process pointed out all the strengths and weaknesses of the described projects in the areas of doctrines, organization, materiel, infrastructure, and policy. It also showed us the level of institutional preparedness of the Armed Forces as a whole. These gave us the answer to the question „Why are the current states of the described projects as illustrated?". We see where these projects are on time or
- 86 - lagging behind, which aspects are right, and which need to be fixed. The key issues were further explained in chapter five.
During answering the fourth question, „What would be the best course of action regarding the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic in the near future?", we took these identified issues and tried to propose appropriate measures that might help to fix them. We have covered the lack of financial resources, dependence on Russian hardware and services, and the issue of inadequate policies and doctrines. However, these proposed suggestions are somewhat limited, and they need to be further worked on. Because of this, perhaps one idea stands out among the other – need to reopen an internal MoD think-tank, composed from both officers and civilians that would be tasked with continual analysis of what is going on inside the ministry and the Armed Forces. The fact that such an institution already existed and was disbanded not that long ago is quite alarming.
Perhaps we owe the reader some justification for why this thesis might be longer than the required span. The author tried to keep the parts outside of the description and analysis very conservative, and in this central part, a lot of projects had to be covered. The issue is that this is the first work of this type ever done in the Slovakian context, and all the described projects have to be cover for it to make sense. Therefore, the author believes that even if longer, it is for the better of this thesis.
The image that this thesis painted might seem rather dire. Moreover, there is, unfortunately, no way around it – they are. The tremendous amount of neglect that the resort of defense has been under for the past two decades is stunning. It has come so far that the current fulfillment of requested standards of the whole force – including both Air and Ground elements – is as low as 50 to 60 percent. The Long-term development plan, heavily cited in this thesis, is the first complex policy that deals with the modernization of the Armed Forces on such a scale. If we throw the developed unsound situation behind our back, which itself is almost impossible, and take into account only the proposed Long-term development plan, and count on it to be carried out at least precisely in the way it is intended, then the situation will start to improve gradually. However, since its introduction, many problems continue, and some new arose.
Slovak defense is currently in terrible shape. We had some limited success in the recent years, but the hardware remains to be very sub-par, not even beginning to talk about the
- 87 - personnel issues. Considering that we are on the border of both NATO and EU, the developed situation is borderline hazardous. Even more so if we take into account the fact that we are a part of allied structures. No one is expecting Slovak Armed Forces to carry out defensive or expeditionary operations on its own, but still, we need to be a perfectly lubricated bearing of the whole allied military machinery.
The problem is that with such a lousy record of keeping up promises and delivering on them without significant issues, any remarks that might sound pessimistic are more in the realm of realism. This thesis aimed to start a broader debate on this issue outside of Slovak language space. We achieved answering the outlined research questions. These answers are rather clear, and it will be up to the reader how he will interpret them.
However, ending up this thesis on such a sad note would be a pity. There is a certain tendency to improve things, and they are slowly improving. We bought new transport planes; more Black Hawks are on the way, the ISTAR battalion was equipped with modernized tracked IFVs. The area of policies is improving too, with the introduction of the latest White Paper, and the Security, Defense and Military policies, and in the case of this thesis, mainly the Long-term development plan. Of course, its implementation is not without an issue. The purpose of the debate which this thesis meant to start is to ensure it is done better.
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