Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing Gerald Lebovits
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Signed Opinions, Concurrences, Dissents, and Vote Counts in the U.S
Akron Law Review Volume 53 Issue 3 Federal Appellate Issue Article 2 2019 Signed Opinions, Concurrences, Dissents, and Vote Counts in the U.S. Supreme Court: Boon or Bane? (A Response to Professors Penrose and Sherry) Joan Steinman Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview Part of the Courts Commons, Judges Commons, and the Litigation Commons Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be important as we plan further development of our repository. Recommended Citation Steinman, Joan (2019) "Signed Opinions, Concurrences, Dissents, and Vote Counts in the U.S. Supreme Court: Boon or Bane? (A Response to Professors Penrose and Sherry)," Akron Law Review: Vol. 53 : Iss. 3 , Article 2. Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss3/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. Steinman: Response to Penrose and Sherry SIGNED OPINIONS, CONCURRENCES, DISSENTS, AND VOTE COUNTS IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: BOON OR BANE? (A RESPONSE TO PROFESSORS PENROSE AND SHERRY) Joan Steinman* I. Response to Professor Penrose .................................. 526 II. Response to Professor Sherry .................................... 543 A. A Summary of Professor Sherry’s Arguments, and Preliminary Responses ........................................ 543 B. Rejoinders to Professor Sherry’s Arguments ...... 548 1. With Respect to the First Amendment ......... -
The Brief (The Summer 1978 Alumni Magazine)
Southern Methodist University SMU Scholar The Brief (Law Alumni Magazine), 1965-2002 Law School History and Archives Summer 1978 The Brief (The Summer 1978 Alumni Magazine) Southern Methodist University, School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/brief Recommended Citation Southern Methodist University, School of Law, "The Brief (The Summer 1978 Alumni Magazine)" (1978). The Brief (Law Alumni Magazine), 1965-2002. 31. https://scholar.smu.edu/brief/31 This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School History and Archives at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Brief (Law Alumni Magazine), 1965-2002 by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu. t e rie OF" THE SCHOOL OF" LAW SUMMER, 1978 SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY VOL, 11 No. 2 - HONORING THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY Of' THE CLASS Of' 1928 THE F'IRST GRADUATING CLASS Of' THE SCHOOL Of' LAW, the brief OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL Of" LAW SUMMER, 1978 Cover, The Closs of 1928 Pictured left to right- top row: Paul L. Williams, James F. Gray, Edgar H. Selec man, and John W. Randall; middle row: Hubert 0. Wills, DeWitt Horry, Erin Bain Jones, Harry S. Pollard, and J. Harold Goode; bottom row: Ellis P. House, Euell Moseley, W. Autry Norton, and Ely Straus (photo courtesy of J. Harold Goode) Reminiscences of the Dean 3 A Short History of the School of Law 4 Professor Joseph W. McKnight Fifty Classes 6 Michael H. Hoffman International Friend 6 Continuing Legal Education 7 Ted Reiner CLE Program Schedule 8 News Briefs 9 Title History of the SMU Law Quadrangle 10 Professor Lennart V. -
Statutory Interpretation--In the Classroom and in the Courtroom
University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 1983 Statutory Interpretation--in the Classroom and in the Courtroom Richard A. Posner Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Richard A. Posner, "Statutory Interpretation--in the Classroom and in the Courtroom," 50 University of Chicago Law Review 800 (1983). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom Richard A. Posnerf This paper continues a discussion begun in an earlier paper in this journal.1 That paper dealt primarily with the implications for statutory interpretation of the interest-group theory of legislation, recently revivified by economists; it also dealt with constitutional interpretation. This paper focuses on two topics omitted in the earlier one: the need for better instruction in legislation in the law schools and the vacuity of the standard guideposts to reading stat- utes-the "canons of construction." The topics turn out to be re- lated. The last part of the paper contains a positive proposal on how to interpret statutes. I. THE ACADEMIC STUDY OF LEGISLATION It has been almost fifty years since James Landis complained that academic lawyers did not study legislation in a scientific (i.e., rigorous, systematic) spirit,' and the situation is unchanged. There are countless studies, many of high distinction, of particular stat- utes, but they are not guided by any overall theory of legislation, and most academic lawyers, like most judges and practicing law- yers, would consider it otiose, impractical, and pretentious to try to develop one. -
Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance and the Duty to Settle Leo P
University of California, Hastings College of the Law UC Hastings Scholarship Repository Faculty Scholarship 2015 Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance and the Duty to Settle Leo P. Martinez UC Hastings College of the Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Insurance Law Commons Recommended Citation Leo P. Martinez, Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance and the Duty to Settle, 68 Rutgers L. Rev. 155 (2015). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1443 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE AND THE DUTY TO SETTLE Leo P. Martinez* Abstract More than sixty years ago, Judge Robert Keeton authored what has come to be the definitive exegesis on the insurer’s duty to settle.1 Judge Keeton was followed some twenty-five years later by Professor Kent Syverud with what has come to be the second definitive work on the insurer’s duty to settle.2 Since that time, a scattering of articles have addressed the duty to settle but none have done so in Syverud’s comprehensive way. The occasion of the American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) project, the Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance, initiated five years ago, provides the opportunity to revisit the insurer’s “duty to settle.” * Albert Abramson Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. -
Nuisance, Ultrahazardous Activities, and the Atomic Reactor Monroe H
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship Winter 1957 Nuisance, Ultrahazardous Activities, And The Atomic Reactor Monroe H. Freedman Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship Recommended Citation Monroe H. Freedman, Nuisance, Ultrahazardous Activities, And The Atomic Reactor, 30 Temp. L.Q. 77 (1957) Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship/706 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. TEMPLE LAW QUARTERLY VOL. 30 NO. 2 WINTER 1957 NUISANCE, ULTRAHAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES, AND THE ATOMIC REACTOR MONROE H. FREEDMANt INTRODUCTION In the words of President Eisenhower, " . The atom stands ready to become man's obedient, tireless servant, if man will only allow it." I A new day, artificially irradiated by nuclear power, is about to dawn. But there is a radioactive cloud on the horizon. However real or fanciful the hazards attending atomic reactors may be, the public has come to equate "atomic" with "bomb." Although everyone wants lower utility rates and the obvious financial benefits of living near a tax- able utility, there will be a cautious few who would forego these ad- vantages to avoid the concomitant risks. This latter group would undoubtedly grow to substantial proportions if there should be even a minor, much less a major, atomic reactor accident. -
Sunday, June 6, 2021
SUNDAY, JUNE 6, 2021 2:45 ─ 3 p.m. Welcome & Opening Greeting Magnolia, Main Level Chief Justice John L. Weimer • Louisiana Supreme Court • New Orleans Alainna R. Mire • LSBA President; Alexandria City Attorney’s Office • Alexandria Hon. Susan M. Chehardy • LJC President; 5th Circuit Court of Appeal • Gretna Hon. Kirk A. Williams LJC President-Elect and Conference Chair 3 ─ 3:10 p.m. Announcements of Upcoming Summer School Sessions & Events H. Minor Pipes III • Pipes Miles Beckman • New Orleans 3:10 ─ 4:10 p.m. Be the Light: The Importance of Human Connection in the Practice of Law (1 credit; Professionalism) Magnolia, Main Level R. Ashby Pate • Lightfoot, Franklin & White • Birmingham, AL 4:20 ─ 5:20 p.m. “Solitary: Unbroken by Four Decades in Solitary Confinement. My Story of Transformation and Hope” ⸺ A conversation with Albert Woodfox and his attorney, George Kendall (1 credit) Magnolia, Main Level George H. Kendall • Squire Patton Boggs • New York, NY Albert Woodfox • New Orleans 5:30 ─ 6:30 p.m. Impeachment and Political Investigations (1 credit) Magnolia, Main Level Ross Garber • Tulane University Law School • New Orleans 6:30 ─ 7:30 p.m. Opening Reception in Exhibit Hall (open to all registrants) Magnolia, Main Level 1 Updated 5/24/2021 MONDAY, JUNE 7, 2021 8 ─ 9 a.m. On the Precipice: Bet the Company Litigation ⸺ Are We Really Going to Trial? (1 credit) Magnolia, Main Level Moderator: Richard C. Stanley • Stanley, Reuter, Ross, Thornton & Alford • New Orleans Panelists: Kent A. Lambert • Baker, Donelson • New Orleans Stephen J. Herman • Herman, Herman & Katz • New Orleans Phillip A. -
The Road to Bush V. Gore: the History of the Supreme Court's Use of the Per Curiam Opinion, 79 Neb
Nebraska Law Review Volume 79 | Issue 3 Article 2 2000 The Road to Bush v. Gore: The iH story of the Supreme Court's Use of the Per Curiam Opinion Laura K. Ray Widener Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr Recommended Citation Laura K. Ray, The Road to Bush v. Gore: The History of the Supreme Court's Use of the Per Curiam Opinion, 79 Neb. L. Rev. (2000) Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol79/iss3/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Laura Krugman Ray* The Road to Bush v. Gore:' The History of the Supreme Court's Use of the Per Curiam Opinion TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction .......................................... 518 II. The History of the Per Curiam Opinion as a Form of Judicial Expression ................................... 521 A. The Background: An Instrument of Consensus ..... 521 B. The Transformation: The Decline of Consensus .... 524 III. The Per Curiam and the Idea of Individualism ........ 530 A. The Emergence of the Separate Voice .............. 530 B. The Pursuit of Consensus ..................... 533 IV. The Per Curiam as a Strategic Device ................. 536 A. Achieving Efficiency ............................... 537 B. Working by Indirection ............................ 538 C. Creating New Law ................................ 541 D. Using Procedure as a Screen ...................... 548 E. Disciplining Courts and Litigants .................. 549 V. The Per Curiam and Individual Expression ............ 550 A. The Minimalist Opinion and Efficiency: New York Times Co. -
What's an Opinion For? James Boyd Whitet
JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING What's an Opinion For? James Boyd Whitet The question the papers in this Special Issue address is whether it matters how judicial opinions are written, and if so why. My hope here is to suggest a way of elaborating the ques- tion that may provide the reader with a useful point of departure for reading the more extensive papers that follow. It might help, to begin with, if we were to imagine a legal world without the judicial opinion at all. Suppose that we had a system designed by one who truly believed that the law really "is what officials do about disputes," as Karl Llewellyn used to say, and nothing else. We might have statutes and a constitution and judges appointed to resolve disputes arising under them, but the judges would never explain themselves, for it would be irrelevant for them to do so: the law would be what they did, not what they said. They would simply decide the cases, issuing orders reflect- ing their judgment. Their judgments might be appealed, but an appellate court would simply affirm or reverse, in the latter case substituting its judgment for that of the lower court, but never issuing an opinion explaining or justifying its decision. What would life in such a regime be like? One's first reaction might be to think that in such a system there would be no precedent, no argument from precedent, and in this sense no law: every question would be argued as an original matter, without the advantage of the collective experience over time that the judicial opinion provides. -
Marquette Lawyer Spring 2009 Marquette University Law Alumni Magazine
Marquette Lawyer Spring 2009 Marquette University Law Alumni Magazine Marquette Lawyers On the Front Lines of Justice Also Inside: Doyle, Lubar, McChrystal, O’Scannlain, Rofes, Sykes, Twerski Marquette University Rev. Robert A. Wild, S.J. TABLE OF CONTENTS President John J. Pauly Provost 3 From the Dean Gregory J. Kliebhan Senior Vice President 4 Marquette Lawyers On the Front Lines of Justice Marquette University Law School 1 2 A Conversation with Mike McChrystal on Eckstein Hall Joseph D. Kearney Dean and Professor of Law [email protected] 1 8 2008 Commencement Ceremonies (414) 288-1955 Peter K. Rofes 2 2 Law School News Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law 2 6 Public Service Report Michael M. O’Hear Associate Dean for Research and Professor of Law 3 7 Alumni Association: President’s Letter and Annual Awards Bonnie M. Thomson Associate Dean for Administration 4 1 Alumni Class Notes and Profiles Jane Eddy Casper Assistant Dean for Students 5 5 McKay Award Remarks: Prof. Aaron D. Twerski Daniel A. Idzikowski Robert C. McKay Law Professor Award Assistant Dean for Public Service Paul D. Katzman 5 8 Rotary Club Remarks: Sheldon B. Lubar Assistant Dean for Career Planning Devolution of Milwaukee County Government Sean Reilly Assistant Dean for Admissions 6 4 Bar Association Speech: Hon. Diane S. Sykes Christine Wilczynski-Vogel The State of Judicial Selection in Wisconsin Assistant Dean for External Relations [email protected] 7 4 Hallows Lecture: Hon. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain Marquette Lawyer is published by Lawmaking and Interpretation: The Role of a Federal Marquette University Law School. -
Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off the Formal for the Function Peter N
University of Richmond UR Scholarship Repository Law Faculty Publications School of Law 1991 Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off the Formal for the Function Peter N. Swisher University of Richmond, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications Part of the Insurance Law Commons Recommended Citation Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off ht e Formal for the Function, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 1037 (1991). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 01HO STATE LAW JOURNAL Volume 52, Number 4, 1991 Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off the Formal for the Function PETER NASH SWISHER* Judicial opinions [in insurance law] are less than ordinarily enlightening about principled bases for decision. Often . the favorite generalization advanced by outside observers to explain a judgment against an insurance company at variance with policy provisions is the ambivalent, suggestive, and wholly unsatisfactory aphorism: "It's an insurance case." -Professor [now Judge] Robert E. Keeton BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 341 (1971) Disinterested legal doctrinal analysis of the traditional kind remains the indispensible core of legal thought, and there is no surfeit of such analysis today. I daresay that many legal scholars who today are breathing the heady fumes of deconstruction, structuralism, moral philosophy, and the theory of second best would be better employed.. -
The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct: Balancing Judicial Independence and Accountability Cynthia Gray
Hofstra Law Review Volume 32 | Issue 4 Article 11 2004 The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct: Balancing Judicial Independence and Accountability Cynthia Gray Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Gray, Cynthia (2004) "The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct: Balancing Judicial Independence and Accountability," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 32: Iss. 4, Article 11. Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss4/11 This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Gray: The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct: Balancing J THE LINE BETWEEN LEGAL ERROR AND JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT: BALANCING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY Cynthia Gray* Most of the complaints filed with state judicial conduct commissions-generally more than ninety percent-are dismissed every year.' Some dismissed complaints do not allege a violation of the code of judicial conduct. For example, litigants sometimes complain that a judge did not return telephone calls because they do not understand that a judge is required to avoid such ex parte communications. Others are dismissed because the evidence does not support the complaint. For example, a Texas prison inmate alleged that the judge who had presided in his trial had been prejudiced against him because they had once been married; the State Commission on Judicial Conduct dismissed his complaint after its investigation revealed that the judge had never been' married to the complainant . -
Judicial Opinion Writing: Gerald Lebovits
JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING For State Tax Judges October 12, 2018 Chicago, Illinois GERALD LEBOVITS Acting Justice, NYS Supreme Court Adjunct Professor of Law, Columbia Law School Adjunct Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University School of Law Judicial Opinion Writing For State Tax Judges October 12, 2018 By: Gerald Lebovits Table of Contents Gerald Lebovits, Alifya V. Curtin & Lisa Solomon, Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 237 (2008).................................................................................... A Gerald Lebovits, The Legal Writer, Ethical Judicial Writing—Part I, 78 N.Y. St. B.J. 64 (Nov./Dec. 2006) ................................................................................. B Gerald Lebovits, The Legal Writer, Ethical Judicial Writing—Part II, 79 N.Y. St. B.J. 64 (Jan. 2007) ........................................................................................... C Gerald Lebovits, The Legal Writer, Ethical Judicial Writing—Part III, 79 N.Y. St. B.J. 64 (Feb. 2007)........................................................................................... D Gerald Lebovits, The Legal Writer, Legal-Writing Ethics—Part I, 77 N.Y. St. B.J. 64 (Oct. 2005) ........................................................................................... E Gerald Lebovits, The Legal Writer, Legal-Writing Ethics—Part II, 77 N.Y. St. B.J. 64 (Nov./Dec. 2005) ................................................................................. F Gerald