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Wireless Smartwi with a Black Plastic Cover

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Wireless Smartwi with a Black Plastic Cover TEST REPORT Card Sharing Wireless SmartWi with a black plastic cover. Thanks to the new antenna, interference A close-up with the cover Pay TV reception removed shows the antenna: is now almost a thing of the past because no more radiation can the U-shaped conductor on enter the receiver. the right side which uses the all over the house whole length of the card in The outward appearance of the new version 8 Picture this: you have one pay TV subscription but several TV sets the control unit has remained spread all across the house. In the past there were three ways to dis- unchanged. On the inside, how- tribute pay TV to more then one TV: you either had to lay a dedicated ever, a lot has been amended. SmartWi box can be installed and cable to each TV set and this way set up your own private cable network, Firstly, the unit is now USB 2.0 configured in the usual Plug&Play or you had to use small radio transmitters which distribute the channel compatible, and secondly, the way, which makes it rather easy to all rooms, or you simply added any number of subscriptions to make transmission and reception to install the required driver and sure everybody in your family can watch the pay channel they want. capabilities have been vastly to open the programming tool. However, options 1 and 2 mean that the same channel has to be watched improved. Like for the previous by everyone in the house, and option 3 is only available for those willing model the power supply comes The software update only to spend money on several subscriptions month by month. from the PC's USB interface, yet takes some seconds and the an additional external power pack next step is the personalisation is also included. of the individual reception cards, which is one of the most crucial In direct comparison, the new The old SmartWi steps in the process because and improved model features very card had an antenna otherwise everybody within the sturdy reception cards which have which partially range of the control unit would lost their delicate touch that gave radiated into the have access to pay TV channels rise to some concern in the first receiver and thus – at least in theory, assuming all version, and the overall workman- could cause inter- those unauthorised users have ship gives a very positive impres- ference with some the same technical equipment. sion. The manufacturer offers a receiver models. SmartWi without personalised whole range of software on its cards is much the same as an website at www.smartwi.net, unprotected WLAN network. To Danish company SmartWi has a total of seven different recep- ranging from a firmware update for personalise the system, each looked at this dilemma and has tion cards, four of which can be the control unit or the appropriate card is briefly inserted so that come up with a simple yet ingen- active at the same time. Compli- PC applications to the download both ends can exchange a unique ious solution to this problem. The ance with the ISO 7816 standard of the instruction manual. There identification code. The other pay TV smartcard is inserted into is guaranteed and the manufac- is even a dedicated support forum benefit of this process is that two an external card reader which at turer says an indoor distribution for users and a support technician different SmartWi systems do the same time is a radio transmit- range of at least 15 m can be of SmartWi is available for expert not interfere with each other. ter. Special cards with a recep- achieved. There is no indication advice. tion antenna are then inserted regarding outdoor range, but In case the encryption system and/or the individual receivers into the slots of all receivers in we assume 150 m or even more require the correct ATR code to the house. If somebody selects should be possible. Everyday use Before the SmartWi box is be available directly on the card, an encrypted pay TV channel ready to use it has to be equipped this code can be read out from on their individual receiver the TELE-satellite presented this with the necessary firmware. On the original card by the control required key is requested by the clever solution some time ago, its website the manufacturer unit and then transmitted to all receiver from the original smart- but SmartWi has not rested on its offers two different types which active reception cards. In order card in the external reader. The laurels in the meantime and has support the Irdeto, Viaccess, to set this up the original card reader then transmits the valid been working to further improve Conax, Cryptoworks, Nagravision has to be briefly inserted into key back to the reception card in the system. Even back then both and Seca Mediaguard encryption the control unit, followed by all the receiver and the requested the manufacturer and TELE-sat- systems. The control unit is the reception cards. The box takes channel is shown on the TV. ellite received overwhelmingly size of a pack of cigarettes and care of the rest. For our practi- Sounds complicated? Maybe, but positive feedback from our read- features the USB interface for cal test we used the smartcard it works perfectly in a matter of ers, and the new version 8 offers establishing a connection with of a German pay TV provider in milliseconds. an improved transmitter/recep- the PC, as well as the plug for connection with an Alphacrypt tion unit on the cards, a PCB the external power pack, a status CI, a Cryptoworks card of Aus- This system does not only work antenna and an additional protec- LED and of course the core of trian public broadcaster ORF and with one or two cards, but with tion of the sensitive electronics the system, the card reader. The a Viaccess erotics smartcard with The power pack, the control unit and three SmartWi cards (only one shown) are included in the package TELE-satellite International — www.TELE-satellite.com a Viaccess CI.. The control unit current CI modules. While inter- detected all three original cards nal card readers are also sup- flawlessly and within moments ported in general, there is slightly all available pay TV channels less perfection with these when could be individually selected and compared to CI modules. watched on all receivers within the SmartWi system, all this with The SmartWi website offers a only one smartcard for each pay small tool for ambitious users and TV provider. experts, which shows information regarding the currently used pay In our test setup, all receivers TV smartcard and the complete were located in the same room, transmission/reception system. which is a rather unrealistic sce- This way possible problems can nario in the real world. So we went be detected and solved at an out and set up the whole system early stage. In addition there is in the house of one of our edito- another free application available rial staff. We tested the SmartWi which can be used to perform a system in different spots in the timing test. Generally, the inter- house from the basement hobby nal card reader of a receiver or room to the children's room in the CI module needs to access the loft and were impressed with the smartcard every ten seconds the results. Thanks to the control in order to be able to present a unit which was placed in the living selected pay TV channel error- room we were able to supply pay free. Calculating the keys in the TV all over the house. The 15 m CI module according to the infor- range given by the manufacturer mation received via satellite may is a safe estimate on the lower take up to two seconds. If several side of the maximum distance reception cards are in use at the between control unit and recep- same time it becomes obvious tion cards, and even reinforced that the system may sooner or concrete walls could not stop the later reach its limits. This is all radio waves. the more risky if a digital receiver requests the keys every four sec- According to the manufacturer onds, for example, instead of the up to four reception cards can be usual ten seconds. The timing tool used simultaneously. While we is used to exactly measure these cannot confirm this claim as only request times and depending three cards came with our test on the receivers' requirements, unit, we can nonetheless tes- it can be established whether tify that these three cards work indeed up to four reception cards perfectly when used at the same can be used simultaneously or time. Our test also confirmed that whether two cards are the maxi- the system is compatible with all mum. If you still use the maxi- mum number of cards in such a scenario, all four receivers may TECHNIC show decoding errors. DATA Manufacturer SmartWi, Denmark Fax +45 86406622 E-mail http://www.smartwi.net/contactus.html Model Wireless SmartWi, version 8 Function Card splitter with wireless radio transmission Radio frequency ISO 7816 Standard Range Inside >15m, outside n.a. Maximum number of reception cards 7 (4 of which active) Simultaneously available channels 4 Power supply Master max. 100mA, clients max. 50mA Firmware upgrade possible yes Dimension 90x57x23mm Expert conclusion + The radio connection between the card reader and the reception cards works flawlessly even over larger distances. This means that a connection between the control unit and several receives can easily be estab- lished in single-family house.
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