Market Power of Russian Generating Companies

Natalia Aizenberg*, Sergei Dziuba**

*Energy Systems Institute SB RAS, , Russia **Irkutsk National Research Technical University, Irkutsk, Russia Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok, Russia

XXI April International Academic Conference on Economic and Social Development 2020 Introduction n The Russian electricity market was completely liberalized in 2011 n 26 market entities - generating companies were formed (OGK and TGK) n The process of companies consolidation was begun in 2011 n The final form of the Russian electricity industry was determined in 2016 n There are 12 major concerns, including several generating companies in 2016 n The electricity market is an oligopoly, therefore, the market power of companies is possible Wholesale electricity and capacity market

Electricity market Capacity market

Competitive selection of Long-term contract market capacity (forward market )

Free Contract Regulated Contract

Capacity supply contracts Free Contract Contracts forced mode

Day ahead market Regulated Contract

Competition Projects Balancing market Zones of wholesale market Location of generating companies

The level of competition is determined by the number of generating companies OGK-3 Mergers of generating companies as of 2019 OGK-1 TGK-10

TGK-11 RusHydro RosAtom OGK-2 OGK-6 OGK-4

TGK-1 Uniper

Mosenergo Krasnoyarsk HPP OGK-5

TGK-5

TGK-6 TGK-12

08.04.2020 suek-logo-ru.svg TGK-7 TGK-4 TGK-9

Orenburg TGK TGK-13

file:///Users/Ayzya/Downloads/suek-logo-ru.svg 1/1 Market power in the electricity market

n Green and Newbery, 1992; Green, 2014; Bushnel, 2007 - the more small generating companies, the more effective the oligopoly (it is standard for any market structures) n Farrell and Shapiro, 1990 – with the low demand elasticity (it is characteristic of the electricity market) the results of the merger of companies can be both negative and positive n Joskow, 1997; Joskow and Tirole, 2000 – disaggregation of generating companies in the UK electricity market initially gave a positive effect n Tashpulatov, 2015 – empirically proven that excessive unbundling of generating companies turned out to be counterproductive Some generating companies operate in two markets Generating companies with TPP capacities (80% Europe zone, 20% Siberia zone) operate in n Wholesale electricity market (includes electricity and capacity market) n Retail heat market

The market power for multi-product oligopolies has features (theory of industry markets): Belleflamme, Peitz, 2015 - multi-product companies charge higher prices for their products in the markets than independent suppliers would do (product substitution effects and oligopoly power) Market Power Studies in Electricity Markets n Herfindahl – hirschman index (HHI), the concentration ratio. It is technically simple, but the index HHI does not take into account the structure of the electric grid, assuming that all companies impact each other. HHI indices for Russia electricity market evaluated Cooke, 2013; Gore et al., 2012; Pittman, 2007 n Residual supply index (RSI) for each generating company at certain hours of the day (Genc, 2015; Hirth and Schlecht, 2019) RSI indices for Russia electricity market evaluated Chernenko, 2015 n The conclusions are contradictory Methodology n Analysis of the dynamics of structural elements of cost, starting from the merger ends moment. n A manifestation of market power can be considered the ability to affect the market price to increase profits. n The main tool for analyzing the market power of generating companies is the analysis of changes in the fuel component in the costs of the company, as well as its relative dynamics in revenue and cost. Methodology n Determining the costs of generating companies, excluding the cost of Impairment of assets in the financial markets. n Determining the revenue and the operating incom of companies from the sale of heat and electricity. n Determination of the fuel component in the cost of production (FCP). n Determination of the fuel component in revenue (FCR). n Analysis of the dynamics of FCP, FCR and profitability. Cost structure of GK on fossil fuel capacities

Component Share in cost (for 2018) Fuel average minimal maximum Personnel costs 56,5% 51,8% 66,9% Depreciation 7,8% 5,2% 12,0% Repairs 7,4% 5,3% 11,2% Patterns characterizing the level of market power

Return Fuel cost share Rates of № Pattern description of sales in cost in revenue growth 1 The fuel costs of GK are growing, and the rest of cost is constant. The = é é rising energy prices only offset the rising of fuel costs. v s t+τ ≥ t+τ 2 All costs and revenues of GK v s grow in proportion to rising = = = t t fuel prices. 3 Energy prices are rising faster than fuel prices. Non-fuel costs é =/é ê rise no faster than fuel prices v s t+τ ≤ t+τ 4 Energy prices and non-fuel vt st costs are rising faster than fuel é ê ê prices.

If GK falls into 3 or 4 pattern then it has market power. Correctness conditions of analysis n Pattern-based analysis is possible if companies do not have technological and / or structural changes, i.e.

n a) there are not a large amount input/output of electric capacity in generating companies; n b) the specific fuel consumption of generating companies does not change; n c) the fuel balance does not change. n We estimated it on the basis of specific fuel consumption of energy production. Inter RAO 2013-2018 n Including n OGK-1 n OGK-3 20%

n ТGK-11 18%

16%

14%

12% ч

10%

8% million kW* 6%

4%

2% Consumption of so-called. (or billion m3) per billion (or so-called. of Consumption 0%

Gas / Generation Coal / Generation Analysis of effectiveness InterRAO n Fuel component in revenue falls n Fuel component in cost falls n EBIT on sales grows n InterRAO is in 4 pattern

70% 14%

60% 12%

50% 10%

40% 8% Fuel component in revenue

30% 6% Fuel component in cost EBIT on sales 20% 4%

10% 2%

0% 0% 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Separation of companies by market power

31.4% of the market is not assigned to the patterns: RosAtom, EuroSibenergo, SGK, Lukoil-Ekoenergo

Efficiency of cost management High Low

Pattern 1: 12,0% of market Pattern 2: 1,3% of market RusHydro TGK-2, TGK-14 Low power

Pattern 3: 18,0% of market Паттерн 4: 37,4% of market

Enel Russia, , InterRAO, WGK-2, Fortum, Market

High T+, Tatenergo, TGK-1,

Quadra The growth rate of company revenue by segments of 2013-2018

250%#

200%#

150%#

100%#

50%#

0%#

ОГК62# ТГК61# Энел# ТГК62# Квадра# Фортум# ТГК614# РусГидро# Юнипро# Интер#РАО# Мосэнерго# Татэнерго# Мощность# Электроэнергия# Тепло#

The growth rates of revenue of power and heat is generally higher than the growth rate of revenue in electricity Conclusions

§ Generating companies in the Russian electricity market have market power. Electricity prices are higher than it could be. § The manifestation of market power is typical for companies that provide about half of the total electricity generation in Russia (including hydro and nuclear). § The manifestation of market power is not determined by the size of the company. § Least of all the market power is manifested in the electricity market, but in the segment of capacity and heat markets the companies “make up” for lost revenue. § The ability to manipulate price allows companies to use inefficient technologies. Thank you for attention 0,64$ Schematic representation of patterns 0,1$ 0,63$ 0,09$ 0,62$ 0,61$ 0,08$ 0,1$ 0,1$ 0,6$ 0,69$ 0,69$ паттерн'1' 0,09$ паттерн'2' 0,09$ 0,67$ 0,67$ 0,07$ 0,59$ 0,65$ 0,08$ 0,65$ 0,08$

0,58$ 0,63$ 0,63$ 0,06$ 0,07$ 0,07$ 0,57$ 0,61$ 0,61$ 0,06$ 0,06$ 0,05$ 0,56$ 0,59$ 0,59$ 0,05$ 0,05$ 0,57$ 0,57$ 0,55$ 0,04$ 0,55$ 0,04$ 0,55$ 0,04$ 1$ 1$ 2$ 3$ 2$ 1$ 2$ 3$ 3$

Топливная$компонента$к$выручке$ Топливная$компонента$в$себестоимости$ Рентабельность$продаж$по$операционной$прибыли$

0,1$ 0,1$ 0,69$ 0,69$ паттерн'4' 0,09$ паттерн'3' 0,09$ 0,67$ 0,67$ 0,65$ 0,08$ 0,65$ 0,08$ 0,63$ 0,63$ 0,07$ 0,07$ 0,61$ 0,61$ 0,06$ 0,06$ 0,59$ 0,59$ 0,05$ 0,05$ 0,57$ 0,57$ 0,55$ 0,04$ 0,55$ 0,04$ 1$ 2$ 3$ 1$ 2$ 3$