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Chapter 4 Multifaceted Ecology Between Organicism, Emergentism and Reductionism Donato Bergandi1 the Classical Holism-Reductioni

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Chapter 4 Multifaceted Ecology Between Organicism, Emergentism and Reductionism Donato Bergandi1 the Classical Holism-Reductioni Chapter 4 Multifaceted Ecology Between Organicism, Emergentism and Reductionism Donato Bergandi1 The classical holism-reductionism debate, which has been of major importance to the development of ecological theory and methodology, is an epistemological patchwork. At any moment, there is a risk of it slipping into an incoherent, chaotic Tower of Babel. Yet philosophy, like the sciences, requires that words and their correlative concepts be used rigorously and univocally. The prevalent use of everyday language in the holism-reductionism issue may give a false impression regarding its underlying clarity and coherence. In reality, the conceptual categories underlying the debate have yet to be accurately defined and consistently used. There is a need to map out a clear conceptual, logical and epistemological framework. To this end, we propose a minimalist epistemological foundation. The issue is easier to grasp if we keep in mind that holism generally represents the ontological background of emergentism, but does not necessarily coincide with it. We therefore speak in very loose terms of the “holism-reductionism” debate, although it would really be better characterised by the terms emergentism and reductionism. The confrontation between these antagonistic paradigms unfolds at various semantic and operational levels. In definitional terms, there is not just emergentism and reductionism, but various kinds of emergentisms and reductionisms. In fact, Ayala (1974; see also Ruse 1988; Mayr 1988; Beckermann et al. 1992; Jones 2000) have proposed a now classic trilogy among various semantic domains – ontology, methodology and epistemology. This trilogy has been used as a kind of epistemological screen to interpret the reductionist field. It is just as meaningful and useful, however, to apply the same trilogy to the emergentist field. By revealing the basic assumptions of each, we should be better able to understand the points that are similar and shared, as well as the incommensurable ones. The first question regarding the emergentism and reductionism debate concerns the type of explanation the sciences are seeking. At present in the sciences – from physics to the human sciences – the ontological and epistemological foundation is essentially naturalistic and materialistic, meaning that all natural (or social) objects, events and processes can be understood without reference to extra- or supernatural (vitalistic or theological) entities, 1 D. Bergandi - Muséum National d’Histoire Naturelle, Paris, France : e-mail: [email protected] A. Schwarz and K. Jax (eds.), Ecology Revisited: Reflecting on Concepts, Advancing Science, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-9744-6_4, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011. 1 causes, aims or explanations. The order and laws structuring natural reality are intelligible and, in principle, there is no limit to naturalistic explanations. The existence of this philosophical substrate – the existence of a scientific and naturalistic epistemology – should be taken into account every time the key words ‘emergentism’ and ‘reductionism’ appear. In ecology – and, without exception, in the other natural and human sciences – the classical confrontation between emergentism and reductionism plays a very important and structuring role. It is necessary to be aware that their basic assumptions involve different and generally antinomian ontologies (worldviews, the “true” structures of reality, or in other words, our “bets” on the structure of reality), methodologies (research strategies) and epistemologies.2 The existence of these specific semantic domains should be kept in mind every time we approach this issue. Holism and Reductionism: An Epistemological Confrontation? Today’s perspective of reductionist cosmological ontology has its antecedents in the mechanistic worldview of previous centuries. Gradually, from Leucippus and Democritus to Dalton and, among others, Bohr, reality has been defined from an atomistic perspective: reality consists of distinct, discrete, indivisible atoms with a fixed spatio-temporal amplitude. Unlike reductionism, the holistic ontological perspective of emergentism is continuistic and relational: reality consists of acontinuum of events and processes that are intrinsically interconnected and interdependent. At first sight both reductionism and emergentism currently share a common scientific philosophy, namely that all biological phenomena are fundamentally physico-chemical and that the laws of physics and chemistry are applicable to biological phenomena. Nevertheless, emergentism holds that the various levels of organisation (physical, biological and psycho- sociological) are characterised by the acquisition of new and specific properties (emergent properties). These properties increase the degree of complexity of a given level compared with the various levels of which it is composed (hierarchical organisation). For this reason, even if physics and chemistry are normally applicable to, say, ecological phenomena, each level of organisation requires appropriate laws and theories that allow for an understanding of 2 In this context the word ‘epistemology’ connotes the more limited and specific meaning of the research domain concerning the relationships among theories and laws that belong to different different organisational levels. In other words, it is characterised by the epistemic challenge of “heterogeneous reduction”, or “theoretical reductionism” (Ruse 1988). 2 the specific properties of that particular level. By contrast, reductionism denies the existence of emergent properties or else considers them an epiphenomenon strictly dependent on the state of our knowledge – what is emergent today will lose its emergent character tomorrow (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, pp. 149–151). These ontological assumptions have, of course, significant consequences in the methodological and epistemological domains. In the methodological domain, the two perspectives view the analytical method in a very different way. Reductionism considers that at a given level of organisation, analytical study of constituent parts and their relationships is necessary and sufficient to predict, or at least explain, all the properties of that level. Fundamentally, reductionism is a “bottom-up” strategy. It takes into account the level at which the events to be explained occur (ecological phenomena, for instance) as well as the lower levels that contribute to that explanation (for example, genetics, chemistry or physics). An analytical and additive method, therefore, dissects the entity, or decompose the process, under examination into its component parts, or phases, and attempts to take into consideration the relationships among them. A successive summation of the individual component properties or interactional properties should allow extrapolation of the global properties of the entity as a whole. In some cases, this dissective and synthetic process should allow us to formulate some more general theories or laws. Methodologically, the emergentist approach, while recognising the need for analysis, considers its explanatory power limited. In fact, according to an emergentist and hierarchical perspective, the feedback loops that link different levels of organisation play a role of utmost importance in the determination and causation of the emergent properties. From a methodological point of view, the higher and lower levels adjacent to the primary object of study are considered differently than in methodological reductionism. This approach does not limit the analysis to the constitutive parts of – or their relationships in – a specific level of organisation. In other words, for this “top-down” approach, both the higher levels (downward causation) and the lower ones participate in determining the properties of specific levels. Thus, a multi-level triadic approach – where at least three levels of organisation are considered simultaneously – is held to be a methodological necessity and is the main characteristic of the emergentist methodology (Feibleman 1954; Campbell 1974; Salthe 1985; Bergandi 1995; El-Hani and Pereira 2000). Epistemologically, reductionism is a mono-directional bottom-up explanatory strategy. This approach is directly descended from nineteenth century positivism and from neo-positivism 3 (1920s and 1930s). In its struggle against the intrusiveness of metaphysics in science, neo- positivism sought a unification of science based on the language, laws and theories of physics. Epistemological reductionism maintains that the theories and laws of a specific organisational level can be – and sometimes must be – “reduced” to the theories and laws of a more “fundamental” field of science (Woodger 1952; Nagel 1961; Levins and Lewontin 1980; Bunge 1991; Jones 2000). According to this epistemological perspective, an ideal scientific development will involve, in the long run, the “de-substantialisation” of non-fundamental sciences. For instance, taking into account the relationships between ecology (secondary science) and physics (primary science), ecological laws and theories could be reduced to physical laws and theories (heterogeneous reduction). Were this to occur, the process of integration, incorporation and absorption of ecological phenomena in the physical domain would provide a larger and clearer understanding of all the phenomena that previously constituted the objects of ecological research. Such a hypothetical reduction would determine the birth of a new and more meaningful physical science, emerging from the “dilution”
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