The Cinema-Cognition Dialogue: a Match Made in Brain

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provided by Frontiers - Publisher Connector HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY ARTICLE published: 04 September 2012 HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00248 The cinema-cognition dialogue: a match made in brain

Yadin Dudai*

Department of Neurobiology, The Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel

Edited by: That human evolution amalgamates biological and cultural change is taken as a given, Idan Segev, The Hebrew University and that the interaction of brain, body, and culture is more reciprocal then initially of Jerusalem, Israel thought becomes apparent as the science of evolution evolves (Jablonka and Lamb, Reviewed by: 2005). The contribution of science and technology to this evolutionary process is probably Oliver C. Schultheiss, Friedrich Alexander University, Germany the ﬁrst to come to mind. The biology of Homo sapiens permits and promotes the Uri Hasson, Princeton University, development of technologies and artefacts that enable us to sense and reach physical USA niches previously inaccessible. This extends our biological capabilities, but is also expected *Correspondence: to create selective pressures on these capabilities. The jury is yet out on the pace at Yadin Dudai, Department of which critical biological changes take place in evolution. There is no question, however, Neurobiology, The Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot 76100, that the kinetics of technological and cultural change is much faster, rendering the latter Israel. particularly important in the biography of the individual and the species alike. The capacity e-mail: [email protected] of art to enrich human capabilities is recurrently discussed by philosophers and critics (e.g., Arsitotle/Poetics, Richards, 1925; Smith and Parks, 1951; Gibbs, 1994). Yet less attention is commonly allotted to the role of the arts in the aforementioned ongoing evolutional tango. My position is that the art of cinema is particularly suited to explore the intriguing dialogue between art and the brain. Further, in the following set of brief notes, intended mainly to trigger further thinking on the subject, I posit that cinema provides an unparalleled and highly rewarding experimentation space for the mind of the individual consumer of that art. In parallel, it also provides a useful and promising device for investigating brain and cognition.

Keywords: brain, cinema, dissociative states, emotional mental travel, mental time travel, working memory

ON THE CINEMA-BRAIN RESONANCE information about the world in general. Our brain has evolved Born just a little over a century ago, cinema capitalized on the multiple knowledge or memory systems (Figure 1). These are rich history of the art of the theatre and on developments in commonly classified along multiple axes (Dudai, 2002). One of the technology of photography, while harnessing the visual illu- these axes is time—whereas some information is stored for sec- sion of motion. Combined with the budding of globalization, onds or minutes only, other information is stored for weeks, this culminated in the fast development of cinema into a pop- months, years, even a life time. The first type of information is ular cognitive domain and social phenomenon, and ultimately aptly termed “short-term memory” (STM), whereas the second is into a rich universe of visual (and ultimately audiovisual) artis- “long-term memory” (LTM). Another criterion for the taxonomy tic and social experience (Cook, 1981; Salt, 1992; Thompson and of memory systems, which is presently dominant in the science Bordwell, 2003).Butwhatisitthatturnedcinemaintosuch of memory literature, concerns the role of conscious aware- a success? I propose that in addition to the ripe technological ness in retrieving the information. Hence LTM is considered as and social context that promoted cross-cultural dissemination, a either “declarative” (“explicit”) or “non-declarative” (“implicit”) major drive in the fast and triumphant evolution of cinema is that (Dudai, 2002). Declarative memory involves the conscious rec- this form of art uniquely fits, exploits and expands the potential ollection of facts and events, as opposed to non-declarative, in of basic and critical faculties of human brain and cognition. These which retrieval can materialize in the absence of conscious aware- are Working Memory (WM), Mental Time Travel (MTT), Mental ness. The declarative—non-declarative dichotomy is widespread Emotional Travel (MET), and a spectrum of transitions in con- in the literature not only because it is intuitively appealing but also sciousness manifested in Dissociative States.Furthermore,since because the brain honors it, i.e., different brain circuits subserve cinema taps into the above faculties, it can also be exploited as a the two types of information. convenient scientific tool to investigate those faculties and their brain substrates. ON WORKING MEMORY (WM) A dedicated information processing system that combines STM ON INFORMATION SYSTEMS IN THE BRAIN and LTM, is “WM” (Figure 2A). WM is a limited capacity sys- Understanding how the human brain reads a movie and reacts tem embedded in distributed brain circuits, that holds informa- to it can benefit from understanding how the brain acquires tion under attentional control in temporary storage during the

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FIGURE 1 | Memory systems. Humans have multiple memory systems that Non-declarative memory includes types of memory as diverse as priming, could be classified according to multiple criteria. One is time: short- vs. habits and skills, motor and emotional reflexes, and more. The long-term memory. On this axis, working memory (WM) is a type of dynamic declarative—non-declarative dichotomy seems to be honored by the brain, short-term memory (see Figure 2A below). Long-term memory (LTM) which contains different neural circuits for each system. Only non-declarative systems are commonly classified into declarative, i.e., requiring conscious (implicit) emotion is noted in the scheme, but mental emotional travel (MET), awareness for retrieval, and non-declarative, not requiring conscious discussed in the text, involves also declarative (explicit) manifestations. WM, awareness for retrieval. Declarative memory is further classified into the involving attentional control, is usually discussed in the context of declarative memory of events (episodic) and of facts (semantic). Episodic memory is tasks, but some information passing via WM is likely to end up over time in considered to allow mental time travel (MTT) and hence imagining. non-declarative long-term “stores.” (Adapted from Dudai, 2008). planning and execution of a task (Miller et al., 1960; Baddeley, episodic buffer: mental space in which information from the 2007). It combines on-line information (i.e., percepts) with off- content-dedicated workspaces and LTM is temporarily bound line information (i.e., LTM) to yield temporary task-oriented under the control of the CE to form coherent representations internal representations. Some of these representations may sub- of events, on their potential route to LTM. The CE is postu- sequently become consolidated into LTM, but often, it is disad- lated to interconnect with modulatory and reinforcing circuits, vantageous to retain the task-related information in LTM because e.g., encoding emotion and hedonic valence, which control the it may interfere with subsequent tasks. WM is hence a “mental allocation of attention and filter the transformation of WM hub” essential for mentation and behavior and indispensible for representations to LTM. human cognition and intelligence. Rudimentary WM capabilities It is noteworthy that generic attributes of film resonate opti- may exist in species lower on the phylogenetic scale, but it is con- mally with the capabilities of WM, and that WM seems to be able sidered to have reached its pinnacle in humans, and it takes years to exploit efficiently information in movie stimuli. This resonance to mature in the individual of the species (Luciana and Nelson, was postulated to greatly enhance the rapid successful integration 1998). of movies as an “extracorporeal” cognitive organ and a global A particularly influential cognitive model of WM proposes social phenomenon (Dudai, 2008). Several points support this three types of components (Baddeley, 2007)(Figure 2A). One assumption (Dudai, 2008): is an attentional control system, termed the “central executive” (CE). Another type is content-dedicated workspaces that (a)Cinemaisfirstandforemostavisualart.Humansarevisual are depicted as subordinates of the CE. The model singles out animals, and therefore are likely to be strongly attracted two: a phonological loop, which deals with speech-based infor- by visual stimuli. Furthermore, movies depend heavily on mation and is assumed to comprise a phonological store and motion [movi(ng pictur)e], which is a prime mover of atten- articulatory rehearsal mechanism, and a visuospatial sketchpad, tion. This is expected to strongly and effectively engage the which deals with visuospatial information. The two workspaces CE and the visuospatial sketchpad. are assumed to process information related to the most salient (b) The auditory input in movies engages the phonological loop, domains of the human mind—vision, space, sound, and lan- thus activating the second major mental working space of guage. Additional “workspaces” may exist (Yeshurun et al., WM. Coincidence detection of different inputs is considered 2008). Finally, a third type of hypothetical component is the instrumental in successful encoding at different levels of brain

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FIGURE 2 | Film resonates with working memory. A dominant model of (see MET in the text). (A) Defining attributes of narrative film resonate neatly WM considers multiple components (Baddeley, 2007). They are portrayed with multiple components of WM, as well as with effective transformation of as a master system, the central executive, which executes attentional information from the episodic buffer into long-term memory. Three major control over subordinate systems that are content-dedicated mental attributes are contextual focusing of the central executive toward the workspaces, the phonological loop, which deals with speech-based stimulus, intense multi-modal co-activation of both the visuospatial sketchpad information, and the visuospatial sketchpad, that deals with visuospatial and the phonological loop, and compression of narrative highlights that information. Another postulated component is the episodic buffer,inwhich facilitate the focusing of the CE as well the pruning of information to be information from the content-dedicated-workspaces and LTM is temporarily consolidated from the episodic buffer into LTM. “Author” usually represents bound under the control of the central executive, to form coherent multiple individuals though in some cases mainly the director, still never really representations of events, on the potential route to LTM. The mental state in isolation. (B) Captivating movies can induce a dissociative state in which evoked by the relevance to survival (e.g., threat, mate, food) of the the movie stimulus dominates the operation of WM components to information flowing into each of the subordinate systems and bound in the temporary block simultaneous unrelated input. For further discussion episodic buffer, could be considered as “emotion”; it is usually not explicitly including comparison to other art forms and other dissociative states, see included in models of WM and therefore not depicted in the scheme text. (The frame in the inset is from Bresson’s Pickpocket, 1959) (Adapted discussed here, yet is highly relevant to the appeal and effect of cinema from Dudai, 2008).

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function (Dudai, 2002). The multimodality of film hence absence of explicit social interaction. This could markedly enhances its perceptual and mnemonic effectiveness. The affect the CE, focusing attention and creating a special mind unique role of multi-sensory synergism in film has long been set, and could also activate social-intimacy and safety reward noted by major film directors (Eisenstein, 1998). Indeed, circuits. This enhanced attention in the semi-detached milieu some silent films have outstanding affective impact and artis- could further activate the episodic buffer, while at the same tic qualities, nevertheless, activation of the brain’s language time promote a transient, mild dissociative state (and see workspace is likely to occur even in the absence of sound, by below). This added-value of contextual defamiliarization may observing people talking and trying to decipher what they say. account for the failure of Edison’s Kinetoscope, in which It is also of note that even silent film had snapshots of explicit spectators watched movies in isolation. verbal information, provided by intercalated text slides. (h) Dissociative states of the aforementioned type can be (c) The multi-modal input of the film stimulus, which engages assumed to involve transient loss of inhibitory control by both the visuospatial sketchpad and the phonological frontal brain areas, i.e., disruption of CE function. This loop, results not only in reinforcement of perceptual and loss of control is potentially rewarding (as illustrated by the mnemonic encoding by coincidence detection in associative individuals and communities who enter trances of various brain circuits, but also permits better exploitation of the sorts voluntarily; Kihlstrom, 1985; Robinson and Berridge, inherently limited capacity of WM and hence promotes the 2003). Once induced by spatiotemporal MTT in the unique processing of a richer percept at any given point in time. contextual setting and mental set, the dissociative state in This is because the limited capacity of each of the two dedi- the spectator might be rewarding per se,promotingpos- cated workspace systems of WM is independent of each other itive feedback that further promotes the enjoyable mental (Baddeley, 2007). state. (d) The episodic buffer binds ongoing episodes, which then con- solidate into LTM (Dudai, 2004). In real-life, modulatory and reinforcing circuits promote consolidation of some but not ON MENTAL TIME TRAVEL other pieces of information during the event or immediately Resonance with the capabilities of WM is, however, only one afterwards. If the time window of the event is longer than a component in the productive dialogue between brain and cin- few hours or days, the saliency and relevance of certain indi- ema. Another is the ability of movies to extend, manipulate and vidual event fragments might be disregarded and proactive promote individual experimentation with another pinnacle of and retroactive interferences take place (Wixted, 2004). This human brain and cognition, namely, MTT (also termed chron- could result in lack or erroneous binding of the narrative. In esthesia). MTT refers to the ability to be aware of one’s past and the narrative movie, the “author” pre-selects the events to reenact it in mind, as well as to imagine potential future scenar- be presented in the movie. As a consequence, the episodic ios (Tulving, 1983, 2005; Suddendorf and Busby, 2005; Bar, 2011; buffer of the spectator ends up receiving a narrative that is Suddendorf et al., 2011). Some consider this mental faculty to already filtered to create the desired effect within the tem- be uniquely human, others posit that rudimentary forms exist poral limits of the film. This is expected to facilitate binding in some other species as well (Tulving, 1983, 2005; Suddendorf and consolidation, hence enhancing perception, reward, and and Busby, 2005; Bar, 2011; Suddendorf et al., 2011). MTT is the memory. decisive fingerprint of bona-fide episodic memory. Its imagining (e) Physical time in real life flows unidirectionally. In contrast, component, i.e., the ability to mentally construct potential scenar- compression and inversion of time is an essential device in ios of future occurrences, has been suggested as a major drive in film art (Tarkovsky, 1986; Turim, 1989). At the level of the the evolution of episodic memory (Dudai and Carruthers, 2005; brain machinery, this may create a mismatch between what Schacter and Addis, 2011). It may also underlie the feeble veracity is naturally anticipated and what happens on the screen. of episodic recollection: strict faithfulness to details might ham- Such mismatch is known to augment saliency and atten- per useful imagination. It is noteworthy that episodic recollection tion and enhance encoding (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). and imagining share brain circuits (Hassabis and Maguire, 2011; Intermsofbrainmechanisms,thisisexpectedtobemedi- Schacter and Addis, 2011). ated via activation of modulatory circuits linked to WM, Movies promote, entrain and enhance MTT. Their ability to and particularly the CE, the episodic buffer, and the consol- simulate real-life, day-dreaming, and “dream-like” experiences by idation of memory from the latter to LTM. It is tempting fusing multimodal perception with emotional and cognitive over- to consider the process as a brain correlate of defamil- tones, distanced from the acute spatiotemporal coordinates in iarization, proposed as an essential artistic device at large which the spectator is present at that specific point in time, was (Shklovsky, 1917). long noted by movie theorists (Eisenstein, 1969; Morin, 2005). (f) Similarly, spatial coordinates are also manipulated by the Indeed movies have been recently introduced as effective stim- author (using close-up, panning, light effects and cuts), uli in perceptual studies and memoranda in memory studies altering attention and defamiliarization (Eisenstein, 1947; that combine behavioral analysis and functional neuroimaging Andrew, 1976; Bordwell and Thompson, 2004). (Hasson et al., 2006, 2008a; Furman et al., 2007; Mendelsohn (g) Attention combined with defamiliarization-induced saliency et al., 2008, 2009, 2010). What is less noted in the studies of is also enhanced by the context of the movie spectator, com- brain and cognition is that the experience of becoming immersed monly a dark enclosure with other people present but in the in a movie also provides an intriguing mental experimentation

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space for exercising MTT in the observer, and as such, can successful reenactment of remote self-episodes. Two major rep- provide internal reward in exposing the immersed observer to resentatives of this approach come immediately to mind, each imaginary experiences otherwise unattainable. This rewarding unique in his idiosyncratic implementation of the concept: the value is shared with other forms of art, however, cinema, being French auteur Robert Bresson (1901–1999) and the Japanese a multi-model art form, may provide a more universal, and for auteur Yasujirô Ozu (1903–1963). most individuals probably more accessible opportunity, to tap Bresson (A Man Escaped, Pickpocket, Au Hasard Balthazar, into this type of reward. Mouchette, and nine other masterpieces), a master of lean and crystallized cinematography, recurrently used what he called ON MENTAL EMOTIONAL TRAVEL “models”: non-professional actors trained in neutral line read- Similarly to the promotion and entraining of MTT, and cou- ing, automatic gestures, and emotional inexpressiveness (Quandt, pled to this ability, movie art can also be considered an effective 1998). He attempted to identify and use the most reducible manipulator of MET. “Emotion” is considered in the scientific lit- behavioral elements, and strip these motor, cognitive, and emo- erature in multiple connotations, the two dominant ones being tional atoms from all superfluous context- and time-dependent emotions as a trigger of an automatic physiological response, heuristics. By doing so he wished to present the “pure” human mostly to danger and social cues, and emotions as the subjec- action (and hence potential feelings underlying it) to the observer, tive feeling which accompanies the above and other states related and to decipher and reconstruct the scene and its underpinning to the relevance of ambience to the self (LeDoux, 1996). In the bare human actions. Bresson’s style is to focus on body parts present context, it is the latter manifestation of emotion that (e.g., hands) rather than the whole body, pushing reductionism counts. Given the proper movie, the observer can wander into even further. “Models who have become automatic (everything and explore a spectrum of rich and deep emotional experiences weighed, measured, timed, repeated 10, 20 times) and are then and domains unexplored by most people in daily life, let alone dropped in the medium of the events of your film—their relations within the condensed time capsule that the movie offers. Selected with the objects and persons around them will be right, because (admittedly idiosyncratic) examples range from neorealistic cor- they will not be thought” (Bresson, 1975)“...Itiswithsomething nerstones (e.g., Ozu’s An Inn in Tokyo, its artistic sequel, Bicycle clean and precise that you will force the attention of inattentive Thieves by De Sica, or Rosselini’ The War Trilogy)tothebleak eyes and ears.” and provocatively disturbing postmodernism of Haneke in Caché Ozu, in contrast, exercised reductionism and minimalism and other masterpieces. Exploration of the unlimited imaginary while relying on a small cast of professional actors, many of emotional spectrum further expands the mental reward space them playing recurrently in his films. The overall outcome in provided by cinema. Although the movies and the examples of terms of inciting universal responses in the observer is, how- the cinematic devices brought up in this article mostly refer to ever, quite similar to that of Bresson, though reflecting a more “auteur” (in European cinema a top director is considered the humane and empathic and less austere and religious ambient author of the movie) or arthouse movies, clearly, a movie need than the latter. Ozu used an almost unbelievable number of takes notbeahighqualityartpiecetoachievetheaforementioned for every scene, “correcting our every inflection, over and over effects. Any emotional drama, irrespective of its artistic quality ...trying to reduce things to their most basic essence, free of and literary value, evokes MET. Indeed, both MTT and MET are all excess” (Arima, 2003). An idiosyncratic Ozu shooting style, generic attributes of the cinema. which promotes attention and focuses the gaze, was the so called “tatami shot,” in which the camera (always static, no tracking ON CINEMATIC APPROACHES TO PROMOTING MTT shots) is placed at a low height, supposedly at the eye level of AND MET a person kneeling on a tatami mat. Ozu produced 53 movies, A wide range of styles used by various film directors can effectively most of them a variant of a similar type of simple plot focus- trigger and promote explorative MTT and MET. It is noteworthy ing on family life and generation gaps; An Inn in Tokyo, The that excessive audiovisual effects or mimicking real-life excessively Only Sun, Late Spring and Tokyo Story are notable examples. In to the point that defamiliarization, an important artistic device a way, Ozu (like many great artists) repeated his leitmotif, again (e.g., Brecht, 1977), is minimized, are not necessarily helpful; andagain,50times,eachtimetryingtoextractnovelnuances making a movie too real was proposed to even hamper imagin- using the same elementary building blocks (Bordwell, 1988). ing and hence MTT (Dudai, 2008). In the present context, only Bresson and Ozu, each in his unique reductive and minimalist a single particularly interesting style, which echoes a highly suc- manner, exposed the underlying unity of the human condition. cessful conceptual framework of modern scientific research and Their rationale, a driving force for many artistic giants, was therefore might particularly be appreciated by scientists, will be effectively expressed two centuries earlier: “Nothing can please briefly noted. This is reductionism, characterized by an attempt to many, and please long, but just representations of general nature” identify cognitive, emotional, and motor universals and manipu- (Johnson, 1765). late them in a minimalistic manner. This is a bottom-up approach guided by the goal of entwining emergent cognitive and emo- ON DISSOCIATIVE STATES tional outcomes from their most basic building blocks. This All forms of art are capable of inducing some form or another of seems to effectively prompt the observer to reconstruct situations, transient “dissociative states.” These are disruptions in integrative plots and emotions while maximizing mental effort, attention functions of consciousness, memory, identity, or perception, and and self-involvement—not unlike those sometimes required for can be pathological. Transient, mild dissociation occurs however

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in normal individuals when they get immersed in some activity capable of evoking MET, and probably to a lesser degree MTT, while suppressing attention to other external or internal stim- particularly in the trained mind, eye or ear, irrespective of the uli (see also in this context “suspension of disbelief” in Bazin, medium. Painting and sculpture are visual, but do not involve 1967). When induced by art, dissociative states could be regarded concrete visual motion, auditory stimuli, and dynamic physical as the enslavement of the CE of the consumer to that of the time compression. Even ingenious narrative-telling painters such author (Dudai, 2008)(Figure 2B). The appreciation that the as Poussin only create limited spatiotemporal compression in the artist can come to control the audience’s mind has of course mind of the spectator, restricting the appreciation of the limited been with us since classical times, probably dating back to cave mental travel which is anchored in a physically static snapshot artatthedawnofcivilization(Lewis-Williams, 2002). Although only to those who invest proper mental effort. Another exam- while engaged in the creative act the artist may not necessarily ple is time-travel elicited by literary fiction, in which MTT, if be aware of the long-reaching effects on the other’s mind, many elicited, is often more fragmentary and has to be accumulated are; a notable example in film is Eisenstein, who, faithful to the over the time span of reading the piece. Music per se is not visual tradition of Soviet pragmatism and Pavlovian physiological psy- (though may evoke visual imagery). Theatre (including opera chology, attempts to condition the spectator with discrete sensory and some forms of dance) is audiovisual and uses limited spa- and semantic devices (Eisenstein, 1947). Tarkovsky formulates tiotemporal compression, with more restricted potential MTT the mind-control objective boldly: “...a kind of revision takes and fewer technological capabilities than film (e.g., absence of placewithinthesubjectiveawareness...thisprocessisinherent rapidly merged flashbacks, close ups, and panning, unless film in the relationship between writer and reader; it’s like a Trojan is integrated into theatre, opera, dance, or other forms of the horse, in whose belly the writer makes his way into his reader’s visual arts). Furthermore, having human beings in real time on soul” (Tarkovsky, 1986). Many film theorists noted the disso- stage may apriorilimit defamiliarization. Hence although it is ciative, or “lowered consciousness” state that can be induced by an error to try and rank art forms, as the types of emotional cinema (Kracauer, 1960), some attributing it to the aforemen- and cognitive enrichment and reward that they incite and pro- tioned “dream-like” state (Clair, 1953)orto“daydreaming” vide differ by the art form, the art piece, and the participant or experiences (Morin, 2005). The depth, persistence and quality consumer, one could still generalize that film as a medium is that of the dissociative state clearly depends on the reader, listener art form that integrates the most varied and advanced technolo- or spectator, on the specific work of art, and on the context, giesformimesis,whileatthesametimepresentingonaveragethe but to get an idea, the reader of this discussion might wish to anonymous spectator with most opportunities and, most impor- imagine getting absorbed in a book, a quartet, or a film. This tantly, lowest threshold to extract idiosyncratic enjoyment. Still, transient partial detachment from the outside world is a func- of course, without investing much mental work on top of the tion of the state of the WM system at that specific point in movi[ing pictur]e, and without some experience, one cannot fully time. Dissociative states can have a marked reward valence—as appreciate a Bresson, Ozu or a Tarkovsky, or the works of many well exemplified by those taking drugs to obtain them, risking others. addiction (Robinson and Berridge, 2003). They hence provide another potential reward value that promotes the enjoyment of ON CINEMA AS A SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTATION SPACE movies. While film equips us with an extracorporeal cognitive and emotional space that can enrich and expand MTT and MET, as well ON CINEMA AS A PARTICULAR MENTAL EXPERIMENTATION as potentially induce rewarding dissociative states, it also pro- SPACE vides scientific research with a powerful tool to probe human One could argue that the ability of cinema to resonate with WM brain and cognition. Movies can serve as stimuli and mem- and to promote, instigate and extend MTT, MET, and limited dis- oranda that can effectively mimic realistic situations (Hasson sociative states, is shared by other forms of art as well. The role in et al., 2006, 2008a,b; Furman et al., 2007; Mendelsohn et al., promoting and enriching MTT and MET is encapsulated already 2008, 2010). They permit reproducible presentation of ongoing in Aristotle’s reference to the poet, whose function is: “...to episodes, and are particularly useful in experiments that involve describe, not the thing that has happened, but a kind of thing that functional brain imaging, such as fMRI (functional magnetic mighthappen...”(Poetics 1451.1). And one could neatly replace resonance imaging) (Hasson et al., 2006, 2008a; Mendelsohn “Shakespeare” with “film auteur” in Johnson’s praise of the Bard, et al., 2008, 2010). Indeed the use of movies has already pro- who“...approximatestheremote,andfamiliarizesthewonder- vided novel information on brain processes elicited by com- ful; the event which he represents will not happen, but if it were plex audiovisual stimuli (Hasson et al., 2006)andonthe possible, its effects would probably be such as he has assigned; and engagement of identifiable brain circuits in long-term episodic it may be said, that he has not only shewn human nature as it acts (Hasson et al., 2008a; Mendelsohn et al., 2008, 2010)andauto- in real exigencies, but as it would be found in trials, to which it biographical (Mendelsohn et al., 2009)memory(seealsothe cannotbeexposed...hewhohasmazedhisimagination...may discussion of “neurocinematics” in Hasson et al., 2008b). Of herebecured...bysceneswhichahermitmayestimatethetrans- particular interest is the finding that unlike “traditional” exper- actions of the world, and a confessor predict in the progress of the iments, that consistently unveil subsequent memory effects for passions” (Johnson, 1765). still images or context-less verbal material in the mediotempo- However, in my view, none of the other forms of art com- ral lobe (MTL) and the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), the use bines all the attributes of film, although a good piece of art is of narrative film as memoranda also implicate the superior

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FIGURE 3 | Film as a window for exploring brain and cognition. areas include the right temporal pole (TP), bilateral anterior and posterior As discussed in the text, movies enrich human cognitive experience, superior temporal gyrus (STG), bilateral anterior parahippocampal cortex but also provide a window into how this experience is encoded in the (aPHG), bilateral posterior parahippocampal gyrus (pPHG), and bilateral experiencing brain, because they can be used as reproducible real-life-like temporoparietal junction (TPJ). These areas were implicated by other stimuli in perceptual and memory experiments. In this example, Hasson studies in social cognition. RH, LH, are right and left hemisphere, et al. (2008a) used a narrative movie as the stimulus to be encoded in respectively. This suggests that in real-life, the modulation of social long-term episodic memory. The statistical maps of blood oxygen cognitive processes impacts episodic memory formation, a finding not level dependent (BOLD) activity depict brain areas with significantly commonly unveiled by using simple static and contextless stimuli in enhanced activity during movie events that were subsequently memory experiments. (Adopted with permission from Hasson et al., remembered compared to events that were not remembered. These 2008a). temporal gyrus (STG), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and the All in all, hence, movies can enrich human mental experience, temporal poles in memory formation (Hasson et al., 2008a) yet can also provide a window into how this experience is encoded (Figure 3). These regions have been consistently implicated in in the experiencing brain. social cognition and perception; this suggests that in real-life, the modulation of social cognitive processes impacts episodic ACKNOWLEDGMENTS memory formation, a finding that tended to escape under the I am grateful to Rina Dudai and Uri Hasson for enriching discus- radar of brain imaging paradigms using non-realistic memo- sions of cinema, and to Aya Ben-Yakov, Micah Edelson, and Alex randa. Pine for helpful comments.

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