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DVB-T (La "T" Sta Per "Terrestrial"-"Terrestre")

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DVB-T (La Facoltà di Scienze Matematiche Fisiche e Naturali Anno Accademico 2008/2009 Tesina di Sicurezza su Reti 2 Prof. Alfredo De Santis Studente: Umberto Palo •Introduzione •I vantaggi dello standard digitale •Standard trasmissivi e Standard interattivi •Codifiche video •MPEG2 •Sicurezza nel sistema DVB •Il sistema per l’accesso condizionato (CAS) •Tecniche di scrambling •Cut and rotate •Line shuffle •Sicurezza e Gerarchia a livelli •Rimappatura •Il sistema Seca •La pirateria della televisione a pagamento •Le tecniche per la visione abusiva •I successi della pirateria •Proposte per combattere la pirateria. •Curiosità e info Università degli studi di Salerno Umberto Palo •Introduzione •I vantaggi dello standard digitale •Standard trasmissivi e Standard interattivi •Codifiche video •MPEG2 •Sicurezza nel sistema DVB •Il sistema per l’accesso condizionato (CAS) •Tecniche di scrambling •Cut and rotate •Line shuffle •Sicurezza e Gerarchia a livelli •Rimappatura •Il sistema Seca •La pirateria della televisione a pagamento •Le tecniche per la visione abusiva •I successi della pirateria •Proposte per combattere la pirateria. •Curiosità e info Università degli studi di Salerno Umberto Palo Il Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) •rappresenta un insieme di standard aperti ed accettati a livello internazionale •concepiti per lo sviluppo e la diffusione della televisione digitale •ha prodotto degli standard per ciascun mezzo trasmissivo (terrestre, satellite, via cavo): •DVB-S (la "S" sta per "Satellite") •DVB-C (la "C" per "Cable"-"Cavo") •DVB-T (la "T" sta per "Terrestrial"-"Terrestre") •DVB-H (la "H" sta per "Handheld"-"Portatile") Università degli studi di Salerno Umberto Palo Il Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) •rappresenta un insieme di standard aperti ed accettati a livello internazionale •concepiti per lo sviluppo e la diffusione della televisione digitale •ha prodotto degli standard per ciascun mezzo trasmissivoPer ricevere(terrestre, i segnalisatellite, video via cavo): è necessario collegare il televisore ad un ricevitore •DVB-S (la "S" sta per "Satellite") satellitare collegato ad un'antenna parabolica, che •DVB-C (la "C" per "Cable"-"Cavo") riceve i segnali direttamente dai satelliti posti in orbita •DVB-T (la "T" sta per "Terrestrial"-"Terrestre") geostazionaria •DVB-H (la "H" sta per "Handheld"-"Portatile") Università degli studi di Salerno Umberto Palo Il Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) •rappresenta un insieme di standard aperti ed accettati a livello internazionale •concepiti per lo sviluppo e la diffusione della televisione digitale •ha prodotto degli standard per ciascun mezzo trasmissivo (terrestre, satellite, via cavo): •DVB-S (la "S" sta per "Satellite") il segnale è ricevuto grazie ad •DVB-C (la "C" per "Cable"-"Cavo") un cavo coassiale •DVB-T (la "T" sta per "Terrestrial"-"Terrestre") •DVB-H (la "H" sta per "Handheld"-"Portatile") Università degli studi di Salerno Umberto Palo Il Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) •rappresenta un insieme di standard aperti ed accettati a livello internazionale •concepiti per lo sviluppo e la diffusione della televisione digitale •ha prodotto degli standard per ciascun mezzo trasmissivo (terrestre, satellite, via cavo): il segnale video è ricevuto attraverso le normali •DVB-S (la "S" sta per "Satellite") antenne televisive •DVB-C (la "C" per "Cable"-"Cavo") •DVB-T (la "T" sta per "Terrestrial"-"Terrestre") •DVB-H (la "H" sta per "Handheld"-"Portatile") Università degli studi di Salerno Umberto Palo Il Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) •rappresenta un insieme di standard aperti ed accettati a livello internazionale •concepiti per lo sviluppo e la diffusione della televisione digitalemodalità di radiodiffusione terrestre •ha prodotto degli standard per ciascun mezzo trasmissivostudiata per(terrestre, trasmetteresatellite, via cavo): programmi TV, radio e contenuti multimediali ai •DVB-S (la "S" sta per "Satellite") dispositivi handheld, come i più comuni smartphone e i palmari Pda. Si tratta di •DVB-C (la "C" per "Cable"-"Cavo") uno standard derivato dal DVB-T e funziona •DVB-T (la "T" sta per "Terrestrial"-"Terrestre") combinando gli standard del video digitale con •DVB-H (la "H" sta per "Handheld"-"Portatile") l'Internet Protocol. Università degli studi di Salerno Umberto Palo Il progetto DVB raccoglie oltre 300 paesi •con l’obiettivo di introdurre la televisione digitale e i servizi multimediali ed interattivi sui diversi mezzi trasmissivi I primi risultati significativi si sono avuti con gli standard •DVB-S che permise la diffusione da satellite di TV multi- programma. •DVB-C per la distribuzione dei segnati televisivi attraverso le reti via cavo. Università degli studi di Salerno Umberto Palo •Lo standard per la televisione digitale terrestre (DTT) è il DVB-T •Nato nel 1995 e approvato dall’ETSI nel 02/1997 • Il processo di normalizzazione è stato influenzato da vari fattori: •Complessità tecnica nella propagazione del segnale nelle bande VHF/UHF rispetto al satellite •l’interesse di soddisfare nuove modalità operative su reti isofrequenziali (SFN = utilizzare la stessa frequenza) anche a grande copertura Università degli studi di Salerno Umberto Palo L'Istituto Europeo •Lo standard per la televisione digitale terrestreper gli (DTT)Standard nelle è il DVB-T Telecomunicazioni •Nato nel 1995 e approvato dall’ETSI nel 02/1997 • Il processo di normalizzazione è stato influenzato da vari fattori: •Complessità tecnica nella propagazione del segnale nelle bande VHF/UHF rispetto al satellite •l’interesse di soddisfare nuove modalità operative su reti isofrequenziali (SFN = utilizzare la stessa frequenza) anche a grande copertura Università degli studi di Salerno Umberto Palo •Lo standard per la televisione digitale terrestre (DTT) è il DVB-T •Nato nel 1995 e approvato dall’ETSI nel 02/1997 • Il processo di normalizzazione è stato influenzatoA ottobre da 2005 vari l'ETSI fattori: contava 688 membri. Diversi standard sono •Complessità tecnica nella propagazione del segnale nelle stati sviluppati bande VHF/UHF rispetto al satellite nell’ambito ETSI, ad •l’interesse di soddisfare nuove modalità operativeesempio il GSMsu -retiUMTS isofrequenziali (SFN = utilizzare la stessa frequenza) anche a grande copertura Università degli studi di Salerno Umberto Palo •Lo standard per la televisione digitale terrestre (DTT) è il DVB-T •Nato nel 1995 e approvato dall’ETSI nel 02/1997 • Il processo di normalizzazione è stato influenzato da vari fattori: •Complessità tecnica nella propagazione del segnale nelle bande VHF/UHF rispetto al satellite •l’interesse di soddisfare nuove modalità operative su reti isofrequenziali (SFN = utilizzare la stessa frequenza) anche a grande copertura Very high frequency 30-300 MHz Ultra high frequency 300-3000 MHz Università degli studi di Salerno Umberto Palo •Lo standard per la televisione digitale terrestre (DTT) è il DVB-T •Nato nel 1995 e approvato dall’ETSI nel 02/1997 • Il processo di normalizzazione è stato influenzato da vari fattori: •Complessità tecnica nella propagazione del segnale nelle bande VHF/UHF rispetto al satellite •l’interesse di soddisfare nuove modalità operative su reti isofrequenziali (SFN = utilizzare la stessa frequenza) anche a grande copertura Super high frequency 3-30 GHz Extremely high Università deglifrequency studi di Salerno30-300 GHz Umberto Palo •Un contributo decisivo alla definizione delle specifiche DVB è stato dato da società aderenti al progetto europeo “RACE dTTb” e a progetti nazionali come “HD-DIVINE e HDTV-T” •Le società aderenti a questi progetti hanno adeguato i propri piani di ricerca e sviluppo per dedicarsi completamente al progetto DVB Università degli studi di Salerno Umberto Palo •La Campania sarà una delle prossime regioni ad abbandonare l’analogico e a passare al digitale •dovrebbe avvenire per Novembre 2009 •Questo standard è ufficiale in Sardegna •prima regione in Italia ad aver abbandonato completamente la TV analogica passando alla TV digitale • pro e contro Università degli studi di Salerno Umberto Palo •La Campania sarà una delle prossime regioni ad abbandonare l’analogico e a passare al digitale •dovrebbe avvenire per Novembre 2009 •Questo standard è ufficialeL’intera regionein usufruisceSardegna di servizi digitali ed interattivi di ultima •prima regione in Italiagenerazionead aver abbandonato completamente la TV analogica passando alla TV digitale • pro e contro Università degli studi di Salerno Umberto Palo •La Campania sarà una delle prossime regioni ad abbandonare l’analogico e a passare al digitale •dovrebbe avvenire per Novembre 2009 • Tutte le famigli in possesso di più televisori, Questo standard è ufficialeper usufruirein di Sardegnaquesti servizi devono •prima regione necessariamentein Italia abbinaread ogniaver TV diabbandonato un completamente la TV analogicaricevitorepassando DVB alla TV digitale • pro e contro Università degli studi di Salerno Umberto Palo •Introduzione •I vantaggi dello standard digitale •Standard trasmissivi e Standard interattivi •Codifiche video •MPEG2 •Sicurezza nel sistema DVB •Il sistema per l’accesso condizionato (CAS) •Tecniche di scrambling •Cut and rotate •Line shuffle •Sicurezza e Gerarchia a livelli •Rimappatura •Il sistema Seca •La pirateria della televisione a pagamento •Le tecniche per la visione abusiva •I successi della pirateria •Proposte per combattere la pirateria. •Curiosità e info Università degli studi di Salerno Umberto Palo I vantaggi dello standard digitale si riassumono in tre principali ordini di fattori: 1. il potenziamento del servizio televisivo in termini
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