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Crime Moderate Risk Organised Criminal Groups Are Active Along Northern Areas Along the Border with Kosovo and in Skopje, but They Do Not Target Foreigners

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Crime Moderate Risk Organised Criminal Groups Are Active Along Northern Areas Along the Border with Kosovo and in Skopje, but They Do Not Target Foreigners Riskline / Country Report / 29 August 2021 NORTH MACEDONIA Overall risk level High Reconsider travel Can be dangerous and may present unexpected security risks Travel is possible, but there is a potential for disruptions Overview Emergency Numbers Medical 194 Upcoming Events 01 September 2021 - 02 September 2021 Medium risk: Entry requirements to be tightened from 1 September – Update Effective 1 September, all inbound travellers are required to present either a negative COVID-19 PCR test result no older than 72 hours prior to entry, proof of full vaccination against COVID-19 or proof of having recovered from COVID-19 within the previous 45 days; transit travellers who stay less than five hours are exempted. Macedonian citizens who arrive without these documents must quarantine for seven days upon entry. Riskline / Country Report / 29 August 2021 / North Macedonia 2 Travel Advisories Riskline / Country Report / 29 August 2021 / North Macedonia 3 Summary North Macedonia is a High Risk destination: reconsider travel. High Risk locations can be dangerous and may present unexpected security risks. Travel is possible, but there is a potential for severe or widespread disruptions. Covid-19 High Risk In August 2021, the country saw a sharp uptick in new COVID-19 cases due to the spread of the delta virus variant. A health pass system is in effect for some public venues. Political Instability Medium Risk There are longstanding tensions and animosity between the country's ethnic Albanians and Macedonian nationalists, which remain despite the efforts of the European Union (EU) and pro-West Prime Minister Zoran Zaev to give ethnic Albanians more local power. Tensions in ties with Bulgaria are hindering negotiations for North Macedonia's EU membership. Conflict Moderate Risk Following the brief 2001 civil war between ethnic Albanians and Macedonian government forces, political violence significantly decreased, but tensions remain. Terrorism Moderate Risk The country is not at great risk of terror attacks as it is not a target nor a haven for known terror groups, but attacks by hardline Albanian nationalists are possible. Police and emergency response services are adequate. Riskline / Country Report / 29 August 2021 / North Macedonia 4 Unrest Moderate Risk Protests over political and ethnic issues as well as football are common and can turn violent. Most rallies are limited to Skopje, Ohrid, Bitola, Kavadarci and Kičevo. Crime Moderate Risk Organised criminal groups are active along northern areas along the border with Kosovo and in Skopje, but they do not target foreigners. Petty crime is common in market and tourist areas. Police services are generally reliable, yet hindered by a lack of resources and demands for bribes. Natural and Environmental Moderate Risk The country is vulnerable to earthquakes and flash floods during heavy rainfall and the winter and spring season. The infrastructure in Skopje and the rest of the country is hardly adequate, but emergency response services are generally good, yet less so if natural disasters are very large or take place in remote areas. Health and Medical Medium Risk Health facilities around the country suffer from chronic shortages of medicine and equipment. Mosquito- and tick-borne diseases, including West Nile virus, are present in the country. Local Travel Moderate Risk Road travel is generally safe, but road conditions and driving habits can be poor in rural areas. Air travel is safe and public transport services, buses specifically, are good, excluding rail travel due to poor maintenance. Petty crime is a frequent problem on public transport. Riskline / Country Report / 29 August 2021 / North Macedonia 5 Political Overview : Medium Risk In May 2017, Social Democratic Union (SDSM) leader Zoran Zaev formed a new government in partnership with Albanian minority parties. Despite the creation of a new government, protests that began the previous year over the December 2016 election results continued, becoming increasingly nationalistic in tone as conservatives accused Zaev of selling the country out to foreign powers. Since 2017, the opposition VMRO-DPMNE has led protests against Zaev’s government and plans to solve the name dispute with Greece by changing the country name to North Macedonia, which was ratified by Parliament in January 2019, paving the way for the country to join NATO. However, the failure of the European Union (EU) to commit to a firm timetable for North Macedonia's ascension process led to Zaev calling snap elections for April 2020. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the elections were delayed until July and saw sharply reduced turnout. After a month of talks, the SDSM formed a coalition with the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) minority Albanian party on 18 August 2020 by agreeing to rotate Zaev out as prime minister before the next round of elections planned in 2024. There are no recent incidents Riskline / Country Report / 29 August 2021 / North Macedonia 6 Conflict : Moderate Risk Civil War: In 2001, violence broke out between ethnic Albanians and Macedonian government forces. The conflict was low-intensity, with upwards of 70 deaths over the course of the year and over 100,000 people internally displaced. It ended in August 2001 with the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement between the government and representatives of the ethnic Albanian community. Most Albanian groups that once posed a serious threat, such as the National Liberation Army (NLA), have now disbanded. The Albanian National Army (ANA) opposed this disbanding and it, alongside other NLA factions, continue to demand greater autonomy or separatism for ethnic Albanians in North Macedonia. Ethnic Tensions: The security situation in North Macedonia has stabilised since the brief civil war in 2001. Clashes involving ethnic Albanian militants and criminal gangs associated with them are now rare, though certain areas are still subject to violence, including areas north and to the west of Gostivar, Tetovo, Skopje, Kumanovo, and along the highways that link these cities. While attacks directed against travellers are unlikely, the possibility of being caught up in violence remains. Amid a political crisis that began after the April 2014 general elections, a series of attacks targeting the government and security forces took place, with rejectionist factions of the NLA claiming several of them, including an attack on the government building in Skopje in October 2014, a successful weapons heist at a police base on the Kosovo border in April 2015 and grenade attacks targeting political party offices. These security incidents eventually culminated in May 2015, when police special forces fought a large body of ethnic Albanian militants in the northern city of Kumanovo over two days. Eight police officers and 14 gunmen were killed before order was restored; 30 people were ultimately arrested on terrorism charges over the clashes. While no serious disturbances took place during the 2017 nationalist protests over the formation of a government with ethnic Albanian parties comparable to the deadly events of 2014-2015, unanticipated domestic or regional events have the potential to spark further violence involving ethnic Albanian militants who continue to dispute the post-2001 peace terms. Border Disputes: Prior to Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the Government of Kosovo stated before that they intended to question the location of their country’s Riskline / Country Report / 29 August 2021 / North Macedonia 7 border with North Macedonia. They claim it was decided between Macedonia and the Former Yugoslavia in the late 1990s and bears no relation to the ethnic or geographic territory of Kosovo. However, since Kosovan independence in February 2008, relations between the two sides have improved. There is now a low risk of conflict regarding this border. There are also deep-rooted tensions between Athens and Skopje over the use of the name “Macedonia”. Greece has traditionally believed that by allowing Skopje to use the name, the country would be enabled to make territorial claim over the northern Greek region of the same name. With Greece insisting that the country should have been known by a different name, the version ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)’ was often used internationally on Greece’s request . A breakthrough happened on 17 June 2018, when Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev agreed to rename FYROM as ‘Republic of Northern Macedonia’. The agreement, which would pave the way to Skopje's accession to the European Union (EU) and the NATO, was met with resistance from portions of the population in both countries. The deal was ratified by the Macedonian parliament in early July and a referendum to amend the constitution was set to be held in autumn 2018. Riskline / Country Report / 29 August 2021 / North Macedonia 8 Terrorism Domestic Terrorism: Domestic terrorism in North Macedonia is primarily motivated by ethnic nationalist grievances from hardline Albanian nationalists with prior experience fighting both Serbian and North Macedonian forces across the former Yugoslavia since the 1990s. The most serious incident in recent years involved a faction of the pro-Albanian National Liberation Army that clashed with security forces in Kumanovo in May 2015 [see Ethnic Tensions in the Conflict section]. Overall, however, attacks by Albanian nationalist groups have decreased sharply in recent years, while the core of the NLA has disbanded as part of the post-civil war
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