Bedford V. Canada and the Human Rights of Sex Workers
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SEX WORK, LAW, AND VIOLENCE: BEDFORD V. CANADA AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF SEX WORKERS Graham Hudson* Emily van der Meulen** In Bedford v. Canada, two levels of Ontario courts ruled that a selection of criminal laws prohibiting prostitution-related activities unjustifiably deprive sex workers of their right to liberty and security of the person.*** The courts struck down or modified some of the offending provisions to ensure that sex workers are better able to take precautions against violence. While sex workers consider the Ontario Superior Court of Justice ruling a victory and the Ontario Court of Appeal ruling a partial victory, the government, some women’s rights groups, and other defenders of the provisions argue that courts ventured into a “policy thicket”, which is to suggest that they had stepped outside of their legitimate institutional role. Associated concerns include that the decisions effectively constitutionalize prostitution and will pre-empt or curtail Parliament’s consideration of legislative options. In this paper, the authors clarify misconceptions about the constitutional foundations and implications of Bedford, and explore how the ruling might affect legal and policy- based interactions among various stakeholders. Approaching constitutional rights as discursive mechanisms, rather than as “trumps”, we argue that Bedford will not hinder the continuation of democratic debate about whether, how, and why aspects of sex work should be regulated. To the contrary, Bedford is more likely to enhance the quality of debates by making them more inclusive of the perspectives of sex workers as well as accommodative of growing empirical research that has hitherto been ignored or misrecognized. Dans l’affaire Bedford v. Canada, deux tribunaux ontariens ont conclu que des dispositions législatives du droit criminel interdisant les activités liées à la prostitution privaient de façon injustifiée les travailleurs et travailleuses du sexe du droit à la liberté et à la sécurité de leur personne. Ces tribunaux ont déclaré inconstitutionnelles certaines des dispositions constestées ou les ont modifiées dans le but d’assurer que les travailleurs et travailleuses du sexe puissent prendre des mesures pour se protéger contre * Ryerson University. ** Ryerson University. *** This article entered publication before the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision on December 20, 2013. The Court decided that ss. 210, 212(1)(j) and 213(1)(c) of the Canadian Criminal Code violate s 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and cannot be saved under s 1. In so doing, it upheld the factual and legal findings of Himel J of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, the reasoning of the majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal regarding ss 210 and 212(1)(j), and the reasoning of dissenting Justices of the OCA regarding s. 213(1)(c) – all of which are extensively reviewed (and endorsed) in our article. Although we do not comment directly on the reasoning of the Supreme Court, our appraisal of the constitutional foundations and implications of the decisions of the OSCJ and OCA remain sound. (2013) 31 Windsor Y B Access Just 115 116 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 2013 les actes de violence. Si les travailleurs et travailleuses du sexe considèrent cette décision comme une victoire partielle, le gouvernement, certains groupes de défense des droits des femmes et d’autres défenseurs desdites dispositions prétendent, pour leur part, que les tribunaux se sont aventurés en « terrain politique », ce qui suggère qu’ils ont outrepassé leur rôle institutionnel légitime. Il en découle des préoccupations parmi lesquelles ces décisions rendraient effectivement constitutionnelle la prostitution et qu’elles écarteraient ou limiteraient toute considération d’options législatives par le Parlement. Dans le présent document, les auteurs dissipent les malentendus sur les fondements et répercussions constitutionnels de l’affaire Bedford, et explorent les incidences que pourrait avoir cette affaire sur les interactions aux niveaux juridiques et politiques des différentes parties intéressées. Nous sommes d’avis que, en abordant les droits constitutionnels comme des mécanismes discursifs et non comme des droits primordiaux, la décision Bedford n’empêchera pas la poursuite du débat démocratique sur les questions de savoir si oui ou non, comment et pourquoi les divers aspects du travail du sexe devraient être soumis à une réglementation ou, même, criminalisés. Bien au contraire, l’affaire Bedford est susceptible d’améliorer la qualité des débats en les rendant plus inclusifs des perspectives des travailleurs et travailleuses du sexe de même que plus ouverts à la recherche empirique croissante qui, jusqu’à ce jour, a été mise de côté ou n’a pas été reconnue. I. INTRODUCTION In Bedford v Canada,1 the Ontario Superior Court Justice [OSCJ] and the Ontario Court of Appeal [OCA] reviewed three provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code2 for consistency with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.3 The impugned provisions prohibited activities relating to prostitution, including: renting, using, or owning an indoor location on a habitual or frequent basis for the purposes of prostitution (s. 210), living on the avails of prostitution of another person (s. 212(j)), and communicating in public for the purposes of prostitution (s. 213). The three complainants -- all current or former sex workers -- argued that the three impugned provisions violate sex workers’ section 7 right to liberty and security of the person and that the law against communicating further violates sex workers’ section 2(b) right to freedom of expression, as protected by the Charter. On September 28, 2010, the OSCJ ruled that the provisions do indeed violate the Charter and are not in accord with the principles of fundamental justice. On March 26, 2012, the OCA similarly held that blanket prohibitions on common bawdy-houses and living on the avails of prostitution are unconstitutional. However, a majority upheld the constitutionality of the communication provision. On October 25, 2012, the Supreme Court granted leave to the Crown’s appeal and the complainant’s cross-appeal. Public and professional reactions to this case have been varied. Current sex workers and their supporters have tended to view the rulings more or less favourably, insofar as they are now able to take 1 Bedford v Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264, 102 OR (3d) 321 (SC) [Bedford (2010)]; Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2012 ONCA 186 [Bedford (2012)]. 2 RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code]. 3 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) 1982, c 11 [Constitution Act, 1982]. Vol. 31(1) Sex Work, Law, And Violence 117 more precautions to protect themselves against physical violence. However, even the most optimistic observers think the OCA’s decision fell short by upholding the communication provision. Others think the decisions will increase incidences of violence and exploitation (particularly of women and minors), as well as crime associated with sex work (e.g. drug trafficking, organized crime) and gender inequality. Still others contend that the decision will effectively constitutionalize prostitution, thereby stifling “political” or “policy-oriented” discourses about whether, how, and why sex work should be regulated.4 Somewhere in between these conflicting positions stand those who think the decision will lead to few material changes. Some observe that indoor and street sex work has been pervasive for decades, concluding that Bedford simply reflects an inevitable or at least highly intractable social reality that has not been reduced by criminal law interventions. The argument follows that striking down or modifying the impugned provisions does not create uncertainty, inhibit the regulation of sex work, or expose sex workers to greater exploitation and abuse, since there exist numerous regulatory laws sufficient for contending with the ‘nuisances’ associated with sex work as well as Criminal Code offences of general application (i.e. non-sex-work-specific criminal offences) that prohibit physical violence and exploitation (e.g. assault, sexual assault, extortion, sexual interference, sexual exploitation). In the end, the Bedford decisions may end up having little effect because, as we will see, they rested in large part on the fact that prostitution itself is legal and that laws which penalize and expose sex workers to violence are accordingly irrational; it is conceivably possible ̶ though far from certain or desirable ̶ for Parliament to “rationalize” these provisions by criminalizing prostitution per se. The purpose of this article is to elucidate the constitutional foundations and implications of Bedford with a view towards clarifying persistent confusion about what was and what was not decided. In particular, we will argue that the decisions do not constitutionalize a right to sex work, nor will they facilitate an increase in incidences of violence or exploitation of sex workers. Although we acknowledge holding particular views about whether, how, and why sex work should be regulated,5 we hasten to add that the OSCJ and OCA Bedford decisions do not endorse a position on the question of whether sex work should be decriminalized. Rather, they rest on the empirical claim that substantive law as well as processes of law-enforcement contribute to increased risk of violence and exploitation, as well as on the principle that any attempt to regulate sex work must consist with the maxim: “do no harm.”6 This is to say that Bedford