“Cross-confessional Diplomacy and Diplomatic Mediators in the Early Modern Mediterranean” Budapest, – May
Renegades and the “Secret World”, c. –
Tobias P. Graf Heidelberg University, Germany [email protected]
On the whole, ambassadors’ reports make for rather dull reading. Occasionally, however, even the convoluted and repetitive monotone of administrative language fails to completely drown out the excitement created by the rivalries between various political powers. One such instance is contained in a leer by Friedrich von Kreckwitz, Rudolf II’s ambassador in Istanbul from to , to Archduke Ernst of Austria wrien in August . “I have received reliable reports from secret sources”, wrote the diplomat,
that a Portuguese Jew, who has recently become a Turk in order to please Hoca [Saded- din Efendi], is travelling aboard an Ooman vessel which le for Venice a few days ago. ese same sources have informed me that he is to travel further towards His Majesty’s residences in Prague and Vienna by unknown means in order to scout and betray the country’s terrain, distances, and armament. I have arranged with the very same patron [presumably Hoca Sadeddin Efendi] (who is normally well-disposed towards this house) to take [Franc] Jurković to a place where he can secretly examine this Jewish Turk at leisure in order to make a drawing of his likeness.
is short quotation, unspectacular as it may seem at first glance, takes us right into the middle of a cloak-and-dagger story of espionage and counter-espionage worthy, if perhaps not of the gadget- juggling likes of a James Bond, then at least of Rudyard Kipling’s Kim. More importantly, however, fragments like these offer insights into what one might with some justification call the ‘Great Game’ between the houses of Osman and Habsburg and into early modern intelligence more generally. My research on so-called renegades, like the Portuguese ‘Jewish Turk’ above, suggests that such individuals played a particularly prominent role in the field, not least because it allowed them to capitalize on their status as intermediaries and go-betweens. To illustrate this point, this paper will begin with a brief discussion of the quantitative data generated by the sample of renegades which I have collected over the course of my doctoral studies before taking a closer look at two case studies.
Friedrich von Kreckwitz to [Archduke Ernst], Istanbul, August , KA IÖHKR, Croatica, Akten, box , - -, fol. r-v, at fol. v–r. Jurković seems to have been one of the principal members of von Kreckwitz’s household in Istanbul. See Václav Vratislav z. Mitrovic, Příhody Václava Vratislava z Mitrovic, ed. Jiří Daňhelka (Prague: Československý Spisovatel, ), p. .
Since this is not the place to provide a survey of the theoretical and methodological debates which have shaped the still relatively young academic field of intelligence studies, it is necessary to point out that the word intelligence itself means both a product — information relevant to decision making — and a process, or perhaps more adequately, a field of activity which, as Michael Warner has so elegantly put it, concerns the “means for a sovereign to gauge risk and uncertainty (and shi them quietly to adversaries)”. It is the laer which I have in mind when I use intelligence in this paper unless it is clear from the context in individual instances that intelligence as a product is meant, such as in the phrase “to provide intelligence”.
A sample of renegades
Unfortunately, the term renegade is all but unproblematic, precisely because it is so catchy. Etymo- logically synonymous with apostate, early modern Christian authors used it first and foremost — albeit not exclusively — for those who abandoned Christianity, and occasionally Judaism as in the example above, in favour of Islam. Historians have frequently used the term uncritically, sometimes narrowing its meaning somewhat and occasionally expanding it to such an extent that one wonders what purpose it serves. In early modern Christian European rhetoric those which are designated as renegades are fre- quently also showered in abuse, the most common allegation being that of treason. is is hardly surprising since, as Christine Isom-Verhaaren has put it, “conversion demonstrated a loyalty to the ruler, which was the key to the functioning of the state” in this period. Consequently, abandoning the ruler’s religion signified the withdrawal of one’s loyalty. is link between religious conversion and an (apparent) transfer of political loyalties connects the usage of renegade as a label in differ- ent geographical contexts during the early modern period since Christian Europeans, in the eyes of their compatriots and co-religionists, became renegades not just in the Mediterranean but also, for instance, on the Indian subcontinent and in the New World. e process of course occured in both directions. In fact, even Christian European observers were willing to concede that such converts to Christianity, too, were renegades. Consequently, I use the label renegade only for foreign converts, in line with the tacit consensus emerging from more recent research into the renegade phenomenon. e advantage of this depar- ture from contemporary usage of the word lies in allowing me to distinguish between, say, Germans and Italians who ‘turned Turk’ and those Balkan Christians, for example, who adopted Islam and were assimilated into the Ooman military-administrative elite as a result of the devşirme. While such a distinction may seem artificial, it enables us as historians to examine the parallels, but also
Michael Warner, “Intelligence as Risk Shiing”, in Intelligence eory: Key estions and Debates, ed. Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian, Studies in Intelligence (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, ), p. . Christine Isom-Verhaaren, “Shiing Identities: Foreign State Servants in France and the Ooman Empire”, Journal of Early Modern History (): p. . Compare Tijana Krstić, “Illuminated by the Light of Islam and the Glory of the Ooman Sultanate: Self-Narratives of Conversion to Islam in the Age of Confessionalization”, Comparative Studies in Society and History (): p. –. See G.V. Scammell, “European Exiles, Renegades and Outlaws and the Maritime Economy of Asia c. -”, Modern Asian Studies (): –; Colin G. Calloway, “Neither White nor Red: White Renegades on the American Indian Frontier”, e Western Historical arterly (): –; Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire and the World, – (London, ). e doctoral research of Manja akatz at the University of Münster and Damaris Grimmsmann at the University of Göingen focuses on the conversion and integration of Ooman subjects into the Holy Roman Empire. See for instance a conversation between David Ungnad and Sokollu Mehmed Paşa reported in David Ungnad to Emperor Maximilian II, Istanbul, May , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for May–June, fol. r–v, fol. v–r. See for instance Felix Konrad, “Soziale Mobilität europäischer Renegaten im frühneuzeitlichen Osmanischen Reich”, in Religion und Mobilität: Zum Verhältnis von raumbezogener Mobilität und religiöser Identitätsbildung im frühneuzeit- lichen Europa, ed. Henning. P. Jürgens and omas Weller (Göingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, ), –.
the differences, between these different kinds of converts and the way these were integrated into Ooman society and the political system. e question of whether individual conversions were sincere is irrelevant for my definition of the renegade. While the related issue of individual ambiguity and ambivalence is one which is of central relevance to my work and will also surface in this paper, I subscribe to a formalistic and functionalist understanding of conversion to Islam: A Muslim is whoever formally converted to Islam or was deemed to have done so in the eyes of Ooman Islamic law and thus became a Muslim subject of the sultan’s. rough their formal conversions, renegades acquired new religious, social, cultural, legal, and political identities. To what extent these new identities replaced previously existing ones is a central question of my research. e working definition just outlined underpins the sample of renegades to the Ooman Empire which I have collected as part of my doctoral research. is sample is drawn from relevant doc- uments in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv as well as the Kriegsarchiv in Vienna and the Na- tional Archives of the United Kingdom. In addition to these the selection of Venetian dispatches published in the Calendar of State Papers, Venice was consulted and the sample also includes in- dividuals listed in Ralf Müller’s Prosopographie der Reisenden und Migranten ins Osmanische Reich (-). Individuals were only included, if there was evidence to suggest that they were reneg- ades in the sense of the definition outlined above; the mere designation as a renegade by the sources — or other historians, for that maer — was not sufficient. Moreover, the sample only encompasses individuals who had accepted Islam at any point between and , or, if they had converted earlier, were still alive on January .
male female undeterminable total individuals % individuals % individuals % individuals % renegades . . . . re-renegades . . total . . .
Table : Overview of the renegade sample
Table provides an overview of the sample which currently contains individuals. e over- whelming majority of these, persons (. per cent), are men. In contrast, there are only six women (. per cent) while the gender of the remaining six individuals cannot be determined be- cause they are part of groups of mixed composition but unknown gender ratio. e predominance of male renegades in my sample is a consequence of the nature of my sources although there is reason to believe that female converts to Islam are generally underrepresented in the surviving doc- umentary and narrative evidence. In addition to this gender bias, the sources used very probably also introduced a bias in favour of renegades described as ‘Germans’ who at individuals form the second largest ‘national’ group, in the early modern sense of the word, aer the ‘Italians’ with individuals. Information on ‘nationalities’ within the sample are surprisingly complete with . per cent of renegades accounted for. While there is no evidence about the geographical origins of the remaining . per cent, available information strongly suggests that they had been born and
Systematic research focused on the documents in Staatenabteilungen, Türkei I and Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Be- richte but individual boxes in Staatenabteilungen, Polen I; Länderabteilung, Ungarn; Länderabteilung, Österreichis- che Akten, Innerösterreichische Grenzakten; and Länderabteilung, Österreichische Akten,Schlesien were consulted as well. e following collections were systematically searched for evidence: Alte Feldakten, Wiener Horiegsrat, Prager Horiegsrat, and Innerösterreichischer Horiegsrat, Croatica. e relevant collection here is State Papers . Ralf Müller, Prosopographie der Reisenden und Migranten ins Osmanische Reich ( – ), vols. (Leipzig: Eudora, ).
individuals % persons with entire known sample occupations aer conversion involved in intelligence . . for the Oomans . . for the Austrian Habsburgs . . for the Venetians . . for the Spanish Habsburgs . . ‘double agents’ . .
potentially also involved in intelligence for the Oomans . . members of the divan . . high-ranking members of the harem . . provincial governors . . kahyas . . çavuşs . . interpreters . .
remainder . . total .
Table : Involvement in secret intelligence of renegades with known occupations aer conversion to Islam
lived outside the Ooman realm prior to their conversions to Islam. e sample also includes persons who had originally been Ooman subjects, had converted to Christianity, and eventually returned to Islam and the Ooman Empire. ese are classified as re-renegades. Needless to say, this sample is far from comprehensive and its statistical representativeness is therefore questionable; the element of chance encounters which led to individuals being recorded is simply too high. en again, since there are no sources that allow direct and systematic access to the early modern renegade phenomenon as a whole, this is probably as good as it gets. Bearing these caveats in mind, the sample’s quantitative data suggests the relative importance of intelligence as a field of activity for renegades. Table presents the involvement of renegades in secret intelligence as a part of a subset of the sample for which the sources provide indications of occupations aer conversion. is subset contains individuals and thus covers more than a third of the entire sample. According to my sources, out of these were involved in intelligence, mostly as spies. Espionage was, of course, only a part-time profession and thus many of these individuals also filled other positions, for example as interpreters. If one also includes persons who can reasonably be expected to have been part of Ooman intelligence efforts by virtue of their positions within the Ooman state — high-ranking members of the harem, members of the divan,
is subset only contains individuals for whom indications are fairly clear. I have chosen to omit cases in which ambiguities and uncertainties in the information provided by the sources would only have been resolvable by an unjustifiable amount of conjecture. Emrah Safa Gürkan, “e Frontier Man and the Espionage in the Habsburg Information Gathering in the Ooman Capital” (unpublished paper presented at the graduate workshop “e Early Modern Ooman Empire as a Contact Zone”, Princeton, – June ) makes a similar point. I am grateful to Mr Gürkan for allowing me to read his manuscript.
their deputies (kahyas or kethüdas), çavuşs, and interpreters — the figure rises to (. per cent of the subset, . per cent of the entire sample). If we stick to the smaller number of individuals whose activities in the field of secret intelligence are traceable in the sources, the distribution between the Houses of Osman and Habsburg as be- neficiaries of that activity is fairly even, with individuals contributing to the Ooman and to the Austrian Habsburgs’ intelligence efforts. at the sum of these two numbers is greater than the number of individuals involved in intelligence means that some ‘agents’ had divided loyalties. In fact, out of the total of people in this group are known to have served the Oomans as well as at least one of their Christian rivals.
Ladislaus Mörth and Ooman counter-intelligence
In the spring of a member of Ambassador Kreckwitz’s staff decided to throw in his lot with the Oomans. Although the conversion to Islam of individuals aached to the diplomatic missions was not exactly an every-day occurrence, it was also not uncommon. In most cases, such defections were of minor consequence, save for the symbolic victory which they brought the Oomans over their Christian neighbours. In Ladislaus Mörth’s case things were a lile different, though. Both his position as Kreckwitz’s steward and the timing of his conversion amidst the diplomatic crisis which eventually turned into the so-called Long War between the two empires were to spell trouble for the Habsburg representative. Several days aer his conversion, Mörth, who was now known as Ali Bey, returned to the elçi han, where Kreckwitz and his staff resided, with a group of Ooman officials and orders from Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Paşa that Kreckwitz
hand over at once all documents presently held in the residence. I replied that I did not keep any secret leers since it was my habit to burn them as soon as I had understood his Majesty’s intentions or sent him my most obedient reply. erefore they began searching the house, starting in the chancery. I could not prevent this and let them proceed, being undaunted and hoping that they would not find anything incriminating [. . .] .
Due to an oversight by the embassy’s secretary, however, Mörth was able to find and retrieve the latest bundle of the ambassador’s protocol which contained “everything I have dutifully related” since late February. e search party also took a number of other leers and documents which had apparently been le on Kreckwitz’s desk. ese news deeply troubled Archduke Mahias of Austria. On June he wrote to his brother Emperor Rudolf II in Prague:
On the role of çavuşs and interpreters in Ooman intelligence see Gábor Ágoston, “Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy: Ooman Grand Strategy in the Context of Ooman–Habsburg Rivalry”, chap. in e Early Modern Oomans: Remapping the Empire, ed. Virginia Aksan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ), pp. –. For a brief contemporary comment see for instance Ungnad to Maximilian II, Istanbul, May , fol. v–r. Mörth’s conversion will be dealt with in greater detail in my forthcoming thesis. e most easily accessible accounts are Václav Vratislav z. Mitrovic, Adventures of Baron Wenceslas Wratislaw of Mitrowitz, trans. A.H. Wratislaw (London: Bell & Daldy, ), pp. –; Friedrich Seidel, Denckwürdige Gesandtschafft an die Oomannische Pforte, Welche ehmahls auf Röm. Kays. Maj. Rudolphi II. Hohen Befehl Herr Fridrich von Krekwitz [. . .] verrichtet (Görlitz: Laurentius, ), pp. –. All quotations are from Friedrich von Kreckwitz to Archduke Mahias, Istanbul, May , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for May–June, fol. r–r, fol. v–r. For descriptions of the searching of the embassy see also Seidel, Denckwürdige Gesandtschafft, pp. –; Vratislav z. Mitrovic, Adventures, pp. –; Václav Vratislav z. Mitrovic, Des Freyherrn von Wratislaw merkwürdige Gesandschasreise von Wien nach Konstantinopel: So gut als aus dem Engli- schen übersezt (Leipzig, ), pp. –.
if it should happen that such reports are translated word for word, as is greatly to be feared [. . .] , then not only the ambassador and his household but also the Venetian bailo, our spies and informants, and everyone who is well-disposed towards the am- bassador’s house will be in the uermost danger of life. Your Majesty’s representatives will furthermore be denied permission to dispatch reports and advice via Venice twice a month, which has hitherto been particularly useful and of certain advantage. [It is also to be expected that] the embassy building will be locked, indeed the entire embassy may be disbanded [. . .]
A potentially major diplomatic crisis with Venice was highly undesirable, especially since it would have deprived the Habsburgs of a crucial channel of communication between Istanbul and Vienna. Of course, in light of Mahias’s fears about the possible end to the Habsburgs’ intelligence activities in the Ooman capital along with the cessation of diplomatic relations with the Porte, the issue of communications seems rather secondary. But the archduke was only too aware of the fact that the incident would have its most immediate impact here:
Because the ambassador’s report of May reveals that the bundle confiscated by the Turks also contains documents in cipher, as a maer of precaution and for the sake of security, it will be necessary to change the ciphers hitherto used by Your Majesty as well as myself in our correspondence with the ambassador [. . .]
Even if new ciphers were drawn up, the main challenge was making sure that they were delivered to Kreckwitz without their secrecy being compromised. Given the mounting hostilities between Oomans and Habsburgs on the eve of war, it was only to be expected that the Oomans might be suspicious of any courier. In July, in fact, immediatly upon his arrival in Istanbul, they intercepted and arrested a messenger bringing leers from Austria to the ambassador. If he had carried new ciphers, they almost certainly never reached Kreckwitz uncompromised. It is unclear whether Mat- thias’s advice was ever heeded, though, even by himself. e rapid deterioration of the situation culminating in the outbreak of war in July rendered any such aempts redundant. Kreckwitz was arrested and forced to accompany Koca Sinan Paşa, who had been appointed commander-in- chief, to the front. He died in Belgrade in the winter. Mörth also had other assets which must have seemed useful to the Oomans. Before entering Kreckwitz’s household in , the renegade had been part of the Habsburg frontier troops in Croa- tia. is region was of considerable interest to the Porte, especially since the officially unsanctioned military campaigns of Derviş Hasan Paşa, who had been appointed beylerbey of Bosnia in , across the border into Croatia had made a significant contribution to the souring of diplomatic re- lations between the two empires. In a petition submied to Sultan Murad III probably soon aer the search of the embassy Mörth advertises his familiarity with the Habsburg border defences and offers, “If your Majesty commands me thus, I will show Hasan Paşa a way to bring into his posses- sion, without any hazard, Karlstadt [modern Karlovac], which still remains in Croatia and is a key
Archduke Mahias to Emperor Rudolf II, Vienna, June , KA AFA, box , --/, unfoliated, leaves v–r. Ibid., leaf r. “Aus der kay[serlichen] [Majestäts] Orators Schreiben an die [ürstliche] D[urchlaucht] Erzherzog Ernst vom . July, A[nn]o []”, HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for July–August, fol. r–v, fol. v. Seidel, Denckwürdige Gesandtschafft, pp. –; Vratislav z. Mitrovic, Gesandschasreise, pp. –. On Kreckwitz’s death see Edward Barton to Lord Burghley, Istanbul, March Old Style [ March ], TNA SP /, pt. , fol. r–v, fol. v. is was a contest theme in Kreckwitz’s monstrations to the Grand Vizier and other Ooman officials. e fruitless negotiations are reported at length in his dispatches from Istanbul contained in HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, boxes –.
to three countries.” Whether this particular offer was indeed taken up is not known. e Venetian bailo Maeo Zane at least reports consultations between Koca Sinan Paşa and Mörth related to the preparations for the Ooman campaign of . Even without knowledge of the Ooman files pertaining to this case, however, the value of Mörth’s contribution to Ooman intelligence seems questionable. According to Václav Vratislav of Mitrovic, one of the noble travellers in Kreckwitz’s entourage, what could have been a counter-intelligence coup quickly lost momentum:
Observing, however, that many of the chief officials, and the Sultana herself, were im- plicated, like an old fox, not wishing to fall into disfavour with the imperial ladies, [. . .] [Koca Sinan Paşa] kept this to himself, made lile noise about it, and only informed the Sultan that secret writings had been found in the chancery of the Viennese ambas- sador, whence thus much could be ascertained, viz. that the ambassador betrayed to the Viennese king everything that took place in the city.
Admiedly, with Kreckwitz’s arrest on the outbreak of war, the flow of sensitive information from Istanbul to Vienna and Prague was effectively capped but there is lile to suggest that this situation was different from that of previous wars with the Porte. Initially, the confiscation and translation of the ‘secret writings’ from the elçi han had caused quite a lot of trouble to Kreckwitz. At the extreme, Murad III had ordered that the ambassador and his dragoman be executed. is rather rash decision had been prompted by Mörth’s translation of the confiscated documents which contained allegations that Kreckwitz was undertaking to “have [Koca] Sinan Pasha poisoned [and], with the aid and support of several renegades, set fire to Constantinople in many places, particularly the arsenal”. Most members of the divan were rightly sceptical of the faithfulness of this translation and soon persuaded the sultan to revoke the death sentence. By mid- June the house arrest under which the members of the embassy had been put even before the search of the elçi han was lied, suggesting a period of relaxation which was abruptly ended by Derviş Hasan Paşa’s death before the Habsburg fortress of Sisak.
Marcus Penckner and Ooman intelligence abroad
While Mörth’s employments prior to his conversion had given him access to certain kinds of in- formation, the same was not true of all renegades who subsequently found themselves contributing to Ooman intelligence efforts. Some simply had certains talents and skills — or even contacts — which could be put to use. It is reasonable to assume that the ‘Jewish Turk’ who was sent on a reconaissance mission towards Austria and Bohemia was selected for this mission on the basis of his qualifications. Alas, the sources provide no clues as to what these might have been.
“Copi deren schrien so Ladislaus Marten zu Altenburg ietzo Alibeg genandt, in Constantinopel wid[er] I[hren] Oratorem Sulthano ubergeben”, n.d., HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for July–August, r–v and r–v, fol. v. Horatio F Brown, ed., Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice and in Other Libraries of Northern Italy: Volume , - (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts / Green, ), pp. –, no. . Vratislav z. Mitrovic, Adventures, p. . Friedrich von Kreckwitz to Archduke Mahias, Istanbul, May , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for May–June, fol. r–v, fol. r–v. Gustav Bayerle, ed., Ooman Diplomacy in Hungary: Leers from the Pashas of Buda – (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, ), p. . So far I have only found two references to the individual in question. In addition to the leer quoted in footnote (p. ) he is mentioned in Friedrich von Kreckwitz to [Archduke Ernst], Istanbul, September with postscript dated September , KA IÖHKR, Croatica, Akten, box , --, fol. r-r, fol. r.
In March David Ungnad, who was the Imperial ambassador to the Porte at the time, became aware of a more ambitious plan. A German-speaking convert was to infiltrate the Spanish court, posing as a returnee from the Ooman Empire. Aer six to twelve months, he was to return to Istanbul and report whatever information he had been able to acquire during his stay abroad. is enterprise was apparently backed by Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Paşa who, according to Ungnad, had advanced ducats to cover travel expenses. In order to bolster the cover story, the would- be spy even solicited leers of recommendation from a high-ranking officer in Philipp II’s service, Gabrio Zerbelloni, who was held prisoner in Istanbul at the time. e name of the renegade who appears as the mastermind of this plan and who le Istanbul in mid-March to put it into practice was Markus Penckner. Penckner was originally from Transylvania but had travelled to Istanbul together with the former Heidelberg preacher Adam Neuser in . When Penckner actually converted to Islam is not clear but it is likely that he did so around the same time as his companion shortly aer having crossed the border into Ooman territory near Timișoara. Aer his conversion, Penckner became known as Ahmed. According to a private leer, by the spring of the two men had entered “the Turkish emperor’s service” with a daily income of and akçe respectively. According to Ungnad, the Transylvanian had “good lanuage skills” which eminently qualified him for an undertaking such as the one he had devised. “His Italian, Hungarian, German, and Wallachian are perfect and he knows so much Turkish that he can now even converse with [Sokollu] Mehmed Paşa himself of important maers”. Penckner set out from Istanbul on March but his mission to Spain fell short of all expectations. He returned less than six weeks later, claiming “that everywhere his cover had been blown and he had been betrayed”. e Imperial ambassador may have had a hand in this failure. His leers to Emperor Maximilian II had not only provided advance warning of the plan but had repeatedly advised to relay this warning to the Spanish court via the Emperor’s diplomatic representative there. In addition, Ungnad took the liberty of dispatching leers to his colleagues in Madrid and also wrote to Don García de Toledo whom he calls the commander of the fortress of St Elmo in Malta and whom he had previously ransomed from Ooman captivity. at Ungnad’s warnings were the key factor in the failure of Penckner’s mission is doubtful, how- ever. e renegade himself seems to have blamed the Christian diplomatic community in Istanbul at large for his lack of success. Yet while he probably was less discreet about his undertaking than
David Ungnad to Emperor Maximilian II, Istanbul, March , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for March, fol. r–v; David Ungnad to Emperor Maximilian II, Istanbul, March , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for March, fol. r–r, fol. r–v; David Ungnad to Emperor Maximilian II, Istanbul, March , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for March, fol. r–v, fol. v; David Ungnad to Emperor Maximilian II, Istanbul, April , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for April, fol. r–r, fol. r–v; David Ungnad to Emperor Maximilian II, Istanbul, April , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for April, fol. r–r, fol. r. For Gabrio Zerbelloni see also Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, grossenteils aus bisher unbenützen Handschrien und Archiven durch Joseph von Hammer, nd ed., vols. (Pest: C.A. Hartleben, –), vol. , pp. -. Müller, Prosopographie vol. , pp. –; Marcus Penckner to Marcus Gerber, Istanbul, March , HHStA, StAbt, Polen I, box , fol. r–v, fol. r. For Adam Neuser see Raoul Motika, “Adam Neuser: Ein Heidelberger eologe im Osmanischen Reich”, in Festschri Hans Georg Majer, ed. Sabine Prätor and Christoph K. Neumann, vol. (Istanbul: Simurg, ), –; Martin Mulsow, “Ein Fall religiöser Doppelspionage und Koranverehrung”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung ( April ): N; Christopher J. Burchill, e Heidelberg Antitrinitarians: Johann Sylvan, Adam Neuser, Mahias Vehe, Jacob Suter, Johann Hasler (Baden-Baden and Bouxwiller: Koerner, ). David Ungnad to Emperor Maximilian II, Istanbul, June , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for May–June, fol. r–r, fol. v. at he knew Italian is also evident from a private leer. See Marcus Penckner to [anonymous], Istanbul, March , HHStA, StAbt, Polen I, box , fol. r–v. Ungnad to Maximilian II, Istanbul, April , fol. r. For Penckner’s departure see Ungnad to Maximilian II, Istanbul, March , fol. v. Ungnad to Maximilian II, Istanbul, April , fol. r. Ungnad to Maximilian II, Istanbul, April , fol. r.
the Oomans might have wished for, with Adam Neuser Maximilian II’s representative did have a source which was exceptionally close to the would-be spy. It was almost certainly he who in- formed the ambassador that Penckner had le “a special alphabet”, a substitution cipher, so that the two men could exchange leers, enabling Neuser to report the spy’s whereabouts and progress to Sokollu Mehmed Paşa. David Ungnad’s handling of the affair merits further aention. Already in January he had become aware of plans to dispatch Penckner on a reconaissance mission to Italy. Moreover, in early March the ambassador was informed of a secret meeting between the Transylvanian and Zerbelloni during which Penckner talked at length about his alleged wish to escape from Ooman territory in order to return to Christendom and Christianity. Having already learnt that Sokollu Mehmed Paşa had advanced funds to help with the costs of Penckner’s proposed journey towards Vienna and Rome, Ungnad was convinced that Zerbelloni was being fed lies. e ambassador therefore decided to gamble and devised a plan of his own. He had Zerbelloni informed of what he believed were Penckner’s true intentions, asking him to encourage the renegade “so that he might lure him abroad where he would be given his just reward”. Ungnad apparently took the danger very seriously, fearing that if Penckner weren’t stopped now, he would present a future threat to Christendom. at he aached considerable urgency to the maer is clear not only from the repeated warnings and pleas to prevent the prospective spy from carrying out his designs but also from the wording employed. “[T]o liquidate such a harmful and godless man”, Ungnad wrote to Maximilian II on April , “would be worth all effort”. e documentation of this failed operation on the Habsburg side leaves a number of key ques- tions unanswered. Why did Penckner devise such a risky plan in the first place? It was aer all rather naive, if not entirely implausible. Its success would have depended entirely on the renegade’s ability to, firstly, convince everyone he encountered of the truth of his cover story and, secondly, on ingratiating himself in court circles. e laer might have been easy enough, provided he could have surrendered seemingly valuable intelligence on, say, Ooman designs for the Mediterranean. But as it was, the cover was effectively blown even before Penckner le Istanbul. And how did he manage to convince Sokollu Mehmed Paşa to support his undertaking? e Habsburg sources — especially the Habsburg sources alone — afford at best a very limited insight into the workings of Ooman intelligence. All that can be said for sure is that the Oomans made use of renegades in order to gather information on their neighbours and rivals in the Medi- terranean and Central Europe. But there is no way of telling how significant or insignificant the contribution of renegades actually was. All we do know for sure is that renegades were only one of several groups involved in intelligence collection for the Oomans. In any case, the more fam- ous players were others such as the Jews Joseph Nasi and David Passi whom Bartholomäus Pezzen, Kreckwitz’s predecessor, called “the sultan’s arch spy”. On the other hand, it would be dangerous to dismiss the role of renegades as marginal out of hand. Admiedly, the two cases presented here are examples of, on the whole, rather unsuccessful
On possible indiscretion see Ungnad to Maximilian II, Istanbul, March , fol. r. For Neuser’s involvement see Ungnad to Maximilian II, Istanbul, March , fol. v. David Ungnad to Emperor Maximilian II, Istanbul, January , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for January–February, fol. r–r, fol. r. Ungnad to Maximilian II, Istanbul, March , fol. v. A similar payment is also mentioned in January. See Ungnad to Maximilian II, Istanbul, January , fol. r. Ungnad to Maximilian II, Istanbul, March , fol. v. Ungnad to Maximilian II, Istanbul, March , fol. r; Ungnad to Maximilian II, Istanbul, March , fol. v. otation from Ungnad to Maximilian II, Istanbul, April , fol. r–v. On this also see Gürkan, “e Frontier Man”; Ágoston, “Information”. Batholomäus Pezzen to Archduke Ernst, Istanbul, March , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for March–April, fol. r–v, fol. r; Cecil Roth, e House of Nasi: e duke of Naxos, reprint (New York: Greenwood Press, ); Suraiya Faroqhi, “Ein Günstling des osmanischen Sultans Murad III: David Passi”, Der Islam (): –.
operations. en again, successful intelligence operations are those which remain secret.
Renegades and Habsburg intelligence
For obvious reasons, the records kept in Vienna paint a much clearer picture of the intelligence ser- vices which renegades rendered to Habsburg officials, first among them the ambassadors in Istanbul. Penckner’s story does not end with his return to Istanbul. In June he visited Ungnad and offered to work for him, claiming that he had not been sent abroad as a spy but that he had only made up this story in order to protect his life. For the time being, the ambassdor remained sceptical. “e Earth”, he wrote, “should swallow such a wicked man.” By December, however, Penckner had already begun supplying information to Ungnad primarily on affairs pertaining to Transylvania. Among the documents which I have been able to consult in Vienna are ten expense lists compiled by Ambassadors Joachim von Sinzendorff (covering the period from March to February ) and Friedrich Preiner (from November until his death in August ). Together, these cover three and a half years of expenditure in gis, salaries, stipends,
Ungnad to Maximilian II, Istanbul, June , fol. r–v. “Bericht von Marc[us] Benckner [Penckner]”, Istanbul, [ December ], HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for December and s.d., fol r–r; “Ein anderer bericht von Marc[us] Benckner [Penckner] von . decembris”, Istanbul, December , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for December and s.d., fol r–v; “Mehemet Beeg sonst Georg Deackh und Achmach Beeg zuvor Marc[us] Penckhner genandt bericht vom . Januarij ”, Istanbul, [ January ], HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for January–April, fol. r–v. “Mein Joachimen von Sintzendorff u[nd] Röm[isch] kay[serlicher] M[ajes]t[ät]t u[nd] Reichshofrath unnd Oratoris an der Oomannischen Porten zu Constantinopl außgab unnd darlage vom . tag Marty deß . Jars, In höchster- melter kay[serlicher] M[ajestä]ts Ambtsnouren bey so vilfeltigen geärlichen mutationibus unnd zuestennden außgegeben wie volgt”, Istanbul, January , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for January–February, fol. r–v; “Berechnung Wellichermassen die Von der Khay[serlichen] Ma[jestä]t bey mier Friderichen Breiner Freyherren herein Verorndte Taller, So Järlichen auff die Sultanische Officier geraichet, diß Jar durch beede khays[erlich]e Oratores außgethailet Worden”, Istanbul, April , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for April, fol. r–v; “Verzaichnus deren Stuckh, an Silbergeschier Uhrn unnd parem Gellt, so der Röm. kay[serliche]n Ma[jestä]t unnserm allergnedigisten Herren, an derselben Türckhischen Verehrung, welliche deß ist[en] Jars von Wien auß nach Constantinopel geschickht worden, uber diß so vermüg der Hochlöblichen Khays[erlich]en Hof- camer gefertigten Particular an Ihr Jedes deputiert Ohrt ordentlich außgethailet, auch dißmalls nuzlich erhalten unnd Volgendts mier Friderichen Breiner Freyherren biß auff Ihrer khay[serlichen] Ma[jestä]t genedigisten vernern Beu- elch unnd Nouren, in meiner Verwahrung unnd khuniger Verantwortung miels Inhendig verblieben”, Istanbul, April , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for April, fol. r–r; “Verzaichnis Was gestalt die Taller, so Järlichen auff die Sultanischen Dragomannen von der khay[serliche]n Ma[jestä]t herein geschickht, diß Jar durch beede khays[erlich]e Oratores auß gegeben worden”, Istanbul, April , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for April, fol. r–r; “Verzaichnüß waß Ich Friedrich Breyner Freiherr Röm[isch] kay[serlicher] M[ajestä]t Rath und Orator ann der Oomannischen Poren In höchstermelter Ihrer kay[serliche]n M[ajestä]t Ambts Noüren auff der Raiß von Wien biß alhero gen Constantinopl vom . Nouembris des verstrichnen [igiste]n biß auff den . tag July diz lauffenden [][igiste]n Jahrs, unterschiedlichen außgegeben, wie volget”, Istanbul, July , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for July, fol. r–v; “Verzaichnuß was Ich Freidrich Breiner Freyherr Röm[isch] kay[serlicher] M[ajestä]t Rath und Orator an der Oomannischen Poren Inn höchst ermeler kay[serlichen] M[ajestä]t Ambts Nouren alhier zu Constantinopel vom isten Augusti biß auf den . Tag decembris biß ditz ablauffenden [iste]n Jahres außgeben, wie volge”, Istanbul, December , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for December and s.d., fol. r–v; “Verzaichnus was Ich Friedrich Breyner, Freyherr Röm[isch] kay[serlicher] M[ajestät]t Rath und Orator an der Oomanischen Poren Inn höchstermeler kay[şerlicher] M[ajestäts] Ambts Nouren, alhier zu Constantinopl vom . Tag decembris des verstrichenen ist[en] biß auf den . Tag Augusti des jetzt lauffenden ist[en] Jahrs”, Istanbul, August , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for June–August, fol. r–v; “Verzaichnuß was gestalldt die Taller, so järlichen auf die Sultanischen Dragomannen von der kay[serlichen] M[ajestä]t herein verordnen diß ist[en] Jahr durch mich Friedrichen Breyner Freyherrn außgegeben word[en]”, Istanbul, August , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for June–August, fol. r–v; “Verzaichnuß was Ich Friedrich Breyner Freyherr Röm[isch] Kay[serlicher] M[ajestäts] Rath, und Orator an der Oomannischen Porten, Inn höchst ermeler kay[serlichen] M[ajestäts] Ambtsnouren alhier zu Constantinopl vom . Tag Augusti des verstrichenen []. biß auf den . Marty deß lauffenden []. Jahr ausgebenn, wie volgt”, Istanbul, March , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for March, fol. r–v; “Verzaichnüß dessen was In der Röm[ischen] Kay[serlichen] M[ajestä]t Ambts-
and bribes for Ooman officials, interpreters, spies, and informants — in short, anyone who at one point or other was deemed useful. Penckner makes regular appearances in these registers. Total expenditure in this period amounted to ,. Taler. On the basis of the registers them- selves as well as ambassadors’ reports it is possible to determine the overall spending on intelligence- related services — primarily the provision of information and the relaying of secret or unofficial messages — at a total of ,. Talers. is amounts to just over per cent of ambassadors’ total expenditure in those years. And this figure is by no means complete, since entries at times remain vague or lump a variety of people and presumably also services together in a single entry. Over the course of the three and a half years between March and August , Markus Penckner alone received a total of . Talers, partly in cash and partly in gis, particularly textiles. During Sinzendor’s tenure, he had even received a quarterly stipend of Talers. While this was dropped under his successor, it was replaced by more or less regular gis of usually greater value. In the period covered by these ten registers a total of ,. Talers were spent on intelligence ser- vices performed by renegades, which equals almost a quarter of total intelligence-related expendit- ure. It should be noted that this figure covers only payments to individuals who can be identified as renegades in the sense of my working definition. Another total of ,. Talers went to “secret” and “familiar persons” who remain anonymous and cannot be identified even by their functions. It is quite likely that this group also includes a number of renegades. Both figures, however, fall short of the staggering , Talers which were spent in stipends and gis to “Dr Salomon”, Solomon Abeneas or Alvaro Mendes, in return for his goodwill and what was considered useful informa- tion. Nevertheless, on the whole the registers confirm the impression created by the quantitative analysis of my sample that renegades were of considerable importance to Habsburg intelligence in the Ooman Empire. Markus Penckner was part of a larger network of renegades which collaborated with Christian diplomats in Istanbul. In the s, this network was loosely grouped around another German renegade, Mahmud, who in had become head of the dragomans of the Porte. One of these was a man who is mentioned in the sources only by his last name: Aur. According to Kreckwitz, this man had been taken captive on the Ooman–Habsburg frontier in Croatia in . Aer his conversion, Penckner seems to have been his principal patron and aer the laer’s death he inher- ited his household and married his widow. Because of his association with Penckner, Kreckwitz reported in , Aur “has good intelligence from the Transylvanian embassy and can serve us well in this and other maers.” He therefore advised Archduke Ernst to award him a yearly stipend of Talers to begin with.
Because he has initially made good progress learning not only to speak but also to read and write Turkish I am hopeful that [. . .] he can be encouraged to further improve his
nouren allhir vom . Tag Martzy, biß auf ableiben höchsternenter Ihrer Röm[ischen] kay[serlichen] M[ajestä]t Rath und oratoris, der Wolgebornen Heern, Herrn Friedrich Breyners Freyherrn seligen, den . Augusti ditz ist[en] Jahrs extraordinarie Inn bahrem geldt außgeben worden”, Istanbul, August , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for July–August, fol. r–v. In the registers amounts smaller than Taler are given in akçe (Asper). Since the exchange rates used vary, frequently even within the same register, for the sake of clarity all sums have been converted to decimal equivalents. “Mein Joachimen von Sintzendorff [. . .] außgab unnd darlage vom . tag Marty deß . Jars [. . .] ”, Istanbul, January , fol. v and v. Abeneas is mentioned frequently in ambassadorial dispatches. Listing them here would exceed the scope of the paper. Penckner’s association with Mahmud are mentioned for example in Ungnad to Maximilian II, Istanbul, June , fol. v. For Neuser see Motika, “Neuser”, pp. –. On Mahmud, who is not part of my sample because he died before , see Pál Ács, “Tarjumans Mahmud and Murad: Austrian and Hungarian Renegades as Sultan’s Interpreters”, in Europa und die Türken in der Renaissance, ed. Bodo Guthmüller and Wilhelm Kühlmann (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, ), –; Josef Matuz, “Die Pfortendolmetscher zur Herrschaszeit Süleymāns des Prächtigen”, Südost- Forschungen (): –. Kreckwitz to [Ernst], Istanbul, and September , fol. v.
command of this language so that he can be of even beer service to this house or even to His Majesty should he return to Christendom, which he greatly desires.
As a spy handler, Kreckwitz here appears as no less professional than his twentieth-century coun- terparts working for the CIA, SIS, KGB, Mossad and what have you. His skill in this maer was by no means singular. Although Adam Neuser’s death in puts him outside the scope of my renegade sample, his example is nonetheless instructive in this respect. Before moving to Transylvania and thence into the Ooman Empire, Neuser had been convicted of high treason for his radical theology as much as for his apparently pro-Ooman stance, which had found its expression in a leer addressed to Selim II. Although he may never have intended to actually send this leer, it was found by the Heidelberger authorities during a search of his house and led to his conviction for high treason. Aer his escape from the death sentence, his flight eventually took him to the Ooman capital where he repeatedly approached the Habsburg representatives to solicit a pardon for himself and his son. David Ungnad’s report from May includes an appraisal of Neuser and his service to the embassy in Istanbul from which it is worth quoting at length.
As far as Neuser is concerned, it seems to me that, in his request to Your Majesty, His Electoral Serenity Count Palatine Friedrich was advised by persons who have no know- ledge of Neuser’s activities here. I am of the opinion that Your Majesty, doubtlessly on the advice of [my predecessor] Carl Rym, has acted very wisely in ceasing to re- quest from Mehmed Paşa that Neuser be handed over for punishment. Such requests would not only have been fruitless but would have damaged Your Majesty’s interests while causing the accused much advantage, enhancing his reputation and thus winning him greater support from Mehmed Paşa. A continuation of these requests might have prompted him to finally break with the embassy and turn his life towards causing Your Majesty much trouble and damage. As it is, Neuser has risked his life for us solely on the hope that Your Majesty will pardon him. He persists in requesting my help in this maer [. . .] . I have asked him to remain patient and have exhorted him to continue his loyal service. It is certain that he will never give up his hope of returning to Christen- dom although it would be much beer that he remained here and served the house as he has hitherto done. But since he is so adamant about being excused of his past guilt and receiving Your Majesty’s mercy, I must not destroy all his hopes. I take great care to keep whatever assurances I give to him so vague and uncommial that he cannot hold me to them and that they certainly do not prejudice Your Majesty in any way. Nonethe- less, I most humbly ask Your Majesty to remember him so that he can draw some hope and can thus be preserved in the embassy’s service.
Ungnad certainly was a cynicist — but also intensely pragmatic. e information which Neuser provided, not least the diplomatic leers which he relayed, were immensely valuable. It is not surprising, therefore, that he was not willing to give up such an excellent spy.
Kreckwitz to [Ernst], Istanbul, and September , fol. v–r. I would go so far to say that Kreckwitz was far beer at handling spies than at diplomatic negotiations. His loud and decidedly undiplomatic arguments with Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Paşa suggest as much. See for instance Seidel, Denck- würdige Gesandtschafft, p. . e ambassador’s leers frequently contain personal aacks on Sinan. In Friedrich von Kreckwitz to Archduke Mahias, Istanbul, April , HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, box , bundle for March–April, fol. r–v, fol. v he calls him a “monster” (“bestia”). Mulsow, “Doppelspionage”; Motika, “Neuser”, p. ; Ungnad to Maximilian II, Istanbul, April , fol. r; Un- gnad to Maximilian II, Istanbul, June , fol. r. Ungnad to Maximilian II, Istanbul, May , fol. r.
at renegades played an important role in Habsburg intelligence is perhaps somewhat counter- intuitive given the dismissive rhetoric employed against them. From a pragmatic point of view, it is of course rather sensible. Aer all, the same assets which made renegades interesting to the Oomans — above all their knowledge of foreign languages and their access to information — also rendered them useful for the Austrian Habsburgs and, for that maer, other Christian European states. Regardless of all rhetoric, renegades therefore quite naturally functioned as conduits of in- formation and knowledge. In practice, as the intelligence services provided to Christian European ambassadors show, reneg- ades were oen a lot more ambiguous and ambivalent about both their religious beliefs and their political loyalties than the ideal types conjured up by either my working definition of the term or its contemporary usage. It is precisely this discrepancy, though, which provides fertile ground for historical research. Aer all it created a measure of freedom of action for the individuals concerned as well as opportunities — for the renegades themselves, for the Ooman Empire, and for Christian Europe. Ungnad and others may have hated people like Penckner and Neuser for being traitors but, paradoxically, they benefited considerably from their treason.
References
Archival collections KA AFA Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv, Vienna, Alte Feldakten.
HHStA, StAbt Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Staatenab- teilungen.
KA IÖHKR Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv, Vienna, Innerösterreichischer Hof- kriegsrat.
TNA SP e National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, State Pa- pers.
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Hammer-Purgstall, Joseph von. Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, grossenteils aus bisher unbenüt- zen Handschrien und Archiven durch Joseph von Hammer. nd ed. vols. Pest: C.A. Hartleben, –. Isom-Verhaaren, Christine. “Shiing Identities: Foreign State Servants in France and the Ooman Empire”. Journal of Early Modern History (): –. Konrad, Felix. “Soziale Mobilität europäischer Renegaten im frühneuzeitlichen Osmanischen Reich”. In Religion und Mobilität: Zum Verhältnis von raumbezogener Mobilität und religiöser Identitäts- bildung im frühneuzeitlichen Europa, edited by Henning. P. Jürgens and omas Weller, –. Göingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, . Krstić, Tijana. “Illuminated by the Light of Islam and the Glory of the Ooman Sultanate: Self- Narratives of Conversion to Islam in the Age of Confessionalization”. Comparative Studies in Society and History (): –. Matuz, Josef. “Die Pfortendolmetscher zur Herrschaszeit Süleymāns des Prächtigen”. Südost-Forschungen (): –. Motika, Raoul. “Adam Neuser: Ein Heidelberger eologe im Osmanischen Reich”. In Festschri Hans Georg Majer, edited by Sabine Prätor and Christoph K. Neumann, –. Vol. . Istanbul: Simurg, . Müller, Ralf. Prosopographie der Reisenden und Migranten ins Osmanische Reich ( – ). vols. Leipzig: Eudora, . Mulsow, Martin. “Ein Fall religiöser Doppelspionage und Koranverehrung”. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung ( April ): N. Roth, Cecil. e House of Nasi: e duke of Naxos. Reprint. New York: Greenwood Press, . Scammell, G.V. “European Exiles, Renegades and Outlaws and the Maritime Economy of Asia c. -”. Modern Asian Studies (): –. Warner, Michael. “Intelligence as Risk Shiing”. In Intelligence eory: Key estions and Debates, ed- ited by Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian, –. Studies in Intelligence. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, .
Unpublished secondary sources Gürkan, Emrah Safa. “e Frontier Man and the Espionage in the Habsburg Information Gathering in the Ooman Capital”. Unpublished paper presented at the graduate workshop “e Early Modern Ooman Empire as a Contact Zone”, Princeton, – June .