Yasukuni and the Aesthetics and Ideology of Kobayashi Yoshinori's

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Revisioning a Japanese Spiritual Recovery through Manga: Yasukuni and the Aesthetics and Ideology of Kobayashi Yoshinori’s “Gomanism”

James Shields

– Kato Etsuro, “Shin rinen manga no giho” (Techniques for a New Manga), 1942

Send to Kindle Yasukuni Shrine is the final stronghold in defence of the history, spirit, and culture of Japan. Summary – Kobayashi Yoshinori, Yasukuniron, 2005 This essay provides a critical analysis of the aesthetic ideology of “Gomanism” in the manga In 1992, just as Japan’s economic bubble was in of Kobayashi Yoshinori (b. 1953), particularly process of bursting, a series of manga began to Yasukuniron (On Yasukuni, 2005) and Tennoron appear in the weekly Japanese tabloidSPA! (On the Emperor, 2009), in order to flesh out under the title Gomanism sengen (Haughtiness the implications of the author’s “revisionist” or Insolence Manifesto).2 Authored by approach to Japanese religion, politics and Kobayashi Yoshinori (b. 1953), this series history blurred the line between manga and graphic novel to engage in forthright social and political commentary with an unabashedly nationalistic slant. Over the following two decades, Kobayashi and his works have become a publishing phenomenon. As of 2013, there are over thirty volumes of Gomanism (and Neo- Gomanism) manga, including several “special editions”—such as the best-sellingShin gomanizumu sengen special: Sensoron(Neo- Gomanism Manifesto Special: On War, 1998) and, more recently,Gomanizumu sengen special: Tennoron (Gomanism Manifesto Special: On the Emperor, 2009)—that have caused controversy and even international criticism for their revisionist portrayal of [Figure 1] modern Japanese history. At its most general, Gōmanism is a graphic and rhetorical style marked by withering sarcasm and blustering Manga is an art that should warn of or actively anger at what is perceived as Japanese attack all things in the world that are unjust, capitulation to the West and China on matters irrational, unnatural, or incongruous with the of foreign policy and the treatment of recent will of the nation. East Asian history. Its very success, however,

1 11 | 47 | 7 APJ | JF warrants closer treatment, particular with the perceived rise in nationalistic feeling associated with the new Liberal Democratic Party administration of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō.

In 2005, Kobayashi published a graphic work [Figure 3] External others as “monsters” entitled Shin gomanizumu sengen special: (from left to right pp. 14, 121, 138) Yasukuniron (Neo-Gomanism Manifesto Special: On Yasukuni), which tackles the much- debated “problem” of Yasukuni Shrine, the Yasukuni and the Legacy of State Shinto militaristic religious complex that has become a lightning-rod for debates regarding Japanese The shrine that would become Yasukuni was historical memory—especially with regard to founded in 1869, a year following the Meiji the military expansionism in East Asia that led Restoration, as a place for “pacifying” the to the Asia-Pacific War (1931–1945).spirits of all those killed in wars fought for the “nation.” Originally known as Tokyo Shokonsha Frequently overlooked in discussions of (literally, Tokyo shrine for the invocation of the Yasukuni, however, are a number of complex dead), the name was changed to Yasukuni Jinja issues related to its religious doctrines—in in 1879 at the behest of the Meiji Emperor. As particular, the interpretation of Shinto Kobayashi notes, “Yasukuni” was chosen to presented at Yasukuni and the dominant imply “pacify the nation,” and in a (State) ideology of Japan’s military era, so-called Shinto context this was understood to mean “State Shinto” (kokka Shinto). This essay that the primary if not sole purpose of this examines the portrayal of the Yasukuni Issue shrine was to pacify the spirits of the war dead, within Yasukuniron, in order to: a) flesh out the which would help bring tranquility (and characteristics of Kobayashi’s Gomanism in protection) to the national body kokutai( ). 3 relation to the “theology” of State Shinto; b) Administered directly by the ministries of the examine the power and limits of manga as a Army and Navy, by the time of the Russo- representational form for teaching about the Japanese War (1904–1905), Yasukuni had complex nexus of religion, politics and history entered into popular consciousness as a symbol in modern Japan. Finally, I connect this work of Japanese imperial conquest and a focus for with the more recentTennoron , particularly the state-sponsored cult of the war dead. with regard to the status of the emperor as a Today, Yasukuni enshrines the “souls” of 2.5 “god” (kami). million people, including roughly 57,000 women, 21,000 Koreans, 28,000 Taiwanese, at least three Britons and, most controversially by far, 14 individuals indicted as “Class A” war criminals. 4 All of these men and women “offered their lives to the nation in the upheavals that brought forth the modern state” between 1853 and the present. As such, according to Kobayashi (and Yasukuni itself), those enshrined at Yasukuni are anything but [Figure 2] Depictions of war dead as “mere victims” (tan naru giseisha). They are “heroic spirits” (from left to right, pp. 41, rather “martyrs” (junnansha), “heroic spirits” 19, 45, 137) (eirei), and “(protective) gods of the nation”

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(gokokushin). As we shall see, the intertwined glories of self-sacrifice and martyrdom. As I will tropes of martyrdom and victimhood play an show in this essay, while Kobayashi’s manga important role in the attempt to “restore” revisioningof Yasukuni also relies on this basic Yasukuni—and by extension, the true Japanese set of theological or ideological premises, spirit and identity. Yasukuniron indicates a subtle but significant shift in focus away from the ancient period, the In contrast to the coverage of the various Imperial House and the state and towards a political issues raised by Yasukuni, the more populist, modernist and possibly fascist specific religious or “theological” elements are rendering of “State Shinto.” I am using the often overlooked in popular coverage as well as term “revisioning” deliberately to refer to two within scholarly analysis. Yasukuni is, after all, things: (a) the technique of “revisionist” a “shrine,” and one that has played a central history—which Yasukuniron certainly engages role in the formulation and expression of a in; and (b) the more literal sense of “making particular religious ideology that is known over” or “recreating Yasukuni in a visual way” today as “State Shinto” (kokka Shinto). While via the evocative graphic techniques of manga. there remains much debate over the precise meaning of State Shinto, there is consensus that modern Shinto nationalism has roots in the so-called National Learning or Nativist School (kokugaku) of the mid- to late Edo period (1600–1867). While Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801) is the most significant early Figure in Shinto revivalism, it was his self- proclaimed successor, Hirata Atsutane (1776–1843), who transFigured nativist doctrine into a more “heroic” and populist form, focused on loyalty, patriotism and attunement to the spirits of the dead.

The basic “theology” of State Shinto, at least in its later, wartime incarnation, might be summarized as follows: (a) all Japanese belong to a single national body kokutai( ), whose “head” is the emperor—not any specific person so much as the “unbroken” Yamato imperial line; (b) the Imperial House, by virtue of its lineal connection to the heavenlykami , as confirmed in the sacred classics, is sacrosanct [Figure 4] Slavish politicians, p. 9 and inviolable; (c) all Japanese, by virtue of being members of the national body, owe their complete allegiance and filial piety to the The Gomanist Truth about the Yasukuni emperor, a living kami; (d) by extension, all problem Japanese must obey the directives of the (imperial) state, even to the point of giving The title of the preface toYasukuniron— “The their lives for the kokutai. This is also the Ignorance behind the Yasukuni Problem” theological foundation of Yasukuni(“Muchi ni yoru Yasukuni mondai”) 5—is pure Shrine—albeit with a greater emphasis on the Gomanism. Here and throughout the manga

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Kobayashi asserts that the entire “problem” of well-suited to manga format but also reflects a Yasukuni is based on a widespread (at times, it particular style of academic discourse in Japan, would seem, universal) ignorance of the various where linear structure tends to be considerably issues involved, an ignorance willfullyless important than in the West. As an opening perpetuated by national politicians and the gambit, Yasukuniron begins with a stark (“left-wing”) mass media. However, the Truth is example of popular misunderstanding out there (or rather, in here, i.e., the pages of regarding Yasukuni—in this case, ignorance the Yasukuniron), and possession of that Truth will Shinto doctrine and practice ofbunshi set us all free from our collective blindness. In (literally, “separation of worship,” but best short, do not expect to find here anytranslated as ‘the ritual separation and transfer postmodern prevarications about the nature of of an enshrined kami to another shrine’). 9 After truth and reality. It can and will be uncovered, noting, quite correctly, that politicians in the using “objective” methods of historicalNational Diet frequently call for the investigation (coupled, of course, with stark “separation” of the enshrined Class A war and frequently disturbing visuals). 6 criminals at Yasukuni, K argues that the ritual process of bunshi in Shinto is akin to the However, Kobayashi and his manga avatar transfer of a flame from one candle to another; (who I will refer to as K) are not only waging a in each case, nothing is lost of the original. On battle against ignorance, for such ignorance is the contrary, the original flame/kami is by this aided and abetted by cowardice and moral means effectively multiplied (thus quite the failure. We see this visualised on page 22, opposite of our common-sense understanding where K practically jumps out of the frame to of “separation”). Before coming to the declaim that, unless the nation “has the balls” conclusion of this mini set piece, K adds a to restore Yasukuni Shrine to its rightful place, personal anecdote. He too, we (literally) “see,” there will be no hope of a “Japaneseis briefly puzzled by the fact that a small shrine restoration” (or perhaps, a “revival of the in his Tokyo neighborhood could be dedicated Japanese people”). 7 This is the underlying to Okununushi (a popular kami who plays a theme of the work, and makes for a narrative significant role in the early chroniclesKojiki whose storyline is epic in structure, with the and Nihon shoki), when this kami’s “home” is lone hero—the manga-fied everymanthe grand Izumo Taisha in distant Shimane K—engaged in a quest against enemies of prefecture. The answer is, of course, that various sorts. 8 The reader is invited to identify he/we/politicians do not get the true meaning with the author via his avatar, and thus become of bunshi, in which is it quite reasonable to a part of the battle for the restoration of Truth. have a single kami enshrined in hundreds or This is visualized most clearly on page 12, even—with major kami like Inari, Tenjin and where, after the formulaic query/call to arms: Hachiman—tens of thousands of shrines. And “Goman kamashite yoka desu ka?” (“Will you yet: “This is the Shinto idea.” Then the climax, permit me to be a little insolent?”), the reader with a mocking K pointing his finger: “If you is explicitly invited to join the quest for the were to ‘separate’ the Class A war criminals, truth (shinjitsu) about Yasukuni, in order to General Tojo and the rest would remain in help rescue the nation from its “shameful” state Yasukuni as well as appear in the new location . brought about by the misinformation of the . . If this is what you want, then by all means, unholy triumvirate of “politicians, scholars and go ahead and ‘separate’!” 10 the mass media.” This brief tableau bears analysis, since it is The argument ofYasukuniron works in representative of the style that characterises all piecemeal fashion, a form which is not only of Kobayashi’s Gomanist manga. While K’s

4 11 | 47 | 7 APJ | JF presentation of the Shinto doctrine and ritual of bunshi is quite correct, it is here employed in a classic case of rhetorical bait and switch. When politicians, commentators or scholars call for a “separation” of Class A war criminals from Yasukuni, they arenot referring to the “orthodox” doctrine of bunshi, but rather to the more elusive—and, it has been argued, palpably modern—idea of the souls of Yasukuni being enshrined as a collective unit; i.e., a mass tama without distinction. 11 This, at least according to the shrine itself, is the primary reason that the souls cannot be “separated.” As Yasukuni head priest Matsudaira Nagayoshi (1915–2005) explained in 1987:

[Figure 5] Fanatical media, p. 34

That [i.e., separation] is absolutely impossible. In this shrine there is something called a ‘seat’ (za), which acts as a cushion (zabuton) for the kami. In shrines other than Yasukuni, such a “seat” does not exist. The 2.5 million soul- pillars rest on the same cushion. It is impossible to separate them from this (hikihansu koto wa dekimasen). 12

After a panel in which K notes that, in any event, only “atheists” and “materialists” would conceive of telling certain enshrined kami that [Figure 5] Fanatical media, p. 34 they alone are a “bother” (jama) and need to placed elsewhere, this first salvo is quickly followed by an equally derisive rejection of the alternative proposal: to build a national “non- religious” memorial for the war dead (kokuritsu tsuito shisetsu). K’s point here is reliant entirely on emotion, based on a staple trope of Yasukuni war remembrance: the final promise of imperial soldiers to their comrades and loved ones that they would “meet again at Yasukuni.” He asks, with a sneer, whether politicians are prepared to say to these men (or their departed

5 11 | 47 | 7 APJ | JF souls), just sixty years after the war’s end, that however, are devoted to reflection on the instead of Yasukuni they will have to settle for nature of war (as a nearly-universal modern a posthumous rendezvous at the “National phenomenon, usually begun by Western Memorial Facility.” This argument is continued powers), buttressed by a by-now familiar litany throughout chapter four, in which K—surely regarding the illegitimacy (i.e. “victor’s aware of the irony given the historicaljustice”) of both the Tokyo War Crimes Trial connection between Yasukuni and Stateand San Francisco Peace Treaty. Noting that Shinto—accuses the Koizumi administration most of the contemporary debate on Yasukuni (and opposition) of attempting to create a “new surrounds the issue of the 1978 enshrinement religion” for the state, one that attempts to of the fourteen “Class A” war criminals, K bypass the rituals of Shinto, Buddhism and boldly asserts that, in fact, this debate is based Christianity, but ends up being merely a on a false premise: i.e., that these men actually religion without substance. 13 were/are “Class A war criminals.” In fact, K asserts, citing the dissenting opinion of Indian All throughout, the reader is peppered with Judge Pal, they—along with another 1850 or so images of various sorts: some realistic (K’s “war criminals”—are rather collective victims, face, the neighborhood shrine), others comic even “martyrs” (junnan shisha) of a “ceremony (caricatures of various politicians), and still of savage retribution” (yaban na hōfuku no others abstract (tadpole-like souls swimming gishiki) waged by the victorious Allies. 15 through the air, in search of their proper home) or palpably symbolic (a Shinto torii bathed in a Here the argument begins to turn away from bright glow). The author adds a panel above the opinions of weak-kneed politicians and the images, in which he provides another layer leftist media towards that of the Japanese of comment. Here, in the Gomanist equivalent people, who, K claims, stand squarely on the of a scholarly footnote, we read that while right side of truth. On the one hand, Kobayashi Shinto forms the basis of an unconscious ethos Gomanism leans heavily on the appeal of the for all Japanese, it has only weak prescriptions author (and his avatars) as a lone crusader for regulating external behavior—this is why fighting for truth and justice, but in order to commentators are led to the mistakensucceed he must also hearken to ethnic conclusion that Shinto is “flexible” yuz( u ga populism: “we” ordinary Japaneseknow the kikumono) and therefore open to change at the truth, even if our so-called leaders do not. As is whim of politics, 14 While it is certainly true that familiar in contemporary conservative populism premodern Shinto lacks the formality of wherever it is found, a sharp divide is thus doctrine found in most religious traditions, and established between the elites (i.e., is therefore, one might argue, more susceptible intellectuals, media, government) and the to political manipulation, the assumption that people (however vaguely defined). While there Shinto forms the unconscious core of the is thus recognition of a national “personality Japanese ethos is one that deserves more split,” it is one that may be healed over time, if attention. I will return to this later in the essay. we are willing to take the necessary steps. 16

Chapter one—“The Truth about Yasukuni In Yasukuniron, this tension is resolved in the Group Enshrinement, which is Unknown to following fashion: postwar Japanese (including National Diet Members” (“Kokkai giin ga the bulk of politicians and media) were quite shiranai Yasukuni gōshi no shinjitsu”)—picks up content with the postwar meaning of Yasukuni, the theme of the ignorance of politicians in but they have since either: (a) lost interest relation to the Yasukuni doctrine of “group because caught up in a “materialist” culture; or enshrinement” (gōshi). The opening pages, (b) been negatively influenced by a few leftist

6 11 | 47 | 7 APJ | JF politicians and the mass media, who since 1985 have effectivelycreated the Yasukuni “problem.” 17 In short, this is the story of a collective, and fairy recent,fall into ignorance—albeit one that is not primarily the fault of the people. 18 The organic metaphor here is (disturbingly) familiar: the nation is sick, and requires a strong dose of medicine—i.e., Gomanism—to be brought back to health.

[Figure 7] Violence of the external other, p. 46

Throughout this chapter, as elsewhere in Yasukuniron, the argument is broken up by episodes of unabashed sentiment, or what we might call “human interest” stories: first a one- page aside regarding an emotional song written by several “war criminals” in a Philippine jail cell, which not only became a hit in postwar Japan but had such an effect on the Philippine [Figure 6] Violence of the internal other, p. president that he was moved to release all 12 Japanese prisoners of war; then a brief vignette regarding the author’s reception of a certificate (saishin no ki) from Yasukuni noting the posthumous “deification” of his own grandfather, who perished in Siberia during the war, and his decision in 1999 to contribute a manga-decorated lantern to Yasukuni for display during the annual Mitama Matsuri (several of which are reproduced in the manga). 19

Finally, just prior to the chapter’s close with a rousing call-to-arms, K begins another counter- argument against those who claim that Yasukuni is in fact a modern and derivative version of (State) Shinto, a nationalist ideology

7 11 | 47 | 7 APJ | JF that is not representative of anything in worship” (sosen sūhai). 20 Japanese religion, tradition or custom. This point is further elaborated in chapter two, Thus, K argues, while Yasukuni as an where it makes up a large part of K’s analysis institution may have “modern” elements, it is of the Japanese public’s “fall” away from the squarely rooted in an ancient Japanese truth about Yasukuni. As my analysis here is tradition of reverence for the spirits of the based primarily on the religious claims of dead—whatever one might choose to call that Yasukuni and Yasukuniron, this is a “rebuttal” tradition. Here we see a subtle but important that requires further attention. Aftershift away from “Shinto” to the practice of establishing the black and white scenario of ancestor veneration as the root of Japanese “us” vs. “them” throughout chapter one, K spirit, culture and identity. gives us a very brief history of Shinto, in which he admits that what we call “Shinto” has Envisioning (with) the Dead ‘naturally transformed over the course of Embedded within Kobayashi’s treatment is a history’. In short, though “Shinto may have a portrayal of Yasukuni, and by extension, the ‘foundation’, it is not thereby ‘fundamentalist’.” enshrined heroes who sacrificed their lives to On the face of it, this seems a striking build a modern Japan, and whose souls admission, since it runs against a common continue to protect Japan, as “victims” of understanding of Shinto as the unchanging widespread (internal) ignorance and (external) substructure (or, as K put it in the preface) violence. The violence of which the imperial “unconscious ethos” of the Japanese people. army—and particularly the individuals judged However, with recent trends in Shintoas war criminals—is so often accused is here scholarship—notably after the work of Kuroda turned around against the accusers. This is Toshio, and more recently in the writings of dramatically visualized throughout John Breen and Mark Teeuwen—whichYasukuniron, in which every single image of the question the very existence of anything we can heroic dead is presented in a form that scholars reasonably call “Shinto” prior to the eighteenth of fascism would identify askitsch— i.e., century, Kobayashi could hardly rely on such unambiguously sentimentalized, to the point of an uncritical ahistorical essentialism (K admits caricature (Figure 2), while the faces and in particular the significant impact of Buddhism Figures of the “others”—especially Chinese and on Shinto, though the example provided is of Koreans—are generally rendered as ugly, cruel architectural rather than doctrinal influence). and vindictive monsters (Figure 3). K’s reply, here and in chapter two, is more This applies to a lesser extent to the depiction subtle: (a) Yasukuni Shrine may be a “modern” of Westerners as well as “internal others”—i.e., creation, but this is simply because it is politicians, the mass media and leftist activists dedicated to the construction of Japan as a and intellectuals—though the latter are more modern nation; since this is a set of conditions often depicted as being pathetic/slavish that never existed in the past, there was (politicians) or fanatics (leftists, media) literally no need for such a shrine before the (Figures 4 and 5). Meiji Restoration; (b) following on this, he asks, by what criterion do we call something a In all cases, the emphasis is clearly on the “tradition” or “custom”? Is Meiji Shrine, K asks, violence, both literal and figurative, that has also a product of the modern period, not a been and continues to be done to Yasukuni-qua- traditional shrine? (c) on the other hand, the heroic dead-qua-“the Japanese” by others. Yasukuni is rooted in an ancient tradition, i.e., The menace of internal violence is perfectly the longstanding Japanese practice of “ancestor encapsulated in a small frame (see Figures 6

8 11 | 47 | 7 APJ | JF and 7, below), which depicts two leering within the hustle and bustle of urbanized Figures with a newspaper representing the modern life. So far, this argument suggests that media, activists and politicians extending out of non-Japanese should understand and respect the Japanese islands to drop flamingtorii on these differences in the Japanese the heads of what are presumably ordinary understanding of the afterlife. There is also Japanese people, who scramble about in a here an implication that the Japanese have a panic (Figure 6), while the spectre of external closer, more immediate relation to the dead, violence is dramatically depicted in several who live among them, than do Christians—and images on page 46, which show the “ethnic this difference plays a role in understanding character” of Japan literally melting away the importance of Yasukuni to the Japanese (subete massatsu shite), while foreigners national character and identity. (holding their respective national flags) look on with disdain, egged on by Japanese leftists who But the discussion of religious differences does call for increasing “globalization” (Figure 7). not end there; on pages 42 and 43 K presents a sharp contrast between the peaceful and Revisioning (State) Shinto as Peace tolerant Japanese afterlife (where everyone is automatically raised to the status of a kami or In order to support the claim that Yasukuni is a buddha), and the Chinese belief, “in which the legitimate and traditional representation of flesh of the dead is torn off their bones by their Japanese spirituality and identity and not bitter enemies, and the bones are ground to a (simply) a political or nationalist symbol as it is powder, which is then consumed.” 21 In short, so often represented, K presents the doctrine while Yasukuni Shinto is based on a universal and practice of Yasukuni as being founded on need to comfort the dead, the unique elements Japanese ancestor veneration, which is itself a of the traditional Japanese concept of the specific instance of a more general desire to afterlife provide a tenor of tolerance and peace bring peace and harmony both to one’s loved that is in stark contrast to that found in ones and to the community at large. Here the countries such as China (Figures 8 and argument runs in several directions. First, it 9)—which, hypocritically but perhaps includes an attempt to render the Japanese unsurprisingly, practices the very same form of practice of “comforting the dead” a natural and posthumous violence on the Japanese war dead universal aspect of “national character”—i.e., as they imagine happens in the Chinese an (inviolable) part of culture andafterlife! tradition—and thus “completely distinct from a practice that is rooted in nation or ethnicity.”

At the same time, thereare important differences between the various religious understandings of the afterlife. As opposed to Christianity, K asserts, where spirits are called home to be with the one God, in Japanese polytheism kami can be found literally anywhere and everywhere, and those who die are automatically considered to bekami or buddhas. Moreover, as opposed to the Christian separation of this world and the next, for “we Japanese,” the dead remain among us, even, as the accompanying graphic indicates,

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[Figure 9] Japanese afterlife, p. 42 [Figure 8] Chinese afterlife, p. 42

Without getting into the fact that both Chinese and Japanese understandings of the afterlife are extremely varied (largely as a result of both countries having complex and highly syncretic religious histories), we might note that K’s analysis leaves out the deeply rooted Sino- Japanese conception of the dead as “restless” and potentially “wrathful” spirits onryo( or goryo) caught in a state of limbo—a popular belief that has roots that date to the ninth century, and very much continues to this day (as witnessed by the success of recent Japanese horror films like The Ring (Ringu) and The Grudge (Juon). More to the point, it would appear that this belief in wrathful spirits was the primary instigation for the establishment of Yasukuni Shrine itself as a place to “pacify” the spirits of the war dead. In other words, the shine may have originally been intended not to protect the souls of the heroic dead, but rather

10 11 | 47 | 7 APJ | JF to protect the living from their unsettled wrath! extends even to those without enshrined family 22 While this is clearly not an idea promoted by members. Indeed, the final chamber of the either Yasukuni or the associated Yushukan Yushukan museum, which displays the personal museum today, it does relate, howeverletters of hundreds of these young men, is by unintentionally, to Kobayashi’s implication that far the most moving part of the museum. his heroic spirits have every right to be Whatever one’s politics, it is hard not to be wrathful. Throughout the manga, K frames the stirred by the words of these men—particularly act of pilgrimage to Yasukuni in terms of both when they speak of their parents and children. honoring and pacifying the spirits—albeit less What is missing, of course, is any sense that for their violent deaths in battle as for what these men may have been divided in their they have suffered since the war. loyalties, or hesitant to sacrifice themselves for the Emperor and “family-state.” While they are Individuation and Nationalization of the thus individuated in terms of the specifics of “Heroic Spirits” their letters, these same letters take on a standard form that serves to erase any trace of One of the central tensions in Yasukuni Shinto resistance. It goes without saying that a more is that between the deceased spirits ascomprehensive analysis of the writings of the individuals—with distinctive personalities, Japanese military during the war—including the ambitions and family relationships, and as tokkotai or kamikaze pilots—provides a much subjects—i.e., embodiments of the national more diverse field of perspectives. 23 spirit of heroism, loyalty and sacrifice to the Emperor and nation in the face of near-certain Manga as Tool for Revival of the Japanese death. Within State Shinto logic, this was “Spirit” normally glossed with the notion that the Imperial State is an extension of the family, and Though Kobayashi’s manga are presented as thus all individualized feelings and duties must expressions of his own personal (and self- be sublimated (or sacrificed) to the higher consciously “insolent”) opinions, their very calling of national loyalty. In practice, what we popularity betrays a receptive audience of like- see is an accommodation to individuation of the minded readers, and renders them worthy of heroic dead, at least within certain limits. On a study as a socio-cultural phenomenon. practical level, of course, it would beMoreover, Kobayashi’s personal links to the impossible to deny the emotional connection revisionist Liberal Historiography Study Group between the war dead enshrined at Yasukuni (Jiyushugi Shikan Kenkyukai), the Japanese and their loved ones left behind—not least Society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashii because of the fact that this is (unsurprisingly) Rekishi Kyokasho o Tsukurukai), as well as the a central theme of so many of their letters and Japan Conference (Nihon Kaigi) suggest a diaries. Moreover, the emotional bond is what larger goal of educational, social and brings many to the shrine itself; familyreligious—if not outright members go to Yasukuni to “meet” and “pray political—transformation. The reader is for/to” their deceased kin. The “doctrinal” facts explicitly invited to join the fight for a revival of that these individuals have been posthumously the true Japanese spirit or culture—rooted in elevated into mikoto or kamigami, and thus the virtues of respect, filial piety, national separated from all worldly ties, or rendered pride, self-sacrifice and, last but not least, a into a single mass tama/kami that protects the sense of “heroic history.” To do so, however, nation, hold little resonance for Yasukuni they/we must firstidentify with Yasukuni, visitors, who approach the dead as they would which both symbolizes this spirit and literally at any Buddhist temple or family altar. And this “embodies” the victimhood of the nation’s

11 11 | 47 | 7 APJ | JF heroes to the continuing violence of “others.” manipulation of a group psyche. What is Thus, what is aimed for here is more than distinctive here, however, is that rather than simply a “closed community of mourning,” “appealing to individuals to sacrifice since the process of individuated and collective themselves for a destiny that will bring them mourning is conceived as a form of self and greatness,” the reader is invited to simply communal realization. 24 identify with those who have done the “work” of sacrifice; i.e., those who remain unsettled In short, though it thrives on a bombastic due to our lack of recognition. method of “insolence,” Kobayashi’s Gomanism is, at bottom a technique of subjectivity; i.e., an “Land of Kami, Land of the Dead” ideology that looks to reconstruct a (national) identity via individual conversion. Crucially, This brings us back to the issue of death, this conversion takes place throughdeification, and pacification in relation to the identification—which is at least as much a intertwined theologies of State Shinto, visual and emotive process as a cognitive one. Yasukuni Shrine andYasukuniron . The And it is a conversion that can only effectively concluding chapter to the manga—“The Land of take place at Yasukuni Shrine. In all of these Kami is the Land of the Dead” (“Kami no kuni senses, Gomanism here, as elsewhere, is wa shisha no kuni demo aru”)—provides us committed to the paligenetic imperative, which with an effective re-entry point. It begins with Roger Griffin has argued is central to fascism; several questions, posed as a challenge to the i.e., the myth of the a “purifying, cathartic, reader: Have we Japanese become a-religious national rebirth.” 25 (mushukyo)? Have we Japanese embraced materialism (muibutsuron)? After a few short The trope of (national-cum-individual) sickness, vignettes depicting key events in the author’s humiliation and victimhood followed by an life, each of which concludes with the familiar apotheosis of rebirth is visually encapsulated in image of a deceased spirit hovering above, K the final page of chapter seven (previously begins to “pay attention to the glance” of the published in Sensoron II), in which K stands, spirits of the deceased—who are very much Christ-like, in front of the mass of ordinary “living with us.” In order to more fully hear Japanese, urging “us” to recognize that the what the spirits are trying to convey to him, he very world in which we live has beendecides to pay homage to the dead at Yasukuni constructed on the pillars of those whoShrine, where he becomes enveloped with a sacrificed their lives in the war (Figure 12). feeling of “public spirit” (koteki na kimochi). Here, the visual turns things around, so that the invited reader is placed in a position behind If it were not already evident, by the final the spirits (who appear in their usual ghostly, chapter of Yasukuniron the basic “theology” of benevolent form), facing K and those who have Yasukuni—at least in Kobayashi’s already realized the truth. 26 interpretation—becomes clear. The shrine is a place in which we the living can go to meet In its unspecified promise of both communal with the dead. By paying homage at the shrine healing and individual redemption, here, as (in “traditional” manner), and by simply elsewhere, the imagery resonates with Griffin’s “paying attention” to these spirits via an analysis of the fascist mythos, which attempts exchange of glances, we confirm our own to “unleash strong affective energies” through history and establish both our individual and a vision of reality by positing an organic nation national identity. In short, we are engaging in a in a state of decay that, because it possesses a populist version of “spirit pacification” life cycle, can be revitalized through the (tamashizume or chinkon), a ritual that dates

12 11 | 47 | 7 APJ | JF back to the original “State Shinto” instituted under Emperor Tenmu in the late-seventh and early-eighth centuries CE. As Naumann has argued, state cult ceremonies of this time seem to have been centered on petitions, thanksgiving and warding off evil. Pacification of Spirit ceremonies were among the most important rites for imperial-cum-state protection. Performed near the winter solstice, the primary goal ofchinkonsai was the restoration of the vital power tama( ) of the emperor in analogy to the sun (and the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu). 27 In a later context, the pacification of spirits took on a quite different sense, with the introduction (from the continent) of the belief that once a person dies, their soul or spirit tama( ) lingers in an [Figure 11] Yasukuni, if left unprotected, unsettled state until it is correctly “addressed” p. 196 by the proper funeral rituals and appropriate period of mourning. From the mid-Heian period, a belief in onryo or “vengeful ghosts” became widespread among both elites and commoners. According to this idea, unsettled spirits—those wronged in life, or whose death came under less than ideal circumstances—would cause all sorts of trouble to those left behind, especially but not exclusively their enemies. The classic instance of this is the posthumous deification of the courtier Sugawara no Michizane (845–903) as Tenman-tenjin in the tenth century. In any event, due to an early Shinto sense of death itself as a form of impurity and pollution, in Japan Buddhism has largely been the tradition responsible for dealing with matters of death, and specific rituals (kuyo) were developed in 28 [Figure 10] K inviting us to see the spirits, order to appease and pacify these spirits. p. 146 Interestingly, though these ideas about death and the afterlife seem to elide well—even sharing key terms—with certain aspects of State Shinto, the Buddhistic focus on individual spirits who are or may be unsettled runs against several other elements of State Shinto and Yasukuni doctrine and ritual practice—in particular the understanding that the process of divinization is one in which the souls of the dead heroes are enshrined en masse, as a

13 11 | 47 | 7 APJ | JF collective and inseparable unit. As we have An Imperial Absence seen, in Yasukuniron, as in the Yushukan museum, the emphasis is squarely placed on It is interesting to note that for all of the the human side of the story, with the dead emphasis on sacrifice and heroism found in the heroes visualized clearly by the bereaved (and pages of Yasukuniron, the Figure who, in State the reader) as idealized, peaceful andShinto ideology, is the presumed focus for such individuated spirits, chagrined only by the lack loyalty—the literal and figurative “head” of the of respect that is given them in contemporary national body—is virtually absent. Indeed, just Japan. as he has not been seen at Yasukuni Shrine itself for thirty years, the emperor is hardly Finally, a key aspect of Yasukunieven mentioned in Kobayashi’s tribute to theology—again, as interpreted through the Yasukuni. 30 With respect to the theology of lens of Yasukuniron—is the importance of Yasukuni/Yasukuniron, we might conclude from pilgrimage. Although Kobayashi makes note of this that: (a) the emperor, just as he did during the Mitama Festival, held in mid-July at the period of ultra-nationalism (and before), Yasukuni for the “consolation” (nagusameru) of functions more as an “empty” symbol than a the souls of the dead, he places greater real presence; 31 or (b) the lack of the Emperor emphasis on the necessity of regular visitations suggests a turn towards a more populist appeal to the shrine as the most effective way of to the war dead as “our heroic ancestors”—and consoling the heroic spirits, via a process of the “pillars” (hashira) upon which the modern memorialization and identification. Butstate has been constructed. In other words, pilgrimage can also be understood as a means though this could hardly be admitted, perhaps of self-purification on the part of the pilgrim. As this absence masks an understanding that we Brian Bocking notes, in Japan this concept have reached the stage where the national dates back to the medieval Watarai priestly body no longer needs a head in order to lineage, who promoted pilgrimage to the Outer function. (Gekū) Shrine at Ise as a form of “self- purification, progress towards enlightenment This is not to say that Kobayashi has been silent and the uncovering of the inborn spiritual on the issue of the Emperor and his relevance values of purity, honesty and compassion.” 29 In to contemporary Japan. As if to make up for the Yasukuniron, it is through an exchange of lack of attention paid to thetenno in “glances” that the consolation-qua-Yasukuniron, in 2009 Kobayashi published a identification-qua-purification takes place, and new “Gomanist Special Edition” entirely this requires that the spirits be individuated as dedicated to correcting “our” mistaken notions much as possible, even while conforming to a about the Imperial household. This work is particular “type.” Though the rhetoric of their structured much like Yasukuniron, in that it day called on these young men and women to unfolds the “truth” of the Emperor and Imperial “extinguish themselves through service to the Household for Japanese history, culture, and state” (messhi hōkō), at Yasukuni and in religion—with the intent of provoking within a Yasukuniron they are invoked as individuated sympathetic reader a “conversion” away from a spirits still very much among us. It is only our mistaken and “dangerous” disregard to a neglect of Yasukuni that puts them (and by healthy and informed embrace of the subject in extension, us) in danger of being extinguished. question. The various chapters, interspersed According to Kobayashi, Japan is indeed a “land with personal anecdotes and historical of kami,” but, even more importantly, it is a minutiae, tackle the issue from a wide variety “land of the (living) dead.” of angles, albeit all coming to the same general conclusion: i.e., the Emperor and Imperial

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Household symbolize the historical and cultural essence of the Japanese people (kokumin) and Japan as a “national body” (here Kobayashi has no qualms about invoking the largely discredited term kokutai). In this last respect, against those who would criticize the Emperor for “elitism,” Kobayashi argues that, in fact, the Imperial line has always acted as an “empty vessel” representing the people, taking on, as it were, their sufferings and anxieties without complaint. Indeed, K argues, the Emperor in his unrelenting commitment to the people is ultimately “without personality” (mujikaku)—a notion graphically expressed by showing the Emperor in full sacred regalia, without a face (Figure 12).

[Figure 12] The “empty” Emperor, p. 37

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a “fact” accepted by most Japanese, and repeated in Japanese textbooks and standard histories.

Declaration of Humanity?

Most interesting with regard to the present essay, however, is the way that Kobayashi frames the Emperor in relation to religion—and specifically the notion that, immediately after the Second World War, the Imperial Household was forced to renounce in perpetuity its former “status” as a “god” (kami). This issue is dealt with in some detail in chapter nine: “Was the Emperor a ‘God’?” (“Tenno wa ‘kami’ datta no ka?”). As usual, K begins with an anecdote, in which he laments the fact that so many Japanese have bought into the notion that, prior to the so-called “Humanity Declaration” (ningen sengen) in January 1946, the Emperor believed himself and was believed by the populace to be a “god”—and that this was a cause for the war. It is not true, he avers, that people prior to and during the war thought of the Emperor as a god, though some did believe that he was a person who should be treated as [Figure 14] An invitation to collective if he were a god(“kami no yo ni taisetsu ni 34 Imperial “revisioning,” p. 379 shinakereba ikenai hito”).

Here K makes the interesting (and plausible) As with Yasukuniron, an explicit contrast is argument that those postwar commentators made with China. 32 Whereas Chinese imperial who have been so insistent on the idea that history is rooted in a perpetual series of violent prewar Japanese held the Emperor to be a god dynastic changes (see Figure 13), in which are largely if not entirely of the generation that elites asserted their own claims to power while was raised on strict nationalist education (i.e., mercilessly slaughtering those who they intend those who were exposed to school textbooks to replace, Japanese imperial history has been from 1939–1945), only to face a sudden, peaceful, by virtue of have the “world’s oldest” dramatic (and traumatic) change in what they continual dynastic succession. 33 In short, the were being taught in the occupation period, Chinese imperial system was rooted in the which caused them to flip to the other extreme desire for power and materialistic gain,in the postwar period35 . What was taught whereas the Japanese imperial system was during this brief period, K argues, deviates born out of precisely the opposite feeling; i.e., from the ancient texts Kojiki and Nihon shoki, the desire to protect and preserve the people. which make clear that, while the imperial line Of course, scholars have questioned the idea of is descended from the gods, the “first Emperor” an unbroken Yamato line for decades, but here, Jimmu was in fact a human being, not a as usual, Kobayashi is making a point based on kami—at least not in the same sense as the

16 11 | 47 | 7 APJ | JF heavenly kami. Moreover, continuing the Chinese shin as well as the Abrahamic “God.” 40 populist theme we saw in Yasukuniron, this is Unsurprisingly, this confusion was passed on to true not only for the imperial line but forall the American occupation leaders, who thus Japanese, who are said to be the descendents forced the Emperor to “renounce” his of kami, but not kami themselves. Thus, K divinity—which ironically served to perpetuate concludes, the Emperor is the “head” (shuka) the myth of prewar Imperial divinity. of the “national family” (kazoku kokka) rather than a being of a different species entirely. 36. In addition to—or rather as one aspect of—his To his credit, Kobayashi admits that the status as the “supreme organ” of the kokutai, ultranationalist ideal of the Emperor as a “god” the Emperor functions as the “chief priest” was a modern construction—though he places (saishio) of the kami, in that he is the vehicle the blame not on the late Taisho and early for transmission of the “spirit of benevolence” Showa ideologues who developed the idea but from the heavens to the earth. K notes that this rather on the spread of communism in the wake is not the “superficial concept” of any of the First World War, which “forced” them to particular Emperor being an individual of come up with a more potent nationalist elevated moral character, but rather a function ideology 37. Indeed, this half-decade “deviation” of the Emperor’s status as anakitsumikami , was perfectly understandable given thewhich he glosses as vehicle for the 41 tremendous anxieties and pressures the nation transmission of spiritual power. Indeed, K faced 38. In short, K concludes, in the words of admits that there have been at least a few the Showa Emperor himself: “The Emperor is emperors that have not lived up to the the supreme organ (saiko kikan) of the national standards of virtue or benevolence, a fact duly body (kokutai)” 39. noted in the ancient texts themselves. But this actually helps him make his point that “virtue is And yet, though the Emperor may not be a not a condition for the position of Emperor”—if “god” in the Western (or Chinese) sense, he is it were, it would only be used by power-hungry certainly a very special person, one who elites as an excuse for dynastic change (as in deserves treatment “as if a god” by virtue of his China). And yet, it so happens that the two status as the “supreme organ of the national thousand-year tradition of separation of body.” Just as with Yasukuni, in a strong sense “authority” (ken’i) and “power” kenryoku( ) the Emperor is the people. K develops this allows the Emperor to use the imperial throne argument in the succeeding chapter: “The as a conduit for the construction of Emperor is a kami!” (“Tenno wa ‘kami’ de benevolence. 42 Ultimately, K argues, although aru!”). After beginning by correctly pointing not a “god” in the Western sense, the Japanese out that the traditional Japanese termkami Tenno falls into a unique category, one that never implied an omnipotent creator being does not exist in any other nation or culture. 43 along the lines of the monotheistic “God,” K, “The Emperor, who holds authority gen’i( ) borrowing from Edo-period National Learning without an ‘I’, is a public being (ko no sonzai) scholar Motoori Norinaga, notes that kami is whose work is to pray for the people (min).” 44 better understood as a term denoting a measure of auspiciousness, and is frequently applied to human beings, even today (such as Tezuka Osamu, the “kami of manga”). And yet, Japanese people themselves do not always understand this distinction, due in large part to the linguistic confusion caused by the fact that the Sino-Japanese character 神 is employed for

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“disestablished” after the war, and has, along with ultra-nationalism and militarism, come to be repudiated by the vast majority of the Japanese people, the institutionalized form of Shinto as embodied in the postwar Association of Shinto Shrines (Jinja Honcho) contains more than a few hints of its more obviously politicized forerunner. 46 This is most clear in the promotion (and widely accepted notion) of Shinto as a cultural (if not “ethnic”) form that is somehow inherent to being “Japanese” (a belief that often goes hand-in-hand with a reluctance to label Shinto a “religion”). Indeed, Shinto- consciousness—or, since the word “Shinto” itself is not commonly employed in Japanese, [Figure 13] Japanese vs. Chinese Imperial kami, jinja, or matsuri-consciousness—plays a histories, p. 82 significant role in contemporary Japanese national identity, though only when reframed in terms that make it appear “cultural” rather In short, although the Emperor is virtually than religious or political.47 Explicitly anti- absent from Kobayashi’s treatment of Yasukuni political and anti-religious, this “folkism” or Shrine, Tennoron makes it clear that, in fact, ethno-nationalism (minzokushugi) as a general the Imperial line functions in exactly the same pattern of thought remains strong in way as Yasukuni; i.e., as an “empty vessel” contemporary Japan, and can be readily tapped that: a) preserves the essence of the Japanese into by those whose aims are in fact political. 48 spirit (in particular, the spirit of benevolence) and b) is willing and able to take on the James Mark Shields is Associate Professor of burdens of the people, but consequently c) Comparative Humanities and Asian Thought at must be protected from external and internal Bucknell University (Lewisburg, PA), and Japan foes, in order to d) ensure the survival of Foundation Visiting Research Fellow at the “Japan” and the “Japanese” (which areInternational Research Center for Japanese ultimately one and the same). Of course, one Studies (Kyoto, Japan, 2013–14). He conducts cannot actually “enter into” the Emperor in the research on modern Buddhist thought, way that one can and should “enter into” Japanese philosophy, and comparative ethics. Yasukuni, but the basic principle outlined In addition to various articles and translations, above still applies: an emotionally-charged he is author of Critical Buddhism: Engaging focus on the Emperor/Yasukuni—an exchange with Modern Japanese Buddhist Thought of glances—will go a long way towards fulfilling (Ashgate, 2011), and is currently completing a the goal of personal-cum-nationalbook manuscript on progressive and radical reconstruction (see Figure 14). “It is through Buddhism in modern Japan. His E-mail: the Emperor,” K forcefully reminds us, that “we [email protected] His Website: [Japanese] are able to see our own sanctuary.” bucknell.academia.edu/JamesMarkShields 45 Recommended citation: James Mark Shields, Conclusions "Revisioning a Japanese Spiritual Recovery through Manga: Yasukuni and the Aesthetics Although State Shinto was officiallyand Ideology of Kobayashi Yoshinori’s

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“Gomanism”," The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 11, Notes Issue 47, No. 7, November 25, 2013. 1 Parts of this essay have been previously Related articles published under the title: “‘Land of Kami, Land of the Dead’: Paligenesis and the Aesthetics of • John Breen,Popes, Bishops and War Religious Revisionism in Kobayashi Yoshinori’s Criminals: reflections on Catholics andNeo-Gomanist Manifesto: On Yasukuni,” in Yasukuni in post-war Japan Manga and the Representation of Japanese History, edited by Roman Rosenbaum, pp. • John Junkerman, Li Ying’s “Yasukuni”: The 189–216. London: Routledge, 2012. Special Controversy Continues thanks to Routledge for permission to republish this chapter in its present, significantly revised • Yasukuni: The Stage for Memory and form. Oblivion. A Dialogue between Li Ying and Sai

Yoichi 2 Kobayashi Yoshinori,Shin gomanizumu sengen special: Yasukuniron. Tokyo: Gentosha, • Akiko Takenaka, Enshrinement Politics: War 2005, p. 12. All manga images that appear in Dead and War Criminals at Yasukuni Shrine this essay are “quoted” for purposes of •Takahashi Tetsuya, Yasukuni Shrine at the analysis; all copyrights are held by the original Heart of Japan’s National Debate: History, artist and publishers. Memory, Denial 3 Ibid., p. 7. •Takahashi Tetsuya, The National Politics of 4 Ibid.; these facts (save the mention of the the Yasukuni Shrine Britons) are all noted in the “overnote” to page •Utsumi Aiko, Yasukuni Shrine Imposes Silence 7. on Bereaved Families 5 Ibid., p. 5. •Mark Selden, Nationalism, Historical Memory 6 and Contemporary Conflicts in the Asia Pacific: As Sharon Kinsella notes, “neo-conservative” the Yasukuni Phenomenon, Japan, and the seinen manga as a whole tend to rely on a United States realistic and objective narrative that effectively masks their ideological content; Sharon •Matthew Penney, Nationalism and Anti- Kinsella, Adult Manga: Culture and Power in Americanism in Japan – Manga Wars, Aso, Contemporary Japanese Society. Honolulu: Tamogami, and Progressive Alternatives University of Hawai‘i Press, 2000, pp. 112–113. While this applies to Kobayashi, who relies •John Breen, Yasukuni Shrine: Ritual and heavily on realistic (as well as photographic) Memory images, it is important to note that Gomanism also employs caricature (Figures 4 and 5) and •Yomiuri Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun,symbolism (Figure 6), as well as a form of Yasukuni Shrine, Nationalism and Japan's kitschy sentimentalism that verges on “fantasy” International Relations (Figure 2). Also, whereas Kinsella critiques neo-conservative manga for (deceptively) •Andrew M. McGreevy,Arlington National striving to eliminate the authorial function, this Cemetery and Yasukuni Jinja: History, Memory, would be hard to apply to Kobayashi, who fairly and the Sacred revels in making himself (as K) the hero of his own works.

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7 Kobayashi, Yasukuniron, p. 12. Yasuhiro explained that he would not follow the “traditional” Shinto practice of two bows, two 8 Throughout Yasukuniron, and the Gomanist claps, and one bow but would simply make a oeuvre more generally, Kobayashi paints a single bow before the honden. According to K, portrait of himself as an astute, angry, but in thus bowing to left-wing media pressure, otherwise ordinary middle-aged everyman. Nakasone inaugurated the sad legacy of the Prime Minister’s “private” vs. “public” visits to 9 To Kobayashi’s credit, he does not, like many Yasukuni; Kobayashi, Yasukuniron, pp.32–35. commentators, avoid the trickier religious aspects of the Yasukuni problem; indeed, these 18 Ibid., pp. 15–22. become a centerpiece for his argument about the “criminal ignorance” (hanzaiteki muchi) of 19 Ibid., pp. 16–19. politicians, scholars and the mass media. Of 20 course, much of what he says is either incorrect Ibid., p. 21. or grossly oversimplified. 21 The idea of misunderstandings of Yasukuni 10 Ibid., p. 6, emphasis in original. based on cultural differences regarding the afterlife, particularly with respect to Chinese 11 See Matsumoto Ken’ichi, Mikuriya Takashi versus Japanese views of death, is fairly and Sakamoto Kazuya, “War Responsibility and common. Prime Minister Koizumi and Foreign Yasukuni Shrine,” Japan Echo 32:5, 2005, p. 26. Minister Machimura Nobutaka both raised the same point in response to foreign criticism of 12 Quoted in Takahashi Tetsuya,Yasukuni Koizumi’s 2004 visit to Yasukuni; see mondai. Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho, 2005, p. 74. Takahashi, Yasukuni mondai, pp. 152–153.

13 Kobayashi, Yasukuniron, p. 89. 22 See Klaus Antoni, “Yasukuni-Jinja and Folk Religion: The Problem of Vengeful Spirits.” 14 Ibid., p. 6. Asian Folklore Studies 47, 1988, p. 133; also Takahashi, Yasukuni mondai, pp. 58–59. 15 Ibid., pp. 13–14. 23 See, e.g., Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, Kamikaze, 16 As shown by Takahashi Tetsuya, this way of Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms: The thinking about the Japanese—as a single “we” Militarization of Aesthetics in Japanee History. that has lost its prior unity—continues to play a Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. role in shaping debates about history and culture. Takahashi takes critic Kato Norihiro to 24 I have borrowed this term from Takahashi task for extending this “nationalist”Tetsuya; see Takahashi Tetsuya, “Japanese assumption, even while presenting himself as a Neo-Nationalism: A Critique of Kato Norihiro’s “moderate.” Unsurprisingly, Kobayashi has ‘After the Defeat’ Discourse,” in R. Calichman, attacked Kato from the other direction,ed., Contemporary Japanese Thought. New accusing him of a “masochistic” approach to York: Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 205. history (an accusation which is also applied to Takahashi’s own Yasukuni mondai, mentioned 25 Roger Griffin, Roger, The Nature of Fascism. several times within the pages of Yasukuniron); London: Pinter, 1991, p. xi. see Takahashi, Yasukuni mondai, pp. 194–197. 26 Kobayashi, Yasukuniron, p. 146. 17 Prior to his “official” visit to Yasukuni on 15 August 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone27 See Nelly Naumann, “The State Cult of the

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Nara and Early Heian Periods,” in J. Breen and Modern Japan. Berkeley: University of M. Teeuwen, eds, Shinto in History: Ways of California Press, 1996, p. 24. the Kami. London: Routledge, 2000, pp. 54–55. 32 See especially chapter 17 ofTennoron : 28 The notion of death as “pollution”“Shina no odo, Nihon no nodo,” pp. 277–300. (kegare)—as one finds, for example, in the 33 Kojiki—seems worlds away from Yasukuni In chapter 17, K blames the bloody legacy of theology, which is premised on death (for the Chinese imperial history on the doctrine of the emperor/state) as the highest act of nobility; Mandate of Heaven as established by Mencius, indeed, as a virtual act of transcendence. And according to which “Heaven” (Ch. Tian) grants yet, even after the Restoration, Hirata School favor upon a particular Emperor—and can loyalists within the newly reconstitutedremove that favor if and when he is not acting Jingikanwere appalled by the Okuni faction’s with “benevolence.” This, K rightly notes, was support for “Shinto funerals”; see Helen frequently employed as a justification for Hardacre, Shintō and the State, 1868–1988. “regime change,” and was not an idea that Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, p. found favor in the transmission of Confucianism 36. to ancient Japan.

34 29 Brian Bocking, “Changing Images of Shinto: Kobayashi, Tennoron, p. 154. Sanja Takusen or the Three Oracles,” in J. 35 Breen and M. Teeuwen, eds, Shinto in History: Ibid., pp. 154–57.

Ways of the Kami. London: Routledge, 2000, 36 pp. 167–185. Ibid., p. 160.

37 30 The exception is several panels on page 177, Ibid., p. 161. in which K “rebuts” the misunderstanding 38 Ibid., p. 164. about the emperor as a living “god,” and points out (fancifully; see Tim Barrett, “Shinto and 39 Ibid., p. 168. Taoism in Early Japan,” in J. Breen and M. Teeuwen, eds, Shinto in History: Ways of the 40 Ibid., p. 170. Kami. London: Routledge, 2000, pp. 13–31) that the term tenno was deliberately chosen to 41 Ibid., p. 173. make the Japanese emperor equivalent to the Chinese emperor, thus asserting Japan’s 42 Ibid., p. 186. “independence” from the Middle Kingdom. Of 43 note here is K’s reference to theKojiki and Ibid., p. 37. Nihonshoki as “fables” (monogatari) that the 44 Japanese people have the “magnanimity” Ibid., p.. 195.

(doryo) to hold onto, despite their “marvelous” 45 (kisekiteki) character. This is another reflection Ibid., p.. 186. of the modernist character of Kobayashi’s 46 See Murakami Shigeyoshi,Kokka Shinto. work. Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1970, pp. 216–222; 31 Of course, “empty,” as any East Asian also see the Jinja Honcho website: http:// Buddhist would know, need not implywww.jinjahoncho.or.jp/, accessed 12 July 2012. powerless or ineffective; see Takashi Fujitani, Thanks to John Breen for bringing to my Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in attention the different portrayals of Shinto on the English and Japanese versions of the

21 11 | 47 | 7 APJ | JF website. Yasukuni mondai, pp. 173–178.

47 See Nishikawa Nagao, “Two Interpretations 48 See Kevin Doak’s argument with respect to a of Japanese Culture,” in D. Denoon, M. Hudson, postwar continuation of “fascism unseen”; G. McCormack and T. Morris-Suzuki, eds, Kevin M. Doak, “Fascism Seen and Unseen: Multicultural Japan: Palaeolithic toFascism as a Problem in Cultural Postmodern. London: Cambridge University Representation,” in A. Tansman, ed.,The Press, 1996, p. 248. Also see Takahashi’s Culture of Japanese Fascism. Durham, NC and critique of Eto’s use of “culture” bunka( ) to London: Duke University Press, 2009, pp. mask Yasukuni’s political agenda; Takahashi, 33–34.