Ending an Insurgency Violently: the Samar and Batangas Punitive Campaigns
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ENDING AN INSURGENCY VIOLENTLY: THE SAMAR AND BATANGAS PUNITIVE CAMPAIGNS BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS A. BRUNO United States Marine Corps DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited. USAWC CLASS OF 2010 This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Strategy Research Project Project Research Strategy U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050 The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. 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SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT From 1899-1902, the United States Army waged a successful counter-insurgency campaign in the Philippines. For over two years, Army strategic leaders endeavored to employ a policy of benevolent assimilation to attract the Philippine populace. Due to insurgent resistance, varying levels of attraction and chastisement policies were actually utilized. In 1901, the massacre of a U.S. infantry company at Balangiga, Samar, acted as a catalyst for the Army to end the waning insurgency in the two remaining un-pacified provinces. Resultantly, the Army undertook punitive operations to reduce the last major rebel strongholds in the Philippines—the Batangas Province on Luzon and the island of Samar. Several scholars assert that the Samar Expedition, commanded by BG Jacob H. Smith, was based on a harsh policy of devastation. Smith’s expedition undeniably resulted in significant public outrage over charges of excessive cruelty and war crimes. In contrast, the Batangas campaign plan, under the direction of BG J. Franklin Bell, is remembered as a balanced strategy of coercion and attraction. Nevertheless, both campaigns provide an opportunity to analyze the proper balance of attraction and retribution policies necessary to carry out a successful counter-insurgency campaign. 15. SUBJECT TERMS Philippine Insurrection, Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) UNCLASSIFED UNCLASSIFED UNCLASSIFED UNLIMITED 122 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18 USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT ENDING AN INSURGENCY VIOLENTLY: THE SAMAR AND BATANGAS PUNITIVE CAMPAIGNS by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Bruno United States Marine Corps Dr. Richard J. Sommers Project Adviser This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013 ABSTRACT AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Bruno TITLE: Ending an Insurgency Violently: The Samar and Batangas Punitive Campaigns FORMAT: Strategy Research Project DATE: 25 March 2010 WORD COUNT: 25,194 PAGES: 122 KEY TERMS: Philippine Insurrection, Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified From 1899-1902, the United States Army waged a successful counter- insurgency campaign in the Philippines. For over two years, Army strategic leaders endeavored to employ a policy of benevolent assimilation to attract the Philippine populace. Due to insurgent resistance, varying levels of attraction and chastisement policies were actually utilized. In 1901, the massacre of a U.S. infantry company at Balangiga, Samar, acted as a catalyst for the Army to end the waning insurgency in the two remaining un-pacified provinces. Resultantly, the Army undertook punitive operations to reduce the last major rebel strongholds in the Philippines—the Batangas Province on Luzon and the island of Samar. Several scholars assert that the Samar Expedition, commanded by BG Jacob H. Smith, was based on a harsh policy of devastation. Smith’s expedition undeniably resulted in significant public outrage over charges of excessive cruelty and war crimes. In contrast, the Batangas campaign plan, under the direction of BG J. Franklin Bell, is remembered as a balanced strategy of coercion and attraction. Nevertheless, both campaigns provide an opportunity to analyze the proper balance of attraction and retribution policies necessary to carry out a successful counter-insurgency campaign. ENDING AN INSURGENCY VIOLENTLY: THE SAMAR AND BATANGAS PUNITIVE CAMPAIGNS From 1899-1902, the United States Army waged a successful counter- insurgency campaign against the Philippine Insurrection. For over two years, the Army’s strategic leadership endeavored to employ a policy of benevolent assimilation to attract the Philippine populace. In reality, varying levels of attraction and chastisement policies were utilized due to intense insurgent resistance. In September 1901, the massacre of an American infantry company at Balangiga, Samar, acted as a catalyst for the Army to end the waning insurgency in the two remaining un-pacified provinces. Resultantly, the Army undertook punitive operations to reduce the last major rebel strongholds in the Philippines—the Batangas Province on Luzon and the island of Samar. In retaliation for the massacre, both campaigns were vigorous punitive expeditions that employed the harshest measures allowed under General Order 100 of 1863.1 Several scholars have asserted that the Samar Expedition, commanded by Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith, was based on a harsh policy of devastation and retribution with little attention given to achieving the assimilation of the population. In contrast, the Batangas campaign plan, under the direction of Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, is remembered as a balanced strategy of coercion and attraction. Though both campaigns achieved their objective of pacification, Smith’s expedition resulted in significant outrage among some American citizens and civilian leaders over charges of excessive cruelty and war crimes. Nevertheless, both campaigns provide an opportunity to study the proper balance of attraction and retribution policies that are necessary to carry out a successful counter-insurgency campaign. When waging a guerrilla war, the American counter-insurgency experience has underscored that success is largely determined by two factors—(1) the defender’s ability to provide security for the general population; and (2) cutting off the guerrilla forces from their external supply lines. In terms of security, it has been asserted that “one hundred percent security in 75 percent of the country is far better than 75 percent security in 100 percent of the country.” The counter-insurgency strategy must strive to provide “nearly perfect” security for the population in designated areas.2 Ultimately, the U.S. Army was successful in achieving all of these goals in its efforts to quell the Philippine Insurrection. The final two campaigns, in Batangas and Samar,