The All Party Parliamentary Group for an Integrated Transport Strategy

January 2014

HS2 and Intermodality for the UK: How do we better link up the UK?

1 Foreword by Co-Chairs of the APPG

The All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on UK Integrated Transport Strategy was formed in late 2013 with the objective of encouraging the Government to adopt a long term, integrated approach to national transport policy, combining rail, air, road, both passenger and freight. The aim is to ensure that the UK’s national transport network provides the best return on investment and enables the country to maintain its international competitiveness.

The Group was formed in response to increasing concern at the lack of joined up thinking in the UK’s transport strategy. This is highlighted most clearly in the disconnect between HS2 and airports policy, where Government deposited a Hybrid Bill for phase 1 of a new railway between and the West just a few weeks before publication of the Government ‘s interim report on the UK’s future hub airport capacity. HS2 is also excluded from the draft National Networks Policy Statement, issued for consultation in December 2013.

This contrasts with the integrated approach to the strategic planning of air and rail infrastructure in many other countries, and which has proved so successful in meeting a wide range of economic and environmental objectives.

This paper, the first of what we envisage to be a number of studies, considers air/rail integration, and whether HS2 as currently designed represents international best practice.

Transport is critical to the UK’s competitiveness and connectivity. We believe the scale and importance of the issues of high speed rail and hub airport capacity demands an integrated approach to policy-making instead of continuing to consider these issues in isolation.

The UK increasingly lags behind our competitors in infrastructure development. Catching up is vital, but time and money means we have only one chance to get this right. Our one advantage in coming late to these fundamental decisions is the opportunity to learn from other countries experience, and the proven success of their integrated transport strategies. We hope this paper makes the case for adopting the same integrated approach here.

Geoffrey Clifton Brown, MP for the Cotswolds Rob Flello, MP for Stoke-on-Trent South

2 Forewords

The International Air Transport Association (IATA)

An integrated transportation policy is fundamental to ensuring that both public and private transportation projects are functionally integrated. Integration ensures that all the capital invested in these varied projects is spent well and that each project benefits the others. The proposals put forward in the following paper take a significant step toward integrating several of the UK’s largest and most significant transportation projects. Such an integrated approach seems long overdue, particularly given the magnitude of many of the projects currently underway and also those in the planning stages.

In my previous role with IATA as Assistant Director Projects working on behalf of the Heathrow airline community, I was asked to consider a number of proposals to integrate the UK rail network with Heathrow. IATA and the aviation community have always been very supportive of this approach. The proposal that follows provides a significant opportunity to at last bring together a number of elements of both the rail and aviation transportation networks in the UK. These opportunities need to be seized for the benefit of all.

David Stewart is Head of Airport Development at the International Air Transport Association.

Eurotunnel

Properly integrated transport is a dream long harboured in the . History shows that each generation of new technology has been built separately to compete with existing routes and modes rather than to connect with them. Roads, canals, railways, airports, sea ports, telecoms and utilities are all infrastructures that have different fundamental requirements in order to survive and compete with each other.

But in today’s market it is no longer simply a question of internal competition: city versus city, or region against region, we are evolving in an international market place where the ability to move people and goods over long distances and across borders is essential. Linked transport and the ability to move rapidly from one mode to another are the future.

High Speed 2 gives us an opportunity to link the strength of the United Kingdom from all corners of the realm and to put it on an internationally competitive footing. When was finally completed, 13 years after the construction of the Channel , the true benefits of international rail became evident. More than 10 million high speed passengers per year now benefit from the connection between HS1 and the cross- Channel Fixed Link.

Full connectivity between the UK and the continent, via road, rail, sea and air is vital for the UK to continue to grow and compete. It also seems essential that we adopt the proven European models of seamlessly integrating the UK’s planned high-speed rail network with major airports and HS1. Let’s learn from our history and build our integrated transport system for the future, not the past.

Jacques Gounon is Chairman and Chief Executive of Eurotunnel

The APPG would like to take this opportunity to thank both David and Jacques for their significant contributions to this report

3 Contents

Executive Summary 5 Introduction 7 Objectives of Intermodality 8 Achieving Intermodality 14 Intermodality & the UK 21 HS2 & Intermodality Objectives 40

Conclusion 48

Appendix A 49 Appendix B 50 Appendix C 51 Appendix D 52

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Executive summary

The APPG is calling for:

 Decisions on Heathrow and HS2 to be made together in the national interest, rather than in isolation;  A fully functional rail link between HS1 and HS2;  A ‘fresh look’ at transport planning in the UK – based on integration, across all modes of transport.

The UK has a unique opportunity to consider an integrated approach to its air and rail strategies. This is particularly important in view of the UK’s peripheral offshore location in Europe, and the country’s dependence on global access for its future competitiveness in an increasingly connected world.

By coming relatively late to such decisions, the UK has the opportunity to learn from the success - and failure - of transport strategies elsewhere in Europe. These lessons are reflected in European legislation, which requires an intermodal approach to transport planning.

UK Governments have however consistently failed to consider an integrated approach, or to draw on European experience. HS2 and the UK’s hub airport strategy are being developed in isolation, resulting in HS2, the UK’s biggest ever peacetime investment of public monies in a single project, bypassing, by just a few miles, Heathrow, the UK’s only hub and world’s busiest international airport, directly contributing around 1% of GDP.

Despite capacity constraints, Heathrow retains the highest business connectivity score amongst major European hubs, and is at the end of seven of the top 10 business routes in the world. Some see the airport as being as important to the UK economy as the competitive advantage afforded by the English language, legal system and time zone.

HS2 was designed on the specific assumption that Heathrow would not be expanded. As the Airports Commission have now concluded that only Heathrow or Gatwick are candidates for new runway capacity, there is a clear need to revisit the assumptions that were fundamental in HS2’s development.

Importantly in these economically challenging times, HS2 Ltd’s own estimates confirm an alternative HS2 route via Heathrow would be less expensive. The only disbenefit of a route via Heathrow would be slightly longer journey times – by just three or four minutes. This seems insignificant, particularly as Government have now confirmed that HS2’s early focus on speed alone was wrong, and that connectivity is instead more important.

An alternative route could also follow the principles established by the Rail Link, now HS1 - for example, adopting a design speed to allow the line to follow motorway corridors, tunneling through urban areas below existing railways and tunneling too through the narrowest part of Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB). This would significantly reduce the environmental impacts that have contributed to such widespread opposition to HS2.

European experience is clear. Major airports should be directly served by rail lines, carrying a mix of local, regional, long distance and high speed services via airport interchanges located on through lines, not branches or loops. This enables trains to carry both airport and non-airport passengers, allowing increased frequencies and a wider range of destinations at commercially sustainable loadings.

Integrating air and rail in this way has numerous benefits including modal shift from road to rail, potential air/rail substitution of short haul flights to release scarce airport capacity, wider airport catchments and customer choice, easier regional access to global markets, and a transformation of inward investment perceptions of the attractiveness of regional economies.

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In addition to Heathrow, the Airports Commission has shortlisted Gatwick for additional runway development. Although Gatwick, unlike Heathrow, is already located on a main line railway, its peripheral location, on the far side of London from the majority of the UK’s regions and principal markets, makes it more difficult to envisage the step change in surface access that would be essential to support a potential doubling of traffic.

There is therefore a unique opportunity to develop an integrated approach to the UK’s air and rail strategies before the Airports Commission issues its final report in Summer 2015.

Whilst the HS2 Hybrid Bill has now been placed before Parliament, it is not too late for Government to consider amending the scheme, as the Secretary of State has already indicated may be necessary, to provide proper intermodal integration and secure the UK’s future connectivity and competitiveness.

However, there is increasing urgency, as over £0.3bn of public money has already been spent on HS2 from a budget, in this Parliament before May 2015, of more than £1bn.

If, as this paper proposes, HS2 needs to be adapted to reflect the Airports Commission’s recommendations, this should be considered as soon as possible to minimise the abortive costs to the public purse and enable the Commission to bring forward the best possible option for the UK’s future hub airport.

6 Introduction

As long ago as 1998, the European Commission identified the benefits of an integrated approach to developing air and rail infrastructure. 1 Subsequent policy development led to the 2011 Transport White Paper, which concluded that “better modal choices will result from greater integration of the modal networks: airports, ports, railway, metro and stations, should increasingly be linked and transformed into multimodal connection platforms for passengers.” 2 Most recently, the European Parliament’s December 2013 Regulation requires Member States to integrate high speed rail and airport infrastructure. 3

The Commission sees intermodality as the key issue for air rail integration, defined as “a characteristic of a transport system, that allows at least two different modes to be used in an integrated manner in a door-to-door transport chain.” 4 This is applicable to both passenger and freight traffic.

The Commission notes the successful experience of intermodality at a number of major European airports;

“There are some particularly remarkable examples of HS stations operating along intermodal lines with airports. Frankfurt International Airport is a pioneer in this. Opened in 1972, traffic increased considerably following the introduction of the Frankfurt–Cologne HSL in 2002. According to Deutsche Bahn, two thirds of train passengers are either leaving or have arrived by plane. In France, the station at Paris Charles-de-Gaulle Airport is located at the interconnection between the North HSL and the South-East HSL. It is served by 52 HSTs a day, linking the main towns in France, and by five HSTs serving northern Europe (Brussels and Amsterdam). In Belgium, Brussels National Airport will be linked to all the main Belgian cities and to several European cities, such as Paris, Amsterdam, Cologne and Frankfurt, by 2012.” 5

Intermodality is also seen as fundamental to implementation of the Commission’s 2011 Action Plan for airport capacity, efficiency and safety;

“Air and should become more complementary. At least three interfaces between air and rail exist that each brings specific benefits to the society as a whole, and will also derive a positive impact on the environment:  Links to the city with the benefits of decongestion of road traffic and better air quality around airports;  Links to the region with the same benefits as above and the additional benefit of expansion of the airport’s catchment area;  Link between the airport and major metropolitan areas through High Speed Rail with the same benefits as above and additional potential for short haul slots to be freed for long-haul flights, which for airports and air carriers represent higher slot productivity.” 6

1 Interactions between High-Speed Rail and Air Passenger Transport, COST318 Final report, European Commission DG TREN http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/cost-318-pbC31498275/ 2 Para 23, Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system, European Commission 28th March 2011 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0144:FIN:EN:PDF 3 “The main airports indicated in Part 2 of Annex II shall be connected with the railway and road transport infrastructure of the trans- European transport network by 31 December 2050, except where physical constraints prevent such connection. Taking into account potential traffic demand, such airports shall be integrated into the high-speed rail network wherever possible” - Para 3, Article 41, Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network and repealing Decision No 661/2010/EU - Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council, 11th December 2013 http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:348:0001:0128:EN:PDF 4 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Intermodality and Intermodal Freight Transport in the , Brussels 1997, ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/transport/docs/intermodal_freight_transport_en.pdf 5 High Speed Europe – A Sustainable Link Between Citizens – European Commission 2010 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/studies/doc/2010_high_speed_rail_en.pdf 6 Para 5.1 An action plan for airport capacity, efficiency and safety in Europe, COM (2006) 819 final European Commission 24th January 2007 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0819:FIN:EN:PDF

7 Whilst European policy addresses the physical aspects of intermodality, the impact of technology is also highly relevant in considering future transport development.

Recognizing the continued growth of air travel and continuously evolving security threats, IATA has, for example, developed Checkpoint of the Future to inform cross-industry debate. 7 This seeks to harness emerging technologies to improve security, reduce costs and enhance just one aspect of the overall passenger experience.

Other industry actors 8 are developing similar forward thinking strategies. The common factor is the potential for technology to reduce or remove friction in passenger journeys, bringing the vision of seamless intermodality closer to reality. No passenger journey starts or ends at an airport or railway station.

It is therefore vitally important that physical transport infrastructure, with an inevitable substantial time lag between design and delivery, is designed with full awareness of the implications of virtual infrastructure.

It is easy to forget the pace of technological change. The Mayor’s proposals for a new UK hub airport to the east of London envisage a completion date of 2029 9 - 15 years hence. Looking back a similar period, to 1997, the internet was only just starting to see widespread use, 10 with less than 70 million users worldwide. Today, it is estimated that there are 2.7bn users.

It therefore seems essential to consider how technology might impact on the design of air and rail infrastructure. The traditional model of airport terminal, for example, may quickly be outmoded. Rather than architecture-led design concepts, we believe the focus should be on the total passenger experience, and how physical infrastructure (station and terminal facilities), and virtual infrastructure, (eg: ticketing, security and baggage) can best be seamlessly integrated across air and rail modes.

We consider these issues of air and rail integration under the term “intermodality”

Objectives of Intermodality

IATA has identified the following five key objectives in designing infrastructure to enable intermodality; 11

1 - Assist modal shift from road to rail to reduce road congestion, improve local air quality and enhance the passenger experience.

Airport locations were generally determined many decades ago, when passenger numbers were low, road access the mode of choice, environmental issues given little or no weight and airport accessibility was not the major driver of business locational decision making that it is today. 12

7 http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/security/pages/checkpoint-future.aspx 8 For example Navigating the Airport of Tomorrow, Amadeus 2011 http://www.amadeus.com/airport/docs/amadeus-navigating-the- airport-of-tomorrow-2011-en.pdf 9 A new hub airport for London and the UK – Isle of Grain, TfL July 2013 http://www.tfl.gov.uk/assets/downloads/corporate/new-hub- airport-isle-of-grain-mayor-of-london.pdf 10 http://news.cnet.com/8301-17938_105-57599038-1/revisit-the-amazing-internet-the-cool-kids-used-in-1997/ 11 Air Rail Intermodality Study, IATA February 2003 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/rail/studies/doc/2003_air_rail.pdf 12 See for example, Zurich Airport as an Economic Engine, Flughafen Zurich 2013, http://www.zurich- airport.com/Portaldata/2/Resources/documents_unternehmen/luftfahrtpolitik/13_08_08_Broschuere_Flughafen_Zuerich_als_Wirtschaft smotor.pdf

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Heathrow surface access emissions (Source – Sustaining the Transport Vision: 2008-2012, BAA October 2008)

Today, shifting road traffic to rail, with consequent environmental benefits, is a primary objective of airport policy. Passenger numbers alone can give a misleading picture of road transport’s impacts. For example, each return airport passenger journey by taxi or “kiss and fly” generates double the number of road trips. 13

In addition, some airports are located in areas of poor local air quality, making mode shift even more critical, particularly where airport expansion is dependent on reducing environmental impacts.

Recognising the fundamentally changed context in which they now operate, many airports have adopted integrated masterplans to increase use of rail by both passengers and staff, and increase their value as business locations, through the development of new surface access infrastructure.

This creates a virtuous cycle, for example facilitating development of mixed use “Airport City” models, such as Schiphol. 14 The area around Schipol is promoted as the best location for business in the Netherlands, and the City of Frankfurt’s “Gateway Gardens” 15 adjacent to the airport’s own on-airport commercial development is similarly so. 16 London’s Mayor has favourably commented 17 on the similar, but more radical, (at least to European eyes) Aerotropolis proposition, 18 where airports themselves act as the primary generator of new urban agglomerations.

Maximising commercial development in this way assists the case for rail investment by increasing demand and reducing reliance on airport traffic alone.

2 – Assist modal shift from air to rail to release scarce airport capacity

IATA’s 2003 intermodality study concluded “the evidence collected to date suggests that this air to rail transfer potential is greatest with journey distances of 100km to 800 km, taking between 1 and 3hr by high-speed rail.” Subsequent research suggests the journey time threshold where rail can potentially compete with air may be

13 “61% of passenger travel emissions are generated by kiss & fly, taxi and minicab journeys which all generate four trips per return flight” – Heathrow Carbon Footprint & Surface Access Strategy, BAA 2009 14 http://www.wtcschiphol.nl/airportcityschiphol/airportcity.html 15 http://www.frankfurt- airport.com/content/frankfurt_airport/en/misc/container/gatewaygardens/gateway_gardens_quarters_brochure/jcr:content.file/GG_Qua rtierbroschuere_engl.pdf 16 http://www.frankfurt- airport.com/content/frankfurt_airport/en/misc/container/frankfurt_airportbrochure/jcr:content.file/Fraport_Image_GB_web.pdf 17 Evening Standard 28th November 2012 http://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/boris-johnson-my-vision-of-an-airport-city-on-thames- inspired-by-india-8363224.html 18 http://www.aerotropolis.com/

9 increasing, 19 with SNCF now gaining market share on rail journeys of up to 4hrs. 20 International, which operates high speed trains between France, Germany and the Netherlands, suggests that the increase in journey time where rail can compete with air reflects the increasing importance of productivity rather than journey times. This argues that trains offer a less fragmented journey experience than short haul flights, allowing longer effective time for work. 21

Rail’s competitiveness may also reflect the impact of increased airport security measures on passenger perceptions of the overall journey time of short haul flights. 22

In the UK, the Airports Commission’s Interim Report notes “there is potential for high speed rail to be an attractive alternative to flying for many short haul point to point routes, and it typically captures a majority of the market on routes where the total rail journey time is no more than 3-4 hours.”23

The European Commission’s view is that “air/rail inter-modality cannot be considered as a primary way to decongest airports because in general the decongesting effect amounts to one or two years of air traffic growth. However, it is useful for achieving greater efficiency of the transport system and of airports in particular. Moreover, the environmental burden on airports will be reduced.” 24

However, the Commission further notes that “a conclusion of the Rail/Air Inter-modality Facilitation Forum that took place between September 2003 and June 2004 was that the absence of integrated air-rail tickets was seen as an obstacle to the further development of Air/Rail inter-modality in terms of services and passenger interest.”

Emerging technologies such as smartphone boarding cards, (now being trialed by ), 25 NFC (Near Field Communication), RFID (Radio Frequency Identification), augmented reality 26 and biometric tools such as facial recognition 27 could therefore remove many of the frictions that currently act as a deterrent to intermodality and it is essential that the design of transport interchanges anticipate these technologies.

Air/rail substitution may also have potential environmental benefits. The frequent landing and take off cycles of short haul flights result in disproportionate environmental impacts, and it is these short flights that are inherently most suitable for substitution by rail. 28 The carbon dioxide emissions and fuel use per passenger- kilometre can be considerably lower for comparable rail journeys, 29 although this is heavily dependent on the

19 Air and Rail Competition and Complementarity, Steer Davies Gleave for European Commission DG TREN August 2006 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/studies/doc/2006_08_study_air_rail_competition_en.pdf 20 Guillaume Pepy, Chairman SNCF, 9th July 2008 http://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/jul/09/rail.sncf.montblancexpress 21 Travel Time Efficiency Survey, Thalys-EPSA 2012 https://www.thalys.com/img/pdf/b2b/etude/Etude_Travel_Time_Efficiency_en.pdf 22 High Speed Rail Investment; an overview of the literature, Chris Nash, Institute for Transport Studies University of for New Lines Programme, (undated) http://www.networkrail.co.uk/5880_HSRinvestmentanoverviewoftheliterature.pdf 23 Para. 2.59, Interim Report, Airports Commission December 2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/266668/airports-commission-interim-report.pdf 24 ibid Para 5.2 25 http://www.britishairways.com/en-gb/information/checking-in/mobile-boarding-pass 26 http://www.sita.aero/content/copenhagen-airport-launches-a-world-first 27 http://www.futuretravelexperience.com/2013/06/facial-recognition-system-deployed-at--airport/ 28 “The high rate of fuel burn during take-off and initial climb represents a disproportionate fuel usage for short flights. The proportion of fuel used during take-off and landing and the overall average fuel use per passenger-kilometre increases even further for shorter flights, such as between London and Amsterdam or Paris at around 350 km (220 miles or 190 nautical miles), or London and at a distance of only 260 km (160 miles or 140 nautical miles). Improvements in technology might reduce overall fuel use per passenger- kilometre but cannot eliminate the increase in average fuel use for short-haul flights” – Para 4.11, The Environmental Effects of Civil Aircraft in Flight, Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 2002 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110322143804/http://www.rcep.org.uk/reports/sr-2002-aircraft/documents/aviation- report.pdf 29 ibid Para 4.39

10 generating mix for rail traction power. Over 85% of French railways power requirement, for example, is generated by nuclear. 30

The long term effect of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme on aviation 31 is uncertain in view of the exemptions agreed pending ICAO Assembly’s development of what is intended to be a global market-based mechanism (MBM) for implementation by 2020.

However, policy signals appear clear and the effect of further costs on already marginally profitable short haul flights could be significant. Airline economics could therefore be another factor in assessing the benefits of close integration between air and rail at hub airports, and providing further justification for an intermodal approach to air and rail strategic planning.

3 - Support regional development

Research shows that better access to hub airports improves regional competitiveness,32 and is a major factor in business location decisions. 33

This is particularly critical where capacity constraints at hub airports result in carriers withdrawing domestic flights in order to re-use slots for more lucrative long haul services, 34 making it harder for regions to access global markets, thus hampering their competitiveness and ability to attract inward investment. 35

For example, in 2013 the UK’s constrained hub capacity resulted in Schiphol serving 23 destinations in Britain, compared with Gatwick’s 12 and Heathrow’s seven. 36 The Airports Commission notes “whereas London’s connectivity is on a clear upward trend … the weakening in links to Heathrow has contributed to a continuing decline in connectivity (from the UK’s regions) as measured using the IMF weightings.”37

Loss of domestic feeder services reduces passenger choice of carrier and routing, requiring travel through a more inconvenient airport or via a longer route. Intermodality can open up access to alternative airports, increasing passenger choice, introducing competition and improving regional attractiveness to business.

4 - Increase airport catchment to support hub operations and maximise airline yields

IATA’s 2003 study found that “intermodality is seen by many major airports as a critical competitive advantage, reaching populations in areas where air services are not available or where frequencies are not good”. Where short haul air routes have been withdrawn for reasons of viability or capacity constraints, rail services to

30 Breakdown by origin of electricity used by the railways in 2005, High Speed Europe – A Sustainable Link Between Citizens – European Commission 2010 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/studies/doc/2010_high_speed_rail_en.pdf 31 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/index_en.htm 32 “The UK regions are at a major disadvantage in terms of access from major world markets. This hampers the ability to attract inward investment and regional economic growth” - Economic Impacts of Hub Airports, British of Commerce 2009 www.britishchambers.org.uk/.../BCC_Economic_Impacts_of_Hub_Airports.pdf 33 Heathrow “is vital to the UK’s competiveness: easy access to Heathrow is often a major factor for businesses in deciding where to locate” – DfT Factsheet Connecting to Heathrow, 2011 http://hs2ltd.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/connecting-to-heathrow_0.pdf 34 “In 1990, 18 destinations were served from Heathrow by 118 round trips per day, and these figures fell to only eight destinations and 84 round trips per day in 2004” – Adding Capacity at – Response to the DfT consultation, Dr. Moshe Givoni and Professor David Banister, Transport Studies Unit, University of , February 2008 http://www.tsu.ox.ac.uk/pubs/1035-givoni-banister.pdf 35 “Organisations outside London were concerned about the impacts on international investment in the regions as a result of the limited and reducing number of services to Heathrow from airports within the UK” – Transport and the Economy, Transport Select Committee 2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmtran/473/473.pdf 36 Schiphol claims to operate Heathrow's third runway, Daily Telegraph 7th November 2012 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/aviation/9337349/Schiphol-claims-to-operate-Heathrows-third-runway.html 37 Para 3.87, Interim Report, Airports Commission December 2013

11 airports feed traffic to help airlines fill their aircraft at commercially attractive yields and maintain or seed new routes to more economically marginal destinations. 38

Comparison of airport catchments (millions)

Frankfurt’s success reflects the fact that 47% of the German population lives within a largely rail accessible radius of 200 km. 39 The co-operation agreement between Schiphol Group and Aéroports de Paris specifically recognizes the benefits of the combined catchment area of 59 million people and the high speed rail links between the two airports. 40

Expanding Heathrow’s catchment could protect the viability of hub operations in an increasingly competitive market, (where Dubai is likely to soon overtake Heathrow as the world’s busiest airport for international passengers) 41 by providing economies of scale 42 and supporting higher yields. 43

Direct high speed rail connections to hub airports are particularly critical to achieving these objectives. 44

38 “It may be more financially beneficial for BAA to see bigger, fuller airplanes, but the airlines maintain that to support this operation, they still need the connections to group people together and fill up the big planes" - David Stewart, IATA 28th March 2008 http://www.airport- technology.com/features/feature1783/ 39 Analyst Presentation, Fraport March 3rd, 2010 http://www.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/erp/pdf/FY_2009_Presentation_Weil.pdf 40 Press Release, Schiphol Group 21st October 2008 http://www.schiphol.nl/SchipholGroup1/NieuwsPers/Persbericht/AeroportsDeParisAndSchipholGroupToCreateALeadingGlobalAllianceInT heAirportIndustry1.htm 41 Colin Matthews, Heathrow Airport Ltd. February 2013 http://www.iata.org/publications/airlines-international/february- 2013/Pages/soapbox-heathrow.aspx 42 “Improved surface access to Heathrow would … help to maintain the necessary economies of scale to provide a viable hub route network” - Review of the Impact of Aviation within the Area, SKM for London Sustainable Development Commission, December 2003 http://www.londonsdc.org/documents/research/lsdc_airtransportskm.pdf 43 “Strong local demand is beneficial to help underpin a wide range of services and frequencies. Because there is generally less competition for non-stop flights, this helps support higher yields” – The Future of Hubbing in London, Rigas Doganis & Associates http://www.baa.com/assets/B2CPortal/Static%20Files/HubbinginLondon.pdf 44 “An HSR network serving Heathrow would also encourage those who currently interline at Paris CDG, Amsterdam or Frankfurt to use Heathrow, thus strengthening Heathrow’s competitiveness compared to other European airports for long haul flights” - High Speed Rail Development Programme 2008/09, Strategic Choices, MVA/Systra for

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5 - Enable high value freight connectivity

Whilst air-freight accounts for a very small percentage measured by tonnes lifted, it is hugely significant when measured by value. Heathrow, for example, is the UK’s biggest port by value of freight handled, 45 and accounts for 64% of the UK’s total airfreight by volume. 46 Hub airports provide vital bellyhold capacity on routes that would not support a dedicated freight service 47 and are therefore critical to inward investment decisions.48 Conversely, the “passenger leads, freight follows” model can also support more marginal routes – BA, for example, derives only 7% of its revenue from cargo, but this can be the difference between a profit and loss making route. 49

Proximity to air-freight hubs is particularly important to high added value manufacturing industries such as pharmaceuticals and the luxury goods sector.

The high user costs of major hub airports, together with the risk of delays through congestion and night-time noise curfews, often restrict or prevent use by dedicated cargo aircraft. TNT, for example, chose Liege as its European hub, where 24/7 operations are possible to support an overnight delivery model. 50

In attempting to address this issue, the Eurocarex project, 51 supported by the European Commission and industry partners including FedEx, TNT, UPS and Air France KLM Cargo, seeks to integrate the European high speed rail network with major airports. This would allow dedicated freight trains carrying standard airfreight ULD’s (Unit Load Devices) to make use of spare overnight capacity on the rail network for time sensitive, high value international freight.

The average capacity of a Eurocarex train would be ca. 100-120 tonnes of cargo, equivalent to a Boeing B747- 400 Cargo or three Airbus A310 Cargo aircraft.

A direct connection between hub airports and high speed rail may therefore assume growing importance, not only to supporting hub operations at noise constrained, night-curfew airports but to wider business locational decision making.

45 “Freight going through Heathrow alone is worth £35 billion a year and the airport is the UK’s most important freight port by value” – Heathrow Airport press release 25th April 2013 http://mediacentre.heathrowairport.com/Press-releases/Heathrow-welcomes-Freight- Transport-Association-s-submission-to-the-Airports-Commission-528.aspx 46 Para. 3.19, Interim Report, Airports Commission December 2013 47 “Around 60 per cent of air freight travels in the hold of passenger planes” – Freight Transport Association http://www.fta.co.uk/export/sites/fta/_galleries/downloads/air_freight/the-role-of-air-freight-in-the-UK.pdf 48 “Air freight is crucial to the UK economy because it provides a service which the rest of UK industry relies upon in order to be competitive in the global market. It is vital for the UK to maintain its place as a global centre of business, both for services and high end manufacturing, in order for the economy to thrive. Although the volume of freight travelling by air is very small when measured by weight – around 0.5% of the total, it has a high value – about 40 per cent of the UK's extra-EU trade” – Freight Transport Association submission to the Airports Commission, 25th April 2013 http://www.fta.co.uk/media_and_campaigns/press_releases/2013/20130425_aviation_expansion_vital_to_the_economy_says_fta.html 49 Cargo 2013 Report, Flightglobal 50 Airports as poles of economic development 7th - 8th June 2012, European Conference Brussels http://www.airportregions.org/wp- content/uploads/Genval-Web-1-11.pdf 51 http://www.eurocarex.com/

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Achieving Intermodality

1 - Modal shift from road to rail

IATA’s 2010 benchmarking study for Heathrow’s airlines 52 analysed the characteristics of the intermodal services at Frankfurt, Charles de Gaulle and Schiphol, considering intermodality, customer service quality and operational costs.

This concluded that, to achieve optimum benefits, airports need to be located on through-running routes, (not branch lines or loops), and served by direct high speed, conventional and regional services in order to allow very high frequencies to a wide range of destinations.

The report also emphasized the importance of direct services, since interchanges in an airport access journey act as a very significant deterrent to rail use. 53 Direct services also align with the intent of European transport policy. 54

IATA’s study also found that “Intermodality increases the catchment area of airports as long as rail frequencies provided are sufficient.” Both Frankfurt and Paris CDG offer an average of 10 high speed train services per hour, with Frankfurt and Amsterdam having the highest frequencies to individual destinations per day (13 at Frankfurt and Amsterdam versus 7 at Paris CDG).

Where airports are located on branch

52 Benchmarking study for London Heathrow Airline Consultative Committee (LACC), IATA November 2010 http://highspeedrailresponses.dft.gov.uk/responses/D01S01/HS2_38284.pdf 53 “Evidence for the Committee for Climate Change found that 38% of existing interlining passengers would transfer from air to HSR for the domestic leg of their journey if there was a direct HSR service to the airport, but only 1% would do so if there was a need to make an interchange en route. The Transport Select Committee has recently made its views known: it is essential, in their view that Heathrow is directly connected to the high-speed rail network” - The Heathrow Opportunity, Greengauge 21 2010 http://www.greengauge21.net/publications/the-heathrow-opportunity-2/ 54 “Better modal choices will result from greater integration of the modal networks: airports, ports, railway, metro and bus stations should increasingly be linked and transformed into multimodal connection platforms for passengers” – White Paper, Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system COM(2011) March 2011 http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0144:FIN:EN:PDF

14 lines or loops, rail services are entirely dependent on airport traffic alone – branches because no other destinations can be served, and loops because the journey time penalty makes through services unattractive to non-airport passengers. However, no airport, however large, can generate sufficient traffic alone to provide services to a wide range of destinations, and at the high frequencies necessary to attract time-sensitive airport passengers.

IATA’s earlier (2003) study reinforced the message that rail access in itself does not create the opportunities for intermodality - “An airport needs multiple access routes to create critical mass for the rail network. This is the case at Frankfurt where the airport is linked to all rail tracks serving cities to the south of Frankfurt. At Schiphol the airport is linked to the HST line but also to many domestic cities. At Charles de Gaulle many HST lines stop.”

Frankfurt in particular demonstrates how this approach leads to increased patronage on rail services, creating a virtuous cycle where increasing demand generates higher frequencies 55 and a wider range of destinations.56

SNCF similarly confirm the importance of Paris Charles de Gaulle airport’s location on the direct “LGV Interconnexion” through line that links the north and south of the country. 57

At Schiphol, two alternative schemes for providing rail infrastructure were considered in the 1980’s – an upgrading of the existing network to increase capacity with construction of a branch line to an airport terminus, or a more radical proposal to develop a more circuitous – and expensive - alignment placing the airport on through high speed and regional lines. 58

The choice of the latter has been fundamental to Schiphol’s success and the objective of providing direct links from as many cities as possible has continued with the more recent opening of rail connections at Sloterdijk, (2003). This enables through services to the airport from the north of the country and at Duivendrecht, through trains from Utrecht. The latter example demonstrates the importance of avoiding interchange penalties, since journey times between Utrecht and Schiphol have only reduced by 6 minutes, but a change of train is avoided. The new Dutch high speed line now also connects Schiphol directly with Rotterdam, Belgium and France.

55 “174 long-distance high speed trains calling each day, and regional lines with 223 services daily” - Connecting Sustainably, Fraport 2011 http://www.fraport.com/content/fraport/en/misc/binaer/sustainability1/SustainabilityReport2012/jcr:content.file/sustainability-report- 2011.pdf 56 “High speed long distance trains now carried 19% of originating air passengers at the airport, compared to 8% in 2000, and it was planned to increase this further to 30% by 2015”- High Speed Rail Access to Heathrow, A Report to the Secretary of State by Lord Mawhinney, July 2010 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/lordmawhinneyreport/pdf/ highspeedrailaccessheathrow.pdf 57 “We have more than 12 years of experience in the value of an easy connection between TGV and plane. The commercial success of TGV is due to the fact that Roissy Is a through station. Roissy is progressively working like a hub with many rail/air connections but also numerous rail/rail connections" - Guillaume Pepy, Chairman SNCF, Transport Times conference, London May 2009 58 Amsterdam Airport – The Growing Importance of Rail Access, Donald Hatch Japan Railway & Transport Review 39, July 2004 http://www.jrtr.net/jrtr39/pdf/f18_hat.pdf

15

It is significant that where airports have historically been served by branch line connections, new rail infrastructure has been developed, or is being planned, to allow through running of train services.

In Belgium, where Brussels Zaventem airport found itself at the end of a branch line from the main rail network, studies concluded that “conversion of the existing underground terminus station to a through station is crucial for the development of Brussels airport” 59

The European Commission’s consequent contribution of TEN-T funding to “Project Diabolo” 60 signifies the importance attached to through running train services via airports. The Commission noted that connecting “Zaventem Airport to the north-south railway axes between Brussels and Antwerp contributes to the interconnection of high speed lines, while reducing the isolation of Zaventem Airport, a major economic hub threatened by problems of accessibility and congestion.”

In Italy, the Malpensa North Rail Link project has the similar aim of transforming a branch line connection to the airport into a through network. 61

Munich airport has also identified the absence of direct rail services as a major weakness and proposes a €2.3bn infrastructure investment that will place the airport on major rail arteries. 62 Zurich airport, already well served by rail, similarly proposes major improvements. 63

Koln/Bonn airport demonstrates the counter-factual, that an airport located on a loop is unable to generate sufficient traffic to justify a high frequency rail service. As Lord Mawhinney’s review of high speed rail access to Heathrow noted, “A loop of high speed railway had been built to serve Cologne/Bonn airport but this had added 15 minutes to the rail journey time and as a result the loop was little used.” 64

Since opening, Deutsche Bahn have steadily reduced services to Koln/Bonn airport, reflecting the challenge of reconciling the high service frequencies necessary to attract time sensitive airport passengers with the limited

59 Project Diabolo, Infrabel Mobility Projects 2009 60 http://tentea.ec.europa.eu/download/map_review/ppbundles/pp2.pdf 61 Funding TEN-T PPP Infrastructure Projects, European Commission November 2013 http://tentea.ec.europa.eu/download/events/2013PPPworkshop/presentations/5malpensa.pdf 62 Intermodality air/rail at Munich airport, Flughafen München GmbH September 2012 http://benchmarkingmunich.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/wilhelm-wolters-intermodality-air-rail-at-muc.ppsx

63 Landside Accessibility - Report from Zurich Airport, Tina Wagner, European Centre of Transport and Logistics, TU Hamburg-Harburg 2003 http://www.ziv.de/download/aps3/S_2_Wagner.pdf 64 High Speed Rail Access to Heathrow, A Report to the Secretary of State by Lord Mawhinney July 2010 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/lordmawhinneyreport/pdf/ highspeedrailaccessheathrow.pdf

16 demand that results from dependence on airport traffic alone. The result is that, despite very significant investment,65 the design of the rail infrastructure has resulted in a failure to achieve the intended benefits, and considerable abortive costs.

Switzerland illustrates the wider potential for intermodality to enhance the overall passenger experience and maximise rail use. Zurich and Geneva airports are served by direct trains to a wide range of destinations, but the Swiss Fly-Rail Baggage system is unique in allowing off-airport baggage check-in at stations across the country. 66 Whilst this has been in successful operation within Switzerland for over twenty years, it is not a model that has been copied. However, advances in technology may see more widespread use in the future.

2 - Modal shift from air to rail

IATA’s 2010 study for Heathrow’s airlines found that the benchmarked airports (Frankfurt, Schiphol and Charles de Gaulle) high speed rail stations capture between 6% and 10% of air traffic of the serviced catchment areas within 3 hours, and that integration with high speed rail has allowed these capacity constrained airports to replace some short haul flights. 67

At Charles de Gaulle, Air France codeshare with Thalys rail services to Brussels, with Lufthansa similarly using block booked space on DB service trains between Koln and Frankfurt.68.

Importantly, this latter example replaced the previous use of dedicated train sets, operated exclusively for Lufthansa passengers. 69 This reflected the inherent inefficiency of using dedicated trainsets and valuable train paths for relatively low traffic levels at the high frequencies needed to be commercially attractive to time sensitive airport passengers.

However, it is important to note that, even where new high speed rail services have eroded air market share, airlines have continued to operate on routes in direct competition with high speed rail, albeit at reduced frequencies – for example Paris-Lyons and Paris-Amsterdam. In Germany, only 2-3 daily slot pairs at Frankfurt have been released for alternative use due to the reduction in frequencies between Koln/Bonn and Frankfurt. This compares to 4 daily slot pairs still in use for this extreme short-distance route.

This may reflect the market preferences exhibited by passengers for air/air transfers, and operator preferences for keeping control of their network offering. However, at airports with capacity constraints or high airline user charges, there remains longer term potential for high speed rail to allow significant substitution.

IATA’s study also showed that successful air/ail interchanges allow minimum connecting times (MCT’s) generally lower than 60 minutes, making it essential that air and rail facilities are fully integrated and in as close proximity as possible.

MCT’s are important as they are used by GDS (Global Distribution Systems) when displaying connection times and routing options. Frankfurt’s MCT is 45 min for both air to air and air to rail connections, which allows

65 “The relative underutilisation of the Cologne- Bonn Airport railway station by long-distance trains is particularly deplorable, as about € 360m have been invested in this project for both the subterranean station and the airport rail loop” – Experiences with Advanced Air/Rail Passenger Intermodality, Wolfgang Grimme, German Aerospace Centre http://www.dlr.de/fw/Portaldata/42/Resources/dokumente/paper/GRIMME-NR206.pdf 66 “The airport baggage-handling system of the Swiss National Railways is the largest in the world, from a geographic perspective. It provided baggage processing from 116 separate railway stations, with full check-in (with boarding pass) at 50 rail stations in 2007. This service is provided by the Swiss National Railways, and no airline personnel are involved in accepting the baggage” - Ground Access to Major Airports by Public Transportation, ACRP Report 4, Matthew Coogan 2008 http://www.nap.edu/download.php?record_id=13918 67 “At the same time, moving air traffic to the rail eases some of the strain on flight capacity. For example, landing and departure slots that are freed-up by shifting short-haul flights to the rail can be used for the urgently needed expansion of intercontinental flight services” - http://www.fraport.com/en/our-expertise/frankfurt-airport-development/intermodality.html 68 http://www.bahn.com/i/view/GBR/en/prices/germany/airail.shtml 69 Lufthansa Airport Express http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lufthansa_Airport_Express

17 Lufthansa’s AIRail product and Deutsche Bahn to compete equally on GDS screens with all air options. 70

In contrast, Heathrow’s MCT from T5 to T4 is currently 105 minutes and 90 minutes is required to transfer between T3 and T5. 71

3 – Support regional development

European hub airports share a common objective of maximizing surface access links from their regions, reflecting the importance attached to inward investment decisions based on accessibility. Brussels airport notes, for example, “the sustainable development of the airport region as the 2nd economic growth pole in Belgium and the job creation associated with it need to be secured. To achieve this important measures are required to improve access to the airport from the regions.” 72

In Germany, North Rhine-Westphalia emphasizes its rail links to Frankfurt airport in promoting the region for inward investment, noting that “high-speed trains can be used to reach the European hub at Frankfurt airport in less than one hour” 73 - from, for example Dortmund, some 220km distant. In contrast, UK cities at a similar or lesser distance from Heathrow – for example, (146 km), (154km), Leeds (270km) and Manchester (255 km), lack any direct airport rail connection. Gatwick is of course even further distant from UK markets.

Maintaining and improving regional connectivity with hub airports is increasingly critical as runway capacity constraints across Europe result in short haul flights being replaced by long haul services. The Association of European Airlines highlights “the consequences of the “capacity crunch” are that hub airports will not be able to grow according to market demand and access to the hub airports from the regions and periphery is likely to be diminished. As air transport provides for mobility, prosperity and political cohesion and also stimulates economic growth and social inclusion it goes without saying that such a situation will seriously affect Europe’s 74 economic potential and its worldwide competitiveness.”

4 - Increase airport catchments

Europe’s major airports have successfully pursued strategies to increase their catchment through intermodality. 75 Better access between regions and hub airports benefits airlines and airports by maximizing markets, and regional economic development by improving connectivity.

Frankfurt, (with a population of 35m accessible by rail within 200km), 76 Schiphol, Charles de Gaulle and Brussels all see a commercial imperative in expanding their markets by direct connection to both classic and high speed rail services serving a cross-border hinterland. 77 Schiphol/Charles de Gaulle’s industrial alliance is in

70 Air Rail Intermodality Study, IATA February 2003 71 http://www.heathrowairport.com/heathrow-airport-guide/flight-connections/terminal-5-domestic-connecting-to-terminal-4- international and http://www.heathrowairport.com/heathrow-airport-guide/flight-connections/terminal-5-international-connecting-to- terminal-3-international 72 Brussels Airport strengthens role as intermodal , September 12, 2013 http://www.brusselsairport.be/en/mediaroom/news/40573/ 73 NRW.Invest http://www.nrwinvest.com/NRW_at_a_glance/Facts_Figures/Transportation_and_traffic/index.php 74 Position Paper on Airport Capacity, AEA June 2007 http://www.aea.be/assets/documents/positions/PP_Airport_Capa_07June07.pdf 75 “International evidence illustrates that airports can successfully be served by high speed rail services and other long distance trains in order to increase airlines’ passenger catchment areas. Examples include Paris CDG, Amsterdam Schiphol and Copenhagen” - High Speed Rail Development Programme 2008/09, Strategic Choices, MVA/Systra for Greengauge 21 http://www.scribd.com/doc/39964950/High- Speed-Rail-Development-Programme 76 “A catchment area within a radius of 200 kilometres with 35 million consumers (43% of Germany's population) optimally connected by air, rail and road” - http://www.frankfurt-airport.com/content/frankfurt_airport/en/business_location/cargo_hub.html 77 “In addition to deregulation of the air transportation markets, one reason for the growing competition among the hubs is that their catchment areas increasingly overlap. The impetus here comes from the high-speed rail systems (ICE, TGV) permitting a fast journey to the airport” – Fraport http://www.fraport.com/cms/capacity_growth/rubrik/2/2840.intermodality.htm

18 part predicated on direct high speed rail links between the two airports to expand their combined catchment. 78

In comparison to Heathrow’s limited rail connections, Frankfurt 79 and Schiphol, 80 see accessibility as bringing competitive advantage, particularly important when there is speculation as to whether Northern Europe can sustain even the current number of hub airports. 81

In contrast, and reflecting its lack of rail connectivity from anywhere other than central London, 11.5% of Heathrow’s UK origin and destination passengers come from the local area of and . Only 2.8% come from the major conurbations of Birmingham, Manchester, , Leeds, , Newcastle, Edinburgh, , and Bristol combined. 82 Bristol, for example, only 90 miles west and in what should be Heathrow’s core market, instead sees 10,000 passengers a week interline through competing European hubs. 83

This reflects the lack of direct rail access to Heathrow from the west.

Heathrow rail access (Source - New Rail Access for London Heathrow Airport, Hermann Maier, SKM and Martin Heffer, BAA, European Transport Conference, Leiden, October 2008)

78 Aéroports de Paris and Schiphol Group, December 2008 http://www.schiphol.nl/SchipholGroup1/NieuwsPers/Persbericht/AeroportsDeParisAndSchipholGroupCreateALeadingGlobalAllianceInThe AirportIndustry.htm 79 “Airports with intermodal capabilities have an edge on their competitors because intermodality generates additional traffic: Integration of Frankfurt Airport in Deutsche Bahn's high-speed rail network has expanded the airport's catchment area compared to airports without Long-distance Train Stations. It strengthened the hub function, raised passenger figures, and given us important competitive edges” - http://www.fraport.com/en/our-expertise/frankfurt-airport-development/intermodality.html 80 “For Schiphol, landside accessibility is of essential importance. The construction of the HSL South line will place Schiphol on the European HSL high-speed rail network. The HSL will extend Schiphol’s catchment area towards Antwerp and Brussels” -Long term vision for Schiphol Group 2009 81 “The aviation veteran believes the number of hub airports in Europe will eventually slim down from five to three as more long-haul traffic passes through emerging hubs in geographically advantageous regions such as the Middle East” – Interview with Colin Matthews, Chief Executive Heathrow Airport Ltd, Daily Telegraph 17th February 2013 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/transport/9875444/Europeans-threaten-Heathrow-hub.html 82 CAA 2007 UK O&D passenger survey data 83 “More than ten thousand passengers a week are turning their backs on direct flights from London airports and instead travelling between Bristol International and hubs such as Amsterdam-Schiphol, Frankfurt, Paris Charles de Gaulle, Brussels and Oslo, from where they can access connections to hundreds of destinations worldwide” - Bristol Airport press release 13th June 2008 , http://www.bristolairport.co.uk/news-and-press/press-releases/2008/6/ten-thousand-join-hub-club-at-bristol-international.aspx

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Many towns and cities can in fact reach Heathrow by rail, with a change of train to at or to Railair coach services at Reading. 84 However, of the 0.75 million surface access trips from Reading and 0.65 million from Oxford, 98.7% and 98.9% respectively are currently made by road. 85

This clearly shows the adverse impact of interchange penalties, where the lack of direct services provides a serious disincentive to rail use. British Airways, 86 Star Alliance 87 and others 88 recognize that this is particularly critical to time sensitive, luggage laden airport access journeys.

Interchanges in a rail access journey to an airport also increase the adverse effect of frequency penalties. 89

A strategy to introduce new direct rail services to improve Heathrow’s accessibility and expand its catchment could therefore be extremely beneficial. 90 Reflecting the experience described above, the European Commission have determined a number of conditions for intermodality – see Appendix A.

84 Connecting to Heathrow via an interchange “is an experience that passengers in South and the West of could enjoy today by changing train at Paddington. However they choose instead to either drive to the airport or travel over a European hub. The Future of Air Transport White Paper cited that rail links to Heathrow from and the West of England should be improved in 2003 when links to Heathrow airport via Paddington and Heathrow Express services were already in place” – British Airways Response to the Heathrow Airport High Speed Rail Access Review, April 2010 http://www.scribd.com/doc/39878499/British-Airways-plc-%E2%80%93-Response-to- the-Heathrow-Airport-High-Speed-Rail-Access-Review 85 : The UK’s Global Gateway, Arup submission to HS2 Ltd, December 2009 86 “BA understands the difference between a time penalty versus an interchange penalty. As a network airline, our passengers are generally prepared to pay more to travel on a direct flight rather than a connecting flight. This applied to rail as well as air” - Para 5.3, Second Response to the Heathrow Airport High Speed Rail Access Review, British Airways June 2010 http://www.scribd.com/doc/39878497/British-Airways-plc-–-Second-response-to-the-Heathrow-Airport-High-Speed-Rail-Access-Review 87 “Research, and our experience, clearly shows that even one interchange in an airport access journey acts as a significant disincentive to choosing rail” – Star Alliance submission to Commons Transport Select Committee Inquiry on HS2, May 2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtran/writev/rail/rail3.pdf 88 “Previous studies have demonstrated that an interchange in a rail access journey to the airport suppressed demand by approximately 50%” - High Speed Rail Development Programme 2008/09, Strategic Choices, MVA/Systra for Greengauge 21 89 “Frequency is usually treated as being very important in transport modelling – subject to a weighting, intervals between trains or aircraft are treated as equivalent to additional in-vehicle minutes. Typically, an improvement in frequency from a train or plane every 2 hours to every 1 hour is considered as having the same impact on market share as a reduction in journey time of 20-30 minutes” - Para 2.20, Air and Rail Competition and Complementarity, Steer Davies Gleave for European Commission DG TREN August 2006 90 “An HSR network serving Heathrow would encourage those who currently interline at Paris CDG, Amsterdam or Frankfurt to use Heathrow, thus strengthening Heathrow’s competitiveness compared to other European airports for long haul flights” – High Speed Rail Development Programme 2008/09, Strategic Choices, MVA/Systra for Greengauge 21

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Intermodality and the UK

The policy context

The critical difference between the UK and other European countries is that the UK lacks any overarching transport strategy. The House of Commons Transport Select Committee has repeatedly recommended that Government publish such a strategy, most recently in its Inquiries into Transport and the Economy 91 and DfT. 92

More specifically, the Select Committee expresses concern that HS2, (which appears likely to be the largest ever investment of UK public monies in a single project),93 and the work of the Airports Commission are proceeding in the absence of any strategic framework, and with little or no co-ordination.

“The absence of a transport strategy makes it hard to assess how HS2 relates to other major transport infrastructure schemes, regional planning and wider objectives, such as bridging the north-south divide. The biggest single transport investment proposed in this Parliament should be grounded in a well thought- through strategic framework and we are disappointed that the Government has not developed a strategy for transport, particularly after it rejected our earlier recommendation to publish a White Paper on transport and the economy. The development of what could emerge as separate strategies for rail and aviation again highlights the absence of an overall transport strategy: this is a lacuna which must be filled” 94

The Airports Commission’s Interim Report also supports development of an integrated strategy, stating that “The Commission is supportive of aviation needs being properly included in any future integrated surface transport strategy. The Commission invites the to consider this further.” 95

Most recently, the Government has commenced consultation on a draft of the long awaited National Policy Statement (NPS) for the UK’s road and rail network. However, this specifically excludes any consideration of HS2. 96

This seems perverse, not only because of HS2’s unprecedented scale and cost, but because HS2 Ltd. themselves suggested that an adopted NPS was an essential pre-requisite for the proper consideration of HS2,

91 “We recommend that a White Paper be published, clarifying the Government’s objectives for all transport spending and the criteria it will use for deciding between different claims on the available resources” – Recommendation 5, Transport and the Economy, Third Report of Session 2010-12, House of Commons Transport Committee http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmtran/473/473.pdf 92 “In our report on Transport and the economy we called for the DfT to publish a strategy to explain what the Government aims to achieve by spending money on transport and how its policies support these aims. The department dismissed our recommendation, pointing us to the lists of actions in the business plan. The business plan is a useful and informative document but it does little more than list transport policies and target dates for implementation. It sits in a strategic vacuum and can easily be overtaken by events. Our scrutiny of the DfT’s annual report and the financial information it publishes reinforces our view that an overall strategy for transport is needed. We were pleased to see that the new Secretary of State saw the force in our argument and is considering the benefits of drawing up an overall strategy. We recommend that the DfT publish an overall strategy for transport, preferably in or alongside the next departmental annual report.” - “Counting the cost: financial scrutiny of the Department for Transport 2011–12, Fifteenth Report of Session 2010-12, House of Commons Transport Committee http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtran/1560/1560.pdf 93 “I believe the £32bn price tag of HS2 will be the largest UK public investment made in a single project” – Nick Hayns, Institute of Economic Affairs, 29th February 2012 94 Recommendation 1, High Speed Rail, Tenth Report of Session 2010-12, House of Commons Transport Committee http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtran/1185/1185.pdf 95 Para 70, Appendix 1, Assessment of Short and Medium Term Options, Airports Commission December 2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/266674/airports-commission-interim-report-appendix- 1.pdf 96 “The NN NPS … sets out the policy against which the Secretary of State for Transport will make decisions on applications for nationally significant infrastructure projects on the road and rail networks” (but) “does not cover High Speed Two” – Paras. 1.7 and 1.9, Consultation on a Draft National Policy Statement for the National Road and Rail Networks, DfT December 2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263046/executive-summary-consultation-document.pdf

21 97 noting also the need for “co-ordination of the National Infrastructure Plan, the Growth Review and National Policy Statements – the national networks statement in particular relates to HS2.” 98 The draft NPS also excludes any reference to airport surface access whatsoever, apart from a single reference to the importance of the strategic road network, 99 and clearly continues the UK’s legacy of silo planning of air and rail, which to some extent contributes to the long running failure to develop a coherent airport strategy. 100

This silo approach is not a new phenomenon.

Lord Heseltine notes that “as Environment Secretary studying the various proposed routes for HS1, then called the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, in the early 1990’s, I was surprised by the lack of imagination shown by and the rail industry in their plans to connect London with the Channel Tunnel. The route chosen for HS2 must not be left to the rail industry, though their expertise and opinion is important.” 101

DfT’s New Line Capacity Study in 2007 102 included a map intended to identify “the key transport centres of primary importance (or nodes).” This showed the UK’s major cities, as well as ports such as Dover and Immingham, but omitted Heathrow, the UK’s single largest traffic generator. 103

Conversely, the only reference to rail in DfT’s 2011 consultation on aviation strategy 104 was a suggestion that “in the longer term, much of the demand for domestic aviation and for near-European short-haul aviation could be met by high speed rail.” However, the consultation provided no evidence base or strategy for meeting this fundamental objective, an issue particularly relevant in view of Government’s decision to adopt an HS2 route bypassing Heathrow.

The exhaustive and evidence-based Eddington study for HM Treasury, intended at the time to guide long term decision making, endorsed an integrated approach, one of five key recommendations being for Government to “consider the full range of modal options using appraisal techniques that include full environmental and social costs and benefits.” 105 It also identified international gateways, and surface access links to them, as a key strategic priority that would offer the highest returns on investment.

As previously noted, the UK, in coming relatively late to decisions on development of air and rail infrastructure, has the significant advantage in being able to learn from European experience.

The Government has appeared to acknowledge this, stating for example “there is will remain (sic) a strong strategic case for ensuring that Britain’s high speed rail and aviation hub strategies are effectively integrated”

97 “The National Policy Statement on national networks … will set the context in which HS2 will be considered” – Para. 1.2.10, High Speed Rail, London to the and Beyond, A Report to Government by High Speed Two Ltd. December 2009 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/hs2report/pdf/chapt er1.pdf 98 Para. 3.7, High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future – Decisions and Next Steps Jan 2012 http://assets.dft.gov.uk/publications/hs2- decisions-and-next-steps/hs2-decisions-and-next-steps.pdf 99 “The strategic road network provides critical links between cities, joins up communities, connects our major ports, airports” – Para 2.2, Draft National Policy Statement for National Networks, Presented to Parliament pursuant to section 9(2) of the Planning Act 2008, DfT December 2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263720/consultation-document-draft- national-policy-statement.pdf 100 “The surface accessibility of Heathrow is treated as an ancillary issue in UK air transport policy, with this important issue only being considered after decisions on airside infrastructure and terminals have been made. This undermines the policy objective of the Government with respect to developing Heathrow, especially with regard to securing its economic contribution to the whole of the UK”- Adding Capacity at Heathrow – Transport Studies Unit, University of Oxford 2008 http://www.tsu.ox.ac.uk/pubs/1035-givoni-banister.pdf 101 Foreword by The Rt. Hon. Lord Heseltine, The Right Track, Bow Group 2010 http://www.bowgroup.org/policy/right-track’-delivering- conservatives’-vision-high-speed-rail 102 Figure 2.1 - Key Transport Nodes in the UK, DfT New Line Capacity Study, Supplementary Report, May 2007 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/researchtech/research/newline/suppreport.pdf 103 London Borough of https://www.hillingdon.gov.uk/media.jsp?mediaid=7511&filetype=pdf 104 Para 2.10 Developing a sustainable framework for UK aviation: Scoping document, DfT March 2011 http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/open/2011-09/consultationdocument.pdf 105 Para 15, The Eddington Transport Study - The case for action: Sir Rod Eddington’s advice to Government, HM Treasury, December 2006 http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20100408160254/http://www.dft.gov.uk/adobepdf/187604/206711/executivesummary.pdf

22 106 and “international experience points to the benefits of high speed rail networks serving major hub airports. France, Germany and the Netherlands are amongst the countries successfully integrating these modes to create optimum solutions for passengers in support of economic growth. The Government considers that there is a strong case for following this model in this this country” 107

However, the approach adopted in planning some aspects of HS2 in reality provides a stark contrast to the European model.

HS2 original proposal

As IATA’s research demonstrates, the common feature of successful European hub airports, eg: Charles de Gaulle (Roissy), Frankfurt and Schiphol, is an air/rail interchange located on the direct high speed network, not on a branch line or loop. In addition, conventional (long distance, regional and local) trains also serve the airport interchanges, providing high frequency services to a wide range of destinations.

In 2009, before work started on HS2, both the Labour Government 108 and Conservative opposition 109 endorsed this fundamental principle.

The Secretary of State, in announcing the setting up of HS2 Ltd, explicitly referred to a “Heathrow International Hub station on the Great Western line to provide a direct four way interchange between the airport, the new north-south line, existing Great Western rail services and , into the heart of London.” 110

HS2 Ltd’s remit also included a requirement to consider access to Heathrow from the west, noting that “the key car modal shift gain is likely to be in respect of access to Heathrow from London, the west and Thames Valley, facilitated by the Heathrow interchange (and local rail enhancements).” 111

It therefore appeared logical that phase 1 of HS2 between London and Birmingham would follow a route via a Heathrow airport interchange located at or near the airport, recognizing the airports critical importance to the UK economy.

Despite capacity constraints and recent route consolidation, it retains the highest business connectivity score amongst major European hubs, 112 with Heathrow located on seven out of the top 10 business routes in the world. 113 Together with the English language, legal system and time zone, it provides the UK with a significant competitive advantage and is directly responsible for around 1% of GDP. 114

106 Para. 4.39, “High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future – Decisions and Next Steps”, January 2012 107 Para. 4.27, ibid 108 “I think that [the Hub] is an attractive idea. It’s vital that we have an integrated approach to planning new rail capacity and any new airport capacity that’s also required” – Lord Adonis, Secretary of State for Transport, Sunday Times 4th January 2009, http://cma.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/Test/politics/article141091.ece 109 “A Conservative Government will support proposals along the lines of the plan put forward by engineering firm, Arup, for a new Heathrow rail hub. This would link Heathrow terminals directly into the main rail network and the lines to Reading, Oxford, Bristol, , Cardiff, Swansea, Cheltenham and , greatly improving links to the airport. The plan would also include construction of a new high speed link connecting Heathrow airport to the Channel Tunnel Rail link and the new route north, providing a viable alternative to thousands of short haul flights now clogging up the airport” - Conservative Rail Review, February 2009 http://www.conservatives.com/%7E/media/Files/Downloadable%20Files/Railreview.ashx?dl=true 110 Column 356, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090115/debtext/90115-0006.htm 111 Letter from Sir David Rowlands to Lord Adonis, 13th February 2009 http://assets.hs2.org.uk/sites/default/files/inserts/Letter%20to%20Lord%20Adonis%20from%20Sir%20David%20Rowlands%20130209.pdf 112 Aviation Services and the City, 2011 Update, Aviation for the City of London Corporation - http://217.154.230.218/NR/rdonlyres/63094787-5540-47BA-B2BC-2278674218D7/0/BC_RS_Aviation2011update.pdf 113 The Future of Aviation – First report of Session 2009-10, House of Commons Transport Committee - http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmtran/125/125i.pdf 114 “Heathrow contributes 0.9% of the UK’s GDP – significantly more than any other single site in the UK”- Heathrow Expansion, London Assembly 2005 http://legacy.london.gov.uk/assembly/reports/plansd/heathrow_expansion.pdf

23 Heathrow Airport Ltd, 115 British Airways, 116 the IATA led London (Heathrow) Airline Consultative Committee (LACC) and the Heathrow Airline Operators Committee (AOC) 117 all concluded that a Heathrow interchange should be located on a through running HS2 alignment, located “on or near” the existing airport. Star Alliance’s May 2011 submission to the UK Parliaments Transport Select Committee Inquiry into HS2 also emphasised that, in considering the relative benefits of interchanges “on or near” the existing airport, the crucial factor is passenger experience rather than physical distance. 118

Oxford University’s Transport Studies Unit, 119 Jim Steer, 120 Greengauge 21 121 and indeed DfT 122 also supported a through HS2 route via Heathrow, which, from a rail perspective, would also avoid the inherent inefficiency of services carrying only airport passengers requiring valuable train paths on the main HS2 route.

However, HS2 Ltd, the company that Government set up to develop high speed rail, subsequently developed a route bypassing Heathrow. It may be significant that none of HS2 Ltd’s External Challenge Groups included any aviation industry representation, either at project inception 123 or at the later consultation stage. 124 This may help to explain what otherwise appears inexplicable - that HS2, the UK’s biggest ever investment of public monies in a single project, 125 should deliberately bypass the UK’s only hub and world’s busiest international airport.

115 http://highspeedrailresponses.dft.gov.uk/s2css/viewusercomments.asp?usr=47249 116 http://highspeedrailresponses.dft.gov.uk/s2css/viewusercomments.asp?usr=43840 117 “The current HS2 proposal is to connect Heathrow to HS2 via a spur to the north of the airport. We believe that a spur would not maximise all the benefits that an en-route station would do” - London (Heathrow) Airline Consultative Committee (LACC) airlines and the Heathrow Airline Operators Committee (AOC) submission to the HS2 consultation, July 2011 http://highspeedrailresponses.dft.gov.uk/s2css/viewusercomments.asp?usr=55669 118 “Recognising that Heathrow occupies the smallest site area of any major international airport, and the dispersed nature of Heathrow’s terminals, sites outside the existing airport boundary should be explored, particularly if this allows better connectivity and alignment with HS2, the existing rail network – particularly the – and the local motorway network. The over-riding objective is not necessarily to minimise the distance between train and plane, but to balance journey time, seamless connectivity and costs, in order to achieve the best possible passenger experience and least environmental impact. An integrated, intermodal solution, (along the lines of Arup’s Heathrow Hub proposal), could also release valuable space within the airfield, allowing more space for larger aircraft, improving operational efficiency and resilience, improving air quality and enhancing the passenger experience” - Star Alliance submission to Commons Transport Select Committee Inquiry on HS2, May 2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtran/writev/rail/rail3.pdf 119 “For rail to be a viable alternative to the aircraft, and an alternative to the car to get to/from the airport, airports, certainly the main one, must have a station on the line, not a spur from it. Viewed from a rail planning perspective, with currently over 40 million non-transfer passengers a year needing to travel to/from it, it is hard to understand how a ‘city’ like Heathrow might be bypassed” – Dr Moshe Givoni, Oxford University Transport Studies Unit, The House, Parliament’s Weekly Magazine, 31st January 2011 120 “The key really, as far as we could see from what has happened in France, is to make the airport station a station call en route” - Q147, evidence by Jim Steer, Director, Greengauge 21 to Commons Transport Select Committee, 11th November 2009 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmtran/38/38ii.pdf 121 (Through) “services will have high load factors because they are connecting a number of different markets. Their usage is not dependent on the single market at Heathrow, and their load factors and overall economics will be attractive. They will justify their place on the highly valuable capacity offered by the national HSR network in a way that far fewer services would do if they were just to serve Heathrow on a spur” – The Heathrow Opportunity, Greengauge 21 2010 http://www.greengauge21.net/publications/the-heathrow-opportunity-2/ 122 “The interchange with Heathrow should be considered as through services will not be able to run from all points, both because demand would not be sufficient and because every Heathrow train would take a path on the new line which could be used for London bound trains” - DfT New Line Capacity Study – Cost Estimate July 2007 123 P. 34, High Speed Rail: London to the West Midlands and Beyond. A report to Government by HS2 Ltd. – HS2 Ltd, 2009 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/hs2report/pdf/chap ter2.pdf 124 http://www.hs2.org.uk/about-hs2-ltd/external-challenge-groups#Analytical%20Challenge%20Panel 125

24

HS2 Ltd. justified this decision by two related assumptions – the use of an appraisal model that valued each and every minute of journey time saving at between £0.3bn - £0.6n, 126 and a calculation that a route via Heathrow would incur a journey time penalty of 9 minutes, 127 hence reducing monetised benefits by ca. £2.7bn - £5.4bn.

The journey time assumption was subsequently found to be wrong, and a route via the airport was in fact found to extend journey times between London and the north by just 3-4 minutes. 128 However, by then it appears that the decision that HS2 should bypass Heathrow, (by less than 12km), was irrevocable.

It is also significant that references to “sufficient” speed “balanced with operational energy costs and energy” in HS2 Ltd’s original remit 129 were replaced, as early as the summer of 2009, by confirmation that only routes allowing speeds of 400kph, following effectively a straight line between London and Birmingham, were under consideration. 130

126 “Early tests suggested that reducing journey times by one minute would provide benefits of around £300-600m on a fully utilised high speed line” – p.17, HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/demandandappraisa l/pdf/report.pdf 127 p. 56 HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010 128 “The additional route length would entail a longer journey time between London and the West Midlands of 3 minutes for non-stopping services, and 8 minutes for services stopping at the airport” – High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future – DfT February 2011 129 “The new line should be sufficiently high speed to optimise journey time benefits balanced with operational energy costs and achievement of maximum capacity. It is likely to be designed to at least the maximum speed of HS1”- Letter from Sir David Rowlands to Lord Adonis, 13th February 2009 130 “With such a high top speed, there could be no and few curves. Aerodynamic forces would increase tunnel costs tendfold” - Andrew McNaughton, Chief Engineer HS2 Ltd, Rail News 1st June 2009. http://www.railnews.co.uk/news/business/2009/06/01-hs- two.html

25 This decision to prioritise journey time savings over connectivity was apparently accepted by the then Secretary of State, 131 despite evidence that passengers actually perceive no value in relatively small reductions in journey times. 132

For example, DfT’s 2007 White Paper concluded “cutting journey time is not a high priority for passengers or businesses,” 133 with research showing that “ticket price, frequency, punctuality and capacity are currently passengers’ top priorities for improvement” – journey time and train speed were 13th and 15th out of 29 parameters. 134 The Department’s more recent research on business passengers use of time, (dated June 2009 but apparently only made publically available in April 2012), 135 suggests that 92% of the total time saved by business passengers from having shorter journey times has no economic benefit. 136

Yet, in the latest iteration of HS2’s business case, 79% (£45bn) of all the transport user benefits (£57.7bn) are now attributed to time savings. This has almost doubled since the Feb 2012 case when these savings accounted for 55% (£24.5bn of £44.1bn) of project benefits. 137

This also appears entirely inconsistent with Government’s new focus on capacity and connectivity 138 rather than speed, the key driver behind HS2 Ltd’s choice of route. 139 Indeed, it is significant that, whereas ca. 75% of HS2’s Phase 1 route between and is designed for a 400kph design speed, less than 40% of the Leeds arm of the Phase 2 route is designed to that standard. 140

It therefore seems perverse that HS2 should bypass, by just a few miles, what seems likely to remain one of the world’s most important airports, solely to avoid a three or four minute longer journey whilst at the same time incurring additional capital 141 and monetized environmental impact costs.142 HS2 also fails to properly take account of the very highest level of environmental protection intended by Parliament in granting AONB (Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty) status to the Chilterns – equivalent to a National Park. 143 The comment by a

131 “A railway designed for a lower speed would have a very significant impact on the business case” – Response by , Secretary of State, Transport Times conference 4th November 2010, quoted in Getting Back on Track, CPRE February 2011 http://www.cpre.org.uk/campaigns/transport/rail/highspeed2 132 ”Research from the Institute of Transport Studies suggests that for journey time changes between 0 and 6 minutes, the value of time is more or less zero” – Second Response to the Heathrow Airport High Speed Rail Access Review, British Airways, June 2010 http://www.scribd.com/doc/39878497/British-Airways-plc-–-Second-response-to-the-Heathrow-Airport-High-Speed-Rail-Access-Review 133 Delivering a Sustainable Railway, DfT July 2007 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dft.gov.uk/about/strategy/whitepapers/whitepapercm7176/multideliversustain railway 134 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dft.gov.uk/about/strategy/whitepapers/whitepapercm7176/railwhitepaperrese arch/evidencepackpassenger1/Page_040.ppt 135 http://stophs2.org/news/7986-dfts-hidden-document 136 “60% of surveyed business passengers said that they would not do any work in the time saved - a reduction in scheduled journey time by, for example 10 minutes, would increase the average amount of time spent working by all business rail passengers by just 0.75 minutes” - Productive Use of Rail Travel Time and the Valuation of Travel Time Savings for Rail Business Travellers, Final Report, DfT June 2009 http://assets.dft.gov.uk/publications/productive-use-of-travel-time/productive-use-of-travel-time.pdf 137 http://www.hs2actionalliance.org/press-release/government-resorts-voodoo-economics-fantasising-desperate-bid-win-public-support- hs2/ 138 “Promoting the HS2 rail link on the basis of speed has been wrong, Transport Secretary Patrick McLoughlin has said. Mr McLoughlin said cutting 20 minutes off journey times between London and Birmingham was "almost irrelevant" – BBC News, 7th September 2013 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24009212 139 “Prime Minister says ministers put too much emphasis on the benefits of HS2’s faster journey times and not enough on freeing up capacity on the network” – Daily Telegraph, 4th November 2013 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david- cameron/10424790/David-Cameron-HS2-was-wrongly-sold-to-a-sceptical-public.html 140 Approximate figures from analysis of published HS2 route maps 141 (An alignment) “in parallel with an existing motorway … made constructing the line 15% cheaper than it would have been otherwise.” - Dr.Ing. Eberhard Jaensch, Network Strategy Unit, DB Netz AG, Railway Technical Review 2/05 142 The Economic Case for HS2: Value for Money Statement, DfT January 2012 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/3651/hs2-economic-case-value-for-money.pdf 143 “AONBs have equivalent status to National Parks as far as conservation is concerned” - http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/default.aspx?page=1527

26 previous Secretary of State, that the Chilterns “is not some Constable Country” 144 suggests that the vital importance of protecting our most important natural capital has simply not been recognized.

Very high speeds also incur increased operational costs, in energy consumption, 145 (also important in view of the UK’s ambitious and legally binding climate change targets 146 and meeting demand), 147 and maintenance of infrastructure and rolling stock. 148 Although the relationship between speed and power consumption was apparently recognised by HS2 Ltd. at an early stage, 149 it appears to have had little or no impact on design standards and route choice.

It may be significant that China, which has developed the world’s most extensive high speed rail network, has recently reduced speeds to save maintenance and energy costs. 150

An alternative route could follow the principles established by HS1, the Channel Tunnel Rail Link 151 - for example, adopting a design speed to allow the line to follow motorway corridors, tunneled through urban areas below existing railways and tunneled through the narrowest part of AONB’s. This is the approach endorsed by, for example, CPRE 152 and adopted in the design of new European high speed lines – for example DB’s Frankfurt to Cologne 153 and FS’s Turin to Milan line, 154 - reducing the environmental impacts that have contributed to such widespread opposition to HS2. This is also the approach apparently adopted in the design of phase 2 of HS2. 155 It is therefore surprising that an M40 alignment was not included in any of HS2 Ltd’s numerous option studies for phase 1, 156

Furthermore, HS2 Ltd’s appraisal methods considered the costs of a route via Heathrow, but none of the benefits – for instance, rail access to Heathrow from the west, 157 an omission noted by British Airways in their

144 Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, Daily Telegraph 11th December 2010 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/road-and-rail- transport/8194406/Philip-Hammond-high-speed-rail-will-be-a-pleasant-surprise-for-many.html 145 “Journey time saving of 3.5 minutes consumes 23% more energy (comparison of 360 km/h operation to 300 km/h operation)”- HS2 Traction Energy Modelling December 2009 http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/56774 146 “The UK is committed to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% by 2050, relative to 1990 levels” – Department of Energy and Climate Change http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/tackling/2050/2050.aspx 147 “Demand reductions across all sectors of the economy will be essential” - Generating the Future, UK Energy Systems Fit for 2050, The Royal Academy of Engineering March 2010 http://www.raeng.org.uk/news/publications/list/reports/Generating_the_future_report.pdf 148 “Maintenance of high speed lines is an important issue; it must start with the conception of the line. RAMS and Life Cycle Costs have to been taken into account during the design phase of the project and followed up during the whole life cycle of the line” – Maintenance of High Speed Lines, UIC September 2010 http://www.uic.org/download.php/publication/520E.pdf 149 “Work was underway to assess balance between power consumption and speed” – HS2 Ltd. Minutes of Technical Challenge Group 29th April 2009 150 “Telling the People’s Daily that speed restrictions would be placed on the trains to make them most cost-efficient, Sheng Guangzu, head of China’s railways ministry, said that trains running at 350 kph consume twice as much energy as those traveling at 200 kph. Slowing them up will save both on power costs and maintenance. Speeds are to be cut back from upwards of 350 kph to 200 kph-250 kph with a maximum of 300 kph” - http://chinabystander.wordpress.com/2011/04/14/slow-train-coming/ 151 http://www.andrealeadsom.com/downloads/kent-criteria-for-hs1.pdf 152 “Damage to landscape, heritage and tranquility must be minimal, for example by running new lines along existing road and rail lines wherever possible, as well as extensive tunneling, landscaping and noise barriers” - Campaign for Protection of Rural England, http://www.cpre.org.uk/campaigns/transport/rail/highspeedrail 153 “On environmental grounds, the new line (between Cologne and the Rhine/Main conurbation) was generally constructed in parallel with an existing motorway, as close to it as possible. For this reason, the maximum gradient was set at 40%, minimum track radius at 3350m and maximum cant at 170mm, which allows a design speed of 300 km/hr around curves.” - Dr.Ing. Eberhard Jaensch, Network Strategy Unit, DB Netz AG, Railway Technical Review 2/05 154 “The route exploits the natural lie of the land and runs alongside the motorway to minimise environmental impact … within a corridor with an already dense infrastructure” – The New High Speed Turin - Milan – Line, RFI 2005 http://www.rfi.it/cms- file/allegati/rfi/The%20new%20high%20speed%20TURIN%20-%20MILAN%20line.pdf 155 “The engineers say to me the line should go by the road network” – Rt Hon Patrick McLoughlin MP, BBC News 1st February 2013 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21293724 156 Route templates, drawing no.HS2_ARP_00_G1_RW_00148 Issue 1, HS2 Ltd. http://assets.hs2.org.uk/sites/default/files/foi10- 142redacted.pdf 157 “It is important to note that the model does not analyse the potential market to Heathrow from areas to the west. This means for instance that the model does not forecast the demand to Heathrow from (for example) Reading using a London Interchange Station connected to the GWML” – p.25 HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010

27 submissions to the HS2 Heathrow access review. 158 This is despite the HS2 Environmental Statement recognising that up to 20,000 passengers per day (7.3m annually) would use a Heathrow interchange. 159

HS2 Ltd’s decision making also reflected Government’s policy at the time, ruling out expansion of Heathrow’s runway capacity. The Secretary of State for Transport’s letter dated 21st May 2010 to Lord Mawhinney confirmed that he was to conduct his review of HS2 and Heathrow surface access “within the context of current Government policy, which now does not support the construction of a third runway at Heathrow.” 160

The 2011 public consultation on HS2 also made clear that Government had decided “not to support the provision of further runway capacity at Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted” 161 whilst the subsequent decision document confirmed that HS2 Ltd. had considered “all the options for maintaining the UK’s aviation hub status, with the exception of a third runway at Heathrow.” 162

Since then, the Commons Transport Select Committee’s Inquiry concluded that there was a clear case for increasing Heathrow’s capacity. 163 In addition, the Airports Commission has been established by Government to “examine the scale and timing of any requirement for additional capacity to maintain the UK’s position as Europe’s most important aviation hub and identify and evaluate how any need for additional capacity should be met in the short, medium and long term.” 164 The Commission’s Interim Report concludes that, of the three shortlisted options for new runway capacity, two involve Heathrow. There is therefore a clear case for revisiting the fundamental assumptions that led to the development of HS2’s currently proposed route.

HS2 Ltd’s decision to bypass Heathrow also resulted in a severely compromised proposal for a remote interchange at Old Oak Common, some 12km from the airport, which would require airport passengers to change trains

This arrangement would result in significant interchange penalties, a key concern of BAA. 165 Indeed, HS2 Ltd’s own research confirms the particular sensitivity of airport passengers making international journeys, 166 whilst British Airways suggest that the significance of interchange penalties may not have been properly considered by HS2 Ltd. 167

158 “Heathrow was not fully assessed for the wider benefits it could bring as an interchange type station to the south of England” – Second Response to the Heathrow Airport High Speed Rail Access Review, British Airways, June 2010 ttp://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/lordmawhinneyreport/pdf/appendix3_6.pdf) 159 Para 8.1.8, Alternatives Report, London-West Midlands Environmental Statement, Volume 5 Technical Appendices ES 3.5.0.18 HS2 Ltd. November 2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/259616/Vol1_Alternatives_Report_CT- 002-000_wm.pdf 160 http://assets.dft.gov.uk/publications/hammond-20100521/hammond-20100521.pdf 161 Para 3.17, High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future - Consultation, DfT February 2011 162 Para. 4.39, High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future – Decisions and Next Steps, DfT January 2012 163 “We conclude that expansion of Heathrow is necessary and recommend that the Government permits this to happen” - Aviation Strategy, First Report of Session 2013–14, House of Commons Transport Committee 8th May 2013 http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/transport/Aviation%20Strategy%20Volume%20I%20.pdf 164 Written Statement, The Rt Hon Patrick McLoughlin MP, 7th September 2012 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/increasing- international-competitiveness-of-uk-airlines-and-airports 165 “The key driver … is passengers’ reluctance to transfer during their journey. This is represented through an Interchange Penalty (IP) and is added to the GJT to represent passengers’ anxiety over the reliability and frequency of the transfer, lack of familiarity with the interchange and managing their luggage. For long journeys, such as those on the HSR network IP5 is significant and will translate into significant loss of passenger demand. The issue of direct services to the airport rather than a remote interchange is therefore significant” - High Speed Rail Access to Heathrow, BAA 2nd Submission to Lord Mawhinney’s Review, Heathrow Airport Ltd June 2010 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/lordmawhinneyreport/pdf/ appendix3_13.pdf 166 “Passengers travelling to or from airports, particularly for international journeys, have particular characteristics that set them aside from other rail users. For example, they are likely to place greater value upon the reliability of the service, especially when accessing the airport. They may be particularly deterred by interchange, partly because of the added risk of delay, but also due to difficulties associated with changing trains while carrying baggage” – Model Development Report, A Report for HS2 Ltd, February 2010 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/appraisalmaterial/p df/modelreport.pdf 167 “It is not clear to BA whether HS2 have applied standard rail industry time penalties for interchanges at Old Oak Common for Heathrow passengers. It appears HS2 have underestimated the negative impact of routing airport passengers via Old Oak Common in their analysis” -

28 HS2 was also designed without any connection to HS1. Hence passengers from mainland Europe, after experiencing fast, seamless journeys across the continent, would be expected to walk between St Pancras and Euston to continue their journey to UK destinations.

HS2 revised proposal

The Coalition Government, on taking office in 2010, instructed HS2 Ltd. to revisit two of their key original assumptions – connectivity with HS1 and Heathrow. 168 Despite this fundamental change in Government’s strategic objectives, HS2 Ltd. did not, as might perhaps be expected, carry out any fundamental reassessment but simply proposed two retrofits.

For a link with HS1, the route and Euston terminus remained unchanged and a single-track, slow speed (30- 40mph) 169 link retrofitted to provide the umbilical connection between the UK and Europe. This link is proposed to leave the main HS2 line at the east end of the proposed Old Oak Common sub-surface station box, via a single-track tunnel located between the twin tunnels to Euston. Importantly, this arrangement means that there would be no possibility of doubling the link in the future should demand require. 170

The constraints inherent in a single-track link are exacerbated by the proposal that HS2 will be required in part to share capacity with existing passenger and freight services on the already congested . , 171 the Labour Party 172 and others believe this to be fundamentally flawed. Greengauge 21 found considerable demand for rail services linking the east and west of the capital. 173

This includes demand between the city regions in the Midlands and the North served by HS2 and the strong growth area of East London, served by Stratford International, as well as South East London, Kent and Essex. This amounts to as much as 45% of the equivalent market from the HS2 catchment to and from central London. Demand is forecast to be highest where East London and Docklands are served (from Stratford), on both inter-urban long distance services to the West Midlands and the North West, but also on regional services to North West London, Milton Keynes and Heathrow. Transfers from other travel modes would also bring wider benefits not just to the link but the wider network, strengthening the overall business case for HS2.

The London Borough of Newham 174 suggests that HS2 Ltd’s demand analysis for the HS1 connection only considered international services from Birmingham. This fails to consider the potential for services from the North West and to the continent in phase 2 of the network, or the potential for high speed regional

Second Response to the Heathrow Airport High Speed Rail Access Review, British Airways, June 2010 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/lordmawhinneyreport/pdf/ appendix3_6.pdf 168 Letter from Philip Hammond MP, Secretary of State for Transport to Sir Brian Briscoe, 11th June 2010 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131112903/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2remit/remiths2june2010 .pdf 169 Item 7, Minutes of HS2 Community Forum, and HS1 Link Thursday 22 March 2012 http://assets.hs2.org.uk/sites/default/files/inserts/1%20Minutes%20Camden%20Town%20CF.pdf 170 http://assets.dft.gov.uk/publications/hs2-maps-20120110/hs2arp00drrw05151issue2.pdf 171 “TfL believes very strongly that if a link between HS2 and HS1 is necessary, then this should be delivered in a way that does not impact on current operations or prevent future enhancements on this line taking place” – Para 3.29, Major Rail Projects Update (HS2, , Extension), TfL 5 July 2012 http://www.tfl.gov.uk/assets/downloads/item06-major-rail-projects- update.pdf 172 “Labour would delay construction of the London leg of the (HS2) railway in order to redesign the route through the capital, shadow transport secretary has told City A.M. Eagle said the government’s current proposal to link HS2 to the High Speed 1 (HS1) line using existing tracks through north London is “completely inadequate” and will cause years of chaos for Camden residents. She said a Labour government would instead immediately commission a review of the HS1-HS2 link on taking office even if it were to delay the start of phase one” of HS2’s route from London to Birmingham” – City AM, 27th August 2013 http://www.cityam.com/article/1377573343/exclusive-labour-threatens-redesign-hs2-link 173 Travel Demand Market and the HS2-HS1 Link, Greeengauge 21 June 2013 http://www.greengauge21.net/wp-content/uploads/Travel- market-demand-and-the-HS1-–-HS2-link-Greengauge21.pdf 174 House of Commons Public Bill Committee, High Speed Rail Preparation Bill, Evidence from London Borough of Newham, July 2013 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmpublic/highspeedrail/memo/hsr24.htm

29 services, (effectively an extension of existing Javelin services) between Kent and Essex (home to some 8.6 million people, ca. 16% of the UK population) and the Thames Valley and Heathrow.

These new cross-London connections could effectively redraw the economic geography of the South East, breaking the constraint of Victorian-era railways terminating around the edge of central London, providing new journey opportunities, improving access to Heathrow and relieving congestion on the existing classic rail network and .

The capacity constraints of the proposed HS1 link also adversely impact freight, effectively preventing high capacity 175 European gauge railfreight services between Europe and UK markets. 176 This would require transshipment from HS1 onto UK gauge vehicles, almost certainly making any services unable to compete with road. The Rail Freight Group notes “High speed freight traffic for lightweight goods is a realistic prospect over the time horizons being considered. This means that the route must be build to be freight capable, and that the connection between HS1 and HS2 must have sufficient capacity.” 177

Network Rail recognise that “when HS2 is constructed, with a direct European gauge connection to/from HS1, then potential opportunities for conveying such traffic to points further north might conceivably present themselves overnight.” 178

However, the Rail Freight Group notes that, under the current proposals, “the existing freight link to the WCML is frequently used for recessing trains waiting for paths on the main line. The proposals would limit this capability and could therefore be expected to have performance impacts, even at existing levels of freight service.” 179 The also highlights the extreme adverse environmental impacts of the link, and the need for extensive demolition of business and residential properties. 180

The second part of Government’s revised remit to HS2 Ltd, for a direct link to Heathrow, 181 reflected the incoming administration’s view that a remote interchange at Old Oak Common to serve Heathrow passengers was “not an option.” 182

175 The extra capacity of Continental gauge compared to UK gauge can be up to 50% - Para 7.1.13 HS1 Ltd Five Year Asset Management Statement, Consultation 18 October 2013 http://highspeed1.co.uk/media/16154/hs1_ltd_5yams_consultation_18_october_2013_public.pdf 176 See, for example, para. 5.21, Rail Freight Strategy, Transport for London August 2007 http://www.tfl.gov.uk/microsites/freight/documents/rail-freight-strategy-aug-2007.pdf 177 Para 19, Evidence from Rail Freight Group, All Party Parliamentary Group for High Speed Rail UK Rail Capacity Inquiry March 2012 http://www.appghsr.co.uk/upload/Rail%20Freight%20Group%20Submission.pdf 178 Para 9.7.6, London and South East Route Utilisation Strategy, Network Rail July 2011 http://www.networkrail.co.uk/browse%20documents/rus%20documents/route%20utilisation%20strategies/rus%20generation%202/lond on%20and%20south%20east/london%20and%20south%20east%20route%20utilisation%20strategy.pdf 179 House of Commons Public Bill Committee, High Speed Rail (Preparation) Bill, Written evidence from the Rail Freight Group, July 2013 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmpublic/highspeedrail/memo/hsr13.htm 180 House of Commons Public Bill Committee, High Speed Rail (Preparation) Bill, Written evidence from the London Borough of Camden July 2013 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmpublic/highspeedrail/memo/hsr30.htm 181 Letter from Philip Hammond MP, Secretary of State for Transport to Sir Brian Briscoe, 11th June 2010 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131112903/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2remit/remiths2june2010 .pdf 182 The connection between HS2 and Heathrow “cannot be lug your heavy bags down a couple of escalators, along 600 metres of corridor and then change trains at a wet, suburban station somewhere in north west London. That is not an option” – Philip Hammond, Oral Evidence to Transport Select Committee 26th July 2010 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtran/1185/1185ii.pdf

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However, rather than considering what might appear to be the most logical alternative of a through HS2 route via Heathrow, the HS2 route remained unchanged and a spur (branch line) was retrofitted to provide a connection with Heathrow, subject to part of its (very considerable) cost being met by users 183 184 (presumably referring to airlines through Heathrow’s user charges).

This follows the precedent of Heathrow’s user charges contributing to Crossrail’s costs, 185 in line with UK regulatory principles. 186 The result is that airport operators – and hence users – are required to bear a significant share of the cost of providing surface access to airports, 187 potentially placing UK airports at a competitive cost disadvantage.

This highlights a wider issue that is critical to achieving optimum intermodal connectivity, namely the UK’s fragmented public and private ownership of key infrastructure assets.

183 “A link (from Heathrow) to the high speed network would be of significant value to the airport operator and airlines, and a private sector contribution to the costs would reduce the cost to Government” - HS2 options for connecting to Heathrow, HS2 Ltd, September 2009 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/proposedroute/heathrow/ 184 “Significant numbers of individuals and organisations would stand to benefit from the construction of new high speed rail lines. This could include airport operators, businesses close to high speed rail stations and local authorities. The Government expects that such parties would therefore make a contribution to the cost of those links”.- High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future, Consultation, DfT February 2011 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/hsr-consultation.pdf 185 £230m contribution – Heathrow Q6 Capital Investment Plan http://www.heathrowairport.com/static/HeathrowAboutUs/Downloads/PDF/Heathrow_CIP_2010-App_P.pdf 186 At the previous price review for BAA's London airports, the CAA set out principles for the co-funding by regulated airports of surface access developments serving the airport. The CAA made clear that such projects brought benefits to airport users and to other users of the new surface access and its neighbouring existing infrastructure (e.g. congestion easing on commuter lines). The CAA insisted that airport users should only bear the costs of surface access (through increases to the airport's regulated asset base) in proportion to the benefits realised. This principle has been applied to cost-sharing for Crossrail, and may be applicable to HS2 as well. The aim is equitable cost- sharing between the airport operator, the rail operator(s) and the Government. 187 “Already the UK Government places more costs on the airport owner than is the case internationally - e.g. surface access projects” – DfT Review of Regulatory Framework for UK Airports, submission from the Chartered Institute of Logistics & Transport, 2008 http://www.ciltuk.org.uk/download/Review_of_Regulatory_Framework_-_CILT_final.pdf

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As shown in Appendix B, this contrasts with much of Europe and the rest of the world, where transport infrastructure is seen as a critical national asset and the State retains a degree of control. This allows, for example, the co-ordinated approach to air, rail, environmental impacts and economic development seen in the Dutch Government’s 2006 White Paper on the future of Schiphol airport. 188

Even in New York, which might be thought to be the home of free market economics, the Cities of New York and Newark own, and the publicly owned Port Authority operates, all three major airports, as well as Teterboro and Stewart International.

It is therefore important that the regulatory context is considered as an integral part of UK transport policy, since otherwise it would probably be purely coincidental if private commercial interests and the national interest were to be perfectly aligned. This is particularly relevant as, to date, the Airports Commission has not addressed the issue of how regulatory issues might affect decisions on the UK’s hub airport strategy and, in particular, the necessary surface access improvements.

Heathrow already has the 4th highest user charges in the world, 189 presenting a challenge if Government expects significant contribution to the cost of an HS2 spur and other surface access at Heathrow or Gatwick. Heathrow’s owners 190 and airlines 191 have made representations on this point. Even assuming that the principle of funding contributions was accepted, this would significantly increase the airports RAB. In the case of a Heathrow HS2 spur, this would in fact place Heathrow at a significant competitive disadvantage. 192

There are also practical problems with the proposal for a branch line from HS2 terminating at Heathrow. Heathrow, although the UK’s single largest generator, 193 is unlikely to be able to fill very high capacity trains solely with airport passengers at the frequencies necessary to attract modal shift from road or air/rail substitution, 194 and provide a viable business case. This likely result is a need for ongoing revenue support, whether from Government or via airport user charging.

188 “The Dutch government’s position regarding Schiphol Airport. The Cabinet formed its position with contributions from many parties, including commissions, advisory councils, planning offices, municipalities, provinces, interest groups, people living in the vicinity of the airport and many others” - Kabinetsstandpunt Schiphol, April 2006 http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/notas/2006/04/26/kabinetsstandpunt-schiphol-2006.html 189 “Heathrow has recently moved from being the world's 20th most expensive airport in the world to the 4th, following user charges increasing 46% in 2007•08. Whilst this may represent legitimate pricing of scarce demand, and might be argued as necessary to fund much needed airport improvements, it is important that this, and any future private and public decisions on charging and taxation, are considered in the wider context of the UK economy and inward investment decisions. Heathrow was one of only two airports in the top 30 busiest airports worldwide to report a decline in traffic in 2010, (the other being Las Vegas/McCarran International in 22nd place). Heathrow's continued pre-eminence amongst its European competitors cannot be taken for granted” – Submission to Transport Select Committee Inquiry into the Strategic Case for High Speed Rail, Bow Group May 2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtran/1185/1185vw89.htm 190 “It is important to note that while we recognise the potential national strategic value of connecting Heathrow directly into the high speed rail network – i.e. to deliver Government objectives on mode shift and carbon savings - our commercial evaluation of the various options showed a limited investment case from a Heathrow perspective” – Heathrow Airport Limited submission to Commons Transport Select Committee HS2 Inquiry, May 2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtran/writev/rail/rail3.pdf 191 “Over the likely HSR construction period, airlines will continue to fund a significant capital expenditure programme at Heathrow designed to renew and develop the UK’s hub airport. In this context the airline community will not be able to support funding for HSR as their primary focus and responsibility is to the airport itself” – British Airways submission to Commons Transport Select Committee HS2 Inquiry, May 2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtran/writev/rail/rail3.pdf 192 “A link from HS2 to HS1 should not be progressed before Heathrow is directly linked to the HS2 network and is able to connect to HS1 services. Connecting HS1 to HS2 will enable through‐running rail services between the UK regions and continental Europe. This will give major European airports direct access to UK air passengers, without a reciprocal benefit for Heathrow. The airport must be able to compete for air passengers in the UK and in Europe too, which requires equivalent access to both HS2 and HS1 services” – British Airways submission to Transport Select Committee Inquiry into HS2, May 2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtran/writev/rail/rail3.pdf 193 www.hillingdon.gov.uk/media/pdf/d/c/chapter_1.pdf 194 “Frequency is usually treated as being very important in transport modelling – subject to a weighting, intervals between trains or aircraft are treated as equivalent to additional in-vehicle minutes. Typically, an improvement in frequency from a train or plane every 2 hours to every 1 hour is considered as having the same impact on market share as a reduction in journey time of 20-30 minutes. In order to be able to compare the importance of frequency with the importance of journey time, we calculate a frequency penalty measured in minutes for each mode and route. The point of the frequency penalty is take into account that a low service frequency makes a mode relatively

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Even a very limited service over a spur of just 2 trains per hour, assuming full length HS2 train sets, 195 would still provide capacity equivalent to four or more fully loaded A380 aircraft serving UK regional cities every hour. 196Alternatively, a low service frequency would incur significant and well-understood penalties, confirmed by HS2 Ltd’s own data, 197 and make rail unattractive even if the journey time is faster. 198

The proposed airport interchange also fails to follow European examples of a transport interchange fully integrated with the airport. Instead the proposed station is located a considerable distance west of Terminal 5, requiring a lengthy transit for passengers through the T5 car park to the terminal itself. Passengers requiring other terminals would then face a further transfer via Heathrow Express or Crossrail from the T5 station. 199

The disconnect between HS2’s development and emerging airport policy also presents a risk. The initial cost estimates for a spur (£2.5bn - £3.9bn)200 were reduced, 201 presumably by reducing the extent of tunneling from that first assumed. However, the result is that the spur is now designed to cross the elevated M4/M25 junction on a viaduct, 202 apparently conflicting with the location of one of the Airports Commission’s two shortlisted runway options. 203

unattractive even if the journey time is faster, and vice versa” – Air and Rail Competition and Complementarity, Steer Davies Gleave for European Commission DG TREN 2006 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/studies/doc/2006_08_study_air_rail_competition_en.pdf 195 “A spur …would allow HS2 services to start at Heathrow and split on route to serve a number of destinations in the Midlands, the North and ” – Connecting to Heathrow, DfT Factsheet, DfT 2011 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/connecting--‐to--‐heathrow_0.pdf 196 “There will be up to 1,100 seats per train” - http://hs2.org.uk/about-hs2/facts-figures/route-trains-cost 197 “A service frequency penalty is applied in determining the rail journey time where a connection is required – Frequency penalty = 2*(average minutes between rail services) – (An hourly service between, say, Heathrow and Manchester, would therefore incur a frequency penalty of 120 minutes) p. 6 SKM IRTDM 198 “To be attractive for airline passengers who might reasonably need to catch a specific departing flight, the service frequency needs to be at least one per hour. Even on our assumption that we can serve more than one city with a single train, (which depends on the structure of the HSR network), many of the flows, (Scotland, Manchester/Liverpool, Sheffield/Leeds/Newcastle, Birmingham and Bristol/Cardiff), do not have a viable flow” – High Speed Rail Development Programme 2008/09, Strategic Choices, MVA/Systra for Greengauge 21 199 The Heathrow spur: Description of HS2 Ltd’s recommended route and station option, HS2 Ltd. http://assets.hs2.org.uk/sites/default/files/inserts/130116%20heathrow%20route%20description%20for%20ehs%20final%20policy%20ap proved%20text.pdf 200 Investing in Britain’s Future, Consultation, DfT February 2011 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/hsr- consultation.pdf 201 “The Secretary of State had, by the time of her decision, received an oral briefing from HS2 Ltd which indicated that, on the basis of ongoing design work, the final cost of the proposed spur line was likely to be lower than that in the September 2010 report, at roughly £1.8bn - £1.9bn” - EIR request, Costs of HS2 spur to Heathrow, DfT (undated) https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/8725/dft-e0008892.pdf 202 The Heathrow spur: Description of HS2 Ltd’s recommended route and station option, HS2 Ltd. http://assets.hs2.org.uk/sites/default/files/inserts/130116%20heathrow%20route%20description%20for%20ehs%20final%20policy%20ap proved%20text.pdf 203 Figure 6.5: Site 2 Option (a) one new runway to the northwest, Interim Report, Airports Commission December 2013

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Recognising the drawbacks inherent in the proposal for dedicated airport trains terminating at the airport, Government has suggested that the spur could be extended in the future to form a loop back to the main HS2 line. 204

Whilst the proposed HS2 station at T5 has therefore been designed to allow a southward extension, a loop would be hugely expensive, (requiring tunneling over its entire length) while it is not clear how this could connect into HS2. Whilst passive provision for the necessary junctions between HS2 and a spur are included in phase 1 of the HS2 project, there is no similar provision for a junction between HS2 and any future loop.

HS2 current situation

In advance of the Airports Commission’s findings, Government has paused work on a spur, with the HS2 Hybrid Bill including only passive provision for the junctions that would be necessary to join the HS2 main line to Heathrow.

There is a real risk in continuing to promote HS2 as currently designed. If, in due course, it is found that a spur is not practical, fundable, viable or otherwise deliverable, Heathrow would be condemned to rely solely on a remote interchange at Old Oak Common – which Government previously dismissed as “not an option”. There is also the risk that Heathrow Express will be withdrawn on expiry of its Track Access Agreement in 2023, 205 and its train paths subsumed into Crossrail. 206 This reflects the increasing capacity constraints on the Great

204 “A spur of this kind could, however, be designed to be capable of extension in the future into a loop back onto the main HS2 line” – Para 4.33, High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future - Decisions and Next Steps, DfT January 2012 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/3648/hs2-decisions-and-next-steps.pdf 205 Written answer, HL5250 13th February 2013 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldhansrd/text/130213w0001.htm#wa_st_49 206 “This option is the only realistically viable means of fully responding to the peak capacity gap. It is therefore likely to be required within the RUS timescale, providing four extra fast trains per peak hour from Reading or beyond to London in the current Heathrow Express paths. The emerging service for Heathrow Airport, developed in response to feedback received during the consultation, is for 10 Crossrail trains per hour. The journey, based on a skip-stop pattern in the peaks, would be longer than on the existing Heathrow Express, but the trains would be significantly more frequent and would operate through central London, rather than just to London Paddington. This package of service changes has potential to provide major improvements to the GWML. Further development is required, especially in connection with avoiding any reduction to the rail modal share, and passenger experience, to and from Heathrow Airport” - Option A5, London and South East Route Utilisation Strategy, Network Rail June 2011 http://www.networkrail.co.uk/browse%20documents/rus%20documents/route%20utilisation%20strategies/rus%20generation%202/lond on%20and%20south%20east/london%20and%20south%20east%20route%20utilisation%20strategy.pdf

34 Western Main Line, and Heathrow Express’s relatively low load factors compared to other non-airport services. 207 In that event, Heathrow would be entirely reliant on Crossrail services, configured for high-density commuter peaks rather than airport traffic.

It is significant and welcome that the Airport Commission’s early guidelines emphasized a commitment to “an integrated approach, which establishes the links between different transport modes, rather than seeing airport policy in isolation.“ 208

However, the effect of Government’s decision to proceed with an HS2 alignment bypassing Heathrow is that the Commission is effectively prevented from considering the proven model demonstrated by European experience, of a direct HS2 route via the airport. By the time the Commission’s final report is issued in Summer 2015, it is possible that the Hybrid Bill will have progressed to the point where the principle of an HS2 route bypassing Heathrow is seen as effectively irreversible.

The Secretary of State has indicated that HS2 may need to be “adapted” depending on the final recommendations of the Airports Commission in 2015. 209 However, as the Commission’s interim report contains only two options, it seems logical to consider HS2 and airport strategy as soon as possible. This would also minimise the risk of what could be very significant abortive costs, as HS2’s costs continue to steadily increase. Most recently, HS2’s funding in this Parliament alone (to May 2015) has increased from ca. 0.9bn 210 to over £1.1bn 211 – before the Committee stages of the Hybrid Bill have even started. In excess of £300m has been spent on HS2 to date, 212 coincidentally similar to the write-off costs that followed Government’s 1991 decision to scrap British Rail’s Channel Tunnel Rail Link proposal in favour of the alignment via Stratford that was privately promoted by the consulting firm of Ove Arup and Partners. 213

It is significant that, in contrast to the approach taken at Heathrow, the design of HS2 at Birmingham and Manchester airports recognises the benefits of a direct intermodal interchange located on through lines.

Manchester airport would be served by an interchange located ca. 1.6km from the existing airport, presumably with the intention of passenger and potentially baggage transfer systems, although these are not specified. 214 As with the Heathrow spur, Government note that the provision of an interchange is subject to local funding

207 Table 4.2, Morning peak demand and capacity (2010) for each London terminus/cordon - London and South East Route Utilisation Strategy, Network Rail June 2011 208 Guidance Document 01, Airports Commission February 2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/70285/submitting-evidence-airports-commission.pdf 209 “The High Speed Rail Line (HS2) to Birmingham may have to be adapted depending on what is decided about the future hub airport. A Bill for the line will take until 2015, the year the Davies Commission reports. I hope if anything needs to be adapted we will have the time to do it” - The Rt Hon Patrick McLoughlin MP, Secretary of State, Department for Transport, Evening Standard 27th September 2012 http://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/i-wasnt-made-transport-secretary-to-push-through-third-runway-at-heathrowall-options-are- on-the-table-8181588.html 210 “Maria Eagle: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport whether any changes have been made on expenditure on High Speed 2 since the figures set out in the 2010 spending review. [146109] Mr Simon Burns: As part of the Government's comprehensive spending review in 2010, £773 million was allocated to the development of the High Speed 2 Project. This has increased to around £900 million, primarily due to an increase in the capital budget relating to property compensation. This increase reflects the forthcoming introduction, subject to the outcome of the recent consultation, of long-term discretionary and statutory compensation schemes for Phase One. The increase in budget was notified to HM Treasury as part of the Department's main estimate submissions at the beginning of 2012” – Written Questions 6th March 2013, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm130306/text/130306w0001.htm 211 Column WA293 Hansard 7th January 2014 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldhansrd/text/140107w0002.htm#wa_st_276 212 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/road-and-rail-transport/10566090/Officials-in-charge-of-HS2-have-already-spent- 300m.html 213 £140m in 1990 money equivalent to £270m today - Page 153, The Right Line, Nicholas Faith, Segrave Foulkes 2007 214 “Future work with Group and other Manchester delivery partners would consider the best means of integrating the HS2 station with the Enterprise Zone and the airport itself” – Para. 5.22 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future, Phase Two: The route to Leeds, Manchester and beyond, DfT January 2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69738/hs2-phase-two-command-paper.pdf

35 contributions. 215 The design of the phase 2 HS2 network does however limit the benefits of the proposed airport interchange, with Manchester located at the end of a dead end branch line. This makes access from anywhere other than the south impossible, precluding any expansion of Manchester airport’s catchment to the north.

An interchange is also proposed close to , located directly on the HS2 route, ca. 2km from the existing airport terminal and existing rail station. However, unlike Manchester, there appear to be no suggestions that the interchange is dependent on local funding contributions. Indeed, the cost (quoted variously as between £105m 216 and £470m 217) of a ‘” is included in HS2 Ltd’s cost estimates. This appears to contrast with Manchester, and indeed with Heathrow where the cost of a similar connection to an interchange on an alternative HS2 route via the airport was given as a fundamental reason for not adopting such a route. 218 HS2 Ltd’s Review of Route Selection and Speed confirmed that an HS2 route via Heathrow would be less expensive than the current proposal to bypass the airport if the cost of a people mover was excluded. 219

Interestingly, Birmingham airport recognises the potential benefits of seamless intermodality and have developed proposals to relocate the airport’s terminal facilities to the HS2 interchange itself, 220 which appears most recently to have caught the imagination of Chinese investors. 221

215 “We consider it is right that there should be a significant local contribution to the costs of adding this element to the project” – Para 9.13, ibid 216 “A figure of £105 million was has (sic) been assigned to the capital cost of a monorail system people mover. No cost has been calculated for the annual running.” - Freedom of Information response, HS2 Ltd. 26th October 2011 http://assets.hs2.org.uk/sites/default/files/foi11- 301_redacted.pdf 217 “People mover and rail reconstruction work £470m” - Table 4, HS2 Cost and Risk Model, HS2 Ltd. January 2012 http://assets.hs2.org.uk/sites/default/files/inserts/hs2%20cost%20and%20risk%20model_january%202012_forpublication.pdf 218 “The decision to opt for Old Oak Common in preference to Iver was determined on transportation and cost grounds – particularly … the additional high cost of a people mover to connect Iver to the Heathrow terminals” – Para 8.1.10, London-West Midlands Environmental Statement, Volume 5, Technical Appendices Alternatives Report CT-002-000), HS2 Ltd November 2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/259616/Vol1_Alternatives_Report_CT-002-000_wm.pdf 219 “While the cost estimate of £3.1 billion for a spur from HS2 to a new station at Terminal 5 was more than the £2.9 billion estimated incremental cost of a route through an interchange on the GWML at Iver, this excluded the substantial cost of a people mover between Iver and the main terminal areas” – Para 3.4.14, Review of HS2 London to West Midlands Route Selection and Speed HS2 Ltd January 2012 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/3659/hs2-review-of-route-selection-and-speed.pdf 220 Birmingham airport plans to move terminal buildings, New Civil Engineer 31 May 2012 http://www.nce.co.uk/news/transport/birmingham-airport-plans-to-move-terminal-buildings/8631120.article 221 “The link between the Birmingham Interchange station and the airport is designed to allow passengers to check in at the rail station and travel direct to their boarding gate. The current HS2 proposal would link the airport via the National Exhibition Centre with no pre-check-in facilities” – Financial Times 8th January 2014 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/003704a2-7897-11e3-831c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2poPoD6DY

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This principle of a co-located passenger processor at the transport interchange is similar to the scheme put forward by Heathrow Hub Ltd, who propose new airport terminal facilities located at a transport interchange on an alternative HS2 route running directly via the airport, as well as the classic rail network (Great Western Main Line/Crossrail) and the UK motorway network.

The Airports Commission’s Interim Report notes “a transport hub of this kind could widen the catchment area of the airport, potentially increasing the proportion of passengers reaching the airport by public transport.” 222

In contrast to the Commission’s recognition of the benefits of a transformation of Heathrow’s surface access, its recommendations for improving surface access to Gatwick, the only other option now under consideration for additional UK runway capacity, are limited to “enhancement of the Main Line with a particular emphasis upon enhancing capacity and reliability.” 223 Whilst clearly useful, this would however do nothing to increase Gatwick’s currently limited catchment or provide direct access from the majority of the UK regions, which are on the “wrong” side of London in terms of surface access links to the airport.

The airport’s own priorities appear similarly limited, challenging DfT’s franchise and fleet allocation decisions which have resulted in the loss of the dedicated services and rolling stock configured for the specific requirements of airport passengers, (eg; wide sliding doors, ample luggage space, on-board ticket sales).

Arup’s study for the airport 224 identified this work as a priority, whilst also noting the potential for new and improved rail services to Kent to the east, and the Thames Valley to the west, using existing underused infrastructure. However, these proposals are extremely modest in comparison to those of other major European airports. It is difficult to envisage a strategy where Gatwick’s surface access could be transformed to

222 Para. 6.96, Interim Report, Airports Commission December 2013 223 Para 5.89, Interim Report, Airports Commission December 2013 224 Rail Surface Access Study, Arup March 2012 http://www.gatwickairport.com/PublicationFiles/business_and_community/all_public_publications/transforming_gatwick/Gatwick_Rail_A ccess_Phase2.pdf

37 the point where it could serve a two runway hub airport, even if the existing capacity constraints which Arup identify were removed. 225

At the time of writing, there is one other output from the Airports Commission, a letter from its Chairman, Sir Howard Davies, to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 226 This recommends a number of studies into surface access improvements to airports including Stansted, Gatwick and Heathrow. The principle of considering surface access alongside airports policy is of course to be welcomed, and, in a clear echo of the Eddington Study’s conclusions, Sir Howard notes “a strong case for attaching a greater strategic priority to transport investments which improve surface access to our airports.” 227

It is however surprising that the proposed studies do not appear to form part of a holistic review of surface transport, and instead continue the piecemeal approach that has seen the development of, for example, HS2, Crossrail and Western Rail Access to Heathrow (WRAtH), considered separately. The Commission’s letter recommends studies into rail access to Heathrow from the south, presenting the risk of yet another project being developed without consideration of a wider framework.

This approach is unlikely to deliver the optimum results at least cost to the public purse. For example, the WRAtH proposals require significant public funding 228 which would not be required if HS2’s remit to consider western access to Heathrow as an integral part of HS2’s route selection process had been considered 229 and its benefits assessed. 230

225 “The Sussex Route Utilisation Strategy (RUS) was published in 2010, with its principal focus being flows to and from London. Of the strategic gaps identified, where the future railway does not or will not meet demand, one of the highest priorities was the gap between committed capacity and future demand on peak services to London, including the services via Gatwick” – Para 3.3.2, Gatwick Airport Rail Surface Access Study, Arup March 2012 226 Letter from Sir Howard Davies, 26th November 2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263208/surface-access-letter.pdf 227 Para. 5.88, Interim Report, Airports Commission December 2013 228 “Government will contribute £500m towards a western rail link to Heathrow” – DfT Press Release, 12th July 2012 http://www.dft.gov.uk/news/press-releases/dft-press-20120712b/ 229 “It is important to note that the model does not analyse the potential market to Heathrow from areas to the west. This means for instance that the model does not forecast the demand to Heathrow from (for example) Reading using a London Interchange Station connected to the GWML” – HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010 230 “We have not taken account of the wider connectivity benefit that would accrue if Iver were to be developed as a wider hub interchange. We have not sought to model and analyse the benefits of improved connectivity to Heathrow generally through, for instance, improved western access. We focused on the case for high speed and considered a Heathrow station on the basis of a wider high speed network” - High Speed Rail – London to the West Midlands and Beyond - Report to Government, HS2 Ltd, December 2009

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WRAtH would also require passengers from stations west of Reading to change trains, incurring the interchange penalty and suppressing demand as discussed earlier. Developing new, dedicated airport services also results in inefficient use of scarce rail capacity, a particular issue as the Great Western Main Line is already one of the UK’s most congested arteries. WRAtH services would be entirely reliant on airport traffic, meaning load factors are likely to be low. Even Heathrow Express, serving the dense markets of central London, runs at only ca. 30% capacity in the morning peak, when other trains on the Great Western Main Line have load factors in excess of 100%. 231

Access from the west is particularly important as Crossrail will do nothing to improve access to Heathrow from important markets such as Bristol, Cardiff, , Newquay and Plymouth. The south west has lost its air links to Heathrow and Plymouth airport has also now closed, increasing the peripherality of these already severely disadvantaged regions. 232 Existing rail links are also vulnerable to extreme weather, with flooding closing the Great Western Main Line to the south west a number of times in recent years. 233

As previously noted, access to Heathrow from the west is possible today, with a change of train at Paddington or to the RailAir coach link at Reading, but the interchange that acts as such a significant deterrent today would remain with WRAtH.

Illustrating the dangers of silo planning, the London Assembly suggests that Crossrail may provide a 1% increase in Heathrow’s public transport mode share, but that subsuming Heathrow Express into Crossrail (as proposed by Network Rail to alleviate Great Western Main Line capacity constraints) 234 could in fact reduce rail’s mode share of Heathrow passengers by 3%. 235

231 Table 4.2 London and South East Route Utilisation Strategy, Network Rail July 2011 http://www.networkrail.co.uk/browse%20documents/rus%20documents/route%20utilisation%20strategies/rus%20generation%202/lond on%20and%20south%20east/london%20and%20south%20east%20route%20utilisation%20strategy.pdf 232 Both Cornwall and South Wales qualify for Convergence funding (the highest level of European assistance) 233 The South West Spine – Devon County Council, February 2013 http://www.devon.gov.uk/south-west-spine.pdf 234 London and South East Route Utilisation Strategy, Network Rail July 2011 235 “It is currently unclear what level of modal shift a completed Crossrail is likely to provide, although a one per cent increase in mode share has been suggested. HAL has estimated that withdrawal of the Heathrow Express service would reduce the rail mode share by three per cent” - Plane Speaking: Air and Noise Pollution around a growing Heathrow Airport, March 2012 http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Heathrow%20airport%20-%20Final%20version_0.pdf

39 The failure of BAA’s Airtrack proposal 236 also highlights the failings of silo planning, where dedicated airport services were proposed to be simply overlaid on an already congested rail network, leading to a clearly unacceptable situation where some level crossings along the route would be closed to road traffic for up to 45 minutes in every hour. 237

238 The Campaign for Better Transport’s report on Heathrow expansion concludes that there is an “overriding need to address surface access issues before aviation capacity increases can be considered.” It also seems essential that these issues are considered in an integrated way, both at Heathrow and Gatwick, rather than continuing the piecemeal approach to the planning of surface access. This is particularly critical when considering the unprecedented cost and national significance of HS2.

HS2 and Intermodality objectives

1 - Modal shift from road and air to rail

Heathrow has the significant advantage of a location in one of the principal economic engine rooms of the UK and Europe, largely a result of proximity to the airport. However, this attractiveness, combined with the lack of rail access, results in high levels of road congestion, making modal shift from road to rail a key priority.

Local air quality around Heathrow fails to comply with legal limits, 239 a result of the local road network experiencing some of the worst congestion in Europe, (with over 18% of total UK vehicle delay experienced on the M25

Company headquarter locations (Source – Heathrow, A New Approach, Heathrow Airport Ltd. July 2013

236 Improving Public Transport Access to Heathrow Airport, BAA October 2008 http://www.heathrowairport.com/static/Heathrow/Downloads/PDF/HeathrowAirtrack_Consultation2.pdf 237 http://www.egham-airtrack.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=66&Itemid=77 238 Heathrow and Surface Transport Stress, Campaign for Better Transport, September 2013 http://www.bettertransport.org.uk/files/surface-access-final.pdf 239 “Modelling by the Greater London Authority suggests the air around Heathrow is likely to continue exceeding legal limits for nitrogen oxides (NOx), despite measures in the Mayor’s Air Quality Strategy to tackle London’s emissions” – London Assembly, 17th October 2011 http://www.mayorwatch.co.uk/assembly-to-question-stakeholders-on-heathrow-air-and-noise-pollution/201117199

40 alone), 240 and airport operations, exacerbated by Heathrow’s congested and constrained site. 241 The extent to which Heathrow and its associated surface access contributes to the local air quality problem was made clear by studies during the airspace closure as a result of volcanic ash in 2010. 242

The London Assembly studied the impact of Heathrow’s forecast growth from ca. 69 million to 90-95 million passengers, within existing planning limits, (for example the cap of 480,000 ATM’s per annum), with no additional runway capacity and assuming higher load factors and larger aircraft. 243 This shows a considerable increase in surface access demand to and from the airport. 244

As noted earlier, it is important to note that numbers alone understate the impact, since each passenger using private vehicles to access the airport can generate up to four road journeys (eg: minicabs, kiss and ride), estimated to be responsible for 70% of airport related CO2 emissions. 245

The Assembly therefore conclude that there is a pressing need to reduce airport related road traffic, which represents up to 30% of all traffic on major routes around Heathrow, by increasing public transport’s mode share from the current 40% to at least 60%. 246 Even if Heathrow’s runway capacity continues to be constrained, an integrated surface access strategy, to include HS2, therefore appears essential.

In examining the potential for modal shift from air to rail (air/rail substitution), Heathrow Airport Ltd. (HAL) have suggested that, if HS2 was designed to follow European best practice, between 45,000 – 91,000 ATM’s at Heathrow 247 could be switched to rail.248 Appendix C summarises BAA’s conclusions on the critical elements for intermodality at the UK’s hub airport.

240 Road statistics 2009: Traffic, Speeds and Congestion, DfT June 2010 http://www.dft.gov.uk/adobepdf/162469/221412/221546/226956/261695/roadstats09tsc.pdf 241 “Delays caused by airport operations, (lack of gates etc), accounted in 2006/07 for eight percentage points of the 33% of flights which were delayed. Even when controlling for congestion in air traffic with respect to runways (ATM’s per runway), the proportion of delays at Heathrow is relatively high” – p. 20/21, Imagine a World Class Heathrow, London First, June 2008 http://www.london- first.co.uk/documents/Imagine_a_world_class_Heathrow_FULL_REPORT.pdf 242 “This period of unprecedented closure during unexceptional weather conditions has allowed us to demonstrate that the airports do have a clear measurable effect on NO2 concentrations and that this effect dropped almost to zero during the period of closure, leading to a temporary but significant fall in pollutant concentrations adjacent to the airport perimeters” - Preliminary analysis of the impact of airport closures due to the 2010 Eyjafallajokull volcanic eruptions on local air quality, Ben Barratt and Gary Fuller, King’s College London Environmental Research Group, May 2010 http://www.londonair.org.uk/london/reports/volcano_airport_closures.pdf 243 “The higher levels of passengers will come about through a combination of higher load factors on aircraft (and) bigger planes” - Plane Speaking: Air and Noise Pollution around a growing Heathrow Airport, March 2012 http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Heathrow%20airport%20-%20Final%20version_0.pdf 244 “Even without a third runway, absolute numbers requiring surface access to Heathrow will increase dramatically over the next 20 years. In 2001/2, around 27mppa used cars and taxis to access Heathrow. By 2015/20, and assuming a 40% sustainable surface access target has been achieved, this figure will be around 40mppa” - Heathrow Expansion, The London Assembly’s response to BAA’s consultation on the Interim Masterplan for Heathrow, London Assembly 2005 http://ww.legacy.london.gov.uk/assembly/reports/plansd/heathrow_expansion.rtf 245 “As part of a strategy to reduce the carbon impact of surface access, the reduction of “Kiss and Fly” journeys would have a significant impact on reducing overall carbon emissions since it is the most inefficient form of surface access, requiring four trips per return flight. Estimated landside CO2 emissions (2005) from “Kiss and Fly” (passenger drop-off, including passengers using minicabs) equals 70% of estimated CO2 emissions” - BAA 2008-2012 Transport Vision http://www.baa.com/assets//B2CPortal/Static%20Files/LHR_SAS.pdf.pdf 246 Plane Speaking: Air and Noise Pollution around a growing Heathrow Airport, March 2012 http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Heathrow%20airport%20-%20Final%20version_0.pdf 247 Heathrow Airport Limited evidence to the Transport Committee’s Inquiry into the Strategic Case for High Speed Rail, June 2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtran/writev/rail/m131.htm 248 “Overall, by 2030 the presently untapped market from which the interchange could induce traffic to shift to rail contains up to 36m road journeys and 10m air journeys per year” - Improving Rail Connectivity to Heathrow - Implications for the Development of the Heathrow International Interchange, BAA October 2009 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100409200813/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/stakeholdersubmissi ons/pdf/heathrowconnectivity.pdf

41 In their submissions to HS2 Ltd, HAL also looked at the potential for mode shift assuming an optimised intermodal interchange serving the airport and an HS2 route via the airport. 249

Car, taxi and minicab Total journeys made in journeys in 2008 2008 (millions) (millions) Relevant market Heathrow airport passengers surface access journeys 43 27 Heathrow passenger escort journeys 13 12 Heathrow employee surface access journeys 30 23 Domestic short haul passenger air journeys to/from 4 NA Heathrow Other short haul passenger air journeys to/from 2 NA Heathrow Short haul passenger air journeys from other UK 4 NA airports to/from European hub airports Total 96 62

Heathrow also estimated the number of road and air journeys in 2030 that could be attracted to use an optimised Heathrow Interchange and associated rail services. 250

Number of journeys in 2030

(millions) Relevant market Heathrow airport passengers surface access journeys 27 Heathrow passenger escort journeys 1 Heathrow employee surface access journeys 8 Domestic short haul passenger air journeys to/from Heathrow 4 Other short haul passenger air journeys to/from Heathrow 2 Short haul passenger air journeys from other UK airports to/from 4 European hub airports Total 46

This assumed a third runway, increasing Heathrow’s capacity from 480,000 to 605,000 ATMs, generating 85m surface access journeys in total (i.e. by both car and taxi and public transport).

HAL’s response to the HS2 public consultation 251 emphasised that “simply connecting the high speed rail line to Heathrow is not in itself the solution to achieving Government transport policy objectives. Encouraging modal shift from aviation to rail relies on a number of critical success factors:

• “frequency of service is a key factor in minimising end to end journey times as it determines both average waiting time incurred at the interchange and the degree of uncertainty about the total time that must be allowed for each trip.”

• “Each time a passenger has to change between trains at each leg of the journey the total end to end journey time is increased by additional waiting time. The impact of this interchange penalty

249 Table 1, Improving Rail Connectivity to Heathrow – Implications for the Development of the Heathrow International Interchange, BAA October 2009 250 Table 2, ibid 251 Heathrow Airport Ltd submission to HS2 consultation, July 2010 http://highspeedrailresponses.dft.gov.uk/s2css/viewusercomments.asp?usr=47249

42 tends to be greater for passengers who are travelling with luggage, such as air passengers, and is particularly high for foreign travellers and those who are unfamiliar with our transport systems.”

• “Proximity to airport terminals will determine the nature of the link that can be provided for conveying passengers and bags. IATA standards recommend that passengers should not walk more than 250m without assistance (e.g. by using a ).”

• “Ideally, the long term development of Heathrow airport will be best served by the provision of a rail interchange that is: o as close and as well connected as possible by fast and frequent services to the airport campuses; o located on a site whose scale provides maximum opportunity for the phased development of air terminal facilities co-located with the rail services provided at the interchange”

The Airports Commission’s Interim Report suggests that high speed rail would only lead to a small reduction in demand for airport capacity, noting the constraints on rail line and tunnel capacity. However, this may be influenced by the design of HS2, which requires dedicated rail services to Heathrow and is capacity constrained by the single-track link that is proposed between HS2 and HS1. 252

A full capacity link is essential to allow the possibility of European destinations being served by high speed rail as an alternative to short haul flights – the latter including Paris, Frankfurt, Dusseldorf, Brussels, Bordeaux and Amsterdam. 253 Transport 2000 Trust concludes that air rail substitution at Heathrow could result in over 7 million passengers annually switching from rail to high speed rail. 254 Even if this is not likely in the foreseeable future, it seems shortsighted in the extreme to design HS2 in such a way to preclude the possibility.

The current design is also unlikely to even achieve the limited capacity claimed. The single line tunnel between Old Oak Common and the North London Line creates an inevitable performance risk – late running of a through train in either direction would inevitably create consequential delays for trains in the other direction, which would either have to wait at Old Oak Common, (impacting on HS2’s capacity) or on the North London Line, (with even more serious consequences on London Overground services, which are planned to increase to ten trains an hour in each direction, and for freight).

At least one alternative for a HS2/HS1 link has been developed. Lord Bradshaw and Berkeley’s Euston Cross proposal 255 suggests a full capacity connection which would also have the benefit of providing an interchange at Kings Cross/St Pancras, significantly improving onward connections for HS2 passengers and easing congestion on Euston’s Underground lines. Without such a proposal, additional funding of ca. £15bn 256 for Crossrail 2 is essential. 257 Euston Cross is supported by RailFuture who note “diversion of WCML suburban services via Crossrail and extension of HS1 Javelin services via Euston Cross on to the WCML would allow HS2 services to be accommodated at Euston with less tunnelling and without a massive expansion of the station footprint.” 258 This sort of integrated planning is noticeable by its absence in the design of HS2.

It is difficult to see how Gatwick, the other option identified by the Airports Commission for additional runway capacity, could achieve comparable substitution. Its location makes it difficult to imagine a high speed rail connection between HS1 (and Europe) and the UK regions.

252 Box 4b, Interim Report, Airports Commission December 2013 253 Table 4.1, The Heathrow Opportunity, Greengauge 21 February 2010 http://www.greengauge21.net/wp-content/uploads/heathrow- opportunity.pdf 254 Fog on the Runway, Transport 2000 Trust, May 2006 http://www.bettertransport.org.uk/files/pdfs/Fog_on_the_Runway.pdf 255 http://www.railtechnologymagazine.com/Rail-News/lords-submit-alternative-route-for-hs2 256 http://www.nce.co.uk/projects/crossrail/johnson-puts-cost-of-crossrail-2-at-up-to-15bn/8627346.article 257 “HS2 Ltd now acknowledges the need to incorporate Crossrail 2 into HS2 at Euston station though there has been no formal change of remit to date” – Para 2.8, Crossrail 2 Consultation Report, Mayor of London, TfL, Network Rail October 2013 http://www.tfl.gov.uk/assets/downloads/corporate/crossrail_2_Consultation_Report.pdf 258 http://www.railfuture.org.uk/High+speed+rail

43

A high-speed railway could potentially link Gatwick and Heathrow via a route following the M25 corridor, as envisaged in the “” proposal 259 for a “virtual hub.” However, such a line would be entirely reliant on inter-airport passenger traffic (since the line would not serve any other population centres), making it unlikely that there is any conceivable business case for capital or operating costs.

2 – Support regional development

Government recognises that Heathrow “is vital to the UK’s competitiveness: easy access to Heathrow is often a major factor for business in deciding where to locate.” 260 The Coalition Government’s first Secretary of State for Transport emphasized the need to “think about the UK through the prism of Heathrow” 261 when considering inward investor perceptions.

The important SINEI study for England’s RDA’s 262 concluded that “access to Heathrow appears as a criterion supporting many of the RDA’s economic objectives and highlighting their national economic significance. This reinforces the fact that access to Heathrow is a fundamental requirement for achieving many of the economic objectives which have been set”

It also found that “comparison provides a stark contrast whereby:  Heathrow is connected only to London at a frequency of 4 trains per hour; 263  Paris CDG has a local service frequency of eight trains per hour to Paris plus high-speed TGV services to the north, south and northeast. To demonstrate the efficiencies provided by these connections the centre of Brussels is only one and a quarter hours by TGV to Paris CDG and extensions to Rotterdam and Amsterdam will bring these within 3 hours or so;  Amsterdam Schiphol has 8 local trains per hour to Amsterdam and inter city services to Amsterdam, Rotterdam the Hague, Brussels and Paris. It also has further extensive connections throughout Belgium, France and Germany; and  Frankfurt Main has a local S-Bahn service to Frankfurt every 20 minutes and high-speed connection to major cities in Germany and hence throughout Europe. Quite clearly the accessibility of regions remote from these national hubs is very different from UK experience and vastly superior. The picture being painted therefore complements earlier analysis which overall, paints a picture where the UK has less infrastructure in total than its competitors and critically, much weaker strategic connections.”

The 2006 Eddington Transport Study 264 similarly found a case for better links to the UK’s major airports, concluding “over the next 20 years, the strategic economic priorities for transport policy should be;  Maintaining or improving the performance of the UK’s key international gateways. Specifically international airports that support a high-level of business and/or freight usage and are showing signs of congestion and unreliability. This focus should incorporate surface access routes to these gateways, again where such links are showing signs of congestion and unreliability;

259 Protecting London’s Position as a World City – Creating the First Virtual Hub Airport, Victoria Borwick AM, London Assembly March 2012 http://www.mayor-for-london.co.uk/pdf/VirtualHub.pdf 260 Connecting to Heathrow, Factsheet, DfT 2011 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/connecting-to- heathrow_0.pdf 261 “It is clear to me that faster and simpler connectivity to a location is vital, particularly for inward investors. In places like Manchester and Leeds it may not be the way you like to think about it, but the reality is that for most people outside the UK they think about the UK through the of Heathrow. That is how they arrive. The question is not, "Where is it?" The question is, "How long does it take for me to get there from Heathrow?” - Philip Hammond, Oral Evidence to Transport Select Committee, 13th September 2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtran/uc1185-v/uc118501.htm 262 Surface Infrastructure of National Economic Importance (SINEI) - A Study for England's Regional Development Agencies, Faber Maunsell/Ecotec January 2004 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.advantagewm.co.uk/Images/sinei_tcm9- 35434.pdf 263 Since increased to 8 tph following introduction of , a stopping service between Paddington and Heathrow 264 House of Commons Library Note SN/BT/42081st March 2010 www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN04208.pdf

44  The key inter-urban corridors between these places, where they show signs of congestion and unreliability. From a passenger perspective, these corridors may connect urban areas with each other and with international airports.

Domestic air services accounted for only 6.6% of Heathrow’s capacity in 2010,265 showing how market forces and the structure of landing charges266 have led airlines to focus on long haul routes The continuing attrition of domestic flights and frequencies, and the lack of a rail alternative, reduces Heathrow’s accessibility from the UK regions, effectively increasing their peripherality relative to global markets 267 and reducing their competiveness. 268

Heathrow Airport Ltd’s submission to the HS2 public consultation 269 noted “an integrated air/rail transport solution would improve connectivity to the airport through the re-establishment of important links between Heathrow and the UK regions. By attracting UK passengers back to Heathrow, high speed rail could help to maintain the airport's hub role, increase the economic potential of those UK regions to compete in wider markets within and outside the UK, and make the UK a more attractive investment proposition.”

As noted earlier, the Coalition Government’s first Secretary of State for Transport recognized the importance of considering inward investor perceptions “through the prism of Heathrow”. An Old Oak Common interchange would result in a very different and far inferior, onward travel experience compared to that experienced by an arriving passenger at Frankfurt, Schiphol or Charles de Gaulle. At those airports, the integrated railway station provides very frequent departures to a large number of domestic and international destinations. In contrast, passengers from Heathrow would need to travel by Crossrail to Old Oak Common, where a change of train would be required for destinations other than central London.

Placing Heathrow on the main HS2 route and the classic rail network would provide the UK’s regions with direct access to global markets, increasing their attractiveness as business locations and better assisting the Government’s worthy objective of rebalancing the UK’s economic geography. 270

Gatwick suffers from a location remote from the majority of the UK’s regions. Whilst additional runway capacity could allow reintroduction of short haul domestic air services to regional airports, surface access infrastructure would be inherently constrained by the need to cross or orbit the Greater London conurbation, a particular challenge in view of the density of existing development and the protected green belt status of much of the undeveloped land around the capital.

3 – Increase airport catchment

Clearly, placing Heathrow at the heart of the UK’s rail network would be hugely beneficial in terms of supporting hub operations and improving the UK’s regions access to global markets. 271

265 Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation, April 2010 http://www.centreforaviation.com/news/2011/04/11/londons-heathrow-competitive- disadvantages-are-beginning-to-hurt/page1 266 “The domestic passenger charge will increase from £13 to £20 per passenger, and, from 1 April 2011 an annual regulator-approved increase will also be implemented, bringing the total charge to £22 per departing domestic passenger” – BBC News, 31st January 2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-12324693 267 “Organisations outside London were concerned about the impacts on international investment in the regions as a result of the limited and reducing number of services to Heathrow from airports within the UK” – Transport and the Economy, Transport Select Committee 2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmtran/473/473.pdf 268 “The UK regions are at a major disadvantage in terms of access from major world markets. This hampers the ability to attract inward investment and regional economic growth” - Economic Impacts of Hub Airports, British Chambers of Commerce 2009 www.britishchambers.org.uk/.../BCC_Economic_Impacts_of_Hub_Airports.pdf 269 Para 23, http://highspeedrailresponses.dft.gov.uk/s2css/viewusercomments.asp?usr=47249 270 "I'm passionate about this project because time and again we have this debate in our country about how we're going to bring the gap between the north and the south together, how we're going to make sure that our growth is not just on the City of London. High Speed 2 is about changing the economic geography of this country, making sure the north and the Midlands benefit from recovery as well" – Rt Hon George Osborne MP, BBC Interview 1st September 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/sep/01/hs2-economic-geography- george-osborne

45

However, as noted earlier, HS2’s current proposals in fact disadvantage Heathrow, since the first phase would provide direct access from the regions to Heathrow’s European competitors, but not to Heathrow itself.

It is difficult to see how Gatwick’s catchment could be significantly expanded without very significant and entirely new rail infrastructure. Arup’s study showed the airports limited catchment, and its dependence on the M25 corridor and Brighton Main Line for road and rail access. Whilst improvements may be possible, (albeit at very high cost and potential disruption during construction), it seems unlikely this would provide any significant increase in the airports wider catchment.

Influences on passenger choice of airport (Source – Future Airports Policy, The Key Challenge for London – Presentation by Sir David Rowlands to the Royal Aeronautical Society, Gatwick Airport Ltd. 2013)

Surface access is particularly critical to an expanded Gatwick’s ability to attract new carriers and support hub operations, since ease of surface access is almost as important as availability of routes to passenger’s airport choice.

Gatwick rightly notes that it serves 120 stations directly, compared to Heathrow’s 6. However, Heathrow’s location provides the potential for many more towns and cities to be served directly, if the right rail connections were put in place, and following the example of other major European airports.

4 - Enable high value freight connectivity

As the UK's gateway to the global economy, Heathrow gives businesses access to markets and customers world-wide, and helps to make the UK an attractive place to do business. It represents the UK's busiest freight port by value, and handles 56% of all UK air freight by value - worth around £35 billion a year. 272

The draft National Networks NPS emphasizes the importance of, and policy support for, Strategic Rail Freight Interchanges (SRFI’s). 273 However, it refers only to links into the rail and trunk road system, and fails to address the additional benefit of airport connections. Whilst rail is best suited to low value, high bulk trainload

271 “It is also likely that by making access to Heathrow quicker and easier from around the UK, HSR will actually extend Heathrow’s catchment area and thereby increase the level of demand at the Airport” Evidence for the case for routing HS2 via Heathrow and connecting with Great Western, Crossrail and Airtrack, SEEDA 2010 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/lordmawhinneyreport/pdf/appendix3_27.p df 272 HAL submission to HS2 consultation, July 2010 273 Draft National Policy Statement for National Networks, DfT December 2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263720/consultation-document-draft-national-policy- statement.pdf

46 freight, there may be a case for at least considering the potential for future intermodality with air, particularly in view of the long term timescales involved in planning and developing new facilities and the ongoing efforts to secure a SRFI (Slough Intermodal Freight Exchange) close to Heathrow. 274

SRFI’s may also have a specific airport-related function not addressed by the NPS. For example, Heathrow, in an initiative to reduce goods vehicle movements on local roads and hence improve local air quality, has established an off-airport freight consolidation centre. 275 This is estimated to have reduced CO2 emissions by 70%. 276

274 http://www.consultation-online.co.uk/sife/ 275 http://www.freightbestpractice.org.uk/download.aspx?pid=140&action=save 276 http://www.urbantec.de/media/urbantec/downloads_6/pdf_8/vortraege_1/brown_martin.pdf

47 Conclusion

In an increasingly global economy, transport is more critical than ever before to the future prosperity and competitiveness of this island nation, dependent on international trade and located off the shores of mainland Europe.

HS2 requires the biggest investment of public monies ever envisaged in a single project in the UK.

The issue of hub airport capacity and location is the UK’s longest running political conundrum, with its roots in a July 1953 White Paper on London’s Airports, 277 pre-dating even the question of Britain’s relationship with Europe.

It is welcome that, like the Secretary of State, 278 the Airports Commission recognises the “strong case for attaching a greater strategic priority to transport investments which improve surface access to our airports,” 279

However, HS2 and emerging airport policy continue to proceed in isolation. 280

It is surely sensible to instead take these decisions in an integrated way, by developing an intermodal, integrated air, road and rail transport policy, to replace the current silo approach.

Appendix D lists some of the groups who endorse this principle.

An MIT paper concludes, “intermodality is low on the agenda of the completely privatized actors in the UK. The emerging picture at Heathrow is one of isolation between airport and rail network development, with no appreciation of possible mutual benefits. The UK has seen a series of privatizations in the transport sector, which has shifted the focus towards more short-term thinking. The DfT is being lobbied by individual industries who advocate for their own short term narrow interests and needs, pushing the Department of Transportation into uni-modal thinking.” 281

Continuing to pursue HS2 in isolation also risks ignoring a clear message of the Eddington study;

“It is critical that the government enforces a strong, strategic approach to option generation, so that it can avoid momentum building up behind particular solutions and the UK can avoid costly mistakes which will not be the most effective way of delivering on its strategic priorities. The risk is that transport policy can become the pursuit of icons. Almost invariably such projects – ‘grands projets’ – develop real momentum, driven by strong lobbying. The momentum can make such projects difficult – and unpopular – to stop, even when the benefit/cost equation does not stack up, or the environmental and landscape impacts are unacceptable” 282

We believe there is therefore a compelling case for pausing further work on HS2 until these issues have been fully considered. This would also allow HS2 Ltd’s new Chairman time to properly consider Government’s request to “drive down” the cost of the project 283 and study the benefits of starting work in the north. 284 This

277 London’s Airports, Cmd. 8902 July 1953 278 “As far as infrastructure is concerned, we would always want to service the major hub airport of the country” – Rt Hon Patrick McLoughlin MP, Q841 Oral evidence to House of Commons Transport Committee 11th February 2013 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmtran/78/78ii.pdf 279 Para 5.88, Interim Report, Airports Commission December 2013 280 “The Commission … will not however consider the case for any re-routing of the main HS2 line” – Para. 6.94, Interim Report, Airports Commission December 2013 281 Why some airport-rail links get built and others do not - Julia Nickel, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010 http://seari.mit.edu/documents/theses/SM_NICKEL_PS.pdf 282 The Eddington Transport Study, DfT December 2006 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/about/strategy/transportstrategy/eddingtonstudy/ 283 “Following his recent appointment as the new chair of HS2 Ltd, Sir David Higgins has been tasked with reporting on how to reduce the £42.6 billion cost of the scheme. He will present his findings to the Transport Secretary in March, before the second reading of the Hybrid

48 is of particular interest to the APPG, (and a potential subject for a future paper), and could also consider whether an alternative to the current London-centric design of HS2 might better serve northern regional economies.

Despite claims of an urgent need for HS2, 285 there is in fact time for careful assessment – annual passenger demand growth on the continues to decline, from 20.4% in 2010 286 to less than 1% in 2013. 287 Network Rail’s analysis shows that, of all London termini, Euston is the least crowded. 288 Most recently, and despite economic recovery, there is also evidence of a real decline in rail journeys nationally. 289

Above all, by taking the time for careful assessment, we have the opportunity of ensuring that we do not repeat the environmental and commercial mistakes of one of the most well known UK “grands projets” - Concorde. 290

At any time, such care would be important. In what is - and likely to remain - a challenging economic landscape, it is, we believe, essential.

Appendix A – EC Conditions for Intermodality

The Commission Des Communautes Europeennes has established that conditions for an efficient air/rail complementarity are: 291  “Convenience: the walking distance between rail and air terminal has to be as short as possible  Transparency: ticket system and references like signs at the airport and rail terminals have to be clear so as to be easily understood by occasional users  Information: the access to information has to be easy. Information in and outside trains have to be written in more than one language and staff have to be approachable. After landing the information on the rail transportation should be easy. Otherwise passengers will take the easier option, the taxi.  Accessibility: the boarding to railway vehicles has to be easy for all passengers, including those with reduced mobility. In addition vehicles should have plenty room for luggage.

Bill” – Rt Hon Patrick McLoughlin MP, 4th November 2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/sir-david-higgins-to-drive-down-cost-of- hs2 284 “If you are in the north you will want to see the benefits earlier. I don’t think people will want to wait until 2032 or 2035 to see the benefits. That is something I will look at closely. We should certainly look at building it .. (from north to south)” – Sir David Higgins, Chairman HS2 Ltd, Uncorrected evidence of oral evidence to House of Commons Transport Committee, 14th October 2013 http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/transport/131014%20-%20Uncorrected%20transcript.pdf 285 “Our trains are already full” – Rt Hon George Osborne MP, Daily Telegraph 18th September 2013 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/road-and-rail-transport/10319158/Our-trains-are-already-full-says-Osborne-in-urgent-plea- for-HS2.html 286 Page 13, Annual Report and Financial Statements 2012 http://www.stagecoach.com/~/media/Files/S/Stagecoach- Group/Attachments/media/publication-financial-reports/ar2012.pdf 287 http://www.51m.co.uk/why-we-dont-need-hs2/ 288 Table 4.2 – Morning peak demand and capacity (2010) for each London terminus, London and South East Route Utilisation Strategy, Network Rail July 2011 http://www.networkrail.co.uk/browse%20documents/rus%20documents/route%20utilisation%20strategies/rus%20generation%202/lond on%20and%20south%20east/london%20and%20south%20east%20route%20utilisation%20strategy.pdf 289 Office of Rail Regulation- Passenger journeys by sector, http://dataportal.orr.gov.uk/displayreport/report/html/22c71959-•‐ 3f97-•‐405f-•‐8342-•‐e4981745d08b 290 “A serious technical oversight was failure to recognise sufficiently the environmental problems. Probably more important was the commercial misconception that speed was the key criterion for success, over-optimism in predicting sales and insufficient regard to customer requirements. Indeed, one could argue that there was a reckless failure even to care whether or not there was a market” - They Meant Well - Government Project Disasters, D R Myddleton, Institute of Economic Affairs, 2007 http://www.iea.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/files/upldbook419pdf.pdf 291 Review of the current intermodality situation, Eurocontrol October 2004 http://www.eurocontrol.int/care- innov/gallery/content/public/docs/innov2/m3/WP1%204.0.pdf

49  Security: vehicles and terminals have to be controlled by cameras and staff  Timetable coordination: For express train, transit, suburban railway and regional railway the frequency has to be adapted to the passenger demand (high frequency in peak periods). For high speed train, timetables have to be coordinated with airline timetables so as to optimise the interconnection time between air and rail network.  Reliability and punctuality: Passengers should count on the service offered. Hence if high speed train or airline is delayed, passengers have to be transferred on another flight or HST and if necessary accommodated  Booking: Airline and railway companies should cooperate to offer a common booking. When booking flight, passenger should be informed on public transport connections, and should have the possibility to buy a combined air-rail ticket  Check-in: the luggage check-in should be possible at the origin of the trip i.e. at the railway station. IARO, ATAG and ACI [Ref 38] estimate that baggage handling is probably the major issue for air/rail intermodality and that full check-in in rail station would generate more passengers  Price: Price of express train, light rail transit, suburban railway and regional railway have to be attractive so as to dissuade passengers to joining the airport by car and encourage the use of public transportation. The total price of a trip combining air transport and HST from an origin to a destination has to be enough low in comparison to the price of the direct flight so as to compensate the longer time trip and to be incentive for passengers.  Total travel time: the total travel time by train should be shorter than the total travel time by air transport”

Appendix B - Airport ownership models

Europe  Frankfurt - 100% owned by Fraport AG, with the Hesse regional Government owning 31.4% and the City of Frankfurt 20.1% (through Stadtwerke Frankfurt am Main Holding GmbH) - http://www.fraport.com/en/investor-relations/the-fraport-share-/basic-data-shareholder- structure.html. In addition, Lufthansa owns 10%, with the remaining shares held by a range of private and institutional shareholders;  Schiphol – Schiphol Group 76% owned by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 22% by the Municipality of Amsterdam and 2% by the Municipality of Rotterdam - http://www.schiphol.nl/web/file?uuid=995f1355-d695-41a5-9a1f-0741de4d26f7&owner=91d2b553- c4e5-4bc9-b97d-70a39d4dd19d In addition, Aeroports de Paris and Schiphol Group each hold an 8% stake in the other;  Paris Charles de Gaulle - Aeroports de Paris is a public company which owns and operates Charles de Gaulle, Orly and Le Bourget airports, as well as a number of smaller airfields around Paris. The French Government holds a 50.6% share and Schiphol Group 8%. The remaining shares are owned by a combination of private sector companies, institutional investors, individual shareholders and employees -http://www.aeroportsdeparis.fr/ADP/Resources/2e854db0-df7f-4d81-8c82- 20d9e1c20042-CPresultatssemestriels2013ENvdef.pdf;  Madrid - 100% owned by State - http://www.aena.es/csee/ccurl/695/965/2011-annual-report.pdf  Zurich - Flughafen Zürich AG is quoted on the Swiss Exchange. Major shareholders include the canton of Zürich, with 33.33% of the shares, and the city of Zürich, with 5% of the shares. No other shareholder has a holding exceeding 5% - http://www.zurich- airport.com/Portaldata/2/Resources/documents_unternehmen/investorrelations/Corporte_Governa nce_2010_en.pdf

Only the airports of Bratislava, Brussels, Copenhagen, Malta, Vienna (50 % plus 10% employee foundation) have a majority private ownership. No other major airports in Continental Europe have been fully privatized

50 without any ownership restrictions.

Worldwide  New York – JFK, La Guardia International, Newark Liberty International, Stewart International and Teterboro airports are operated by the Port Authority of New York, a bi-state agency between the States of New York and New Jersey - http://www.panynj.gov/about/facilities-services.html (Note - all other major US airports similarly owned by City and Regional Municipalities);  Tokyo Narita and Haneda airports are 100% publicly owned, by the Narita International Airport Corporation and the Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism respectively;  Dubai International Airport and Dubai World Central are owned by the Government of Dubai.

Appendix C – BAA principles for an intermodal interchange at Heathrow

BAA concluded; 292  “The location chosen for the interchange and the routes for its connections with the Great Western Main Line and with the new north-south high speed link, must improve rail journey times from these western regions in order to attract the journeys that would otherwise be made by car or taxi;  The airport needs to be served by high speed services that run directly to the airport or to an interchange located as close as possible to it;  Services must be as frequent as possible to minimise the contribution of waiting times to total journey times;  The optimum design of interchange is likely to involve the development of a large station with high speed and conventional rail platforms in close proximity, and located as close as possible to terminals or with good links to them;  The long term development of Heathrow airport will be best served by the provision of a rail interchange located on a site whose scale provides maximum opportunity for the phased development of air terminal facilities co-located with the rail services provided at the interchange.”

BAA suggested that adopting these criteria could have a very significant effect on Heathrow’s catchment 293 and public transport mode share. 294

A further submission to HS2 Ltd. 295 highlighted the particular importance of;  “Frequency of service: critical for rail-air substitution;  Wider transport connectivity: national, regional and local;  “At Heathrow” passenger experience: should feel like a plane-to-plane interchange;  Ease of interchange: time, distance, ambience;  Baggage management: check-in points, amount of handling;  Inter-Terminal connectivity: efficient movement to/from each of the airport terminals.”

292 Improving Rail Connectivity to Heathrow - Implications for the Development of the Heathrow International Interchange, BAA/Arup October 2009 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/stakeholdersubmissions/pdf/heathr owconnectivity.pdf 293 “By 2030 the potentially untapped market from which the interchange could induce traffic to shift to rail contains up to 36m road journeys and 10m air journeys per year” - Improving Rail Connectivity to Heathrow - Implications for the Development of the Heathrow International Interchange, BAA/Arup October 2009 294 “Our proposals have the potential to drive the public transport share of journeys to Heathrow up to 60%, taking between 10 and 20 million cars off the road each year, depending on future traffic levels and staff numbers at the airport” – Heathrow Hub: The UK’s Global Gateway, Arup submission to HS2 Ltd, December 2009 295 Serving Heathrow Airport by High Speed Rail - A Position Paper, BAA December 2009 http://www.scribd.com/doc/40066186/Serving-Heathrow-Airport-by-High-Speed-Rail-A-Position-Paper

51 Appendix D – Support for an integrated approach to HS2 and Heathrow

The International Air Rail Organisation (IARO) in their study of the various options for serving Heathrow with a new high speed line concluded “failure to make the right choices now will leave future generations with a lasting legacy of poorly conceived design, minimal passenger uptake and will be seen as a failed investment of hard-pressed public funds. Planning a new High Speed railway (HS2) to pass close to Heathrow, but not making provision for it to actually stop there, would be perverse." 296

The London Chamber of Commerce and Industry “rejects the Government’s plans to link HS2 and Heathrow eventually via a spur. Based on the international evidence and the arguments discussed here, we believe that a direct line with a through station at Heathrow would increase and spread HS2’s expected economic benefits whilst enhancing connectivity between the country’s main economic centres, the airport and international markets.” 297

Also "LCCI has consistently argued that Heathrow should be directly linked to HS2. While it is welcome that the route will run through Birmingham and Manchester airports it makes little sense not to directly connect with Britain's hub airport and its 70 million passengers a year. Government has a great opportunity to secure 'integrated transport' - something that has eluded Ministers for decades. By ensuring direct linkage between train and plane the UK can optimise its strategic transport infrastructure and reap enhanced economic benefits.” 298

The Institute of Directors notes “other airports, such as Amsterdam, Paris and Frankfurt, have high speed lines running directly through the airport, not on branch lines. A direct line allows a high frequency of service to and from the airport, and combines city centre with airport traffic. It is far superior to putting Heathrow at the end of a branch line, which would offer a much lower frequency of service.” The report concludes that there is a need to “transform Heathrow’s rail connectivity by running the HS2 line directly through Heathrow” 299

Unite the Union “believes that HS2 should connect the principle transport hubs and hence supports the Heathrow Hub proposals for a multimodal transport interchange at Heathrow Airport as opposed to the HS2 Limited option of a route via Old Oak Common. This variation on the High Speed Line would add just three minutes to the possible journey time but connect directly with Heathrow rather than forcing passengers onto the Crossrail service. Routing the line in this way also reduces the impact on the Chilterns enabling the entire area to be crossed below ground and provide passengers on the Great Western line a way of accessing the airport without having to go via central London” 300

ASLEF’s press release, 301 issued on the day that Government laid the HS2 Hybrid Bill before Parliament, notes “We believe Britain needs not only a new high speed rail line but a high speed rail network. We would, ideally, like to see HS2 run the length of the United Kingdom, being built from Scotland and the south at the same time, meeting in the middle, linking HS1 and going via Heathrow”

The Labour party in opposition has highlighted the need for an integrated approach to air and rail strategy.

“Only a coherent plan can break down the barriers between each area of transport. Investors find it extraordinary that we are taking decisions over high-speed rail and aviation in isolation” - Maria Eagle, Shadow

296 IARO, 27th May 2009 http://www.iaro.com/iaronews.shtml?zcategory=IPR&sorder=d&msg_mode=&zentry=74 297 Connecting Opportunities: Making the most of HS2, July 2011 http://www.londonchamber.co.uk/docimages/9111.pdf 298 London Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 27th August 2013 http://www.londonchamber.co.uk/lcc_public/article.asp?id=0&did=47&aid=6221&st=&oaid=-1 299 Flying into the Future, Institute of Directors, December 2012 http://www.iod.com/Influencing/Policy- papers/Infrastructure/Infrastructure-for-Business-Flying-into-the-Future 300 http://archive.unitetheunion.org/sectors/docks_rail_ferries/rail/hs2.aspx 301 http://www.aslef.org.uk/information/139551/why_we_welcome_the_hs2_bill/

52 Transport Secretary - Financial Times 21st November 2012 302

“I know that Sir Howard will want to consider the importance of better connectivity to, as well as between, our airports. Because while it may not provide the only answer, I do believe that has to be part of the solution. By the time we have Sir Howard Davie’s recommendations, not only will the final decisions have been taken on the route of the planned new high speed rail line, but the legislation enabling at least the first part of HS2 will already have gone through parliament. If we’ve learnt nothing else in recent years, surely it is that we must do better at joining up our decision-making over transport infrastructure between different modes. We need decisions on HS2 and on how best to meet our future aviation capacity to be taken together” - Maria Eagle, Shadow Transport Secretary – 22nd October 2012 303

More specifically, Labour has indicated support for an alternative HS2 route via Heathrow and a full capacity link between HS2 and HS1 – “If the Government was to take the line via Heathrow it would remove the need to build an expensive spur later while opening up the prospect of private sector funding, potentially saving the taxpayer billions. It could lead to a new route that makes better use of existing transport corridors and avoids an area of outstanding natural beauty where residents were wrongly insulted as '' by Tory Ministers. If this were to happen it would also open up the opportunity to connect to the Great Western mainline, bringing the benefits of the high speed line to the South West” – Maria Eagle, Shadow Transport Secretary, 31st October 2011 304

302 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/aeefbd74-2e4f-11e2-8f7a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Ha75pxjZ 303 Maria Eagle speech to Airport Operators Association conference 22nd October 2012 304 http://www.labour.org.uk/cross-party-consensus-on-aviation-and-high-speed-rail,2011-10-31

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