Matthew Crippen Art and Pragmatism
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View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by YorkSpace Matthew Crippen Art and Pragmatism: James and Dewey on the Reconstructive Presuppositions of Experience A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy Graduate Programme in Philosophy York University Toronto, Ontario May 2010 Abstract This dissertation connects the claims of James and Dewey (and to a lesser extent Peirce) to historically specific concerns that occasioned them, attending particularly to claims made with respect to the centrality of the reconstructive practices of art to those of experience. In unpacking these claims, I employ exegetical methods that R. G. Collingwood advocated when he emphasized that we cannot understand what philosophers have said without first comprehending the questions they meant to answer. At the same time, I also connect what classical pragmatists said to what others have said since, thereby heeding Dewey’s admonition that it is only from the standpoint of where we have arrived that we can coherently register anything at all. By approaching the ideas of pragmatists in these ways—and by drawing occasional support from other thinkers such as Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein—I especially endeavour to establish that pragmatic conceptions of “experience as art” show that interactions in the world achieve outcomes traditionally attributed to inner operations of mind or brain; that insensitivity to this fuels seriously misplaced conceptions about how we relate to “reality”; and that these misplaced conceptions promulgate subjectivism on such a scale that even scientists become unwitting promoters of it. My overarching aims are to demonstrate, first, that classical pragmatists, contrary to what some recent interpretations suggest, understood their projects to be anti-sceptical; and, second, that classical pragmatists have bequeathed to us means by which we, too, may counter scepticism. Throughout this dissertation, I bear in mind that James called pragmatism “a new name for some old ways of thinking” and that Dewey repeatedly stressed that new ideas are reconstructed out of old ones. So while arguing that classical pragmatists challenged scepticism by turning traditional modern Western conceptions of experience inside out, I also examine how their work might be used to reorient and reinvigorate certain traditional notions. ii Acknowledgements I owe much to Dr. Evan William Cameron, Department of Philosophy and Department of Film & Video, York University. He has directed me through two theses, a dissertation and a number of superbly taught courses. He has spent uncounted hours reviewing and commenting upon my work. He has encouraged and actively helped me to pursue my own intellectual interests. That he has done so testifies to his intellectual breadth and flexibility, for I have, while under his supervision, earned degrees in three different fields and toured through an eclectic array of sub-disciplines that fall both inside and outside of these fields. A number of other people also deserve credit: Dr. Jeanette Bicknell, Dr. David Jopling and Dr. Stuart Shanker, who served on one or both of my graduate committees; Dr. Henry Jackman, who supplied me with a thorough introduction to William James; Dr. Samuel Mallin and Dr. Diego Nigro, who vastly increased my comprehension of the Continental philosophical traditions that figure in my dissertation; Franca DeAngelis, Matthew Dixon and Fred Nix, who edited materials that ended up in my dissertation; Cristal Del Biondo, who remained patient with me when I was losing patience with myself; Scott Jordan and Elaine Powney, without whom I may not have pursued a university education; my immediate family—Bob, Paula, Marc and Shannan Crippen— who have tolerated my self-absorbed years of study; and Katharine Straut, who has stimulated me intellectually. iii Table of Contents INTRODUCTION 1 I. SCULPTING EXPERIENTIAL WORLDS: JAMES AND HIS DARWINIAN CONCEPT OF CONSIOUSNESS 16 Pre-Darwinism and Darwinism 17 Rationalism, Empiricism and Neo-Lamarckism 19 Assimilating the Darwinian Idea of Indirect Adaptation 24 Copernican and Darwinian Revolutions 30 II. THE RIGHT TO BELIEVE: TURNING DARWINISM AGAINST EMPIRICISTIC SCEPTICISM 38 Early Roots in Darwinism 40 A Pragmatic Challenge to Materialism 42 A Darwinian Challenge to the Concept of Belief as Correspondence 49 A Pragmatic Account of Belief 53 From Belief to Action to Experience 55 James, Dawkins and the Necessity of Faith 70 III. ART, EXPERIENCE AND MUTUAL PARTICIPATION 80 Mutual Adaptation 81 Systems of Activity 93 IV. WORLD-BUILDING AND WORLD-GRAMMARS 102 World, Meaning and Form 103 World-Grammars and Our Sense of Reality 112 V. EXPERIENCE AND SUBJECTIVITY AS ACTIONS OF BEING IN THE WORLD 121 Emotional Experience 122 Experience, Self and World 125 Pre-Reflective Intelligence 133 Body-Mind 139 iv VI. AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 145 Art as Experience: An Overview 149 Having an Experience 152 Formal Conditions of Aesthetic Experience 155 Perception Revisited 162 Temporality and Reconstruction 168 VII. ART, MEANING AND APPEARANCE 175 Intensified Meanings 179 Expanded Meanings 185 Eidos Revisited 191 CONCLUSION 205 Menand’s “Story” 205 The Moral of the “Story” 207 REFERENCES 211 v Introduction I shall be attending in this dissertation to the core tenets of pragmatism, particularly as articulated by William James and John Dewey. Others have done so before me. What could I possibly hope to achieve by attending yet again to them? Robin Collingwood (1939), nearing the end of his life, put his finger squarely on the problem that has led so many philosophers to render unfruitful accounts of their predecessors. Most have presumed they can register and weigh what others have said before them by attending to the statements they have made. As Collingwood protested, however, we “…cannot find out what a man means by simply studying his spoken or written statements” (p. 31). We cannot, he insisted, because a statement is an answer to a question, and identically worded statements can have very different meanings when they are responses to different questions. Hence we are not in a position to “…think [we] understand any statement made by a philosopher until [we] have decided, with the utmost possible accuracy, what the question is to which he means it for an answer” (p. 74); and we are not in a position to ascertain this unless we investigate the historical context in which the question arose as a viable provocation to inquiry (see pp. 61-63). This kind of investigation is open-ended and subject to ongoing revision, for the scope and limits of our own historical context of inquiry differ from those of the past, changing what we must do if we are to understand what others did before us (see pp. 75-76 & 114; also see Cameron 2004, pp. 21-26). 1 In the case of classical pragmatists, Collingwood’s approach is especially helpful, for their choice of words was, as James (1909a) admitted, “unguarded” at times (p. 824). Consequently it is easy to misconstrue what they said, especially if one abstracts their statements from the contexts out of which they arose. Along just such lines, James complained that his detractors engaged in “vicious abstractionism” (p. 964), treating his words as “self-sufficients [sic.] with no context of varying relation that might be further asked about” (p. 964). This, in turn, led them to wrongly convict him and other pragmatists of “self-contradiction and absurdity” (p. 964). The mistake, James argued, was that critics assumed that “meanings and things meant, definitions and things defined, are equivalent and interchangeable, and nothing extraneous to its definition can be meant when a term is used” (p. 964). They failed to recognize, for example, that “[t]he social proposition that ‘other men exist’ and the pragmatist proposition ‘it is expedient to believe that other men exist’”—though similarly worded—“come from different universes of discourse” (p. 965), and thus have different meanings. “The first expresses an object of belief, the second tells of one condition of the belief’s power to maintain itself” (p. 965). Hence we “can believe [one] without being logically compelled to believe the [other]” (p. 965). We can also believe both, and even if one turns out to be false, we will not be guilty of a logical contradiction. We will not be because the two propositions answer different questions, and, as Collingwood observed, “[n]o two propositions . can contradict one another unless they are answers to the same question” (1939, p. 33). 2 If past critics easily misconstrued the questions that preoccupied James and Dewey, then the potential to misconstrue them today is especially great. It is, in the words of Collingwood (1939), because most philosophers “…write for their contemporaries, and in particular for those who are ‘likely to be interested,’ which means those who are already asking the question to which an answer is being offered” (p. 39). This means that “a writer very seldom explains what the question is that he is trying to answer. Later on, when he has become a ‘classic’ and his contemporaries are long dead, the question has been forgotten” (p. 39), and if the question is forgotten, the import of his response is obscured. To weigh fruitfully the claims of pragmatists, therefore, we must identify the questions they were asking (for only then can the richness of their answers be assessed with respect to them),