Containing Kosovo Gordon N

Containing Kosovo Gordon N. Bardos ∗ The international community’s five-year performance review of its efforts in Kosovo has come in, and the result is a failing grade. By almost any measure, the North Atlan- tic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN), Kosovo’s own political leaders, and the myriad other organizations and states ostensibly struggling to foster peace, stability, human rights, and a multiethnic society in Kosovo have utterly failed in their efforts. As Human Rights Watch summed up the situation in Kosovo in the wake of the March 2004 pogroms in which twenty people were killed, four thousand were driven from their homes, and thirty-six Christian churches and monasteries were destroyed: The security organizations in Kosovo—KFOR, UNMIK international police, and the KPS—failed catastrophically in their mandate to protect minority communities dur- ing the March 2004 violence…. The international community appears to be in abso- lute denial about its own failures in Kosovo.1 Yet, while representing the most serious outbreak of violence in Kosovo in the five years since NATO and the UN assumed responsibility for the province, this violence was certainly not an isolated occurrence. In reality, ethnic minorities, in the words of a report issued jointly by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), have faced an “unrelenting tide of violence” in the province since 1999.2 In a 2003 report, Amnesty International pointed out: … minorities in Kosovo continue to be denied access both to their basic human rights, and to any effective redress for violations and abuses of these rights. Almost four years after the end of the war in Kosovo, despite the efforts of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the UN Civilian Police (UNMIK Police) to provide security and protection, members of minority communities continue to both suffer and fear assaults by the majority community on their lives and property…. This climate of fear, insecurity, and mistrust … has resulted in the effective denial of the right of ethnic minorities to enjoy freedom of movement in Kosovo. Additionally, those who are able to gain some measure of freedom of movement, find themselves subjected to ∗ Gordon N. Bardos is Assistant Director of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University. 1 Failure to Protect: Anti Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004 (New York: Human Rights Watch, July 2004), 2-3; emphasis added. 2 Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo (period covering October 2000 through February 2001), UNHCR and OSCE Mission in Kosovo, March 2001, Executive Summary. 21 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL both direct and indirect discrimination when seeking access to basic civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights.3 Thus, in 21st-century Europe, in a province administered by the United Nations, individuals in Kosovo towns such as Kisa are living behind barbed wire. The impotent monitoring of violence against ethnic minorities, however, is only one item in a long list of the international community’s failings in Kosovo. But since failure is not an ex- cuse for not having a policy, the question remains, What should the international community do about Kosovo? Some argue that the current status quo in the province is untenable and that moving towards independence is the only feasible political option. In reality, however, as will be argued below, the current thrust of international policy, intent on maintaining a strict “standards before status” approach regarding the Serbian province’s future, is the only realistic policy available for Kosovo for three reasons. First, there are simply no responsible institutions or individuals in Kosovo to whom sovereignty could be transferred. The actions of Kosovo’s political leaders, security organizations, and civil society institutions over the past five years have shown that none are capable of creating a state that will respect the rights of non-Albanian ethnic communities or the security of neighboring states. Second, everything we have learned in the Balkans over the past fifteen years dur- ing the breakup of Yugoslavia, and especially over the past five years in Kosovo, shows that a spillover effect is very much in operation in southeastern Europe. Grant- ing independence to Kosovo would very seriously endanger the future viability of Ma- cedonia, the stability of southern Serbia’s Presevo Valley, the still-shaky Dayton Peace Process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and could complicate the still unresolved process of state-building in Albania itself. Third, in a province with such a weak economy and such poorly developed institutions, the possibility that organized crime or terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda could take control of the province would increase considerably, creating a potential Afghanistan in Europe’s backyard. Finally, the Kosovo case is important for another reason. In the debates over U.S. policy and the Iraq war, some argue that Kosovo is an example of how Iraq “should have been done.” Former State Department spokesman Jamie Rubin, for instance, claimed “Kosovo has been a success.”4 Such a mindset inevitably led many people to believe that other interventions could similarly “succeed.” Yet any truthful, intelligent, and serious examination of the aftermath of the Kosovo intervention inevitably leads to precisely the opposite conclusion. To avoid the mistakes of the Kosovo operation from being made again in other parts of the world, we must ignore the hype of bureaucratic spin-masters and gain a more realistic understanding of the complexities of intervention, ethnic conflict, and state-building in the Balkans. 3 “Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo/Kosova) ‘Prisoners in our own homes’: Amnesty Interna- tional’s Concerns for the Human Rights of Minorities in Kosovo/Kosova” (Amnesty Interna- tional, May 2003), Introduction. 4 See James P. Rubin, “Honoring Nation-Building,” Washington Post, 19 October 2004, A23. 22 VOL. III, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2004 The Case for Containment Since 1999, the international community has been engaged in what (until the Iraq conflict) had been considered the most expensive effort in democratization and state- building yet attempted. According to one estimate, Kosovo has received “more money, aid and support than any other war-ravaged country.”5 Yet even this tremendous international effort, in an area no larger than greater Los Angeles and with a population of only two million people, has achieved none of its stated goals. Kosovo remains wracked by innumerable social, political, cultural, ethnic, and security problems, all of which the international community has been practically impotent to solve. Kosovo’s current unemployment rate is estimated to be as high as seventy percent.6 Kosovo’s governmental institutions have little ability to raise revenue on their own; as a recent report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) notes, “the majority of Kosovo Albanian individuals and businesses fail to pay their utility bills and consumer taxes.”7 The flow of drugs through Kosovo has increased since NATO took control of the province, as has Kosovo’s importance as a transit point in the traf- ficking of women from Eastern European countries to brothels in Western Europe.8 Five years after the war, the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) still has not satisfied even the most basic infrastructural needs of the province; large parts of Kosovo, including the main city, Pristina, remain plagued by water shutoffs and electricity blackouts several hours a day. As one analyst has noted, “Infrastructure such as electricity and water actually run slightly worse than they did under Serbian rule.”9 Kosovo residents are right in claiming that this is due in large part to UNMIK’s in- competence and corruption. Yet this state of affairs is part of a larger story plaguing Kosovo: the fact that Kosovo on its own is not an economically viable entity, and the overall weakness and corruption of Kosovo’s own institutions and leadership. Given these problems, any hasty changes to Kosovo’s status will in all likelihood have sig- nificant negative spillover effects throughout the region. They could also lead to a se- 5 As reported by Helena Smith, “Angry Kosovars Call on ‘Colonial’ UN Occupying Force to Leave,” The Observer (London), 19 October 2003. 6 As cited by Jehona Gjurgjela, “Kosovo: Murders Expose Divided Community,” IWPR’s Bal- kan Crisis Report, 24 January 2003. 7 As cited in Collapse in Kosovo (Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels: International Crisis Group), 22 April 2004, 38. The same problem holds true for Albanian-populated areas in neighboring Macedonia. According to one report, more than half of the citizens of Tetovo do not pay their electricity bills. See “Macedonia: No Room for Complacency.” Skopje/Brussels: Inter- national Crisis Group Europe, Report No. 149, 23 October 2003, 16. 8 Maggie O’Kane, “Kosovo Drug Mafia Supply Heroin to Europe,” The Guardian Unlimited, 13 March 2000. By 2002, Albanian criminal gangs in Britain, for instance, were estimated to control 75 percent of the brothels in London. Many Albanian criminals enter Britain posing as Kosovo Albanian refuges. See Stewart Tendler, “Albanian Gangs Use Balkan Violence to Invade Underworld,” The Times (London), 25 November 2002, p. 10. 9 See the comments of Nicholas White, as cited by Robert McMahon, “Kosovo: Under Mount- ing Criticism, UN Considers Changes to Policy,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Feature Article, 13 August 2004. 23 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL curity vacuum that could potentially affect Western Europe and the United States as well. The Weakness of Kosovo Institutions A report by the ICG on the March pogroms claimed that Kosovo is: … deeply troubled, lacking institutions, leadership and the culture to absorb shocks and contain its violent, criminal minority … the inadequate responses of Kosovo Al- banian politicians, media and society to the violence have also demonstrated Kos- ovo’s lack of readiness for final status….

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