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Jihadist Radicalization and caused the coalescing of four relatively after being arrested in Syria in 2007 small clusters of individuals. Two of the and still awaits trial in Morocco. the 2004 Madrid Bombing clusters were interconnected because Network they evolved from the remnants of an All 27 individuals were men, born al-Qa`ida cell established in Spain between 1960 and 1983. More than half By Fernando Reinares during the mid-1990s. This cell was were between 23 and 33 years of age at led by Syrian-born Imad Eddin Barakat the time of the bombings. Most were on march 11, 2004, terrorists launched a Yarkas, better known as , native Moroccans, except for three series of coordinated bombings against and was partially dismantled during the Algerians, one Egyptian, one Tunisian Madrid’s commuter train system, months following 9/11.2 and one Lebanese.4 None were originally killing 191 people. The terrorists who from Spain. planned and perpetrated the attacks A third cluster of individuals who belonged to multiple different groups eventually became part of the network At the time of the attacks, 24 of the 27 and organizations, but they shared a was linked to the Moroccan Islamic were living in Spain, a country in which common jihadist ideology. The attacks Combatant Group (GICM), which the vast majority of Muslims are of have often been labeled a case of established structures across Western Moroccan descent.5 Two of the group “homegrown” terrorism, a result of Europe in the 1990s, particularly in lived in the Belgian city of Brussels extremist attitudes caused by the war in France and Belgium. The fourth cluster and one in the northern Italian city of Iraq, or the product of a self-radicalized was initially composed of a criminal Milan. Most of the men were economic cell. Yet a closer look at the individuals gang active throughout Spain and immigrants and included both legal and involved in the network behind the specialized in illicit trafficking of drugs attack reveals a more complicated and stolen vehicles. “The Madrid attacks were picture. There are 27 individuals about whom not a case of ‘homegrown It is important to examine the network there is currently both empirical data terrorism’ in the strictest responsible for the March 2004 Madrid and legal grounds to implicate in plot in more detail, since the incident the preparation or execution of the sense of the word. Among constituted the most lethal terrorist Madrid bombings.3 Of the 27, 13 have the network’s members attack in a Western country since the already been convicted in Spain, two in September 11, 2001 attacks in the United Morocco and one in Italy, all on charges were individuals linked States. Analysis of the network will of involvement in the March 2004 plot. to international terrorist help provide a deeper understanding of Seven individuals committed suicide in terrorist radicalization, a process that an apartment safe house in the Spanish groups such as the GICM continues to occur within open societies. town of Leganés on April 3, 2004. The and al-Qa`ida.” Indeed, the individuals responsible for four remaining individuals are known the March 2004 Madrid bombings did fugitives, although one of them was not become prone to terrorism at the handed over to the Moroccan authorities same place, the same time or through the illegal foreign residents. Many of the same processes. A detailed examination 2 This al-Qa`ida cell in Spain was detected by the police men were single, although a significant of the case, based on official information at the end of 1994. Among its founding members were number were married and a few had extracted from judicial documents, Anwar Adnan Mohamed Saleh, also known as Chej children. Although the sociological reveals interesting variations in the Salah, who moved from Madrid to Peshawar in October profile of the group was diverse, they 1 radicalization process. 1995 and Mustafa Setmarian Nasar, better known as Abu were generally poorly educated and did Mus`ab al-Suri, who relocated to London four months not have high-paying jobs. The Madrid Bombing Network before and then settled close to Usama bin Ladin in Af- The terrorist network responsible for ghanistan. This al-Qa`ida cell was connected to the Ham- the March 11, 2004 attacks in Madrid burg cell that spawned the 9/11 attacks. Abu Dahdah was was assembled between March 2002 in contact with Mohammed Atta since the early 1990s. 4 The Moroccans include: Hassan el-Haski, Youssef Bel- and November 2003. During this time The former and 17 other individuals were convicted of hadj, Mohamed Larbi ben Sellam, Jamal Ahmidan, Said period, the desire and then the decision terrorism related charges by the National Court on Sep- Berraj, Mohamed Afalah, , Othman el- to execute a terrorist attack in Spain tember 26, 2005. Gnaoui, Fouad el-Morabit Anghar, Saed el-Harrak, Mo- 3 The number of people directly or indirectly involved hamed Bouharrat, Rachid Aglif, Abdelmajid Bouchar, 1 Unless marked otherwise, all of the facts in this article in the attacks may exceed 27. It would be beyond the Rifaat Anouar Asrih, Abdenabi Kounjaa, Mohamed are drawn from the criminal proceedings for the 2004 deontological boundaries of academic work, obliged to Oulad Akcha, Rachid Oulad Akcha, Abdelilah Hriz, Mo- Madrid train bombings, which in Spain accumulate 241 respect fundamental human rights and rule of law guar- hamed Belhadj, Hamid Ahmidan and Hicham Ahmidan. tomes and 30 separate volumes with previously secret antees when researching and publishing on terrorism, The Algerians include: Allekema Lamari, Daoud Ouh- records, containing a total of 93,226 paged files. In addi- to include persons who were detained following the at- nane and Nasreddine Bousbaa. The Egyptian is Rabei tion, judicial documentation includes records from the tacks but never charged, or prosecuted but absolved of Osman el-Sayed Ahmed. The Tunisian is Serhane ben central investigative judge responsible for the case and all charges. Others, condemned for dealing with stolen Abdelmajid Fakhet. The Lebanese is Mahmoud Slimane sentences both at the National Court and the Supreme explosives that ended up in the hands of the terrorists, Aoun. Court. Also, from related criminal proceedings and sen- did not exactly belong to the jihadist network as such and 5 Most of those part of the bombing network who lived in tences delivered in Milano and Sale. therefore are excluded from this analysis. Spain resided in or near Madrid.

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A Case of Homegrown Terrorism? the network were born or naturalized in On the other hand, 13 to 14 of the At least four of the 27 individuals part Spain or in any other European Union network’s members adopted a violent of the Madrid bombing network clearly member-state. Most of the network ideology before the invasion of Iraq. internalized an extremist ideology arrived in Spain between 1990-2001 as Of these, five to six individuals were outside of Spain. These four include first generation immigrants in their late radicalized after the 9/11 attacks and Hassan el-Haski, Youssef Belhadj, teens and mid-20s. Moreover, while in the subsequent military intervention and Allekema Lamari. Spain, their daily routines placed them in Afghanistan. Eight became prone to Hassan el-Haski was already a leading in constant interaction with people of terrorism before the 9/11 attacks.8 The member of the GICM by March 11, 2004, the same background. network’s members who radicalized although it is not clear whether he was before 9/11 were the main actors in the radicalized in Morocco or in Belgium. Only one member of the group, March 2004 attacks, and they were also Youssef Belhadj, on the other hand, was Rachid Aglif, could be considered a critical radicalizing agents for the rest clearly radicalized in Belgium, where he “homegrown” terrorist. Aglif settled in of the group. joined the GICM. Rabei Osman allegedly Spain with his father and other close espoused jihadism while in , where How They Became Jihadists he was born; while in Egypt he joined “The network’s members Members of the network who radicalized , which merged before 9/11 and were in contact with with al-Qa`ida in 2001. Allekema who radicalized before Abu Dahdah’s al-Qa`ida cell attended Lamari was a member of the Armed 9/11 were the main actors Madrid’s main Islamic worship sites, Islamic Group (GIA) by 1996, even such as the Abu Bakr mosque and before arriving in Spain from Algeria. in the March 2004 attacks, the M-30 mosque. It was at these As for Daoud Oughnane, who was also and they were also critical locations that they were spotted as born in Algeria, it is not clear whether possible followers.9 In addition to being he acquired a violent interpretation radicalizing agents for the indoctrinated at these locations, where of Islam prior to his arrival in Spain, rest of the group.” extremist materials were disseminated, which occurred in the 1990s. they were then usually invited to countryside gatherings next to the Yet the 2004 Madrid terrorist attacks Alberche River, near the rural town have often been labeled a case of Moroccan relatives when he was only of Navalcarnero. At these informal “homegrown” terrorism because at 10-years-old. Moreover, he attended countryside gatherings, recreational least 21 of the 27 individuals part of the public schools in the Madrid region, and activities were mixed with proselytizing network adopted a jihadist ideology started work at his family shop when he sessions on religion, jihad and conflicts while in Spain, although a few of was 16-years-old. involving large Muslim communities, them were certainly influenced during such as in Bosnia. Individuals who temporary stays abroad. Nevertheless, Iraq and the Radicalization Timeline attended these meetings were persuaded the Madrid attacks were not a case Another assumption about the March of “homegrown terrorism” in the 2004 Madrid bombing network is that 8 Four of the eight include Hassan el-Haski, Rabei Os- 6 strictest sense of the word. Among the they were mostly radicalized as a result man, Youssef Belhadj, and Allekema Lamari, all of 7 network’s members were individuals of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Only 12 whom were part of jihadist groups before the 9/11 at- linked to international terrorist groups to 13 individuals part of the network tacks. Three of the eight who became prone to terrorism such as the GICM and al-Qa`ida. Two internalized a jihadist ideology after the before the 9/11 attacks were already part of Abu Dahdah’s of the group members who radicalized invasion of Iraq. At least five of those al-Qa`ida cell. They included Jamal Zougam, Said Berraj abroad, Rabei Osman and Youssef who radicalized into terrorism after the and Sarhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, “The Tunisian,” Belhadj, acted as external radicalizing invasion of Iraq belonged to a band of who radicalized while in contact with a prominent mem- agents for members of the network criminals under the leadership of Jamal ber of the cell, Amer Azizi. Amer Azizi, also known as living in or near Madrid, who as a result Ahmidan, or “The Chinese.” Another Othman al-Andalusi, was identified by the Spanish na- of Osman’s and Belhadj’s propaganda four from the group of 12 to 13 were tional police when conducting investigations on the Abu decided to become involved in the plot. slightly connected to past members Dahdah cell to which he belonged. Before 9/11, Azizi was In addition, none of the 27 members of of the Abu Dahdah al-Qa`ida cell in active in radicalizing Maghrebi immigrants and sending Spain. them to training camps in Afghanistan, where he person- 6 A delimitation of the phenomenon useful for an in- ally traveled, probably more than once. He was one of the formed discussion on this and other cases can be found charismatic figures whose impact as a radicalizing agent in Evan F. Kohlmann, “Homegrown Terrorists: Theory 7 Two individuals belonging to the Madrid bombing in Spain was accurately stressed by Rogelio Alonso in and Cases in the ’s Newest Front,” Annals network, Mohammed Larbi ben Sellam and Abdelilah “Procesos de radicalización de los terroristas yihadistas of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences Hriz, subsequently engaged, from Spain as well as Tur- en España,” Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 31/2007. 618:1 (2008): pp. 95-109. The network responsible for the key and Syria, in activities aimed at facilitating travel to 9 It is worth mentioning that before he was radicalized commuter train attacks of 3/11, however, accommodates Iraq for Muslim extremists who radicalized in Europe into a jihadist ideology, Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet better to the concept of a grassroots jihadist network as and wanted to join the terrorist campaign of al-Qai`da- had joined Tablighi Jama`at. It was also inside this group, proposed by Javier Jordán, Fernando M. Mañas and Ni- related organizations in the country. One of the fugitives, for instance, that Amer Azizi met for the first time Mou- cola Horsburgh in “Strengths and Weaknesses of Grass- Mohamed Belhadj, was arrested in Syria in 2007 and an- stapha Maymouni, the man who initiated the formation root Jihadist Networks: The Madrid Bombings,” Studies other, Mohammed Afalah, actually made it to Iraq, where of the Madrid terrorist network in 2002 but was arrested in Conflict and Terrorism31:1 (2008): pp. 17-39. he allegedly perpetrated a suicide attack in May 2005. during a trip to Morocco in 2003.

17 november 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 11 to donate money to the mujahidin fighting Was the Internet a Significant Radicalization Arabic by Sayyid Qutb. During this time in these conflicts, as well as invited to Tool? period, members also downloaded the undertake military training at jihadist The internet was not a radicalization audiovisual productions of al-Sahab, al- camps in Afghanistan.10 Eventually, factor for individuals who adopted Qa`ida’s media production house. After select individuals were chosen and then a jihadist ideology before the 9/11 March 2003, members visited sites such secluded to private residences where attacks. It was a limited factor among as www.tawhed.ws, www.almaqdese. they were indoctrinated. Indoctrination those who adopted a jihadist ideology com and www.alsunnah.info; they processes included watching videos of between 9/11 and February 2003. As focused on the texts of , fighting in Bosnia and Chechnya, and for those who radicalized into violence Ibn Taymiyya, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu listening to taped sermons from radical after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Nasir bin Hamad preachers such as Abu Qatada. internet appears to have been a greater al-Fahd, Abdul Munim Mustafa Halima, factor in their radicalization process.12 Hamid al-Ali and Muhammad Fizazi. Weeks after the 9/11 attacks, however, Moreover, those who radicalized after Spanish authorities dismantled Abu The Role of Affective Ties Dahdah’s al-Qa`ida cell, and the “Indeed, 25% of the 27 Other significant radicalizing factors countryside gatherings on the riverbank were affective ties between individuals. ceased. Meetings became more discreet individuals part of the Pre-existing ties contributed not only and behind closed doors in city flats network had at least one to the adoption of jihadism, but to and storefronts, such as a barber’s individuals’ actual inclusion in the shop located in a quarter of Madrid other relative involved in terrorist network. These relationships where Maghrebi and other immigrant the plot.” were usually based on kinship, populations are concentrated. friendship and neighborhood links. For example, 11 of the 27 individuals During this period after 9/11, some were born in Tetouan and Tangiers in individuals part of the network were the 2003 invasion of Iraq also did so Morocco. Nevertheless, this fact is not socialized into jihadism by influential more rapidly than the others, although a definitive causal relationship since people traveling to Spain from abroad, with varying degrees of intensity.13 more than 20% of the tens of thousands such as Mimoum Belhadj and his Judicial documentation from the March of Moroccans living in Madrid are from brother Youssef Belhadj, who were 2004 terrorist case provides valuable these two cities.15 There are, however, already members of the GICM. Network information about the internet sites cases where network members were member Abdelmajid Bouchar, for visited by the members of the network. active within the same city quarter, example, was radicalized in this way. connections that date back to childhood Others who later became part of the Files recovered from a hard drive and youth years. This is true of Jamal 2004 Madrid bombing network were and USB devices found in the debris Zougam and Said Berraj with respect observed in 2002 outside worship sites of the Leganés apartment explosion to Tangiers. In these circumstances, in Madrid where they were subjected to are revealing.14 Before 9/11, leading affective ties based on neighborhood proselytizing by Rabei Osman. Fouad members of the Madrid terrorist become much more significant, el-Morabit Amghar is an example of a network paid close attention to the texts particularly if they are recurrent during network member radicalized by this of Abdullah Azzam and Abu Qatada. occasional stays in the same city of method. Others were radicalized while Between 9/11 and February 2003, origin. serving time in Spanish prisons, such as members visited websites such as www. Mohamed Bouharrat.11 jehad.net and downloaded writings in Regardless, it is not easy to establish the location of birth or residence as a 12 A longitudinal perspective on radicalization among causal factor since other variables are those involved in the Madrid bombing network indicates often involved. Jamal Ahmidan, Hicham the growing importance of the internet, although not to Ahmidan and Hamid Ahmidan all come the point of self-radicalization or self-recruitment. For a from Tetouan, yet they all share family broader discussion based on other examples, see Peter bonds. Mohamed and Rachif Oulad 10 Said Berraj, for example, was on his way to Afghani- Newmann, Joining Al-Qaeda. Jihadist Recruitment in Eu- Akcha, both members of the terrorist stan in 2001 when he was arrested in Turkey. Said Berraj rope (London: International Institute for Strategic Stud- network and both born in Tetouan, was traveling in the company of three other followers of ies, 2008), pp. 53-62. are brothers. Indeed, 25% of the 27 Abu Dahdah, more concretely Amer Azizi himself, Sala- 13 Interestingly, a gradual sense of progressive involve- individuals part of the network had at heddin Benyaich, also known as Abu Muhgen, and Lah- ment, usually considered a consistent quality among least one other relative involved in the cen Ikassrien, who was captured by the U.S. military in those becoming terrorists, seems to be absent for some plot. Afghanistan following 9/11, imprisoned for a few years at latecomers in the Madrid bombing network. For an in- Guantanamo Bay and finally extradited to Spain in 2005, sightful perspective on these issues, see John Horgan, As for friendship ties, it is difficult where he was released. “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Per- to make what would otherwise be 11 Rachid Aglif, Otman el-Gnaoui and Mahmoud Sli- spectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Ter- an important analytical distinction mane Aoun, all of whom radicalized into violence after rorism,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and March 2003, also served time in prison during the 1990s, Social Sciences 618:1 (2008): pp. 80-93. 15 Bernabé López García and Mohamed Berriane eds., but apparently it did not result in the adoption of extrem- 14 The files on the drives were created between July 1997 Atlas de la Inmigración Marroquí en España (Madrid: Uni- ist attitudes. and February 2004. versidad Autónoma de Madrid, 2005), pp. 499-500.

18 november 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 11 between relationships existing before importantly a complement to face-to- individual socialization into jihadism face interactions. The Past and Future of and those forged within the four group Deobandi Islam clusters after extremist ideas were Nearly six years after the Madrid adopted but prior to the formation bombings, many of these same By Luv Puri of a terrorist network. Nevertheless, causal factors still exist. The country in regard to individuals engaged in continues to host worship sites where as the barack obama administration criminal activities headed by “The a number of foreign radical Salafists considers modifying the current U.S. Chinese,” loyalty to the criminal gang preach. Prisons remain locations where strategy in Afghanistan, it is useful to and above all to its leader appears to jihadist radicalization occurs. The understand the social, religious and have been the key motivating factor internet has only grown as an important historical forces that influence Pashtun for involvement in the 2004 Madrid radicalization tool, and extremist society. Pashtuns form the single bombing plot. documents can now be found in Spanish. largest community in Afghanistan, Iraq has become another radicalizing consisting of approximately 38% of Conclusion factor, joining other conflicts involving the population.1 Pakistan also hosts The 2004 Madrid train bombing Muslims such as Afghanistan, Somalia a significant Pashtun population, network should not be viewed as a and even North Africa. primarily in the North-West Frontier case of “homegrown” terrorism, or as Province (NWFP), where they make a case of a “homegrown” network of There is also a new potential radicalizing up 78% of the population, and in the al-Qa`ida sympathizers. The network factor to be considered. Spain is Federally Administered Tribal Areas did not lack international connections now experiencing the emergence of a (FATA), where they make up 99% of the with prominent global terrorism figures second generation of descendents from population.2 Overall, 15% of Pakistanis and entities, and its members, with one immigrant Muslim parents coming of are Pashtun.3 exception, were not disaffected people age. Although this second generation, as born or raised in Spain or in any other a large aggregate, is not yet old enough When developing a strategy involving Western European country. for university, schools may gradually the Pashtun community in Afghanistan become locations where peer groups and Pakistan, it is relevant to understand As for the network’s radicalization of second generation adolescents are the Deobandi school of Islam. Deobandi processes, individuals who radicalized eventually affected by a lack of effective Islam is the most popular form of into jihadism after the 2003 invasion integration into Spanish society and a pedagogy in the Pashtun belt on both of Iraq are a relative majority, and concomitant absence of identification sides of the Durand Line that separates this issue appears to be a significant with the country from where their Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, factor in their radicalization. Members parents came. This could be conducive prominent Afghan and Pakistani Taliban who adopted jihadism before the 2003 to global jihadism as an alternative leaders have studied in Deobandi invasion of Iraq were influenced by cognitive frame of reference among seminaries. This article explains the Islamic injustice frames, such as with the several thousand pupils currently history of Deobandi Islam, shows how respect to major conflicts involving between 14 and 17 years of age. Deobandi Islam in Afghanistan and Muslim communities. These include Failure to prevent and counter jihadist Pakistan has been influenced by Saudi the conflict in Bosnia before 9/11, or radicalization could finally result in Wahhabism, and finally looks at the Afghanistan immediately afterward; the real cases of “homegrown” terrorism role of Deoband today. invasion of Iraq also likely contributed. in Spain, similar to incidents in other As for members who acquired a Western European countries. History of Deobandi Islam jihadist ideology before 9/11, their The Deobandi school of Islam was radicalization processes were slower, Dr. Fernando Reinares is Full Professor of founded in the latter half of the taking from months to years. A possible Political Science and Security Studies at 19th century. It was part of a series explanation is that the radicalizing Universidad Rey Juan Carlos in Madrid. of revivalist movements that were agents needed more time to build trust After serving a term as Senior Adviser sweeping British India during the time. among subjects for indoctrination, and on Antiterrorist Policy to the Spanish After the 1857 revolt against the British they may have deliberately created Minister of Interior following the Madrid colonialists, Muslims in British India various radicalization stages to advance bombings of March 11, 2004, engaged in were the primary targets during the a recruit’s socialization into jihadism. adapting national security structures to the challenges of international terrorism, 1 See the UNHCR Assessment for Pashtuns in Afghani- It was in mosques, worship sites, he was appointed Director of the Program stan, located at www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,MA countryside gatherings and private on Global Terrorism at the Real Instituto RP,,AFG,4562d8cf2,469f3a5112,0.html. residences where most of the members Elcano, the leading think-tank for 2 “Population by Mother Tongue,” 2006 Pakistan Cen- of the Madrid bombing network international and strategic studies in sus Report, Pakistan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs and adopted extremist views. A few Spain. He has been invited to join the Statistics, available at www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/ adopted a violent conception of Islam Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, statistics/other_tables/pop_by_mother_tongue.pdf. while in prison. The internet was D.C., as Public Policy Scholar in 2011. 3 Ibid. Other Pakistani provinces host sizeable Pashtun clearly relevant as a radicalization populations: Baluchistan Province (29.84% Pashtun), tool, especially among those who were Sindh Province (4.19% Pashtun), Punjab Province (1.16% radicalized after 2003, but it was more Pashtun), and Islamabad (9.52% Pashtun).

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