In Response to Yasukuni: the Curious Approach the Chinese and South Korean Governments Take Toward an Unresolved Link to the Past
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Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2013-06 In response to Yasukuni: the curious approach the Chinese and South Korean governments take toward an unresolved link to the past Lewentowicz, Steven E. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/34697 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS IN RESPONSE TO YASUKUNI: THE CURIOUS APPROACH THE CHINESE AND SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENTS TAKE TOWARD AN UNRESOLVED LINK TO THE PAST by Steven E. Lewentowicz June 2013 Thesis Advisor: Alice Miller Second Reader: Robert Weiner Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2013 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS IN RESPONSE TO YASUKUNI: THE CURIOUS APPROACH THE CHINESE AND SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENTS TAKE TOWARD AN UNRESOLVED LINK TO THE PAST 6. AUTHOR(S) Steven E. Lewentowicz 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943–5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Lingering historical animosities between Japan and its Northeast Asian neighbors—China and South Korea—inhibit improvements in Japan’s bilateral relationships with these countries and contribute to regional instability. One of the ways Japan antagonizes its neighbors is when the Japanese prime minister pays tribute to Japanese war dead through ceremonial worship at the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo—an event that Chinese and Koreans criticize as honoring Japanese imperialism. When Japanese prime ministers visit Yasukuni, they elicit responses from Beijing and Seoul that are widely known. What is less understood is what these responses can reveal about the starkly different political systems these two countries employ. The study examines 64 Japanese prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine since 1951 and the resultant responses from Beijing and Seoul, and argues that the difference in political system had little impact on the approaches both governments took to these visits. While political systems may not have shaped the responses, they were important in the way each government responded to public opinion. The thesis concludes that when either government objected to official visits to Yasukuni, the underlying motivation for both governments was and remains the same: To prevent a resurgence of Japanese militarism. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Japan, Tokyo, People’s Republic of China, Beijing, Republic of 15. NUMBER OF Korea, Seoul, Yasukuni Shrine, Shinto, Political Systems, Authoritarian, Democracy, Anti- PAGES Japanese Nationalism 135 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited IN RESPONSE TO YASUKUNI: THE CURIOUS APPROACH THE CHINESE AND SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENTS TAKE TOWARD AN UNRESOLVED LINK TO THE PAST Steven E. Lewentowicz Major, United States Army B.S., North Georgia College and State University, 2000 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (FAR EAST, SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2013 Author: Steven E. Lewentowicz Approved by: Alice Miller Thesis Advisor Robert Weiner Second Reader Harold Trinkunas Chair, Department of National Security Affairs THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT Lingering historical animosities between Japan and its Northeast Asian neighbors— China and South Korea—inhibit improvements in Japan’s bilateral relationships with these countries and contribute to regional instability. One of the ways Japan antagonizes its neighbors is when the Japanese prime minister pays tribute to Japanese war dead through ceremonial worship at the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo—an event that Chinese and Koreans criticize as honoring Japanese imperialism. When Japanese prime ministers visit Yasukuni, they elicit responses from Beijing and Seoul that are widely known. What is less understood is what these responses can reveal about the starkly different political systems these two countries employ. The study examines 64 Japanese prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine since 1951 and the resultant responses from Beijing and Seoul, and argues that the difference in political system had little impact on the approaches both governments took to these visits. While political systems may not have shaped the responses, they were important in the way each government responded to public opinion. The thesis concludes that when either government objected to official visits to Yasukuni, the underlying motivation for both governments was and remains the same: To prevent a resurgence of Japanese militarism. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. IMPORTANCE ................................................................................................2 B. THE LITERATURE ........................................................................................4 1. China .....................................................................................................5 2. The Republic of Korea.........................................................................9 3. Japan ...................................................................................................11 C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES ...........................................................13 D. THESIS OVERVIEW ...................................................................................15 II. SHINTO AND YASUKUNI ......................................................................................17 A. SHINTO ..........................................................................................................17 B. YASUKUNI ....................................................................................................18 1. History of the Shrine ..........................................................................18 2. Enshrinement .....................................................................................19 3. Politicization of Yasukuni .................................................................20 a. Prime Minister Visits to Yasukuni..........................................20 b. Capacity of Prime Minister Visits ...........................................23 c. Class-A War Criminals ...........................................................23 C. CONCLUDING REMARKS ........................................................................25 III. POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND STATE LEADERSHIP .........................................27 A. POLITICAL SYSTEMS ...............................................................................27 1. Consolidated Democracies ................................................................27 2. Transitional Democracies ..................................................................28 3. Authoritarianism................................................................................29 B. THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: POLITICAL SYSTEM AND STATE LEADERSHIP ........................................................................30 1. Mao Era Authoritarianism ...............................................................31 2. Deng Era Authoritarianism ..............................................................35 3. Post-Tiananmen Authoritarianism ..................................................38 C. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: POLITICAL SYSTEM AND STATE LEADERSHIP ...............................................................................................39 1. Authoritarian South Korea (1948–1988) .........................................39 2. Democratization (1988-present) .......................................................44 D. CONCLUDING REMARKS ........................................................................45 IV. BEIJING’S RESPONSE TO JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER VISITS