Hobbes on Persona, Personation, and Representation

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Hobbes on Persona, Personation, and Representation Hobbes on Persona, Personation, and Representation Behind the Mask of Sovereignty Marko Simendic, MA PhD in Politics University of York Politics Department August 2011 Abstract This thesis explores Thomas Hobbes’s idea of a person and personation. More particularly, it aims to uncover what it means for Hobbes to (re)conceptualise political representation as “bearing” of a certain person. This is especially important because Hobbes uses this notion to describe the relationship between the sovereign and their subjects. There are three aspects to the research undertaken. Firstly, this account discusses a number of intellectual sources that Hobbes relied on in crafting his idea of a person. To this end the thesis tackles Cicero’s conception of persona as well as various legal and theological sources that have marked the medieval development of this idea. The second aspect of the thesis deals with Hobbes’s definition of a person and its relationship with his definition of the state. Here it is argued that the contemporary commentators have misread Hobbes’s definition of a person and mistakenly identified Hobbes’s commonwealth with it. In response, this thesis offers a more sophisticated definition of a person and places the Hobbesian “person of the state” in its proper place: as the defining, although not the only element of the commonwealth. The third aspect of the thesis addresses the role of Hobbes’s account of representation in his wider political theory. This role is twofold. Firstly, personation describes the relationship between a number of principal agents in Hobbes’s political philosophy: God, the sovereign(s) and the subjects. Secondly, the theatrical nature of Hobbesian personation might suggest another way of approaching Hobbes’s political theory. This is a multi-perspectival approach that conceptualises human agency and mutual interaction as inseparable from its perception. The concluding part of the thesis deals with the way in which the three dimensions of Hobbes’s account come together and form a potent argument in favour of absolute and unitary authority. 2 Acknowledgments I was very fortunate to be guided in my research by my two supervisors, Dr Jon Parkin and Dr Tim Stanton, to both of whom I am most indebted. Over the past few years I got to enjoy unprecedented level of support from them in every stage and in every aspect of the research that culminated in this thesis. Therefore I can only hope that the work in front of you demonstrates my ability to learn from their scholarship as much as its timely completion stands as a testament to them infusing me with their passion for Thomas Hobbes’s political philosophy. Another very powerful source of encouragement behind my work comes from the University of Belgrade – Faculty of Political Sciences, particularly from Professor Ilija Vujačić and Dr Vladimir Pavićević. It was from them and with them that I discovered my interest in political theory and the history of ideas. For that and more, I am more than grateful. Apart from being meticulously read and commented upon by my supervisors, my work has much benefited from being presented at a number of conferences, seminars and workshops held in York, Belgrade, Bucharest, Antalya and Manchester. Here I would like to thank at least some of the individuals whose comments helped me improve various parts of my account: Professor Roland Dannreuther, Professor Artemy Magun, Professor Alexander Semyonov, Professor Miodrag Jovanović, Dr Adrian Blau, Noel Boulting and Lisa Pelot. Furthermore, I owe special gratitude to Professor Matt Matravers and to all of my fellow members of the Working papers Group organised at the University of York: Beth Kahn, Luís Rodrigues, James Hodgson, James Armstrong and John Baxter. I am greatly indebted for Professor Glen Newey’s thought-provoking and very detailed commentary on what would become one of the chapters of this thesis. Also I would like to extend my gratitude to Dr Stephen Clucas and to the two readers for the Intellectual History Review who have helped me improve a draft chapter of my thesis and prepare it for publication. 3 My most intimate gratitude goes to Mima Rajić who brought so much colour to the years that I have spent researching Hobbes. There are no limits to her patience and understanding. Finally, none of this would have ever been possible without the unprecedented level of faith, support, devotion and sacrifice that came from my family: from my mother Lidija Simendić and from my grandmother Sevleta Lalević. I stand grateful to them and to my late grandfather, Marko Lalević, whose kindness continues to inspire me. My success is their success too. 4 Table of contents Introduction ........................................................................................................ 6 Hobbesian personation in recent scholarship ............................................................ 10 Methodology and structure ....................................................................................... 18 1. Cicero and Hobbes on personhood and persona civitatis .......................... 26 Hobbes’s (re)interpretation of “persona” and its consequences ............................... 33 Hobbes and Cicero on persona and the distinction between natural and civil law .. 43 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 55 2. Hobbes’s accounts of personhood and representation and their medieval theological and legal background ................................................................... 58 Theological background of Hobbes’s account of personhood .................................. 59 The theological aspect of Hobbes’s account of personation and representation .. 64 Parson as a person and a corporation ................................................................... 75 Hobbes and persona ficta ......................................................................................... 78 Coke, Hobbes and the idea of corporate personhood ........................................... 88 Two ways of describing Hobbes’s account of corporate personhood .................. 93 3. Hobbes’s definition of a person ................................................................. 100 The distinction between a person and a persona: the relationship between the representative and the represented .......................................................................... 103 Hobbes’s definitions of a person ............................................................................ 107 Will and agency ...................................................................................................... 112 Intelligent substance ............................................................................................... 116 Unity of the three defining elements of Hobbesian person .................................... 119 Hobbes’s account of authorisation and responsibility ............................................ 121 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 128 4. The personality of the state ....................................................................... 130 The distinction between persons and non-persons ................................................. 131 Artificial persons ..................................................................................................... 138 Persons “by Fiction” ............................................................................................... 141 Person(a) of the state as a specific kind of person(a) ............................................. 148 The underlying consensus in Skinner-Runciman debate ........................................ 151 The defining elements of commonwealth’s person(a) ............................................ 154 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 164 5. Hobbesian personation applied: a multi-perspectival view of the relationships within and outside the commonwealth .................................. 169 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 169 Natural and civil contexts within and outside the commonwealth ......................... 174 The relationship between the subjects and their sovereign ..................................... 179 The subjects’ perspective ................................................................................... 179 The sovereign’s perspective ............................................................................... 187 The relationship between the sovereigns (Hobbes’s theory of international relations) ................................................................................................................................ 191 The relationship between a sovereign and God ...................................................... 199 The relationship between God and a subject .......................................................... 204 Disentangling the Naaman issue ........................................................................ 206 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 211 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 218 Bibliography ..................................................................................................
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